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We . Face . Forward

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Welcome to the fourth edition of the Sussex Undergraduate Politics Journal. This journal is a joint collaboration between the University of Sussex Politics Society and the Politics Department. It seeks to celebrate excellence across all three year groups, presenting the work of Sussex undergraduate students from Politics and affiliated disciplines. We hope you enjoy reading this selection of essays and that this journal may continue in the future to showcase the talent of those whose work *shines bright like a diamond*.

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'Non-state actors are increasingly shaping the foreign policy of states.' Discuss.

(Written for The Politics of Foreign Policy, 2nd Year)

Andreea Oglagea

Introduction

David Singer's (1961) three levels of analysis, the international, the state, and the individual, are in practice defined by an inherent relationship of interconnectedness. Although they are fundamentally separate from each other and they each offer a different explanation of world politics, all three interact with each other and influence one another, and therefore need to be analysed together. The debate in International Relations literature surrounding transnational actors, defined as non-state agents that do not operate on behalf of a national government or an intergovernmental organization (Evangelista 1995), is relatively new. Paradoxically, trans-cultural phenomena like trade networks or migration patterns have long preceded the nation-state as we know it today, being deeply embedded in the nature of human relations. The international has always been transnational, even though most theoretic approaches to IR, especially foreign policy, have always been very state centric. Much of the literature surrounding this debate argues that there has been a break with the past that begs for new categories of analysis to explain the disruption in the character of inter-state relations. This claim for newness however is fairly over-stated, as many of the features considered characteristic of the present, like interdependence, the role of trade and transnational actors, were highly relevant to past systems as well (Gourevitch, 1978). What is more, even examples of transnational political organizations can be seen throughout history in a significant number of empires, or the papacy.

The central question we need to ask is what does transnationalisation mean for the nation-state? Does it require its complete reformulation, or is it just leading to a transformation of the modern state adapting to external influences? I will use this essay to argue that the

increase in transnational transactions and interactions that we are currently witnessing is causing non-state actors to have an increased influence in shaping the foreign policy of states, although how much depends on a number of factors. This is not leading to the end of the nation-state, which remains a central actor in the international system, but it does have to adapt to rising influence from non-state actors. I will first start by looking at how non-state actors are conceptualized in both the state and society centred approaches and I will continue by assessing the ways in which transnational actors affect state sovereignty. Following, I will argue that the influence that non-state actors have on states' foreign policy is highly dependent on the type of regime and state strength. Lastly, I will look at the channels of influence that non-state actors use, such as lobbying, public opinion and violence, and consider just how effective they are.

Non-state actors and the state

Although the concept of foreign policy has traditionally been understood in terms of state centrism, the impact of globalization on world politics has triggered the emergence of new civil society actors who have increasingly raised their influence, power, and legitimacy in the international system, leading to a growing literature regarding the new role and structure of the state. The notion of non-state actors in itself is slightly challenging, as it is comprised of such a vast array of different actors. It includes, but is not limited to, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), Transnational Corporations (TNCs), networks of international professional associations, commercial lobbying groups, social movements, and criminal and terrorist networks (Arts 2003, p.3).

The main question in the transnational debate is whether NSAs do matter in international and foreign policy. The realist, state-centric approach claims they do not, with Waltz arguing that their relevance is restricted to domestic politics: 'I define political structures in terms of states (...) When the crunch comes, states remake the rules by which other actors operate' (1979, p.95). He believes that what determines outcomes at the international level is the inherently anarchic structure of the international system, and the security threats and power struggles that ensue as a consequence. This position is prevalent outside the realm of realism as well, being supported even by constructivists like Wendt (1999), who does not deny the importance of NSAs in initiating change, but still believes that this change happens ultimately

through states, who remain at the centre of the world system. In retaliation, approaches that centre around society point to the proliferation of NSAs in recent decades and argue that they do not only initiate fundamental changes, but can even overrule governments. The most powerful examples are the success of Amnesty International and other human rights groups in forcing oppressive regimes out of power, as in the case of Chile, and the power of TNCs to shape the process of economic globalization (Arts 2013, p. 9).

The idea that non-state actors are an influencing factor is therefore a firm reality, with the debate moving from whether non-state actors matter, to how they matter. State-centrism argues that NSAs cannot bring about structural change in the international system as a whole, without the ultimate involvement of nation-states. It is however true that they are vital in specific issues, such as human rights and the environment, by making international resources available to domestic political actors and building new links between the actors in civil societies, states and international organisations. Furthermore, empowered by political, technological and financial resources, they are assuming roles that were previously associated with the state. Advanced technology has had a major influence on NSAs, by making it possible for them to have a global reach and thus increase their autonomy. This has led to them acting with more effectiveness than the state (NGOs in humanitarian disasters), challenge strong powers (Google in China) and even modify security issues (international networks of terrorism like al-Qaeda). The effectiveness with which they perform gives them legitimacy (La Porte 2012, p.4), while also leading to a blurring of the boundaries of state-citizen relations and a transformation of national sovereignty (Keck and Sikkink, 2014).

Jessica Mathews (1997) points to the decreasing importance of political boundaries in the circulation of resources as well as threats, like money, information, pollution and popular culture, to affirm that not just the autonomy of national governments is being affected, but the 'absolutes of the Westphalian system' as well: territoriality, state sovereignty and the lack of an authority above states. Contrary to Mathews' radical view, I believe the sovereign state is not in decline. As McGrew argues (2008, p.28) sovereign power and authority is not necessarily being eroded, but rather undergoing a transformation. They now represent less a claim to supreme power and more of a bargaining instrument vital in the context of transnational systems of rule-making that encompass other agencies and social forces as well. In this sense, the forces of

globalization are not resulting in state erosion, but stimulate the emergence of a more activist state.

From a different perspective, Keohane and Nye (1973, p.163-164) agree that non-state actors like multinational corporations or transnational guerrilla movements complicate inter-state relations and foreign policy in itself, and look at the structures of interdependence between global actors, both state and non-state. If state-centred Marxists say that interdependence only exists because states allow it to exist, they recognize the impact that NSAs can have on key issues and the vast resources at their disposal. Coexistence between state and non-state actors, although sometimes a challenge, provides greater opportunities for the development of interests that go beyond the boundaries of the territorial state. Edward Morse (in Gourevitch 1978) goes even further than that by arguing that modernity and interdependence are interlinked, so modern societies are inherently characterised by interdependence. This perspective sees the notion of sovereignty as losing its importance, as opposed to the international sphere which becomes more important.

Regimes and state strength

Many issues that were previously seen as domestic, such as agriculture, policing or justice, are now part of the international agenda formulated by states together with non-states actors. The main purpose of most transnational actors is promoting ideas, but how open countries are to these ideas and the degree to which they are actually implemented as policy strictly depends on domestic state structures. There is a significant difference in levels of influence and access between countries characterised by secretive, centralized and state-controlled structures and countries that are open and have a pluralistic polity. Evangelista (1995) analyses the example of the Soviet Union, arguing that a highly centralized, authoritarian state like the Soviet Union in the 1980s can limit the access to a wide range of groups, and can also choose certain groups to privilege, in this case a transnational community of scientists and other professionals involved in international discussions on disarmament which were successful in influencing the state's security policy. The shift to a more open domestic structure in the late 1980s made it more difficult for this group to see their policies implemented, by leading to increased competition that depended on power and resources. Joachim (2003) also talks about

the institutional context, which either imposes difficulties or delivers opportunities, as the 'political opportunity structure.' This is comprised by formal elements of liberal approaches, like voting rules, or cultural and normative components and affects the framing of processes in a few ways. It creates opportunities of action, but also act like a gatekeeper and privileges certain frames while side-lining others.

Globalization theory also argues that transnationalisation weakens the state. The emergence of transnational structures that are not dependant on territory or government regulation diminishes the role of government authority and weakens state structures (Langhorne, 2005). The strong versus weak states theory is not about relative capabilities and hierarchies, but rather looks at the relations between state and society, and the relative autonomy of the state from society. Therefore a weak state is one responsive to societal pressures put forward by domestic or non-state actors, while strong states are autonomous from societal demands. Original theorizing about transnational relations maintained that these would not be able to penetrate 'high politics' and would only predominate in democratic countries that would permit the penetration of government policymaking. The Soviet Union therefore served as the perfect example of a strong state that would be immune to the influence of non-state actors. At the opposite end, the United States would be the best example of a weak state, a state that is responsive to pressures from society. Mathews (1997) offers as example the negotiations between America and Mexico for the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement, which were being done behind closed doors until NGOs opposed to it and demanded provisions on health and safety, trans boundary pollution, consumer protection, immigration, labour mobility, child labour, sustainable agriculture and debt relief. The opposition they generated forced the Bush administration to open the agreement to environmental and labour concerns. However, I would like to argue that continuous transnationalisation is making the dichotomy of weak-strong state somewhat anachronistic, as it becomes more and more difficult, even for authoritarian states, to resist to external pressures.

This is not to say that individual states have no control over transnational transactions and interactions. The assumption that they are powerless before external structures of influence makes it easy for governments to shift blame on non-state actors when necessary. The relationship does, however, go both ways and non-state actors are also influenced by states. Not

only that, they can sometimes be in the complete possession of state actors, through financial support, the most evident example being the Comintern in Soviet Russia.

Channels of influence

Because they consist of such an extensive range of actors, NSAs have many responsibilities dictated by material and ideational structural constraints alike, both at the domestic and international levels. Their range of work and interests are very broad. Their purpose is to generate new ideas, advocate, protest and mobilize public support; do legal, technical, scientific and policy analysis; change institutions and norms (Mathews 1997, p.53). They usually impact on specific issues through agenda setting, policy formulation, policy implementation and monitoring compliance. Still, in order to have an actual effect on state policies, they need to actively influence the foreign policy of states, and they do this by playing a part in the phase of formal policy decision-making. The most relevant strategies they use in order to achieve this are lobbying, advocacy, monitoring, participation and protest (Arts, 2013).

Lobbying represents mainly informal, tacit attempts to influence decision- makers which are usually employed by representatives of multinational companies trying to protect their interests. While it implies direct and close contact, it is often criticised for its lack of transparency. At the EU multi-level system, for example, business interests work to influence legislation in certain policy areas through diverse and complex structures of lobbying, but these are difficult to assess due to the inherent lack of transparency (Bouwen, 2002) . Although it is seen as less effective due to its lack of specific targets a more open way of spreading information and ideas is advocacy. Monitoring consists of supervising whether governments abide by their promises and policies, while protest is the only form of influence independent of the political system, and it implies the open propagation or opposition to certain measures or institutions. The most direct way of influencing decision-making is participation, through which non-state actors are formally part of policy arrangements. Which channels of influence are used is highly dependent on the non-state actors employing them, as well as the institutional structures and the policy area.

While multinationals are most likely to engage in lobbying, NGOs generally take on strategic framing processes to set the policy agenda, which consist of definition of problems, development of policies and politicization of these ideas. The success of non-state actor

influence is contingent on the dynamic interactions of the organising structures at their disposal and the political opportunity structure in which they are set in (Joachim, 2003). It is important to note that the concept of NGOs framing agendas in itself illustrates that power does not only result from 'hard' military and economic resources as assumed by realist theory, but also from the influence of defining/redefining and legitimizing/delegitimizing, as advocated by constructivists. The influence NGOs have been playing for the past few decades can be most clearly seen in their essential role in designing, implementing and monitoring the international human rights regime. Risse (2000) goes as far as saying that human rights norms have had severe effects on the principle of national sovereignty, as accusations of human rights violations can no longer be branded by dictators as interference in their internal affairs.

However, non-state actors have not only helped institutionalize human rights or environmental laws at an international level, some of them have caused the destabilization of international security. Transnational networks of violence and terrorism have undermined the state's monopoly on the use of force and increased the spreading of transnational security issues (Schneckener 2006). In the case of criminal networks of power, response from the international system, state and non-state actors, is essential. Retaliation from the U.S. with the War on Terror has only led to additional humanitarian disasters, creating more security problems and governance failures. The current situation in international security asks for a reaction that will take into consideration the interests of the system as a whole, and not just the interests of one state. The influence of non-state actors in a policy response would have less damaging consequences than unjustified military interventions.

Conclusion

Debates surrounding the effects of globalization on the world system have led to a growing literature on global governance that proclaims the demise of state authority and sovereignty, caused by the surge and dominance of private actors in world politics. Although it is true that the influence non-state actors have over states' foreign policy has increased over the past few decades, they still do not hold enough influence to bring about structural change in the international system as a whole. What they do generate is a rethinking of the structures of the world system. Nation-states are still the central actors responsible with creating effective change,

but now they have to do it in consideration of other external as well as domestic influences. Even though NSAs might not be able to generate outcomes, the influence they have on agenda setting and in procedural terms is rather fundamental. The resources they bring in terms of ideas, arguments and information are crucial in influencing internal debates as well, together with the legitimacy that they confer to domestic actors by association.

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Is the neoliberal state a contradiction in terms?

(Written for International Political Economy, 2nd year)

LaTisha Gordon

The concept of the neoliberal state is a widely contested issue within the discipline of international political economy. This essay aims to explain the notion of the neoliberal state, the relationship between the state and the economy under neoliberalism in theory and in practice, and finally argue whether or not the neoliberal state is a contradiction in terms. In my view, I would argue that the neoliberal state is indeed a paradox on the basis that the state cannot be 'limited' if it is enforcing market liberalisation through privatisation and 'regulated deregulation'. As such, the state is indirectly intervening in the market.

Nevertheless, neoliberalism can be defined as "a new stage of capitalism that emerged in the wake of the structural crisis of the 1970s" (Duménil & Lévy, 2011, p. 1). At the core of neoliberal theory is an attempt to "replace political judgement with economic evaluation... including that offered by markets" (Davies, 2014, p. 3). Thus, the central defining characteristic of neoliberalism is its "hostility to the ambiguity of political discourse, and a commitment to the explicitness and transparency of quantitative, economic indicators" (Davies, 2014, p. 4). In other words, neoliberalism is the pursuit of the "disenchantment of politics by economics" (Davies, 2014, p. 4). Therefore, as Davies argues, neoliberal ideology seeks to deconstruct the "language of politics" using the model of the market price system (Davies, 2014, p. 4).

Neoliberalism is not only conflicted in its relationship with the state, but also in its relationship with its own prerequisite ethos: replacing politics with economics as an efficient way of organising society (Davies, 2014, p. 8). As such, one of the critical questions for neoliberalism is why economics should be a better unit of analysis for government than other political or scientific forms of authority (Schmidt & Woll, 2013, pp. 8-9).

Even so, the end of the 1980s saw the formation of a new social order (Duménil & Lévy, 2005, p. 9) and the revival of economic liberalism as a form of political economy

(Gamble, 2001, p. 129). Neoliberalism, although largely confined to English speaking countries of Anglo-America (notably the US and UK) (Gamble, 2001, p. 129), surfaced following the collapse of Keynesian economics. As such, the political ascendency of neoliberal ideas represented by Thatcherism in the UK and Reaganism in the US established the neoliberal doctrine as the "new paradigm shaping all policies" (Gamble, 2001, p. 129). Therefore, the neoliberal belief in the "preservation of income and wealth of the owners of capital" (Duménil & Lévy, 2005, p. 13) replaced the Keynesian objective of full employment.

Nonetheless, Cahill identifies three fundamental features of neoliberal thought. Firstly, the neoliberal analysis of the world is understood through the notion of methodological individualism, whereby the individual is taken to be the "basic unit of analysis" (Cahill, 2014, p. 3). In addition, the individual is perceived in certain way – based on the pessimistic neoliberal conception of human nature – as self-interested, rational and utility maximising. Secondly, the preservation of individual liberty should be the ultimate goal of society and government (Cahill, 2014, p. 3). Neoliberals therefore advocate negative freedom, or freedom from coercion. Finally, markets are understood as spheres of voluntary exchange between individuals (Cahill, 2014, p. 3). As such, if markets are freed from restrictions (such as the state), market transactions ensure individuals are able to satisfy their needs (Cahill, 2014, p. 3). As well as this, neoliberals argue free competitive markets warrant economic efficiency. Therefore, the free (competitive) market is seen the most efficient and most ethical – because it preserves individual liberty – form of social organisation (Cahill, 2014, p. 3). As a result, neoliberals advocate the devolution of state functions, for example through policies of privatisation, deregulation and marketisation.

Despite this, the neoliberalism that surfaced in the 1980s differs significantly from the liberalism of the nineteenth century, particularly with regards to the relationship between the state and the economy. As Harvey argued, "neoliberalisation seeks to strip away the protective coverings that embedded liberalism allowed and occasionally nurtured" (Harvey, 2005, p. 168). Whilst classical liberalism was characterised by its advocacy of limited government (Dardot & Laval, 2013, p. 16), neoliberalism focuses more on reconstructing the widest possible conditions for market competition to flourish by removing restraints, and "empowering market agents by reducing taxation" (Gamble, 2001, p. 132). In this way, the principle of the free,

competitive market is paramount within neoliberal thought, and so neoliberalism has distanced itself from the "dogmatic version of liberalism" established in the nineteenth century (Dardot & Laval, 2013, p. 17).

Furthermore, neoliberal philosophy holds that the state should favour strong individual property rights, the rule of law, and the institutions of freely functioning markets and free trade (Harvey, 2005, p. 64). This institutional approach lies at the heart of neoliberalism (Hilgers, 2012, p. 81), and is considered essential to guarantee individual freedoms (Harvey, 2005, p. 64). However, this also highlights a fundamental contradiction within neoliberalism. As Friedman put it, "government is necessary to preserve our freedom; yet by concentrating power in political hands, it is also a threat to freedom" (Friedman, 1962, p. 2). In this sense, the concept of the neoliberal state is a paradox.

However, Hayek argued that it is necessary to create a "political programme that can facilitate the emergence of spontaneous market order" (Hilgers, 2012, p. 81). Thus, the neoliberal state must use its power to "impose or invent market systems" (Harvey, 2005, p. 65). As well as this, the principle of competition is of primary virtue within neoliberalism, and, combined with privatisation and deregulation, neoliberals argue this will "eliminate bureaucratic red tape, increase efficiency and productivity, improve quality and reduce costs" (Harvey, 2005, p. 65). From this perspective, the role of the neoliberal state is to expand its competiveness in the global market. Therefore, it can be argued that it is through the state neoliberalism has been able to "realise [its] vision" (Schmidt & Woll, 2013, p. 112), and so I would argue that the state for neoliberals is a 'necessary evil'.

Furthermore, neoliberalism requires a strong state because it is "an essential prerequisite to a space of pure competition" (Hilgers, 2012, p. 81). Like Harvey, Hilgers argues competition requires that the state be organised in a way that enables it to correct the "natural phenomena" (for example price instability or the creation of monopolies), that may hinder market competition (Hilgers, 2012, p. 81). Thus, competition and maximisation become the organising principles of the state (Hilgers, 2012, p. 81). What's more, the free movement of capital is regarded as crucial for neoliberals, as it enables international competition to flourish (Harvey, 2005, p. 66). Therefore, states under neoliberalism should collectively seek to remove barriers to capital and trade in order to open the market to global exchange (Harvey, 2005, p.

66). In this way, the neoliberal state is not a contradiction in terms in theory, on the grounds that the role of the state still remains limited; its only responsibility being to create the institutions necessary to uphold the free market (Schmidt & Woll, 2013, p. 118).

On the other hand, neoliberals view the state as inherently dangerous (Schmidt & Woll, 2013, p. 118). For Freidman, this explains why the role of the state must be as constrained as possible, despite the fact that this may give monopolies more freedom and consequently distort the market (Schmidt & Woll, 2013, p. 118). In addition, Buchanan argues public officials are self-interested – reflecting the pessimistic neoliberal perception of human nature – and maintains that they will act against the public interest in order to satisfy their own personal needs (Schmidt & Woll, 2013, p. 118). As a result, neoliberal theorists are strongly suspicious of democracy, viewing governance by majority rule as a potential threat to individual rights and constitutional liberties (Harvey, 2005, p. 66). Therefore, neoliberals tend to favour government by elite rule. As Hayek argued in *The Constitution of Liberty*, "in any state of affairs, government by some educated elite would be a more efficient and perhaps more just government than chosen by majority rule" (Miller, 2010, p. 93). However, here another contradiction arises: between the notion of possessive individualism and the desire for a meaningful collective life (Harvey, 2005, p. 69). For instance, given the neoliberal restriction on democratic governance, there is a strong reliance placed upon "undemocratic and unaccountable institutions" such as the IMF and World Bank (Harvey, 2005, p. 69).

Nevertheless, Friedman argues that government power must not only be dispersed (Friedman, 1962, p. 3), but the scope of government must be limited, its major function being to "protect our freedom both from the enemies outside our gates and from our fellow-citizens" (Friedman, 1962, p. 2). This also suggests why the neoliberal state, especially under Thatcher was so focused on preserving law and order. Subsequently, neoliberals endorse the implementation of a strong state in order to enforce the rule of law.

Having said that, the role of the state under neoliberalism in practice suggests that perhaps the neoliberal state is indeed a paradox. As Palley argues, "pragmatism forced neoliberal policy makers to depart from theory" (Palley, 2005, p. 23). This is particularly evident in the UK and US, whereby the elections of Thatcher in 1979 and Reagan in 1980 can be viewed as "inaugurating the formal period of neoliberal economic policy dominance"

(Palley, 2005, p. 24). Consequently, the general character of the state in the era of neoliberalisation is difficult to describe without falling into contradictions. Thus, the "systematic divergences from the template of neoliberal theory" soon become apparent. (Harvey, 2005, p. 70). Harvey distinguishes two arenas of bias that arise out of the neoliberal state. Firstly, the need to for the government to create a "good business or investment climate" for capitalistic endeavours (Harvey, 2005, p. 70). Secondly, in the event of conflict, neoliberal states typically favour the integrity of the financial system over the well-being of the population (Harvey, 2005, pp. 70-71). However, whilst it is crucial for the neoliberal state to preserve the integrity of the financial system, the "irresponsible and self-aggrandising individualism" of operators within it produces financial scandals (such as the recent Libor banking scandal in the UK) and chronic instability (Harvey, 2005, p. 80). From this perspective, it can argued that neoliberal policies of deregulation facilitate behaviours that ultimately call for re-regulation if crisis is to be avoided (Harvey, 2005, p. 80), resulting in more state intervention.

Furthermore, on the one hand the neoliberal state is expected to take a back seat and simply "set the stage for market functions", but on the other hand neoliberals push for the state to be an activist in creating a good business climate and act as a competitive entity in global politics (Harvey, 2005, p. 79). This includes averting financial failures, for example the US savings and loans crisis of 1987-8 (Harvey, 2005, p. 73). Therefore, although in theory the neoliberal state has quite a limited role, in reality, the opposite is true. As Cahill claims, "the size and scope of the state did not diminish during the neoliberal era... in some areas it increased", and this is partially evident through neoliberal policies of privatisation and deregulation (Cahill, 2014, p. 32). In addition, the traditional neoliberal view of the state is centred on the concept of 'market failure' and the problems of natural monopolies and negative externalities, which ultimately lead to calls for government intervention through regulation, taxes and subsidies or government control of production (Palley, 2005, p. 27).

On the other hand, some neoliberals would argue that intervention may lead to 'government failure', and, as such, they claim that though markets may fail, having the state remedy that failure may be worse (Palley, 2005, p. 27). However, though the 'government failure argument' has had great resonance in the US with its culture of radical individualism (Palley, 2005, p. 27), I would argue this line of argument is simply inadequate, on the basis that

the role of the government in a market economy runs far deeper than correcting market failure (Palley, 2005, p. 27). For example, the state also provides essential services related to welfare, healthcare and education, in addition to stabilising the business cycle through monetary and fiscal policy (Palley, 2005, p. 27).

Nonetheless, it could also argued that the neoliberal state can only be sustained in the short run. Neoliberalism as an ideology is a "social order aimed at the power and income of the upper classes" (Duménil & Lévy, 2011, p. 228). Thus, under neoliberalism the state always works in favour of the upper classes (Duménil & Lévy, 2011, p. 228), generating hostility amongst the poor in the long run (Gamble, 2001, p. 132). Neoliberalism is therefore a "predatory system" that uses the state as a means of strengthening the power of, and restoring the income and wealth of the upper fractions of the ruling classes (Duménil & Lévy, 2005, pp. 18-19). As a result, this goes against the neoliberal notion of preserving individual liberty, and further reflects the egoistical neoliberal view of human nature. Moreover, this contradicts what Gamble calls the "practical foundations" of the neoliberal state: to secure internal order and external defence, and more importantly, to "promote the prosperity and welfare of it citizens" (Gamble, 2013, p. 61).

Furthermore, the neoliberal state is inherently unstable (Harvey, 2005, p. 81). For instance, the neoliberal push for state authoritarianism in market enforcement, most evident in the Thatcherism during the 1980s does not sit well with the neoliberal ideals of individual freedom (Harvey, 2005, p. 79). Therefore, the more neoliberalism veers towards the former (state authoritarianism), the harder it becomes to maintain its legitimacy with respect to the latter (individual liberty) (Harvey, 2005, p. 79), thus creating a contradiction between the role of the state and neoliberal values. Additionally, Polanyi feared the 'neoliberal utopian project' could only be maintained by resort to authoritarianism. Consequently, the freedom of the masses would be restricted in favour of the freedoms of the few (Harvey, 2005, p. 70), and so this further suggests that there is a paradox between neoliberalism and the role of the state.

To conclude, neoliberalism is the successor to the economic liberalism of the nineteenth century, an "ideological and political project responsible for the free market experiment" (Gamble, 2001, p. 33). For neoliberals, the state is "an instrument through which we can exercise our power" (Friedman, 1962, p. 2) and safeguard individual liberties. The

neoliberal state justifies its decisions, policies and rules in terms of the logic of markets (Davies, 2014, p. 6). Davies argues the authority of the neoliberal state is heavily dependent on the authority of economics to dictate legitimate courses of action (Davies, 2014, pp. 8-9).

Nevertheless, the idea that the neoliberal state is a contradictions in terms remains a disputed topic, although I would argue there is a paradox between neoliberalism and the state, especially in today's society, on the grounds that the government continues to play a key role in economic and political life. However, as Hayek argued, "it is the character rather than the volume of government activity that is important" (Dardot & Laval, 2013, pp. 121-122).

Nonetheless, the neoliberal state highlights a fundamental contradiction within neoliberalism (Schmidt & Woll, 2013, pp. 112-113). Whereas neoliberal theory demands a highly limited state, in practice a strong inteventionist state capable of imposing neo-liberal reform is required (Schmidt & Woll, 2013, p. 113).

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What impact did the Muslim Brotherhood have in Egypt? And how has it changed over time?

(Written for Reforming Islam, 3rd Year)

Jessamy Fussco-Fagg

Hasan al-Banna in 1928 formed a religious organisation called the Ikhwan al-Muslimin (Muslim Brotherhood), originating in Egypt, their Islamist ideology spread to surrounding Arab nations, starting the Islamic movement that has dominated that region since. For the purposes of this essay, I will be focusing on the Brotherhood in Egypt and analysing its impact within the three main spheres that it worked within: the political, social and religious. I chose to focus within Egypt as "Egypt, of course, has the oldest and most influential Islamic movement, both domestically and regionally"[1] and this Islamic movement is epitomised by the Brotherhood. The Muslim Brothers are a group founded on, and fighting for, Islamic revivalism. Based on the belief of a need to reinvigorate Islam, which started with the Islamic modernist movement led by scholars like al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh in the 1920s, which went on to spark the reactionary revivalist movement, of which the Brotherhood is a part. The Brothers are attempting to generate Salafism in order to renovate Islam, recommit Muslims to the 'true' practice of Islam and campaign for shari'a to be the basis of law. The organisation started off as an education centred movement, attempting to impact society through da'wa (religious outreach), to try and create a more dedicated Muslim community. "It [arguably] quickly developed from a strictly religious organisation proselytising adherence to true religious values to one with a political and social vision for Egypt",[2] which will be evaluated when looking at its impact in the political and social arenas. This shift arguably happened due to the progress the Brotherhood made in the religious fields of its project; which taught people that the shari'a should govern "over all aspects of life: the political, the economic, the personal and the social".[3]

[1] Nazih Ayubi, *Political Islam Religion and Politics in the Arab World* (Oxon: Routledge, 1993) 71
[2] Mariz Tadros, "The Muslim Brotherhood's Gender agenda: Reformed or Reframed?" in *IDS Bulletin Vol. 42 No. 1* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Limited, Jan 2011) 89
[3] Ahmad S. Moussalli, "Hasan al-Banna's Islamist Discourse on Constitutional Rule and Islamic State" in *Journal*

As the movement developed so did the leader al-Banna, who came to realise and express that "mere religiosity without solid commitment to political, social, and economic activism is useless in the service of the Muslim society",[4] and so expanded the work of the Brothers to be active in these fields. However, the Brotherhood has faced several waves of repression from the government, under leaders like Nasser and Mubarak, which arguably has limited its political role, giving way to a more progressive role in the social and religious arenas. This idea has been touched upon by Stark: the Brotherhood "gained broad based credibility through the social and educational activities that they have effectively taken over from the state",[5] and this concept of the Brotherhood replacing the state in social fields will be explored later. As the movement started in the late 1920s- early 1930s, and continues to be a presence in the Arab world and specifically Egypt, I have chosen to chart the movements impact across time. I will be assessing their impact by looking separately at each arena, for example in the political arena I will assess their impact by looking at whether they were able to achieve goals, such as ensuring laws are based on the shari'a, as well as looking at the more traditional route of impact, election results.

As already indicated the political aspect of the Brotherhood has been suggested to be a later development, in terms of its active participation in the political arena. Arguably, the Brotherhood has always had a political agenda as it "promoted the necessity of an Islamic state on the basis of shari'a",[6] as part of its Islamic message, as "the Brotherhood's understanding of Islam [is that it is] not just a matter of private faith and ritual, but also as the guiding principle for the regulation of society's affairs",[7] which implies a politic of state building. The political aspects however, as Mitchell explains, took a back seat in the initial phases of the movement, i.e. before the politicisation of 1939; "At such an early stage in the society's formation and development, the tasks of moral reform (islah al-nufus) and agreeing on an Islamic approach and methodology (minhaj islami) must have appeared more appropriate for the requirements

of Islamic Studies Vol. 4 No. 2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993) 168

[4] IBID 167

[5] Jan Stark, "Beyond 'Terrorism' and 'State Hegemony': Assessing the Islamist Mainstream in Egypt and Malaysia" in *Third World Quarterly Vol. 26 No. 2* (Taylor and Francis Limited, 2005) 317

[6] Ahmad S. Moussalli, "Hasan al-Banna's Islamist Discourse on Constitutional Rule and Islamic State" in *Journal of Islamic Studies Vol. 4 No. 2* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993) 164

[7] Carrie Rosetsky Wickham, "The Muslim Brotherhoods and Democratic Transition in Egypt" in *Middle East Law and Governance 3* (Brill Leiden, 2011) 206

of the phase".[8] I would argue against this, as I think the Brotherhood has always had a political agenda, and that didn't take a back seat in the da'wa education dominated phase of the 1930s. This is reflected in the British reports about the Ikhwan, "subsidies from the Wafd to the Ikhwan el Muslimin would be discreetly paid by the Government"[9], showing active communication and cooperation between the government and the Brotherhood in its early da'wa phase. Across time this has been shown to continue with the Sadat government also supported the Brotherhood "in an attempt to counterbalance the Nasserist and socialist trends".[10] Returning to how in its initial phase it was still proclaiming a political agenda Wickham explains, "by spreading its message, it sought to create a society of committed Muslims who would themselves eventually demand a political order based on the shari'a",[11] so was already, in its initial da'wa projects seeking a political goal for the establishment of an Islamic state. After the fifth conference in 1939 where it re"defined the society as inter alia, as a political organisation"[12] its "the first and most important [...] political reform measure[...] was the reform of the constitution".[13] This was to make sure it incorporated an article that based legislation on the shari'a. This goal to have laws based on the shari'a hasn't changed with the development of the movement across time, reflected by the continued dedication to the protection of Article 2 in the constitution, that they initially fought for in the drafting of the constitution in 1952.[14] The adoption of Article 2 in 1953, and its continued appearance in the proceeding constitutions, 1971, 2012 and 2014,[15] show a significant impact that the Islamist ideas spread and advocated by the Brotherhood have had. This is reflected in Aybui's views that "in terms of political action, there is little doubt that the Islamic movements in Egypt have registered some notable victories".[16] The adoption of Article 2 being the main one, and which continues to impact on Egyptian policy as shown by the attempted 1985 liberal family law

[8] Nazih Ayubi, *Political Islam Religion and Politics in the Arab World* (Oxon: Routledge, 1993) 131
[9] Anita L. P. Burdett, *Islamic Movements in the Arab World 1913-1966 Vol. 3: 1933-1948* (Archive Editions Limited, 1998) 364
[10] Nazih Ayubi, *Political Islam Religion and Politics in the Arab World* (Oxon: Routledge, 1993) 74
[11] Carrie Rosetsky Wickham, "The Muslim Brotherhoods and Democratic Transition in Egypt" in *Middle East Law and Governance 3* (Brill Leiden, 2011) 206
[12] Richard P. Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969) 16
[13] IBID 260
[14] Carrie Rosetsky Wickham, "The Muslim Brotherhoods and Democratic Transition in Egypt" in *Middle East Law and Governance 3* (Brill Leiden, 2011) 219
[15] http://comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/comparing-the-egyptian-constitution/ last accessed: 8/12/14 12:39
[16] Nazih Ayubi, *Political Islam Religion and Politics in the Arab World* (Oxon: Routledge, 1993) 85

proposed by Sadat that was eventually blocked and found to be unconstitutional on the basis and use of Article 2.[17] What this demonstrates is the lasting impact that this article has made and will continue to make in Egypt and in the process of law making, which reflects the impact the Brotherhood has made, in so far as they were active campaigners for the introduction of this article.

The other area of impact that I will be assessing is the electoral and active participation of the Brotherhood in the parliamentary realm. The reason I am looking at this is that it reflects how much the Brotherhood has had an impact on society, in order to gain votes for seats, as well as demonstrating how successful they have been in dominating the political sphere. The Brotherhood started to become present in the political scene as argued by Mitchell, "by the outbreak of the Second World War, [to become] one of the most important political contestants on the Egyptian scene".[18] Initially they "operated outside the formal political order and sought the comprehensive Islamic reform of society and state",[19] as already explained through da'wa, but they began to field candidates for many types of elections from 1984, and then in 1987 they secured "thirty six representatives in the parliament".[20] They have continued to grow and gain more electoral support, demonstrated by claims by historians like Tadros that "2005 signalled that the Muslim Brotherhood were the most organised political force with wide appeal that could seriously compete with the ruling party, the National Democratic Party" (NDP).[21] This argument shows the significant role that the Brotherhood has had, in terms of gaining such electoral success, but also in how much more it could have, posing a threat to the ruling party. I am inclined to agree with Tadros because as can be seen by the 2014 election of Abdel Fattah Saeed Hussein Khalil el-Sisi, a member of the armed forces, of which the Brotherhood has had a close relationships with,[22] the Brotherhoods alliance building proved it

[17] IBID
[18] Richard P. Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969) 12
[19] Carrie Rosetsky Wickham, "The Muslim Brotherhoods and Democratic Transition in Egypt" in *Middle East Law and Governance 3* (Brill Leiden, 2011) 206
[20] Nazih Ayubi, *Political Islam Religion and Politics in the Arab World* (Oxon: Routledge, 1993) 73
[21] Mariz Tadros, "The Muslim Brotherhood's Gender agenda: Reformed or Reframed?" in *IDS Bulletin Vol. 42 No. 1* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Limited, Jan 2011) 88
[22] Carrie Rosetsky Wickham, "The Muslim Brotherhoods and Democratic Transition in Egypt" in *Middle East Law and Governance 3* (Brill Leiden, 2011) 213

to be more successful than the NDP. This relationship has led to some arguing rightly that "the Brotherhood had been granted a privileged role"[23] in terms of the governments favour to listen to Brotherhood policies through its connections with the armed forces, but also "as Egypt's largest opposition group, the Muslim Brotherhood is uniquely situated to play a leading role in this era of political transition".[24] What this means for the assessment of the impact the Brotherhood has had on Egypt is that, it continues to make an increasing impact. It does this by dominating the political opposition and infiltrating ruling parties through alliances. Overall, this position in the political arena has undoubtedly impacted on Egypt, which is demonstrated by the adoption of Article 2, and the increasing electoral success of the Brotherhood. Over time this impact has continued to grow, with its increasing presence in the political arena through elections and alliances, as well as through the continued work of the da'wa, which attempts to convert people to a belief in political Islam and an Islamic state.

The next area I am going to look at is the social arena, which "perhaps in no other field except politics was the society more persistent in the pursuit of its aims".[25] I would argue along the line that in the social arena is where the Brotherhood has had most impact. The first reason I would argue this is due to the impact it has had in the education field. "In its social-reform programme, the society's greatest activity was in the field of education",[26] before the war, in its initial phases it introduced its education and school program, by opening schools for both boys and girls and campaigning to reform the Egyptian education system to one that is based principally in Islam, but also teaches broadly aspects of science, in an attempt to modernise the education system.[27] Its impact is evident by the fact that "in the autumn of 1946 the education minister, Muhammad Hasan al-Ashmawi, sent a formal letter to the society enlisting its support and its educational apparatus for a programme then being launched by the government to fight illiteracy".[28] The fact the then government called upon the Brotherhood to help mould and run the state educational affairs shows the impact it was making in the field of education before the

[23] IBID
[24] IBID 204
[25] Richard P. Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969) 284
[26] IBID 283
[27] Israel Gershoni et al, *Redefining the Egyptian Nation 1930-1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) 88 and Richard P. Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969) 287
[28] Richard P. Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969) 287

war. Its role in helping the government in fighting illiteracy and creating the educational curriculum has had a lasting impact. Its core aim was to "represent[...] a conscious attempt to adjust Egyptian life to the sweeping changes of the twentieth century by developing an outlook and lifestyle which would be both Muslim and modern",[29] which is what it attempted to develop in the educational field, was undoubtedly achieved, via the modernising of the religious education offered in Egypt. This again can be backed up by al-Banna who argued "education should be neither purely secular, but should harmoniously blend religious character and moral training with scientific training".[30] I would argue that it succeeded in this, through the adoption of scientific teachings being put into the religious education system, and being taught to the poorest in society through the Brotherhood school systems.

Some would argue however that the Brotherhoods social impact was limited, and would use the example of women. The Brotherhood permit women to work on the basis that they have permission from their husbands under qawamah (guardianship). They argue however that "such rights [(the right of qawamah for men over their wives)] should not be regulated by law and the authorities should not interfere with them".[31] What this means is that a woman should not have a civil right to work guaranteed by law, as that would infringe on the husbands authority under qawamah to stop her. However, legally women do poses this right guaranteed by the constitution, which states that everyone has the equal right to work.[32] This shows that the Brotherhoods view and campaign against women's work rights has failed to impact. This again is shown in the campaign for the right to vote, of which the Brotherhood opposed, women gained the vote in 1956 regardless of heavy campaigning against it by leading Brotherhood officials like Hasan al-Banna, before he died. Although it had a limited impact in terms of the position of women legally in society, it did impact on the cultural premise of women. The cultural shift to a more conservative, traditional Islamism has resulted in the return to veiling as a custom. This custom has continued to be present across Egypt since its initial return in the

[29] Israel Gershoni et al, *Redefining the Egyptian Nation 1930-1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) 21
[30] Richard P. Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969) 285
[31] Mariz Tadros, "The Muslim Brotherhood's Gender agenda: Reformed or Reframed?" in *IDS Bulletin Vol. 42 No. 1* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Limited, Jan 2011) 92
[32] http://comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/comparing-the-egyptian-constitution/ last accessed: 8/12/14 12:39

1970s.[33] Indicating that in terms of women's role in society, the Brotherhood did have some impact, even if it was limited to be outside the legislative field.

Although arguably its impact on women was limited, it did continue to impact on society not just through education but also through health. "Banna made public health an important part of social reform concentrating especially on the dissemination of information and the increase of facilities and personnel to tackle the vast national health problem".[34] One of the ways the Brotherhood went about tackling the health issue was through the creation of the Rovers, which was a team of volunteers that worked in rural areas "used to disseminate hygienic knowledge and bring medical care to the countryside" as well as provide first aid and encourage people to use clinics and hospitals.[35] This rural outreach programme had vast impact on these communities, as it was the first port of call and education programme that informed these people of the health risks and ways in which to go about seeking medical aid. The Brotherhood not only actively engaged with the educational aspect of health care, but also in the active administering of health care, in the form of creating hospitals and clinics. These impacted greatly on the overall care offered to the public, as it treated 21,672 patients by 1945. [36] This added with its education programme has led some to suggest that they "almost come to represent a state within a state",[37] as they provided the services the state was meant to issue to the public. I feel this claim, by historians like Aybui, of the Brotherhood representing a state within a state shows the vast impact it had in the social arena, as it provided the standard welfare system to the Egyptian public, by replacing the state in this field. Which is rightly argued by both Ayubi, and Stark who suggested the Brotherhood "effectively took over the role of a largely passive state".[38]

[33] Margot Badran, "Locating Feminism: The Collapse of Secular and Religious Discourses" in *Mashriq, Agenda: Empowering Women for Gender Equity* (Taylor and Francis, 2001) 45 and Mariam Fam, "Egypt TV's Veil Uproar: Actresses Cover Their Heads On Screen and Touch Off an Art vs Religion Debate" in *Wall Street Journal, Eastern Edition* (New York: Dow Joner and Company Incorporated, Oct 31 2006)
[34] Richard P. Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969) 289
[35] IBID
[36] IBID 290
[37] Nazih Ayubi, *Political Islam Religion and Politics in the Arab World* (Oxon: Routledge, 1993) 133
[38] Jan Stark, "Beyond 'Terrorism' and 'State Hegemony': Assessing the Islamist Mainstream in Egypt and Malaysia" in *Third World Quarterly Vol. 26 No. 2* (Taylor and Francis Limited, 2005) 312

The final element I am going to assess is the religious arena, looking at the impact the Brotherhood had within Egypt religiously. I will be focusing on the da'wa and the spreading of the Islamic message, and the interpretation of Islam they specifically endorsed which has been described as "a distinctive conception of the comprehensiveness of Islam".[39] The Brotherhood interpreted Islam in the broadest sense, seeing its implications as already stated "as not just a matter of private faith and ritual, but also as the guiding principle for the regulation of society's affairs".[40] What this means is that Islam should be the basis of conduct for all spheres of life from the political to the private. As well as seeing Islam as all encompassing, they also called for increased practice and dedication of Muslims to the Islamic faith through prayer, pilgrimage and dress. This aspect of dress has already been touched upon, with the calling for women to wear the hijab or veil, of which they were largely successful. As Aybui rightly notes "growing religiosity among the populace at large, [...] manifested [itself in] things such as increasing participation in prayers and pilgrimages, modesty in dress, higher consumption of religious literature, and growth in the Sufi (mystic) orders and charitable societies".[41] This increased religious observance by the masses shows the impact of the teachings, and da'wa of the Islamist organisations, of which the Brotherhood was the most prominent. As it represents an adoption of more religious conservative ideas by the masses, buying into the Brotherhoods specific brand of Islam, to make it a populist movement. This is reflected by Stark, there was "a general shift of Islamic mainstream policies [...] resulting [from] ideological proximity between mainstream and fundamentalist Islam over an Islamic state, with the [shari'a] as its only legislation and adherence to an Islamically defined morality and lifestyle".[42] What Stark is attempting to argue here is that fundamentalist Islam became the mainstream and accepted form of Islamic practice in Egypt as a result of the Brotherhood, which manifested itself in the legislative acceptance of Article 2. This again is reiterated by Wickham when talking about the position of the Brotherhoods policy on the shari'a, "given the conservative religious sensibilities of a majority of Egyptian citizens, the Brotherhood has not faced significant pressures from the

[39] Nazih Ayubi, *Political Islam Religion and Politics in the Arab World* (Oxon: Routledge, 1993) 131
[40] Carrie Rosetsky Wickham, "The Muslim Brotherhoods and Democratic Transition in Egypt" in *Middle East Law and Governance 3* (Brill Leiden, 2011) 206
[41] Nazih Ayubi, *Political Islam Religion and Politics in the Arab World* (Oxon: Routledge, 1993) 72
[42] Jan Stark, "Beyond 'Terrorism' and 'State Hegemony': Assessing the Islamist Mainstream in Egypt and Malaysia" in *Third World Quarterly Vol. 26 No. 2* (Taylor and Francis Limited, 2005) 317

electorate to abandon its call for shari'a rule".[43] This all shows the impact the Brotherhood has had in getting fundamentalist Islam to the forefront of society, in practice, and in the minds of the people of Egypt, showing a lasting impact in the countries dedication to Islamism.

To conclude, I have argued similarly to Aybui that "there is no doubt that their activist conception of Islam has had a lasting effect",[44] in all three fields that I have looked at. Politically, with the adoption of Article 2 and their continued electoral success, they have impacted on the laws of the country and have positioned themselves within the system to continue to do so. Socially, they "engaged in a wide range of social and political activities... from mosques, clinics and welfare institutions",[45] which forged them a fundamental role within society and the system as providers of basic care to the public. This undoubtedly shows the impact the Brotherhood has had as it became a fundamental part of the everyday welfare system of Egypt. And finally in the religious field as Stark argues "the consequence of two decades of intense Islamisation [has] radically altered society",[46] in terms of its adoption of more conservative Islamic practice and absorption of the Islamist ideology. All these three elements illustrate the vast impact the Brotherhood has had in Egypt across time, from its initial da'wa programmes and focus on education in the 1940s to its electoral success and political focuses throughout the 1950s and late 1980s.

[43] Carrie Rosetsky Wickham, "The Muslim Brotherhoods and Democratic Transition in Egypt" in *Middle East Law and Governance 3* (Brill Leiden, 2011) 221
[44] Nazih Ayubi, *Political Islam Religion and Politics in the Arab World* (Oxon: Routledge, 1993) 134
[45] Jan Stark, "Beyond 'Terrorism' and 'State Hegemony': Assessing the Islamist Mainstream in Egypt and Malaysia" in *Third World Quarterly Vol. 26 No. 2* (Taylor and Francis Limited, 2005) 312
[46] IBID 324

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Is it Possible to devise a fair system of Lustration?

(Written for Politics of Governance: Eastern Europe, 2nd Year)

Leah Adamson

The collapse of communism in 1989 brought about significant problems for the former Soviet satellite states. One of the issues for post-communist states was what to do about the crimes committed during the former regime, which were legal under communism. During the process of transition, Eastern European states under went a programme of lustration: bringing to light the truth about the crimes against human rights. The post-communist countries demonstrated a variety of ways to implement lustration from the start of the transition process (Stan 2010: 247). Although some states such as Poland and Hungary were late to lustration, no country avoided some level of the transitional justice (Nalepa 2010:2-3). As each country had differing styles of lustration; debate arose over how fair these methods were, and whether there was a fair way to implement lustration. This essay will side with the argument that it is impossible to achieve a fair system of lustration throughout the whole of Eastern Europe, as each country experienced different types of communist rule. Also, it is difficult to achieve a fair system of lustration within individual post-communist countries, as each individual case poses different issues. This creates challenges over how to achieve a morally fair and practical system of lustration. This essay will firstly define what is meant by lustration and de-communisation. I will then go on to illustrate the debates over the measures of lustration; suggesting it is not morally or practically fair to implement one system of lustration. In this section I will also define what is meant by morally and practically fair. Next I will focus on how lustration was implemented, dividing the types of lustration into three groups: radical, moderate and no major lustration. Finally, I will assess the effects of lustration, considering the effect on the promotion of democracy, the practical effect on states after lustration and whether lustration is morally or practically fair. This will demonstrate how most forms of lustration have not been morally fair or practical. This essay will conclude that it is difficult to achieve one overarching fair system of lustration. A moderate system of lustration like that undertaken by Poland, Lithuania, Albania

and Hungry is the most morally and practically fair. This is because it achieves a fairer system of moral lustration than radical systems whilst still providing transitional justice. However, practically, due to the lack of complete and truthful evidence in post-communist states, a fair system of lustration is almost impossible to achieve. The lack of legitimate evidence to condemn people is not morally fair either, as it makes it difficult to distinguish the innocent from the guilty.

The process of lustration is a system stemming from de-communisation. De-communisation means the removal of the relics of the old communist regime. This includes excluding associates from the old regime from public life. These are generally old communist party members above a certain level of authority. To lustrate is to bring something to light, or uncover the truth. The process of lustration undertaken by the post communist Eastern European countries was aimed at bringing to light the truth about injustices carried out during the communist regime. Lustration can be defined as the process of screening groups of people for previous acts of collaboration under the communist regime and distinguishing members from holding high level positions in the public system (Appel 2005: 383). This includes holding people to account for their crimes in the previous regime. The system of lustration brings with it debate on how fair the system is and how far the measures should be taken. These come under debates on the moral and practical fairness of lustration.

Morality is a significant part of judging whether lustration is fair or not. To be morally fair within lustration is to have political neutrality when dealing with cases and to be able to judge cases on an individual basis. Individual circumstances must be taken into consideration to make sure that lustration is carried out in a fair manner. The point of political neutrality is difficult to put into practise. This is because lustration laws are somewhat based on communist distain (Appel 2005: 397), which in turn takes away political neutrality. Lustration can be used to discredit the opposition which highlights its political aims (Ellis 1996: 196). Therefore it can easily be used to eliminate the electoral competition (Napela 2010: 10). This was seen in the Czech Republic where Jan Kavan claimed that lustration accusations stemmed from his opposition to Va'clav Klaus' economic programme (Appel 2005: 398). This example highlights a way in which lustration is used to a morally unfair advantage, as it has not be used in a politically neutral manner. The other problem with lustration is that it is difficult to

separate the guilty from the innocent, to distinguish who is actually a collaborator (Napela 2010: 8). Due to the nature of the communist regime, most people were acting with limited freedom which hinders their moral ability. This makes it difficult to judge who was actually a collaborator, as people were acting under restrictions. Andrzej Kaniowski presents the argument that although this is a valid claim, not all circumstances justify any action (1999 :230). He presents the significant argument that lustration should be subject to individual evaluation, not group evaluation, to ensure it is morally fair (Ibid :230). Individual conditions, such as coercion from agents, should be taken into account before reaching a judgment (Calhoun 2004:173). This however is difficult in practice due to the practical barriers, such as tampered evidence. This shows that it is difficult to devise one overall morally fair system of lustration, as the practical measures create a barrier.

The practical fairness of lustration takes into account the ability to form a complete judgement on the individual with proper evidence. To be practically fair means that all evidence is legitimate and in good condition and can produce a clear conviction. However, this is close to impossible due to the nature of the old regime and the conditions of the files which produce a lack of legitimate evidence. Communist agents were encouraged to "pad" files and fabricate evidence to fill a quota. Romanian, Slovakian, East German and Czech agents were known to purge and alter files after the collapse of the communist regime. This produces false accusations and not enough evidence to condemn (Appel 2005: 398). This in turn produces an unfair system of lustration, as the individuals are persecuted on limited, and sometimes fabricated, evidence. This sometimes leaves judgements up to assumptions which link to the issue of morality; that it is difficult to separate the innocent from the guilty. This demonstrates that, even theoretically, it is difficult to devise a system of fair lustration. In reality, the systems of lustration have had difficulty combating the issues of morality and practicality, leading to unfair systems of dealing with the communist past.

Lustration in Eastern Europe has been implemented in different varieties. Eastern Europe, with the exception of Romania and East Germany, has had the tendency to side towards forgiving and forgetting. The premise is that the weaker the autocratic regime at the time of transfer to democracy the more likely officials have been held accountable (Stan 2010: 263).

This is a relatively accurate claim when taking into consideration radical lustration systems in East Germany, however too broad in assumption when states like Belarus are taken into account, with strong communist leadership but a lack of major lustration. Lustration can be grouped into three main styles: radical, moderate and an absence of major lustration. These styles have come under scrutiny when deciding whether they are morally and practically fair.

Radical lustration can be seen early on in the transitional process in the Czech Republic and the former GDR (Stan 2010: 248). In other countries, such as Bulgaria, Lithuania and Romania, there was an initial rejection to the radical approach to lustration. However this resurfaced later on in the process of transition. Romania, at the height of lustration and de-communisation, executed their former leader Ceauşescu and his wife in 1989. This was after a show trail and violent revolution. This is the most radical of all the systems of lustration and de-communisation. The East German system of lustration transferred 250,000 state employees to the status of pending, with fewer than 5% of scholars being re-employed after lustration measures had taken place (Letki 2002: 539). In March 1997, the former GDR banned those found guilty under lustration from holding senior positions for 8 years (Ellis 1996: 194). The Czech Republic, following its split from Slovakia in 1993, continued with lustration. By August 1993 210,000 people had been screened (Ibid: 183). Around 15,000 positive lustrations took place in the Czech Republic; however this did not result in a significant change in the labour status of the lustrated as they were not in elite positions (Ibid: 539). A law passed on July 9th 1993 declared the former communist party "illegitimate" and "criminal". This illustrates the political nature of lustration and demonstrates how it is a product based on communist distain, and so isn't completely morally fair. This is seen further in the communist party being banned form Bulgaria, Latvia and Lithuania in their process of de-communisation and lustration (Ellis 1996: 187-190). These are the most radical examples of lustration systems; there have been more moderate systems in the post-communist states of Eastern Europe.

Less radical measures of lustration were undertaken by countries such as Poland, Lithuania, Hungry and Albania. These laws were based more on screening than those of the radical lustration measures. Hungarian lustration dealt more with the collaborators of the 1956 revolution (Ellis 1996: 183). The laws dealing with the collaborators of the revolution applied

to around only 600 positions (Letki 2002: 539). In March 1994 a lustration law was passed which screened 12,000 officials, including members of government. More than 25 categories of high ranking positions were subject to the new law. However the constitutional court struck down the 1994 law as it was seen as too vague. A new law was passed in July 1996 requiring all people born before 1972 to be screened before taking an oath before parliament (Ellis 1996: 184). The lustration laws in Albania restricted political participation of former communists after the March 1992 elections. The law also outlawed all political parties with communist tendencies. In Lithuania, lustration caused the suspension of around 80 people (Letki 2002: 540). Poland came late to lustration. The process of lustration started in 1996. Lustration measures were different for each person as the categories of persons subject to screening were in a process of protection. The commission rejected an amendment defining what constituted as collaboration (Ellis 1996:192-3). These countries opted for a more moderate form of lustration than that of the radical system. However there were some states that didn't have any major lustration, however these were few.

In some Eastern European countries there were no major lustration measures. In Belarus there were no lustration measures. This is due to President Lukashenko who runs Belarus under an authoritarian communist system (Ellis 1996: 196). President Lukashenko opposed "shock therapy" transition to democracy from communism. It is clear then why Belarus has not undergone a system of lustration. In Ukraine there has mainly been de-communisation, but no real forms of lustration measures to bring to light past communist crimes. In Estonia there have been very limited lustration measures. Lustration has come about through citizenship regulation laws and laws limiting local election participation (Ibid: 191). Slovakia, emerging from a peaceful transition after the 1993 split from the Czech Republic, chose not implement lustration measures (Napela 2010: 27). Instead it took a 'forgive and forget' stance towards the perpetrators of the previous regime. Even though there were no major systems of lustration in these countries, each form of lustration caused effects on the states which implemented them. The effects of lustration highlight the difficulty of the creation of an overarching fair system of lustration.

The results of lustration have come under criticism from the international community as it is argued that lustration is neither morally or practically fair in relation to democracy. When looking at lustration there is no perfect liberal democratic solution to the inherent problems within transitional justice. There is a long search for justice for the people which is difficult to satisfy in a fair manner (Calhoun 2004:167-169). There is a paradox that the countries that need justice the most have had the hardest time coming to a solution (Ibid: 173). The implementation of screening procedures was intended to bring positive change and transform the fundamental structures of authoritarian rule (Letki 2002: 451). However, the effects of lustration have given rise to criticisms, especially from the international community. The criticisms have been more political in nature than from the judiciary (Ellis 1996: 196). The international community has critiqued lustration for both practical and moral unfairness. For example, there was international criticism of the 1991 Czechoslovakian lustration law on the ground that it discriminated and violated human rights standards (Ellis 1996: 182). However, state sovereignty is upheld by international law (Calhoun 2004: 176). This in turn puts the responsibility of devising a fair system of lustration to progress democracy and find retribution on that of the state. Although lustration contributes to the consolidation of democracy there is not a strong causal relationship between it and the establishment of a strong democracy (Letki 2002: 529). This in turn means it is not necessary for democratic consolidation. A criticism of the fairness of lustration is that inclusiveness in democracy is in coloration with its quality (Dahl 1989: 128). However advocators of the fairness of lustration say that exclusion in some cases is necessary to promote democracy (Ibid) as it produces retribution for the people which is for the greater good. A system based on full inclusion is utopian (Letki 2002: 541). This realisation is displayed when Eastern European countries have shifted from a policy of forgiving and forgetting to systems of radical lustration advocating more exclusive measures. Examples of this can be seen in Bulgaria, Lithuania and Romania. It can therefore be seen that it is difficult to establish a fair system of lustration as it can contradict with democracy. To further add to this, the effects of lustration have not been completely successful in a practical sense.

The effects of lustration have not been fair on the countries after the systems have been implemented. Due to the lustration process, many officials were forced to leave positions,

which created more problems for the countries after transitional justice had taken place. This affected countries that underwent radical forms of lustration more due to the sheer number people prosecuted. Only East Germany didn't face a problem with recruitment (Letki 2002: 543) even though they underwent a more radical system of lustration. This is because they had ties with West Germany and so could recruit from there (Ibid). Lustration also created the problem that the less politically aware were left to fill the positions of those are deemed as criminals. People with less political experience were left to fill positions, which in turn threatened state stability (Ibid: 542). For example, both Poland and Hungry had difficulty filling major positions, as around 600 official positions were left vacant after lustrations measures took place (Ibid), even though they both underwent moderate forms of lustration. This shows that the effects of lustration have not been completely positive on the countries which underwent the system. Also, when taking into account the evidence used to incriminate people, the number of demotions from positions cannot be seen as fair. This is because the evidence used was thin, and so it is difficult to distinguish the innocent from the guilty. The effects of lustration can also be seen as not being morally fair due to the lack of political neutrality.

Lustration can be seen as not being fair in a moral sense. Political impartiality and the character of lustration can be used as a point to measure the fairness of lustration (Ibid). Some lustration measures in the post Soviet satellite states can be seen as morally unfair due to the lack of political neutrality. For example the Albanian lustration bill was said to be designed to disqualify political opposition. The bill was implemented immediately following an election, which highlights this issue (Ibid: 544). Similarly, the genocide law implemented by Albania in 1995 was criticised for giving too much executive control. After banning 139 people from the May 1996 elections the international community critiqued the Albanian government for not granting prospective candidates the right to due process (Ellis 1996: 186). There were similar cases in many other countries, as lustration measures were used as a political weapon. It was more common in counties such as the former Czechoslovakia and Romania who underwent radical forms of lustration, compared to those countries who opted for a forgive and forget approach. It can therefore be inferred that a more moderate form of lustration is better for creating political neutrality as the effects are less severe, however this does not mean that there is complete exemption from lustration being used as a political weapon, as shown in the case of

Albania. This shows therefore that it is difficult to devise a completely morally fair system of lustration, as it is hard to stay politically neutral and not use lustration as a weapon. This in turn is not morally fair, as lustration can be used to attack the innocent. Moral fairness can be linked with practical fairness when looking at the unfair nature of documents used in the lustration measures and the effects this had on the lustration process.

The documents used as evidence to persecute people under systems of lustration contribute heavily to the debate on the fairness of lustration systems. The use of fabricated, damaged and missing documents to condemn people under systems of lustration links the idea of practical and moral unfairness. Using fabricated documents to persecute is not practically fair as it holds little legitimate weight in court. It is also not morally fair as it makes it difficult to distinguish between the guilty and the innocent. The processes of lustration carried out in Eastern Europe had this problem. In Poland approximately 40-50% of documents were destroyed when communism was seen to be failing. In Czechoslovakia a staggering 90% of documents were destroyed during the fall of the communist system. This is the same case in Hungary where many secret police documents were destroyed. In Bulgaria and the former Baltic republics the KGB moved files to Russia. (Letki 2002: 543). This had a huge effect on the process of lustration as people are convicted of crimes using false or limited files as the only evidence. The environment of limited public freedom in which the files were constructed also adds to this, as the question arises over how much accountability one can have in the communist regime. This shows that it is almost impossible to devise a fair system of lustration, as the evidence to incriminate is neither morally fair of practically fair in a court of law. This in turn illustrates that it is very difficult to devise a completely fair system of lustration because the evidence it is based on is thin and so causes practical and also moral unfairness to those being incriminated.

In conclusion there has not yet been a completely morally or practically fair system of lustration formulated in the post-communist Eastern European states. Processes of lustration are systems of collective justice applied to individual cases which stop it being fair. Some states have dealt better with this by using moderate lustration. Moderate lustration provides a sense of retribution for the people which a lack of lustration lacks, it is also a way to progress and allow

the inclusion of the condemned back into society which radical lustration doesn't provide. It is extremely morally difficult to create fair lustration. When lustration becomes morally fair it stops being a practical system and so there is a barrier. It is impossible to devise one fair system of lustration for the whole of Eastern Europe. This is because each country has their own individual problems and circumstances to cope with their communist past. Each country must come to its own solution. However, it is also very difficult to devise a morally or practically fair system of lustration within countries. This is because each case is individual and so a form of collective justice would not be morally fair. Although this issue is important, the main issue that hinders the production of a fair system of lustration is the lack of legitimate evidence that can be used to convict people. No post-communist country can avoid this issue, although some countries, such as the former Czechoslovakia, have a more difficult problem than others, due to the amount of damaged documents. Although moderate lustration produces the fairest system of lustration it is not perfectly fair because of the evidence used. This shows that it is almost impossible to devise a fair system of lustration because it would not be practically fair to use illegitimate evidence, which in turn makes it not morally fair as the innocent would not be distinguished from the guilty.

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From Kohl's Madchen to the Most Powerful Woman in the World: How has Gender influenced Angela Merkel's Rise to Power and what impact has it had on her Chancellorship?

(Written for Politics of Governance: Germany, 2nd Year)

Julie Brauch

Angela Merkel is the first female German chancellor. Moreover, she is also the first chancellor from the former German Democratic Republic and the first one with a scientific background. The importance of her gender and its intersection with these other social roles will be analysed throughout this essay. First, traditional gender theories will be described however, the apparent disagreements among scholars will lead to the introduction of the intersectionality approach. This paper will continue with an application of the intersectional lens by analysing Merkel's rise to power, her foreign policy and some aspects of domestic politics. It will conclude that whilst gender has played a crucial part in Angela Merkel's career, it can by no means be used as an isolated factor to describe her chancellorship.

INTRODUCTION

Merkel's quick rise to power after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, becoming Minister of Family and Women in 1991, is mainly due to her special relationship with Helmut Kohl. The latter was German chancellor from 1982 – 1998, hence during the *Wende*[47], and is especially known for being the main architect of the united Germany as well as the Maastricht Treaty. He became Angela Merkel's mentor, which led to her being called his *'Mädchen'*[48]. Under his watch Merkel rose to one of the main figures in the Christian Democratic Union (CDU). In 1999,

[47] *Wende* literally means turnaround; generally used to describe the German unification
[48] *Kohl's Mädchen* = Kohl's girl

Merkel, Secretary-General of her party, broke publically with her mentor following a party funding scandal. She demanded a fresh start without him and became elected first female party leader in 2000 (Davidson-Schmich, 2011). After the elections in 2005, Angela Merkel became Germany's first *Bundeskanzlerin*[49], but her biography made this woman from the East an outsider in the Western, male-dominated political sphere.

This essay is divided into three parts, first it will look into different theories about gender and what to expect from a female executive in terms of leadership style, foreign policy and the accommodation of women's issues into domestic policy. Due to the major disagreements among scholars about the impact of gender, it will introduce the intersectionality approach, which will help to understand the complexity of every leader's personality. Second, this paper will analyse the hold of this approach by looking into Merkel's rise to power and finally her chancellorship, more specifically her foreign policy and some aspects of domestic politics. It will conclude that while gender has played a vital role in Merkel's political career, it cannot be seen as a factor on its own; only the intersection of multiple social traits can explain who the *Bundeskanzlerin* Angela Merkel is.

DISCOURSE ABOUT GENDER

When John Gray famously wrote '*Men are from Mars, Women are from Venus'* he carried the gender specific stereotypes too far.[50] However, he seems to put the perceived differences in everyday life between men and women, whether real or imaginary, in a nutshell. Since the term 'gender' has been introduced in 1955[51] it has been widely used to differentiate biological sex and gender as a social construct; especially feminist theories in the 1970s embraced this distinction. Joan Scott (1986: 1067) characterizes gender as 'a constitutive element of social relationships based on perceived differences between the sexes, and (...) a primary way of signifying relationships of power'. Instancing is the concept of the 'Glass Ceiling' that is widely used to explain why men dominate the arenas of power. For example Zamfirache (2010: 176-177) argues

[49] Bundeskanzlerin = female Chancellor
[50] John Gray (1992), *Men are from Mars, Women are from Venus.* United States: Harper Collins
[51] by sexologist John Money

that it is impossible for women to reach high positions of power due to invisible obstacles that are impossible to overcome. These artificial barriers are primarily stereotypes, media related issues and informal boundaries. Furthermore, Zamfirache points out that the state, the political system, and leadership are seen as being masculine while women are associated with the private, personal sphere of life. The glass ceiling makes it hard for any woman to obtain a position of power. The numbers seem to support this argument: as a matter of fact, 2012 in Germany only 8.7% of leadership positions in companies with more than 500 employees were hold by women.[52] Moreover, only 4% of executive board members in the 200 largest German firms were female.[53] On the other hand, the political arena seems to be more advanced. Since the 1990s the percentage of female members of the *Bundestag* has steadily increased, being currently at a demonstrative 36.5%.[54] However, the difference between descriptive and substantive representation should be pointed out. Lovenduski (2002: 210) describes the former to be a simple presence of women while the latter means the inclusion of women's preferences in policy-making process. Although the gender affinity effect stresses the relation between the female electorate and the female candidate, due to women feeling the need to be represented by other women (Zamfirache, 2010: 184), the critical mass concept states that women representatives will act for women when there are enough of them present (Childs, 2006: 8).

When it comes to the political sphere of representative democracies, gender theory has come a long way since its original assumption that men and women are intrinsically different in behaviour, style and strategy. Nonetheless, there is still little consensus on what is to be expected from female governance or from women in leadership positions in general. While there is a multitude of different literature on gender, this essay will focus on the following three: Louise Davidson-Schmich (2011) describes the main contradictory theories on the anticipated behaviour of female executives. Firstly, about scholars' disagreement of a female leader's approach towards women's issues. Secondly, international relations literature disagrees about anticipated attitude in foreign policies. Thirdly, scholars have different expectations about female leadership style and stance.

[52] http://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/182510/umfrage/frauenanteil-in-fuehrungspositionen-nach-unternehmensgroesse/
[53] http://www.bmfsfj.de/BMFSFJ/gleichstellung,did=88098.html
[54] http://www.bundestag.de/bundestag/abgeordnete18/mdb_zahlen/frauen_maenner.html

Traditional Approaches

Regarding the first disagreement, some scholars would predict that a woman - more likely than any man - in the executive branch will campaign for pro-female policies, while others argue that a *Bundeskanzlerin* will be careful not to come across as caring predominantly about women. This opposed understanding of how a female chancellor will deal with women's issues is the result of two different strands in feminist theories. *Equality feminists* believe that women will become 'political men' as soon as they enter office and hence they will shy away from female issues because they perceive that acting on behalf of women will make them seem 'weak' (von Wahl, 2011: 393). On the other hand *difference feminists* argue that women have a different voice as the men and hence they will change their leadership nature in order to better represent women's issues (Gilligan, 1994: 19). The latter is endorsed by Ferree (2006: 100) who states that men have been generally considered genderless as they are seen to represent the "general" interest while women might only stand for their "special" interest: women's issues.

Next, as Yoder (2011: 361) points out, in the field of international relations there is just as little consensus on the role of gender. Some authors such as Tom Lansford, Francis Fukuyama and Patricia Lee Sykes, suggest that women are more pacifistic than men. Hence, they expect them to be 'softer' regarding their relations with other nations and to focus more on human rights and welfare, aspire for consensus and collaboration. Others align more with the equality movement in feminism, expecting women leaders to be extraordinary 'tough'. V. Spike Peterson and Anne Sission Runyan (1999, cited by Yoder, 2011: 361) predict that female executives may be inclined to copy the male, more aggressive behaviour. Additionally, they argue that female leaders may even tend to become quite offensive in order to prove their power. According to Yoder, the available research suggests that the stereotype of pacifistic women does not hold when it comes to leadership positions. However, she draws our attention to the thought that as the 'masculinised' field of foreign policy is challenged more with female politicians, the system might transform and better accommodate alternative solutions (Yoder, 2011: 362).

The final disagreement among scholars is about general leadership style. While some anticipate female chief executives to pursue a non-confrontational orientated governing approach, because as Olsen (2011: 344) explains, women are traditionally associated with a 'softer' leadership style which emphasis cooperation, consensus and constructivism. On the other hand, some scholars

expect a particular strong top-down 'Iron Lady' attitude pursued with the attention to cover up the inevitable gender discussion.

However, Myra Mary Ferree points out that the gender discourse is not only about the attribute of gender itself but that we shall recognize that the political opportunity structure is gendered (2006: 98). That all interpretations of behaviour are made through a gendered lens becomes clear when reading Evelyn Roll, Merkel's Biographer (Gaschke, 2005):

> *If Angela Merkel is convinced of the inevitability of a process, she moves on unsentimentally. But that is remarked on differently for her than it would be for a man. And should she seek a compromise, which would be called political talent in a man, the newspapers call her hesitant. If she gets her own way, she's called the iron lady whose path is littered with the corpses of her male opponents.*[55]

Alternative approach: Intersectionality

Of course, Merkel is not only a woman. This is why Davidson-Schmich (2011:326) strongly argues that all the previously introduced debates about gender in political science are due to the wrong assumption of an idealised 'woman leader' as well as the missing acknowledgment of the existence of multiple kinds of female as well as male leaders. The executive's biological sex is

[55] "Wenn Angela Merkel von der Unumkehrbarkeit eines Prozesses überzeugt ist, leistet sie sich keine Sentimentalitäten mehr. Nur wird das bei einer Frau anders kommentiert als bei einem Mann. Sucht sie den Kompromiss – bei Männern gilt das als politische Begabung –, liest man über Merkel in den Zeitungen, sie sei zögerlich. Setzt sie sich durch, ist sie die eiskalte Lady, an deren Wegesrand sich die Leichen von gemeuchelten Männern türmen."

only one of a multiplicity of other characteristics that constitute his or her identity: she grew up in the former GDR, had a Protestant education and a successful career in Physics. All these different characteristics have *intersected* to account as a whole for the personality of the *Bundeskanzlerin*. This combined nature of her social traits has to be looked at to understand Merkel's Chancellorship and how it differs from any other past or present, male or female executive. As Ferree (2006: 102) defines it, this inevitable co-existence of many identities for any individual and their varied meanings depending on structural location, has become known in the social science as "intersectionality". Thus instead of constructing a 'homogenous right way of being a woman' (Davidson-Schmich, 2011: 326) as the literature described above does, the intersectionality approach accommodates for the different experiences of 'womanhood'. This means that the shared characteristic of biological sex differs in its meaning across women, depending on how their gender intersects with race, ethnicity, class, sexual orientation, or other (ibid). The intersectional approach convincingly suggests that it is simply impossible to identify a single female executive leadership style. Moreover, it is a presumptuous attempt to name a priori the female policy positions expected from any women in a leadership position.

Looking at Merkel through this intersectional lens shows how her own upbringing has shaped her specific experiences of gender. The GDR claimed itself as having accomplished women's liberation and even if it did not come close to real emancipation, it was significantly further away from the traditional breadwinner model than West Germany, mainly by making marriage less a matter of economic dependence. Moreover, Angela Merkel is divorced and remarried, and has no children, which stands in stark contrast to her party's ideology on family traditions. Another interesting aspect of her past is her scientific background. As in her youth, Merkel was facing discrimination due to her father being a Protestant pastor – not because she was a woman – science for her was rather a refuge from politics, rather than from gender discrimination (Ferree, 2006: 100-104). All these aspects will be analysed in the following paragraph in more depth, concentrating first on Merkel's rise to power and second on her chancellorship in order to identify if the intersectional approach is a suitable analytical tool.

After the heady days of 1989, Merkel joined the social movement group *Demokratischer Aufbruch* (DA)[56] and became its spokesperson. Although gender distinctions were omnipresent, the unbureaucratic nature of social movements offer women more opportunities than formally organised parties do (Ferree, 2006: 104). When the DA joined the East-CDU Merkel worked on a pro-reunification policy that was backed by Chancellor Kohl. In 1990, she secured herself a seat during parliament elections and Kohl surprised everybody by offering the thirty-six year old Merkel a post in his first post-unification cabinet. This would help Kohl diversify his cabinet and as a result of his patronage Merkel got dubbed his '*Mädchen'.* During the government's next two terms, Merkel's loyalty towards her mentor earned her promotions. From being Minister for Women and Youth Affairs, a position stereotypically given to women, she became Environment Minister in 1994. Recognising her scientific skills and ability to deal with 'manly' issues such as climate change and nuclear waste, enabled Merkel to step out of the female pathway in politics for the first time (Clemens, 2006: 153). In the long run, this helped her to avoid being branded as a 'token women' (Davidson-Schmich, 2011: 335). Along with her government positions, Merkel quickly moved up the internal party ladder. Both her close relationship with Kohl and her multiple-minority attributes helped her to become *Stellvertretende Vorsitzende*[57] of the CDU in 1991. After the CDU's 1998 defeat and Kohl's retirement, CDU party chair, Wolfgang Schäuble, named her General Secretary of the party. As a young Easterner she was expected to diversify the CDU's leadership and fulfil informal quotas. The following year Kohl was implicated in a party finance scandal and Merkel, his protégée, was one of the first high-ranking party members to publicly break with her former mentor and advocated a fresh start for the party without him. While Kohl dragged Schäuble down with him, Angela Merkel emerged as the CDU's best hope for new leadership. Viewed as an outsider, she was expected to be capable of the necessary reforms in order to clean up the political chaos. Supplementary to this, her ability to appear as Kohl's legitimate successor got her elected Chair of the party (Clemens, 2006: 153-156). Schwarzer (2000) and Ferree (2006: 104) argue that this milestone of a woman leading one

[56] Democratic Awakening
[57] Deputy head

of the *Volksparteien*, has mainly been possible due to a gendered opportunity structure of politics. Women are expected to have a greater moral rectitude and less self-serving behaviour, leading to their association with clean government (Davidson-Schmich, 2011: 335). Other examples would be Bachelet in Chile and Johnson Sirleaf in Liberia who both came into office in the course of reforms and anti-corruption measures (Ferre, 2006).

Another aspect often neglected is Merkel's youth. Being comparatively young, 46 when becoming chair, made her stand out in comparison to her competitors. Given the party's need for generational change at the top, it was a big advantage for her to know how to use a mobile phone and be comfortable with pop culture (Clemens, 2006: 155).

Despite Merkel's successful rise to the top of her party, it was CSU[58] chair Edmund Stoiber who stood for Chancellor candidate in 2002. In exchange for her support of his unsuccessful candidacy, Stoiber stood behind her as leader of the opposition in the *Bundestag* during the following years. The 2005 elections were called rather suddenly and hence no other rival had time to mobilise against Angela Merkel and so she became the CDU/CSU's *Kanzlerkandidatin*[59]. After the elections and the following substantial negotiations, Merkel assumed Chancellorship of a Grand Coalition, becoming the first woman in office (Davidson-Schmich, 2011: 336). Forbes Magazine (2014) has elected her to be Number One on the list of the most powerful women in the world every year of her eight years in office. Looking at her path to power we can conclude that the intersection of her social traits has helped her to catch Kohl's attention and be elected in several positions in order to diversify the party. However it is impossible to reduce her career on her gender or on any of her other characteristics. She has proven her talent for seizing the opportunity and we can clearly state that Merkel has broken the *Glass Ceiling* by becoming the first *Bundeskanzlerin.*

[58] Christian Social Union (CSU), the Bavarian sister party of the CDU
[59] Chancellor candidate

'THINK, CONSULT, DECIDE': MERKEL'S CHANCELLORSHIP

Angela Merkel's leadership style is characterized by pragmatism and an interest in hearing different solutions to problems in order to deduce the most logical path to take (Clemens, 2010). She has been described as a *realpolitik*[60]politician due to her cautious and practical decisions (Müller and Theile, 2012). Following the example of her mentor Kohl, she adopted the 'party manager' style to avoid committing herself to any particular group or policy within her party. This gives her the possibility to delay concrete or controversial decisions until a consensus has emerged (Olsen, 2011:350). This non-confrontational and consensual approach to leadership, adopting the role of a mediator, is often seen as typical for female executives. However it seems illogical to label Merkel's leadership style as 'feminine' because then it would be necessary to call Kohl's style feminine as well, as she has imitated his political strategies quite substantially (Davidson-Schmich, 2011: 335). Additionally, it is essential to note that leadership style and culture change from generation to generation and both male and female executives will most certainly differ from their predecessors. While Merkel's style has absolutely nothing in common with her forerunner Gerhard Schröder, she reflects the consensual and appeasing style of her mentor Helmut Kohl, considered characteristic of the party management approach and particularly useful when dealing with the heterogeneous membership of the CDU/CSU (ibid). This reveals once again why the intersectional approach is relevant in working out the factors that produced the personality of the *Bundeskanzlerin.* For instance her GDR background most likely shaped her aversion towards open confrontation and bluntness much more than her gender (Olsen, 2011: 352). Therefore, it would be incorrect to presume that her consensual leadership style is a typically female, submissive one when in fact it is a result of her personal intersection of characteristics.

In the following, this will be analyzed by looking into Merkel's Foreign as well as Domestic policy, focusing essentially on her first term as *Bundeskanzlerin.*

[60] real or realistic politics

Foreign policy

As the intersectionality approach suggests, we shall analyse Angela Merkel's foreign policy with regards to her multiple social traits. The lived experiences of any leader will influence their foreign policy style and substance. In the case of Merkel, an Easterner, a Protestant, a Physicist, and the leader of a Grand Coalition, Jennifer Yoder (2011: 363) does not anticipate explicit foreign policies concerning women's rights or any initiatives that would target women in particular. She argues that this is all due to Merkel's GDR background that shaped her worldview in which women and men are intrinsically equal. Hence it follows that she will treat them as equals and not give women more attention. On the other hand, as a result of growing up under communism, Yoder does expect Merkel to place emphasis on the importance of human rights (ibid). From her personal experience she knows the difference between freedom and dictatorship and believes in Western values of freedom, human rights and democracy. Being suspicious towards Russia, like many people from Central and Eastern Europe, Merkel actively seeks to improve the relations with the United States (Hacke, 2008: 1). Secondly, Merkel's scientific education influences her foreign policy making. Her pragmatic leadership approach originates in her 'step by step' political motto 'think, consult, decide' (Bernhard, 2007). She wants to take logical decisions by listening to various recommendations and then choosing the most reasoned, logical solution to a problem (Yoder, 2011: 363). This fact-orientated style goes hand in hand with her preference for teamwork, transparency, dialogue and discretion (Hacke, 20018: 1).

When looking at the full extent of Merkel's foreign policy, she seems to cover these expectations. Hence it becomes obvious that focusing only on her gender does not do justice to the complexity of her style. In reality, it is not as simple to qualify a female executive either as especially 'soft' or remarkably 'tough', as the theories outlined in the beginning suggested.

Domestic policy

In order to get a good insight into how her gender might have affected Merkel's domestic policies, we will now study two explicitly gender-related policy areas: family and anti-discrimination policy. Angelika von Wahl (2011: 392) points out that the criteria she is looking for is whether the

Chancellor has either pursued or avoided certain topics. In the objective of a most-similar-case comparison, these two policy(political) areas are particularly helpful as they are both handled by the Ministry of Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth. Furthermore, they are under the female leadership of Minister Ursula von der Leyen who is affiliated to the same party as the *Bundeskanzlerin* Angela Merkel. Firstly, on the level of family policy, von der Leyen has pushed reforms regarding childcare, parental leave, and tax policies, continuing her predecessors' initiatives. She was rather successful in implementing those because she enjoyed enough personal popularity and the political support of Angela Merkel (ibid: 397). Some good examples are the introduction of income-dependent *Elterngeld*[61], 'father's months' (a two-month parental leave taken by the father) and significant investments into expanding childcare facilities. These policies reflect major institutional and normative changes away from the classical breadwinner model, which is traditionally defended by the CDU/CSU (ibid). While this all seems convincing that Merkel is at least passively taking care of women's issues, Müller and Theile (2012) draw our attention to the fact that this illusion was limited to her first term in office. They point out that in order to calm the CSU and the male, older, centre-right politicians in the CDU, Merkel approved a very controversial childcare allowance. Know as *Betreuungsgeld*[62], it means a monthly cash benefit of 150 Euros for stay-at-home mothers and signifies a fallback into the old breadwinner model. Simultaneously, Merkel refuses until April 2013 to institute a quota for giving women board membership. She was even ignoring the European Commission's proposals on this issue, and needed von der Leyen (now labour Minister) to push her into accepting board quotas for women. Even so, the 30% women policy will only be legally binding from 2020 onwards (Eddy, 2013). *Emma* editor-in-chief Alice Schwarzer, initially so euphoric about Merkel's election, later concluded that the chancellor seems to prefer to abstain when it comes to women's issues (Müller and Theile, 2012). Angelika von Wahl (2011: 405) is defending another view of Merkel's politics. She argues that Merkel did improve reconciliation and anti-discrimination policy while being cautious in appearing not too supportive and hence staying behind Ursula von der Leyen. Nevertheless, she argues as well that Merkel shows different levels of concern and the issue of reconciliation of motherhood with labour benefits more from her attention than women who are already in the labour marked and demanding more equality. This might explain her completely

[61] parenting benefits
[62] care credit

ignoring the gender pay gap with women earning on average 23% less than men in the same position. Or the anachronistic tax system which privileges married couples with one high income and one low, incentive for housewives to stay at home (Helwerth, 2009).

BEING A WOMAN IS NOT A POLITICAL PROGRAMME: CONCLUSION

As the traditional gender theories of female leadership have shown to be too narrow, this paper has introduced the alternative approach of intersectionality. The latter points out the importance of firstly analysing each political leader as an individual and not as part of a group determined by their gender. Secondly, it has shown the need to study how all their different social traits intersect and interact in order to define the personality of a leader. Viewing Angela Merkel through an intersectional lens uncovers that on the one hand her rise to power is rather closely interconnected with the multitude of minorities she belongs to. On the other hand, the importance of her gender on her chancellorship is much harder to determine. By analysing her foreign and domestic politics it became clear that there is no obvious line that could be drawn back to either her gender or any other of her characteristics of being a protestant to growing up in the GDR or being a scientist: it is the intersection of all of them.

To sum up, when asking 'Does gender matter?' von Wahl (2011: 394) suggests that while it does matter sometimes, it is more useful to investigate when and which other social traits and their intersection with each other become relevant. *Kohl's Mädchen* is now the most powerful woman in the world and her gender is only one of her many characteristics that make her the individual leader she is. Being a woman is fortunately not a political program (Helwerth, 2009).

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Appendix

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1991

1995

1998

2006

What are The Principle Issues Raised by Humanitarian Intervention?

(Written for Politics of Governance: International Institutions and Issues, 2nd Year)

George Brown

Humanitarian intervention (HI) is a much disputed topic within both the academic world and the practical world that is deeply divisive. It has come to embody the argument of how states should behave morally throughout the international theatre. Consequentially, many issues have arisen due to this policy. HI is generally considered to mean "an activity taken by a state, or other actor, which interferes in the domestic affairs of another state for moral reasons concerning human rights" (Spalding, 2013, pp.4). However, different schools of thought within this topic has led to different perspectives concerning HI, which can explain various issues that it raises (Spalding, 2013). It is the object of this essay to examine the principle issues that HI has raised both in theory and in practise. These key issues can be identified as:

1) The theoretical issues of humanitarian intervention and state sovereignty.
2) Neo-Colonialism thinly disguised as altruism
3) The inconsistency of the implementation of humanitarian intervention
4) The legality of humanitarian intervention

The theoretical issues of HI and state sovereignty will be addressed first as they serve as the ground work which the other factors draw from. It will be clear that the theoretical issues will influence practical issues raised and will help illustrate and explain examples of HI. Furthermore, it should become apparent that the theoretical issues raised are the most prominent concerns due to their direct influence in shaping the other issues. The argument that HI is disguised neo-colonialism will be further examined, both in theory and in practise. The inconsistency of HI will then be examined, with comparison between several instances of HI or instances where it should have taken place. The legality of HI will then be addressed with a theoretical and practical sense concerning international and various supra-national institutions. It should become apparent throughout this essay that the theoretical issues that surround and are raised by HI are the most prominent due to their ability to directly influence

the other issues both in their theoretical and practical sense. It is important to note that this examination is objective rather than normative; the author of this essay is not attempting to make a case for or against HI, yet is examining and explaining the causes of the major issues raised by HI.

The foundations of any theory constrain their analytical focus and this is critical to an analysis of the topic. These issues will address issues of state sovereignty and whether or not HI entails obligations and duty. Non-intervention theories will first be considered which will then be followed by pro-intervention theories. It is important to understand this theoretical groundwork as it will explain the stand points of the justification of HI and consequentially, the issues that arise from it.

The realist theory plays a prominent role in the issues raised by HI. Realist theory proposes that states are the highest actors in the international system that can be described as in a state of anarchy. Their behaviour is self-motivated and act rationally in their own interests (Warntjen, 2010). The sovereignty of these states is centric to realist rhetoric. Governments have a duty to protect the interests of their citizens in an anarchic and hostile world and constantly keep their self-interests in mind. The international realist perspective concerning global ethics is that morality is not universal, but rather distinct to different actors. As such, HI is "also rejected on the grounds of a rejection of universal human rights" (Spalding, 2013) because the highest moral authority is the political state (Devetak, 2007). Realists would therefore see no moral obligation to intervene. Realists analyse that to achieve order in international society states must retain territorial sovereignty and respect that of others. The policy of non-intervention is heavily based upon realist discourse. As such, the preference of order over justice in the international system is clear. Realism also heavily relies on rational choice theory (Warntjen, 2010), which is where an actor can force the most amount of gains with conceding a few amount of concessions as possible. Due to this, it is evidently irrational to invest one's own resources and man-power into something where no viable reciprocation is possible, based upon a concept of morality that is subjective. This is not to suggest that realists would say all types of humanitarian intervention are wrong, if it is in the interests of the state to intervene in another's affairs, then it is rational to behave as such. This idea of safeguarding states' interests will support the argument of

colonialism and can partially illustrate the inconsistencies of the implementation of HI.

The English School can be seen as a mediator between realists and liberal cosmopolitans. It theorises that the state is sovereign within a society of other states, although the condition of anarchy exists; there is some norm-guided behaviour within the international society (Spalding, 2010). The English school places emphasis on state-sovereignty over humanitarianism and can further be divided into two broad schools of thought: pluralist and solidarist. The pluralist theory regards HI as impermissible because it impedes on the sovereignty of states within the international community (Buzan, 2004), this somewhat leans towards the realist theory of international relations. In contrast to this, the solidarist theory suggests that a society of states should do more to promote the causes of human rights as opposed to the rights of states to political independence and non-intervention in their internal affairs (Buzan, 2004, pp.141). Despite these differences within the English School, both branches agree that the state can be regarded as a supreme moral authority and as such, the protection of state sovereignty take priority over the alleviation of human suffering.

In direct contrast to this, the liberal cosmopolitan support of humanitarian intervention consists of three assumptions: people have equal rights and freedoms, these rights and freedoms are universal, the protection and enforcement of these rights and freedoms are an important concern for all actors, be it the individual, the state or supra-national institutions (Janse, 2006). Unlike realists, liberal cosmopolitans believe in universal human rights and the authority of morality. According to Teson, "If human beings are denied basic human rights and are, for that reason, deprived of their capacity to pursue their autonomous projects, then others have a prima facie duty to help them" (2003, p.97). As such, the violation of universal human rights is immoral and the authority of morality in international society provides the theoretical support for humanitarian intervention. This is supported by the solidarist theory which, "holds that diverse communities can and do reach agreement about substantive moral standards" (Bellamy, p.325). This is in direct conflict with the pluralist English School's realist interpretation that this is not possible in a diverse international society due to the subjectivity and particularistic nature of morality. The liberal-cosmopolitan would therefore place morality over order.

By having examined these three approaches of international relations concerning HI, it is clear that the realist theory and liberal cosmopolitan theory are somewhat polarised. Furthermore, whilst the English school takes a realist stance on the importance of state sovereignty, it can somewhat be considered as a via media between the other two. The priority of morality or state sovereignty will ultimately affect one's stance on HI. By examining the following issues, these theories will help explain both the academic and practical concepts that surround the principle issues that have arisen from HI.

A strong argument can be made that HI is thinly disguised neo-colonialism. Since the dissolution of the European empires, newly formed states have made attempts to move towards self-determination. However, there is evidence to suggest that colonialism is not dead, but rather has evolved through various means in order to achieve the same results in the form of neo-colonialism. Neo-colonialism can be seen as the geopolitical practice of using capitalism, corporate globalization, and cultural imperialism to influence a country, in lieu of either direct military control or indirect political control for the gain of the influencer (Sartre, 2001). HI can be seen as a colonialist tool that can be implemented for the material or political gain of the interveners.

An evident case is the 1989 Invasion of Panama. The U.S used military force to invade the country of Panama and displace Noriega. Given the breakdown of negotiations following calls for democracy and after the attack of four U.S servicemen, relations between the two States had soured, which resulted in invasion. This violation of the sovereignty of other states was justified by the U.S on several grounds including their duty to defend their citizens and to safe-guard democracy and prevent human rights violations (Jones, 2001). The liberal-cosmopolitan theory pervades here as the U.S's actions would seemingly indicate a preference for morality over that of preserving international order (Beardsworth, 2011). As such, it would appear that if one were to view the Invasion of Panama through the lens of a liberal-cosmopolitan view, it would appear as HI rather than neo-colonialism.

However, one should recognise Panama of great geo-political importance, serving as a link between the Northern and Southern hemispheres. The Panama Canal remains a key strategic

military position whilst serving as a fundamental global trade route (Child, 1979). Noriega started to re-align himself towards the Soviet bloc, soliciting and receiving military aid from Cuba, Nicaragua, and Libya (Cole, 1995). The realist argument can also explain the U.S's behaviour here, non-intervention into the sovereignty of a state was respected until it was in their (perceived) interests to intervene. The U.S' attempt to win the war had its merits in promoting its sphere of influence whilst preserving its international interests. Although they violated the sovereignty of another nation, this was of legitimate cause. A cynic could also suggest that the liberal-cosmopolitan goals of preserving the universality of human rights were a by-product of this self-motivated behaviour. As such, the realist explanation would explain and somewhat embody the outlined definition of neo-colonialism.

It would appear that the issues arisen from HI disguised as neo-colonialism would depend upon the theoretical lens one would examine it through. It is also important to note that whilst the realist theory's focus on state sovereignty is important, it prioritises the self-interest of states, and consequentially, legitimises colonialism disguised as humanitarian intervention (Chesterman, 2002). Many states are reluctant to intervene in case being labelled a coloniser, as such this partially explains the norm of non-intervention. However the concept of "in-humanitarian non-intervention" - the idea of passively allowing atrocities to occur which makes bystanders implicit in these crimes, is also relevant (Chesterman, 2001). Consequentially, one must turn to the issues of inconsistency of application in order to validate whether HI is disguised neo-colonialism. Again it is clear that these issues are not isolated yet can be viewed as products and architects of one another.

"If it is true that the 90s signalled a new era of awareness with regards to humanitarian activism, the reality on the ground painted a far different story" (Davidson, 2012, pp. 136). The inconsistency of the application of HI illustrates key issues that have arisen from the policy. The UN sanctioned Somalian intervention in 1992-93 can be seen as a norm-guided, internationally consensus driven behaviour in protecting and safe guarding human rights. There was no strategic interest in the U.S led intervention to be had and as such the phenomena cannot be explained by realist theory. The non-apparent gain would suggest the contrary to the neo-colonialist argument too. By contrast, the solidarist view would support HI on the grounds

that the Somali state had failed and should no longer be regarded as such. The liberal cosmopolitan view best explains why HI took place in Somalia, which can be seen as an international, legally sanctioned effort to resolve the problem. It is important to note that the UN played a significant role in adding legitimacy in this case, the consequences of this will be examined further on. Somalia characterises the liberal interventionist argument by having international consensus, legally sanctioned and non-apparent gains for the interveners with the objective to protect and uphold universal rights. The failure of events in Somalia in 1993 "all but extinguished any hope for forceful and meaningful intervention to put an end to gross violations of human rights" (Davidson, 2012, pp.137), which had future consequences for the consistency of application.

Rwanda is in stark contrast to the events of Somalia. Wheeler (2000, PP.208) argues that "as a consequence of disaster and failure in one African country, the Security Council would become a bystander to genocide in another". Rwanda is a polarisation of Somalia. The genocide of 800,000 Rwandans (United Human Rights Council, 2014) can be seen as reluctance by the international community to protect norms and uphold legal obligations. Despite 145 states ratifying the 1948 Genocide Convention which aims to prevent and punish genocide (OHCHR, 1948), international response was too little too late. What remains consistent between Somalia and Rwanda is that both held no strategic importance to western powers. Unlike Somalia, the recognition of no apparent gain in Rwanda combined with non-intervention would seem to support a case for neo-colonialism as nothing would be gained by investing resources into other state's affairs. Arguably, if there *was* a strategic interest to be had in Rwanda, intervention would seem likely, providing further support to the neo-colonialist argument. Whilst the liberal-cosmopolitan view can best explain the intervention in Somalia, the realist theory best explains the lack of intervention in Rwanda. It is important to recognise that the issues of inconsistency of application are driven by the theoretical attitude one takes to HI. Since the failure of Somalia, "the selectivity of intervention is likely to occur in the future... states would not intervene in humanitarian crises if their national interests are not at stake" (Yoshida, 2013). Consequentially realist rhetoric seems to have dominated the discussion on international policy regarding HI; enabling powers to cherry-pick crises and make a case for it. The most recent example of this would be Syria. Given its geo-political status and relationship

with Russia, it is clear why the UK and others wanted to intervene on the grounds of HI (Engle, 2012). It is important to note that regarding the liberal-cosmopolitan view, there should not be any inconsistencies in the application of HI as all cases should be treated the same due to inalienable rights. The fact that this inconsistency *does* exist would suggest this behaviour is a product of the neo-colonialist attitude disguised as altruism, which is best explained by realist theory. It is therefore clear that these issues are products of one another with the realist theory providing the best explanation as to why this is so.

"The starting point for reflecting on the legality of humanitarian intervention is that the majority of international lawyers argue that this practise is unlawful" (Wheeler, 2000). Whilst Wheeler labels these lawyers "restrictionists" he concedes that they recognise that the Security Council has the legal authority under Chapter VII of the UN charter to legitimise HI. Chapter VII of the Charter outlines how the Security Council should behave and respond to matters that threaten international peace. However, HI can only be found legitimate if the Security Council can "determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression" (Un.org, 2014). The implications of this are clear; HI in the strictest legal sense is only legitimate when there is a threat to international peace and security. Wheeler (2000) therefore critically adds that "It [UN Security Council] cannot authorize military intervention on humanitarian grounds alone". This has implications for some of the major issues that HI raises. First, it is clear the UN charter is favouring international order over morality. This can be explained by the realist theory: as long as international peace is not threatened, the activities within the state do not warrant HI as it is a gross violation of state sovereignty.

A further implication to this is that it contradicts the UN's Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Wheeler identifies those who contend "that the promotion of human rights should rank alongside peace and security in the hierarchy of UN Charter principles" (Wheeler, 2000, pp.42) as "counter-restrictionists". The counter-restrictionists use "the pre-amble to the UN Charter and Articles 1 (3), 55 and 56, which impose a legal obligation...in promoting human rights" (Wheeler, 2000, pp.42). Teson adds further weight to this by stating that the "promotion of human rights is as important a purpose in the Charter as is the control of international conflict" (Teson, 2003, pp.13). As such, counter-restrictionists would argue that

the Security Council has a legal right to authorize HI regardless if it is a threat to international peace on the moral grounds of preserving the universal rights they are legally obliged to protect. As there is a consensus driven acceptance within the UN of fundamental, universal, inalienable rights; the liberal cosmopolitan theory is evident here and as such the counter-restrictionists are somewhat influenced by this rhetoric. Chapter VII somewhat contradicts this philosophy. It is crucial to recognise that the declaration is not legally binding yet Chapter VII is. These conflicting doctrines demonstrate the inconsistency of HI application because it enables states to cherry-pick when HI is permissible, most notably as a means to justify their interest-driven behaviour. Furthermore, it demonstrates that the international community has a preference for stability and order over the safeguarding of universal rights of the individual, explaining the norm of non-intervention.

It is clear that there are divisions in the legal interpretations of international law; the restrictionists adhere to realist rhetoric whilst counter-restrictionists lean towards the liberal-cosmopolitan view. Again it has been demonstrated that the theoretical framework shapes the nature of the internal conflicts that have arisen from the principle issues associated with HI. Ultimately, issue stance is dependent upon theoretical inclination.

Despite looking at the theoretical arguments that pervade the legal issues raised by HI, a practical examination of such a case must be undertaken in order to embody and illustrate theory. The example of Kosovo is a key example of this. The 1999 NATO led intervention into the Balkans was surrounded by legal controversy from the very start. There was no sanctioned action from the UN Security Council and as such, in the purest sense, made the intervention by NATO illegal (Evans, 2008). Furthermore, there was vocal resistance from China who placed a major concern for the protection on state sovereignty (Wise, 2013). Tony Blair's Chicago speech clearly demonstrates his thoughts on HI: "But people want to know not only that we are right to take this action but also that we have clear objectives and that we are going to succeed." (Blair, 1999). It is evident that despite no legitimate backing, Blair felt morally compelled to intervene and stop human suffering, an action which critics would later label him with the "messiah complex" (Danchev, 2007). This poses severe theoretical and practical issues. Blair took the assumption that morality was universal and the Kosovars were

not inalienable to the rights the UN have sworn to uphold. In contrast to this one could argue that if there is no moral and deliberative consensus then there is the real danger in states violating state sovereignty all in the name of HI. There is no "scale" to judge what constitutes what is moral, the closest reference one has is the law (Fuller, 1969); and by having broken international law, by logic, unauthorised HI is immoral. It has been argued that trying to reconcile human rights and the Charter's non-intervention norms are fruitless, and practical reactive solutions are needed instead of a one size fits all policy (Holzgrefe and Keohane, 2003).

The key disputes raised within the legal issues raised by HI are vast and is only lightly touched upon here. What is important to note is that the theoretical stances on HI have influenced and created differing schools of thought on the legality of HI, and ultimately the consequences this has for actors on the international platform.

The object of this essay was to highlight the principle issues that have arisen from HI. By having first examined the theoretical groundwork that HI is heavily based upon, it is apparent that these issues pervade and influence the other issues that are raised from it. They can also help to explain and illustrate debate within these issues. It is obvious that the realist theory plays an important role in explaining how states operate regarding HI. It also explains how colonialism can take its place in the 21st century. The inconsistency of the implementation of HI can be seen both as an illustrative example that lends force to neo-colonialist theory whilst also being a major issue that HI raises in itself. The inconsistency also arrives to the conclusion that states are able to 'cherry-pick' cases, which questions intervener's true motives and the universality of morality. The legal issues raised were not without theoretical influence too, embodying the debate between state sovereignty over the individual. The evident self-contradicting nature of the UN in particular, poses and perpetuates these problems, enabling states to promote a case for (or against) HI. The scope of this essay is large, as such, this brief examination of these issues which are by no means exhaustive, serves as an introduction with more in-depth analysis on each issue to be found in other existing literature. It is not the object of this essay to make a case for or against HI, but as this essay has repeatedly demonstrated, it is heavily dependent upon one's theoretical stance.

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Why should we obey the law?

(Written for Foundations of Politics, 1st Year)

Beatriz Lacerda Ratton

"Excess of liberty, whether in states or individuals, seems only to pass into excess of slavery."
— Plato, *The Republic*

The necessity to obey the law is epitomised here by Plato: if people are given too much freedom and no restrictions, the strongest thrive while the weakest perish. When discussing why we should obey the law, we are in essence asking why there should be a state, under which such laws are made. A contentious concept, the state can be defined as a group of organisations which govern a given region in which a group of people are structured as a society; it defines and implements laws by which they must live and is unavoidable. There are many traditions which attempt to justify the state: social contract, consequentialist and fairness arguments can be said to be the most prominent in this debate. In contrast to these justifications, anarchism argues against a state, and though it can be said to be impractical, it raises important points which those attempting to justify the state must consider. The utilitarian argument can be seen as the most assertive argument as to why we should obey the law, as it points out that any alternative to the state would be worse than no state at all. Arguments of social contract and fairness, on the other hand, can be used to fortify the need for the existence of the state (and thus for its citizens to obey the law) by approaching it in ways in which some may find more binding. Ultimately, while it is essential to justify the state in a way which is convincing and fair, a stateless society would descend into a state of chaos, where mankind 'endeavour[s] to destroy, or subdue one another'[63]. This therefore justifies the state, and why we should obey the law.

The utilitarian approach is a convincing argument in explaining why we should obey the law. A consequentialist tradition, it is based on the almost mathematical premise of aggregate utility: we have a moral duty to act in a way which maximises pleasure, or happiness. This is supported

[63] Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan,* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 87

by Bentham, whose argument focuses on the premise that a law should be created when it maximises 'utility', and because of this, should be followed, avoiding disaster, or unhappiness[64]. An example in which this argument would be justifiable is the Mignonette case of 1884[65]. It can be argued that the desperately starving shipwrecked sailors were justified in killing and eating their youngest and semi-comatose companion as if they had not, then all of them would have died, whereas only one did, amounting to a larger sum of 'happiness'. Mill goes further in this argument by saying that preventing 'harm to others'[66] is the only situation in which one should abstain from acting in a certain way: in this case, the Mignonette case may not be wholly justified, as a human life was lost, or harmed, regardless of the circumstances. Nevertheless, obeying the law is in line with this, as the law (and state) prevents people from harming one another.

However, it can be said that utilitarianism has a major flaw in that it excludes minorities. In a utilitarian society, a minority group could have fewer advantages (for example), if the majority believed that was the right thing to do, thus maximising aggregate utility. Consequently, in this society, passing a law in which a certain religion has fewer rights in the workplace would be in accordance with this argument. Thus, while the utilitarian argument is suitable in suggesting how useful the state is, it fails to project a beneficial state for all, which is a valid argument when claiming that it does not unequivocally explain why we should obey the law.

Social contract arguments suggest that the justification of the state comes from consent, be it explicit or tacit. Residence, voting or enjoyment of the benefits provided by the state are said to indicate tacit consent, and because of this, one therefore 'submit[s] to the sovereign'[67]. However, some would argue that this is not enough; an explicit adherence to the state is necessary. This is backed up by Hume's idea that a 'poor peasant', who has no language skills[68], would not be able to leave their country in order to pursue a life elsewhere. It is then not enough for one to be required to follow the government's laws if they have little or no choice on the matter. Locke, though suggesting that through tacit consent one is 'obliged to obedience

[64] Jeremy Bentham, *A Fragment on Government,* ed. Ross Harrison, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 56
[65] The Mignonette Case, *British Medical Journal,* 2:1246, (1884), pp. 977-978
[66] John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty,* ed. Gertrude Himmelfarb, (London: Penguin, 1985), p. 68
[67] Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Of the Social Contract,* (London : Penguin, 1762; 1968), p. 153
[68] David Hume, 'Of the Original Contract', in *Social Contract: Essays by Locke, Hume and Rousseau,* ed. E. Barker, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1748; 1947), pp. 221-222

to the laws of that Government'[69] also follows Hume's view that this type of consent on its own is insufficient. One can be held fully accountable to follow a country's laws only through 'positive Engagement, and express Promise and Compact'[70], for example, by swearing an oath of allegiance.

While this explicit consent is a potential solution to justifying why one should obey laws, Rousseau suggests a different approach: in an ideal society, we are all bound by the social contract by giving up the same amount of rights in order to benefit from the same amount of duties, in the interest of the 'general will; by virtue of it, [we] are citizens and free'[71]. This hypothetical form of consent proposes that one should obey the law in order to ensure their own freedom – by accepting the majority will, one is free from a society which is governed by individual will. However, Hume points out that virtually none of us actually agree to this contract and that most people follow the state, not because of a contract, but because they believe they are 'born to such obedience'[72]. Thus, the social contract argument for why one should obey the law is persuasive in that it suggests different ways in which people are bound to it, but those who do so explicitly are in the minority and the majority have no choice but to follow the law.

The fairness argument is another issue which attempts to explain why one should accept the state, or obey the law. It suggests that, because citizens enjoy benefits of the state, it would be unfair to disobey the law, or not accept the state's expectations in a way which would be harmful to others. Hart supports this by saying that those who have 'submitted to these restrictions when required have a right to similar submission from those who have benefitted by their submission'[73]. For example, according to this argument it is extremely unfair for one to enjoy the benefits of state funded schools while not paying their taxes. It contrasts with the consent argument in its justification; whereas one argues that this comes from a contract, the former focuses on fairness, and by extension, morality. However, this can be opposed by

[69] John Locke, *Two Treatises of Government,* ed. Peter Laslett, (Cambrige: Cambridge University Press, 1690; 1991), p. 349
[70] John Locke, *Two Treatises of Government,* ed. Peter Laslett, (Cambrige: Cambridge University Press, 1690; 1991), p. 349
[71] Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Of the Social Contract,* (London : J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd, 1762; 1935), p. 93
[72] David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature,* ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), p. 548
[73] H. L. A. Hart, 'Are There Any Natural Rights?', *Theories of Rights,* ed. J. Waldron, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 85

Nozick's argument, which states that 'people should not be forced to participate in joint projects, when they may prefer to use their time and resources in other ways'[74]. In other words, one should not be held accountable for something they never previously agreed to, simply because they were born into the benefits of it. While this argument is strong in that it appeals to the human factor and people's morality, the state is compulsory and so there is no way to say that we have accepted to its benefits and burdens, a similar problem to the consent theory.

While the merits of different arguments justifying the state are very much relevant in proposing why we should obey the law, anarchism is a tradition which, contrasting to others, completely opposes it, and by extension, the following of the law. Its rejection of the state stems from the idea that it has no right to exist, and we should not follow it. Kropotkin argues this when saying that 'liberty, equality and practical human sympathy' are the only ways in which to conquer the evils of some in humanity[75], and thus only by working together, without being bound by the government, can we have an ideal society. Additionally, anarchists in this line could suggest that we only follow the state due to 'fear of punishment'[76], but Kropotkin's assumption that 'human sympathy' prevails leads to the suggestion that one should look to morality rather than the government in order to live in a harmonious society. However, one can argue that Rousseau's line of thinking is more persuasive; though believing in man's 'natural innocence'[77], he does not adhere to a stateless society, as people's freedoms would be limited, through the strongest acting in their own interests.

When it comes to rule of law, anarchism posits that one need not heed it, as there is no need for it to exist. William Godwin maintains this, and believes that humans could be exceptionally supportive of one another. He proposed that, in order to live in an optimum society, they needed to forget the past and focus on the building of a society which would no longer be in need of a state[78]. Proudhon goes further than Godwin by saying that being governed means that one is 'kept in sight, inspected, spied upon'[79], by people who are incompetent and have no right

[74] Keith Hyams, 'Political Authority and Obligation', in Catriona McKinnon, *Issues in Political Theory,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 20
[75] Peter Kropotkin, *Law and Authority,* repr. in *The Anarchist Reader,* ed. George Woodcock, (Glasgow: Fontana, 1977), p. 117
[76] Jonathan Wolff, *An Introduction to Political Philosophy,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 47-48
[77] Ibid, p. 29
[78] Ibid, p. 30
[79] Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, *General Idea of the Revolution in the Nineteenth Century,* trans J. B. Robinson,

to rule. Though it is true that states need checks in order to prevent corruption, it can be said that an anarchist society would be no better off. It is ultimately impractical, as proven by the failure of the Paris Commune in 1871[80]. Therefore, though good points are made in holding the state accountable and relying on the morality and good nature of people, in concrete terms, anarchism fails to convince one why one should follow this ideal over the law.

It is largely accepted by most civilised societies that we should obey the law. While there are conflicting arguments as to why one should do so, it is something most people believe is correct. The most convincing argument for this is the utilitarian, as it gives us an incentive to follow the rule of law by proposing how much worse off we would be if we did not obey it, and thus dissolved the state, though it has clear faults with the exclusion of minorities. The social contract attempts to approach abiding the law through a binding agreement, while the fairness principle appeals to morality. While the anarchist argument makes a valid point in, suggesting that the government can be corrupt and has no intrinsic right to exist, it does not give us a good enough alternative that it should compel one to not obey the law. Ultimately, there is no isolated justification for the state. The different traditions combine to make the existence of the state more desirable than the alternative. The absence of a state of law would lead to the victory of the strongest and is therefore undesirable. Golding makes an allusion to this in Lord of the Flies, where the lack of a clear leader and thus a disorganised society with no rules causes chaos and eventually the brutal killing of Simon, the weakest in the group[81]. Nevertheless, it is important to not merely accept the law (or the state) blindly; changes are necessary and theories of the state need frequent updating in order to adapt to current climates and changing societies and social status. It is not enough for some to have more pronounced rights than others. It needs to guarantee the rights of all.

(London: Freedom Press, 1923), p.293

[80] Keith Hyams, 'Political Authority and Obligation', in Catriona McKinnon, *Issues in Political Theory,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 25

[81] William Golding, *Lord of the Flies,* (London: Faber & Faber, 1954;1997)

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Did New Labour solve the crisis of social democracy or end social democracy?

(Written for Death of Socialism, 3rd Year)

Paul Miller

Introduction

New Labour lasted longer in power than most other Western European parties claiming to be socially democratic, but in thirteen years, the movement has left British social democrats at a difficult crossroads. Before coming to power, it was considered by many a given that New Labour would stand up against the trend of rising inequality witnessed in the 1980s. After all, it is the pursuit for greater equality that most fuses and defines the spirit of social democracy, which had thrived in the post-war years, but had been undermined by circumstance and rhetoric between 1976 and until New Labour came to power. Social democracy emerged out of socialism and was spearheaded by the thought of Eduard Bernstein. Historian Tony Judt probably distinguishes the two schools of thought most eloquently when he says

> '**Socialism** was about transformative change: the displacement of capitalism with a successive regime based on an entirely different system of production and ownership. **Social democracy**, in contrast, was a compromise. It implied the acceptance of capitalism and parliamentary democracy – as the framework within which the hitherto neglected interests of the large sections of the population would now be addressed'[82].

New Labour's task under its leadership duopoly of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown was to either resurrect classical means to achieving greater equality, or find new means to that sacred end. For former and current senior party figures such as Roy Hattersley and Jon Cruddas, New Labour not only failed to revive that spirit, but failed in even attempting to revive it. Others are not so cynical, with commentators claiming New Labour did find new solutions for

[82] Tony Judt, *Ill Fares the Land* (New York: The Penguin Press, 2010), 229

social democracy. Therefore, the task of this essay is to ascertain the extent to which New Labour's values relate to those of social democracy, and if so, how imaginary policies were to achieving social democracy. Where has New Labour left its successors in British politics in perpetuating social democracy as a vision? More broadly, where has New Labour left the future for social democratic policies in British parliamentary politics? New Labour's belief of and commitment to equality is in some ways complex, in others ambiguous. In no way, though, can Tony Blair's version of equality be reconciled with the social democrat's version, even if Blair repeatedly claims it can. Second, the so-called crisis of social democracy will be considered, in relation to the question concerning the extent New Labour could have changed society.

Social democracy: A Journey

Given the nature of its birth, accommodating both capitalism and parliamentary democracy, its journey has seen it undergo many changes. One can identify three unmistakeable frameworks of social democracy, all born to accommodate unique historical circumstances. First, Eduard Bernstein founded social democracy as an evolutionary force in society, rejecting communism and any total equality of outcome, and attributing the equality of opportunity and workers cooperatives[83]. Second, in the post-war period, Crosland attributed the success of social democracy as possessing a mixed economy, the Keynesian economic model and a welfare state. Third, Giddens deployed public sector investment and a revamped version of welfareism as a means to achieving social democracy. Uniting all of its strands, perhaps the most appropriate - and certainly the most lasting –definition of social democracy for scholars interested in the field, can be found from two gurus of social democratic politics, William Paterson and Alistair Thomas. In 1977, they defined social democracy as a 'belief that social and economic reform designed to benefit the less privileged should be pursued within a framework of democracy'[84]. While this rather encapsulates the over-a-century old movement rather well, elaboration is needed. Social democracy is often cited as a fixed, multidimensional

[83] Christopher Pierson, *Hard Choices: social democracy in the twenty-first century* (Cambridge: The Polity Press, 2001), 28
[84] William Paterson and Alistair Thomas, *Social Democratic Parties in Western Europe* (Fife: Croom Helm, 2007), 11

theory: Paterson and Thomas, scholars of post-war social democratic parties, conceptualise social democracy as possessing five key tenets. They disaggregated these principles from Anthony Crosland's 1956 *The Future of Socialism*. Social democracy, for Paterson and Thomas, comprise of a commitment to liberal, parliamentary democracy; a mixed economy; Keynesian economics and a belief in equality. However, too strictly on many occasions, Paterson and Thomas's interpretation has been cited as providing contemporary scholars the most helpful parameters for judging whether parties are socially democratic. Since they borrow their analysis exclusively from Crosland, all the while accepting that their understanding of the phenomenon accommodates its culture of 'revisionism'[85], it is strange that so many twenty-first century papers researching the politics of social democracy use Paterson and Thomas as the epistemological bedrock of their analysis[86]. Perhaps this is why Paul Cammack has maintained that Giddens' revision of social democracy is unauthentic, and quite the opposite, 'unashamedly neo-liberal'[87]. On the contrary, as the diversity of Bernstein, Crosland and Giddens' theories show, there are various means to achieving social democracy. While social democracy is a revisionist doctrine, there has been one single, defining thread of continuity shared by Bernstein, Crosland and Giddens, which has been its pursuit for a more equal society. At the centre of every revision of social democracy has been an unwavering retention and ideological pursuit of that goal. In this way, despite writing over one hundred years ago, Bernstein had as much social democracy in his blood as Crosland – Manfred Steger rightly states that Bernstein 'speaks directly to the current process of rethinking of the traditional project'[88]. Social democracy, therefore, hinges on the belief in reducing inequalities as much as possible in a bid for a 'just and humane society', as Crosland articulates it[89].

What was the crisis of social democracy New Labour needed to solve?

[85] Paterson and Thomas, *The Future of Social Democracy*, 3
[86] Paul Webb in *The Modern British Party System* and Knut Roder on *Social Democracy and Labour Market Policy*, for example, can be justly accused of deploying Paterson and Thomas's classification of social democracy anachronistically
[87] Paul Cammack, 'Giddens's way with words', in in *The Third Way and Beyond: Criticisms, futures, alternatives*, ed. Sarah Hale, Will Leggett and Luke Martell (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), 152
[88] Manfred Steger, *The quest for evolutionary socialism: Eduard Bernstein and social democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 2
[89] Anthony Crosland, 'A Social-Democratic Britain', in *Socialism Now* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1974), 71

With the understanding that the pursuit for equality of economic conditions - along with a conviction towards parliamentary democracy - pulls at the very heartstrings of social democracy, the crisis of social democracy can be understood. Welfareism, Keynesianism, tax-and-spend and a mixed economy were necessary means to that end in the post-war period. From 1976, piece by piece, these means either became untenable or were undermined by the march of the New Right. In other words, the crisis of social democracy can be seen as containing elements which were real and other elements which were imaginary. Of the former, the Keynesian economic model, for proponents of social democracy in the post-war period, was an ideal means to achieving a more equal society. Keynesianism was attractive to social democrats due to its guarantee of near full employment, high wages and economic growth[90]. When Keynesianism failed, social democrats lacked an alternative economic model capable of achieving equal outcomes which could be feasible in a liberal democracy. Of the latter, the Labour Chancellor Dennis Healey's loan from the IMF came with the agreement that Britain would retrench its welfare state at that time has been distorted by the Conservative Party and neo-liberal writers in order to make it appear as though the welfare state had had a hand in prompting the loan in the first place[91]. Moreover, in the 1980s, the mixed economy was squeezed from both left and right, with the Bennite wing of the Labour Party calling for full nationalisation while the Conservative government under Margaret Thatcher carried out a programme of extensive privatisation. Finally, and most significantly, the level of inequality soared during the 1980s. The Right to Buy policy as well as an intended splintering of the industrial workforce and trade unionism caused a further problem for Labour to address. So, upon coming to power in 1997, New Labour had two broad choices. New Labour could either find a new set of means to achieve a more equal society, or resurrect the methods of welfareism and a mixed economy which had been dismantled by the Tories.

Did New Labour solve the crisis of social democracy?

[90] Paterson and Thomas, *The Future of Social Democracy*, 3-4

[91] Bryn Jones, 'Those Crazy Days of 'Socialism': The 1970s and the Strange Death of Social Democracy', *New Left Project*, published November 1, 2013, accessed January 1, 2015, http://www.newleftproject.org/index.php/site/article_comments/those_crazy_days_of_socialism_the_1970s_and_the_strange_death_of_social_dem

New Labour's stance towards equality has been a source of much debate. Those still subscribing to the five-tenet model of social democracy as prescribed by Paterson, Thomas and Crosland might consider New Labour's commitment to the cause be a no-brainer. From the turn of the twenty-first century to the onset of the financial crisis in 2008, the British treasury had, from spending twelve per-cent of its national spending on public services and the welfare state, soared to forty-per-cent[92]. The 'Welfare-to-Work' programme, tax credits, the introduction of the national minimum wage and the eradication of child poverty – in this way – have been seen as definitive statements of the party's commitment to social democracy[93]. They, at the very least, exemplify policies of redistribution to the poorest in society which Crosland, in a chapter of his 1974 essay *Socialism Now* titled 'A Social-Democratic Britain', stressed was an 'exceptionally high priority' of social democracy[94]. In real terms, health spending and funding per-secondary school pupil doubled while New Labour governed[95]. In this way, New Labour certainly revived old means through which social democrats and socialists had traditionally striven for equality. However, in spite of all of this, New Labour did not manage to create greater actual or income equality in Britain over its thirteen years in government. Only the offer of more generous state pensions for low earners had the direct effect of limiting inequality, but only among the elderly population[96]. Among the general population, income inequality soared to further highs under New Labour. Although income inequality was escalated most rapidly under Margaret Thatcher's Conservatives, New Labour failed in thirteen years to reverse that decline, and barely managed to steady the trend (see Figure 1).

Comparing income inequality with the rate of public spending since 1979

[92] Nick Pearce, 'Beyond tax-and-spend: revising social democracy for a new age', *Open Democracy* (30 March 2014), accessed December 24, 2014, https://www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/nick-pearce/beyond-tax-and-spend-revising-social-democracy-for-new-age
[93] Ruth Lupton et al, 'Labour's Social Policy Record: Policy, Spending and Outcomes, 1997-2010', *Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion* (London School of Economics: June 2013), 20
[94] Crosland, 'A Social-Democratic Britain', in *Socialism Now*, 71
[95] 'Labour's record: Things can only get better', *The Economist,* published April 29, 2010, accessed December 27, 2014, http://www.economist.com/node/16004271
[96] Lupton et al, 'Labour's Social Policy Record, 22



While it is one thing to state that New Labour unequivocally failed to solve the crisis of social democracy, it is quite another to suggest New Labour failed in even attempting to pursue a social democratic agenda in its political programme. After all, the Labour Party's manifesto for the 1997 election did vow to 'tackle the division and inequality' in British society. Moreover, the Institute of Fiscal Studies (IFS) concludes that inequality "would have been even higher" in the absence of Labour's tax and benefit measures[99]. On the other hand, the lack of institutional reform to the NHS, education and the welfare state has left them lacking autonomy and further vulnerable to retrenchment under an opposition government[100]. When Gordon Brown announced in January 1997 that New Labour would not increase the top rate of tax, which then stood at forty-five per cent – below other European democracies – newspaper commentators such as Hugo Young pondered how New Labour would fight inequality contrary to the 'standard method' of taxing the rich[101]. If New Labour had a new solution, it was – to borrow

[97] 'Incomes in the UK', *Institute for Fiscal Studies*, published July 15 2014, accessed January 1 2015, http://www.ifs.org.uk/tools_and_resources/incomes_in_uk

[98]'Public finances databank', *Office for Budget Responsibility*, last updated December 16, 2014, accessed January 1, 2015, http://budgetresponsibility.org.uk/data/

[99] Mike Brewer, David Phillips and Luke Sibieta, 'Living Standards, Inequality and Poverty: Labour's Record', *Institute for Fiscal Studies* (Election Briefing Note No.2, 2010), 14

[100] 'Labour's record: Things can only get better', *The Economist*

[101] Hugo Young, 'Labour's tax plans', published January 21, 1997, accessed January 1, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/politics/1997/jan/21/economy.comment

the words of Caroline Lucas – "half-hearted and deeply flawed"[102]. Many in the New Labour camp, having disregarded nationalisation, Keynesianism and welfareism, naively misconceived equality-of-opportunity as being a single means to reducing actual inequality. For social democrats, equality of opportunity', to quote Hattersley', 'has to be built on the foundations of equality of outcome'[103]. Throughout New Labour's premiership, Hattersley maintained that a meritocratic society cannot be an end in itself for anyone wishing to call themselves a social democrat[104]. Similiarly, New Labour resurrected old socialist ideas of community. Communitarian values were placed at the forefront of Blair's new social democracy. However, the prescriptive form influenced by Amitai Etzioni appeared more a blueprint for revising the party than an idea for achieving genuine social democracy[105]. Ruth Lister suggests that, had New Labour closed tax loopholes and cracked down on tax havens, we might view New Labour's emphasis on meritocracy less cynically[106].

Granted, the 'Welfare-to-Work' programme required a redistributive element, transferring wealth through taxation from the richest to the poorest. However, this transfer was effectively made in vain due to the increasing concentration of wealth in the hands of the richest one-per-cent in British society. The 'Welfare-to-Work' programme, which contained sanctions for young people refusing work, can thus be seen to be forcing the integration of British citizens into a labour market which was being freely allowed to become increasingly unequal, as New Labour waved the white flag to globalisation. Indeed, it would not be unfair to go as far as Eunice Goes as saying New Labour's public investment in education, health and welfare represented an offer of 'minimum opportunities than to equal' ones. In other words, the amalgamation of New Labour's policies created an extremely diluted form of meritocracy. Not

[102] Caroline Lucas, 'Fare rises show why British railways should be nationalised', *The Guardian*, published January 2, 2015, accessed January 3, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jan/02/fare-rises-british-railways-should-be-renationalised-caroline-lucas

[103] Roy Hattersley, 'Balance of power', *The Guardian*, published July 25, 1996, accessed January 2, 2015, ProQuest Historical Newspapers: *The Guardian* (1821-2003) and *The Observer* (1791-2003)

[104] Roy Hattersley, 'It's no longer my party', *The Observer,* published 24 June, 2001, accessed December 28, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2001/jun/24/labour2001to2005.news, ProQuest Historical Newspapers: *The Guardian* (1821-2003) and *The Observer* (1791-2003)

[105] Eunice Goes, 'The Third Way and the politics of community', in *The Third Way and Beyond: Criticisms, futures, alternatives*, ed. Sarah Hale, Will Leggett and Luke Martell (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), 118

[106] Ruth Lister, 'From equality to social inclusion: New Labour and the welfare state', *Critical Social Policy* 18 (1998): 218

even Bernstein believed equality-of-opportunity alone could by itself lead to a greater equality of outcome[107]. Social democratic thinkers such as Crosland[108] and Giddens as well as scholars have asserted that equality-of-opportunity cannot alone promote social democracy. As Paterson and Thomas put it, the belief in equality for social democrats is 'more than a belief in equality-of-opportunity or of citizenship rights'[109]. All New Labour did was widen the pool, not deepen the net, for wealth in society which, under the Tories, had undergone a huge transfer from poor to rich[110]. While some inside New Labour at the time certainly possessed a belief that its programme could eventually reduce real inequality, this was not backed with any social reform or any affirmative action to this end. In the early years, the feelings of Labour's leader Tony Blair appeared somewhat ambivalent towards creating more equal outcomes in the UK. In 1995, Blair in one breath promised 'equality between people' in which it seemed he meant just that as he coupled the commitment with a separate one for 'social justice' in a feature for social democracy journal *Renewal*[111]. One would naturally conclude from this that Blair was a strict egalitarian steeped in the tradition of social democracy. In another breath, however, Blair declared his opposition towards the economic egalitarian goals of Old Labour[112].

In 1997, New Labour's intentions became slightly more comprehensible. Gordon Brown confronted backbencher Roy Hattersley – a politician who had previously been deemed to be on the right of the party – on the notion of equal outcomes. The Chancellor categorically stated that New Labour was to reject a fast-tracked pursuit for equality on the basis it is 'neither desirable nor feasible'[113]. In 1998, Blair said he rejected 'abstract equality', which can be reconciled with social democracy, being a direct quote of Bernstein's rejection of the same thing, the communist form of total equality of outcome[114]. However, this still left blurry the

[107] Steger, *The quest for evolutionary socialism*, 12
[108] Anthony Crosland, 'Is Equal Opportunity Enough?', in *The Future of Socialism* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1968), 218-237
[109] Paterson and Thomas, *The Future of Social Democracy*, 4
[110] Lister, 'From equality to social inclusion', 219
[111] Tony Blair, 'Power for a purpose', *Renewal* 3 (2009): 13, http://renewal.org.uk/articles/power-with-a-purpose
[112] Goes, 'The Third Way and the politics of community', 113
[113] Gordon Brown, 'Why Labour is still loyal to the poor', *The Guardian*, published August 2, 1997, accessed December 29, 2014, ProQuest Historical Newspapers: *The Guardian* (1821-2003) and *The Observer* (1791-2003)
[114] Eduard Bernstein, *Die Arbeiterbewegung* (Frankfurt: Riitten & Loning, 1910), 135, cited in Steger, *The quest for evolutionary socialism*, 138

issue of whether New Labour intended to reduce inequality at all. In 1999, the BBC's Niall Dickson believed New Labour was a devoted to Giddens' renewed social democracy and that scholars make a 'mistake' in 'underestimating' the party's commitment to greater equality of outcome[115]. Likewise, in 2001, Driver and Martell stated that New Labour's commitment, 'backed by hard cash', to improving public services such as the NHS and secondary education 'against Tory tax cuts' suggested – in their words – 'a clear sign that some kind of social democracy remains at the heart of the Labour government'[116]. John Gray and Eric Shaw had displayed similar sentiments[117]. However, in the same year, Blair disclosed in an interview with the *Newsnight*'s Jeremy Paxman that 'the key thing is not whether the gap between the person who earns the most in the country and the person who earns the least'[118]. His intention, he lay clear, was to 'level up, not level down' and he (throughout his tenure as New Labour leader) refused raise the level of income tax for the highest earners because 'in today's world, they probably would move elsewhere and make their money', adding, 'It's not my burning ambition... to make sure that David Beckham earns less money'[119]. Such statements not only reflects just Blair's own personal view, but was spread across other senior New Labour figures. Labour's then business secretary Peter Mandelson had repeatedly remarked that he was 'intensely relaxed about people getting filthy rich'[120]. As a matter of fact, the richest one-per-cent extended its wealth more rapidly in Blair's second term of office between 2001 and 2005 than in Thatcher's between 1983 and 1987 (see Figure 2). Considering Thatcher oversaw Britain's inequality grow more steeply than in any industrial country in the world bar New Zealand[121], and by the time New Labour came to power inequality was still rising to levels unseen in nearly a century, it is difficult to explain away Blair's lack of devotion towards creating more equal outcomes. Despite Blair's insistence that creating more equal outcomes

[115] Niall Dickson, 'What is the Third Way?', *BBC News*, published September 27, 1999, accessed January 6, 2015, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/458626.stm
[116] Stephen Driver and Luke Martell, 'From Old Labour to New Labour: A Comment on Rubenstein', *Politics* 21 (2001): 48
[117] Dave Hill, *New Labour and Education: Policy, Ideology and the Third Way* (London: The Tufnell Press, 1999), 1
[118] Jeremy Paxman and Tony Blair, *Newsnight*, aired June 1, 2001, transcript, BBC. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/events/newsnight/1372220.stm, accessed January 1, 2015
[119] Ibid
[120] Peter Mandleson and David Wighton, *Financial Times* (October 23, 1998). Cited by John Rentoul, "Intensely relaxed about getting filthy rich", *The Independent* (February 14, 2013)
[121] Anthony Giddens, 'The Rise and Fall of New Labour', *The New Statesman*, published May 17, 2010, accessed December 24, 2014, http://www.newstatesman.com/uk-politics/2010/05/labour-policy-policies-blair

would restrict economic growth, recent data has indicated the opposite to be the case[122]. If New Labour had continued with Blair as leader, the trend would have surely continued, such was his intention to increase VAT, a tax which would have surely led to greater inequality[123].



Figure 2: Share of all income received by richest 1% in Britain, comparing change between 1983 and 1987, Margaret Thatcher's second term in office, with Tony Blair's second term in office, 2001 and 2005[124].

[122] Larry Elliott, 'Revealed: how the wealth gap holds back economic growth', published December 9, 2014, accessed December 26, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/dec/09/revealed-wealth-gap-oecd-report
[123] Tony Blair, *A Journey* (London: Arrow, 2010), 621
[124] Daniel Dorling, *Fair Play: A reader on social justice* (Bristol: The Policy Press, 2011), 292

Hence, it is unsurprising that Giddens himself condemned New Labour for 'exacerbating inequalities'[125]. Giddens, reflecting on New Labour's time in power in 2010, adjudged the party to have made a 'fundamental error [in allowing] the prawn cocktail offensive to evolve into fawning dependence, with the result that the UK was transformed into a kind of gigantic tax haven'. Although Blair attributed his ideas directly to the Third Way renewal of social democracy[126], in truth New Labour contradicts a philosophy that Giddens should have perhaps highlighted and emphasised at the heart of his treatise. Giddens waited until chapter four to state clearly that, while 'many suggest...the only model of equality today should be the equality of opportunity', that 'neoliberal model' is 'not tenable'[127]. Giddens then elaborates that 'a radically meritocratic society would create deep inequalities of outcome, which would threaten social cohesion'[128]. Nevertheless, the fact that he does rather supports the view of Stephen Driver, Pete McCullin and Colin Harris that Giddens's *Third Way* revision of social democracy is intrinsically socially democratic, and somewhat renders the criticism from Cammack to be unfounded. Perhaps Blair should have studied Giddens' treatise more scrupulously. The legacy of New Labour's departure from social democracy has been evident on the Labour Party of 2015. Senior figures such as the shadow business secretary Chuka Umunna in the Labour Party is as unenthused about equality as Blair and Mandelson were in New Labour. This has left the Labour Party, in the words of Lilia Giugni, with 'no innovative paradigm' in response to the 2010 crisis[129].

Conclusion

Overall, the party's lackadaisical attitude towards tackling inequality fully betrays the fundamental belief of social democracy. Startlingly neo-liberal in sentiment, Blair's trickle-up economic argument echoes Margaret Thatcher's final speech in the House of Commons in which she criticised socialist politicians on the same charge: 'So long as the gap is smaller,

[125] Giddens, 'The Rise and Fall of New Labour', *The New Statesman*
[126] Tony Blair, 'The Third Way: New Politics for a New Century', in *The New Labour Reader,* ed. Andrew Chadwick and Richard Heffernan (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003), 28-29
[127] Anthony Giddens, *The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003), 101
[128] Ibid
[129] Lilia Giugni, 'Ed Miliband's Labour and ideology. Did New Labour change the party forever?', *Politics in Spires*, published November 12, 2014, accessed December 24, 2014, http://politicsinspires.org/ed-milibands-labour-ideology-new-labour-change-party-forever/

they'd rather have the poor poorer'[130]. Rather than forming the essence of New Labour's programme, belief in the *bona fide* social democratic idea of equality –the raison d'être of social democracy - had been undermined by the only realistically electable party with an ideological attachment to social democracy in Britain. In this way, New Labour has ended social democracy. New Labour policies in education and welfare were barely meritocratic, and shifted the party away from any commitment to achieving a more equal society, the core, overarching principle of social democracy. New Labour were neither reformist, nor egalitarian in sentiment or action. They left social democracy on the brink of extinction by pursuing a self-contradictory programme which, on the one hand, pumped money into education. On goes the crisis of social democracy across Europe, but most pertinently, in Britain – to which Labour's answer remains hazy. Taxpayers' money continues to be poured into private hands. Since Labour left power, rail fares have been risen twenty-per-cent by the privatised rail companies, with ninety-per-cent of that profit going to shareholders. Meanwhile, housing benefit continues to be eaten up by private landlords. New Labour certainly ended its commitment, as far as it went, to a more equal society. However, it remains to be seen whether social democracy is dead to the Labour Party beyond New Labour.

[130] HC Debate 22 November 1990, vol 181, cols 445-53

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How far did the Women's liberation movement change the social and economic status of women?

(Written for Britain in the Twentieth Century, 2nd Year)

Louis Patel

The women's liberation movement challenged the patriarchal society of mid-twentieth century Britain. The determination of the individuals who embodied the women's liberation movement created legal, cultural and social change. Whilst the movement was successful in granting these changes, it should be remembered that the efforts of the Labour governments towards the end of the sixties and mid-seventies should also be noted for enacting changes to women's lives. The liberation movement fought to radicalise young women and female sexuality, allowing young women to celebrate their sex. Whilst the movement laid the foundation stones for changes socially, less was achieved for the economic advancement of women. Despite parliamentary reform, the division between public and private, along with class divisions impeded economic liberation and opportunity. The domestic chores and division of labour within the home acted against the career opportunities which were opening for women. Many working class women were worse affected, and the cuts in welfare and social services in the nineteen eighties meant little time to pursue employment. Arguably, the ideology of the eighties, versus that of feminism created a dichotomy which would not be solved until the turn of the century. The welfare state continually acted against the liberation of women, promoting the traditional male breadwinner family. While the liberation movement sought to challenge these notions, the determination of the state crushed hopes for true liberation. This essay will argue that the liberation movement allowed women to be freer socially, but did not make as larger impact economically. Whilst the failure economically should not be solely placed on the shoulders of the liberation movement, it is worth noting that internal divisions negatively impacted on their desired outcome. The essay will first examine the social changes that took place post-liberation movement, focusing on contraception, femininity, and marriage. Then moving on to examine the economic effects that the movement achieved, but mainly, why economic change was not so radical. The essay will

focus on the division between public and private, whilst also arguing that the welfare state was inherently gendered, designed to support *'traditional'* family models.

Social change: liberation and control over the body

The social aspect of women's lives throughout the century has undergone changes in terms of sexuality, domestic, and married life. By the end of the century, the lives of women in social terms was far better than it had been at the start of the century. Radical feminists sought to challenge the social parameters of society, which neglected the social rights of women. The movement demanded 'free contraception, abortion on demand, (...) an end to the discrimination against lesbians, and freedom from intimidation by violence or sexual coercion.' (Meehan, 1990:p195). At face value, it's easy to see how these demands were met. The Sexual offences act (1967) legalised homosexuality and the Abortion Act (1967) granted abortions to women, provided that the pregnancy had not exceeded its twenty-forth week, and provided two doctors gave consent. Contraception was made freely available by the National Health Service in 1975; between 1962 and 1969, the number of women on the pill rose from fifty-thousand to one million (Cook, 2004:p301). While these reforms allowed for women to enjoy greater sexual freedoms and control over their bodies, there is contention as to how far these reforms actually liberated women from the wider patriarchal sphere of society. Moreover, changes in law and medical autonomy did not necessarily create a society which allowed directly change the lives of all women. As argued by Germaine Greer, the liberation of sexuality in the seventies, was more about the desires of men, and how contraception made it easier for men to engage in sexual activity (Greer, 1993: p122).

This section of the essay will analyse the effects of contraception, and also the changes in married life. The debate around how far the pill really achieved women's sexual freedom focuses on how the pill was publicly perceived. Despite contraception becoming freely available, the British Medical Association refused to advertise the availability of the pill provided by the Family Planning Association in *Family Doctor* (Hall, 2000:p170). Despite the pill becoming freely available, society still viewed its use with caution. It was only in the seventies that it became freely available for all, prior to that it had been only available to married women, who were predominately middle class (Cook, p312).

Many of the radical feminists who embodied the liberation movement, argued that young women should be able to talk freely about their views on sex and sexual desires. Hall makes the point that sex education policy post-nineteen-eighty did little to encourage girls to enjoy their sexuality. Instead, as put by Hall 'it focused on where babies come from, and menstrual hygiene' (Hall, 2001:p53). Seeing as feminists wanted a dramatic shift in what young people were taught, it would seem that their demands were met with caution. While feminist movements were advocating this kind of discussion, only later on would these topics be discussed openly. Despite the provision of contraception, there were still barriers to getting it: 'women still have to jump through hoops in order to obtain morning-after contraception, (...) Sex education is still more about protecting girls from dangers such as early pregnancy , than enabling them to experience sexual pleasure (Ibid, p66)'. While one could argue that it is too radical to teach young women how to better understand their body, one could counter that by arguing it is an essential part of a young women's development. Sexuality is key to feminist thought, as it is liberating for women of all ages to enjoy their sexuality, and it is oppressive in some sense to deny them of this right, when it is enjoyed by men. Whilst the twentieth century certainly showed a more liberal attitude to sex, many would argue, that actually, a liberal attitude to sex only means acknowledgement of difference, rather than active acceptance and liberation.

Contraception benefitted married women, in that women no longer needed to fear about unwanted pregnancy within marriage. Draconian methods of contraception which had embodied the past, such as withdrawal, no longer needed to be an option. Both the availability of contraception, but also, the Divorce Act (1969) changed marriage to being something which arguably women could control as equally as men. However, illegitimacy, and the falling age of marriage were present before legislation (Lewis, 1992:p40). But changes in laws, and with women's greater participation in the labour market did create a decline in the traditional family. The women's liberation movement held differing views on marriage; some radicals claimed marriage was not something a women should aspire to, others accepted it was a matter of choice. The latter was supported by liberal feminists, who argued in favour of marriage, providing that women were to be treated equally under the law.

Towards the end of the twenty first century, women became more financially independent, with more women working. While the changes for women economically will be covered later, it is

worth mentioning it briefly here. The amount of women working within the labour force rose dramatically, the figure in 1961 stood at 29.5 % and rose to 48.6 % & by 1981 (McCloskey, 2001:p169). While women were more likely to be in work towards the end of the century, the demands made by the women's liberation movement did not impact as greatly as they may have wished. The domestic 'responsibility' imposed on women has never been alleviated, for example: the call for twenty four hour nurseries has never been met (Meehan, 1990: p195). While twenty four hour nurseries can be viewed as possibly unrealistic, the amount of women who rely on day care remained (and still does) high. This added with the costs of childcare creates a situation where women end up spending a significant amount of their wages on childcare. It is interesting to note that marriage rates fell as the century progressed, suggesting more women were pursuing careers. For feminists, protection within marriage was a primary goal, while some radicals rejected the idea of marriage, many recognised that for those women within marriage, they should have their rights protected. Marital rape became illegal towards the end of the century (1991), domestic violence also became a forefront issue. The dichotomy within the women's movement around marriage, stems from differing beliefs surrounding the private and public dichotomy. Liberal feminists argued that the state had no business in interfering with the private sphere, e.g. 'the home'. While radicals rejected this, as if one rejects the regulation of the private sphere, issues such as marital rape, domestic violence, and female circumcision become impossible to outlaw. As a result, the women's liberation movement failed to really change marriage, due to disagreements within the movement.

Therefore, the social lives of women were arguably better in the latter half of the century, with the availability of contraception, the changes in marriage laws, and the liberation of female sexuality. These changes are emulated in the openness in which women talk about sex, and the openness in sex education today. Despite there still being issues for women socially, the liberation movement changed how women were viewed, both culturally and socially. The changes which were brought about by the movement laid the foundation stones for further progression, shown today in third wave feminism.

Economic advancement: equal pay, opportunity and the gendered welfare state

This section of the essay will argue that economically, the women's liberation movement failed to enact great change for women; although, this was not necessarily the movement's fault. The movement's central demand for women was: equal pay, twenty-four hour nurseries, and equal opportunity (Meehan, 1990:p196). The central problem within the women's liberation movement arose from differing viewpoints from within. Radicals, Liberals, and Marxists frequently argued about economic demands and outcomes. Liberals wanting institutional change, e.g. equal pay laws. Radicals wanting complete overhaul of the domestic system: provision of day care and subsidising domestic work. Radicals argued, there was little point in equal pay laws unless these other factors were addressed as well. On the other end of the spectrum, Feminist Marxists argued that capitalism should be removed by force - arguing for equal pay would only further enslave women into the oppressive capitalist system. (Meehan, 1990:p196). It can be argued that Liberal Feminist triumphed in this arena, both the Equal pay act (1970), and Sex discrimination act (1975) were passed, and further amended throughout the century. However, it would appear that radical feminists were right, in that other factors that impact on women's working life have rendered some reform pointless. The cost of child care being one, along with the cuts in the nineteen-eighties to welfare, health and social services (Ibid).

Women's working lives post-liberation were largely hampered by domestic chores, along unequal pay. While it is true that modern advancement in household technologies has eased the work load for women at home, the number of hours women spend on housework has not declined dramatically (Lewis, 1992: p67). As a result, most married women opted for part time careers, often working in unskilled jobs (Ibid). While the number of women in work has risen, indicators show that women are paid disproportionately compared to their male counterparts (McCloskey, 2001). This is largely due to maternity leave, and the 'glass ceiling' in some areas of the workplace. The balance between domestic life and career life created a 'double burden' for women (Zweiniger-Bargielowska, 2001: p160). While more women went to work, the division of labour within the home prevented many women from enjoying a fulfilling career.

Despite the women's liberation movement achieving change in the laws during the nineteen seventies, evidence shows that right through towards the end of the eighties, many working class women chose to be housewives, as the job opportunities available were 'low-status, low-paid,

employment opportunities which were not perceived as liberating but as additional burdens'. (Ibid, p151). It is for these reasons that the radical feminists persisted that change in domestic chores must be a precursor to liberating women, and allowing them to pursue a career.

This final section will concentrate on the gendering of the welfare state, arguing that government provision promotes the idea of the traditional family. Studies conducted by Lewis indicate that the British welfare state favoured the 'male-breadwinner family model' in twenty-first century Britain (Lewis, 1992:p162). Britain historically favoured male breadwinner families, and only in the seventies did change occur regarding the law around equal pay. In the mid nineteen seventies, "the government offered an allowance for the unpaid work of caring for infirm dependents (Invalid care allowance), but at the same time, the invalid care allowance was denied to married women on the grounds that 'caring was part of the 'normal' duties of such women" (Ibid, p164). The welfare state did not accommodate for women who worked and were mothers due to loopholes in the law, for example, in the nineteen eighties, only sixty-percent of women were entitled to paid eleven weeks maternity; Britain was also the only country within the European community which diminished maternity rights during the 1980s (Ibid). The strong ideological differences between Thatcherism and radical feminism made compromise on either side impossible. Therefore, the government was able to continue with gendered policy.

Conclusion

The women's liberation achieved radical changes both institutionally and culturally. The movement, although divided by ideology, made impacts mainly for the future generations of women. Changes socially challenged patriarchal society, allowed women to celebrate their sex, and laid the foundations to change the way society viewed women. These changes were no doubt due to the efforts of the women's liberation movement, and should be celebrated. While institutions were slow to change, women's lives certainly improved as society became more liberal. The changes that second wave feminism fought fell short, was in real change to the economic status and opportunities of women. While changes in the law theoretically allowed for women to enter the labour force, the juggling of domestic chores, along with a career constrained women. Figures show that most married women did not work full time, and often worked in unskilled jobs. Class also proves to be a burden, with many working class women being deterred

by low paid, low skilled jobs. Along with the government favouring traditional families, women were not liberated in the work place, and suffered economically. Only at the turn of the century does this start to change with the end of Thatcherism, and the start of Blairism. The women's liberation movement challenged cultural, social, and economic hardships that arguably oppressed women. Second wave feminism, despite having internal ideological conflicts, made great social and cultural progress, but, due to resistance from the state, were unable to make the same gains economically.

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To what extent did Divided Government restrict the Presidency of Bill Clinton?

(Written for Politics of Governance: USA, 2nd Year)

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Introduction

The Presidency of Bill Clinton was distinguished by its partisan nature, with challenges to established processes of campaigning and governing from both sides, making it a very interesting period for political scientists and theorists to study. The extensive use of the Presidential veto exposed how the constitution still favoured Presidential supremacy, even when cohabiting with a highly cohesive and objectionable Congress – with this institutional tool being manipulated by the President to utilise his imposing media presence to reframe the debate. In this paper I will consider the theoretical perspectives of what kind of President Clinton was, before looking at Republican attempts to supplant Presidential policy leadership with party government in an attempt to further Republican priorities, characterised by the 'Contract with America.' Finally, I will argue that the constitutional provision of the Presidential veto – and two thirds Congressional majority required to over-ride the veto prevents the an undiluted Republican agenda from dominating, despite a secure majority.

Theoretical Perspectives

Firstly, let us consider how we should judge the Clinton Presidency, and how his placing in the political cycle determined how successful he could be. Rockman (1984) argued that the presidency moved in cycles. The first phase of this cycle was powerful and decisive leadership, the second continued the programme of the predecessor with the third reflecting a shift in the social and economic values time. This theory of 'political time' and measurable changes was echoed in some degree by the work of Skowronek (1993) who described categories of Presidents. These were divided into; innovators who build coalitions, continuity presidents who build upon the success of the established political order, presidents who oversee the decline of

a political order or pre-emptive presidencies. When considering the case of Bill Clinton, we categorise him as a pre-emptive figure, breaking with the socially conservative agenda of the Reagan and Bush presidencies (Wilson, 1998, p.20). This is important because it reflects the nature of the challenge faced by Clinton.

Clinton could not claim a 'policy mandate', having won a plurality of the vote due the emergence of a third candidate (Ross Perot) and the incompetence of George Bush and his inability to deal with the recession (Wilson, 1998, p.22). Public opinion was decidedly conservative, this was reflected by the return of a Republican Congress in 1995 and supports Skowronek's model. but the likeable personality of candidate Clinton won over the electorate - whilst the agenda was decidedly conservative, I would argue that Clinton punched above his weight in terms of his influence on policy.

Morris (1997, p.24) argues that as a pre-emptive president, Clinton's decision making was influenced heavily by opinion polls in order to stay in office. Conservative feeling amongst the public was met by the President, with reforms to crime, welfare and government efficiency. This reinforces the interpretation of Clinton as a pre-emptive president in a political time out of kilter with his own politics. Even if we are critical of Skowronek's political cycles theory, the relationship between the political landscape, institutions and parties is an important one and helping us conclude the challenges faced by Clinton and what he could realistically expect to achieve.

Jones (1994, 1995), argues that in a system of separate government institutions, the Congress is of equal importance as the President when making policy. This is more visible during periods of divided government, when the parties share different objectives. Indeed, Edwards, Barrett and Peake (1997) show that policy failure is greater during periods of divided government – it is my view that whilst increasingly cohesive parties placed new challenges on the system, the unique position of the presidency still commands the policy leadership role Mayhew (1991) argues however, that in periods of divided government, cooperation is encouraged, with neither side wanting deadlock. In the Clinton years, this could be exemplified after the 1996 elections, with the Republicans failing to 'muster enough votes to overcome either bipartisan opposition or the prospect of a Presidential veto' (Congressional Quarterly, 20 December 1997, p.3103) and instead seeking compromise to further their objectives. In contrast, between 1994 and

1996, it is my view that Edwards, Barrett and Peake's theory of government failure is indeed a more accurate reflection of events.

The Republican Revolution: The Contract with America

The aim of the 1994 Republican campaign was to significantly rebalance power away from the President towards Congress. This was to be achieved by a nationalising approach in the form of a common party manifesto (McKeever, Davies and Maidment, 2012, p.235). The 'Contract with America' (Gingrich, Armey, Gillespie and Schellhas, 1994), differed significantly from established Congressional campaigns in US politics. As a nationwide agreement the document prioritised family values and conservative spending commitments, it sought to shift away from the district specific promises of previous elections (Schickler, 2002, p.97).

Although 30 candidates signed the 'Contract', it was dismissed by critics as being a gimmick, with no guarantees the contract could be enacted. There was no support from the Senate, either to support the Contract or to act in unity with the House of Representatives. This lack of unity meant that the President still had the power to veto the proposals of the contract (McKeever, Davies and Maidment, 2012, p.235) - the Constitution had already thwarted the attempt at 'party government' before it had even got off the ground. President Clinton still had a decisive tool at his disposal to ensure objectives close to his own were met.

The 'gimmicky' nature of the Contract (Gingrich, Armey, Gillespie and Schellhas, 1994) was reflected by the opinion polls. 71% had never heard of the contract, with 7% more likely to vote for the Republican party and 5% less likely to vote Republican (Jacobson, 1996, p.209). Whilst the electorate may not be able to recite the finite details of the Contract, the document did establish clearly the themes the Republicans sought to prioritise 104th Congress and unified the new candidates behind common goals (Hershey, 1997, p.208). As the Republicans had not held control of the House of Representatives for 44 years (Wilson, 1998, p23), I would argue that this new method of communication and campaigning was a necessary innovation for the Republicans to achieve their objectives.

Party Government: Personalities and Partisanship

Within two years of being elected, the relevance of President Clinton was already being questioned. (Wilson, 1998, p.19). Investigations into the White-water scandal and campaign

financing meant that even before he reached his first midterms, his reputation had already sustained damage (Wilson, 1998, p.24). His flawed personality made it difficult for him to command authority in negotiations with Congress (Barber, 1972). Clinton's lack of self-discipline (Wilson, 1998 p.24) , I would argue, does not fit well with an opposition whose agenda included family values and fiscal responsibility. Furthermore, Neustadt (1960) argues that a President requires a good professional reputation in order to maintain the respect of Congress and achieve his policy objectives. Within the first two years of the Clinton Presidency, his National Health Insurance programme had failed. This was a big blow to his policy reputation and meant the Republicans were in a better position to capitalise on his weakness and achieve their objectives over and over his.

Following the 1994 midterm elections, Newt Gingrich, Republican Speaker of the House of Representatives, sought to expand and transform the office into a more Prime Ministerial figure, a leader of major policy innovations (Schickler, 2002, p.97). Gingrich did this by taking a more active role in the organisation of the House committees. Previously, when the Democrats dominated the House in the 20th Century, the chairmanship was decided on seniority. Gingrich took a new assertive approach by choosing more junior members who were loyal to the leadership. This enabled the speaker to extend his role, influence and priorities further than was possible before and arguably helped the House Republicans achieve their aims. This reform was compounded by the introduction of term limits for committee chairs (Schickler, 2002) which further secured the move away from the seniority method of appointment, towards a more partisan procedure. By prioritising party loyalty, the House Republicans were more cohesive in nature and a more effective force at blocking Clinton's policy objectives.

Other reforms to extend Republican influence included abolishing three Democrat dominated standing committees and the abolition of the Legislative Services Organisation (Schickler, 2002), The latter in particular, restrained individual legislator initiative and forced Representatives to rely on the good will and resources of the party leadership. This enabled the Republican House leadership to extend their influence and restrict that of the minority Democrats, further threatening the policy objectives of the President in favour of their own.

Keefe and Ogul (1993, p.270-1) argue that congressional party leaders face a 'fine balancing act' to avoid defending the (unpopular) institution and the membership to which they belong themselves. Jim Wright in Keefe and Ogul (1993, p.269) describes the majority leader as a 'conciliator, mediator and peacemaker' – 'even when patching together a tenuous majority he must respect the right of honest dissent, conscious of the limits of his claims upon others.' This is in stark contrast to the leadership of Speaker Gingrich. By introducing a more partisan appointment procedure for Committee chairs and rewarding loyalty he broke with the path dependency in an attempt to block the objectives of the Clinton presidency.

Presidential Veto and Congressional Override

The use of the Presidential veto could be considered an extreme form of 'going public' (Kernell, 1997) with their use a catalyst for further partisanship. The veto did also allow Clinton to achieve policy outcomes closer to his own preferences (Conley, 2004) however.

The purpose of the Presidential veto is not purely to kill the legislation but also extract concessions from an opposition that may lack the congressional strength to over-ride it, argues Sinclair (2000, p.145). These theories suggest the veto is a decisive tool for furthering the presidential policy objectives.

As parties have become more ideologically homogeneous, there have been fewer opportunities for cross-party coalitions like those open to Presidents Eisenhower and Nixon before 1973 in the pre-reform era (Conley, 2004). Previously, the moderates of both parties held the balance of power and could work together to pass Presidential legislation (Bond and Fleisher, 1990; 2000). This centripetal arrangement meant that the Presidential veto was used sparingly, with the President building policy coalitions. The non-homogeneous nature of the first half of the 20th century meant that whilst the Presidential party may have had a numerical majority, the existence of Southern conservative Democrats and Northern Democrats in the same party meant that it may not equate to a policy majority so working with moderates of the opposition was common and necessary. By the 1990s however, Southern Democrats had moved to the Republican party and Congress had become more cohesively partisan. This is reflected by the 82% unity score in congressional voting behaviour in 1994 (Rohde, 1989).

A veto-proof majority is a threat to the credibility of the President. An example of this is the Truman Presidency, where Republicans and Southern Democrats worked together to block

legislation not in their constituency interest. Contrast this with the experience of Clinton, where the House Republicans struggled to override the Presidential veto because of the newly cohesive nature of the House Democrats (Conley, 2000). This shows that the objectives of Clinton were not significantly impeded by a hostile congress.

During the 103rd Congress (1993-1994), the President did not exercise his veto (Conley, 2004). This is in stark contrast with the 35 vetoes (excluding pocked and line-item vetoes) between 1994 and 2000, with the President opposing 2/3 of bills (Congressional Quarterly Almanacs, 1995-2000). Only one of these vetoes was overridden by the Congress – this is important because it shows that the formal powers invested in the President by the Constitution have enabled Clinton to block the objectives of the House Republicans. Whilst this does not necessarily mean he achieved his own objectives, it does mean that the office of the President has significant power to block, obstruct or postpone policy that he disagrees with.

In 1995, the House Republicans set a trap for Clinton with the HR1158 appropriations bill. It directed funds to areas at risk of flooding and earthquake damaged California at the expense of Clinton's national service (AmeriCorps) and education (Goals 2000) programmes (Taylor, 1995). Clinton seized this opportunity to reframe the debate, whilst Speaker Gingrich criticised the failure of President Johnson's Good Society, stating that 'Washington was not the answer' (Devroy and Pianin, 1995 cited by Colney, 2004). Clinton cast the Republicans as extremists, reckless and socially responsible (Schneider, 1995; Devroy and Morgan, 1995 cited in Colney, 2004) working to destroy the Good Society settlement. The President carried out his veto threat, boosting his credibility. This settled the question of his relevance and 'made the decision stick' by avoiding a Congressional override (Mitchell, 1995 cited by Colney, 2004; Cloud, 1995 cited in Colney, 2004). Clinton stood firm against Republican attacks on Democratic constituencies, vetoing the HR2491 appropriations bill because it failed to protect 'Medicare, Medicaid, education and tax fairness' (Gray, 1995 cited in Colney, 2004). Whilst Clinton did not achieve his own objectives outright, he prevented the House from dominating the agenda, highlighting his priorities through the use of the veto.

Clinton continued to cobine the informal and formal powers of his office, arguing that the House Republicans violated the values of centrist America. Simultaneously he offered them a 'gesture of good will.' This took the form of a detailed plan to balance the budget – something

they had been craving since the Contract for America (Gingrich, Armey, Gillespie and Schellhas, 1994) was written, and was the first sign of compromise (Purdum, 1995 cited by Colney, 2004) between the two sides. The House Republicans were dogmatic, unwilling to compromise – cuts to the 'Cops on the Beat' programme were cited by the President as further examples of extremism (Idelson, 1995 cited by Colney, 2004). By positioning himself as a Centrist, in contrast to the extremes of the House Republicans and Liberal House Democrats, Clinton built a body of public support – through the use of the veto, that proved difficult to challenge. By 1996, the gap between those who favoured the Republican agenda and those who opposed it had grown by 10%, in Clinton's favour (NBC/NYT poll, Clymer, 1995 cited in Colney, 2004). 44% of those polled blamed the House Republicans for the shutdown of the Federal government, with 33% blaming President Clinton by January 1996 (Clymer, 1996 cited in Colney, 2004). This enabled the President to mould the agenda around his own priorities.

The roots of this public opinion turnaround can be traced back to the 1994 elections. Only 1/3 of registered electors turned out to vote (Hames, 1995). By the government shutdown, trust in Congress and the President were near parity (McAneny, 1997; Newport, 1998 cited by Colney, 2004). The House Republicans had hoped that the brinkmanship of the shutdown, as well as other inter-branch conflict like legislation on partial abortions, would shore up the conservative electoral base for the 1996 elections (Harris, 1996 cited by Colney, 2004). Their strategy worked on the premise that Clinton's veto would bring the president long-term unpopularity, giving the Republicans momentum (Goodstein, 1996 cited by Colney, 2004). As shown above, the President came out of the shutdown crisis with an improved public image. Seizing the vital centre ground for himself, he described Republican reforms as 'tough on children and not helping people from welfare to work' (Pear, 1996 cited by Colney, 2004) – and constructed a reputation as the 'saviour' of Medicare and Social Security (Colney, 2000). This allowed Clinton to achieve some of his policy objectives in a difficult political environment – this links with Skowronek's (1993) theory of political time by showing that expectations of what the president can achieve should be realistic and in line with the feeling of the political discourse.

The elections of 1996 showed that neither Clinton nor the House Republicans really had momentum, but by this point in the electoral cycle the President was more concerned by his legacy. The budget compromise of HR2015 could be considered the biggest of the Congress.

Taylor (1997) cited it as a prime example of brokerage politics, with the 104th Congress producing a 'solid sense of each other's parameters' – facilitating compromise in the future. The budget accord allowed both sides to claim victory – an example of this was the House Republicans cutting social security spending on legal immigrants to meet tax reduction targets (Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 12/06/97). Whilst this does not mean Clinton achieved his own undiluted objectives, it does mean what was achieved was closer to his preference.

In addition to the use of the Presidential veto – Clinton used the threat, or implied use of veto extensively. Between 1994 and 2000, the threat to veto was used 140 times. This veto culture led to a stalemate of 'blame game politics' (Groseclose and McCarty, 2001), with the different branches of government manipulating the disagreements to their own ends (Gilmour, 1995).

Veto threats have been classified into two models, the Commitment and Coordination models (Cameron, 2000; Matthews, 1989). The Commitment model focuses on the effect of political rhetoric. Cameron (2000, p.197) claims that half of veto threats were not carried out when the Congress has failed to comply fully with the demands of the President. This is an example of how Clinton seized the agenda in order to achieve his objectives in divided government – the threat of the veto could be considered as powerful as that of actually blocking the veto, considering 4/5 Congressional overrides failed (Colney, 2000). Ingerberman and Yao (1991) argue that a veto threat gives the President the power of proposal, Congress is forced to find out what President will accept. An example of this was the 1994 State of the Union address where Clinton vowed to veto any healthcare reform that did not guarantee universal coverage (McCarty, 1997). This threatening rhetoric could be considered a strategic bluff in order for the President to achieve policy objectives closer to his own preferences.

The coordination veto model assumes that both branches of government are interested in the substance of policy outcomes (Matthews, 1989) with the threat of Presidential veto only being taken seriously if there is some uncertainty about what the President will accept (Cameron, 2000, p181-2). The rhetoric of the president is important because it establishes a policy reputation for the President, as either an accommodator or compromiser (Matthews, 1989; Cameron, 2000. Colney (2004) argues that it explains policy compromise better than the commitment model as the President is not compelled to carry through with his threats and the

nature of the public sentiments are sometimes unclear. This lack of clarity can facilitate a misunderstanding of the acceptance point , provoking an unintentional veto. This model establishes the policy reputation as defining how successful the President can be. As considered earlier, the failure of Clinton's National Health Insurance programme suggests Clinton had a bad policy reputation and as such would struggle to assert his policy objectives.

Congress Success Rate and the Failure of the Republican Revolution

As shown above, the Republican Revolution failed to establish party government because of the structures and constraints imposed by the constitution (McKeever, Davies and Maidment, 2012, p.236), particularly in the form of the presidential veto. The natural home of US political leadership is the presidency, this is shown by the ease with which the Republicans in Congress ceded control of the policy agenda to George W. Bush following his election in 2000 (McKeever, Davies and Maidment, 2012, p.236). Furthermore, under Bush, there was limited appetite for a balanced budget amendment, one of the central planks of the Contract for America (Gingrich, Armey, Gillespie and Schellhas, 1994). Instead of policy leadership, Fisher (1985, p.334) describes the task of Congress as 'overseeing the daily grind of administration policy'. This is evidence that the policy leadership, perceived by framers of the Constitution has not materialised (McKeever, Davies and Maidment, 2012, p.236) and that the party government that Speaker Gingrich sought to accomplish did not happen. The policy objectives of President Clinton were constrained by this new model, but not overridden.

Looking purely at Clintons's Congress Success Rate can be too simplistic, with trivial matters and non-reforms distorting the figure (Wilson, 1998, p.27). For example, Clinton achieved a success rate of 86% in his first year (Wilson, 1998, p.27) – only Presidents Eisenhower and Johnson achieved higher. This is compounded by an 86% success rate in the second year of the Clinton Presidency, with only President Johnson achieved a higher level of success (Duncan and Langdon, 1993; Langdon, 1994). Whilst the success rate of the President can be overly simplistic, it can provide a general reflection on the success of a President. For example, Clinton's success score in 1995 was 36% - the lowest figure since the Congressional Quarterly was compiled (Healey, 1996), this low figure reflected the approval ratings of Clinton that had plummeted to 39% in September 1994 and stayed at that level until early 1995 (Gallup Poll

Monthly, 1996). The low figure in 1995 suggests that Clinton did not achieve his policy objectives, but as considered here, the number does not reflect the nature of the successes.

Furthermore, by 1996, Clinton's Congressional Success rate had bounced back to 55% - this was the largest year-to-year gain of any US President (Doherty, 1996 cited by Wilson, 1998). Once again, the figure is very selective, only reflecting a short period in a Presidential term of 4 years – 8 if re-elected. This big increase shows that Clinton did achieve his policy objectives following the difficulties of the 104th Congress.

Conclusion

Clinton faced some great challenges as President, finding himself elected to the Presidency against the established political order, he managed to use the formal and informal powers invested in his office by the constitution to further his own objectives. If one chooses to judge the Clinton presidency in black and white terms, an undiluted Clinton vision was not achieved. However, even in periods of unified government, a 'pure' presidential vision is rarely achieved because of the importance of constituencies in congressional affairs. The Republican campaigning innovation, in the form of the Contract with America changed the nature of the threat Clinton faced – formalising the process of national partisanship that had taken place over the 20th century and increasing party cohesiveness. Whilst this cohesiveness party politics was different to what had existed before, the flexible nature of the constitution meant that because the Republicans did not have veto-proof majority they could not define the agenda as much as they might have wished. Clinton knew that the presidential veto had to be deployed carefully as to not look like he was undemocratic in the eyes of voters, fusing the formal power of veto with the informal presidential power of access to the media in order to achieve his objectives. His successful strategy, in my view, forged a reputation for himself as both a pragmatist, buy also great reformer – a reputation that many Presidents who encounter united government have attempted and failed to emulate. To this extent, whilst diluted differing from those he entered office with, Clinton did manage to achieve his policy objectives in a period of divided government.

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Is Fukuyama right to say that history has ended and socialism is no longer an alternative to capitalism?

(Written for Death of Socialism, 3rd Year)

Alexandra Cook

There is a current tendency, both within academia and the public realm, to assume that politics has taken an irreversible shift to the right. Socialism, in its Soviet Communist form as exemplified in Eastern Europe and the Social Democratic regimes of Western Europe, has been regarded as discredited. After the historic collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 socialism was no longer seen as desirable, largely due to the disastrous economic and cultural legacies of the eastern bloc, but substantially as a result of over 70 years of hegemonic anti-communism in the west. As a result there ensued a triumphalist attitude from supporters of capitalist democracy, and a begrudging acceptance from the left that socialism had indeed failed. Consequently, socialism today is suffering. This has led many to favourably accept Francis Fukuyama's surprising proclamation of 1989, that history had ended. Liberal democracy and the capitalist system it relies upon had emerged victorious; socialism was dead and could no longer offer a viable alternative to Capitalism. For a long time Fukuyama's argument has been remarkably resilient to challenges from the left. With social democratic parties globally falling into line with the neoliberal orthodoxy, socialists visions seem only to appear in academic journals and university courses. For too long, little has been done to formulate a response to Fukuyama's thesis. However, the political positions of existing parties does not equate to there being no alternatives. The first decade of the 21st century has confronted us with unprecedented levels of inequality and in response we are gradually seeing an anti-capitalist movement re-emerge. This suggests, not only that socialism can offer such an alternative, but that it is one of increasing relevance.

This essay endeavours to demonstrate that Fukuyama's thesis is unfounded and establish how socialism still offers a credible alternative to capitalism, a claim which is given little currency in contemporary academic literature. In the first section, I shall elaborate on Fukuyama's thesis and his supporting arguments. Throughout the second section, I aim to dismantle Fukuyama's thesis;

firstly looking at the class issue, followed by examining the extent of the liberal hegemony, and finally exploring the glaring contradictions which remain within capitalism. Finally, having explained why a socialist alternative is necessary, I will explain how it remains plausible within the climate of today.

Fukuyama and the End of History

Before considering whether socialism still offers a viable alternative to capitalism, it is well to recap Fukuyama's central thesis. In the summer of 1989, amid a backdrop of rapidly disintegrating communist regimes in the Eastern bloc, Francis Fukuyama, deputy director of the U.S State Department's policy planning, published his notorious essay, "The End of History?" The theory was later elaborated into a book of the same title in 1992. Fukuyama's argument is simple; liberal democracy (by which he means capitalist democracy) as a form of governance has triumphed. By 1989 it had emerged not only as the dominant, but also the final ideology of the modern world, culminating in the end of history:[131]

"What we are witnessing is not just the end of the cold war, or the passing of a particular period of post war history, but the end of history as such: that is the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalisation of western liberal democracy as the final form of human government."[132]

Fukuyama proclaimed that belief in political liberalism had eroded throughout the 20th century due to the rise of alternative totalitarian systems. As the century drew to a close Fukuyama argued that liberalism was regaining its self confidence and hegemonic position after its two major ideological challenges, fascism and socialism, had been defeated. The former, diminished during the dismal end of the Second World War, and the latter by the ideological rejection of communism illustrated by the sudden collapse of the USSR, and China's abandonment of

[131] Howard Williams, David Sullivan and E. Gwynn Mathews, *Francis Fukuyama and the end of history* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1997), 83.
[132] Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?", *The National Interest,* (1989), accessed 10 December 2014, http://www.viet-studies.info/EndofHistory.htm.

Marxism.[133] In arriving at the end of history, man has reached a point where no further evolution of ideological thought is possible. In understanding the world in this way Fukuyama views history as teleological process, consisting of a "beginning, middle and end", drawing heavily upon Hegelian philosophy. Following Hegelian thought, Fukuyama asserts that ideas and ideologies are the ultimate arbiter of history. Having triumphed over alternative systems of thought, liberal democracy has shown it cannot be improved, ultimately earning its place as the final ideology of history. To illustrate his point, Fukuyama cites French intellectual and follower of Hegel, Alexandre Kojeve. Kojeve famously claimed history ended as early as 1806 with the Battle of Jena, which saw Napoleon defeat the Prussian monarchy, therefore signifying the triumph of the liberal views of the French Revolution.[134]

Fukuyama's thesis has been the most influential attempt to comprehend the post-cold war world to date, and quickly becoming an emblem of western intellectual superiority. Other than the evidential defeat of competing ideologies, Fukuyama engages a number of arguments to reinforce the superiority of capitalist democracy. Foremost, Fukuyama claims that "with the receding of the class issue", (the core accusation against liberalism), traditional support for socialism has declined. Again referencing Kojeve, he explains that the "egalitarianism of modern America represents the essential achievement of the classless society envisioned by Marx."[135] He argues that class antagonisms today are external to liberalism, which is essentially egalitarian and redistributionist. Instead, Fukuyama believes class contradictions are rooted in the historical legacies of society. For example, he insists that black poverty in America is not an issue within liberalism but a remnant of the "legacy of slavery and racism".[136] Another argument enlisted alongside the decline of Marxists Leninism in Eastern Europe is the phenomenal expansion of capitalism in Asia as evidence of the ascendency of liberal democracy. He highlights the economies of the likes of Japan and Singapore, and the reforms in China as verification of the "unabashed victory of economic and political liberalism".[137] Likewise, in support of this Fukuyama points to the declining membership of left parties in contrast to the success of

[133] Peter Saunders, *Capitalism: A Social Audit* (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1995), 106.
[134] Jonathan Steele, Edward Mortimer and Gareth Stedman Jones, "The End of History?", *Marxism Today,* November 1989, 26.
[135] Fukuyama, "The End of History?".
[136] Ibid.
[137] Steele, Mortimer and Stedman, "The End of History?", 26.

conservative parties across the globe to suggest that there is no longer support for a socialist alternative.[138] Moreover, his fundamental claim is that in the "universal homogenous state" man will not evolve beyond the ideology of liberal democracy because it is capable of fulfilling all human psychological needs.[139] In his Hegelianism, Fukuyama asserts that history is driven forward by contradictions between world views. Therefore, in arriving at 'the end of history', Fukuyama is essentially claiming that western liberal democracy has resolved all prior contradictions. The human race has moved beyond previous conflicts and oppressions and entered an era of freedom and peace.[140]

For Fukuyama, the world has unanimously agreed that liberal democracy and the free market is the best possible system we can aim for, thus we have reached the end of history. However, Fukuyama is careful to note that the liberal ideal is still a fair way from fulfilment in many parts of the world. Therefore, in professing the end of history he was not ruling out the history of events, which would indeed continue. He is citing an end to the grand ideologies which had previously led to world conflicts. Furthermore, Fukuyama acknowledged the existence of threats such as religious fundamentalism and nationalism, but dismissed these has having limited appeal beyond their localities.[141] What we appear to be seeing today is this view permeating the social democratic and moderate parties on an international scale. Marxist historian Eric Hobsbawm accuses such parties of increasingly committing themselves to the free market.[142] He explains that, "between the fall of the USSR and now" he "can think of no such party or leader denouncing capitalism.".[143] Hobsbawm points to New Labour's policies under Blair and Brown as the key culprits of this. Moreover, Eric Ruder, writing for the *International Socialist Review,* insists this is not just a trend we are seeing within Britain. He argues that even the renowned social democratic countries of Europe such as Norway, Sweden and Denmark are showing increasing signs of moving to the right. He highlights the privatisation of state pensions, schools, health care

[138] Fukuyama, "The End of History?".
[139] Ibid.
[140] Williams, Sullivan and E. Mathews, *Francis Fukuyama and the end of history*, 83.
[141] Saunders, *Capitalism: A Social Audit* , 106.
[142] Eric Hobsbawm, "Socialism has failed. Now capitalism is bankrupt. So what comes next?", *The Guardian,* Friday 10 April 2009, accessed 16 December 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/financial-crisis-capitalism-socialism-alternatives.
[143] Ibid.

and public transport across the board.[144] With such trends on the rise it appears that consolidating a concrete socialist alternative is more imperative than ever.

Finally, before I endeavour to do so, it is important to remember that any attempt to evaluate Fukuyama's thesis must incorporate the necessary caution to any thesis which may theorise the future. This may be the biggest criticism in Fukuyama's case, for it is clearly hazardous to hypothesise the future from current trends which are susceptible to change. Understandably though, theories about "endism", were popular as the millennium drew to a close.[145] Unfortunately, due to space permitting this essay will not expand upon such challenges to Fukuyama's thesis. Moreover, critiquing the 'grand narrative' is a tool unavailable to those of the Marxist belief, as both traditions are Hegelian in this regard.[146] Therefore, the focus of my argument as follows will be to dismantle the challenges Fukuyama's has posed for socialism's demise and prove the resilience and necessity of a socialism today.

Class Conflict Today

Firstly then, as Fukuyama argued, it is often accepted as fact that the working class today is in decline. This is a popular myth, propelled in many ways by New Labour's announcement that "we're all middle class now." It is true that the industrial working class makes up a smaller percentage of the workforce in the western world than it did thirty years ago. Largely this is a result of increased globalisation and the rising trend of capitalists moving production abroad to cheaper countries.[147] However, such sentiments tend to view the industrial working class as synonymous with the working class as a whole. Therefore, it is assumed that the decline of manufacturing industries, ushered in an era of a classless society. Quite simply, this is not the case. Across the globe today there remains enormous inequalities of wealth between classes. Noteworthy, the Gini coefficient measure (a calculation of the distance which separates the rich

[144] Eric Ruder, "Does socialism exist in the world today?", Socialist worker.org, 22 November 2010, accessed 15 December 2014, http://socialistworker.org/2010/11/22/does-socialism-exist.
[145] Krishna Kumar, "Post History: Living at the End," in *Understanding Contemporary Society*, ed. Gary Browning et al, (London: Sage Publications Ltd, 2000), 59.
[146] Christopher Bertram and Andrew Chitty, *Has History Ended? Fukuyama, Marx, Modernity,* (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 1994), 5.
[147] Hannah Snell, *Socialism in the 21st Century,* (London: Socialist Publications Ltd, 2002), accessed 18 December 2014, http://www.socialistparty.org.uk/socialism21/index.html.

and poor) of the United States today puts it on a level comparable to China, a country we consider to be developing in comparison to America.[148] The working class today remains in formidable numbers. Whilst the industrial working class may have declined, the fastest growing sector of the labour market can be found among those who clean, cook or child mind for others. Long hours and low wages are still the norm among this new working class. Marx did not define class by their job definition, it was by the economic exploitation under a capitalist system, referring to their social situation and living standards. As noted in the *Guardian* on 6th June 2000: "For those on rock bottom wages…Karl Marx would recognise their situation even though the job descriptions may be unfamiliar."[149] These inequalities are not external to capitalism as Fukuyama argued, rather they are integral to its make-up. The free market has not only exacerbated the gap between rich and poor, it has also reduced average incomes across the developing world.[150] Furthermore, inequality is just as apparent within western countries. Today black Americans earn 61% less per year than their white counterparts. Similarly, in the UK black and Asian workers earn three quarters of the income an average white employee takes home. These inequalities are ingrained within the capitalist economic system. A socialist government arguably could not eradicate such mass poverty but it could install economic measures to ease the capitalist burden. Such as more jobs, free universal education and childcare, decent housing and a living wage.[151]

Assertions that class antagonism have decreased due to the "egalitarian and redistributionists" nature of liberal democracy are also disputable. Christopher Hitchens, in a talk at George Washington University in 1992 strongly refuted Fukuyama's arguments. He insisted that the working class critique of capitalism is today as relevant and piercing as ever.[152] Hitchens suggested that whilst class conflict may be on the decline on the level of the proletariat/bourgeoisie axis, class conflict in the 21st century occurs at the nation state level. That is between the global north and south, or the developed and developing worlds. He argues that the western, or developed

[148] Tony Judt, "What Is Living and What Is Dead in Social Democracy?", *The New York Review of Books,* 56:20 (2009), accessed 21 December 2014, http://www.nybooks.com/issues/2009/dec/17/.
[149] Snell, *Socialism in the 21st Century.*
[150] Timothy Stanley and Alexander Lee, "It's Still Not The End of History", *The Atlantic,* September 2014, accessed 19 December 2014, http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/09/its-still-not-the-end-of-history-francis-fukuyama/379394/.
[151] Snell, *Socialism in the 21st Century.*
[152] Christopher Hitchens, *History Is Not Over,* 1992, accessed 22 December 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o2Jt-JU1azU

world exploits many countries, (for natural resources, labour etc) which engages traditional Marxist accusations of exploitation and alienation. In this sense it is illogical to argue that class contradictions have been resolved within liberalism. Hitchens accuses Fukuyama's thesis of being a mere defence of the new world order, calling his theory "an alibi for old imperialism".[153] Fukuyama, in his own work even seems to allude to this reality, admitting that the "economic inequality brought about by capitalism" is "in a certain sense, unresolvable within the context of liberalism."[154] Therefore this raises the question; what other economic system can better resolve such inequalities of wealth and living standards?

The Unabashed Victory of Liberalism?

Fukuyama claims the western liberal democratic ideal has triumphed by emphasising the expansion of capitalism across Asia. However, as sociology professor Peter Saunders points out, this line or argument is flawed. What we often see in the successful capitalist nations across Asia, are more bureaucratic or corporate types of capitalism, not based upon liberal principles. Therefore, this does not consolidate the theory that the development of ideologies and competing systems has terminated with liberal democracy.[155] Saunders accuses Fukuyama's theory of containing a "worrying ethnocentrism", as he assumes the dominance of capitalism to equate to the dominance of western liberal democracy. Fukuyama's assumption in this case has been criticised for failing to recognise the different types of capitalism which exists in the world today from America to China.[156] Michel Albert's influential book *Capitalism Against Capitalism* expands upon the idea that the western capitalist hegemony is today being challenged internationally. Albert highlights the strength of the Rhine model, or, "the other capitalism", associated with countries such as Germany, Switzerland and Japan in contrast to the 'neo-American' model so praised by Fukuyama. [157] Both, he says are "indisputably capitalist" since private property, free enterprise and a market economy form the bases of both systems. However, Albert is confident in asserting that the Rhine model is proving to be more successful

[153] Ibid.
[154] Joseph McCarney, "Shaping ends: Reflections on Fukuyama", in *Has History Ended? Fukuyama, Marx, Modernity,* ed, Christopher Bertram and Andrew Chitty, (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 1994), 24.
[155] Saunders, *Capitalism: A Social Audit* , 107.
[156] Ibid.
[157] Michel Albert, C*apitalism Against Capitalism,* (London: Whurr Publishers Ltd, 1993), 100.

in recent years, emphasising its different economic organisation which appears to be both more stable and dynamic.[158] The Rhine model of Japan and Germany puts a much greater emphasis on collective success, cooperation and long term concerns in contrast to the western model based on individual and short term success. Moreover, income distribution and state welfare is more advanced within the Rhine model.[159] Such findings, undermine Fukuyama's theory that we have reached the end of history, in which no rival system can challenge the hegemony of western liberal democracy.

Moreover, contrary to Fukuyama's claims, support for movements which challenge global capitalism are still in existence. Venezuela's Bolivarian Revolution stands out as a case in point. Although not the only example, Venezuela has proved that the world has by no means entered a post-ideological era.[160] By contrast, the revolution has inspired an entire '21st Century Socialist' movement across South America in direct response to decades of neoliberal domination.[161] The United Socialist Party of Venezuela have implemented extensive political and economic changes. Social Welfare programmes across the country have reduced not only poverty but also the inequality of access to commodities such as education and healthcare.[162] Fukuyama, however dismisses President Chavez's economic successes as only being due to the mass export of petroleum.[163] A point which Dr. Roett of John Hopkin's university endorses, to the extent he believes the economy would be failing if it were not for the oil market. Regardless of Fukuyama's disillusionment with the socialist reforms of Venezuela, it cannot be denied that the region is experiencing a substantial orientation towards socialism. Therefore this suggests that a socialist alternative, in this case based upon popular democracy and eradicating political corruption, still generates mass appeal.

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[158] Ibid.
[159] Saunders, *Capitalism: A Social Audit* , 108.
[160] Danny Haiphong, "The Prospects and Problems of 21st Century Socialism in the US", *Global Research*, June 2014, accessed 19 December 2014, http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-prospects-and-problems-of-21st-century-socialism-in-the-us/5386614
[161] Preston Whitt, "The Changing face of Socialism in the 21st Century", *CETRI,* October 2010, accessed 2 January 2015, http://www.cetri.be/spip.php?article1855.
[162] Ibid.
[163] Francis Fukuyama, "The End of Cahvez- History's Against Him", *The Washington Post,* 6th August 2006, accessed 22 December 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/08/04/AR2006080401768.html.

Contradictions within Capitalism

The contradictions we see within capitalist democracy today are vast. It is Fukuyama's fundamental argument that liberal democracy has resolved all prior contradictions thus qualifying it as the final ideology in mans' evolution. However, it is fallacious to believe that the internal contradictions of capitalism have been resolved. As Ralph Miliband highlights in his defence of socialism, capitalist democracy, is in itself a contradiction of two opposing systems. Fukuyama even acknowledges that "liberal democracies are doubtless plagued by a host of problems like unemployment, drugs, crime and the like".[164] Fukuyama's acknowledgement of the inadequacies of capitalism, whilst undermining his own argument do not go far enough. There appears an increasing number of indictments which can be brought against the superiority of capitalism. For Fukuyama, liberal democracy incorporates the twin principles of liberty and equality, however the supposed benefits of liberalism are globally unequally distributed and ever more environmentally damaging.[165] Free trade policies and increasingly privatising social services has facilitated the accumulation of extensive wealth for the owners of capital. Today we face the mega trends of rising inequality, poverty, political instability and climate change. In light of these trends and the recent economic crisis, it is evident that liberal democracy is fraught with contradictions and evidently does not best serve the vast majority of society environmentally or economically.

Today the free market economy is still reeling from the financial crisis of 2008, the greatest crisis of global capitalism since the 1930s. In many respects the most recent crisis has had a more profound affect given the advancement of globalisation and the interdependence of the world's economies.[166] The economic crisis and subsequent bail out of the banks undoubtably tars Fukuyama's assertions that liberal democracy offers a sustainable system free from contradictions. Marx's theory, described over a hundred years ago, that capitalism was condemned to repeatedly lurch from boom to slump because of the "cycles of overproduction" rings incredibly true.[167] For many, the global recession has made it abundantly clear that laissez-

[164] Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man,* (London: Penguin Books, 1992), 288.
[165] Mortimer, "The End of History?", 29.
[166] Hobsbawm, "Socialism has failed".
[167] Snell, *Socialism in the 21st Century.*

faire economics does not ensure prosperity.[168] Across Europe countries who have been the most severely hit by the crisis such as Greece and Hungary, are showing clear signs of turning away from liberalism in favour of economic interventionism.[169] For many commentators, such trends only serve as evidence that liberal democracy has not triumphed. Deputy secretary of the US Treasury, Roger Altman, admitted that the crisis has been a "major geopolitical set back for the U.S and Europe."[170] Perhaps the biggest affront of the financial crisis is that capitalism has failed to use the immense resources it has created. Despite an abundance of wealth and technical ability, capitalist societies are still characterised by insecurity and unemployment.[171] The world's richest economies still contain the most extreme polarisation of wealth. Continuation of long hours, inequality and poverty suggest the failings of capitalism and the urgent need for socialism in the political system.

Polarisation between those at the top and those at the bottom has struck a chord with many struggling under the increasing social pains of government austerity programmes in repose to the financial crisis. As a result, there has emerged a renewed questioning of capitalism and a revision of Marxist values.[172] In Britain many traditionally middle class sectors of the population such as teachers, civil servants and lecturers are turning towards the traditional working class weapon of striking in response to being increasingly overworked and under paid.[173] Moreover, we are seeing an increasing amount of social movements attacking capitalism, such as 'Occupy Wall Street', and the global 'October 15th' protests, which aimed to target growing inequality and corporate influence. A renewed interest in a socialist alternative is making itself apparent. Many public opinion polls such as one conducted by 'Pew Research Centre poll' centre in 2011 shows that almost half of young people in America today believe socialism to be more desirable that

[168] Stanley and Lee, "It's Still Not The End of History".
[169] Ibid.
[170] Quentin Peel, "Risks rise in shift to a multipolar world", *The Financial Times,* 28 January 2009, accessed 4 January 2014, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4f75d91e-ecdb-11dd-
[171] Ralph Miliband, "The Socialist Alternative", Journal of Democracy, 3:3 (1992): 120, accessed 17 December 2014, doi: 10.1353/jod.1992.0035
[172] Richard Wolff, "Alternatives to Capitalism", *Critical Sociology,* 39:4 (2013): 487, accessed 21 December 2014, doi: 10.1177/0896920513485317.
[173] Snell, *Socialism in the 21st Century.*

capitalism.[174] There is an increasing discontent with the inadequacies of capitalism's 'solutions' such as bank bail outs, increased regulation and austerity measures, demonstrating the ardent need for a concrete socialist alternative.[175]

The Socialist Alternative

In highlighting the inequalities, class conflicts and contradictions which remain within capitalism, I believe it is fair to say Fukuyama's argument is in many ways flawed. By no means is socialism dead, except within the mindset of western politicians. Whilst, 'actually existing' socialism is almost unanimously regarded as morally bankrupt, the original ideas of Marxist thought are not.[176] If we return to a belief in socialism as a set of moral injunctions against the numerous sins of capitalism, socialism has extensive appeal. Socialism is about the elimination of poverty, the redress of the massive inequalities of wealth and power in today's society and ensuring that human needs come first within an economic system.[177] Socialism remains critical in providing a critique of capitalism and the social inequalities it produces. As Marxist philosopher Slavoj Žižek notes, the extent in which these injunctions and ideals have been incorporated into the ethos of modern capitalist societies is to socialism's credit.[178] The cornerstones of the socialist ideal live on. Marx himself famously noted, "an idea, once it gets hold of the masses, becomes a material forces."[179] This is true of socialism today. As Seweryn Bialer argues, socialism will always have a future, not only as an academic discipline and a "predilection of working people" but also as a "moral creed" in upholding the core values of society.[180]

However, what remains needed is a response to the fundamental question; how, after communism, after social democracy's rightward shift, do we generate a sense of alternative within

[174] Alexander Eichler, "Young People More Likely To Favor Socialism Than Capitalism: Pew", *The Huffington Post,* December 2011, accessed 4 January 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/12/29/young-people-socialism_n_1175218.html.
[175] Wolff, "Alternatives to Capitalism",488.
[176] Seweryn Bialer, "Is Socialism Dead?", *Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences,* 44:2 (1990): 20, accessed 17 December 2014, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3824880.
[177] Bailer, "Is Socialism Dead?", 21.
[178] Slavoj Žižek, *First As Tragedy, Then As Farce*, (London:Verso, 2009), 38.
[179] Bailer, "Is Socialism Dead?", 22.
[180] Ibid.

socialism, especially given that socialism's hopes were so dramatically betrayed and defeated throughout the 20th century? The answer, in many ways is simple, it needs to return to its foundations. In order to offer a viable alternative to capitalism, socialism of the 21st century must return to its roots, whilst at the same time learning from mistakes of the past. As Anatole Anton and Richard Schmitt, in their anthology *Toward a New Socialism* argue, socialists must acknowledge the errors of the Chinese and Soviet models and account from them. A successful socialist system needs not to believe in the inevitability of capitalism leading to socialism, since capitalism thus far has proved seemingly resilient.[181] Therefore socialism today must prove its dynamism. Socialism needs to move away from Marx as its sole originator, allowing for other utopian traditions which preceded Marx.[182] To become a historical force once again socialism must resonate with the needs of society in the 21st century and fit within the social, economic and political possibilities. Whilst it is evident that resistance to global capitalism is on the rise, so is the acknowledgement that a grand socialist vision is no longer possible.[183] Socialism must harness the needs of those outside the working class if it is to have appeal. As Stalinism and social democracy has faded so has the industrial working class. This means a viable socialist alternative must reach beyond the workers in order to be successful. Left Movements all over the world today are evidence of the strength that remains within socialism. They increasingly transcend the traditional socialist emphasis on government ownership of production, central planning and preference for the working class.[184]

What is salient in this shift is a renewed emphasis on the equal rights of citizens, and fighting oppressions which surpass the traditional capital/labour nexus. As Marxist professor Ronald Aronson explains, all the successful social movements of recent years have been fought against oppression in a variety of contexts, be it race, sexuality or nationality. However, they are united in their fight for equality and liberation, the fundamental principles of the socialist agenda. To be recognised as a credible alternative, socialism today is incorporating these movements, and

[181] Ursula McTaggart, review of *Toward a New Socialism*, by Anatole Anton and Richard Schmitt, *Solidarity*, April 2009, accessed 3 January 2015,http://www.solidarity-us.org/node/2095.
[182] Ibid.
[183] Jayati Ghosh, "Socialism Is Not Dead (Indeed, It Has More to Offer Than Ever)", *The Guardian,* Monday 4 June 2012, accessed 20 December 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2012/may/28/emerging-left-world-capitalism
[184] Ibid.

expanding its commitment to fighting not only against economic exploitation but domination of all kinds, which are exacerbated within the capitalist system. [185] Moreover, as the environmental movement has taught us, socialism of the 21st century must abandon its 19th century commitment to industrialism and previous indifference to nature in favour of an ecological approach. An approach, which again aims to protect the world from the detrimental effects of capitalism.

In conclusion, Fukuyama presents a fatalistic assertion that mankind has reached the best possible system and that human consciousness has evolved to its limits. Having suggested the ways in which liberal democracy's hegemony is being challenged, both by capitalist alternatives, such as the Rhine model and by new socialist agendas seen across South America, Fukuyama's arguments seem illogical. What is more, in highlighting the many contradictions and inequalities which remain within the capitalist system, I have argued that Fukuyama's thesis is flawed and in many ways disheartening. With the many resources we have available to us today, I believe it is possible to devise a system superior to capitalist democracy in which we can redistribute wealth and alleviate rising poverty levels. In demonstrating the dynamism of the left today, it is evident that socialism still offers a credible alternative to capitalism. Finally, this essay has exemplified not only the viability of the socialist alternative at present, but the necessity of it in the face of ever growing austerity.

[185] Ronald Aronson, "The Soul of Socialism", *New Politics,* 6:1 (2006), accessed 16 December 2014, http://newpol.org/content/soul-socialism.

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