The Scottish and Welsh Party Systems Ten Years after Devolution: Format, Ideological Polarization and Structure of Competition

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Abstract

In 1999 the Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales were established. After three elections, the new party systems have shown some stable features which are analyzed here in the light of the theoretical literature. Aspects of the party systems remain rather fluid, making their classification more complicated. The formats of the party systems in Holyrood and Cardiff Bay differ considerably from those of Scottish and Welsh seats in Westminster. In order to explain how the two party systems work, an investigation of the ideological space and of the distances between parties is undertaken. New data, gathered from a survey conducted by the author on MSPs and AMs, are presented. These data are triangulated with the existing literature and with a qualitative analysis of party manifestos.
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Introduction

The Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales were first elected in May 1999, giving birth to proper party systems in the two ‘stateless nations’. After the third election in May 2007 new governing formulas have appeared in both polities. This paper aims to analyze the ‘institutionalization’ of the two party systems in the light of the whole period from the 1999 to the post 2007 election. It is argued that such a time frame is sufficient to highlight the solidification of important features of the two party systems, though some aspects seem to remain rather fluid and susceptible of further adjustments.

The analysis is driven by the theoretical work which has been produced on party systems, as presented in the second section of the paper, and is based on empirical evidence concerning election data, the structure of the ideological space, and government formation. In order to investigate on party positions along the most salient ideological/policy dimensions, a survey of Members of the Scottish Parliament (MSPs) and the National Assembly for Wales (AMs) was carried out between May and September 2007. On the basis of the literature on Scottish and Welsh politics1 I have selected four political dimensions - state/market, libertarian/authoritarian, environment/growth and (Scottish or Welsh) independence/unitary UK - plus two issues that might be (or become) relevant for the understanding of politics in the two regions – electoral reform and EU integration. MSPs and AMs were asked to place parties along these six continua on a 0-10 scale (see appendix). In this paper only party positions along the first four dimensions are presented.

Party ideological positions are normally calculated on the basis of systematic analysis of manifestos, as set out by the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP)\(^2\), or on the basis of expert survey\(^3\). Leaving aside the debate on the strengths and weaknesses of these methods\(^4\), they cannot be of use here because they have traditionally focused on the state level, i.e., general elections and political parties that are relevant for central government formation. In addition, these studies have, at best, paid scarce attention to the self-government dimension, which is very salient in regional party systems such as those analyzed in this paper. For these reasons, the author has opted for a political elites’ survey, following other studies on political parties at regional level (Stefuriuc, 2009) and at EU level (Farrell et al., 2006).

Surveying political elites, just like the other methodologies mentioned above, has its strengths and weaknesses. On the one hand, asking the people who are directly involved in the activities of disseminating the party ideological stances, developing policies, discussing and voting (regional) laws, negotiating alliances with other parties, etc., should allow getting a very ‘insider’ point of view of the party system. On the other hand, it cannot be taken for granted that the respondents, intentionally or unintentionally, stop ‘playing politics’ while filling in the questionnaire. Fortunately, the responses on which the present study is based are reasonably well balanced between the parties represented in the legislatures. This should limit the chances of skewed results as a consequence of the partisan point of view of the respondents.

After the main analytical frameworks have been outlined in the next section, the two party systems will be analyzed separately. In the final section conclusions will be drawn through comparing and contrasting the two cases.

**Analyzing party systems**

Duverger was among the first scholars who proposed a definition of party system as the “forms and modes” of coexistence among parties (Duverger, 1954, p. 203). His

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\(^3\) See Huber and Inglehart (1995); Hooghe et al (2002).

\(^4\) For a discussion on this issue, see Peter Mair (2001b).
classification is based mainly on the numerical criterion, stressing the distinction between two-party and multi-party systems. In contrast, Dahl attributed greater significance to party interactions, developing a four-fold taxonomy: strictly competitive, the best example being the UK; cooperative-competitive, as in USA, France and Italy; coalescent-competitive, best represented by the Austrian case; and strictly coalescent, an unlikely type of which Colombia, at that time, was probably the only existing example (Dahl, 1966).

Sartori’s classic book, considering the paucity of later conceptual work on the subject and the tremendous success it still enjoys in terms of citations, may still be considered the most influential contribution to the study of party systems. He defined party systems as “precisely the system of interactions resulting from inter-party competition” (Sartori, 1976, p. 42). His major innovation consists of having proposed more rigorous rules for counting the number of parties, thus restating the significance of the numerical criterion of classification, and of having supplied an additional criterion, the ideological distance between parties (or polarization), in order to obtain a new typology (Sartori, 1976, p. 119-129). The taxonomy produced by the numerical criterion provides what Sartori calls the format of the party system. That is the level and character of the concentration/dispersion of political power, expressed in terms of parliamentary parties’ strengths (op. cit., p.128). However, the mechanics can be fully understood only taking into consideration the ideological distance among parties and, therefore, the level of polarization. Combining the two criteria Sartori obtains four types of (competitive) party systems: pre-dominant, two-party, moderate and polarized pluralism. The first two types are normally associated with single party government, whereas the last two types entail multi-party or minority governments. The crucial difference between moderate and polarized pluralism lies in the ideological distance between parties and, as a consequence, in the coalitional configuration and the direction of competition. While moderate pluralism displays relatively short ideological distance among the relevant parties, bipolar coalitional configuration and centripetal competition (p. 179), polarized pluralism is defined by great

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5 Most of the study on party systems since Sartori’s work, especially as far as established democracies are concerned, has dealt with the central question of party system change: its occurrence (or not), the extent and the causes. See for instance M. Shamir (1984) and P. Mair (1997; 2001a).
ideological distance (materialized in the presence of anti-system parties), tri-polar coali-tional configuration and centrifugal competition (p.132-36).

The scarcity of proper anti-system parties in the post-1991 political landscape, however, makes the distinction between moderate pluralism (ever more common) and polarized pluralism (ever more rare) less significant. This results in an increasing need to elaborate new criteria to sort out different party systems falling within the overcrowded moderate pluralism type. The classification proposed by Peter Mair explicitly aims to address this issue. He proposes distinguishing party systems by different patterns of competition for government (Mair, 1997, p. 206-14). More precisely, Mair points out the difference between closed competition, where government coalitions are entirely alternative and predictable, and open competition, where innovative formulas are likely to emerge. The Scottish and Welsh party systems will be analyzed in the light of these frameworks.

However, before moving forward, one more aspect remains to be explored at a conceptual and theoretical level. This is the use of the term ‘institutionalization’. The concept of institutionalization, used in regards to party systems, developed from the study of political systems after the third wave of democratization. In the last fifteen years more and more scholars dealing with party systems in new or quasi-democracies have questioned the applicability of Sartori’s framework – as well as other frameworks developed from the study of western democracies – arguing that a further criterion should be brought into consideration: the level of institutionalization of the party system (Mainwaring, 1999; Gryzmala-Busse, 2002).

Mainwaring identifies four indicators of party system institutionalization (1999, p. 22-39). Two of them concern individual parties: the strength of the social roots of parties and the capability of party autonomy from leaders and prominent politicians. The remaining two are more ‘systemic’ indicators: the level of legitimacy enjoyed by parties in general and the stability of inter-party competition. It is immediately clear that applying the

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6 More known in the political science’s literature is the concept of institutionalization related to individual parties. See Janda (1980) and Panebianco (1988). The two concepts, though connected, should not be confused.
concept of institutionalization to the Scottish and Welsh party systems can look
inappropriate. As part of the UK, the two regions have long experienced the development
and consolidation of the democratic system based on electoral competition for (UK)
government among established political parties. The three traditional British parties have
had well established regional branches for a century and more, which allowed them to
contest the Scottish and Welsh seats for the general and local elections. Indeed, one could
talk of a Scottish and Welsh party system pre-dating devolution, meaning the election and
the distribution among parties of the Scottish and Welsh seats of Westminster. However,
in the light of the above definitions, such a view cannot be accepted. As strongly re-stated
by Mair:

…the core of any party system qua system is constituted by the structure of
competition for control of the executive. Despite the differing perspectives
advanced by various classifications to be found in the literature… this remains a
point of more or less widespread agreement: defining a party system begins with
an understanding of how governmental power is contested. (Mair, 2006, p. 65)

Scottish and Welsh party systems were, therefore, born only in May 1999, with the first
election of the autonomous respective governmental bodies established by devolution.
General election results in Scotland and Wales (prior to and post devolution) will be used
in this paper for diachronic and multi-level comparison. However, they must be seen as
representing only the format of ‘virtual’ party systems that, in fact, did not exist. So we
can say that, as new (or very young) party systems, they are unavoidably undergoing a
process of institutionalization. It goes without saying that they do not need to
institutionalize along all four dimensions pointed out by Mainwaring. Individual parties,
at least those which were part of the pre-existing format, have been well rooted and
institutionalized for long time. Legitimacy is not a major issue, or at least no more than in
other established democracies. What, in fact, remains to be seen in terms of party system
institutionalization is whether the pre-existing format has undergone significant change
and, most importantly, whether some patterns of competition among parties have (started
to) become solidified.
The Scottish Party System

The Scottish Parliament is elected every four years with a Mixed Member Proportional system (MMP), also known as Additional Member system (AMS), where 73 seats are allocated in single member constituencies by the traditional First Past the Post (FPP), and 56 are allocated proportionally within regional multi-member constituencies so as to compensate for the disproportional effects of FPP seats. The result is a Parliament which mirrors rather faithfully the electoral results, though excluding from representation small parties which do not reach around 5 – 6 % of votes in regional constituencies (Curtice, 2007, p. 42).

The format

As shown in figure 1, the format of the Scottish party system in Holyrood is strikingly different from that made of the Scottish seats in Westminster. As far as the latter is concerned, since the late 1960’s Labour has become the pre-dominant party in a four-party format including the Tories (who in Scotland are called the Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party), the Liberals (later Alliance and then Liberal Democrats) and the Scottish National Party (SNP). In the three most recent general elections Labour has maintained an absolutely predominant position. The LibDems have emerged as the largest of the three minor parties getting close to 20% of the Scottish seats in 2005. In contrast the Tories disappeared in 1997 and got only one MP in the two subsequent elections, leaving the nationalists as the third party. Looking at the parties in Holyrood and at their relative parliamentary strength, as represented in figure 1, we are presented with a substantially different picture.\(^7\)

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\(^7\) A discussion on the causes of the different electoral behaviour for the general and devolved elections in Scotland goes beyond the remit of this paper. Authoritative studies have shown that such differences cannot be attributed entirely to different voting systems but should be explained primarily in terms of ‘dual voting’, i.e. preference for state-wide parties in the general elections and preference for the nationalists (or abstention) in the devolved elections (Hough and Jeffery, 2006).
First, Labour was the largest party in Holyrood during the first two terms but it never obtained an absolute majority of seats. Second, the Conservatives have achieved their comeback in Scottish politics and must be counted as a relevant party. Third, two new parties, the Scottish Greens and the Scottish Socialists, succeeded in getting represented in the first election, with one MSP each, and increased their parliamentary strength in the second election. However, their permanence in the party system may prove temporary, since the Scottish Socialists, which during the second term split into two parliamentary groups (the new group being called Solidarity), disappeared after the 2007 election and the Greens saw their group reduced from seven to only two members. As we shall see below, after the 2007 election the Greens acquired a certain importance in terms of government formation, despite their slight numerical weight. However, it is not entirely
clear whether they will be able to persist as a stable and relevant presence in the Scottish party system. The last but definitely not least important novelty concerns the rise of the Scottish nationalists. While in the Scottish seats of Westminster the SNP has stabilized as the third party, it emerged in the new party system as the second party and maintained that position after the 2003 election, in spite of the electoral setback. In addition, the SNP managed to become the largest group in Holyrood and the office holder after the 2007 election. The only party which, taken in isolation, has not substantially changed their weight are the Liberal Democrats. Their parliamentary strength has remained on average around 15%. However, having all the rest changed around them, new opportunities in terms of government formation opened up for the party.

As expected, the established democratic setting and the presence of rooted political parties has worked in favor of a rapid institutionalization of the party system, at least in terms of voting patterns. This can be easily measured by the index of electoral volatility. Considering the whole period 1999-2007 the average value of this index is only 8.825 (9.7 computing it with the PR vote), a rather low level in comparative terms.\(^8\) It is worth stressing that such a low level of electoral volatility can also be interpreted as an indicator of the legitimacy of the individual parties and the party system as a whole (Bartolini and Mair, 1990, p. 25). In summary, the stabilized format of the Scottish Party system falls within Sartori’s class of limited pluralism, with two major parties – Labour and the SNP – two minor parties which must be considered relevant – the Conservatives and Lib-Dems - and one borderline party– the Greens.

**Party positions and ideological distance**

As stated in the introduction the data concerning party positions within the ideological space were drawn on a three-wave survey conducted on Members of the Scottish Parliament (MSPs). The number of respondents was 49, giving a ratio of about 2/5.

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\(^8\) For instance, if we included Scotland in the list elaborated by Mainwaring and Torcal (2006), in which 39 countries were ranked according to the level of mean volatility (from the lowest to the highest) in the period 1978-2003, it would rank in 6th place (between Germany and Switzerland).
Figure 2 represents the results of the survey concerning four major dimensions of competition: state/market, libertarian/authoritarian, environment/economic-growth and independence/unitary-UK.

As far as the state-market dimension is concerned, there seems to be a crowded central area, occupied by Labour, the Lib-Dems and the SNP, with the Conservatives and the Greens in more polarized (and opposing) locations. The fact that both major parties are placed left of the centre points to the presence of a ‘consensus area’ which confirms a traditional left-leaning approach to socio-economic policy issues in Scotland (at least from the 1960s onwards). The closeness of Labour and the SNP indicates quite clearly that, as far as this dimension is concerned, the competition among parties has assumed a clear centripetal structure. The Conservatives and the Greens may look ideologically
isolated but they are not very distant from the centre and, anyway, cannot be considered
anti-system parties. Therefore, on the basis of the survey data we can conclude that, as far
as the state-market dimension is concerned, the Scottish party system seems to fit
comfortably into the moderate pluralism type. Does this picture find confirmation on the
analysis of the party manifestos and academic literature? And does it represent a
stabilized or volatile pattern? Party manifestos seem to confirm the picture drawn by the
data in terms of relative distance between parties. They point to a common approach on
socio-economic matters among ‘central’ parties, which consists of ensuring economic
development and maintaining a high level of social spending (Scottish Labour Party
Manifesto, 2007; Scottish National Party Manifesto, 2007; Scottish Liberal Democrats
Manifesto, 2007), while the Conservatives and the Greens distinguish themselves, with
the former proposing to improve efficiency in order to save public money and the latter
stressing environmental policies (Scottish Conservative Manifesto 2007; Scottish Green
Party Manifesto 2007).

The second question is more difficult to answer. Looking backwards to the two previous
terms, one does not find shifts in party positions so relevant as to change the pattern we
find in figure 3. It could be argued that the SNP has moved slightly towards the centre
under Swinney’s leadership but the overall approach to socio-economic issues remains
solidly social-democratic (McEwan, 2003, pp. 56-57). The Conservatives have become
more prone to advance social spending proposals in the attempt to leave behind their
public image associated with extreme neo-liberalism and to get more in tune with the
Scottish electorate (Seawright, 2003, p. 72, Bennie and Clark, 2003), but they appear to
be still isolated to the right. For the remaining parties, Labour, LibDems and Greens, it is
rather difficult to appreciate relevant changes in their position in the period 1999-2007. In
short, along the state-market dimension the system appears to be pluralistic but not
polarized.

It is worth noting (Fig. 2) that the relative party positions along the second and third
dimensions - libertarian/authoritarian and environment/growth – are exactly the same.
From left to right we find respectively the Greens, the LibDems, the nationalists, Labour
and the Tories. In addition, with the exception of the Greens (which can be explained with the salience of environmental issues for that party), the absolute positions are also very similar. These results would appear to support the thesis that the two dimensions can be subsumed in a single socio-cultural dimension, as proposed by Kitschelt (1994), Hix (1999), Hooghe et al. (2002). As for the state-market dimension, the closeness of the two major parties (and of the LibDems) points to a centripetal dynamic of competition and lack of polarization. The party positions do not seem to have undergone substantive change in these dimensions. The only significant trend consists in the adoption by Labour and the SNP of more populist policies for tackling crime and anti-social behavior. However, the Conservatives’ policy proposals on this policy area remain by far the toughest.  

Looking at the party positions along the last dimension – independence/unitary UK - a completely different pattern emerges. There appear to be two poles which are very distant, while the centre is rather week. The strongest pole (in purely numerical terms) is formed by Labour, which is in favour of the maintenance of the devolution settlement, and the Conservatives, who have in recent years moved towards acceptance of more powers to the Scottish Parliament but (probably due to their unionist legacy) are either considered not credible or at any rate are still perceived as a centralist British force. The pro-independence pole, formed by the SNP and the Greens (in the second term the Scottish Socialists and Solidarity were also part of this pole), grew in parliamentary strength after the 2007 election. The LibDems, advocating a federal UK, are positioned in between these two poles, though unambiguously against the independence option (Lynch, 2003). This dimension is, therefore, characterized by the presence of two main poles and by a high level of polarization. Although the leader of the Scottish Labour party, Wendy Alexander, has recently dropped the choice of defending the status quo in favor of advocating more powers for the Scottish Parliament (speech to the University of Edinburgh, 29 November 2007), the level of polarization is going to remain high because of the SNP’s commitment to independence.  

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9 For an easier comparison of party positions on several policy areas see BBC|News|Scotland, At-a-glance: Party Manifestos.
In terms of diachronic analysis it needs to be considered that, while the other parties’ position does not seem to have changed significantly since 1999, the Conservatives have rapidly abandoned a grandstanding anti-devolution position in order to adopt a more popular stance (Seawright, 2003). If we had to analyze the ideological distance along the constitutional dimension after the 1999 election, we could imagine a similar picture but with the Conservatives isolated towards the edge of ‘UK centralism’. It is also arguable that Labour and the Lib-Dems would have looked closer than they do in figure 2, as during the first half of the 1990s they had elaborated together, within the Scottish Convention, the proposals which would become the Government of Scotland Act in 1997. The resulting picture would be that of a dominant central pole, formed by Labour and the Lib-Dems, a very strong (Scottish) independence pole, formed by the SNP and the Greens, and a weaker, but still existing, (UK) centralistic pole, represented by the Conservatives. Both extreme poles were against the constitutional settlement provided by devolution and could be considered, broadly speaking, anti-system. Therefore, the Scottish party system in 1999 would have looked very much like a case of polarized pluralism along the constitutional dimension. However, this configuration did not solidify. The picture we have in 2007 is rather different. Since the Conservatives have accepted devolution, the UK centralist pole does not exist anymore and we are left with a bipolar, though still polarized, system.

**Patterns of government and opposition**

The electoral results represented in figure 1 indicate straightforwardly that a hung Parliament in Scotland is pretty much the rule and, therefore, a single-party-majority government is not an option. As a consequence, Scotland had two coalition governments between 1999 and May 2007 - Labour and Lib-Dems - and a minority government since May 2007 – the SNP with external support of the Greens. The fact that only one change in government has, so far, occurred is a limitation on providing definite conclusions about patterns of government formation. However, combining the short experience of government formation with the data on the ideological distance between parties leaves us
with enough information to attempt an evaluation and classification of the Scottish party system in this respect.

First of all, it should be noted that some features of the Westminster style have been imported into the Scottish party system, despite the different institutional environment. These features concern mainly the strictly competitive nature of party interaction in the electoral arena and the adversarial structure of the parties’ roles in the Parliament (Bennie and Clark, 2003). This is to say that: although coalition government is the most likely outcome of any given election, no pre-election agreements or tactical co-operation between parties occurs; and despite the fact that no opposition party is likely to win a majority of seats in the following election, the largest opposition party designs a shadow cabinet, as if it aimed to form a single party government in the next term. So the first point to make is that electoral competition is between individual parties and not between coalitions. Formal bargaining on government formation starts only once the ballot papers have been cast and the seats have been counted. In particular, the 2007 election seems to have sanctioned the principle that the initiative to form the government is left to the largest party. The investiture vote of the SNP minority government (formally the election of Alex Salmond as First Minister) was made possible by the abstention of the LibDems and the Conservatives. The pattern which seems to be institutionalizing is that government formation is a matter for the two largest parties, which can alternate in office depending on which one won most seats. The chances of minor parties being part of the government coalition depend on their ideological proximity to the major parties and on the latter’s electoral results, more than on their own performances. The LibDems, for instance, have maintained their parliamentary strength nearly unaltered during the three terms but lost power in 2007 because Labour lost the contest with the SNP. For the same reason, the Greens are much closer to power (as external support partner) in the third Parliament than they were in the second, despite reducing their seats to less than a third. Figures 3 and 4 show the ideological distance between Scottish parties in two-dimensional space.
The constitutional dimension was included in both figures because it is the one which divides most significantly the two parties competing for government and separates the independence pole (primarily the SNP) from the other parties. Although the LibDems have a more autonomist position on the powers to be attributed to the Scottish Parliament they belong firmly to the non-separatist camp. This choice was confirmed by their refusal to take part into a coalition government led by the SNP, primarily because the latter was determined to include in the government plan the proposal of holding a referendum on independence (BBC|News|Scotland, “LibDems rule out SNP coalition”). The independence watershed significantly diminishes the actual options for coalitions, determining what Mair (1997) calls a closed structure of competition for government. Indeed, only two main alternative options, with few variants for each option, seem to be viable: Labour-led government - either minority or (as happened twice) in coalition with the LibDems – or an SNP led government (most probably minority) – either alone or with the Greens as an external support party (as the current situation) or with the Greens within the government. It is interesting to note that while in Figure 3 Labour is closer to the LibDems, in Figure 4 it is closer to the Conservatives. In this respect, the Lib-Lab coalitions from 1999 to 2007 can be interpreted in three ways: firstly, independently of
the ideological distance at the Scottish level, the influence of UK politics is so strong that a Labour-Tory coalition would be inconceivable; secondly, the state/market dimension is more salient that the authoritarian/libertarian one; thirdly, party positions in the previous eight years were so different that Figures 3 and 4 do not represent them correctly. After three elections the Scottish party system seems to have institutionalized, not only in terms of the format, but also of the mechanics. It falls within the ‘moderate pluralism’ type and is characterized by a limited pluralist format, centripetal competition along the ‘traditional’ dimensions, and more polarized competition along the constitutional dimension. Parties strictly compete on the electoral arena but can co-operate in forming governments, according to a closed structure of alternation in power mainly determined by the party positions along the territorial/constitutional dimension.

**The Welsh Party System**

The National Assembly for Wales is elected every four years with an Additional Member system, where 40 seats are allocated in single member constituencies and 20 are allocated proportionally within regional multi-member constituencies. The compensatory effect of the regional constituency seats is lower than in the Scottish case, as the ratio of proportional seats decreases from roughly 2/5 in the Scottish Parliament to 1/3 in the Welsh Assembly.

**The format**

The format of the Welsh party system departs substantively from that made of the Welsh seats of Westminster, as Figure 5 shows. However, in comparison with the Scottish case the differences are less marked. In Westminster the format has remained characterized by the predominant position of Labour throughout the post-war period, with the party getting more than 70% of seats on average, with peaks of over 80%. The Conservatives have been the second largest party up to 1997, when they lost every single seat in Wales, before recovering slightly in 2005. Conversely, the LibDems and the Welsh nationalists (PC) have rarely surpassed 10%.
Figure 5. Difference in format between Westminster and Cardiff Bay

Format of the Welsh in Westminster

Format in Cardiff Bay

The format emerging from the Welsh Assembly is rather different. Welsh Labour obtained 50% of the seats in the 2003 election, while it remained below that majority threshold in the first and third Assembly election. The nationalists emerged as the second party (in terms of seat share) while being closely challenged by the Conservatives for the status of formal opposition party. In the last election, although the Conservatives won the same share of FPP votes and a slightly larger share of PR votes, PC remained the second largest party thanks to its more effective distribution of votes. However, the contest between PC and the Conservatives for the second party position means that, differently from Scotland, Labour’s first party status remains unchallenged. The LibDems have

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10 Again, for the causes of such different electoral results between the general and devolved elections see Hough and Jeffrey (2006).
stabilized as fourth party in the Assembly with a steady 10% seat share. However, as for their Scottish counterparts, opportunities for coalition government have opened up. Applying Sartori’s criteria of classification strictly would imply that the format of the newly emerged Welsh party system is one of ‘limited pluralism’. However, given the very strong position of the Labour party, it looks more like a hybrid falling in between limited pluralism and predominant party systems.

**Dimensions of competition and ideological distance**

The data concerning party positions within the ideological space were drawn on a three-wave survey conducted on Members of the National Assembly for Wales (AMs) between May and September 2007. The number of respondents was 20, giving a ratio of exactly 1/3. Figure 6 shows the parties’ positions along four major dimensions of competition.

As far as the state-market dimension is concerned, the data seem to reflect the public image projected by the parties in Wales. PC has adopted a very markedly leftist ideology from the 1970s onwards. In 1981 a clause committing the party to decentralized socialism was introduced in the constitution (McAllister, 2001) and, although it seems to have moved to more moderate positions in the last decade, it has maintained a very social-democratic outlook and policy agenda. Welsh Labour, especially from 2000 when Rhodri Morgan took over as party leader, has stressed its leftist character often marking a distinction between them and their counterpart in London (Wyn Jones and Scully, 2004). It therefore comes with no surprise that we find it solidly to the left. In contrast, the LibDems and the Conservatives occupy roughly the same position as in Scotland, with the former slightly right of the centre and the latter firmly to the right. Considering the parties’ relative strength, it is clear that the Welsh electorate displays a marked preference for leftist parties. The left pole is by far the largest, making up nearly 70% of the Assembly, while the centre-right pole is clearly minoritarian.
Like in Scotland the second and third dimensions seem to be correlated, as the relative position of parties is identical (PC-LibDem-Lab-Con) and the absolute positions are also very similar. Again, this would suggest that scholars, such as Kitschelt (1994), Hix (1999) and Hooghe et al. (2002) are right in including environment within a broader socio-cultural dimension, which refers also to the opposition between libertarian/alternative and traditional/authoritarian attitudes. Party positions along these dimensions seem to reflect the conventional wisdom on Welsh parties. The ideological baggage of Plaid Cymru was full of anti-war stances and romantic environmentalism from its origins in the inter-war period (McAllister, 2001). Such libertarian and environmentalist orientation was maintained and developed with the involvement of many party members in the social movements of the late 1960s and, more recently, with an electoral alliance with the Greens in the early 1990s (Lynch, 1995).
As far as the self-government dimension is concerned, the survey data confirm to a great extent the public image of the parties. However, a qualitative reading of recent party manifestos would suggest slightly different positions. For instance, PC has adopted the policy of independence in Europe in 2003 and restated such policy in the 2004 European election (Plaid Cymru, Manifesto 2004). Nonetheless, since then the party has kept a very low profile on the issue, going back to its traditional ambiguity on the final objective of the party (Plaid Cymru, Manifesto, 2005, 2007). This should translate in the party occupying a slightly more moderate position. Moreover, Welsh Labour’s position is questionable. Like the LibDems the party is strongly committed to obtain for the Assembly the same legislative powers enjoyed by the Scottish Parliament (Welsh Labour manifesto 2007; Welsh Liberal Democrats manifesto 2007), so it should probably occupy a position closer to that of the LibDems. In contrast, the position of the Conservatives seems to reflect rather faithfully their opposition to the Government of Wales Act 1997 and their suspicions on the new Government of Wales Act 2006 (Welsh Conservative Party manifesto 2007, p. 35) which allows the Assembly to ask the Secretary of State for Wales for the competences to legislate in specific policy areas. In summary, what emerges from the parties’ manifestos is a tri-polar structure, i.e. PC-Lab&Lib-Con, with limited polarization due to PC keeping a low profile, at least for the time being, on the secessionist option.

It is rather complicated to decide which category the Welsh party system fits in. Surely there is no anti-system party, in the sense of an anti liberal-democracy party. This should exclude the polarized pluralist type and lead to opt for a moderate pluralist type. Such an argument is strengthened by the fact that PC is slightly more moderate in their nationalist claims than the SNP in Scotland. However, the pattern of competition along the self-government dimension remains typical of a polarized system, with a large central pole and two other poles at the opposite sides. It is arguable that the failure of the UK government to deliver a constitutional settlement that would satisfy Welsh Labour’s demands has contributed to maintain the debate alive and the settlement fluid. Such a situation appears to hinder the stabilization of a bipolar confrontation between
independentists and supporters of the final status quo, much in the same way as happened in Scotland.

Patterns of Government and opposition

From 1999 to date Wales has experienced four different government formulas: Labour-LibDems coalition (2000-2003), Labour majority\(^\text{11}\) (2003-2005), Labour minority (1999-2000 and 2005-2007\(^\text{12}\)) and Labour-PC coalition (2007-). These government changes, and the last one in particular, are very instructive about the likelihood of a stable pattern of government and opposition emerging in Wales. First of all, government formation can help us sort out the issue of whether the Welsh party system can be considered to be a predominant system. On the one hand, Labour’s ambition to govern alone, testified to by the attempt to get on with a minority government in 1999, the choice to form a single party government with only 50% of the seats in 2003 and then the decision to maintain a minority government in 2005 restates the above mentioned border-line character of the Welsh party system’s format. On the other hand, the failure of the 1999 minority government means that we may apply the 50% threshold quite rigidly in order to discern the two classes.\(^\text{13}\) It is therefore more sensible to conclude that, since Labour did not achieve a majority of seats consistently and since minority governments do not seem to be the norm in Wales, the Welsh party system must be considered a case of moderate pluralism rather than a predominant system.

Concerning the composition of the successive governments, the constant feature that emerges immediately is the presence of Labour in every executive. Applying Mair’s framework (1996; 1997), we can immediately say that the Welsh party system is characterized by an open structure of competition, with only partial alternation in office. Whenever Labour gets a majority of seats, single party government remains the first option. The chances of the other parties getting in office depend, beyond their relative

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\(^{11}\) After the 2003 election Labour could count on 50% of the Assembly seats. With a member of the opposition assuming the post of Preceding Officer, Labour was left de facto with a 50% + 1 majority.

\(^{12}\) Labour lost the majority in 2005 for the defection of one of its AMs.

\(^{13}\) See Sartori 1976, p. 196.
strengths, on Labour’s strategic choices. But what is the impact of the parties’ relative ideological distance on government formation? Figures 7 and 8 show the Welsh political space and the parties’ positions within it.

The key feature here is the great distance between the nationalists and the Conservatives which gives Labour a pivotal role in determining the government composition. The post 2007 election process of government formation was very telling in many respects.

The election results left several options open, among which was a PC led government in coalition with the LibDems and the Tories. Such option was seriously discussed between the three parties’ leaders and even a document for a government plan was agreed upon (BBC|News|Wales, ”’Rainbow coalition’ poll backing”, 25/06/07). However, the Lib-Dems refused to ally with the Tories and Plaid Cymru eventually opted for joining a Labour-led executive. The incapability of three minor parties to co-operate, which is obviously due to their respective ideological distance, leaves no chance of a government without Labour and no chance of the Conservatives winning office at any time, barring an electoral earthquake to their advantage. However, the fact that the three parties came extremely close to forming a coalition government together indicates that such possibility
cannot be excluded in the future. This testifies to the still-fluid status of the Welsh party system, at least in terms of government formation.

On Labour’s part, when they cannot achieve a single party government the choice is between the LibDems and PC. In 2000 they preferred the LibDems, who accepted after having secured a great number of their policies (especially on health and education) being included in the government plan (BBC|News|Wales, “Labour executive approves coalition”, 06/10/00). However, in the aftermath of the 2007 election the situation looked rather different. In the period 2000-2007 most Labour AMs (though not Welsh Labour MPs) developed a pro-Welsh Parliament position which brought them closer to the nationalists’ position. In addition, in order to secure a deal with the LibDems, Labour would have had to concede a voting system reform for the local councils, thus jeopardizing Labour’s dominance at the local level. The Welsh leadership in the Assembly felt the PC option more compatible with their strategic plans to develop the Welsh Assembly into a law-making power Parliament.

The government partner change, from LibDems in 2000 to PC in 2007, is also relevant in order to solve the puzzle of which the most salient dimension of competition is. While the first coalition left out of government both the opposition of the right, i.e. the Tories, and the opposition of self government, i.e. PC, the second coalition left out only the centre-right opposition, i.e. the Tories and the LibDems. It is not entirely clear whether the Labour-PC coalition must be interpreted as a sort of ‘grand coalition’, thus considering the territorial-constitutional dimension as the most salient one, or whether it should be interpreted as a simple ‘centre-left’ coalition against the centre-right pole formed by the Lib-Dems and the Tories. The latter case would lead to consider the state/market as the most salient dimension. Given the still evolving character of devolution in Wales and the limited sympathy of Welsh electorate for independence, the territorial dimension may even lose more salience after a referendum on the creation of a Welsh Parliament has been voted, especially if the proposal wins popular support. However, for the time being the situation remains fluid.
Concluding discussion

As set out in the introduction, the main aim of the paper was to analyze the emerging party systems in Scotland and Wales in order to evaluate what features have become institutionalized and what have to be considered still fluid. An implicit and secondary aim was to compare and contrast the two cases. Table 3 summarizes the main characteristics of the party systems, thus providing a synthetic comparison between them.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Scotland</th>
<th>Wales</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Format</strong></td>
<td>limited pluralism - 4/5 parties – (institutionalized)</td>
<td>limited pluralism - 4 parties – (institutionalized)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type</strong></td>
<td>moderate pluralism, polarized along the territorial dimension (institutionalized)</td>
<td>moderate pluralism, rather polarized along the territorial dimension (still fluid)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Electoral relationships</strong></td>
<td>strictly competitive (institutionalized)</td>
<td>strictly competitive (institutionalized)</td>
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<td><strong>Governmental relationships</strong></td>
<td>competitive/co-operative (institutionalized)</td>
<td>competitive/co-operative (institutionalized)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Structure of competition for Government</strong></td>
<td>closed -Labour led vs. SNP led governments with alternative allies - (institutionalized)</td>
<td>open -Labour is the constant element but different formulas are available- (fluid)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Most salient dimension of competition</strong></td>
<td>self-government (institutionalized)</td>
<td>from self-government to left-right? (still fluid)</td>
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</table>

Both party systems, as expected, boast well institutionalized parties and, as a consequence, well institutionalized formats. The comparatively low level of electoral volatility testifies the institutionalization and legitimacy of parties in Scotland and Wales. The formats of both party systems have undergone substantive change, if compared with the Scottish and Welsh seats in Westminster, due to a patterned variation in voting behavior which systematically favors the respective nationalist parties to the expenses of
Labour and to the mechanical effects of the new voting systems. Although both formats fit Sartori’s ‘limited pluralism’ class, the party systems differ in the fact that Scotland has two major parties competing for the status of largest party, whereas in Wales Labour firmly holds that position and the Assembly seats are more evenly shared among the remaining parties, none of which is in a position to challenge Labour’s primacy.

Although coalition and/or minority governments are the most likely outcomes of every election and parties are compelled to co-operate in the legislative and governmental arenas, both party systems have ‘imported’ strictly competitive relationships in the electoral arena, as in the British tradition. The most noticeable differences between the two party systems refer to the structure and dimensions of competition for government. In the Scottish case, the pattern which appears to have solidified is a closed competition between Labour and the SNP for the leadership of the government. Minor variations, which do not affect this pattern, concern whether they form the government alone (minority) or externally supported by their alternative allies - the LibDems for Labour and the Greens for the SNP - or with these allies in office as minor partners. The alternative between Labour and the SNP would also suggest that the most salient cleavage in the Scottish party system is self-government. In contrast, in Wales a more fluid situation seems to persist. The lack of a credible competitor for Labour’s primacy makes a non-Labour led government a rather unlikely event. This translates in several different options being available: Labour single party minority, Lab-LibDems or Lab-PC government. At the moment the Tories remain out of any government deal among parties, like in Scotland. However, the long term persistence of Labour primacy and government leadership may push the other parties to overcome their ideological incompatibilities and form an anti-Labour rainbow coalition. At the moment, the refusal of the Lib-Dems to ally with the Tories has pushed PC to working with Labour, leaving the Tories as the official opposition party in Wales. This perhaps indicates the predominance of the left-right dimension over the territorial/constitutional one. However, the pattern of competition is likely to remain fluid, at least until the devolution settlement in Wales fulfils Labour AMs’ preferences.
One last comment concerns the usefulness of the analytical frameworks deployed in this study. In particular, Sartori’s typology appears unsatisfactory at least in respect to two issues. First, the concept of anti-system party seems difficult to apply to pro-independence parties. Although these parties want to break the state, they aim to do so by democratic means and aim to create a new democratic (independent) state. As such they cannot be considered anti-system. Yet, they entail a very high level of polarization along the territorial dimension which does not fit comfortably with the moderate pluralism type.

The second issue concerns the failure to appreciate important differences within the moderate pluralist type. Sartori’s framework does not point to any difference between the Scottish and the Welsh party systems, both falling within the moderate pluralism type. In contrast, Mair’s framework does provide criteria which are able to sort out a major distinction between the two party systems in regards to the structure of competition for government.

**Primary sources:**

- BBC|News|Wales, ”’Rainbow coalition’ poll backing”, 25/06/07
- BBC|News|Wales, “Labour executive approves coalition”, 06/10/00
- Plaid Cymru Manifesto 2005.
• Scottish Conservative Manifesto 2007.
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• Scottish National Party Manifesto 2003.
• Scottish National Party Manifesto 2007.
• Welsh Liberal Democrat Manifesto 2007.

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• Hough, Dan and Jeffrey, Charley (eds), (2006), Devolution and Electoral Politics, Manchester: Manchester University Press.


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Appendix A

QUESTIONNAIRE
FOR MEMBERS OF THE SCOTTISH PARLIAMENT

PARTY POSITIONS

Dear MSP,

The following questionnaire is part of my doctoral research conducted at the University of Sussex, Department of Politics and Contemporary European Studies. It is extremely simple and will not take more than 3 minutes of your time. I would appreciate if you completed it by ticking the cells in the following tables to indicate parties’ positions in the relevant policy areas. After having completed it, please send it back using the attached envelop or by fax (see fax number below). I will be happy to report on the findings of the questionnaire in September 2007, at the general conference of the European Consortium of Political Research which will be held in Pisa.

Thanks a lot for your co-operation and best regards,

Author,
Address

Which Parliamentary Group (party) are you part of?.........................................................
1- Socio-Economic Policies
Place each party where you think most appropriate on the following 0 to 10 scale, where 0 represents a preference for minimal state intervention, free markets and low (direct) taxation, while 10 represents extensive public ownership of industry, strong market regulation and/or high (direct) taxation.

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2- Socio-Cultural Policies
Place each party on the following 0 to 10 scale where 0 represents an extreme preference for traditionalist values and authoritarian attitudes, while 10 represents an extreme preference for libertarian values and alternative lifestyles (5 being the centre).

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3- Constitutional policy (Scottish self-government)
Place each party on the following 0 to 10 scale, where 0 represents a preference for a pre-devolution, unitary UK, 5 represents the status quo and 10 represents full independence for Scotland.

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4- Environmental Policy
Place each party on the following 0 to 10 scale, where 0 represents a preference for economic growth over environmental considerations under any circumstances, and 10 represents a preference for environmental considerations over economic growth under any circumstance (5 represents no clear priority for one or the other objective).

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5- Electoral reform (for the Scottish Parliament)
Place each party on the following 0 to 10 scale, where 0 represents a preference for the FPTP system, 5 represents a preference for the *status quo* (MMP), and 10 represents a preference for pure PR.

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6- European integration
Places each party on the following 0 to 10 scale, where 0 represents ‘hard euroscepticism’, 5 represents a preference for the *status quo* and 10 represents a preference for moving towards a ‘federal Europe’.

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Appendix A1


Questionnaires sent to MSPs in three waves between May and September 2007

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<td>Ratio</td>
<td>28.30%</td>
<td>46.80%</td>
<td>47%</td>
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Appendix B

QUESTIONNAIRE
FOR MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY FOR WALES

PARTY POSITIONS

Dear AM,

The following questionnaire is part of my doctoral research conducted at the University of Sussex, Department of Politics and Contemporary European Studies. It is extremely simple and will not take more than 3 minutes of your time. I would appreciate if you completed it by ticking the cells in the following tables to indicate parties’ positions in the relevant policy areas. After having completed it, please send it back using the attached envelop or by fax (see fax number below). I will be happy to report on the findings of the questionnaire in September 2007, at the general conference of the European Consortium of Political Research which will be held in Pisa.

Thanks a lot for your co-operation and best regards,

Author,
Address
Which Assembly Group (party) do you belong to?........................................................

1- Socio-Economic Policies  
Place each party where you think most appropriate on the following 0 to 10 scale, where 0 represents a preference for minimal state intervention, free markets and low (direct) taxation, while 10 represents extensive state ownership of industry, strong market regulation and/or high (direct) taxation.

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2- Socio-Cultural Policies  
Place each party on the following 0 to 10 scale where 0 represents an extreme preference for traditionalist values and authoritarian attitudes, while 10 represents an extreme preference for libertarian values and alternative lifestyles (5 being the centre).

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3- Constitutional Policy (Self-government)  
Place each party on the following 0 to 10 scale, where 0 represents a return to a pre-devolution unitary UK and 10 represents full independence for Wales.

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4- Environmental Policy  
Place each party on the following 0 to 10 scale, where 0 represents a preference for economic growth over environmental considerations under any circumstances, and 10 represents a preference for environmental considerations over economic growth under any circumstance (5 represents no clear priority for one or the other objective).

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<th>Party</th>
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5- **Electoral Reform (local elections)**
Place each party on the following 0 to 10 scale, where 0 represents a preference for the FPTP system and 10 a preference for pure Proportional Representation.

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6- **European integration**
Places each party on the following 0 to 10 scale, where 0 represents ‘hard euroscepticism’, 5 represents a preference for the *status quo* and 10 represents a preference for moving towards a ‘federal Europe’.

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Appendix B1

Party positions in the National Assembly of Wales

Questionnaires sent to AMs in three different waves between May and September 2007

| Total Number of respondents | 20 |
| Total Number of AMs          | 60 |
| Ratio                        | 33.33% |

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<tr>
<th>Number of respondents per party</th>
<th>Lab</th>
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<td>Number of AMs per party</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>15</td>
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<td>Ratio</td>
<td>19.20%</td>
<td>53.30%</td>
<td>16.70%</td>
<td>83.30%</td>
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<td>Working Papers in Contemporary European Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Vesna Bojicic and David Dyker</td>
<td>June 1993</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>Sanctions on Serbia: Sledgehammer or Scalpel</em></td>
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<td>2. Gunther Burghardt</td>
<td>August 1993</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>The Future for a European Foreign and Security Policy</em></td>
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<td>3. Xiudian Dai, Alan Cawson, Peter Holmes</td>
<td>February 1994</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>Competition, Collaboration &amp; Public Policy: A Case Study of the European HDTV Strategy</em></td>
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<td><em>The Future of Unemployment in Western Europe? Reconciling Demands for Flexibility, Quality and Security</em></td>
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<td>5. John Edmonds</td>
<td>February 1994</td>
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<td><em>Industrial Relations - Will the European Community Change Everything?</em></td>
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<td>6. Olli Rehn</td>
<td>July 1994</td>
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<td><em>The European Community and the Challenge of a Wider Europe</em></td>
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<td>7. Ulrich Sedelmeier</td>
<td>October 1994</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>The EU’s Association Policy towards Central Eastern Europe: Political and Economic Rationales in Conflict</em></td>
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<td>8. Mary Kaldor</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>Rethinking British Defence Policy and Its Economic Implications</em></td>
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<td>9. Alasdair Young</td>
<td>December 1994</td>
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<td><em>Ideas, Interests and Institutions: The Politics of Liberalisation in the EC’s Road Haulage Industry</em></td>
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<td>10. Keith Richardson</td>
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<td><em>Competitiveness in Europe: Cooperation or Conflict?</em></td>
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<td>11. Mike Hobday</td>
<td>June 1995</td>
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<td><em>The Technological Competence of European Semiconductor Producers</em></td>
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<td>12. Graham Avery</td>
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<td><em>The Commission’s Perspective on the Enlargement Negotiations</em></td>
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<td><em>The Maastricht Protocol on Social Policy: Theory and Practice</em></td>
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<td>15. Alasdair Smith, Peter Holmes, Ulrich Sedelmeier, Edward Smith, Helen Wallace, Alasdair Young</td>
<td>March 1996</td>
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<td><em>The European Union and Central and Eastern Europe: Pre-Accession Strategies</em></td>
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<td>16. Helen Wallace</td>
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41
From an Island off the North-West Coast of Europe

17. Indira Konjhodzic
   Democratic Consolidation of the Political System in Finland, 1945-1970:
   Potential Model for the New States of Central and Eastern Europe?  
   June 1996

18. Antje Wiener and Vince Della Sala
   Constitution Making and Citizenship Practice - Bridging the Democracy
   Gap in the EU?  
   December 1996

19. Helen Wallace and Alasdair Young
   Balancing Public and Private Interests Under Duress  
   December 1996

20. S. Ran Kim
   Evolution of Governance & the Growth Dynamics of the Korean
   Semiconductor Industry  
   April 1997

21. Tibor Navracsics
   A Missing Debate?: Hungary and the European Union  
   June 1997

22. Peter Holmes with Jeremy Kempton
   Study on the Economic and Industrial Aspects of Anti-Dumping Policy  
   September 1997

23. Helen Wallace
   Coming to Terms with a Larger Europe: Options for Economic
   Integration  
   January 1998

24. Mike Hobday, Alan Cawson and S Ran Kim
   The Pacific Asian Electronics Industries: Technology Governance
   and Implications for Europe  
   January 1998

25. Iain Begg
   Structural Fund Reform in the Light of Enlargement
   CENTRE ON EUROPEAN POLITICAL ECONOMY Working Paper No. 1  
   August 1998

26. Mick Dunford and Adrian Smith
   Trajectories of Change in Europe’s Regions: Cohesion,
   Divergence and Regional Performance
   CENTRE ON EUROPEAN POLITICAL ECONOMY Working Paper No. 2  
   August 1998

27. Ray Hudson
   What Makes Economically Successful Regions in Europe Successful?
   Implications for Transferring Success from West to East
   CENTRE ON EUROPEAN POLITICAL ECONOMY Working Paper No. 3  
   August 1998

28. Adam Swain
   Institutions and Regional Development: Evidence from Hungary and
   Ukraine
   CENTRE ON EUROPEAN POLITICAL ECONOMY Working Paper No. 4  
   August 1998

29. Alasdair Young
   Interpretation and ‘Soft Integration’ in the Adaptation of the European
   Community’s Foreign Economic Policy
   CENTRE ON EUROPEAN POLITICAL ECONOMY Working Paper No. 5  
   October 1998

30. Rilka Dragneva  
   March 1999
Corporate Governance Through Privatisation: Does Design Matter?

31. Christopher Preston and Arkadiusz Michonski
   Negotiating Regulatory Alignment in Central Europe: The Case of the Poland EU European Conformity Assessment Agreement
   March 1999

32. Jeremy Kempton, Peter Holmes, Cliff Stevenson
   Globalisation of Anti-Dumping and the EU CENTRE ON EUROPEAN POLITICAL ECONOMY Working Paper No. 6
   September 1999

33. Alan Mayhew
   Financial and Budgetary Implications of the Accession of Central and East European Countries to the European Union.
   March 2000

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   Public Opinion and Eastward Enlargement - Explaining Declining Support for EU Membership in Poland
   May 2000

35. Keith Richardson
   Big Business and the European Agenda
   September 2000

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   Opposing Europe: Party Systems and Opposition to the Union, the Euro and Europeanisation
   OPPOSING EUROPE RESEARCH NETWORK Working Paper No. 1
   October 2000

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   The European Trade Agenda After Seattle
   November 2000

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   Impact Assessment and European Integration Policy
   December 2000

39. Alan Mayhew
   Enlargement of the European Union: an Analysis of the Negotiations with the Central and Eastern European Candidate Countries
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   Economic Policy Co-ordination in the Eurozone: What has been achieved? What should be done?
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   Trade Effects From The Integration Of The Central And East European Countries Into The European Union
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   The Impact of EU Accession on Enterprise, Adaptation and Institutional Development in the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe
   May 2001

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   May 2001
Adaptation of the Polish legal system to European Union law: Selected aspects

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Party's, Positions and Europe: Euroscepticism in the EU Candidate States of Central and Eastern Europe
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Professionalizing the Millbank Tendency: the Political Sociology of New Labour's Employees
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June 2001

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Hungarian Party Identities and the Question of European Integration
OPPOSING EUROPE RESEARCH NETWORK Working Paper No. 4
September 2001

50. Karen Henderson
Euroscepticism or Europhobia: Opposition attitudes to the EU in the Slovak Republic
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September 2001

51. Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak
The Party Politics of Euroscepticism in EU Member and Candidate States
April 2002

52. Alan Mayhew
The Negotiating Position of the European Union on Agriculture, the Structural Funds and the EU Budget.
April 2002

53. Aleks Szczerbiak
After the Election, Nearing The Endgame: The Polish Euro-Debate in the Run Up To The 2003 EU Accession Referendum
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54. Charlie Lees
'Dark Matter': institutional constraints and the failure of party-based Euroscepticism in Germany
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Turkey EU Relations in the Post Helsinki phase and the EU harmonisation laws adopted by the Turkish Grand National Assembly in August 2002
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56. Nick Sitter
Opposing Europe: Euro-Scepticism, Opposition and Party Competition
OPPOSING EUROPE RESEARCH NETWORK Working Paper No. 9
October 2002

57. Hans G. Nilsson
Decision Making in EU Justice and Home Affairs: Current Shortcomings and Reform Possibilities
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58. Adriano Giovannelli  
*Semipresidentialism: an emerging pan-European model*

59. Daniel Naurin  
*Taking Transparency Seriously*

60. Lucia Quaglia  
*Euroscepticism in Italy and centre Right and Right wing political parties*

61. Francesca Vassallo  
*Another Europeanisation Case: British Political Activism*

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