HUNGARIAN PARTY IDENTITIES & THE QUESTION OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

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SEI Working Paper No. 49
Opposing Europe Research Network Working Paper No. 4
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First published in September 2001
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Abstract

The objective of the paper is to assess the extent to which party identity and ideology are reliable guides to political parties’ attitudes to European integration in one of the East Central European EU-applicant countries, Hungary. Starting from general propositions regarding the relationship between particular ideological strands and orientations to European integration, the paper establishes the nature of the ideological space of the Hungarian party system and of the main parties’ location within it. Finally, a textual analysis of election manifestos and other policy documents provides a brief overview of party attitudes to integration. In conclusion, the Hungarian case suggests that while ideology does not account for the clear-cut choice between support and rejection of EU membership by parties, it is nonetheless a necessary explanatory variable in the context of the basis and strength of parties’ European orientations.
HUNGARIAN PARTY IDENTITIES AND THE QUESTION OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

The significance of the decision by the European Union (EU) to take in a large number of post-communist countries can hardly be overstated, either for the EU or the former East bloc countries themselves. Membership in the EU as an objective enjoys overwhelming support among political elites in the applicant countries. This apparent consensus can be contrasted not only with the pre-accession debates that divided the political classes in the cases of the latest EU members, but also with ‘politics as usual’ in post-communist democracies where inter-party relations are typically more conflictual than those in Western Europe (Mair 1997). However, analyses of the party politics of EU accession can reveal a background that is not entirely unlike the Western European cases that have been explored in the literature. This paper investigates one aspect of this subject, the relationship between support for European integration and party ideologies, by looking at the way the issue of EU membership is channelled into party politics in one of the East Central European (ECE) candidate countries, Hungary.

A number of recent, key studies consider party attitudes to regional integration in the West European context by mapping out the ideological dimensions of the political systems of the member states or the EU itself (e.g. Taggart 1998, Hix & Lord 1997, Hix 1999a, Hix 1999b, Marks & Wilson 1999, Hooghe & Marks 1999). Underpinning research along these lines is the proposition that while ideology alone is insufficient to account for party positions on Europe, certain kinds of ideologies are nonetheless conducive to Euroscepticism or a broadly pro-integration stance. This paper takes a similar approach. On the empirical level, the paper thus takes up Paul Taggart’s (1998:363) idea of using the EU issue ‘to trace the contours of … party systems’ by providing a party system map with parties’ ideological characteristics on the one hand and their positions on Hungary’s EU membership on the other. On a broader theoretical level, the objective is to assess the extent to which party identity and ideology are reliable guides to political parties’ attitudes to Europe.

The main argument is based on the proposition that the political space in which Hungarian parties exist is structured primarily by a dimension of cosmopolitan opening vs national closure rather than a socio-economic dimension (Kitschelt et al 1999:234-39). This, together with the country’s solid

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1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Annual Conference of the Political Studies Association (Manchester, 10-12 April 2001). I am grateful for helpful comments on various versions of this paper to the participants of the ‘Opposing Europe’ panels of the PSA conference, in particular Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak, and to Ian Herbison, Cas Mudde, Ulrich Sedelmeier, Nick Sitter, Julie Smith, and Pieter van Houten. I would also like to thank János Simon (MTA PTI Budapest) for giving me access to the data from the parliamentary surveys Section 2 draws on.

2 Kitschelt et al’s dimension is secular cosmopolitan libertarians vs religious nationalist authoritarians but cosmopolitan opening vs national closure more closely captures the primary issue (the definition of what
position among the front-runners for EU membership make the political system of Hungary a particularly interesting and suitable case study, which has so far received relatively little scholarly attention.\(^3\) The case also presents a paradox. Although European integration has implications for many of the issues that the cosmopolitan opening vs national closure dimension sums up (views on the definition of political community, national identity and culture), this dimension does not directly correspond to official policy positions taken by parties on EU membership: even parties with national closure profiles have favoured fast EU accession and most continue to do so, although perhaps with waning enthusiasm. A recent development, the signing of a formal declaration by all six parties represented in Parliament expressing support for the goal of fast EU accession seems to indicate a degree of consensus among the Hungarian political elite that is rather unusual even among ECE applicant countries (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2000). It appears, thus, that the issue of EU membership has to a large extent been de-coupled from identity politics that otherwise constitutes the main point of reference for parties’ differentiation.

However, this paper argues that, beyond the crude measure of declared support for EU membership or its absence, ideology is an important explanatory variable in the context of party attitudes to Europe. Firstly, party positions on issues making up the cosmopolitan opening – national closure divide correspond to detectable differences among parties in the basis, and therefore the strength, of their commitment to European integration. Secondly, to the extent that ideological predispositions and policies on European integration appear to be in conflict with each other, parties frame the issue in technical, material, and bargainable terms - a strategy that Maor & Smith ((1993), Maor 1997) labelled as the ‘squeezing process’, i.e. the transformation of value-related issues into resource-related ones. In other words, political parties the basic values of which are, or may be perceived to be, less compatible with political integration transformed Europe into a purely material issue and reduced its salience.

Before embarking on this project, it is necessary to acknowledge two limitations. Firstly, it has to be stressed that ideology is not claimed to account fully for party positions and policies on EU accession, but merely to serve as one explanatory variable and a starting point for further investigations. To enable a focus on the political space largely in abstract, parties’ interactions and relationships both with each other and the voters are as much as possible put aside. In other words, parties are looked at to a great extent in isolation from the broader society and the competitive pressures that largely induce their behaviour. Parties are also considered as unitary actors, although factionalism and party splits are noted to the extent that these are connected to conflicting ideological strands within parties. This is justified with the focus of the paper on dimensions of ideology, which, as Lijphart (1990:253) constitutes the politically relevant community for political parties) for the purposes of this paper.

\(^3\) Notable exceptions are Navracsics (1997), Hegedüs (1999), and Grabbe & Hughes (1998 and 1999).
suggests, should in turn also mean a ‘focus on the differences between parties rather than within parties’. Secondly, and following from the first limitation, ideology in the context of this paper is taken to mean a ‘domain of identification’ rather than a ‘dimension or space of competition’ (Sani & Sartori, 1983:330-31). Although the relationship between the two aspects of ideology is close, it is by no means mechanical: the extent to which fault-lines of identity and political conflict overlap is a function of historical development and political choice (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967; Sartori, 1968).

In the following (Section 1), a brief review of the West European experience is used to generate expectations regarding the relationship between particular ideological strands and orientations to regional integration. By drawing on the surveys conducted among Hungarian parliamentarians by the Institute for Political Science of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (MTA PTI), Section 2 establishes the nature of the Hungarian political space and the main political parties’ location within it. A textual analysis of election manifestos and other policy documents in Section 3 provides an overview of party attitudes to integration. Finally, the findings of the paper are summarised in a brief Conclusion.

1. Ideological predispositions and attitudes to European integration

‘Europe’ has been characterised as a ‘maverick issue’ or a ‘touchstone of dissent’, indicating that it does not easily conform to the existing ideological foundations of domestic politics (Maor & Smith 1993, Taggart 1998). Questions of regional integration only appeared on the scene long after the organising principles of West European party systems settled or ‘froze’ into place (Lipset & Rokkan 1967). Being rooted in the distinct political settings of internally and externally consolidated nation states, the ‘historically derived identities’ of West European parties bear little or no relation to regional integration (Sartori 1976, Bartolini 1999). European issues thus ‘uncomfortably’ blur the distinction between domestic and foreign, defy clear-cut association with Left or Right (Taggart & Szczerbiak 2001:7) and, by cutting across the partisan lines that structure West European political spaces, give rise to divisions within as well as between parties.

Nonetheless, by distinguishing between integration as a political and as an economic process (Hooghe & Marks 1999:71) - each generating different kinds of political issues that may need to be channelled into national party politics - it is possible to discern a tentative relationship between particular party ideologies and their affinity with the European project. By changing the distribution of competencies among different levels of the European Union system (or, in the case of accession states, adding one level), political integration has implications for sovereignty and indirectly national identity and democracy. It is from this aspect that ‘Europe’ as a nonconforming issue is likely to arise. Economic integration, on the other hand, generates issues relating to levels of regulation, redistribution and
economic inequality that correspond to the socio-economic Left-Right dimension characterising Western European party systems (Bartolini & Mair 1990). In other words, while economic integration entails a controversy about the role of the EU in the socio-economic domain, political integration puts the existence and nature of the EU itself onto the agenda (Hix 1999b, Hooghe & Marks 1999:71). Both of these dimensions express normative judgements but while one reflects, arguably, primarily material interests, the other is grounded in values, symbols, and traditions even though the economics and politics of European integration are closely intertwined in practice.

Regarding the socio-economic dimension, it has been suggested that support for European integration is most likely to characterise pro-market parties given that so far the European political agenda has focussed on negative integration or deregulation rather than positive integration or re-regulation (e.g. Raunio 1999:140). The relationship between party attitudes to the EU on the one hand and identity politics, the dimension relating to political integration, on the other is more ambiguous, largely because identity politics sums up a number of different normative aspects of the link between state and society. The principal, and for European integration most relevant, aspect is what is considered to be the most appropriate focus of identity and thus allegiance and loyalty: the nation (state) or a community (entity) beyond, above or below it. While nationalist parties can reasonably be expected to be less supportive of European integration, the reverse is not necessarily true (Taggart, 1998:379, Raunio 1999:141). A non-nationalistic orientation does not in itself imply support for European integration as the EU, its institutional embodiment, may be considered as ‘the “wrong” sort of international institution’ (Taggart, 1998:379). Identification with a community other than the nation, i.e. a sub- or supranational community, is only associated with a pro-EU stance if it is perceived to be more compatible with European governance than a national one. On this basis, regionalist parties (associated with sub-national communities) and Christian Democratic parties (with an allegiance in Catholic countries to the Church in party ethos if not policy) for instance can be considered as special cases.4

These expectations are, however, based on two premises. Firstly, that political parties relate to the EU primarily in a ‘positive’ way (i.e. to the EU as it is perceived to be presently) rather than a prescriptive or predictive way (how the EU should or will develop in the future). Secondly, that the national tradition in terms of market vs social protectionism is not more pro-market than the EU regulatory system is. Arguably, these conditions hold for a post-communist applicant state like Hungary – where market reforms were reinforced, and to some extent necessitated, by approaching EU membership -, but not necessarily for present member-states and certainly not uniformly for all member-states.

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4 Christian democratic parties’ attitudes are also influenced by their close association with the historical origins of the European project (I will not pursue this line of thought any further as none of these cases seem particularly relevant in the Hungarian context. For a comprehensive overview see Marks & Wilson (1999)).
Future-oriented, prescriptive considerations explain the pro-integration stance that typically characterises the centre-left in EU member states since the mid-1980s as positive integration gaining impetus may suggest the future emergence of social democracy on the European level (Marks & Wilson 1999:117-21, Hooghe & Marks 1999; Johansson & Raunio 2001). At the same time, centre-right parties appear to be pro-integration for the success of the Union as a free-market project (Marks & Wilson 1999:124). In other words, party positions seem to be determined by the level of ‘optimism’ parties display regarding the direction of development, the speed of changes, and the future shape of the EU, with the well-known result that, at present, both the centre-left and the centre-right tend to be predisposed towards a pro-integration stance in Western Europe - albeit on different bases and time-scales.

The influence of prospective and prescriptive thinking is likely to be much smaller on party attitudes in applicant states than in present member-states. ECE parties remaining outside the EU for a period as yet uncertain cannot reasonably be expected to adopt positions on their country's EU membership on the basis of speculations about the direction of a process that they can scarcely, if at all, influence (i.e. internal developments within the EU). Therefore, on a purely ideological basis, support for the EU in its current form is most ‘natural’ for ECE parties that are both pro-market and non-nationalistic in identity politics. Conversely, opposition to the EU can be expected to come from parties characterised by various degrees of nationalism and a preference for social protectionism, while in the case of parties belonging to either the protectionist - cosmopolitan or the free market - nationalist quadrants, the predisposition of the party is connected to the relative weight within the party's ideological profile of one or the other of these dimensions.

2. Party system mapping: Hungary since the mid-1990s

Before these propositions are tested in relation to individual parties, the nature of the Hungarian political space, and the main parties’ location within it, needs to be established. As Kitschelt et al (1999) have shown, the relative importance in post-communist politics of the two ideological dimensions substantially differs from the general West European picture: with the exception of the Czech Republic, the socio-economic dimension has relatively less potential to structure ECE party systems. The main outlet or expression of that dimension is economic policy, an area where ECE governments were more constrained than their Western counterparts by foreign indebtedness, large uncompetitive sectors, and expensive and ineffective social services inherited from the previous regimes. Thus, while party policies differed considerably in the 1990s regarding the pace and strategy of reforms, economic realities and the general course of transitions together led to a near consensus on the market model and left little scope for party competition on socio-economic issues. This was especially the case in Hungary where economic liberalisation started before regime change, leaving
the larger communist successor party (the Hungarian Socialist Party; MSZP) too with a credible economic reformer profile (Hanson 1999, Körösényi 1999:52). The importance of identity politics, in contrast, is reinforced by the historical disjuncture in the region between language, culture, and ethnicity on the one hand and state on the other. The traditionally great salience of the national question was enhanced by communism in the satellite states as, paradoxically, both the ruling local party elites and (part of) the anti-communist opposition tried to exploit national sentiments: the former in the hope of enhancing the popular acceptance of the party-states and the latter by characterising the same regimes as foreign imposition (Schöpflin 2000:147-69; Shafir 1999).

In this respect, the Hungarian case stands out to some extent in the ECE context. With a sizeable Roma community within its borders and some three million Hungarians especially in the neighbouring states of Romania, Slovakia, Yugoslavia, and the Ukraine (living on the historical territory of the medieval Kingdom of Hungary and the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy), nationhood has been a central political issue in every Hungarian regime in 20th century (Schöpflin 2000:370-410). The divergence of notions of nationalism and the extent to which it was relied on by the anti-Communist political elites in the course of the democratic transition was perhaps nowhere else more evident than in this country, with these forces formally divided between the camps of the democratic opposition and the populist-national opposition relatively early on (e.g. Körösényi 1992, Fritz 1999). Based on a 1994 cross-national elite survey conducted in the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria, Markowski (1997) and Kitschelt et al (1999:234-9) found that socio-cultural issues dominated politics in Hungary more than in any of the other countries, with a deep fault-line dividing the political class between ‘Christian, national, and collectivist authoritarians on one side and secular, cosmopolitan, and libertarian individualists on the other.’

Drawing on more recent data from the surveys conducted by the MTA PTI with members of Parliament (MPs) in the second (1994-98) and third (1998-) parliamentary terms, the following map of the Hungarian political space establishes the ‘relevant’ parties’ positions on socio-economic issues and the arguably most important component of the identity politics dimension, nationalism, or more precisely, the definition of political community. This analysis focuses on the second half of the

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5 The Hungarian term is nép-nemzeti, with ‘nép’ (perhaps closer to the German ‘Volk’ than the English ‘populist’ or ‘people’s’) closely associated with the idea of a community defined by blood and ethnic origin (nemzet – nation).
6 Körösényi (1999, esp. Chapter 3) and Fritz (1998) identified similar fault-lines (Körösényi’s ‘ideological-cultural’ dimension or Fritz’ Christian-national vs liberal Europeanist/universalist dimension) although attributed different relative weight to them over time.
7 Under Sartori’s criteria, the parties represented in Parliament in the current (1998-) term all obviously qualify as relevant: all, apart from MIÉP, have been part of governing coalitions and continue to have coalition-potential (MIÉP qualifies as relevant through its blackmail potential). KDNP and MDNP, two smaller parties that were present in Parliament in the second term (1994-98) but not in the third are excluded from this analysis. The MTA PTI surveys, conducted with nearly 200 MPs in both 1996 and 1998, were representative of the
1990s: arguably, the founding election and the first parliamentary term (1990-94), a period characterised by party political fluidity, is less suitable for studying party ideologies. At the end of the 1990s, the Hungarian political landscape featured a large Socialist successor party (MSZP), which governed the country with a liberal party (the Alliance of Free Democrats, SZDSZ) between 1994 and 1998. The coalition taking over after the 1998 election consisted of the ‘civic’ Fidesz-MPP (Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Party), the agrarian Independent Smallholder Party (FKGP) and the small Christian-conservative Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF). (The two latter parties had governed the country after the founding election of 1990 together with the now defunct Christian-Democratic People’s Party (KDNP).) In addition, the national populist Party of Hungarian Justice and Life (MIEP), an MDF splinter, also gained representation in Parliament for the first time in 1998 (election results in Table 1 in the Appendix).

Looking at the socio-economic dimension first (Table 3), the most pro-market party in both parliamentary terms was SZDSZ. The Free Democrats generally refused the idea of imposing upper limits on personal incomes and by 1998 the (considerably slimmer) SZDSZ faction also uniformly rejected the statement that ‘it has to be the job of the government to protect people from economic difficulties’. Fidesz-MPP and, somewhat more surprisingly, the ‘successor’ Socialist Party - especially as a governing party in coalition with SZDSZ - were also characterised by varying degrees of market-orientation, while MDF and FKGP MPs were the most likely to object to economic inequality and feel a need for a ‘caring’ government. On the basis of the policies it advocated, the Justice Party is allocated an extreme social protectionist position.

Approaching identity politics, the other dimension, from the angle of rights and obligations in a democratic order, it seems reasonable to assume that for those considering the status of ethnic Hungarians outside the borders of Hungary as more important for ‘democracy’ than the rights of minorities within that state the politically relevant community is the nation in an ethno-cultural sense (Table 4). For FKGP, MDF, and – to some extent – Fidesz parliamentarians the rights of Hungarian citizens were less important in the context of the democratic order than the rights of Hungarians who are citizens of another country, as opposed to MSZP and SZDSZ politicians. Approaching the identity composition of Parliament. However, the size of the sample regarding some parties was relatively small which warrants some caution interpreting the statistical evidence. (For the composition of the samples and the questions used from these questionnaires see Tables 2-7 in the Appendix.) MIEP MPs did not take part in the surveys. The position of this party is therefore a rough estimate on the basis of its policy statements (for details see Section 3). Regarding the other five parties, the attitudes of the members of the parliamentary party are treated as indicators of the location of the party as a whole in relation to the ideological axes. To the extent that there may be systematic differences between the attitudes of members of the parliamentary party on the one hand and of central office or the party on the ground on the other, this is a simplification made necessary by the absence of comparable data. However, taking Polish parties as an indication of the ECE pattern, it seems that the different party leaderships (parliamentary and extra-parliamentary) in any case tend to overlap considerably and the position of the parliamentary elites is as a rule dominant (Szczerbiak, 2001a).
politics dimension from another angle, the politicians’ perceptions of their own identities, this division between the two camps is by and large confirmed (Table 5). The MSZP and SZDSZ factions were the only two in both 1996 and 1998 where, given the choice among a number of geographical-cultural units, fewer than half of the parliamentary group identified primarily with Hungary. The overwhelming majority of all other parties’ MPs (with the exception of MDF in 1998) felt more Hungarian or ‘local’ than East Central European, European, or cosmopolitan. There is little doubt that – had they participated in the MTA PTI research - MIEP politicians would also have identified with Hungary and the community of ethnic Hungarians rather than Europe or the universal world.

While direct comparison with Kitschelt et al’s data from 1994 is not possible (since their study relied on different indicators) and the small sample size regarding some of the parties in the MTA PTI surveys caution against overly firm conclusions, some broad tendencies can nonetheless be pointed out. Political parties indeed clustered in the market-liberal ‘half’ of the socio-economic axis, although more in the mid- than in the late 1990s by which time the rather radical (and with the electorate highly unpopular) reform package of the socialist-liberal coalition had started improving macro-economic performance. The conservative and the agrarian parties’ leaning towards egalitarianism and paternalism was more marked than that of the Socialist successor party which shifted towards the pro-market views of its liberal coalition-partner while in government in the mid-1990s. These observations are consistent with the finding that the dominant strand of Hungarian conservatism (‘traditional’ conservatism, Chan 1999) is characterised by social protectionism (e.g. Fritz 1992, Schöpflin 1992). Regarding the identity politics axis, firstly, the proportion of MPs with a primarily national or local identification was higher in the current (1998-) term than in the socialist-dominated Parliament of 1994-98. Secondly, while in 1996 the most likely non-national/local identification among MPs was European, in 1998 it was least likely (Simon 1997:671 and 1999:143). Both of these changes reflect the greater numerical strength of the nationally-oriented parties in Parliament after the 1998 election victory of Fidesz-MPP and its coalition-partners.

Finally, as far as the salience of the two axes is concerned, patterns of politicians’ perceptions of their own and parties' ideological location on a single Left-Right scale confirm the continuing primacy of the identity politics axis over the socio-economic one in the Hungarian ideological space. The Left-Right ‘scores’ MPs gave to themselves and the parties (Table 6) reflected their judgements on identity politics issues (Tables 4 & 5) to a far greater extent than on socio-economic ones (Table 3). In other words, Left and Right in the Hungarian context, as Kitschelt et al (1999) and Körösényi (1999) have argued, said relatively little about the role the political class believed the state should play in the economy, even at the end of the 1990s. Equally importantly, however, the capacity of MPs to interpret Left and Right by filling these categories up with this very specific and ‘atypical’ content indicates that the ideological space is highly structured: identity politics is a highly effective ‘organising
principle’, at least as far as politicians are concerned. By presenting the relevant parties’ individual profiles, the following section looks at how this ideological structuration bore on party attitudes to European integration.

3. Party attitudes to European integration

If parties’ location within the Hungarian ideological space is a reliable guide to their positions on European integration, the Free Democrats and the Socialists should be most positively predisposed towards the EU, with Fidesz-MPP and MDF taking an intermediate position, while the Smallholders and especially the Justice Party would be expected to be sceptical or even hostile in outlook (Figure 1). The most evident indicator of a party’s views on European integration is its support for, or rejection of, EU membership itself. However, this measure is only suitable for distinguishing between broadly pro-integration parties on the one hand and ‘hard Eurosceptic’ parties on the other, but it says nothing about more nuanced, intermediate positions (‘soft’ Euroscepticism) or the ideological bases of these attitudes (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2001). Thus, unsurprisingly, the ‘support for Hungary’s EU membership’ question in the MTA PTI parliamentary surveys is of little help in drawing the EU-attitude map of the Hungarian party system, especially given that the only parliamentary party with a radically different position from the ‘average’, MIÉP, did not take part in the survey (Table 7).

On the other hand, the survey results draw attention to the fact that representatives of the mainstream parties overwhelmingly support the general idea of Hungarian EU membership. This convergence on a broadly positive European outlook has been a major building block in the ‘foreign policy consensus’, i.e. an oft-quoted if informal agreement among the mainstream political parties, dating back to the time of the first freely elected parliament, on the general objectives of Hungarian governments in the country’s international relations (Csizmadia 1998). The notion of foreign policy consensus embodied three basic strategic goals: ‘Euro-Atlantic integration’ (as it was labelled until the country joined Nato); good-neighbourly relations with the countries surrounding Hungary (often equated with ‘regional policy’), and the representation of the interests of ethnic Hungarians living in these countries (‘minority policy’). The three objectives were closely interrelated. For instance, the situation of ethnic Hungarians in Romania and Slovakia clearly had a bearing on the quality of these countries’ bilateral relations with Hungary; at the same time conflictual bilateral relations would hinder integration into West European structures. Nonetheless, keeping the three elements conceptually distinct is important because whether a party emphasises integration, good-neighbourly relations or the role of Hungary as a motherland for all ethnic Hungarians is clearly connected to the strength of a party’s European (or national) commitment and to the identity politics axis.\(^8\) In this sense, the concept of the foreign policy

\(^8\) It needs to be stressed that the differences are of emphasis rather than clear-cut choice: it is highly unlikely that
consensus is highly superficial: it disguises controversy on strategy, timing, and priorities that were often as important politically as the long-term, overall goal itself.

What follows is a brief overview of the main political parties and their policy statements on European integration, as argued in their election manifestos from 1994 and 1998 and other policy statements reported in the Hungarian press. This summary focuses on a number of key issues: the foreign policy priorities of the parties, the negotiation strategy they proposed to employ vis-à-vis Brussels, and also the question of how much weight parties gave to more value-oriented as opposed to purely pragmatic or resource-related considerations in relation to the EU. A brief note on party history and affiliations to transnational party federations is also included to supplement the quantitative data on their broad ideological profiles.9

**Party of Hungarian Justice and Life (Magyar Élet és Igazság Pártja; MIÉP)**

Besides its opposition to ‘communist internationalism’ and ‘cosmopolitan liberalism’ (MIEP 1998 and 1999), the defining issue for the Justice Party was to defend of the Hungarian nation or, more specifically, to address the alleged injustice of the post-World War 1 peace settlement that changed the historical borders of the country (MIEP 1999). This question was the immediate cause of the party’s independent existence: MIEP-leader Istvan Csurka and his followers’ left the then governing Hungarian Democratic Forum in 1993, after the group of MPs refused to endorse in Parliament a treaty recognising the existing borders between Hungary and the Ukraine (Körösényi 1999:38). The party was initially a political outcast until its leading personalities returned to Parliament in 1998 by winning 5.5 per cent of the popular vote.

The Justice Party is a rather clear-cut example of a national populist party (Mudde 2000), with its ethos thus largely made up of a general protest against foreign influence in any shape or form, be it cultural, economic, military, or political. ‘If multiculturalism … means that the Hungarian culture is only one of many in Hungary, we reject it. Hungary is for the Hungarians’ – reads a sentence from the party document ‘The Hungarian way’ (MIEP 1999:13). MIÉP was against privatisation, foreign investment and Hungary’s membership of Nato, which was characterised as military occupation (Csurka 1997). Regarding socio-economic policy, the party advocated the re-nationalisation of privatised assets and set the objective of full employment, imposing an upper limit on incomes and

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9 For more detailed party profiles see e.g. Fritz (1992); Körösényi (1999) and, especially in relation to European integration, Navracsics (1997).
determining a minimum wage that covered ‘real costs of living’ (MIEP 1998).  

A pronounced ‘hard’ Eurosceptical stance seems to be a logical part of this ideological baggage (Taggart 1998). EU enlargement was indeed described by the party leader as a renewed attack by Western powers: ‘Due to the pressure from global financial interests and for reasons of business, they want to settle, to enlarge – in fact, to colonise - , to redraw borders … while they do not provide for the economic, political and cultural conditions for these processes’ (Csurka 2000, emphasis added). Particularly unacceptable was to the party the perceived danger that – in case Romania and Slovakia joined the EU later than Hungary - extending the boundaries of the Union to the Eastern borders of Hungary, entailing stricter border-controls and the adoption of the Schengen visa-regime, would reinforce the ‘partition’ of the nation, and thus commit ‘the crime of Trianon [the post-World War I peace-treaty]’ again (Csurka 2000). Yet, at the time of the parliamentary debate in 1999, MIÉP did not categorically rule out EU membership: the party leader ‘merely’ proposed to postpone a final decision to the distant future and return to the question from a strengthened position ‘in 8,10,15 [or] 20 years’ time … if a united Europe still exists’ (Official Records of the Parliament of the Republic of Hungary, 29 September 1999). Recently, in an effort to project a more mainstream image, MIEP’s Euroscepticism seems to have been toned down somewhat. It endorsed the formal six-party declaration of September 2000 that expressed support for fast EU accession (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2000), even though the leading personalities of the party continued to voice their reservations about the EU.

Independent Smallholder Party (Független Kisgazdapárt; FKGP)

The agrarian party’s rhetoric is perhaps best exemplified by its motto ‘God, Fatherland, Family’. FKGP, a party that characterised itself in 1990 as a national-Christian peasant party, shared with MIÉP both the claim to represent the interests of the nation and the vehemence with which they attacked the ‘shameless supranationalism’ of parties they claimed were liberal (FKGP 1995:83). The flirtation with political populism strained the party’s international links (in 1992, the European Democratic Union (EDU) terminated the party’s right to participate in its meetings), which have only recently recovered with FKGP’s acceptance as associate member, together with its coalition partner Fidesz-MPP, to the European People’s Party (EPP) in November 2000. Yet, from a starting point that was somewhat more moderate but not unlike the MIÉP’s, FKGP arrived at a different conclusion: an explicit, if somewhat ambiguous, pro-EU stance. Instead of postponing integration to the indefinite future, as

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10 This feature is the only important difference between MIÉP and Taggart’s ‘ideal type’ new-populist party, described as neo-liberal in economic policy (Taggart 1995). The distinctive political rhetoric – a claim to speak for the ‘people’ (the ‘mainstream’ in Taggart’s terminology) and defend the motherland (‘heartland’) – and charismatic leadership however mark MIEP as rather typically new populist in the ECE context.
MIÉP suggested, FKGP called for European integration as a way of strengthening Hungary’s economic influence.

Nonetheless, in line with its general rhetoric, the 1995 manifesto of FKGP criticised the negotiation strategy of the social-liberal government coalition which the party felt was servile, and advocated instead to defend the national interest by following the ‘wise’ policy of (the then) Czech prime minister Vaclav Klaus, renowned for his critical approach to his country’s EU accession (FKGP 1995:64). The Smallholders also took a firm stand on the issue of land-ownership (a crucial question in the negotiations with the EU), by ruling out the liberalisation of the market to allow the acquisition of arable land by foreign nationals and warned about the dangers that in the party’s view would arise from premature EU accession. EU-membership, coming at a time when the Hungarian economy was still unprepared, would destine the country to a subordinated position within the Union and threaten the loss of national identity. ‘Being integrated into a more developed society Hungarians could easily lose their distinct national characteristics …’ (FKGP 1995:65).

However, paralleling a process in which, preparing for office, the Smallholder party toned down ideology altogether (focussing instead on the representation of its agrarian constituency’s interests) by 1998 the material advantages that in the party’s judgement would follow from EU accession clearly outweighed any other concerns it may have had earlier. Membership was not simply approached almost exclusively from an economic aspect but was effectively reduced to a numerical cost-benefit analysis, summarised in a 5-page balance-sheet in the party’s election manifesto on the ‘returns and expenditures’ of EU membership. The bottom-line: the expectation of a ‘substantial and positive balance of payments with the Union’, which the party also pledged to enforce in the accession negotiations (FKGP 1998:161 and 169). In other words, although there was little doubt that FKGP was in favour of accession to the Union, it was also evident that the European orientation of the party was conditional on a perception of European integration providing substantial ‘hard’ (material) benefits. As one sentence of the 1998 manifesto crudely put, ‘[a]ccession only makes sense if the country will have access to the development funds that have so far been usually provided [by the Union]’ (1998:36). Should this perception change, the pro-EU stance of the party may also wither away, although with FKGP in government this seemed unlikely.\textsuperscript{11}

\textsuperscript{11} Deep divisions and, subsequently, the disintegration of the party into warring factions in 2001 reduced the ‘moderating’ impact of coalition membership, with the party leader rejecting the deal its government secured in the accession negotiations on EU citizens’ land ownership in Hungary.
Hungarian Democratic Forum (Magyar Demokrata Fórum, MDF)

MDF was the largest governing party in the first freely-elected Parliament of the post-communist era, with at least three clearly identifiable ideological strands and corresponding internal groupings (populist-national, liberal and Christian democratic) (Fritz 1992). These strands were united during the democratic transition and at the beginning of the first term by a distinctive ethos putting, in comparison with Western European conservative and Christian democratic parties, a greater emphasis on ‘Christian and traditional values and the concept of nation’ (Körösényi 1999:38). Party unity however proved fragile, with first the radical nationalists (Csurka and what became MIÉP) and three years later, in 1996, the market-liberals departing (the latter founded the Hungarian Democratic People’s Party, MDNP). By 1998, MDF was dwarfed by declining electoral support, only securing its presence in Parliament and government through a favourable electoral agreement with Fidesz-MPP.

MDF as the major government party of the early 1990s launched Hungary’s quest to ‘return to Europe’. At the same time, concern for ‘members of the Hungarian nation, wherever they live’ (MDF 1994:62) remained a prominent part of the party’s profile. When the issue of the conclusion of basic treaties with the neighbouring countries (also considered as an informal condition for Nato and EU membership) forced each of the parties to choose foreign policy priorities in the second term, MDF’s decision was ‘to pursue … national unity/collaboration irrespective of political borders and circumstances’ as top priority (MDF 1998b:119). Consequently, MDF condemned the MSZP-SZDSZ government of the time for what they claimed was an ‘internationalist-cosmopolitan practice of submitting to the negotiating partners’ wishes’ (MDF 1998b:120) and failing to support Hungarians across the borders in their pursuit of autonomy for ‘a pat on the back in the West’ (MDF 1998a:148). At the same time, the 1998 manifesto stated the long-term objective ‘to integrate the communities of Hungarians over the borders and the territories inhabited by them (as well) in the uniting Europe’ (MDF 1998b:122). At the end of the 1990s, the party’s new leadership seemed to seek to project a less ideological image. Altogether it seemed that, at times, the overriding commitment to members of the broader national community sat slightly uneasily with the party’s European policy. Yet, the party’s commitment to European integration was clear, attesting to the continuing importance of the legacy of MDF’s formative years, the internal power relations characterising the party at the time, and also the weakening of the populist-national element in the party’s ideological make-up more recently.

Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Party (Fidesz – Magyar Polgári Párt, Fidesz-MPP)

Starting its life as a radical anti-Communist youth movement before the first free elections (FIDESZ was an acronym for Alliance of Young Democrats), Fidesz spent the first two parliamentary terms in opposition, initially as a liberal party. Having renounced its generational identity, the party was
renamed Fidesz - Hungarian Civic Party in 1995, with the new name also marking a very visible ideological transformation. Indicative of Fidesz’ shift on the political spectrum in the 1990s was the realignment in its transnational affiliations from the Liberal International (of which it had been member since 1992) and ELDR to associate membership the EPP in 2000. Fidesz-MPP has been the senior coalition partner in the current national-conservative government since 1998.

Fighting (and losing) the 1994 elections, ‘old’ Fidesz presented a manifesto built around the idea of limited state and economic policies guided by free market principles (Fidesz 1994a). The party unequivocally stated Hungary’s fastest possible integration into West-European structures as its primary foreign policy objective which was also to determine its policies on both the neighbouring countries and the Hungarian minorities living in these countries: ‘The success of our integration [policy] is largely dependent upon the development of non-conflictual relations with the neighbouring countries. At the same time, our successful EU-integration will contribute to the stability of the East Central European region and the situation of minorities’ (Fidesz 1994b:1). Hungarian EU membership was presented both as a way to ‘return to the community of modern European states’, to ‘the modern form of European economic and social unity’ and as a precondition for achieving a competitive market economy (Fidesz 1994b:1-2).

Following the electoral defeat of 1994 and the launch of ‘new’ Fidesz, the free market logic was toned down slightly in the party’s policy documents while the notion of the nation became a more explicit part of its ethos (Fidesz-MPP 1996). ‘For a civic Hungary’, putting forward Fidesz-MPP’ new policies and basic values, for instance, devoted a substantial section to the party’s own definition of what constituted ‘Hungarianness’ and distinguished between the ‘national interest’ (the interest of all Hungarians, wherever they live) and the ‘interest of the state’ (i.e. of the citizens of Hungary) (Fidesz-MPP 1996:8-11). Standing up for the national interest, also vis-à-vis Brussels, was not only a pledge in the 1998 election manifesto (Fidesz-MPP 1998) but also became a pronounced part of the party’s policy line in government, as the initiation of a controversial piece of legislation (the ‘status law’) granting benefits in Hungary for ethnic Hungarians from the neighbouring countries exemplified more recently.

Fidesz-MPP viewed Hungary’s EU membership as a ‘natural claim to harmonise our [Hungary’s] position on the cultural map of Europe with our position in the European economy’ (Szájer 1998, emphasis added). Enlargement was consequently considered ‘an alliance of interests based on mutual benefits’, the terms of which were to be determined in negotiations that were expected to be characterised by ‘the niggardliness of [the negotiating] partners’ (Fidesz-MPP 1996:119). While Fidesz-MPP’ support for Hungary’s EU membership was beyond question (Prime Minister Orbán’s occasional critical statements may well have reflected mounting disappointment and frustration with
the speed of the enlargement process rather than waning commitment to the strategic goal of accession), this ‘hard-bargaining’ rhetoric nonetheless corresponded to the party’s ideological shift to the national centre-right.

Hungarian Socialist Party (Magyar Szocialista Párt, MSZP)

The Hungarian Socialist Party was founded as the larger successor to the state-party (the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (MSZMP)) in October 1989. MSZMP was dissolved and its members invited to join the ranks of MSZP. Only about one out of every twenty MSZMP member did so (Waller 1995). Members of the new party later characterised the 2nd congress in 1990 as their ‘Bad Gödesberg’ (MSZP 1998), and the previous change of name, the redesigning of the party’s programmatic profile, and its affiliation to the Socialist International (first as observer and since 1996 as member) make the Hungarian successor party a successful case of ‘social-democratisation’ (Waller 1995). Returning to power in 1994 by winning a large majority of seats in Parliament with the Free Democrats as their junior coalition partner, however, MSZP in government pursued an economic policy that was ‘more orthodox’ in terms of liberalisation and fiscal discipline than its conservative predecessor’s had been between 1990 and 1994 (Hanson 1999:286).

This outcome reflected the economic necessities that a party in office had to take into account, the internal power-relations within the party and the long-term strategic choices MSZP had made in the formative period of the first parliament. While in the early 1990s the dominant strategic vision within the MSZP leadership was a ‘traditional’, working-class social democratic appeal, by 1994 the technocratic, market-liberal wing took over (Ziblatt 1998:134). Together with these changes, the party also opted for a universalist, pragmatic, technocratic, ‘moderniser’ stance, which implied an imperative ‘to catch up with Europe’ (Bozóki 1997:8) and therefore, unsurprisingly, also European integration as a top foreign policy priority for the party. A clear illustration of this approach comes from MSZP’s 1994 ‘Theses about the nation’:

‘In the view of the Socialists, there is no other way of modernisation for Hungary and more broadly Central Europe than joining the process of European integration as soon as possible, voluntarily giving up part of sovereignty and transferring that to the institutions of European integration. At the same time … [t]he divorcing of national and state frameworks offers an opportunity for Central Europe … to approach the national question from a qualitatively new angle’ (MSZP 1994b:12).

Altogether, MSZP’s transformation resulted in a party profile of which a pro-EU stance was a logical part, with both the economics and the politics of European integration clearly ‘substantiating’ the new Socialist image. The basis for the strong European commitment may have been largely pragmatic as the dominant strands within the party themselves were: MSZP’s self-constructed party identity was built on the rejection of the ‘ideologisation’ of politics in general, and of a ‘missionary approach’ to
foreign policy in particular (MSZP 1994a).

**Alliance of Free Democrats (Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége; SZDSZ)**

The Alliance of Free Democrats, a member of the Liberal International since 1993, was characterised by an ethos dating back to its roots in the ‘democratic opposition’ of the former regime. The Free Democrat party profile was based on advocating a limited role for the state in the economy, individualism, a respect for human rights and multiculturalism (Fritz 1992:118-122, Körösényi 1999:39-42). Consequently, although ‘SZDSZ consider[ed] a commitment towards Hungarians over the borders as the natural political duty of the Hungarian state’ (SZDSZ 1994:253), the party’s concern was with human and minority rights, not with the nation as an ethno-cultural community (Körösényi 1999:40). SZDSZ’s main criticism of the foreign policy of the MDF-led coalition of the early 1990s was the coalition’s inability to balance between Western orientation and responsibility for Hungarians over the borders, which, SZDSZ claimed, led to conflictual relations with the neighbouring countries and thereby ‘made [Hungary] a less desirable partner for integration’ (SZDSZ 1994:245-46).

The SZDSZ was probably most renowned for the controversial decision to enter into an oversized coalition with the Socialist Party in 1994. While the coalition followed an economic policy that was rather close to the Free Democrats’ market liberal views, the two parties seemed most alike in their views on identity politics. Consequently, as for MSZP, the unambiguous top priority for the Free Democrats (both in government and opposition since 1998) was the fast integration of the country into Euro-Atlantic structures, an objective against which progress in foreign policy was measured. However, European integration has been a more stressed part of SZDSZ’s programmes and ethos than perhaps of any other party. Hungarian EU membership by 2002 was the first among the party’s 10 key objectives in their programme for 1998-2002, overtaking in importance decreasing inflation or the growth of incomes, for instance (SZDSZ 1998a). The 300-page-long Free Democrat election manifesto bore the title ‘For a modern, European Hungary’ (SZDSZ 1998c) while the ‘Basic principles’ of the party (SZDSZ 1998b:1) stated the creation of a ‘Hungary where freedom and solidarity are the most fundamental values, and which is an equal member of the community of free and democratic European states’ as the key task ahead. Altogether, the party’s profile corresponded to its location on the ideological map of the Hungarian party system as most committed to free-market principles in socio-economic policy and most prone to define political community in terms of shared values rather than nationality. Indeed, the broad notion of Europe as a synonym of modernisation, and the more specific goal of becoming a member of the EU ‘as a guarantee of maintaining … the democratic order and the rule of law, deepening market economy, and increasing living standards’ (SZDSZ 1998d:3) made up much of the Free Democrat party identity.
4. Conclusions

Returning to the original question the paper posed, to what extent ideology and party identities account for attitudes to European integration, the Hungarian party political map shows a varied picture. Ideology clearly does not determine party positions as far as a clear-cut choice between accepting or rejecting EU membership is concerned. If ideology was sufficient to predict party positions, MIEP and possibly FKGP would be ‘hard’ Eurosceptic parties. This is not the case, as even the Justice Party did not categorically rule out accession to the EU, despite its clear hostility to both the economic and the political foundations of the European project. Szczerbiak’s (2001c) study on the Polish debate found a similar pattern: it centred not on the question whether to join the EU but rather on the terms of accession and nature of integration. This in turn suggests a focus on more nuanced party attitudes: the bases and strength of parties’ commitment to European integration (EU membership) rather than its mere presence of absence. And, as the initial proposition ran, there are detectable differences in party attitudes that ideological variation explains, ranging from the strongest EU-commitment characterising the cosmopolitan-market-oriented parties to a markedly sceptical, if not hostile, attitude to EU membership at the ‘bottom’ of the national-social protectionist quadrant, with rather more ambiguous positions in between. This correspondence alone necessitates taking party identities and ideologies into account.

However, the explanatory power of ideology is quite uneven across the political spectrum. Ideology proved to be strongly linked to party attitudes to the EU in the case SZDSZ and MSZP one the one hand and MIEP on the other. These parties very strongly identify with particular, typical constellations of values in relation to both of the cognitive axes, MIEP as a national populist party and MSZP and especially SZDSZ as social-liberal and liberal parties. The explanatory power of ideology as a variable is somewhat weaker in the case of Fidesz-MPP and MDF, and poor in the case of FKGP. Fidesz MPP’s party identity has undergone a substantial change in the past decade, and as the party itself ‘expanded’, so did the ambiguity of its identity increase. Nonetheless, corresponding to its manoeuvre on the ideological spectrum, the party’s attitude to Europe has also become more critical, at times also including elements of ‘national-interest (soft) Euroscepticism’ (Taggart & Szczerbiak 2001). MDF, taking the same path from the opposite direction, was similarly characterised by a diversity of ideological tendencies, including Christian-democracy, within its ranks that may have diffused the, in any case, weakening impact of elements otherwise potentially at odds with the idea of a supranational political institution. FKGP, on the other hand, seemed to be equipped with all the ideological features that make up a Eurosceptical party, without any inclination, so far, to question the utility of Hungarian EU membership itself.
One possible explanation for this variance in the relationship between party ideology and attitudes to Europe is the fact that some parties are more closely associated with one clear or consistent ideological stand than others. In this sense, size, internal heterogeneity, historical origins (for instance of MDF as a broad umbrella organisation), the representation of a narrowly defined electoral base (as with the agrarians), and leadership styles clearly matter. Equally importantly, however, these findings confirm that for a full account of party policies analyses need to go beyond ideology and include factors arising from the party system and the intra-party arenas: parties’ proximity to power (the dominant party variable, Taggart 1998), the government-opposition relationship (Sitter 2001), coalition- and alliance building, the nature of electoral incentives, and the position of party elites within party organisations, to mention only a few possible variables (e.g. Featherstone 1988, Sowemimo 1996, Christensen 1996, Daniels 1997, Raunio 1999, Saglie 2000). The relative importance of the possible explanatory variables needs to be established by further research, but office-seeking and consequently pressures arising from alliance- and coalition-building seem to provide particularly strong incentives in the Hungarian case to tone down or abandon notions of hard Euroscepticism for the parties that are ideologically most prone to it.

Finally, the Hungarian case study draws attention to the importance of how the issue of EU membership is approached or framed by political parties. Utility, as with FKGP, is a key word in this context. By focussing on material gains to be secured in the accession negotiations, parties with identities that may conflict with political integration can successfully avoid the sensitive, potentially divisive questions that arise from a country’s membership bid. There is some indication that there is a tendency, for instance, among Polish political parties with nationalistic identities too to view integration into the EU as an economic necessity and attempt to project a hard-bargaining image (Kucharczyk 1999, Szczerbiak 2001b). In the case of Hungary, various versions of this pre-emptive strategy have to a great extent effectively de-coupled the issue of European integration from the identity politics axis and ensured that the debate focussed on economic and technical issues. Removing Europe from the primary point of reference for party differentiation is in turn largely responsible for the, so far, relatively lacklustre public debate.
Appendix

Table 1: Elections in Hungary.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Votes %</td>
<td>Seats</td>
<td>Votes %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fidesz-MPP</td>
<td>8.95</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>7.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FKGP</td>
<td>11.73</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>8.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDF</td>
<td>24.73</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>11.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIEP</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSZP</td>
<td>10.89</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>32.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SZDSZ</td>
<td>21.39</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>19.76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: only the six parties represented in Parliament after 1998 are included.
Source: Kitschelt et al (1999:117)

Table 2: Respondents in the MTA PTI parliamentary surveys ‘Europe, democracy, and political culture’ (MPs within parliamentary party groups)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Fidesz-MPP</th>
<th>FKGP</th>
<th>MDF</th>
<th>MSZP</th>
<th>SZDSZ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Parliamentary surveys, MTA PTI.

Table 3. The socio-economic orientations of Hungarian MPs: Attitudes to the role of the state in the provision of social security and to economic inequality

‘Which of the following statements do you agree with, and with which do you disagree?’ (agree, disagree, no answer)
‘It has to the job of the government to protect people from economic difficulties.’
‘It is necessary to have an upper limit to what a person can earn.’

(agrément with statements, in percentage of parliamentary party factions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Fidesz-MPP</th>
<th>FKGP</th>
<th>MDF</th>
<th>MSZP</th>
<th>SZDSZ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection from economic difficulties</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limiting incomes</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average on two statements</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market (-) vs. soc. Protectionism (+)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Parliamentary surveys, MTA PTI.
Table 4. The definition of political community

Instruction to respondents: ‘Rank the following items according to the extent to which you believe they are part of the concept of democracy!’ (40 - fully; 30 - to a great extent; 20 - to some extent; 10 - not at all) (mean scores within parliamentary party factions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Fidesz-MPP</th>
<th>FKGP</th>
<th>MDF</th>
<th>MSZP</th>
<th>SZDSZ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The rights of Hungarians living in neighbouring countries</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The rights of national minorities living in Hungary</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More important: citizens’ rights (+) or ethnic Hungarians’ rights (-)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Parliamentary surveys, MTA PTI.

Table 5: National vs. Regional/cosmopolitan identifications among Hungarian MPs

Question: ‘Which of the following geographical-cultural units can you identify with most?’ (per cent of MPs in their parliamentary party faction mentioning their domicile, Hungary, East Central Europe, Europe, or the universal world as the primary basis of their identity)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Fidesz-MPP</th>
<th>FKGP</th>
<th>MDF</th>
<th>MSZP</th>
<th>SZDSZ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domicile</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECE</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universal world</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domicile/Hungary</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECE, Europe or world</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Parliamentary surveys, MTA PTI.

Table 6: Self- and parties’ placement by MPs on a single left-right dimension (1998)

Questions: ‘Where would you place yourself on the following scale, from 1 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right)?’
‘Where would you place the political parties [on the same scale], according to the extent to which you believe they are left- or right-wing?’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Fidesz-MPP</th>
<th>FKGP</th>
<th>MDF</th>
<th>MSZP</th>
<th>SZDSZ</th>
<th>MIEP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MPs’ self-placement</td>
<td>6.75</td>
<td>7.20</td>
<td>7.33</td>
<td>3.30</td>
<td>4.83</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parties’ placement</td>
<td>6.59</td>
<td>7.08</td>
<td>7.11</td>
<td>3.34</td>
<td>5.42</td>
<td>9.02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Simon 1999: 140.
Table 7: Support for the accession of Hungary to the EU

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Fidesz-MPP</th>
<th>FKGP</th>
<th>MDF</th>
<th>MSZP</th>
<th>SZDSZ</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Parliamentary surveys, MTA PTI.*

Figure 1: Parliamentary parties’ location in the ideological space, 1998

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cosmop.</th>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SZDSZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MSZP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Fidesz</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Soc. Protect.</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fidesz</td>
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<td></td>
<td>MDF</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Market</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MIEP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The figure does not indicate precise ideological distances between parties but is intended merely as a graphic summary of the analysis above. Governing parties underlined. MIEP’s position estimated on the basis of policy documents.
References

Party documents and policy statements


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