‘When life gives you lemons make lemonade’: Party organisation and the adaptation of West European Communist Parties

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Abstract
This paper examines the development of Western European Communist parties (WECPs) and their post-Communist successor parties. These parties had always adapted in surprising ways as they struggled in political systems that they sought to overthrow. Following the collapse of Communism in 1989 in central and Eastern Europe (CEE) they continued to amaze. Some reformed themselves dramatically, sacrificing or transforming their policies in search of office and votes. Others resisted compromising their orthodox Marxism-Leninism but remained significant players in their party systems. This study analyses the reasons behind the divergent trajectories of five WECPs and their post-Communist successor parties in the Netherlands, Sweden, Ireland and Portugal. It does this by importing and refining an analytical framework developed to explain the diverse adaptation of Communist parties in CEE. This article points to the lessons that scholars of western European party change can learn from importing theories from CEE. It also identifies the strengths and weaknesses of using such theories to build a comparative understanding of WECPs’ adaptation.
Communist parties in Western Europe faced a considerable challenge following the collapse of Communism in 1989 in CEE. It had seemed that they had been discredited. However, in a similar way to their counterparts in CEE several WECPs successfully regenerated themselves with successful vote- and office-seeking strategies. Seemingly against the odds, some managed to position themselves as social democrats or to transform themselves into other non-Communist radical left parties. In contrast, some WECPs stubbornly resisted reform. Where attempts at transformation failed or were unable to deliver success, leading reformers often split to form their own parties or merged with non-Communist rivals to accomplish these goals.

Despite a long tradition of scholarship on WECPs (see, for instance, Duverger, 1954) relatively little research exists on them in comparative perspective. The dramatic events of 1989 prompted scholars to analyse the impact of the revolutions in CEE on WECPs. The literature grappled with classifying their fast changing identities and to make sense of the continued break-up of the WECP party family (key studies included: Bull, 1995; Bull and Heywood, 1994; Bell, 1993). Scholars tried to show which parties had transformed their appeals becoming ‘non-communist parties of the left’ and which parties were pretending that nothing was happening (Bull 1994, pp. 210–218). In later years, Hudson (2000) focused on the electoral fortunes of several WECPs and their relationships with social democratic parties whilst Bosco (2001) analysed the roles played by Communist parties in the consolidation of southern European democratic party systems. More recently, Dunphy (2004) made significant advances in assessing the responses of Left parties towards European integration.

These studies apart, there has been little comparative research on WECPs and their post-Communist successor parties. In particular, a systematic and theoretically informed comparative analysis to explain WECPs’ diverse adaptation following the collapse of Communism does not exist. Studies have failed to go beyond thick description of their histories or to question whether causal factors have wider significance. Scholars have also paid little attention to organisational factors which is surprising when they have been found to have been central in shaping the mainstream parties’ ability to respond to external shocks like election defeats (Harmel et al, 1995). This is particularly puzzling given that WECPs had traditionally
operated under the highly controversial Leninist organisational structures of democratic centralism. This article contributes to filling these gaps and aims to re-orientate the study of WECPs in a comparative direction. To do this it imports ideas from Anna Grzymała-Busse’s study ‘Redeeming the Communist Past’ (2002). This provides a particularly detailed analysis of how organisational factors inherited from the previous regime and organisational reforms shaped the ability of Communist successor parties in Slovakia, Poland and Hungary to take advantage of their new democratic systems. These parties were able to adapt their policies towards social democracy, regenerate their support and return to office while in the Czech Republic the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM) remained orthodox and was restricted to protest politics.

This article has four main sections. The first section outlines Grzymała-Busse’s analytical framework and explains the operationalisation of this study. Section two tests hypotheses derived from Grzymała-Busse’s framework. It shows how the advancement of elites with transferable skills beneficial to programmatic transformation made it easier for some WECPs to adapt themselves to the collapse of Communism in CEE. Third, this research draws on Grzymała-Busse’s ideas about organisational change. It shows that unlike in CEE it was not necessary for WECPs to build highly centralised party organisations for them to adapt. A typology is presented that explains the organisational strategies that WECPs’ leaders pursued. The final section identifies several lessons from importing Grzymała-Busse’s framework for the study of WECPs and party change in Western Europe. It refines her ideas to provide a broader framework for use in analysing the development of WECPs and takes into account the different context that they operated within.

As an endeavour in importing ideas from CEE this research allows us to test how well theoretical frameworks developed in the study of CEE are able to travel to other contexts. Therefore it has important implications for the wider literature on political parties and the role of party organisational factors in party change. Importing such a framework is justified in light of the increasingly pan-European focus of the literature on parties (see March and Mudde, 2005; Lewis and Webb, 2003) and presents added value because few (if any) studies have sought to test or refine frameworks developed in studying CEE parties by applying them elsewhere.

1.1 The adaptation of Communist Parties in CEE

There are explanatory frameworks on offer from the wider literature on party organisation and party change in Western Europe that might help to develop our
understanding of WECPs. In particular, Harmel and Janda’s (1994) ‘Integrated Theory’ of party change presents avenues for future research (developed in Harmel et al., 1995; Harmel and Tan, 2003). These studies propose that external shocks and changes in parties’ environments such as election defeats can send ‘ripples’ throughout their organisations (Harmel et al. 1995, p. 257). They argue that a plethora of organisational variables influence parties’ ability to respond to such shocks by questioning their primary goals including vote-, office-, policy-seeking and internal democratic decision making.

This study draws on Harmel and Janda’s idea that exogenous shocks like electoral defeats may spur programmatic change and that organisational factors may influence parties’ ability to adapt. However, in a field that has already lost sight of the wood for the trees, parsimony is needed to begin developing a clear starting point from which to analyse WECPs. The number of variables in their model makes it harder to operationalise. More detailed analysis of the many organisational variables that they identify provides avenues for further research as do comparisons between their framework and the one developed in this study.

This research looks elsewhere for inspiration to shed light on WECPs’ diverse adaptation. There are now a number of significant comparative analyses of how the former Communist parties of CEE have successfully adapted to democratic competition since 1989 (including Ishiyama and Bozóki, 2001; Kitschelt et al., 1999; Ishiyama 2005, 2001, 1997). This literature shows the statistical significance of a wide range of ‘internal’ organisational factors (such as the levels of resistance to reform from middle or low ranking apparatchiks and the size of parties’ membership relative to its electorate) above ‘external’ environmental factors (such as the institutional features of the electoral system and the degree of competition from other left-wing parties) in shaping parties’ ability to break with Communism, embrace social democracy and to seek office (see Ishiyama, 2001).

There are significant advantages, from importing Grzymała-Busse’s framework for analysis. First, while there are broader theoretical frameworks on offer, she provides the most detailed theoretical account of the relationship between organisational variables and programmatic reform and draws on several variables found to be important in other studies. Moreover, Grzymała-Busse focuses on a handful of organisational variables that played a highly significant role in shaping programmatic change. Unlike other analytical frameworks her framework was also designed to analyse Communist parties that have the unusual characteristics of democratic centralism.

Second, while other studies concluded that the ideological views of party leaders affected the ability of Communist parties to break with Communism (Ishiyama 1995, p. 149),
Grzymała-Busse took this a stage further and showed that their ‘Ideological stance per se mattered less than their practical skills and experiences in affecting parties’ chances of successful transformation (Grzymała-Busse 2002, p. 13). She found that some parties had systematically promoted elites with greater levels of ‘portable’ or ‘transferable’ skills (including pragmatism, expertise in policy innovation, administrative experiences) and ‘usable pasts’ (their records of previous accomplishments that they could point at in order to justify reforms) that were beneficial to adapting their parties to democratic competition in 1989.

Third, there are methodological reasons for importing this framework for analysis. Most comparative studies of Communist parties have taken insufficient effort to speak to the actors instrumental in their development to test generalisable propositions about the causal process at work inside their parties, or the reasons behind their actions. This framework shows just how effectively qualitative research can be used in such ways. Fourth, studies including Steve Levitsky’s (2003) research on Latin American labour parties have found that applying ideas about the relationship between party organisation and programmatic change from very different contexts can be valid. Importing theories in this way will not necessarily tell us the whole story of party change but provides insight and serves as a useful template from which to identify similarities and differences in party change across different contexts.

1.2 Importing Grzymała-Busse’s analytical framework to study WECPs

This article analyses five parties whose diverse range of programmatic directions warrants explanation. The cases were selected to both incorporate into analysis parties that have resisted change and those that have embraced different strategies of adaptation. In this way, variation on the dependent variable(s) was assured in order to test the hypotheses set out below. Scholars have tended to limit comparisons between WECPs to sub-regions within Europe or to focus on the ‘big three’ in France, Italy and Spain. The research seeks to break with this trend by building less studied parties into analysis. It establishes an analytical framework that is intended for use in studying the wider WECP population including the historically larger parties in comparative perspective.

Extensive primary research involving 130 elite/mid-level and expert interviews and qualitative analysis of party programmes was used to evaluate Grzymała-Busse’s analytical framework’s usefulness and its implications for studying the trajectories of Communist
The parties that are analysed include the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) which resisted changing its orthodox programmes or breaking with its pariah status. This strategy was coupled with organisational and electoral decline. At parliamentary elections the PCP shrank from 19 per cent of the vote in 1979 to 7.88 per cent in 2009. Second, the Dutch Socialist Party (SP) is analysed. This party broke with Marxism-Leninism to embrace traditional social democratic policies and office-seeking. This strategy helped it to enter parliament for the first time in 1994 and to become a force in Dutch politics gaining 16.6 per cent of the vote in the 2006 Dutch parliamentary election.

The third party studied here is the Swedish Left-Party Communists (VPK) which changed its name to Left Party (V) in 1990 and moderated its policies in an effort to exert influence of the social democrats and gain inclusion in a governing coalition. This strategy helped the party to expand its share of the vote at parliamentary elections from 5.8 per cent in 1988 to 12 per cent in 1998. Fourth, the Irish Workers’ Party (WP) is analysed. This party made significant inroads to breaking with orthodox Communism by adopting a programme in 1991 that made it a ‘democratic socialist party’ (see Keith 2011). Increasingly moderate campaigns delivered electoral expansion as the WP grew from 1.1 per cent of the vote in 1973 to 5 per cent in 1989. The WP, however, struggled to break with its paramilitary past resulting in most of the party leaving to form Democratic Left (DL) which ultimately embraced mainstream politics and latter merged into Labour Party. What was left of the WP became electorally insignificant but repealed the new programme and reasserted orthodox Communism in 1993.

The final party analysed here is the Communist Party of the Netherlands (CPN) which broke with orthodox Communism as it declined from 4.5 per cent of the vote in parliamentary elections in 1972 to 0.6 per cent in 1986. It formed a new party named GroenLinks with other Dutch small left parties following the collapse of Communism in CEE.

The idea of ‘social democratisation’ is used in a broader sense in this research in comparison with Grzymała-Busse’s study. It is used to include those parties who did not join the Party of European Socialists and Socialist International but did take huge strides in exchanging Marxism-Leninism for acceptance of the market and campaigning on traditional social democratic policies – based on protecting the public sector and the welfare state. This

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1 A full list of interviewees is available upon request from the author. References to the interviews have been curtailed for practical reasons. References to only the most relevant interviews and those with leading party figures are prioritised to substantiate the key findings. Extensive research on the individual case studies can be found in Keith (2011) Party Organisation and Party Adaptation: Western European Communist and Successor Parties: available at: http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/6897/.
process meant that several WECPs like V in Sweden and the SP in the Netherlands accepted key parts of social democratic thinking but still in some respects occupy the grey area between social democracy and radical socialism.

Furthermore, breaking with Communism is a complex business and not all of the exit paths led to social democracy. WECPs could break with orthodox Communism, Stalinism or Leninism or adopt programmes based on a range of more humanistic, less dogmatic or less theoretically demanding ideologies. These included versions of ‘refounded’ Communism and socialism as well as social democracy. Therefore the concept of ‘breaking with Communism’ is used in broad terms to allow for this range of programmatic outcomes. Parties that ditched key elements of orthodox Communism can be seen to have made inroads at ‘breaking with Communism’ even if they continued to call themselves ‘Communist’. This approach treats breaking with Communism as a spectrum rather than just using the mutually exclusive categories of being Communist or non-Communist.

One of the main lessons found in the literature on WECPs is that they adapted much more than parties in CEE before the collapse of the Soviet-bloc. Almost relentless pressures to change including election defeats triggered numerous internal crises in these ‘non ruling Communist parties’ and many reforms before 1989 (Greene 1973, p. 345). Sometimes earlier exogenous shocks seemed to play an even more significant role in shaping WECPs’ adaptation than the collapse of Communism. Therefore, the core ideas in Grzymała-Busse’s theoretical framework are applied in a longer-term perspective by analysing how organisational variables shaped the ability of these parties’ ability to adapt to a range of external shocks over multiple time periods both before and following 1989. This provides a greater number of case studies for analysis.

2.1 Elite advancement and party change
Grzymala-Busse found that elite advancement practices prior to the collapse of Communism in 1989 had left some parties’ elites well prepared to adapt. Some parties had advanced elites ‘horizontally’ from across the state apparatus and organisations outside the party as well as promoting leaders with experience of negotiating with outsiders and other social institutions. This meant it was more common for elites to have backgrounds in media institutions, trade unions other social organisations like student unions that were open to believers and non-believers. Highly qualified technical experts, professionals and bureaucrats from outside the party with hands-on experience of public administration and members of the intelligentsia were also advanced to the leadership. These elites were often selected because they had
records in successful administration rather than because they had proved their ideological orthodoxy.

Opportunities for local party organisations to hold elections by secret ballot also gave elites experience in competing for the public’s favour. There they encountered pressures to make effective and broader public appeals to build coalitions of support. These factors fostered elites with experiences that had made them pragmatic, better able to read the electorate’s desires and who had ideas that were useful in carrying out reforms. These elites were better equipped to formulate successful appeals that resonated beyond the confines of their parties’ Communist rank and file. Parties that had historically given more room for debate within their leadership bodies and had greater levels of elite turnover were also better positioned to transform themselves.

In contrast, parties failed to break with orthodox Communism when elites had been recruited ‘narrowly’ as their parties installed tried and tested, ideologically orthodox and loyal apparatchiks. These elites had typically worked their way ‘vertically’ up the party hierarchy through years of proving their orthodoxy by working as functionaries or came from party youth organisations. Elite advancement was also essentially ‘closed’ to exclude those who those with experiences in professional occupations, those who had worked in institutions outside the party and members of the intelligentsia.

2.2 Elite advancement processes in WECPs

The following section shows that elite advancement practices meant that some WECPs were better placed to transform themselves following the collapse of Communism in CEE in 1989.

*H1. Those parties that advanced leaderships with greater prior experience in working with groups and institutions outside of the party were more engaged in carrying out electorally-driven reforms (as well as breaking with Communism, social democratising and office-seeking) after the revolutions of 1989 (or exogenous shocks).*

In all the cases analysed here, Communist politicians proved highly capable of reinventing themselves. However, this process was did not take place at random. This research suggests that it was party leaders who had experience in working with groups and institutions outside of their immediate party hierarchy that led efforts to reform their parties. It was this group of elites who were more moderate to begin with or who ‘cracked first’ following exogenous
shocks and who were better equipped with ideas for electorally-driven policy changes. Elite interviews showed that most reformers had gradually become more pragmatic through their contact with outsiders. Leading reformist elites saw their own paths to seeking reform this way and those of their colleagues.²

This research suggests that leaders with experiences in the student movement, trade unions, new social movements, working in the mass media, the public sector/professional occupations and elected office, or who had risen rapidly to leadership positions, were at the forefront of reforming WECPs. The parties studied here that broke with Communism did so precisely because of the advancement of such elites.³ These backgrounds equipped elites with experiences that were beneficial to implementing electorally-driven reforms and organisational changes. These leaders could draw on ideas and analytical skills, pragmatism, media skills, prior experience of reforming other institutions and of mobilising coalitions of support that helped them to change their parties by undertaking both organisational and programmatic reforms.⁴

Dissent from those writing party publications was often one of the first signs that calls for reform were brewing. Reformist politicians also drew on inspiration for reform from contacts with rival parties and colleagues at the European Parliament.⁵ Such elites were often relieved by the collapse of Communism in 1989 and saw it as an opportunity to start anew.⁶ These processes meant that those WECPs seeking to remain orthodox required extremely rigid elite advancement policies. As orthodox WECPs tried to influence social institutions and elected assemblies they found it very difficult to avoid feedback. This helps to account for the changes made by SP, V (and VPK), WP (and DL), and the CPN and the lack of change in the PCP and the V’s predecessor SKP 1950-64 (see Table 1).

In the SP local councillors and functionaries experienced in running direct action projects were ‘horizontally’ advanced to the leadership. These politicians grew increasingly pragmatic and overthrew the party’s orthodox leadership for failing to take electoral campaigning seriously and later set out to achieve representation in parliament by breaking with Marxism-Leninism in 1991.⁷ In the WP members of the parliamentary group, intellectuals and social activists were advanced to elite positions as the party sought to

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² Including interviews with Van Hoek, Kox, Ohly, Brito and De Rossa.
³ Interviews with Brouwer, van Bommel, Semedo, Kwisthout and Lönnroth.
⁴ Interviews with Moreira, van Bommel, Hoffman, Harris, Izeboud, De Boer, Heffernan, Schyman, Meijer, and Oliveria.
⁵ Interviews with Van Dijk and De Rossa.
⁶ Interviews with Lönnroth and Kox.
⁷ Interviews with Kox, Beekers and Harmes.
acquire greater influence in society.\(^8\) These elites led calls for reform in response to Perestroika and following the collapse of Communism. The CPN’s opportunistic recruitment of students fuelled calls for reform and these younger elites broke with Leninism and democratic centralism.\(^9\) In Sweden, a mix of parliamentarians, students and members of new social movements advanced to the elite pursued a pluralistic brand of socialism and later campaigned on traditional social democratic policies to break with their parties’ captive support role to minority social democratic governments.\(^10\)

Nevertheless, advancing elites with such prior experiences did not guarantee electorally-driven policy change following exogenous shocks. Their attempts to promote reforms following election defeats could be constrained by the domineering role played by their individual historic leaders who had powerful personality cults. This occurred in the CPN and the SP in the 1970s.

### Table 1: Elite negotiation with outside groups and institutions and electorally-driven policy reform

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<tr>
<th>Prior elite negotiation with outside groups and institutions</th>
<th>Electorally-driven Policy Reform</th>
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<td>Low</td>
<td>PCP 1974–1992</td>
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<td>PCP 1992–2002</td>
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<td>PCP 2002–SKP 1950–1964</td>
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<td>VPK 1964–1975</td>
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<td>Moderate</td>
<td>SP 1971–1986</td>
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<td>V 2003–2006</td>
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<td>CPN 1950–1977</td>
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<td>CPN 1982–1986</td>
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### 2.3 Social democratisation and office-seeking

This research suggests that the relationship between elite advancement processes and office seeking or social democratisation were not as strong as in CEE. WECPs that advanced elites with the above prior experiences were more likely to break with Communism and to pursue electorally-driven reforms. For example only the SP 1998–, DL 1992–1998 and V 1993–2003, 2006– pursued social democratisation and office-seeking strategies following the collapse of Communism (or other exogenous shocks) (see Table 2). These cases, however,

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\(^8\) Interviews with Rabbitte and Lowry.

\(^9\) Interviews with Ernsting and Lucas.

\(^10\) Interviews with Sjöstedt, Lönroth and Bäckström.
support the idea that ‘horizontal’ elite advancement of elected officials promoted social democratisation and office-seeking more than can be said of experiences of negotiation with outsiders per se.

However, acceptance of social democracy and office-seeking only occurred gradually in these cases unlike in CEE. Elected officials in their leadership bodies were heavily constrained by other reformist elites from taking such initiatives in 1989.\textsuperscript{11} Office seeking was also still very much a strategy that was unavailable to these parties at this point in time because of their small size and because they were treated as pariahs by mainstream parties.

The opportunity structures available to these WECPs were more constrained than those of the successor parties in CEE. Their adaptation was shaped by developments in their party systems. Calls for social democratisation and office seeking were strongest when social democratic rivals made eyes at bringing their parties into government; or when it was possible to seek electoral gain by arguing that they were pursuing neo-liberal or right-wing policies. Elite interviews, however, suggest that all the parties studied here were presented with realistic chances to social democratise themselves or to make inroads in encroaching on traditional social democratic territory to win votes. Nonetheless, only some of them were able to recognise them or were willing to take this route.\textsuperscript{12}

The SP and V also show that WECPs’ post-Communist successor parties could enjoy periods of electoral expansion through strategies based on social democratisation. Elected officials in these parties pursued successful vote-seeking strategies based on ideological moderation, intense opposition to the acceptance of ‘neo-liberalism’ and privatisations by social democratic rivals and Euroscepticism. As these parties expanded, more elected officials were advanced to their leadership bodies. Expansion also presented opportunities for the parliamentary leadership of V to negotiate directly with the social democrats in parliament – where office seeking increasingly became prioritised.\textsuperscript{13}

In contrast, the CPN’s leaders’ drew on their backgrounds in the student movement and new social movements to break with Communism but remained too radical to accept social democratisation or office-seeking.\textsuperscript{14} The role of elected officials in its national leadership bodies was tightly constrained.\textsuperscript{15} The PCP’s leaders also restricted the horizontal elite advancement of parliamentarians to its leadership bodies in an effort to dampen their

\textsuperscript{11} Schyman, De Rossa and Brouwer interviews.
\textsuperscript{12} Kox, Fidalgo and Izeboud interviews.
\textsuperscript{13} Lönnroth, Larsson and Sjöstedt interviews.
\textsuperscript{14} Van Hoek and Izeboud interviews.
\textsuperscript{15} Izeboud interview.
calls for moderation.\textsuperscript{16} There, orthodox leaders rejected opportunities for closer relations with the social democrats in the 1990s or to pursue social democratic policies when their rivals allied with the centre-right.\textsuperscript{17} All of the WECPs studied here craved the prestige and influence that having elected officials brought, but found that once they had councillors, MPs or representatives at the European parliament, they soon wanted increased influence within leadership bodies and were a force for moderation and breaking with Communism. Not even the PCP’s Stalinistic internal discipline could completely filter out such influences. This echoes Grzymała-Busse’s finding that parliamentarians in the Czech KSČM tended to seek reform.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prior elite negotiation with outside groups and institutions</th>
<th>Office-seeking</th>
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<td>PCP 1992–2002</td>
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<td>CPN 1982–1986</td>
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WECPs’ pursuit of electorally-driven policy reforms, social democritisation and office-seeking did not always work out as planned. for example in V, DL and the SP. Depending on the context and the way in which they were implemented, reforms including broader appeals could be lost on voters, as the leaders of the CPN found out. The SP and V show that office-seeking did not necessarily mean that parties would manage to win inclusion in government. Failing to enter government after having made it appear possible could prove devastating (as in the case of the SP). Being in government also presented additional burdens. It could become a poisoned chalice as DL found out.

\textsuperscript{16} Semedo and Moreira interview.
\textsuperscript{17} Fidalgo interview.
Searching for votes by encroaching on traditional social democratic policies and office-seeking also alienated radical activists.\(^\text{18}\) The leaders of these WECPs found it hard to prevent activists and members tiring or from leaving. The SP suggests that attempting to preoccupy them with direct activism or to coerce them into hard work through centralistic structures might help to keep them on board. However, even such measures seemed to fail in the long-term. Recruiting social democratic supporters offered rapid short-term expansion but they usually returned back to established social democratic parties, were less inclined to meet the commitments demanded of them or found their parties’ centralism problematic.\(^\text{19}\)

This research suggests that the failure of some WECPs to adapt stemmed from the way in which they had pursued elite advancement policies that fostered leaderships that lacked experiences that were beneficial to reform. Orthodox WECPs seeking to retain ideological purity are well advised to pack their leadership bodies with tested and obedient full-time functionaries.

The PCP’s orthodox leaders knew this all along, explaining its inability to adapt like the SP, V, WP and CPN. Tactics such as filling leadership bodies with handpicked, poorly educated, loyal and orthodox functionaries on the party payroll and the exclusion of critics from leadership bodies helped them to resist pressures to reform.\(^\text{20}\) The PCP’s aging elites purposely kept elite turnover low and gradual to avoid calls for change. Moreover, they systematically excluded those with experiences of working with outside institutions or organisations including elected officials from the party leadership.\(^\text{21}\) Instead, they promoted apparatchiks with little political experience other than working at central office or coordinating local party organisations.\(^\text{22}\) Recently, a new generation of elites from the PCP’s highly orthodox youth organisation were promoted.

In contrast to the PCP, this research suggests that WECPs were more likely to take risks in promoting elites with experiences in working with social institutions outside the party hierarchy, in aim of gaining increased influence in them. The impact that this had on WECPs is captured well by Grzymała-Busse’s analytical framework, although, two qualifications are necessary. First, sometimes the promotion of an individual reformer rather than a cohort of reformers in the leadership could be enough to spark reform. For example, attempts to reform Swedish Communism began in the 1960s when C.H. Hermansson entered the party

\(^{18}\) Kox, de Vroomen and Larsson interviews.
\(^{19}\) Denkers interview.
\(^{20}\) Portas and Hespanah interviews.
\(^{21}\) Moreira, Oliveira and Semedo interviews
\(^{22}\) Oliveira, Fidalgo and Semedo interviews.
leadership and went on to play a key role in carrying out reforms that drew on his extensive experience at working with outside groups and institutions. This highlights the need to appreciate the role played by agency as well as institutional factors in understanding WECPs’ adaptation.

Second, sometimes exogenous shocks could trigger a rapid opening up of elite advancement processes that subsequently spurred reform in WECPs. For example, the CPN’s elite advancement processes were relaxed following election losses in 1977. The rapid promotion of younger reformers, who were better equipped to implement reforms than their predecessors, led to extensive programmatic change.23

Similarly to Grzymała-Busse’s findings in CEE, some leading reformists in WECPs had ‘usable pasts’ – records in reform or policy innovation that they could point to in advocating further reform. This helped them to break with Communism in the CPN, SP, V and the WP.24 However, even still sometimes relatively unknown quantities like party leaders Gudrun Schyman in V or new faces like Ina Brouwer in the CPN could be well placed to spearhead reforms. Records of prior reform could also still be overshadowed by reformers’ former complicit role in the party’s past. Would be reformers in the Workers’ Party’s policy unit the ‘Research Section’ found their accomplishments were insufficient to win support from fellow reformers.25

H2. Those parties with leadership bodies that gave more room for ideological pluralism and debate before 1989 (or exogenous shocks), were more engaged in carrying out electorally-driven reforms (breaking with Communism, social democratising and office-seeking) after the revolutions of 1989 (or exogenous shocks).

Ideological pluralism in elite bodies provided a backdrop to breaking with Communism and many of the reforms in V, WP and the CPN following the collapse of Communism. In V and the CPN known reformers had been tolerated in the leadership and allowed to provide their perspectives before such reforms took place. In the WP less room was allowed for debate within the leadership, although ideological differences between leaders were no secret within the party elite in the 1980s, especially as electoral expansion brought more parliamentarians

23 Browuer and Izeboud interviews.
24 Lönnroth, Thio, De Rossa and Kox interviews.
25 Harris interview.
into the leadership in the 1980s. The PCP which lacked prior pluralistic leadership bodies failed to change. There reformers struggled to be heard and were known reformers were rarely included in leadership bodies. The idea (in H2) that prior pluralism and debate in leadership bodies was conducive to electorally-driven policy reform in response to exogenous shocks, gains some support from the case studies (see Table 3). Although there was little opportunity for formal debate in the leadership of the WP until the late 1980s the inclusion of elites known to be ideologically diverse provided a basis for reforms. The lack of prior pluralism in the PCP, SP (1971–1986) and SKP acted to constrain reforms. In these cases, reformers had been unable to air their grievances, advocate alternative policies or to build earlier support for reform. With little precedent for debate in leadership bodies they struggled; it was harder for them to their message across following exogenous shocks.

A background of pluralism in elite bodies did not, however, always mean that reforms would take place. Orthodox leaders tried with some success to limit its impact. Ideological pluralism stemming from parties’ formation (in VPK: 1950–64) or the wartime resistance movement (in the CPN: 1950–1977) could be reduced through purges and attempts to enforce strict discipline in elite bodies. Moreover, longstanding pluralism was not always needed for a party to break with Communism. The SP’s lack of pluralism proved (paradoxically) beneficial to such reforms. There was little precedent for debate on alternative views to those of the party’s top leaders. When they decided in favour of electorally-driven policy reforms that was the end of the matter.

Therefore, while greater pluralism in leadership bodies before an exogenous shock made reform more likely (supporting H2), the SP and CPN show that such conditions did not necessarily preclude electorally-driven policy reforms. Most of the time a history of prior pluralism did not engender office-seeking or social democratisation. However, it is noteworthy that two of the three parties analysed here that did pursue these goals had a history of pluralism in their leadership bodies (DL and V).

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26 Harris interview.
27 Moreira, Denkers, Verhey and Sjöstedt interviews.
28 Pluralism that became apparent in the years leading up to the split from the WP.
Table 3: Prior pluralism in leadership bodies and electorally-driven policy reforms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prior Pluralism in leadership bodies</th>
<th>Electorally-driven Policy Reforms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP 1971–1986</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>SKP 1950–1964</td>
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**H3.** *Those parties exhibiting greater levels of elite turnover will be more engaged in carrying out electorally-driven reforms (or breaking with Communism, social democratising or office-seeking) after the revolutions of 1989 (or exogenous shocks).*

The case studies analysed here suggest that turnover in the elite before exogenous shocks or the collapse of Communism generally made it more likely WECPs would pursue electorally-driven reforms or break with Communism (supporting ideas in H3). Turnover in the CPN, WP, SP and V usually gave significant opportunities for reformers to emerge by removing members of their old guard leaderships who had tended to dominate those parties for decades. A high degree of elite turnover promoted reform in the CPN. However, most of the time moderate turnover was enough to provide basis for new leaders to instigate reform. Even though turnover was low in the PCP, a slight increase in this before the collapse of Communism gave rise to some reform following 1989.²⁹

Turnover in the elite before exogenous shocks usually gave opportunities for reformers to advance. However, occasionally this worked the other way, leading to the radicalisation of policy in response to electoral losses – for example in the PCP after 2000, V 2003–2006. It was also found that turnover in the elite was not always required for electorally-driven reforms and breaks with Communist ideology occurred (see Table 4). Sometimes, established leaders or a handful of newcomers carried out important reforms and tried to break with Communism after exogenous shocks.

²⁹ Brito and Semedo interviews.
3.1 Organisational strategies and programmatic transformation

Grzymała-Busse found that parties in CEE whose elites rapidly replaced democratic centralism with a new highly centralistic organisational model in 1989 were best positioned for programmatic transformation. She argued that reformist elites needed to seize policy making powers and ensure that they controlled candidate lists for the leadership and parliamentary groups. Control over elite advancement meant that they could push aside elderly statesmen or orthodox elites and ensure that reformers gained key positions.

It was also essential that reformers ‘streamlined’ their parties’ organisations to limit the number of decision making points that could derail their plans. This process involved cutting out multiple sources of decisions and overlapping authorities within the party including regional organisations where orthodox members and mid-level elites like regional leaders could interfere with party transformation. These were replaced with a new vertical hierarchy of control that was dominated by the reformist leadership.

These parties only paid lip service to inner-party democracy as they replaced democratic centralism. Internal debate was limited and local party organisations were given less autonomy. The leadership encouraged orthodox members to leave, kicked them out, or made them reapply for membership on the condition that they had left Communism behind. Elites were able to force through vote-seeking policy changes. A high degree of overlap between members of the leadership bodies and the parliamentary group meant that policy sacrifices were possible while maintaining discipline needed for effective campaigns and unity in parliament necessary to become reliable coalition partners.
To Grzymała-Busse the irony of adapting to democracy was that if parties were to take advantage of the window of opportunity presented by the collapse of Communism then they required an undemocratic internal ethos. In comparison, parties like the Czech KSČM whose leaders democratised and decentralised in 1989, failed to break with Communism or to seek a wider audience. Democratisation was counterproductive to transformation. It resulted in reformist elites losing control of strategic matters to an army of Communist stalwarts in the mid-level elite. These orthodox communists slowed and sabotaged reformers’ proposals through internal referendums, congresses and party meetings as too many cooks spoilt the broth.

Grzymała-Busse found that elite advancement practices equipped some elites with ‘skills’ beneficial to centralising their organisations. Some had become centralisers from earlier involvement in carrying out reforms as they became aware of entrenched opposition to reform or from their professional backgrounds. To Grzymała-Busse, being a skilled reformer was almost synonymous with having learnt to become a centraliser.

3.2 Elite organisational strategies in WECPs
This section tests hypotheses based on the above ideas about the relationship between the distribution of power within parties (independent variable) and policy change (dependent variable) in WECPs. It extends Grzymała-Busse’s analysis to analyse whether democratic centralism be used to force through changes or whether it was entirely incompatible with party transformation.

This research suggests that WECPs’ leaders regularly pursued organisational changes to resist or promote reform following exogenous shocks and the collapse of Communism in CEE in 1989. WECPs’ leaders often went to great lengths to use these to influence decision-making or to assert control over strategic matters. Only one period was analysed here when there was little attempt to use organisational changes to influence other aspects of party strategy (V 2006–). Even then, the representation of parliamentarians in national leadership bodies increased in a relatively ad hoc way, which had had profound effects on decision-making.

**H4** Following events in 1989 (or exogenous shocks) parties that replaced democratic centralism with new highly centralised party organisations were more able to adopt radical reforming policies (electorally-driven reforms, social
democratisation, breaking with Communism and office-seeking) than less centralised parties.

3.3 ‘The Centralisers’

This study found some evidence to support the idea in H4 that replacing democratic centralism with new highly centralised organisational structures could be beneficial to transformation following the collapse of Communism or exogenous shocks (see Table 5). This was most evident in the SP after 1991. There, new top down organisational structures allowed the leadership to implement electorally-driven policy changes, exchange socialism for social democratic policies and to pursue office-seeking (see Keith 2010b). Centralisation allowed the leadership to sacrifice radical policies at a whim and to overcome resistance from radical mid-level elites.\(^{30}\) As the party’s parliamentary group expanded, an inner circle within the central leadership became parliamentarians and exerted tight control over the parliamentary group. This prevented tensions emerging between the party in public and central office like in the other parties studied here.

Leaders of other WECPs had also centralised to achieve policy goals. The WP’s leaders created a centralised organisation that allowed the leadership to change policy without debate, to stalinise the party and to broaden its appeal to workers beyond the republican/Catholic community. To a much more limited extent, the CPN’s leaders used informal elitist meetings to set the agenda for the formation of the GroenLinks electoral alliance, the CPN’s eventual merger into it and break with Communism. This allowed the leadership to coordinate the merger while sidestepping resistance from orthodox Communists and opponents in the other founder parties of GroenLinks. This occurred simultaneously with processes of democratisation to empower reformists in the CPN’s party organisation.

Centralisation, however, was rarely a viable strategy for reformist elites by 1989. Leading reformers in the WP, V and CPN thought that the introduction of highly centralistic structures was unlikely to succeed because of opposition to centralising processes from fellow reformers.\(^{31}\) Moreover, orthodox elites and mid-level elites in the party apparatus would cry foul and use it to question reformers’ democratic credentials. Shifting power to central offices would also be counterproductive as these had become strongholds for orthodox functionaries.\(^{32}\)

\(^{30}\) Interviews with Denkers, Voerman, Verhey, Meijer and de Vroomen.

\(^{31}\) Brouwer, Schyman and De Rossa interviews.

\(^{32}\) Gallagher and Sjöstedt interviews.
The SP pursued a highly successful centralised route to breaking with Communism, social democratisation, office seeking and electoral growth. However, it does not present a model that the other WECPs in this study could have easily replicated. The SP’s small size also meant that it had relatively few local branches, and that its elite worked extremely closely with one another making it easier for the leadership to retain its grip. Prior democratisation in V and the CPN made centralisation a huge task and in the WP internal significant levels of internal debate and dissent were also developing before 1989 (Dunphy 1992, p.106). In contrast, the SP maintained a disciplined party culture during the late-1980s.\textsuperscript{33} This suggests that establishing a new centralised organisational model to replace democratic centralism in 1989 was easier in WECPs that had low levels of internal debate among the rank and file throughout the 1980s.

\textit{H5: Following events in 1989 (or exogenous shocks), parties that abolished democratic centralism by democratising themselves were more likely to fail to adopt radical reforming policies (electorally-driven reforms, social democratisation, breaking with Communism and office-seeking) than less democratic parties.}

\textsuperscript{33} Voerman and Harmes interviews.
3.4 ‘The Democratisers’

Leadership driven or grass roots inspired processes of democratisation, it seems, were much more common than centralisation in WECPs following the revolutions in CEE in 1989 and exogenous shocks. The democratisers studied here (the WP, V and CPN) experienced more fights, crises and opposition from newly empowered orthodox mid-level elites (see Keith 2011). Formal or informal processes of democratisation made it more likely that party leaders would lose control over strategic matters offering some support to H5. For example in V neo-Leninists and orthodox Communists managed to undo or block several reforms aimed at broadening appeal in the 1960s and 1970s.34 Similarly, an internal backlash from radical mid-level elites undermined Gudrun Schyman’s office-seeking strategy and acceptance of social democratic policies in the late-1990s.35

However, this research suggests that democratisation or existing democratic structures rarely gave rise to the comprehensive reversal of reforms or a failure to adopt reforming policies. Reformers in the democratisers still managed to secure the majority of the changes they desired.36 Democratisation usually helped reformers to make some programmatic changes like breaking with Communism (see Table 6) and was not incompatible with social democratisation or office seeking. Sometimes programmatic changes took place rapidly. The democratisers studied here suggest that centralisation made it only marginally more likely that WECPs would transform themselves.

Grzymała-Busse found that mid-level elites were more radical or more attached to an orthodox Communist identity than reformist leaders in parties in CEE. This perspective seems similar to May’s (1973) ‘Law of curvilinear disparity’. However, in the democratisers analysed here reformist leaders were still often able to win enough support for reforms. Changes in recruitment structures meant that the rank and file or mid-level elite were closer in experience, background and goals to the reformist elites. What Waller (1989, p. 44) termed as ‘the new member factor’ – where WECPs expanded on the back of other social movements, provided support for reformist elites.

34 Einarsson interview.
35 Larsson interview.
36 Van Hoek, Sjöstedt and De Rossa interviews.
### Table 6: Democratic organisational structures and breaking with Communism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Democratic organisational structures</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Moderate</th>
<th>High</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PCP 1974–1992</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PCP 1992–2002</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PCP 2002–2019</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SKP 1950–1964</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SP 1971–1986</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>VPK 1964–1975</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WP 1977–1989</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>WP 1992–2002</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>V 2006–2006</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>VPK 1975–1993</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>V 1993–2002</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>WP 1989–1992</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>V 2003–2006</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CPN 1982–1986</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CPN 1986–1991</td>
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</table>

In the CPN democratisation helped the leadership to break with Stalinism, Leninism, merge into GroenLinks and to finally abandon Communism.\(^{37}\) In Sweden, it enabled the VPK’s leadership to broaden appeal and break with the Soviet Union (1964–1975). There, democratic internal structures did not completely constrain reformist elites’ attempts to change the party name, reform programmes in response to Perestroika and the collapse of Communism or more recently, to pursue social democratic policies and office seeking strategies. In the WP mid-level elites supported most of the reformist leadership’s proposals for more moderate appeals.\(^{38}\) In DL they endorsed an office-seeking strategy, more electoralist policies and even a merger with Labour. The collapse of democratic centralism and processes of democratisation could occur as elites or mid-level elites broke party discipline and criticised party policy and debate raged. On the other hand democratisation could occur because of leadership led initiatives and strategies to stimulate debate. In the WP, for example informal processes of democratisation took place as reformers questioned party policy. Reformist elites endorsed and encouraged this debate as a means by which to bring about policy change and later pursued formal organisational changes to democratise their party.\(^{39}\)

Reformists also had alternative methods to centralisation to re-orientate their parties. Reformist leaders in the CPN and WP used speeches and media appearances to denounce Communism or to start debates about reform. Even more important, was the shifting of power and resources to the party in public office and the increasing role and inclusion of

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\(^{37}\) Van Hoek, Izeboud interviews.  
\(^{38}\) Breathnach interview.  
\(^{39}\) De Rossa interview.
parliamentarians in national party leadership bodies. A double whammy of processes of internal democratisation and ‘parliamentarisation’ helped the leadership to make most of the reforms it wanted in V, the WP and DL. Moreover, electoral success during the 1980s played a significant role in strengthening the reformist parliamentary leadership of the Workers’ Party in the 1980s and V in the 1990s. These cases generally, then, lend support to Katz and Mair’s idea that parties in public office have been gaining ascendancy over the central administration (Katz and Mair 2009, p. 756).

**H6:** Parties that kept democratic centralism will not have significantly sought to transform themselves (with electorally-driven reforms, social democratisation, breaking with Communism and office-seeking).

### 3.5 The ‘resisters’ and ‘dictators’

Grzymała-Busse said relatively little about what to expect if Communist parties keep the rigid organisational model of democratic centralism following the collapse of Communism. However, her framework implies that democratisation would empower orthodox activists to lead a backlash against reforms and subsequently to reassert democratic centralism in a bid to re-establish ideological purity. This raises important questions about what happened in WECPs that kept democratic centralism and whether it was inherently inimical to programmatic transformation.

This research suggests that although keeping democratic centralism sometimes proved useful to reformers providing them with the power dictate reforms, it generally made reform less likely (see Table 7). Democratic centralism gave the leaders of the WP the authority to appeal to urban workers in less ideological terms and to emphasise social democratic policies with little accountability in the 1980s.\(^\text{40}\) In the PCP it enabled the leadership to run campaigns emphasising broad themes of national and democratic revolution rather than simply a Communist state, with little internal debate (see Keith 2010a). The CPN’s leaders used democratic centralism to break with the Soviet Union and to promote younger reformist elites in the late 1970s.\(^\text{41}\) The SP’s leaders used it to break with Mao without debate in the 1970s and to drop Marxism-Leninism altogether in 1991, contrary to H7.

\(^{40}\) Dunphy interview.

\(^{41}\) Izeboud interview.
This research suggests, however, that reformers could use democratic centralism but found little purpose for it in the long term. It was seen as symbolic of the past they were trying to break with.\textsuperscript{42} Even though democratic centralism helped to initiate the SP’s transformation, its leaders realised that it was electorally damaging.\textsuperscript{43} It was replaced with new top down centralistic structures (see Keith 2010b). Reformist elites in V, the CPN and the WP and for the most part the PCP, were generally hesitant to use democratic centralism to push through change. They wanted rid of democratic centralism and believed using it or imposing new centralistic structures would de-legitimise their calls for reform.\textsuperscript{44} Further, the CPN’s leaders had seen centralistic structures block their previous calls for reform and believed they were largely incompatible.\textsuperscript{45}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 7: Democratic centralism and electorally-driven policy reforms</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Electorally-driven policy reforms</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPN 1977–1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic centralism</td>
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Democratic centralism was only likely to be beneficial to reform if those at the very top desired it and were willing to continue undemocratic organisational practices. The cases analysed here indicate that we can expect such developments in WECPs to be rare. The PCP’s top leaders could have used their power to carry out reforms but chose a strategy of resistance. They refused to moderate Stalinist programmes or a hostile approach to their social democratic rivals. Rigid adherence to democratic centralism gave them almost

\textsuperscript{42} Izeboud, Brouwer and De Rossa interviews.
\textsuperscript{43} Kox and van Bommel interviews.
\textsuperscript{44} Izeboud, De Rossa, Schyman interviews.
\textsuperscript{45} Thio, Izeboud, Van Hoek and Brouwer interviews.
complete control over policy making and elite advancement (see Keith 2010a). The leadership made easy work of dissident reformers following Perestroika, the collapse of Communism and election defeats.

_H7 Elites equipped with greater prior experience in carrying out reforms aimed at broadening appeal or professional backgrounds, will have been more engaged in pursuing organisational centralisation in aim of reform following the collapse of Communism (or exogenous shocks)._  

The case studies gave little support to a link between elite advancement processes and organisational centralisation contrary to H7. The SP was the only party studied here to replace democratic centralism with new highly centralised structures following the collapse of Communism (see Keith 2010b). However the elite’s prior professional backgrounds or experience of earlier reforms did not promote centralisation. Instead lessons learnt from prior election failures showed a need for greater internal coordination and more professional campaigns. The failure to break with the SP’s highly centralistic internal party culture, a hangover from its Maoist roots was more important than the factors that Grzymała-Busse found to promote centralisation in CEE.

Reformers with experience in carrying out prior reforms did not seek to make highly centralistic structures in V, the WP (and its successor DL) or the CPN. Instead experience in policy innovation and carrying out reform showed them that reforms would be likely to fail without democratic processes of consultation and debate. They understood the risks of democratising and that reforms were likely to encounter resistance but did not see centralisation as an easy way out or a magic bullet. Backgrounds in student movements and new social movements were largely alien to centralisation. Furthermore, no elites surveyed in the course of this research associated attempts to centralise with working in professional occupations or the public sector (see Table 8). In recent years politicians in V have searched to find the

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46 Kox, van Bommel and Harmes interviews.
47 Kox, van Bommel and Harmes interviews.
48 De Vroomen, Denkers and Voerman interviews.
49 Izeboud, Lönnroth and De Rossa interviews.
50 Van Hoek, Schyman, Rabbitte and Izeboud interviews.
secrets to the SP’s stunning expansion. However, when they see the source of its chameleonic powers, they are unlikely to want to copy it.

Table 8: Elite professional backgrounds and electorally-driven organisational centralisation

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Elite professional backgrounds</th>
<th>Electorally-driven organisational centralisation</th>
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4: A framework to analyse WECPs’ adaptation

WECPs were obviously very different to their counterparts in CEE. Even though some WECPs became effective at infiltrating the state, they did not have monopolies over it. This meant that WECPs generally had smaller party apparatuses. Arguably this presented them with less of a need to centralise or ‘streamline’ and meant that they had smaller ancillary organisations through which they could ‘horizontally’ advance elites. Nonetheless, this research shows that WECPs still had plenty of opportunities to do this, being able to place elected politicians and officials from party publications, think tanks, Communist student and trade unions and direct action organisations into their leadership bodies. Elites could also have been parachuted in from outside organisations. On the other hand, WECPs could have promoted functionaries from central office, or elites who had worked largely on matters of internal coordination and who had little opportunity to work with outsiders.

Importing Grzymała-Busse’s analytical framework is a useful starting point from which to develop an explanation of WECPs’ divergent adaptation. However, the empirical findings of this research suggest that it needs several modifications to provide a more comprehensive account of WECPs’ development. First, this paper has highlighted that the mid-level elite and party membership in several WECPs were not necessarily like the hardliners bent on stubbornly resisting reform found by Grzymala-Busse and other studies in CEE (see Kitschelt 2002, Ishiyama 2002).
Second, analysis shows that experienced reformers in WECPs were not predisposed to centralising and had not learnt this ‘skill’ as Grzymała-Busse found that reformers in CEE had done – in stark contrast to this, they had learnt to become democratisers. This research raises the question of whether such factors led to centralisation in non-Communist parties in Western Europe. Third, this research shows that while leaders’ portable skills helped them to envisage and carry out reforms their ‘usable pasts’ were generally less significant. Records of reform were not necessary to gain legitimacy as a reformer. Finally, this study has shown that while organisational centralisation could be used very effectively by the leaders of WECPs to enact party transformation, it was not always necessary. WECPs’ party leaders could use democratisation or even democratic centralism to promote reforms. It also shows how shifting power to the party in public office provided reformers also with more subtle elitist organisational strategies to organisational centralisation.

The findings of this research point to four ways in which both the descriptive and explanatory power of Grzymała-Busse’s framework can be improved for analysing WECPs by drawing on ideas from other studies of successor parties in CEE. Therefore, there is a need for a wider, but not exhaustive framework to account for other variables.

First, as Kitschelt observed in CEE, agency factors and the decisions of individual elites could be important in shaping party adaptation and Grzymała-Busse pays little attention to this factor (Kitschelt 2002, p. 39). WECPs’ top leaders could be highly influential in shaping or blocking reform. For example in the PCP, longstanding party leader Álvaro Cunhal’s (and lately his henchmen’s) refusal to change and manipulative use of democratic centralism to control elite advancement and remove rivals presented particularly significant barriers to transformation (see Keith 2010a). The ability to remove such figures affected WECPs’ chances of making a new beginning.

Second, Kitschelt’s argument that office-seeking strategies could yield disappointing results also resonates with the experience of several WECPs. This is in stark contrast to Grzymała-Busse’s tendency to view office seeking as being a successful transformation (Kitschelt 2002, p. 14). Further, Grzymala-Busse’s theoretical framework struggles to account for the SP and V’s ability to break with Communism but to gain significant electoral success in the 1990s, through campaigns based on radical socialism, Euroscepticism and protest politics. Some studies in CEE, however, recognise that strategies of retaining Communism and protest politics could yield electoral success (Bauer 2002, p. 366).

Third, scholars in CEE suggest that, politicians in Communist parties continued to learn from and adapt to exogenous shocks after 1989 (see Kitschelt 2002, and Bunce 2002, p.
Politicians in WECPs and their post-Communist successor parties also continued to adapt after their initial reactions to the revolutions of 1989. Thus, while the revolutions of 1989 were of huge significance, their reactions were not necessarily set in stone and it was not necessarily too late for politicians in WECPs to learn from new political circumstances or to respond to new pressures to change.

Fourth, this research points to the primary significance of organisational variables in shaping the programmatic adaptation of WECPs. These intervening variables mediated change by shaping parties’ ability to respond to changes in their environments. This meant that when some elites saw opportunities to encroach on the terrain of longstanding social democratic or green rivals, others did not. However, like the wider literature on the adaptation of successor parties in CEE has shown external or environmental factors played a secondary role (Bozóki and Ishiyama 2002). A refined model for explaining WECPs’ divergent adaptation needs to take into account the opportunities and constraints presented by WECPs’ party systems and the way in which elites’ perceptions of them influenced their parties’ adaptation.

**Conclusion**

This article sought to fill large gaps in our knowledge of WECPs by importing ideas from Anna Grzymała-Busse’s study ‘Redeeming the Communist Past’ (2002). It shows that in significant respects the adaptation of WECPs resembles that of their counterparts in CEE. Scholars found that the successor parties in CEE were essentially ‘creative’, with differences in their internal features inherited from the previous regime, shaping their diverse programmatic adaptation after the revolutions of 1989 (Bozóki and Ishiyama 2002, p. 7). The seeds for WECPs’ transformation were also planted before 1989 with the advancement of reformist leaders with prior experiences that were beneficial to reform. Changes to their internal distribution of power also shaped their ability to adapt their programmes.

This research shows that we can learn more about parties in Western Europe and WECPs by drawing on frameworks developed in CEE, even though they were not designed for this purpose. Through testing and refining a theoretical framework developed to study party adaptation in CEE against five case studies this paper has proposed a new framework that can be used in studying other WECPs. It suggests a probabilistic relationship between organisational variables and programmatic change in WECPs. It appears that some leadership advancement practices and organisational reforms made programmatic change more likely. It also poses a challenge to scholars to analyse WECPs in comparative
perspective and to question whether the variables identified here shaped other WECPs’ programmatic development or transformation.

The research shows that political scientists should be more active in developing explanations of those parties (and those WECPs) that fail to adapt to external shocks like the PCP. Too often they are crowded out by analysis of more successful counterparts. This is problematic when studying the reasons behind their lack of responsiveness can tell us a great deal about party change.

Attempts to analyse developments at elite level in WECPs have generally been restricted to biographical research on their top leaders rather than providing systematic analysis of cohorts of elites (for example Westlake, 2000; Narkiewicz, 1990). This research shows that the party leaders’ attributes and decisions were often pivotal in shaping party adaptation. They mattered in a similar way to that which scholars have found in radical right-wing parties – pointing to the need for political scientists to pay greater attention to the ‘supply side’ in WECPs and left parties (Mudde, 2007). This also demonstrates the benefits to be gained from talking to elites about the process of party transformation, the motives behind their organisational strategies and how these work to restrict or promote reform.

Appendix 1: Interviews

**Portuguese Communist Party**
Brito, C., former member of the Secretariat: 25.10.08.
Fidalgo, P., Director Renovação Communista: 08.04.09.
Hespanha, A., former member of the intellectual sector: 04.05.09.
Moreira, V., MEP, former PCP parliamentarian: 10.10.09.
Oliveria, D., former member of JCP: 15.10.09.
Portas, M., former member of UEC, MEP for BE: 10.07.08.
Semedo, J., former CC member, parliamentarian for BE: 15.10.09.

**Socialist Party**
Beekers, H., member of Party Board: 17.06.09.
Bommel, H., van, parliamentarian: 25.06.09.
Denkers, R., former regional leader, Drenthe: 06.07.09.
Dunphy, R., political scientist: 29.08.08.
Harmes, G., provincial representative: 17.04.09.
Kox, T., Senator: 12.02.09.
Kwisthout, J., former Board member: 20.06.09.
Meijer, E., MEP: 10.09.08.
Verhey, E., former Editor of Tribune: 30.06.09.
Voerman, G., political scientist: 09.07.09.
Vroomen, W. de, former Board member: 20.04.09.

Left Party
Bäckström, L., former parliamentarian: 09.09.08.
Einarsson, M., former parliamentarian, 09.6.08.
Hoffman, U., former Party Chair: 21.06.08.
Larsson, K., parliamentarian: 20.06.08.
Lönnroth, J., former Vice-Chair: 16.04.08.
Ohly, L., Party Chair: 17.6.08.
Schyman, G., Former Chair: 16.08.07.
Sjöstedt, J., Former MEP: 18.06.08.

The Workers’ Party
De Rossa, P., former WP/DL Party President, MEP: 10.9.08.
Dunphy, R., political scientist: 04.09.08.
Gallagher, P., former parliamentarian: 17.06.08.
Harris, E., former Research Section functionary: 25.01.09.
Heffernan, T., former WP General Secretary: 26.08.08.
Lowry, J., WP General Secretary: 06.07.09.
Rabbitte, P., parliamentarian: 20.08.08.

Communist party of the Netherlands
Brouwer, I., former parliamentary leader: 08.04.08.
De Boer, A., former Board member: 12.03.09.
Ernsting, M., former parliamentarian: 15.11.08.
Izeboud, E., former Party Chair: 14.05.09.
Lucas, M., former local Councillor: 03.09.08.
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