Buckingham, Will The Philosophical Troubadour: Michel Serres, Literature and Ethics: This paper considers the question of the relationship between stories and ethics in the light of Michel Serres's troubadour philosophy. Traditional approaches to the act of storytelling tend to see stories in one of several ways: as preparatory to the hard work of philosophical ethics, as illustrative of ethical 'truths' derived from the harder discipline of philosophy, or as the bearers of ethical meanings that can be elucidated with the aid of philosophy. In all of these, the hard work of thinking is considered to take place in philosophy proper, and the act of storytelling plays a decidedly subordinate role. The philosophy of Michel Serres, however, gives us an alternative approach to the understanding the relationship between stories and ethics. Serres considers the story as a passage through and towards alterity, a passage in which it turns out that everything is at stake. Here the hierarchy between story and philosophy becomes more complex. Narrative, Serres writes in The Troubadour of Knowledge, has the power to go where philosophy is condemned to repetition and stagnation; and yet "only philosophy can go deep enough to show that literature goes still deeper than philosophy" (Serres 1997, 65). This paper will attempt to explore how stories may lead us beyond the repetition of traditional approaches to ethics; and it will establish, by means of a series of interlinked stories, how stories might function as a method for a philosophical ethics that may, if judiciously employed, permit us to continually rethink the nature of ethics and the question of why ethics might matter at all.

Freibach-Heifetz, Dana (Tel Aviv). Giving sense to generosity ethics: A philosophical reading of Dostoevsky's Idiot. This paper presents a philosophical reading of The Idiot, which perceives its main protagonist, Prince Myshkin, as a literary hero who chooses the path of generosity. The paper exposes Dostoevsky's ethics as a unique combination of virtue ethics, Christian ethics, and some existential characterizations; it further analyzes the problematic aspects of this version of generosity-ethics, and discusses several possible explanations of its catastrophic outcomes in the novel. The paper consists of three parts. The first part presents the rich and profound sense that Dostoevsky gives to generosity-ethics in the novel, while showing the good it may bring to one's life. The second part exposes the dangers and the limits of generosity-ethics, because of which the Prince may be referred to as "an idiot". The third and final part reevaluates generosity-ethics, discusses its relation to reason, and puts forth another version of generosity-ethics that may overcome most of the flaws in Myshkin's generosity. Offering such a philosophical reading of this great literary work of art, the paper also says some things about the relation between philosophy and literature, and aims at a fruitful dialogue between the two

Gal, Noam (The Hebrew Uniersity) Hannah Arendt's "Inner Freedom" and the Question of Character Rights: In this lecture I would like to revitalize the inquiry of a rather neglected narratological concept, that is, the literary character. My suggestion begins with rethinking its fictionality, which means, bringing the character into existence in the world, so that it is no less real than me, the one writing about it. A further step would be extracting a character from the narrative context into which it was born, and transferring it to a field that confronts its life story with the life story of the researcher writing about it. This can somewhat balance the strict hierarchy of flesh and blood beings managing the lives of other beings, by placing the character's conditions in the political-social debate on matters of freedom, justice and ethics. I imagine here a kind of critical writing which contains the life testimony of the researcher, and which will always result in new insights about the character, telling more and more about it, as the experiences in the researcher's life grow. That is actually what happened, in August 2005, when I met Michael K, the protagonist of J.M. Coetzee's Life and Times of Michael K. K was born with a hare lip, as was I. This defect has been a fruitful key in a critical reading that places me between the edge of the animal and the edge of the human, hanging by the frayed and double thread called "lip/language" (same word in Hebrew). By re-reading Arendt's "What is Freedom?" I will try to explain why the literary character is located outside any constitution, and to consider it as a rightless being. "Characters rights" can be a discourse that places itself between "human rights" and "animal rights". By "characters rights" I mean the research of singular encounters with characters, which can turn our attention to injustices that we have no access to, and especially to those who cannot be grouped according to a characteristic easily defined as a common denominator, such as skin color or type of sexual organ, as being used in the field of human-rights.

Harris, Leonard (Purdue) Conundrum of Cosmopolitanism and Race: The Great Debate Between Alain L. Locke and William James at Oxford: I imagine a meeting between the Metaphysical Club, which met in Cambridge and included such members as William James and Oliver W. Holmes, and the Cosmopolitan Club, which met in Oxford and included such members as Alain Locke and Pikley K. Seme. I explore the radical differences between the philosophic interests of the two clubs by imagining what might happen if they actually met. The differences between the two clubs help make clear why the cosmopolitanism of the Cosmopolitan Club was intuitively preferable to the cosmopolitanism of the Metaphysical Club. Members of the Cosmopolitan Club considered themselves entrapped in the following conundrums: how is it possible to both promote universal aesthetic traits expressed through literature and simultaneously promote aesthetic traits and literary forms definitive of a local culture, particularly a racial, national or ethic culture? How is it possible to be non-essentialist about race and simultaneously promote color conscious ethnic or racial group self-expressions - and promote such expressions as ethnic or racial expressions? I argue that there is an irreconcilable conflict between universal aesthetic traits and local traits; an incommensurability that is not resolved by appeal to a value neutral criterion by which to evaluate the universal and the local. Analogously, there is an irreconcilable conflict between being non-essentialist about race and simultaneously promoting local culture. The conundrum of the Cosmopolitan Club is resolved, I suggest, as much as a conundrum can be resolved, by Locke's "cosmopolitanism as confraternity."

Mendelson-Maoz, Adia (The Open University of Israel) Literature as a Moral LaboratoryWithout storytelling there is no theory of ethics (Miller, 1987; 3). Art and philosophy, aesthetics and ethics, have exhibited strong ties
throughout human history. In particular, the dual commitment of Literature to aesthetic principles and narrative themes, and the dual commitment of Ethics to abstract models and human experience, have created multifaceted bonds between the two disciplines. Much has been written on the intersection between Literature and Ethics: Literature can illustrate philosophical ideas and illuminate actual moral life (Nussbaum, 1983, 1990; Palmer, 1992; Swanger, 1993; Tomlinson);
philosophy can explore moral concepts and examine moral theories through literary texts (Diamond 1983). Often, literary texts put complex situations under a new light, and hence create an opportunity for thought experiments (Currie, 1998; Carroll, 1998, 2000, 2002) and ethical expeditions (McGinn, 1997; 177). In this talk I develop a new model for the relationships between Literature and Ethics, under the metaphor of the Moral Laboratory. In the first part of the talk, I use Rawls (1971) analogy between moral laboratory and linguistic laboratory. The considered judgment and the
reflective equilibrium are the labs attributes that create a space for forming, testing, and reshaping moral principles. Thus the theoretical grounds of the lab are created. In the second part of the talk, I use Ryle's ([1949] 1973) distinction
between knowing that and knowing how. Literature creates an imaginary place, distinct and secure - the moral laboratory - in which experiments are performed. In the laboratory, simulations are carried out and alternatives are explored. These experiences build a moral capability
for life.--

Moran, Brendan (Calgary) Kafka, the Wise: "Historico-Philosophical" Shame in Benjamin's Kafka: Kafka's writings are among those that Benjamin suggests indicate a decline of tradition as something that can credibly counsel. Epic experience (the experience common to all) and counsel have diverged from one another. There is next to nothing that can credibly be said of epic experience. Common experience remains secret, and all that credibly emerges as epic does so without the traditionally expected correlate of counsel. Kafka "feels" the pressure posed by "the listener ... to the storyteller: to know counsel [Rat zu wissen]." Insofar as "storytelling penetrates Kafka," the latter simply performs that he does not have counsel, that he cannot counsel. All that emerges as epic is the gesture that conveys the impossibility of epic counsel. Nevertheless, a break of sorts with tradition, a performance of tradition and of ourselves as without epic counsel, may be taken to be Kafka's performance of an epic honesty for those who have ceased seeking or dispensing counsel as epic wisdom. With Kafka, we can acknowledge that of wisdom there remains only its "Zerfallsprodukte," only the products of its disintegration.

Kafka's performance of this condition is considered by Benjamin to have a philosophical impetus. Benjamin portrays shame as Kafka's "strongest reaction." This shame is based on a dimension of experience that is not absorbed by counsel. This dimension - called "Vorwelt" - is the historico-philosophical index (der geschichtsphilosophische Index) whereby Kafka registers shame about the continuing pretension of humans to epic counsel. This shame allies with a historico-philosophical resistance of experience to counsel; in its philosophical approach to history, this shame refuses pretensions to epic counsel about history. This is not shame before humans, but rather shame for them in their continual recourse to epic counsel. The latter shame is Kafka's wisdom

Rabe, Ana Maria (Berlin) Conception of "Life" and "Good"in Nietzsche and Tolstoi: Contemporaries of Nietzsche and Tolstoi considered them to be perfect antipodes. And they too obviously percieved themselves to be opposite poles. Nietzsche, who had read Tolstoi's "My Religion" in 1887, referred to Tolstoi in his criticism of Christian compassion in the "Antichrist" and reproached the Tolstoian ascetic ideal for its weakness and resentment. For his part, and although he seems to have had only second-hand-knowledge of Nietzsche's philosophy, Tolstoi condemned the Nietzschean ideal of the «superman» in several writings. The paper I propose confronts the ideas of "life" and "good" -- as defended by both writers -- with the way each of them uses the other's conception. As I will show, such an approach reveals common ground on which their ideas, values and concepts met and entwined. It is true that Nietzsche's and Tolstoi's conceptions of life are completely different. But there are more points in common than they might have themselves admitted. Both took as their starting point the value of present, of practice and of authenticity of conduct. For Tolstoi, the ideal of life-practice manifests itself in love for one's neighbour, for Nietzsche in the strong man who displays his life-potentials.