Centre for Cognitive Science (COGS)

Seminars

COGS Seminars provide a forum for internationally recognised researchers from all corners of cognitive science research to present and discuss their latest findings. All are welcome to attend.

Spring 2026

Tuesdays 4pm-5.30pm

View recordings of past seminars and stay informed about upcoming ones.

DateSeminarVenue

27 January

Mind-body dualism: A perceptual core
Ehud Ahissar
Weizmann Institute of Science

Abstract: Could the abstract ideas of our minds originate from neuronal interactions within our brains? In addressing this long-standing question, we analyse interactions within the 'brain-world' (BW) and 'brain-brain' (BB) domains, representing the brain's physical interactions with its environment and the mental interactions between brains, respectively. BW interactions are characterized as analog—continuous in time and value—while BB interactions are digital—discrete in time and value. Digital signaling allows BB interactions to facilitate effective, albeit information-limited, communication through categorisation. We review existing data showing that cascades of neural loops can convert between analog and digital signals, thereby linking physical and mental processes. Importantly, we show that these circuits cannot reduce one domain to the other, suggesting that the mind-brain duality can be mapped onto the BB-BW duality. This mapping, supported by both behavioral and neuronal data, indicates that the mind's foundation is inherently social. Thus, the BWBB scheme offers a novel account of the physical-mental gap, acknowledging the coexistence of the physical body and the non-physical mind while eliminating the need for a recursive homunculus in the brain or an independent mental foundation in the universe.

Fulton 202

Zoom ID: 821 9927 2300

Passcode: 985900

3 February

Synergistic signatures of consciousness across brains and machines
Pedro Mediano
Imperial College London

Abstract: Integrated information theory (IIT) is a candidate theory of consciousness that posits a tight relationship between consciousness and patterns of information sharing across neurons or brain regions. In this talk, I will describe Weak IIT, an empirically focused approach to IIT, and argue that central IIT metrics can be quantified effectively from data using the information-theoretic concept of synergy: the extent to which neural dynamics irreducibly depend on multiple parts of the system. After describing the main mathematical elements, we will go through key results showing that synergy plays an important role in human cognition and consciousness. Next, we will strengthen the link between synergy and consciousness through a cross-species analysis and a computational whole-brain model. Finally, to causally probe the relevance of synergy for intelligence, we will cover recent results investigating synergy in large language models (LLMs), revealing intriguing similarities between minds and machines.

Jubilee G36

Zoom ID: 825 4268 5874

Passcode: 257993

10 February

Can we assess phenomenal consciousness in artificial systems?
Tobias Schlicht
Ruhr-University Bochum

Abstract: In light of the rapid technological progress, several philosophers and scientists discuss the possibilities of creating and assessing phenomenally conscious AI, building on Putnam’s conjecture that computational functionalism is more plausible than a biological view of consciousness (Bayne et al. 2024, Birch 2025, Block 2025, Chalmers 2023, Dung 2025, Schneider et al. 2025). Butlin et al. (2025) outline a research program for distilling computational indicators of consciousness via neuroscientific theories of consciousness, based on experimental research on the neural correlates of consciousness in humans.

In this talk, I will distinguish three related but different questions in this context, argue that Chalmers’ epiphenomenal conception of phenomenal consciousness is unfit to serve as a target in this debate, and then evaluate whether computationalism and functionalism should be assumed to be empirically more plausible than a biological theory of consciousness. While computational functionalism allows for artificial consciousness in principle, it is questionable whether artificial conscious system are practically possible, and whether we are in an epistemic position to judge whether a specific AI is conscious. For this purpose, I am connecting debates about AI consciousness with debates about the required medium independence of neural computation (Piccinini 2020, Maley 2025, Williams 2025) and on multiple realisability (Chirimuuta 2022, 2025, Cao 2022, Seth 2025). I argue that in the case of non-biological artificial systems, all possible markers of consciousness typically used to assess consciousness in humans and non-human animals are either absent, ambiguous or question begging.

Jubilee G36

Zoom ID: 893 6299 5831

Passcode: 917746

17 February

TBA
Anna Ciaunica
Lisbon

Abstract: TBA

Jubilee G36

Zoom ID:

Passcode:

3 March

Is Agency a Matter of Choice and Decision or Behavioural Control?
Nicolas Shea
Institute of Philosophy, School of Advanced Study, University of London

Abstract: Human agency is overwhelmingly concerned with behaviour – that is, with physical movement. The kind of complex behaviour produced by humans and many other animals is already an enormous achievement. A simple action like biting an apple is in fact an articulated temporally-extended sequence of movements, coordinating muscles of the fingers, arm, jaw, and tongue, as well as postural muscles in the trunk. Behavioural actions unfold in a way that is continuously sensitive to threats and opportunities in the environment, and the changing needs and values of the organism. Reflecting on the evolution, in animals, of the fundamental capacity for complex behavioural control – on basic aspects of the way these mechanisms have evolved to function – offers a valuable perspective, complementary to dominant models of agency in terms of decision-making.

This perspective suggests a significant re-orientation of where we should focus in order to understand agency, away from a moment of choice and towards a temporally-extended episode of behaviour. Being an agent, at least of the human kind, is a matter of the way behavioural episodes unfold, integrated with, and rapidly responsive to, needs and values that change continuously. This perspective also highlights a deep difference between the ‘agentic’ capacities of increasingly intelligent AI systems, focused as they are on the most cognitive and intellectual aspects of agency, and the kind of enactive agency exercised by humans.

Jubilee G36

Zoom ID:  863 9759 5001

Passcode:  097665

10 March

Inferring the presence (or absence) of consciousness in artificial systems
Wanja Wiese
Ruhr-University Bochum

Abstract: How should we assess which artificial systems could be conscious? Given uncertainty about the nature and distribution of consciousness, it is promising to look for indicators of consciousness that provide evidence for (or against) consciousness in artificial systems. A challenge is that there are hard cases in which the evidence pulls into different directions. In particular, cognitive and behavioural similarities between artificial and biological systems may speak for the hypothesis that a given artificial system is conscious; differences regarding the underlying mechanisms and substrates may speak against it.

In this talk, I introduce a taxonomy of indicators of consciousness and distinguish between approaches that manage uncertainty about indicators (reaching rational verdicts in the light of uncertainty) and approaches that seek to reduce uncertainty (improving our understanding of what counts as evidence). I argue that hard cases of possible artificial systems require that we reduce uncertainty, before we can rationally infer the presence or absence of consciousness. Furthermore, I discuss ways in which a reduction of uncertainty may be achieved.

Preprint: https://philarchive.org/rec/WIEITP

Jubilee G36

Zoom ID:

Passcode:

17 March

TBA
Olivia Guest
Radboud

Abstract: tba

online

Zoom ID:

Passcode:

14 April

Transforming agency through generative midtended cognition. Digital thinging with thinging things.
Xabier Barandiaran
Basque Country

Abstract: How can we make sense of the new forms of creativity and agency that generative technologies afford? This talk introduces the concept of “generative midtended cognition”, that explores the integration of generative AI technologies with human cognitive processes. The term “generative” reflects AI’s ability to iteratively produce structured outputs, while “midtended” captures the po-tential hybrid (human-AI) nature of the process. It stands between traditional conceptions of in-tended creation, understood as steered or directed from within, and extended processes that bring exo-biological processes into the creative process. We examine the working of current ge-nerative technologies (based on multimodal transformer architectures typical of large language models like ChatGPT) to explain how they can transform human agency beyond what the con-ceptual resources of standard theories of extended cognition can capture. We suggest that the type of cognitive activity typical of the coupling between a human and generative technologies is closer (but not equivalent) to social cognition than to classical extended cognitive paradigms. Yet, it deserves a specific treatment. We provide an explicit definition of generative midtended cognition in which we treat interventions by AI systems as constitutive of the agent’s intentional creative processes. Furthermore, we distinguish two dimensions of generative hybrid creativity: 1. Width: captures the sensitivity of the context of the generative process (from the single letter to the whole historical and surrounding data), 2. Depth: captures the granularity of iteration loops involved in the process. Generative midtended cognition stands in the middle depth between conversational forms of cognition in which complete utterances or creative units are exchanged, and micro-cognitive (e.g. neural) subpersonal processes. Finally, the talk discusses the potential risks and benefits of widespread generative AI adoption, including the challenges of authenticity, generative power asymmetry, and creative boost or atrophy. This talk is based on previous work in collaboration with Lola Almendros and Marta Pérez-Verdugo.

Recommended Readings:
◦ Barandiaran, X. E., & Almendros, L. S. (2025). Transforming agency: On the mode of existence of large language models. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-025-10094-3
◦ Barandiaran, X. E., & Pérez-Verdugo, M. (2025). Generative midtended cognition and Artificial Intelligence: Thinging with thinging things. Synthese, 205(4), 1–24. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-025-04961-4
◦ Barandiaran, X. E., & Rama, T. (2025). Sensorimotor teleology and goal-directedness. An organismic framework for normative behaviour. https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/25369

About the author: Dr. Xabier E. Barandiaran is a philosopher of mind and biological, cognitive, and social sciences, currently serving as a Senior Lecturer at the University of the Basque Country (UPV/EHU). His work focuses on complex systems analysis and conceptual simulation models for theory building and applications. Dr. Barandiaran has a long-standing history with the University of Sussex, where he earned his MSc in Evolutionary and Adaptive Systems and latter later returned to Sussex as a postdoctoral researcher (2009–2010) at the Center for Computational Neuroscience and Robotics (CCNR) and COGS. In addition to his academic career, he has led significant technopolitical projects, including serving as the coordinator of R&D for Barcelona’s City Council, where he spearheaded the design and deployment of Decidim.org, a digital platform for participatory democracy. He has published over 50 indexed works, including the co-authored books Sensorimotor Life (Oxford University Press, 2017), Decidim, a Technopolitical Network for Participatory Democracy (Springer, 2024), and recently co-edited Outonomy: fleshing out autonomy beyond the individual (Springer, 2025). More information at: https://xabier.barandiaran.net

Jubilee G36

Zoom ID:

Passcode:

Contact COGS

For suggestions for speakers, contact Simon Bowes

For publicity and questions regarding the website, contact Simon Bowes.

Please mention COGS and COGS seminars to all potentially interested newcomers to the university.

A good way to keep informed about COGS Seminars is to be a member of COGS.  Any member of the university may join COGS and the COGS mailing list.  Please contact Simon Bowes if you would like to be added.

Follow us on Twitter: @SussexCOGS