14 and 15 July 2005, Sussex European Institute, University of Sussex, Falmer, UK
People
Tim Bale, Nicolò Conti, Mark Donovan, Brigid Fowler, Simon Green, David Hanley, Sean Hanley, Tim Haughton, Dan Hough, André Krouwel, Charles Lees, Sally Marthaler, Emmanuele Massetti, Nicholas Startin, Aleks Szczerbiak, Paul Taggart, Paul Webb.
July 14 Presentations
The British Centre Right and Europe
Dr Tim Bale, IRP/Sussex European Institute, UK
Conservative Party policy on the EU has hardened in recent years, both in order to outflank Labour and to maintain the unity of an increasingly Eurosceptical membership, inside parliament and without. Yet at the same time the Tories have increasingly downplayed 'Europe', be it in their general election campaign or in their own leadership contest. In the light of the apparent defeat of the EU's Constitutional Treaty and the Labour government's more assertive stance, this could be the precursor to the party's return to a more pragmatic, 'softer' Euroscepticism, albeit one that continues to stress the need for the UK to preserve its national sovereignty to prosper in an apparently global economy.
The Czech Right and Europe
Dr Seán Hanley, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London
In 1990s, the principal party of the Czech right, the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) of former Prime Minister and current President Václav Klaus pioneered eurosceptic discourses, which for a long time ran ahead of the Czech Republic's position an accession state. Smaller centre-right parties, by contrast, have been strongly europhile. After losing national office in 1997, ODS shifted from a largely neo-liberal critique of the EU centring on the need for competing national economic models to a tougher 'national interests' position stressing the defence of Czech statehood and sovereignty and thereby reinstating the traditional nationalist paradigm juxtaposing Czech interests with those of Germany. ODS's attempts to campaign on Europe (for example, in 2002) failed as it lacked saliency with Czech voters - perhaps fortunately, as its wealthier, better educated electorate has always been more pro-European than that of the left. Klaus and ODS (which is expected to win the 2006 elections) opposed the EU Constitutional Treaty as an infringement on national sovereignty, but support further enlargement. Klaus recently called for a re-founding of the EU as an Organisation of European States, rolling back much of the political integration of the last twenty years. Opinion polling indicates a drastic reversal of earlier Czech public support for the Constitution in the wake of the French and Dutch referenda, and right-wing euroscepticism may now for the first time gain real popular resonance.
The Dutch Centre-Right and Europe
Dr André Krouwel, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Netherlands
For many political observers the outcome of the Dutch referendum on the EU Constitution was astounding. Traditionally all major Dutch parties, particularly the Centre Right, had been staunch defenders of European integration. Indeed, even before European-wide integration started, the Dutch had already entered a customs-union with Belgium and Luxembourg and the Dutch were one of the founding members of the EU. Nevertheless, among the population as well as within the centre-right, anti-EU sentiments have been on the increase since the 1990s. As Frits Bolkestein took over the leadership of the conservative-liberal VVD, the party moved towards a more critical position towards European integration, in particular voicing concern over both the size of the net national contribution to the European Union budget and the labour-market implications of EU enlargement. This more nationalist stance of the VVD was reinforced with the electoral breakthrough of Pim Fortuyn in 2002. Fortuyn took a very negative stance towards further political integration and the accession of Turkey and forced the VVD to compete on this issue. Now at both sides of the political spectrum (on the left the Socialist Party and on the right the remnant of LPF and a new right wing populist Wilders) Eurosceptical voices are louder than ever. The other main actor of the centre right and the most constant factor in Dutch government formation, the Christian Democrats (CDA), have always adopted a pro-EU position. This stance is now under pressure from widespread popular discontent with the speed and direction of European integration, while the Christian Democrats are also influenced by more Euroskeptic attitudes within the EPP. The centre-right parties in the Netherlands, which had long been regarded as one of the most enthusiastic supporters of further integration, are clearly under pressure to review their position on the process of European integration.
The French Centre-Right and Europe
Dr Nick Startin, Senior Lecturer in French and European Area Studies, UWE, UK
In France the question of European integration has always been a particularly difficult one for the political parties of the Centre-Right. Since the development of closer European co-operation, the Christian Democrat roots of the MRP essentially moderate, internationalist and pro-European have consistently clashed with the 'France First', 'Europe des Patries' rhetoric of the Gaullist movement. In the post-Gaullian period, divisions over Europe have escalated between the two modern day strands of the mainstream Right, the centre-right UDF and the neo-Gaullist RPR. While the UDF has demonstrated consistency in its broadly pro-integrationalist stance, the RPR repeatedly equivocated, unsure whether to remain loyal to the Gaullist tradition or to redefine its position in reaction to the issues of sovereignty raised by the Single European Act (SEA), the Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice Treaties. The periods immediately following the 1992 Maastricht referendum and the 1999 European elections threatened to pull apart the Centre-Right on a permanent basis. However, on both occasions the necessary momentum required to launch a new movement based around the souverainiste dimension was short lived. The emergence of the UMP after the 2002 legislative elections and the subsequent support of over three-quarters of its voters for the EU constitution at the 2005 referendum would appear to confirm the long awaited victory of the rénovateurs and the defeat of the souverainistes within the Gaullist movement and to indicate that the Eurosceptic ghost that has haunted the centre-right since Maastricht has finally been laid to rest. Such speculation, however, is premature as the 'No' vote at the May 2005 referendum has the potential to re-open wounds within the Centre-Right, in particular with regard to the question of Turkish membership which remains an unresolved issue within both the UMP and the UDF. Furthermore, the traditional pro-sovereignty/pro-EU line of division, historically associated with the Gaullist movement, looks set to be replaced by divisions over EU integration centred around conflict between supporters of the neo-liberal economic model and republican Gaullists who favour the protection of France's social model.
The German Centre Right and Europe
Dr Simon Green, Institute for German Studies, Birmingham University, UK
The extensive body of literature on Germany's policy on European integration that has developed over the past 20 years notes that, under Helmut Kohl's Chancellorship from 1982 to 1998, Germany pursued a highly traditional approach to European integration - an approach which was based on budgetary power within the EU and which saw political integration as the ultimate goal. However, since the advent of the SPD-Green government in 1998, a number of structural changes to Germany's European policy have occurred, principally the budgetary 'resource crunch' following unification. This not only removes Germany's ability to pursue its goals by means of side payments, but also changes its priorities for future integration. A possible new CDU/CSU-led government under Angela Merkel after 2005 will have to resolve the tension between Germany's tradition as an integrationist leader and the need to pursue more direct national interests, not only over the budget but also over issues such as competition policy and Turkish membership.
The Italian Right and Europe
Dr Mark Donovan, School of European Studies, University of Cardiff, UK
The significant deepening of the process of European integration in the early 1990s coincided with a revolution in Italy's political elites. There is evidence that in the decade since then, public opinion towards Europe has become less uniformly supportive, whilst the attitude of the new political elites has polarised in an uneven fashion. That is, on the Left, the moderate majority is strongly pro-European whilst the small but influential far left is highly critical of the nature of the integration process that is taking place. On the Right, the most clearly pro-European position is that of its smallest component, the christian democratic UDC, whilst the party of the Prime Minister, Forza Italia, sends mixed signals, the National Alliance remains moderatly Eurosceptic, having shown inconsistent signs of moving to a more supportive position, and the Northern League has shifted markedly to a position extremely critical of the EU. These changes reflect continuing ideological commitments in some cases, the different interests which these parties represent, and the new strategic necessities imposed on governments by the loss and/or weakening of policy instruments used in the past to promote consensus. In fact, the new domestic and international political context that has emerged in the last decade would ideally require a new mode of governance to be established integrating the domestic and European levels in a new way. It is in this context that an important new ideological conflict has emerged in which Eurorealism is both weakly led and also squeezed between a largely acritical, positive Eurorhetoric on the one hand, and a demagogic, negative Eurorhetoric on the other.
Dr Nicolò Conti, CIRCaP, University of Siena, Italy
Italy is a country that has been associated for long with a tendency of diffuse party-based Europhilia. At the beginning of the 1990s, the situation in was one of convergence, with all parties (excluding the extremes) sharing not only a broad support for the process, but also a specific support for its trajectory as represented by the EEC/EU. This widespread party-based benevolent attitude to European integration was combined with a similar loyal attitude of the domestic elites playing in the European arena. But after 1994, the Italian party system seems to have moved away from the diffuse Europhilia of the pre-1994 phase. On the contrary, the party system has developed new patterns of positioning on the European issue, including various forms of Euroscepticism in the peripheral areas, as well as in the centre-right. Through the analysis of the party discourse, I trace the EU issue-specific preferences of centre-right parties and their overall commitment to the European theme. Finally, I attempt to explain the Italian case in the light of the main theoretical arguments available in the literature.
The Polish centre-right and Europe
Dr Aleks Szczerbiak, Sussex European Institute, University of Sussex
The evolution of the European policies of the two main Polish centre-right parties, Law and Justice and Civic Platform provides something of a contrast. Law and Justice has moved towards a position that is close to British Conservative Eurosceptic critiques of the EU, the key difference being its support for a 'solidaristic' Europe based on a large EU budget and high fiscal transfers from richer to poorer EU member states. Civic Platform has also become more critical in its approach to the EU, particularly in relation to the constitutional treaty. However, the party remains broadly pro-European integration and presents its opposition to the constitutional treaty within a pro-integration intellectual framework. Tactical-strategic, and often domestic political, considerations have played an important role in determining both parties' short-term rhetoric on Europe, although their underlying, longer-term policy positions arguably also reflect their broader ideological preferences. International influences also appear to be important in the case of Law and Justice, less obviously with Civic Platform. Given that Europe was a source of potential division between two parties that are 'natural' coalition partners, both of them welcomed the rejection of the constitutional treaty and the fact that this has muted Polish domestic political debate on the issue - particularly Civic Platform, which would have had problems reconciling its earlier strong criticisms of the treaty with its broadly pro-EU ideology and electorate and its desire to remain within the mainstream of the European centre-right.
The Transnational Centre Right and Europe
Professor David Hanley, School of European Studies, University of Cardiff, UK
In contrast to their national member-parties, the transnational parties (TNP) of the EU enjoy greater freedom of manoeuvre to manage sensitive questions, particularly that of European integration. The institutional context of the European Parliament defines their actions, principally though not exclusively. Within this framework, the centre right has shown considerable capacity for invention and adaptability. Its organisation across 4 main groupings - EPP, ALDE/ELDR, UEN and ID - allows it to give strong and effective expression to its different sensibilities. The expression and management of diversity on the nature and speed of integration is not, however, just a matter of juxtaposing different groups or TNP (a hard eurosceptic ID versus a federalist ELDR, say); the question runs within groups as much as it divides them. This situation has led to a variety of creative solutions on the part of TNP, which enable potentially disastrous tensions to be managed effectively.
15 July: Seminar 1 Progress Meeting
There are plans to produce a special issue of the journal Party Politics on the centre-right in Central and Eastern Europe. July 15 was devoted to the planning and coordination of this and the keynote article. At the meeting were Tim Bale, Brigid Fowler, Seán Hanley, Tim Haughton, and Aleks Szczerbiak.