Centre for Global Health Policy

Researching a Deadly Virus - Science, Security and the H5N1 Controversy

Tuesday 22nd May - All welcome to attend

4pm-6pm in Fulton 104

Followed by a drinks reception

H5N1 Poster

Should scientists researching ‘bird flu’ be censored? 

What are the ethics of developing strains of deadly viruses in the lab?

How should governments balance security issues with those of health?

A Centre for Global Health Policy debate at Sussex will address the questions of research ethics, security and more with a panel of experts intimately connected to the recent controversy on researching the H5N1 virus:

Panel Speakers:

  • Professor Harvey Rubin is the Director of the Institute for Strategic Threat Analysis and Response at UPenn and has served on the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity.
  • Professor David Heymann is Chairman of the Health Protection Agency and Head of the Centre on Global Health Security at Chatham House.
  • Professor Bobbie Farsides is Professor of Clinical and Biomedical Ethics at the Brighton and Sussex Medical School.
  • Dr Caitriona McLeish is a Senior Fellow at the Science and Technology Policy Research Unit (SPRU) at the University of Sussex, and is co-director of The Harvard-Sussex Program.

Background

According to the World Health Organization, more than 50% of people infected with highly pathogenic bird flu (H5N1) have died. So why did two publicly funded university research teams (in Holland and the USA) try to develop new H5N1 viruses that could transmit more easily between humans? And why do they want to publish the findings of how they did it in leading scientific journals? 

The high risks to human health involved, combined with the risk of bioterrorism, has prompted calls for deeper reflection on the implications of such 'dangerous' research. The U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) even took the unprecedented step of requesting that the journals Science and Nature withhold key information when publishing the results. 

With the UK Cabinet Office risk register listing influenza pandemic as the number one civil emergency risk, should scientists researching viruses be censored?  What are the ethics of developing strains of deadly viruses in the lab?  How should governments balance security issues with those of health? 

A Global Health Policy round table at Sussex will address the questions of research ethics, security, and more with a panel of experts intimately connected to the controversy.

Nature website

Science website

BBC website

For further information go to the 'Publish and be damned? Sussex debates the bird flu research controversy' news article.

Sponsors:

  • The School of Global Studies
  • The University of Sussex Research Themes

Videos

Professor Stefan Elbe

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Professor Harvey Rubin

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Professor Bobby Farsides

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Dr Caitriona McLeish

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Images from the debate

H5N1 - 9 H5N1 - 10 H5N1 - 6 H5N1 - 2 H5N1 - 8 H5N1 - 5 H5N1 - 7 H5N1 - 4

Top Tweets from the event: 

Twitter bird

 Question about whether EU governments could use human rights infringements to control. E.g. prevent migration of scientists?

Culture of responsibility is key to publishing questions. wider question is can this info be contained at all? 

Not all scientific information is for everybody- Harvey Rubin.

 Are we framing dual use argument correctly? Do scientists understand their obligations and the risks of dual use research?

 In debate no mention of biological weapons convention. This contains agreements about work which relates to transmissibility.

 Science should be supported in order to achieve or win huge prizes ie cancer drugs, but here we don't clearly see the fight.

Bobby Farsides- ' this work should be published, I don't want to live in a risk averse society ' 

 Bobby Farsides BSMS ethicist, draws parallel with post 9-11 debates and treatment of infected individuals. But threat external.

Harvey Rubin, H5N1 research = 'outstanding' science. Would you want this published? 

Rubin says there are no international agreements or governance on infectious diseases. What would that look like?