

Holocaust Memorial Day
30 January 1933
The Nazi Seizure of Power
After Eighty Years

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Every good sermon needs an introductory text. So let me begin by quoting the Eminent Victorian and Edwardian, F. W. Maitland, who wrote – or said – ‘What is now in the past was once in the future’. If we were to ask: what is significant about the events that took place in Germany, in Berlin, eighty years ago today, how should we go about evaluating them? Not only: how should we look back on them, but how can we expect contemporaries to have considered them? We have, on other words, to engage in an exercise of historicizing. We need to ask: how did people in Germany or elsewhere react to the news of Hitler’s appointment as Chancellor? What could they have known, what *should* they have known about the likelihood of this happening, and of its short-term and long-term consequences? What could they have foreseen and what did they foresee? And if they thought that they could foresee something that was not confirmed by later events, what were the reasons for their error? Above all, what were the consequences, for Germany, for Europe, for the rest of the world of Hitler’s appointment? Which were intended, which unintended, and how many of the intended were actually realized?

Let me therefore begin with my first question: what could people have known? What did they know about Hitler and the Nazis on 30 January 1933? We need to make a distinction here – it is one thing to have the information, another to know what to make of it. One of my Oxford colleagues once examined the phenomenon of information correctly

received but erroneously interpreted. On the morning of 7 December 1941 radar monitors in Hawaii noticed unusual activity, but what did it consist of? Flocks of birds or squadrons of aircraft? If aircraft, whose were they? If Japanese, what were they up to? The information was available, but it did not reveal its meaning, at any rate not until it was too late. Another example comes from the Middle East in 1973. Just before Yom Kippur Israeli intelligence registered movements on the West bank of the Suez Canal. Tanks with artillery seemed to be moving up and down. But why? Were the Egyptians testing equipment? Were they on manoeuvres? Were they preparing to cross the canal? 'Very unlikely' was the conclusion. 'Why would they want to do that?' 'It's very difficult' 'They are neither competent nor experienced'. The only hypothesis that was rejected was the correct one, not because the information was lacking, but because the information did not reveal its meaning, as at Pearl Harbor, until it was too late. These considerations apply to those who were witnessing or reading about the events we are commemorating today. Anyone who wanted to know about Hitler on that day had plenty of information available. In 1924 he had written, or at any rate dictated, a book entitled 'My Struggle', *Mein Kampf*, 'struggle' being one of his favourite words. He had made lots of speeches, at rousing rallies before large crowds, but also before selected private audiences. There was no secret about his views. It was evident that he hated Jews. It was evident that he hated 'Marxists', by which he meant anybody to the left of middle-of-the-road Liberals and between them and Jews there was, in his eyes, a broad overlap. He hated the Weimar Republic, with its democratic parliamentary constitution, its competitive multi-party politics and its admittedly unstable coalition governments. He hated an open society with competing interest groups, each legitimately pursuing its own priorities. That, any rate, is what he claimed and therefore, possibly, also what he thought. What was less certain is how seriously he would stick to his proclaimed views in the event of his gaining power, an event that seemed unlikely in the five years that followed the publication of *Mein Kampf*. It was, after all, not unusual for politicians to say one thing in opposition and to do another when in power.

There are other themes in *Mein Kampf*, beside the catalogue of his hatreds. True, there were no policy details, then or later. What Hitler did proclaim was a *Weltanschauung*, an overall view of the world. What he also proclaimed were his ideas on political organization and these should have raised alarm bells. At the core of the *Weltanschauung* was a biological racism, a hierarchy of human groups at the head of which was the Aryan race and which entailed a biologically-based anti-Semitism. Yet only a part of his writings dealt with what he called the 'Jewish Question'. What concerned him most was political organisation. This was to be strictly authoritarian. At the head of the party there was to be the leader, *der Führer*, and he was indeed anointed *Führer* of the Nazi Party at its 1926 congress. From then on that was his title. He was also determined to create a mass party and in this respect he succeeded in the course of time. By 1933 the Nazi Party had some 850,000 members, more than any other party in Germany at that time. But this mass party was also to be a leadership party, a political community devoted to belief and struggle, homogeneous in mind and will.

But the Nazi Party was not only a leadership-based mass movement with, as Hitler hoped and intended, 'a passive and submissive following'. It was also a fighting force. Beside the party members there were brown-shirted storm troopers, *Sturm-Abteilungen* or SA, who were trained to engage in violence at their own or their opponents' party meetings and in the battle for the control of the streets in major cities such as Berlin. In these fights the enemy was not always the same. The street battles were less against 'the Jew' than the political Left, in particular the Communists who were fighting a similar battle. The SA was trained in preparation for a civil war. Thus while the Nazi Party, for all its contempt for democracy, contested elections it was also a civil war fighting force; beside the ordinary civilian party members it contained the SA, the *Hizbollah* of the Weimar Republic.

All this information was available. But why did it not register? After a brief electoral surge in 1924, following the trauma of the hyper-

inflation, The Nazis sank back into insignificance. In December 1924 they gained 3% of the vote, in 1928 2.6%. Other parties with similar programmes came and went. There were any number of other books and pamphlets preaching a similar political message. At least some of them were better written and better argued than Hitler's rantings. If one were interested in that kind of message one would be better off picking up Oswald Spengler or Arthur Moeller van den Bruck. Moreover, particular items of Hitler's core beliefs were catered for widely along the political spectrum, in the rejection of the value system of the West and the liberal Enlightenment project, or of artistic modernism, whether of flat roofs, abstract painting or twelve-tone composition. Or in the wish to revise or disavow the Versailles peace settlement. Or in a disbelief in the merits of parliamentary government. For all these offerings there were many other stalls in the political marketplace.

What, then, was it that made Hitler a central, decisive figure in German politics? It was a contingent event, the 1929 crash on the New York stock exchange, that led the collapse of one bank after another and resulted, by 1932, in a chain of bankruptcies and foreclosures and six million unemployed. But for these events today's commemoration would not be taking place. It would occur to no organization or institute to ask why Adolf Hitler was of any interest or significance. Even in 1929, as the Nazi Party was beginning to make gains in regional elections, it continued to be underestimated. The next year a premature Reichstag election saw a Nazi breakthrough and the political temperature rose further in 1932, the year of three elections. In the first of the three, in April, President Hindenburg was re-elected, but only in the second round, with Hitler getting more than one-third of the votes. That made the Reichstag election of July in the eyes of many the ultimate battle, the high noon of the Weimar Republic. Almost every newspaper and manifesto adopted apocalyptic tones. For the Nazi *Völkischer Beobachter* the election was going to be the decisive battle; for the Catholic *Germania*, in support of the Centre Party, a 'life or death decision for the German people's state', a term it preferred to 'republic'

or 'democracy'. The Liberal *Berliner Tageblatt*, which spoke for what was left of the predominantly Jewish middle class, called on voters 'to save Germany from a descent into darkness', while the Social Democratic *Vorwärts* warned that whoever voted for Hitler would vote for the last time. The Nazi Party repeated its April success and became the largest party with 37%. There were many voices at this stage, not restricted to the Right, who favoured bringing Hitler into government, in order to test him, or to bind him into the compromises of a coalition. But Hitler, convinced at this stage of the relentless rise of his movement, rejected this. Demanding all or nothing, he had for the moment to be satisfied with nothing. In a further election in November the Nazis fell back, losing two million votes. Opponents of the Nazis breathed a sigh of relief. *Vorwärts* confidently proclaimed that 'Germany's future will not be Fascist'.

In this situation it seemed to make more sense to include a slightly weakened Hitler in a government, especially as the Communists had made a further gain of 600,000 votes, and for the Nazis to calculate that they might not have a better opportunity for power. This is how we arrive at the event whose anniversary falls today: the appointment of Hitler as Chancellor by President Hindenburg. The procedure was constitutionally legitimate, yet later generations are bound to ask how it came about that power was handed so easily to a proclaimed opponent of democracy. There are a number of answers. The first is that though the Nazis never gained a majority in free elections, it did not follow that by the early thirties democracy had majority backing in the population. The Communists, no supporters of the Republic, were at 16.9%. The 'Weimar coalition' of unconditional Republicans were at 36.4%. Since these parties believed that it was majority support that conferred legitimacy, they were morally as well politically in the defensive. Moreover the Nazis had conditional allies who, even if distancing themselves from the Nazis' extremist violence, shared their rejection of the Weimar constitution. The Conservative *Der Tag* saw in the combined votes for the parties of the Right 'a clear mandate ... to put an end to the parliamentary system of Weimar'.

Once the event had happened, what were the reactions in Germany and abroad? Though a Nazi was now at the head of the government of Germany, this was not a Nazi government. It was a coalition, in which there were only two other members of the NSDAP, Wilhelm Frick at Interior and 'Captain Goering' – no hint yet of his later stratospheric promotions – as one of the commissioners for the deposed democratic government of Prussia. The remainder were non-party Conservatives, tried and trusted veterans of earlier cabinets. Nor was it clear why this coalition should be more stable than its predecessors. In the thirteen years of the Republic there had been seventeen coalitions, with an average life-span of nine and a half months. *The Times*, then more than now the voice of official Britain, in particular of the Foreign Office, duly noted that in composition this was basically a nationalist, not a Nazi government and that the important portfolios of Finance and Foreign Affairs were in the hands of experienced figures: 'That Herr Hitler (sic) should be given the chance of showing that he is more than an orator and agitator was always desirable.' The *Manchester Guardian* was more insightful, but also more deluded. It asked pointedly, 'Will he drive the Jews out of Germany and distribute the profits and property of capitalism among the impoverished middle class? Will [he] to seek crudely and sensationally the injustices of Versailles?' But it gave way to illusions in speculating that 'if they attempt the way of suppression they run the danger of uniting all the elements of the Left in a single Marxist party'. Which is the one thing that did not happen. The *New York Times*, too felt that 'judgment [on Hitler] should be suspended until it is more clearly known what course he will elect to pursue ... The dominant German instinct for order, and the determination which Germans have repeatedly shown to stand by, and defend and preserve their republic may again triumph'. Like the *Manchester Guardian* it placed its hopes in 'the powerful organization of German labor, ready to resist, by general strike if need be, any open movement to set up a Fascist Dictator in Germany'. The Communist Party did indeed call for a general strike, but it was ignored except in one small town in Württemberg. At this stage, with unemployment at record

levels, the German labour movement was too punch-drunk to play the Communists' game to embark on a risk with a highly uncertain outcome.

In Nazi mythology the appointment of Hitler appeared as the *Machtergreifung*, the seizure of power. It was nothing of the sort. The Nazis did not seize power on 30 January, they were handed power. The true seizure of power came in the following years. The appointment of Hitler was not a prelude to this seizure, it was a condition of it. The seizure of power itself was not a single event, it was a process, one that stretched over several years and one for the nature of which people were understandably not prepared. It did not follow an accustomed pattern. As a rule dictatorial régimes use terror in order to gain power. For the Nazis it was the other way round. They did not engage in terror to gain power, they needed power in order to be able to exercise terror. *Power was the means and terror was the end.* The more secure their power, the more intense the terror became. The more thorough the control they were able to exercise over the state and society, the more pervasive the terror, the more the instruments of terror were located outside and beyond the conventional institutions of government – in the party's regional bosses (*Gauleiter*), the SS and the Gestapo. It was this development that neither the régime's Conservative allies nor their Liberal or Socialist opponents were accustomed to or prepared for.

What were the stages of this process? What were its consequences and how foreseeable were they? How was one to know what he had in mind, not in 1936 or in 1939, but in the spring of 1933? We need to observe the speed with which the seizure of power proceeded and the particular ways in which the salami was sliced. Let us begin in 1933. February saw the Law for the Protection of the People and the State, in effect a suspension of the constitution that Hitler had sworn to uphold a month before, and a decree that made it possible to ban the Communist Party. March saw the creation of the Propaganda Ministry under Joseph Goebbels, the establishment of the first concentration

camps and the Emergency Powers Act, nominally for four years, but remaining effective for the rest of the Third Reich's duration. April saw the political purge of the civil service and the abolition of the federal states, creating a unitary, centralized state for the first and last time in German history. In May the trade unions were deprived of any autonomy they still retained, in June the Social Democratic Party was prohibited and the other parties dissolved themselves. In July the creation of any new parties was prohibited. And that is the score for just the first six months.

1934 saw the creation of the so-called 'People's Court' from whose verdicts there was no appeal. In July Franz von Papen, Hitler's nominal number two and leading non-Nazi cabinet member, frustrated by his lack of influence, resigned. On 2 August, following the death of President Hindenburg, Hitler became, in addition to Chancellor, head of State and *Führer*. In 1935 conscription was introduced, in contravention of the Treaty of Versailles. In 1937 Hjalmar Schacht, another of the non-Nazi technocrats, resigned as Minister of Finance. In 1938 the army was purged by the dismissal of Field Marshals Blomberg and Fritsch; in August the Chief of the General Staff Ludwig Beck, later prominent in the opposition to Hitler, resigned. So it went on, until in February 1943, after the defeat at Stalingrad, Goebbels proclaimed a total war. Total war was needed for a total state and a total state was needed for a total war.

That is a sketchy summary. I could have listed any number of other measures. More to the point: what was this total power to be used for? It was to be used for a war of destruction against all who stood in the Nazis' way, whether in the East or the West, in Europe or elsewhere. It was to be used, as an audience at a Holocaust Memorial Lecture does not need to be reminded, against the Jews. For Hitler and his followers the Jews were, as Saul Friedländer has put it, a 'meta-historical enemy', the force behind Russian Bolshevism, Anglo-American capitalism, internationalism and liberal democracy, to be finally destroyed. Even in his Political Testament, written just before

his suicide, Hitler singled out ‘international Jewry and its helpers’ as the guilty party in the war. How much of this could have been anticipated before or in 1933? No-one could ignore the widespread anti-Semitism of the Weimar Republic, though reactions to it varied. Those who led the Jewish community were not complacent, but were accustomed to acting in a state governed by the rule of law and were experienced in prosecuting the more extreme agitators through the courts, keeping them at bay even if not defeating them. That the rule of law would one day simply disappear from Germany did not seem a realistic prospect. When Albert Einstein, visiting the United States in 1930, was questioned about Hitler’s growing popularity, he replied, ‘Hitler is living on the empty stomachs of the German people. The instant the stomach is filled, Hitler’s party will find no more to do.’ Three months before Hitler’s appointment, the publisher of Vienna’s leading liberal daily, the *Neue Freie Presse*, assured the American Press Agency that in the unlikely event of Hitler’s gaining power ‘the conscience of the world would prevent the Hitlerites from depriving the Jews of their rights’. Even after 30 January Jewish leaders and publicists, like the majority of their Gentile colleagues, suspended judgment. The Central Association of German Citizens of the Jewish faith, the main representative of German Jews, advised their members to await events calmly (‘ruhig abwarten’), perhaps the then equivalent of Keep Calm and Carry On. The Orthodox newspaper *Der Israelit*, was confident that the new government could not corral Jews into a racial ghetto or abandon them to the plunder of a murderous mob. The Zionist *Jüdische Rundschau* was more pessimistic in talking of Jews now being under ‘the occupation of a foreign power’, but more encouraging in its famous headline, ‘Wear it with pride, the Yellow Star’ – at this stage a metaphorical yellow star; it did not become compulsory for another eight years. While this message could be interpreted as a call to remain in Germany, and not to surrender to the deteriorating situation, it was also a Zionist reminder of the illusions of assimilation, of the illusory belief that Jews could be fully-fledged, full-entitled citizens and an advice to seek solace and security in a separate

identity. In contrast to this message, on the very evening of Hitler's appointment, a meeting of the Jewish artisans' welfare organization took place in Berlin. Only one speaker, the Zionist rabbi Hans Tramer, referred to the events of the day. His reference to the dangers that all German Jews faced was dismissed as scare-mongering.

I have quoted these instant reactions, and could quote many more, to show how open the future seemed in early 1933, whether for Jews, Germans in general, Europe and indeed the wider world. What the new régime in fact intended became clear soon enough. In April the boycott of Jewish shops was only a partial propaganda success. As Victor Klemperer recorded in his diary, 'Some Jewish shops were looted, some were boycotted, others kept their customers'. At least some customers stayed loyal or appreciated better service or lower prices; if non-Jews met in a Jewish shop, they simply ignored each other. In the same month quotas were introduced for Jewish pupils and students. September 1935 saw the proclamation, at the Nazi party's Nuremberg rally, of the Law for the Protection of German Blood and Honour and the Reich Citizen Law – the Nuremberg Laws – that deprived Jews of German citizenship and instituted a post-Liberal *apartheid*, prohibiting inter-marriage or Jewish employment of non-Jews. In 1936 complete segregation was introduced in state schools. In 1937 Jews were barred from submitting doctoral theses. *Kristallnacht* in November 1938 marked a further escalation of Nazi policies, as both a degradation ritual and an opportunity for plunder, but, like the 1933 boycott, not universally welcomed by the population. *Kristallnacht* was followed by Goering's orders that excluded Jews entirely from the economy. Even before that, despite the régime's policy of encouraging emigration, the exemption limit from the emigration tax was lower than it had been in the Weimar Republic. From then on Jews were prevented, step by step, from communicating with the rest of the population or even each other, being banned from owning typewriters, telephones, radios, cameras or domestic pets, from using public libraries or public transport, subject to limited shopping hours and a curfew. On 1 September 1941 the yellow star ceased to be

metaphor and became a compulsory reality. On 20 January 1942 there took place the conference in the villa on the Wannsee to regulate and organize the 'Final Solution' that was by now underway. A little after this meeting, news of which did not, as far as I know, reach the outside world, I sent one of those 24-word Red Cross letters to an aunt in the Kielce ghetto, wishing her a happy birthday. Some months later the message came back with a smudged stamp from the Polish Red Cross, regretting that they were not able to deliver the letter.

That was a small outcome of a large decision. From the appointment of Hitler swearing, in top hat and tailcoat, to uphold the constitution of the Republic, one component after another of the constitutional order, its checks and balances, the rule of law, freedom of opinion, of speech, of association, was diminished until it ceased to exist. The rights of anyone who did not fit the re-defined *Volksgemeinschaft*, or people's community – foreigners, Gypsies, the children of black occupation soldiers and, of course, Jews – suffered systematic diminution. Ultimately the programme became one of complete annihilation, which failed to reach completeness only through the victory of the Allied armies.

Let us go back from the German surrender of 1945 to our starting point. In defence of those who were relatively optimistic or complacent at the time, we can say that though Hitler made no secret of his political vision, even if there was no specific advocacy of world war or genocide, there was no precedent for an attempt to implement this vision unconditionally. That was simply not imaginable in 1933 or even some years later. We know that when news of the Holocaust first trickled out it was treated with skepticism and disbelief, even by some Jewish organizations. We are back at our original question: Is it enough to have the information about ideas and intentions? Or do we have to use our imagination in a particular way? There *were* perceptive, imaginative individuals, outside politics and journalism, not least in this country, who did have their suspicions at an early stage. You may well be surprised at my own candidates for this honour. They are D. H. Lawrence and Rudyard Kipling.

One might have expected the author of *The Plumed Serpent* to have a weakness for blood and soil. Instead he noted earlier than many which way Germany was turning. He visited Germany twice, in 1922 and 1924. The second visit was a disillusioning experience. Even in the traditionally Liberal South-West he felt the country 'is very different from what it was two-and-a half years ago. Then it was still open to Europe for a reunion, for a sort of reconciliation. Now that is over. The inevitable, mysterious barrier has fallen again, and the great leaning of the Germanic spirit is once more eastwards ... A still older flow has set in. Back, back to the savage polarity of Tartary, and away from the polarity of Christian Europe ... then to the days of silent forest and the dangerous, lurking barbarians ... It is the father of the next phase of events.'

Kipling hit the nail even more precisely on the head in 1932 in *The Storm Cone*:

This is the midnight – let no star
Delude us – dawn is very far.
This is the tempest long foretold
Slow to make head but sure to hold

Stand by! The lull 'twixt blast and blast
Signals the storm is near, not past;
And worse than present jeopardy
May our forlorn to-morrow be.

If we have cleared the expectant reef,
Let no man look for his relief.
Only the darkness hides the shape
Of further peril to escape.

It is decreed that we abide
The weight of gale against the tide
And those huge waves the outer main
Sends in to set us back again.

They fall and whelm. We strain to hear
The pulses of her labouring gear,
Till the deep throb beneath us proves,
After each shudder and check, she moves!

She moves, with all save purpose lost,
To make her offering from the coast;
But till she fetches open sea
Let no man deem that he is free!

I have spoken so far about intended consequences, whether anticipated or not. Let me end by looking at two unintended ones. The first of these is that the 1000-year *Reich* lasted only thirteen years. That failure had further equally unintended consequences. The experience of the Third Reich has discredited dictatorship, totalitarianism, discrimination and racist politics – not immediately and not completely, but without question predominantly. Consider today’s Germany: prosperous, enlightened, securely democratic, ruled by law, confident, prepared – well, fairly prepared – to participate in international actions to secure peace and protect human rights. To be sure, there are neo-Nazis, Holocaust deniers and others who do not understand the demands than the complex structures of democracy make, but we have only to compare our own day with the 1930s to appreciate the enormity of the difference. What defines the culture of the present-day Federal Republic? It is that it is *not* the Third Reich, that today’s state is absolute opposite of its predecessor. If ever there was an unintended consequence, that surely is it.

A second unintended consequence has had equally long-term effects. One of the intentions of the Nazi régime, one of the obsessions of Hitler and his followers was to expunge what has become known as Weimar Culture, that cosmopolitan creativity, the varied experiments in architecture, in the fine arts or in philosophy, by no means, as we shall see, an exclusively Jewish phenomenon that characterized Central Europe in the inter-war years. The Nazis did indeed succeed

in this objective in one respect, reducing Berlin and Vienna, Munich and Prague, Dresden and Budapest to a mediocre provinciality from which they are only slowly recovering. That was the intended part. The unintended was the distribution of this culture through the rest of the world, in places that up to then had been only very lightly touched by this *avant-garde* or this quality of achievement. Consider the state of art history in this country without Ernst Gombrich, Nikolaus Pevsner or Edgar Wind. Or of British music in the 1940s and 1950s without Walter Goehr, Egon Wellesz, Otto Klemperer or the Amadeus Quartet. Or British films without Alexander Korda or Emeric Pressburger.

What applied to Britain applied at least equally to the United States. Walter Cook, head of the Art History department at New York University explained his recruitment policy in simple terms: 'Adolf Hitler is my best friend. He shakes the tree and I pick up the apples'. The ingathering of musicians from dictatorial Europe in America included Paul Hindemith, Kurt Weill, Bruno Walter, Arturo Toscanini, Erich Korngold, Béla Bartók, Bohuslav Martinu and Darius Milhaud; that of architects Ludwig Mies van der Rohe, Walter Gropius and the Black Mountain School in North Carolina. When a journalist asked a newly arrived Thomas Mann how it felt to be so far from the centre of German culture, he replied, with characteristic modesty, that where he was one would find German culture. One would indeed have found a major centre of German and Austrian culture in Greater Los Angeles in the 1940s, where Thomas Mann, Bertolt Brecht, Arnold Schoenberg, Erich Korngold and Lion Feuchtwanger lived within easy distances of each other. All these categories showed that the Nazi pogrom of the mind, directed against the 'un-German spirit' evoked by Goebbels at the book burnings, was inter-denominational.

We can go far and near to find monuments of this. If we are looking for the world's greatest concentration of *Bauhaus* buildings, we need to go Tel-Aviv, if for the legacy of Bruno Taut's Berlin social housing, then to Ankara. But we also need go no further than a few miles from where we are sitting – to Bexhill for Erich Mendelsohn's Pavilion, or

to Glyndebourne, that in its early years was such a haven for refugee talent. Some years ago, when I was teaching in Dresden, I noticed a bust in the opera house of Fritz Busch, who was its musical director until 1933. It looked familiar and I then remembered where I had seen it before: at Glyndebourne, where he was musical director from 1934 onwards. That, for me, symbolized the history of Europe in the twentieth century.

Not all refugee lives record success stories. Many experienced downward social mobility and, in not a few cases, poverty. Some suffered from depression, especially if they were separated from parents, children or other family members who remained in Nazi-occupied Europe. There were more domestic servants than industrialists or university professors. At the same time the exodus of so many scholars and artists enormously enriched those countries that were enlightened enough to receive them. Of the scientists who left Central Europe in the 1930s, eighteen have gained Nobel Prizes, of those who came to Britain 121 have become Fellows of the Royal Society or the British Academy. Some years ago I was in discussion with a colleague of Scottish descent on the merits of devolution, which I disputed. In exasperation he said to me, 'The trouble with you is that you are nothing but an English nationalist.' That may surprise most people who know me, but I decided to accept the charge. 'Maybe I am', I said, 'but what else should I be? The English did what no-one else was prepared to do: they saved my life.' But for the English my life might have ended as a puff of smoke over Southern Poland. That is why I should like to dedicate this evening's lecture to them.

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