Welcome to the third edition of the Sussex Undergraduate Politics Journal. This journal is put together and edited by the University of Sussex Politics Society with the precious help of the Politics Department. It seeks to celebrate excellence across all three year groups, presenting the work of undergraduate students in Politics and affiliated disciplines. We hope you enjoy reading this selection of essays and that this journal may continue in the future to showcase the talent of those whose work *shines bright like a diamond*.

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"In the study of Modern International History, Eurocentrism is not a fallacy: it is an inescapable fact about the shape of the historical process itself". Discuss.

(Written for Rise of the Modern International Order)

Federico Gabbiani

The term 'eurocentrism' refers to the belief that the historical rise of the Western world to the prominent status it holds today, was entirely due to the unique characteristics of the European people. According to eurocentric historians, the Western culture is superior to other civilizations because it wasn't until "Europeans came and brought modernity and development"[1] that the rest of the world came out of its backwardness. There are two main debates surrounding this issue. The first argument includes the belief that Europeans were militarily more advanced, more inventive and more rational minded than other populations. Following this view, eurocentrism may be viewed as a true fact about the course of historical events. The second argument opposes this view. It points towards the favourable geographical layout and the location of Europe itself, the political separation of its states and the role of the discovery of America. From this perspective, Eurocentrism is regarded as a false notion and not a fact about the historical process itself. I shall attempt to analyse both sides of the historical debate and argue that Eurocentrism is a false belief, showing that the course of historical events was not one-sided towards Europeans.

Military and Technology under the Eurocentric Perspective

When considering the rise of the West, a number of historians have attributed this to a military and naval superiority possessed by European people. Kennedy argues that it was only in Europe that an ongoing motivation for military improvement existed[2]. Amongst the evidence provided one observes the perfecting of gunpowder by

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[1] Blaut, J.M. Eight Eurocentric Historians, 8
[2] Kennedy, P. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, 28

Europeans. Additionally, after the second half of the fifteenth century, Europeans also developed smaller cannons from alloying tin and bronze. "All of this enhanced to an enormous degree the power and mobility of artillery"[3] and thus allowed Europeans to grow as the most prominent continent, both on land and at sea. Regarding European maritime advancement, the three-masted vessel is worth noting. Not only could this hold the weight of cannons, but it was also able to remain stable whilst firing. By comparison, lighter Chinese and Arabic vessels carried fewer guns and were more vulnerable.[4] According to Kennedy, the development of this long-range ship "heralded a fundamental advance in Europe's place in the world"[5]. With it, "the naval powers of the West were in a position to control oceanic trade routes and to overawe all societies"[6]. The argument is backed by Watson, who feels that by the eighteenth century, European maritime technology had made such significant improvements that no Asian power was able to match the British or the French navies in the Indian Ocean[7]. These arguments point towards the notion that the rise of the West happened due to the superior warfare and maritime abilities of Europeans. Consequently, they seem to show that eurocentrism is not a fallacy but a truth relating to the course of history. The latter is supposedly eurocentric as it was the greatness of European people that allowed them to grow militarily and eventually lead the Western culture to become the most prominent one in the world.

If one persists with the above argument, the superiority in warfare could not have been possible without technological innovations and inventions. Cipolla offers one of the explanations for this. According to the historian, the continent's own "experimental curiosity and imagination"[8] must be credited. From the "twelfth century onward, Western Europe developed an original inventiveness which manifested itself in a rapid crescendo of new ideas"[9]. This eventually led to superior technological innovations. For example, both the mechanical clock and spectacles were European inventions during that period. The historian is also persuasive in his argument that what Europeans didn't

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[3] Ibid, 28
[4] Ibid, 31
[5] Ibid, 32
[6] Ibid, 32
[7] Watson, A. European International Society and its Expansion, 22
[8] Cipolla, C. M. Before the Industrial Revolution, 150
[9] Ibid, 150

invent, they adapted from abroad and improved. Duchesne takes this idea further, explaining that "from the twelfth century onward, [Europe] showed itself to be a great learner"[10]. It must be noted, for example, that the Persian windmill was taken to a more efficient use by reconstructing it with a horizontal axis. Landes agrees, arguing that the late medieval period was constituted by innovation, particularly in agriculture[11]. Improvement in the latter meant prosperity, and this wealth contributed in the rise of the West. Examples include the wheeled plough, which, with "deep-cutting iron share [...] spread across Europe north of the Loire, opened up the rich river valleys [and] turned land reclaimed from forest and sea into fertile fields"[12]. It was in this same period that European agriculture began to shift to a three-field crop rotation system, a significantly more effective way to farm land than the previously existing two-field system. A certain number of inventions and technological innovations certainly did come into existence in Europe, or where taken from abroad and improved by Europeans to maximise productivity and efficiency. This is used to highlight the superiority of the European people and would appear to indicate that Eurocentrism is not a false notion but is indeed a fact about the course of historical events. The West is portrayed as naturally more inventive and creative and as a consequence of this, Europe rose to prominence.

The Eurocentric Argument about Rationalization

The most widely known argument used to depict the historical process as eurocentric, however, regards rationalization. This concerns the belief that Europeans were historically more rational-minded that non-Europeans, leading to their superior nature throughout history. This rational character is believed to be, according to certain historians, the cause for the creation of rational law and economic growth, and the subsequent rise of the West. Chirot feels that rationalization in the western world "goes back to the development of the Roman Republic's law and can be traced through the preservation and modification of that law in the late Roman Empire"[13]. Legal rationalization was what "ultimately led to the creation of capitalist economic

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[10] Duchesne, R. Asia First? 76
[11] Landes, D. The Wealth and Poverty of Nations, 41
[12] Ibid, 41
[13] Chirot, D. The Rise of the West, 187

relations"[14]. Chirot considers this economic rationality to be the reason for the creation property rights. Landes strongly backs this argument. "The very notion of economic development was a Western invention"[15] for "the concept of property rights went back to biblical times and was transformed by Christian teaching"[16] in Europe. This was a significant economic matter as it gave rise to ownership and subsequent trade. Chirot refers to other cultures to explain the superiority of Europeans. "Commercial law was weakly elaborated in China"[17] as equality under the law was not enforced. Indian law was "generally less systemized"[18], whilst in the Islamic world, unlike Europe, no separation between Church and State occurred. This "reduced the possibility of developing objective, practical laws"[19] in a number of sections of society. Chirot actually argues that the economic result of rationality in Europe was the birth of capitalism[20]. This is an obvious eurocentric viewpoint, seemingly demonstrating that Europe grew to its current prominence because, throughout history, Westerners had always been more rational-minded. This was the cause for ultimate economic growth and development. In this sense, eurocentrism appears to be a fundamental fact about the shape of historical events.

The Truth behind 'Rationalization'

This argument regarding rationalization cannot be overemphasized. Both the matters of legal and economic rationalization must be discussed. Firstly, it is necessary to note that arguing for Europe as the only continent with a rationalized legal system is imprecise. Chirot himself recognises that in China "a highly developed legal code was written in the second century B.C., and by the end of the second century A.D. the code, [...] consisted of over 17,000,000 words"[21]. This was considerably impressive, considering that in the tenth and eleventh century, the Chinese legal system was actually "substantially ahead of European law"[22]. Similarly, Islamic law was also highly rationalized. It contained

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[14] Ibid, 187
[15] Landes, D. The Wealth and Poverty of Nations, 32
[16] Ibid, 34
[17] Chirot, D. The Rise of the West, 187
[18] Ibid, 187
[19] Ibid, 187
[20] Ibid, 190
[21] Ibid, 187
[22] Ibid, 187

numerous elements of Roman Imperial law along with its original religious ones[23]. It is possible to see that in reality Europeans were no more talented than other populations in the rest of the world. They did not invent a superior legal system that eventually led to economic growth. I thus argue that it is a misjudgement to consider the development of history as eurocentric. The course of events relating to the creation of a worldwide legal system and a subsequent growth of the economy does not demonstrate any type of superiority amongst Europeans.

Economic development was actually initiated by a number of factors unrelated to Westerners. Kennedy is fair in arguing that the one very important feature of Europe in the sixteenth century was its political fragmentation[24]. The latter was a consequence of Europe's geographical layout. In comparison to the vast Asian fertile lands next to the Yangtze and Yellow Rivers, for example, forests, mountain ranges and different climates between north and south, divide Europe[25]. These diverse climates led to differentiated products. These could be traded, and included agricultural products such as wine or grain, but also wool and timber[26]. This trade continued to expand and increased Europe's wealth. " New centres of wealth like Hansa towns or the Italian cities"[27] were created during the sixteenth century. Kennedy also explains that this, in turn, encouraged the growth of an international banking system, inclusive of bills of exchange and credit. It is therefore possible to notice that "diversity within the European states system mattered enormously"[28]. It was one of the causes for the increase in European wealth and the subsequent rise of the West. This is unrelated to the nature of European people, but is due to geographical circumstances. It is thus possible to see that the historical process does not highlight the superiority of Europeans in terms of wealth accumulation, and hence isn't eurocentric.

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[23] Ibid, 187
[24] Kennedy, P. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, 21
[25] Ibid, 21
[26] Ibid, 21
[27] Ibid, 22
[28] Hall, J.A. Confessions of a Eurocentric, 492

Colonialism

Political fragmentation was, however, only one of the causes that led to Europe's increase in wealth. Blaut offers an even more convincing argument attributing the vast expansion of prosperity to Europe's colonial adventures, considering particularly the discovery of America in 1492[29]. The huge fortune that Europeans obtained in colonial adventures allowed Europe and its population to grow economically and surpass other world cultures[30]. Most of the wealth of the West in the sixteenth century came from the Americas in the form of plantation agriculture but mostly as valuable metals, such as silver and gold[31]. A substantial amount of silver taken from the Americas, in particular, was exchanged in China in return for Asian goods. This increase in trade was what allowed Europe to grow commercially. Europe imported and subsequently re-exported bullion to cover the huge trade deficits and to accumulate capital[32]. It is interesting to note that Latin America "produced roughly 85% of the world's silver between 1500-1800"[33] and that before the opium trade, 90% of that silver was exported to China by Europeans[34]. A more specific example to demonstrate the accumulation of capital through colonialism by Europeans is that 94% of all cargo exported by the Dutch East India Company was in gold bars[35], whilst between 1660 to the early eighteenth century, "precious metals made up [approximately] 87% of VOC imports into Asia"[36]. It is thus evident that Europe's wealth, which contributed in the rise of the West, was not created because of the natural, rationalized mindset of a superior European population. Europe accumulated capital and reduced its trade deficit thanks to the role of its colonies, especially the West Indies and North America. Eurocentrism hence cannot be credited as a fact about the shape of the historical process, especially when considering European economic growth.

I have shown that Europe's commercial growth was not to due to the superiority or economic rationality of the European people but due to the continent's colonies. This

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[29] Blaut, J.M. Eight Eurocentric Historians, 10
[30] Ibid, 10
[31] Ibid, 10
[32] Gunder Frank, A. Re-Orient: Global Economy in the Asian Age, 74
[33] Pomeranz, K. The Great Divergence, 159
[34] Ibid, 159
[35] Gunder Frank, A. Re-Orient: Global Economy in the Asian Age, 74
[36] Ibid, 74

however, leaves one issue out. Why did Europe actually come to conquer and colonise the Americas before any other civilization? I have already offered the eurocentric viewpoint regarding European naval superiority, and this could be used to justify the European colonialist success in America. This is imprecise however. Firstly, it must be noted, as argued by Blaut, that during the late Medieval period "long-distance oceanic voyaging was being undertaken by mercantile-maritime communities everywhere"[37]. Cheng Ho's voyages to Africa and India in the early fifteenth century are famous, for example. Additionally, there are records of an Indian voyage taking place around 1420 towards the Cape of Good Hope and continuing into the Atlantic[38]. It was actually due to a number of favourable factors that Europeans conquered lands across the Atlantic swiftly. Blaut is fair in arguing that one of the main advantages Europeans had, was the location of Europe itself[39]. It was easier to reach America from Spanish and Portuguese ports than from any location in Africa or Asia. As correctly pointed out, East Africa "is roughly 3,000 miles farther away from an American landfall than are the Canary Islands [...] and 5,000 miles farther from any densely populated coast with possibilities for trade"[40]. On top of the location, the sailing conditions favoured European sailors a great deal. When sailing from India to America, "one sails against trade winds"[41]. This is the exact opposite of what Europeans had to deal with, for they were actually helped by trade winds from the Canaries to the Caribbean islands. This wind system was also very familiar to European sailors who had previous experience in voyages to the Azores, the Canaries and Madeira[42]. It was therefore less challenging to tackle the long distance across the Atlantic. It is also worth mentioning, however, that once Europeans arrived in the New World, they found it easier to conquer new lands simply because the local population "succumbed rapidly and massively to Old World diseases"[43] such as smallpox. For example, during the sixteenth century in Mexico, at least 80% of the population died due to illness[44]. It is possible to see that the course of events relating to the discovery of America is anything but eurocentric. Europeans essentially discovered and conquered the Americas because of a number of fortunate factors. These do not

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[37] Blaut, J.M. The Colonizer's Model of the World, 181
[38] Ibid, 181
[39] Ibid, 182
[40] Ibid, 182
[41] Ibid, 182
[42] Blaut, J.M. Eight Eurocentric Historians, 11
[43] Ibid, 12
[44] Ibid, 12

highlight a superior nature possessed by Westerners. Europeans have largely to thank the location of their continent and the diseases they carried across the Atlantic.

Conclusion

It would imprecise to regard the development of historical events as purely Eurocentric. Although it has been argued that the rise of the West was entirely caused by a military capability, a natural interest for technological improvement, and an economic and rational mind-set possessed by Europeans, this is a misjudgement. The Western civilization, together with its people, was neither intellectually superior nor more rational-minded. Europe rose to prominence purely because of a number of factors that were external to the nature of the European people. The rise of the West actually occurred due to the geographical location of Europe and its proximity to the New World, and because of the fragmented nature of the states within Europe. Both factors allowed Europe to grow commercially. Trade developed within Europe and new materials could be imported from the newly conquered colonies. Blaut is correct is his judgement that Europeans grew to prominence "because of their location on the globe, not because they were somehow uniquely advanced, or progressive, or venturesome"[45]. Eurocentrism is thus a fallacy and cannot be described as a fact about the shape of the historical process itself. The latter does not highlight any element of superiority amongst Europeans.

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[45] Blaut, J.M. Eight Eurocentric Historians, 12

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What was Fordism's impact on the global food economy?

(Written for Globalisation and Global Governance)

Lyndsay Burtonshaw

The 'modern' global food economy is characterised by paradoxical 'hunger amidst abundance' (Weis, 2007:12), which is due to a politically-mandated system that guarantees an inequitable distribution of resources (McMichael, 2006:170). With the 1980s redefinition of food security as 'participation in the world market' (McMichael, 2006:174), food became a commodity to be treated as any other within a capitalist framework, to produce a profit. In 1981, the OECD identified that the key pressure on the food economy was the drive to improve efficiency (Lang & Heasman, 2004:155-6), i.e. not to feed the world. Feeding the world is not a corporate agenda, the profit-motive is. Agriculture was becoming fully corporatised and industrialised, and thus unequal. Fordist thinking was an inherent part in this transformation. This essay seeks to explain why Fordism, a system of production that relies on mass consumption of mass produced goods, is inextricable from the inequality, meatification and industrialisation that characterises the global food economy today. This is a Western-centric essay due to context of changes situated in Global North and evidence to suggest that the USA is key to current situation (Friedmann, 1993:33).

Fordism

Corporate agenda has pushed the concept that trade liberalisation will feed the world, which is proven to be categorically false (Madely, 2000), and still pushes the Fordist notion that mass production is a positive aspect of industrialisation. Fordism was born with the idea that the Model T Ford could be mass-produced and thus possessed by many. Once a toy for the elite, cars are now conceived of as consumer-durables available for all who participate in the market. This attitude is translatable to meat. As the food with the highest status, meat is a historical signifier of class and sign of affluence (Lupton, 1996:28). Therefore, meat carries social capital in class relations. Gramsci conceived of Fordism as 'rationalisation and extension of [class] relations' and

through mass-production showing 'the progressive face of capitalism' (Cox, 1987:309-10). Thus, more production of meat can only be a postive thing. This partially explains why agricultural industrialisation has proceeded practically unquestioned with little cohesive international regulation (Friedmann, 1993:33). 'Rising meat consumption is often treated as a normative part of an improving diet' (Weis, 2007:42), and indeed '20th century development projects identify beef with dietary modernity' (McMichael, 2006:179).

Neo-Fordism and the industrial grain-livestock complex

The 'industrial grain-livestock complex' (Weis, 2007:16) is the current state of reduced diversity of crops and animals produced for consumption. It provides a bridge between the decline of Fordism and the Neo-Fordist techniques appropriated for meat production. Neo-Fordism is a revised Fordism, whereby flexibility is integrated into Fordist large-scale production to meet demand for diversity (Cox,1987:330), Friedmann terms this a 'post-Fordist nightmare of 'flexible specialisation' (Friedmann:1993,54). However, this specialisation is a mask of 'commercial pseudo-variety' (Weis, 2007:16), as production is highly standardised. Through industrialisation, agricultural diversity has dwindled to primarily feature monocultures (a colonial legacy) and the livestock 'big three' – pigs, cattle and chickens (McMichael, 2006, Weis, 2007, Friedmann, 1993). It is essential to note that the industrial grain-livestock complex (Weis, 2007:16) must produce an allure of variety because of consumer demand. This points to the need to analyse social forces involved in the global agro-food restructuring. 'Regulation of the food regime both underpinned and reflected changing balances of power' (Friedmann, 1993:31), that is the transferral of power towards giant corporations. Taylorism was a child of Fordism, born of the desire of employer to have utter control over workers and pacing of work (Cox,1987:21) In line with the paradigm of the supremacy of science, this is also key to meatification of diets. Humans exert their control over the natural world (Lupton, 1996:28) using the might of science and scientific management of livestock, as well as workers. The United National Food and Agriculture Organisation worked with a 'reductionist scientific representation of agricultural modernisation' (McMichael,2006:172). It is of course, perfectly economically rational of the capitalist to want to control every aspect of the means of production, in order to exact an increased profit margin. However, systematic violence is inherent in Fordist agro-industrialised

production. Actual violence is applied to animals in terms of mass slaughter in Confined/Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations (CAFOs). Structural violence is applied to small producers as they are coercively dispossessed of control over their work. Domestic policies that support agro-transnational corporations such as the US' Commodity Price Support Programs in turn coerce small farms into relations with agro-food corporations (Friedmann, 1993:33-34). Fordism and Taylorism are inseparable from industrialisation.

Industrialisation

The meatification of diets is inextricable from the meatification of production, massively risen to is 37% of all food production (Weis, 2007:18) This is historically unprecedented, and only made possible with industrialisation of agriculture (Weis, 2007:30) and 'shift from a rural lifestyle to an agribusiness sector with a supply-chain mentality' (Lang & Heasman, 2004:137-8). The industrialisation of agriculture is a 'metabolic rift' as agriculture's natural base is subordinated to 'agro-economic methods of ago-industrialisation' (Friedmann, 1993:177) As the 'concept of farming was transformed by capitalism and industrialisation...industrial techniques [can now] override previous ecological constraints' (Weis, 2007:30) The best, and most terrible example of this is CAFOs. Agricultural means of production, which previously depended on biorhythms, seasonality and nature, were industrialised using Fordist techniques:
'Giant machinery soon began to replace human labour and Fordist thinking was applied to both plant and animal production. Large-scale experimentation was expended on trying to reduce nature's unpredictability'
(Lang & Heasman, 2004:139)

Corporate profits in the agro-food sector depended on restructuring towards Fordist modes of mass production and consumption (Friedmann, 1993:34) Fordism originated in the US, propelled by the 'globalisation project [which] focussed on securing resources to sustain US power and global consumption relations of a minority [elite] class' (McMichael, 2006:170). There are clear class implications when considering the transformation of agriculture from one featuring myriad small farmers, to one dominated by a handful of agro-transnational corporations (McMichael, 2006:170). As the end of feudalism had dispossessed peasants, agricultural industrialisation and liberalisation further dispossessed small farmers and integrated them into the new

transnational-capitalist framework, (McMichael, 2006:175, Weis,2007:16), which brought about concentrated farming and CAFOs.

Confined/Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations (CAFOs

CAFOs are directly comparable to Taylorist regimens of disciplining labour. While the factory totally absorbs the worker's life for the duration of his shift, factory farms make then destroy whole populations of animals. This is present in literature, in Upton Sinclair's *The Jungle* (1906). Packingtown, the meatpacking district of Chicago, is the location of the oppression, abuse and death of reams of animals ushered into slaughterhouses. This is a metaphor for the working class, used and abused through wage labour. Further still is the ubiquitous image of the processed, rotten meat within a shiny tinned exterior, a metaphor for the vile reality underneath the clinical uniformity of mass-produced efficiency (Sinclair,2002) The Fordist factory assembly lines create life as an assembled commodity, shaped for profit slaughter. Weis attributes meatification of diets directly to industrialisation of livestock production, success of the application of the Fordist model is apparent:

> *'warehousing of large populations of animals in crowded, industrial conditions, where their growth and biorythms can be managed and accelerated. Though the export of this model has been relatively recent, on a global scale factory farms are already responsible for 40% of all meat production by volume' (Weis, 2007:19-20)*

As meat has become corporatized and industrialised by CAFOs, the 'turnover time', i.e. how quickly animals can be killed, has risen exponentially (Weis, 2007:19), and 'sentient life has been commodified…lives of individual animals have been dominated to serve human economics and extreme violence has been systematised' (Weis, 2007:40). However, the grain : meat energy conversion is repeatedly proven to be incredibly inefficient at 17:1 (Weis, 2007:41). This suggests mass livestock production is ideological, in keeping with the paradigm of industrialisation and mass production = development. Lupton suggests that the concept of meat as being 'good for you' in an inherently patriarchal discourse (Lupton, 1996:11). One could perceive industrialised livestock production as a patriarchal discourse declaring that capitalism is 'good for you'.

But as previously discussed, ago-industrialisation is not good for small farmers. It creates an inherently unequal system of resource-allocation. Developed and industrialising countries are producing a type of global dietary convergence, which is

segregating new, globalised classes of the world's elite and the world's poor (Weis, 2007:45). The globalisation project (McMichael, 2006) is a continuation of the 17th-18th century agricultural revolution which endeavoured to produce not more staple crops for all, but 'more and cheaper meat and wool for those who could afford them' (Strange, 1994:70). Small farmers are incorporated as employees into the dominating few agro-transnational corporations (Weis, 2007:21), and US government subsidies crowd out small poor farmers from their own domestic market. This demonstrates the politics behind food production. Permitted by the government, 'industrial and bioengineered agricultures systematically displace small famers' (McMichael, 2006:170), which results in a loss of bargaining power when the concept of agriculture is commodified and seen as "food" (Friedmann, 1993:55)

Conclusion

Without Fordism and Neo-Fordist applications onto modes of production within the agricultural sector, the industrialisation of meat production and hence meatification of diets would have been impossible. Increased meat production and CAFOs are presented as a logical step in agro-industrialisation, therefore as economically rational, 'decreed by the almighty law of competitiveness' (Weis, 2007:45) and 'outside the realm of debate or moral concern' (Weis, 2007:39).

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What are the primary causes of ethnic conflict?

(Written for Politics of Governance: International Institutions and Issues)

Rianna Gargiulo

The proliferation of cases of ethnic conflict globally is an issue which has and continues to perplex theorists of both politics and international relations for as long as the literature has existed. The lack of consensus over what causes ethnic conflict is based on the fact that it cannot simply be understood by a rational choice approach; after all, if a peaceful resolution of inter-ethnic tensions produces the most beneficial results for those involved, why do ethnic conflicts exist? My approach to this problem emanates from a synthesis of the primary factors which tend to appear recurrently in the existing literature. Firstly, I will examine the merits of the broadly 'primordial' approach in opposition to the 'institutions' based approach, looking also at the shortcomings of attempting to use these theories in isolation. What is the most important conclusion to make of all, perhaps, is the specific interaction of these factors in shaping and constraining the possibility of ethnic conflicts to occur in any given political environment. Namely, values and emotions are moulded by the system from which they derive, and equally the political system which emerges over time is a result of cultural understandings of history. Using either approach singularly cannot offer all the answers to such a complex situation; the institutional and state infrastructure merely incentivises and gives opportunities to groups who perhaps already have a psychological propensity for instilled emotions of rivalry or hatred of other ethnic groups. Using a range of case studies, I will illustrate how institutions and emotions, as well as rationality and the actions of political elites, all play a part in fuelling ethnic conflict.

It is first, however, essential to explain what is actually meant by the term itself. Our understanding of what ethnic conflict is will undoubtedly affect which approach we find the most persuasive; most evidently, our understanding of which 'resources' are most worth fighting for, either a more nuanced understanding of values and a 'struggle for

group worth and collective merit' (Horowitz, 1985: 146) in contrast to a more financial and self-preserving rational choice understanding. 'Ethnic conflict' can be most simply defined as hostility based along ethnic lines and which can often lead to violent war and genocide. Some claim that it is possible to identify certain 'prerequisites' which appear time and time again, such as 'an ethnic affinity problem, a history of ethnic domination by at least one group over the other, negative ethnic stereotypes, and emotion-laden symbolic issues in dispute.' (Kaufmen, 1996: 169). In many instances, ethnic conflict may also be quite unmistakeably a result of conflicting issues of ethnic nationalism and self-determination which existing states thus far have failed to control (Meadwell, 1999: 267). Different types of conflict can also be distinguished as being either 'elite-led' or 'mass-led'; in other words, a result of either political or grassroots pressures. The rest of the essay will now proceed in examining the existing approaches in order to calculate which have been the most recurrent or dominating factors in generating ethnic conflict.

It is most logical to begin with the primordial approach as, if we grant it significance, it is arguably the first factor to fuel conflict as an inbuilt, historical and even perhaps inherent element of the collective social psyche of societies or ethnic groups. It effectively suggests that present-day individual emotions are based on a collective memory and history that has been shaped by the nature of social competition amongst and between certain groups. Stereotypes emerge based on comparisons of behavioural qualities, distinctive traits and inter-group comparisons between groups, which are sometimes more accurate and other times more unfairly fictionalised. The idea behind this is that competition for instrumental resources as well as the struggle for group worth creates an increasingly hostile climate susceptible to violence and war. Its proponents argue that it adequately explains the 'conflict potential' of ethnicity, by claiming that 'ethnic communities use historical memories of past grievances as a point of reference' (Blagojevic, 2009: 6). This is arguably evident in African states whereby divisions have emerged between 'backward' and 'advanced' groups (Horowitz, 1985: 166) on the basis of certain attributes, thus provoking rivalry and direct group comparison, evaluation and analysis. Furthermore, the context of colonialism saw these long held group evaluations exacerbated in favour of one group over another, for example in the case of the Igbo and Efik tribes in Nigeria; those most closely affiliated to more 'modern' Western values and customs used that fact to extend their claim for group dominance (*ibid*: 166).

This element of competition and rivalry is also relevant in light of rational choice theories of ethnic conflict. Varshney's article focuses predominantly on individual choices, and is very persuasive in that he factors in the Weberian distinction between pure 'instrumental' rationality, and the more nuanced 'value' rationality. Whereas the former uses the assumption of individuals as utility-maximising and therefore making decisions solely based on a cost-benefit analysis, the latter challenges this by claiming that values such as 'dignity, self-respect and recognition' (Varshney, 2003: 85) are more influential in forming individual and collective objectives. Ultimately, this understanding of rationality is incredibly more sophisticated than the more simplistic version, as it allows for the discrepancy between 'rational goals and high costs' (*ibid*: 95), as well as accounting for one of the recurrent criticisms of rational choice theory in that values are relevant to a specific culture rather than attempting to underpin goals as a straightforward and uncompromising notion of economic, self-interest. 'Resources', when approached more broadly, could include rights and material security (Blagojevic, 2009: 11), hence why, whereas the argument for instrumental rationality appears to be incompatible with most conflicts which have manifested themselves within sub-Saharan Africa for example, the value rationality approach happens to give some form of adequate explanation for this. Similarly, the situation between Israel and Palestine appears to display some of these traits too, with Palestinian hostility towards Israel a continually salient topic despite the indubitable negative impact continued conflict has on the Palestinian economy. Since the re-emergence of violent conflict in 2000, unemployment and 'deep poverty' in the West Bank and Gaza Strip has increased so drastically that Palestine's economy may well have suffered longer-term, irreparable structural damage (Geldenhuys, 2009: 163). In this sense, it is possible to understand why some goals, such as national liberation, racial equality and ethnic self-respect, may be deemed so precious that high costs, quite common in movements of resistance, are not sufficient to deter a dogged pursuit of such an objective.

The theories so far have explored the ideas that conflicts derive from the consequences of human choices, which are either based on 'emotion' or 'cost-benefit calculations', but are grounded on people's motivations regardless (Cordell & Wolff, 2009: 44). I would argue, however, that it is vital to factor in the institutional importance of political structures and systems in moulding the relationships between ethnic groups and also by granting them with a varying amount of opportunity to access and utilise

these means. The importance of the political climate as a whole on influencing violent sentiment can be understood by comparing the Bangladesh Liberation War with the constant peaceful situation that exists in Quebec. Although the individual emotional concerns of ethnic, cultural or linguistic divisions exist similarly in both areas, one has emerged as a 'zone of war' and the other a 'zone of peace' as a result of institutional differences (Meadwell, 1999: 267-268). The situation in Bangladesh occurred as the conditions within the region seemed to be in a permanent war-like state, and hostility grew amongst ethnic groups as a result of the inability of autocrats to effectively supply security, thus encouraging violent warfare, ethnic hatred and fuelling demands for independence of East Pakistan. This scenario exemplifies the theory that when state structures are weak, nationalism is likely to be based on ethnic distinctions rather than equal rights and privileges, and furthermore that conflict is more likely to occur within countries which have inadequate constitutional safeguards for minority rights (Brown, 2010: 96-98). Conversely, the political system innate to Canada has meant that conflicts are reduced despite the struggle for rights and resources being as prevalent now as ever. The mere fact that it is a democracy limits opportunities for either elite-led or mass-led warfare, and the consociational power structure in place encourages compromise rather than fostering competition or rivalry. The infrastructure generally allows national differences and makes it easier to politicise them, whilst giving activists the opportunity to mobilise support for the self-determination and rights of Quebec (Meadwell, 1999: 270), and this articulation prevents ethnic conflict from ensuing despite the emotional concerns of those who feel threatened by Canada. In light of this evidence, it would be an acceptable assumption to make that those countries 'whose political institutions politicise cultural identity are more vulnerable to cultural conflict than countries whose political institutions promote social integration of diverse cultural groups' (Blagojevic, 2009: 8).

More importantly, the way these institutional factors interact with existing historical emotions in the primordial sense is certainly not a result of unintended consequences. Structures and institutions are shaped by the political elites who organise themselves within them, and these are not unwilling to utilise their capacity to propagate and propound false histories based along ethnic ties. Blagojevic refers to this as the 'political entrepreneurs approach', and explains that political elites are able to manipulate ethnic polarisation through their use of rhetoric and fear (*ibid*: 10).

Nonetheless, she also reinforces the idea of interdependence between these variables; she argues that 'politicians who use ethnicity to their advantage can successfully operate only within those institutional arrangements that support/allow such practice or are unable to prevent it' (*ibid*: 10). Other factors involved in encouraging conflict are the very external structures and surroundings in which conflicts exist. Colonisation and decolonisation are very important when assessing the impact of structural change on conflict in most African countries. The fault of colonial administrations is evident both in the construction and democratisation of their colonies; in forming colonies, no respect was paid to indigenous political systems, geography or the nature of ethnic frontiers which had already existed prior to external intervention. Furthermore, by promoting some groups at the expense of others, this also had 'the effect of sharpening the contrasts and evaluations that emerged with group disparities', (Horowitz, 1985: 160). Following decolonisation, the doctrine of 'uti possidetis' (Jackson, 1993: 144), which became the dominant discourse, merely reinforced the conflicting and unsuitable boundaries which had caused problems up to now. The emergence of violence in the post-communist era following the collapse of the Soviet Union also displays a similar route to that of decolonisation; the regime change from one which had created ethnic divisions but suppressed conflict saw violence ensue as a direct result of democratisation. In both the postcolonial and post-communist scenarios therefore, democratisation did not serve the same purpose as existing 'democracy', which is thought to promote inter-ethnic co-operation, as a move towards majority democratic rule can be interpreted by minority ethnic groups as a severe threat of domination.

In conclusion, although it is evidently impossible to identify a set pattern for the causes of ethnic conflict, and equally no single factor can provide a comprehensive explanation, there is undoubtedly a recurring theme in that emotions cause competition and value-based rational decision-making, and these can be exploited to turn into violence within a certain type of political system. In other words, as Cordell & Wolff put it, ethnic conflicts always arise as a result of certain 'motives, means and opportunities' (Cordell & Wolff, 2009: 44) in conjunction with one another, existing in different circumstances, across different structures and with the influence of different actors. These issues tend to be accurately portrayed by African countries within the context of colonisation; in Rwanda for example, the genocide, despite its somewhat 'local' causes, is grounded on tensions between Hutus and Tutsis as a result of its 'colonial past and

mismanagement of independence' (*ibid*: 51-52). The synthesis of emotions and institutions as propagated by domestic and external actors and influences can also be found in the Igbo and Yoruba conflicts; the divisions arose from the divergent political systems, but these purely reflected the social and emotional differences inbuilt within their idiosyncratic tribal cultures. Overall, understanding the interactions between emotional collective histories and institutional infrastructures, and their subsequent manipulation by politicians and overarching substructures, is the closest we can get to achieving a substantive understanding of the causes of ethnic conflict. This will provide us with the opportunity to look comparatively across cultures and take further precautions in preventing conflicts in the future.

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Is the Westminster model still relevant to understanding British politics?

(Written for Explanatory Concepts in Political Science)

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The Westminster model of democracy originated as a quintessential British archetype that has become the classic exemplar of Majoritarian governance – it provides one side of the 'dichotomous contrast' with consensus democracy (Flinders, 2005, p.67). Walter Bagehot (1867 [2001] p.23) was authoritative in his advocacy of the Westminster style of politics – he praised the strong central core of the executive that assured the 'mutual confidence of the electors' via accountability. The Westminster model proliferated around the world as many commonwealth and British colonial countries adopted and implemented the method of government. Arend Lijphart (1999, p.3) stated a number of required prerequisites a country must adhere to in order to be considered a Westminster proponent. The conditions are split into two dimensions – 'executive-parties' and 'Federal-unity.' Under these headings includes a strong majority government in a two party system elected through a majoritarian electoral process. It also involves unitary, centralised government operating in a unicameral system with constitutional flexibility and an integrated central bank.

However, Britain as the embodiment of the Westminster model has diminished in recent decades - the reforms of New Labour after Tony Blair's victory in the 1997 election playing a decisive role in the widening disparity between British politics and majoritarian governance by 'redraw(ing) the architecture of the British constitution' (Matthews, 2011, p.490). The intention is to analyse the impact of devolution on Britain's 'unitary' government, whilst also assessing the dominance of Britain's cabinet in light of the increase of multi-party governance. The rationale for choosing these points as the principal focus of the essay is because they cover both the executive-parties and federal-unitary dimensions stipulated by Lijphart (1999, p.3) and provide

insight into the foremost conditions required to be an adherent of the Westminster model. The analysis will be furthered with cross-reference to Flinders' (2005, p.61) scale of reform in which amendments are rated as cosmetic, moderate or fundamental. Alongside this will be offered alternative models that are more suitable for explaining the British political system – namely the Differentiated Polity Model (DPM) and the Asymmetric Power Model (APM), which stipulates an increasingly challenged, power sharing, network based governance with asymmetric power relations and an extension in the segmentation of the executive with ever more necessary negotiation (Marsh, 2008, p.251). The result will demonstrate that Britain has made a shift away from traditional majoritarian democracy through the process of constitutional reform and other external influences.

The increased autonomy of assemblies in Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and the Greater London Authority (GLA) raises questions as to how much Britain has deviated from Lijphart's sixth distinction in which Westminster government is described as being 'unitary and centralised' (Lijphart, 2005, p.17). We live in the decades immediately succeeding the 1997 referendums in which Wales and Scotland voted yes for devolved assemblies. (Mitchell, 2002, p.36). Britain appears to have violated Lijphart's distinction, which would result in the majoritarian alignment of the country being transposed. This could be proved even more accurate when one considers the reality of a yes vote on the impending referendum on Scottish independence due in September 2014. The increase in the capabilities of devolved assemblies juxtaposes Britain's traditionally majoritarian stance. Ron Davies (1999, p.15), former secretary of state for Wales, concluded that 'the devolution process is enabling us to make our own decisions' – this is the very essence of the devolutionary paradigm. The erosion of centralised governance and a shift away from Westminster politics opposes the nature of majoritarian democracy. Bevir and Rhodes (2003, p.54) provide a concise critique of British devolution by stating that it leads to the 'hollowing out' of the state.

Flinders (2011, p.18) notes that there has been a substantial 'reallocation of power within the British polity' as a result of power sharing with regional assemblies. However, there are limited extents to which this power can be practiced. Where Scotland has received tax varying powers and the ability to pass primary legislation

since 1997, the Welsh assembly only secured secondary legislative power in 2011 and is devoid of tax-raising capabilities (Deacon, 2012, p.128). The curtailing of regional capacity downplays any hyperbolic assertions that Britain is a federal state. In reality, although there has been a 'major adjustment to the constitutional infrastructure,' most of the power in Britain is still held by the core executive in Westminster - allowing certain restricted devolved authority. Devolution could also be viewed as an inevitable pragmatic evolution from the already pre-existing 'regional tier of administration', which can 'lift the burden from Westminster' (Deacon, 2012, p.4).

It would be useful to note the rejection of Labour's 'your region, your choice' referendum in the North East in 2004, where 77.9% voted against the proposition (Norton, 2014, p.238). The aforementioned provides insight into the future of British devolution, presenting an increasingly skeptical outlook. – Britain as a federal state does not seem to be impending. This aligns Britain much closer to the Asymmetric Power Model with 'mixed modes of governance, with hierarchy (the) main mode' (Marsh, 2008, p.255). It becomes apparent that devolution in Britain constitutes what Flinders (2005, p.62) calls moderate level reform, which involves a 'shift (in the) balance of power' as a result of the 'centralisation of state power (being) gradually reversed' (Harling, 2001, p.212). The reason it is merely moderate is because some of this authority is superficial simply with added 'democratic accountability' to pre-existing powers (Deacon, 2012, p.4) – the ESRC[46] expressed the 'minimal change from the predevolution arrangement' (Deacon, 2012, p.244), not achieving the 'far reaching' reform criteria stipulated by Flinders in order to achieve fundamental reform (Flinders, 2005, p.62). This result situates Britain as being closer to the Asymmetric Power model with 'power-dependence, involving asymmetric exchange relations' (Marsh, 2008, p.255). Devolution produces an outcome that 'stops short […] of the transition into a federal system' but leaves Britain as a 'quasi-federal state' (Flinders, 2011, p.21).

The capricious nature of politics is fully realised when it is noted that the Scottish parliamentary election of 2011 returned the SNP with a clear majority using the AMS system 'designed to create greater consensuality' (Matthews, 2011, p.490), whereas, the

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[46] The Economic and Social Research Council's Research Programme on Devolution and Constitutional Change

UK general election, ironically, created a coalition under a majoritarian system. Coalition government is a paradigm far removed from majoritarian politics. 'Concentration of power in one-party and bare-majority cabinet(s)' alongside a 'two-party system' couple together to form two of Lijphart's (1999, p.10-13) key provisos for a Westminster model of government. It becomes clear that absence of the latter produces the opposite of the former; therefore, they will be addressed as one. Lijphart (1999, p.10) specifies that a strong majoritarian Westminster style government be built around a majority cabinet extracted from one single party to produce the most 'powerful organ of British government.' The Conservative – Liberal Democrat coalition breached that rule for the first time in post-war Britain.

The ramification of the current coalition is a rapid increase in intra-cabinet compromise and negotiation. The fact that David Cameron had to appoint 20% of ministers from the Liberal Democrats and only 63% of the policies originated from the Conservatives manifesto (Matthews, 2011, p.497-8) denotes a significant amount of bargaining and conceding of policy; this indicates that Cameron is 'unusually constrained by his relationship with Nick Clegg and the Liberal Democrats' (Bennister & Heffernan, 2012, p.778). Weak multi-party governance contravenes Lijphart's assertions to such an extent that the repercussions are that Britain has repositioned itself quite a distance from the classic Westminster model that previously prevailed – the shift is clear to see. David Laws (2010, p.263) provides a primary insider account of the coalition negotiations where the Liberal Democrats treated the conservatives with 'mutual suspicion and hostility' - this style of government is vastly disassociated from the Westminster model and, instead, leans much closer to consensus democracy with signs of the Differentiated Polity Model where there is 'evolving' power-dependence (Marsh, 2008, p.255). The instant corollary to the recent switch towards a traditionally consensus based multi-party governance would be; is it plausible that this theme is likely to continue into the future and become commonplace in the British political system?

The answer is posited as follows; due to the sharp proliferation in multi-party democracy and the increase in smaller peripheral parties who continually gain seats in the House of Commons, it seems inevitable that coalition governments will become a

leitmotif in future British politics. Paun (2011, p.443) suggests that the reason why fringe parties are rapidly gaining support and, indeed, seats in the lower house is because they represent minority issues. The Green party and UKIP are prime examples of parties who emerged as a direct response to certain issues that the electorate is increasingly aware of; therefore, they gain support via the ballot. The 1951 election saw the two main parties achieve 97% of the vote – this has diminished to 65% in 2010 (Paun, 2011, p.443). The rapid shift away from the Westminster model is pronounced further with increased political awareness and distrust of politicians by the general public, which will surely 'weaken voter identification with the established parties' and further the disparity between a two party system and Britain (Paun, 2011, p.447).

Jordan and Cairney (2013, p.243) assert that in the future 'coalition government (could) be repeated regularly,' this certainly does seem to point towards the Westminster model not being relevant to understanding British politics. But, perhaps, the Westminster model is not relevant to understanding any form of modern politics? Dunleavy (2011) notes that there are, in fact, 'no large 'Westminster model' countries left in the world,' everywhere that previously governed under the majoritarian pretense now has a hung parliament. The fact is that this theme is unlikely to revert back – the future seems to indicate more consensus-based democracy as the 'world as a whole is changing towards more complex and multi-party politics' (Dunleavy, 2011). On the issues of a 'two-party system' and 'a single majority government' it is apparent that the change that has taken place, voluntarily or otherwise, is towards the 'fundamental' end of Flinders' (2005, p.61) reform spectrum – there is a 'stark departure' from the previous arrangement.

Increase in multi-party politics, therefore, fuels coalition style governments that may, in turn, influence the role of 'Cabinet dominance,' which is Lijphart's (1999, p.12) second stipulation as essential for an adherent to the Westminster model. Majoritarian advocacy means that a cabinet must be 'clearly dominant vis-à-vis Parliament' – in theory the House of Commons can vote a cabinet out of office but, 'in reality, the relationship is reversed' (Lijphart, 1999, p.12). Cabinet should also have special royal 'prerogative powers' that ensure their authority (Paun, p.452). However, Marsh (2008, p.256) argues that all power and jurisdiction must be 'negotiated by networks' as in the

Asymmetric Power Model, rather than assertion by the core executive – this would seem to imply a restriction of cabinet dominance. This point carries more weight when Matthews (2011, p.499-500) notes that in the current coalition arrangement 'watchdog powers' are given to Junior ministers 'with the capacity to keep their coalition partners in check.' The power to halt decisions depletes cabinet dominance due to 'new veto points (that) stand in direct contrast to Westminster system of government.' Once again, the British political system seems to transgress the outlines of the Westminster model with a lack of Cabinet dominance, instead, achieving a 'statues quo bias' (Blais *et al*, 2010, p.829). The decrease of cabinet authority points towards the Asymmetric Power Model being more relevant where there is a strong but 'increasingly challenged' government (Marsh, 2008, p.255).

The pre-eminence of cabinet is challenged further by taking a glance at the wider political implications of Britain being a member state of the European Union - far from cabinet superiority is the consideration that all member states must 'comply with EU law' (Dobson & Weale, 2003, p.156). Power and control is therefore shared with the EU, this is highlighted by Britain's involvement in the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), which restricts Britain from acting entirely autonomously on some national issues. 'Intergovernmental relations' are much more closely aligned to the Asymmetric Power Model (Marsh, 2008, p.255). Indeed, the emergence of multi-level governance, indicative of the EU, has led to a 'system of continuous negotiation among nested governments at several territorial tiers – supranational, national, regional and local' (Gary Marks 1993, p.392) - Negotiation is one of the prominent facets of the APM. The certitude that the 'incorporation of the ECHR does amount to a shift in power' implies that British cabinet dominance is a far cry from that which is required to be a Westminster model exemplar. The violation of the cabinet dominance prerequisite sits on the moderate level of Flinders' (2010, p.61) scale and positions Britain as much more of an Asymmetric Power Model exponent than a Westminster example.

Lijphart's (1984, p.9) earlier book on majoritarian democracy included a section headed 'British deviations from the Westminster model' - this demonstrates that complete correlation to the model was never envisaged. Indeed, Jordan & Cairney (2013, p.243) argue that Lijphart never positioned Britain as a purely Westminster Model

paragon. In reality, a model is a base or framework on which a system can be built or analysed, and more importantly, amended. What seems to be apparent is that Britain has indeed digressed from a number of the qualifying caveats required for a Westminster model government to such an extent that it is no longer totally relevant to understanding British politics. The British constitutional amendments that have been discussed tend to sit somewhere between moderate and fundamental on Flinders (2005, p.61) scale of reform. This leaves Britain adhering much more vividly to the Asymmetric Power Model, which has become the model that is most relevant to understanding British politics. This is due to the emphasis Marsh (2008, 255) places on networks, rather than solitary core executive power, and also intergovernmental power dependence relationships that are prevalent in devolved Britain. This culminates with the consignment of the Westminster model to the history books, which is transposed by the Asymmetric Power Model - allowed to prevail as an alternative, modernised, evolutionary, pragmatic political approach.

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To what extent can the media contribute to agenda-setting?

(Written for Comparative Public Policy)

Elsa Nightingale

"There is another sector of the media, the elite media, sometimes called the agenda-setting media because they are the ones with the big resources, they set the framework in which everyone else operates."

(Noam Chomsky, linguist and author – 1997)

"Very often the media are led by government officials' opinion rather than vice versa"

(Michael Howlett, academic and author – 1997)

Introduction

Equal political voice and a democratically responsive government are sacred ideals in the United States and Britain alike (Jacobs et al, 2004). Why then are certain demands recognized by government, while others remain at the sideline of official policy debate (Howlett et al, 2009)? More importantly perhaps, how is it that these particular interests gain the recognition of government? This is the central theme of this essay; the part played by the mainstream media in setting government agendas. I am going to explore this issue in the context of two countries; the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US). I will focus primarily on the media's ability to report on policy issues, in particular the power of the media to steer public attention toward certain perceived societal problems (Chomsky, 1997). In doing so I will show that the media does contribute to setting potential agendas for government by providing the public with important policy information - however this power is constrained by public interest and attention (Soroka et al, 2012). Additionally I will explore the subject of media framing, in particular the notion that framing grants the media a certain amount of power to set agendas because it puts pressure on government (Kinder and Herzog, 1993: 363). In recognising the counter argument that it is in fact governments who can influence a

media frame; I will disband the view that media framing has a direct influence on the setting of agendas (Kingdon, 1984; Hess 1984). I hope to illuminate the constraints faced by the media in order to show that the media possess only a limited role in agenda-setting, if any role at all.

Claim one: As a vital source of policy information the media are able to steer public attention, making them a powerful policy player.

The mainstream media serves as a vital source of information for citizens and policy makers alike (Yanovitzky, 2002: 424). The media can facilitate greater political transparency by providing the general public with important political information (Balkin, 1998; Siebert et al, 1956: 610). Equally policy makers and hopeful politicians use the mass media to gage a better understanding of how their policies are being received (Willis et al, 2013). In this way the media play a crucial part in politics as a whole because they act as a link between the citizens and the government (Siebert et al, 1956: 610). Consequently issues covered by the mainstream media can be perceived as being those that most merit public attention. In another sense the media are allowed, within their rights, to publicise issues that they believe the government is not paying enough attention to (The Constitution, First Amendment; Common Law). For this reason it could be argued that they are instrumental to the agenda-setting process (Dearing and Rogers, 1996). Howlett et al (2009) illustrates this power by referring to the media as "gate-keepers" - with the power to define what is and is not worth reporting (Howlett, 2009: 74). In line with the outside initiation model identified by Cobb et al (1976) this is because the media help to expand issues that are identified by non-governmental groups. Once an issue has been placed into the public domain it is possible for these issues to reach the institutional agenda - particularly if there has been a period of inertia (little policy development) (Cobb et al, 1976). It could even be argued that investigative journalists can themselves work as non-governmental actors because they have the ability to seek out vital information or evidence of wrongdoing. The Parliamentary expenses scandal of 2007/2008 is a prime example of this because of the important part played by Telegraph Media Group in exposing the extent of expenses misuse (Telegraph, 2009). This furthers the view that the media is also an important 'watchdog' over Parliament – scrutinising and safeguarding the right to freedom of information (Ward,

2005). In accordance with this theory this is one way that issues can move from the systematic public agenda to the institutional formal agenda – through mass publicity of the problem.

How can this be evidenced in practice? The role of the media in highlighting the plight of modern day slaves appears on the surface to be a fine example (Arbuthnott, 2013; Hill, 2010). Alongside other media co-operations, The Guardian ran a series of articles demanding that more action be taken by the Government to tackle the issue of human trafficking and slave labour in Britain (Howard, 2013). This was followed by a formal recognition of the issue by Home Secretary Teresa May and the discussion of a new anti-slavery bill (Conservatives, 2013; Symonds, 2013). This would appear to confirm the notion that a "direct, symbolic link exists between the media and policy agendas" (Dearing and Rogers, 1996: 74). This is because, in this instance, media publicity of an issue was followed by government response. Indeed a similar case can be observed during the 2001 scandal involving the US energy firm Enron. Once the extent of the company's debt became clear in 2002 (publicized to a large extent by the mainstream media) the issue of corporate reform became a policy priority of the Bush Administration. This would appear to support the claim that media attention can aid the setting of government agendas by steering public attention to an issue (Soroka et al, 2012).

In practice however this power is limited and depends on the content of the story. While the media has the freedom to place policy information into the public domain, in order to do so the stories must capture the interest of the public (Howlett et al, 2009; Soroka, 2002). If not, or they cannot be conveyed in a concise enough manner, they stand little chance of being published in the first place (Howlett et al, 2009:74). Modern slavery and hidden corporate debt are both emotive, eye-catching stories. According to Soroka's (2002) analysis of agenda setting in Canada, these stories are of interest to the public because of their sensationalist nature. As a result you could argue that stories of this kind do not reflect the traditional relationship between the media and policy officials. Instead these examples merely represent the small number of issues that transcend the public-institutional divide because of their significance and the degree of public outcry. There exists a great deal of policy information that is not published by the mainstream

media because it cannot be conveyed easily or it is of less interest to the general public (Soroka et al, 2012). This is supported by a number of studies suggesting that the complexity of issues limits the media effects on both the public and on policymakers (Zucker, 1978; Yagade and Dozier, 1990). It would appear therefore that media institutions do not merely place policy information into the public domain; instead they are restricted to focus on simple and attention-grabbing stories if, particularly in the case of the tabloids, they wish to sell their papers.

The attention span of the general public is inextricably linked to this discussion. According to the 'issue-attention-cycle' developed by Downs (1972), issues can capture public attention but this attention is momentary. If you combine this with the theory of a 'news cycle' (whereby public attention to an issue is quickly redirected through the emergence of a new story) it would appear that the 'shelf-life' of a policy story is short. Indeed Fan (1998) claims that a single news story has the average half-life of a day (Yanovitzky, 2002: 428). This is supported by McComas and Shanahan (1999) where media attention in the New York Times and the Washington Post on the subject of global warming increased in the early stages of discussion, however the coverage quickly eroded as newer stories emerged (Soroka et al, 2012). It is possible therefore to argue that the media are also constrained by public interest (Soroka et al, 2012). Clearly it is as much about fighting for public attention as it is fighting for government attention (Hilgartner & Bosk, 1988). It is also important therefore to consider the number of different issues competing for public attention (Jones and Baumgartner, 1993). If a story emerges at a time when media attention is focused elsewhere, for example following a terrorist attack or natural disaster, the possibility of engaging public attention lessens (Jones and Baumgartner, 1993). Thus it could be argued that a story must emerge at the right time and under the right conditions in order to have any potential impact on the policy process. This highlights the influence that certain factors can have on agenda-setting and creating policy windows. These factors include; the severity of problem, the proximity of the issue to public interest, the presence of novelty, the representation of different actors or the presence of clear causality (Rochefort and Cobb: 1995). If this is the case the media do not so much set government agendas, instead they reflect what is of interest to the general public and interest does not translate into public concern or policy-maker concern.

<u>Claim 2: The ability to frame an issue grants the media power over policy-makers.</u>

The argument that the media are powerful in the agenda setting process is made all the more relevant by media framing. Framing is a process whereby the media, a news organization for example, can define or construct a political issue or controversy (Nelson et al 1997 – media framing in civil liberties). This means that the media manipulates the style, tone and content of an article in order to present an issue in a particular way (Nelson et al, 1997). The issue of immigration is a fine example of this. Crudely speaking, right-wing British tabloid newspapers typically adopt an anti-immigrant stance (Media Matters, 2012). As a result it is common to find the use of emotive, hyperbolic terms like "invasion" and "wave" to describe the movement of foreign migrants (Hitchens, 2013; Hickley, 2006). These headlines have strong connotations of the public being over-whelmed by immigration, and thus present immigration as a negative thing that should be opposed. When you contrast this style with a more left-wing newspaper it becomes clear that no paper is entirely objective, it presents information in a particular way for a desired effect (The Guardian, 2013). Media framing is potentially dangerous for policy-makers and politicians alike because they can lose the ability to define a problem, suggest who is responsible or prescribe solutions (Dearing & Rogers, 1996). As noted by Knill et al (2009: 98) problem definition is subject to many different interpretations. Presumably therefore the power of the media to define a problem is a constraint on policy-makers themselves. According to Dearing and Rogers (1996) the ability to frame is so extreme that the media can become "freewheeling exercises in pure manipulation" (Kinder and Herzog, 1993: 363) (also see, Sniderman and Theriault 1999, 31-32). If this is the case, framing grants the media power to highlight potential government agendas – discourse that it appears the policy-makers have little or no control over.

The reality is however quite different. First and foremost in the British context the government's agendas are laid out in the program for Government and in the Queen's Speech - much like the state of union address given by the US President (The Coalition, 2010; Gov UK, 2013; The White House, 2013). It is the case therefore that the government's agenda has already been codified (Hencke, 2009). This is supported by the

claim that governments like to follow policy routines and are thus unlikely to yield to non-governmental demands (Edwards and Wood, 1999; Kingdon, 1984; HilGartner and Bosk, 1988). As noted by Howlett et al (2009) "policy-makers are for the most part intelligent and resourceful individuals who understand their own interests and have their own ideas about appropriate or feasible policy outcomes" (Howlett et al, 2009: 74). It would appear therefore that policy makers have a great deal of expertise and experience in the policy field, making them less likely to follow media prescriptions. When it comes to informing government officials on areas of policy; think-tanks and interest groups are often utilised because of their specialist knowledge (Howlett et al, 2009: 58-59). This furthers the view that government officials do not rely on the media for information or a positive frame, instead they must merely stay on top of media policy discourse. Additionally policy-makers also have their own resources which allow them to counteract media influence (Howlett et al, 2009: 74). As a result it is unusual for the press to dramatically change the course of policy action. Indeed this has proved the case for the proposal for High Speed Rail in Britain. The program received a considerable degree of press criticism in its' initial stage, yet the Government has not made a decision to U-turn on the policy (BBC, 2013; BBC 2013). This would seem to suggest that press criticism does not always mean that agendas are influenced.

It has been also been argued that it is policy makers who can influence the media and not the other way around (Howlett et al, 1997: 74). Hess (1984) and Kingdon (1984) are among the supporters of this notion claiming that policy officials utilise the media in order to promote their own policies (Hess, 1984; Kingdon 1984). This throws great speculation over the degree to which media framing has an impact on government agendas. As noted by Lee (2001) it is not uncommon for public officials to provide the media with selective information in order to 'bolster their case'. According to Howlett et al (1997:75) "very often the media are led by government officials' opinion rather than vice versa". This is typified by the academic Michael Spiess in the following title; "from watch-dog to lap-dog" (Spiess, 2013). While the media may have the power to frame an issue, the information they are basing their argument on may have been selected for a particular purpose by policy-makers. This mode of agenda-setting is similar to the Mobilization Model recognised by Cobb et al in 1976. According to this model policy officials attempt to expand an issue from the formal, institutional agenda into the public,

systematic agenda (Cobb et al, 1976). This is typically achieved through meetings and public relations campaigns to promote policy (Howlett et al, 2009: 102). This mode of agenda setting assigns policy-makers and policy officials with a great deal of power over both the public and the media. Clearly this contrast with the outside initiation model discussed earlier. If this is truly the case then it appears that the media are far less powerful than they are perceived to be (Chomsky, 1997).

Of course one cannot deny that policy makers must pay attention to the media, in fact this is vital if they are to stay on top of a policy-issue in the media (Linsky, 1986). According to empirical study legislators in the US spend an average of 1.8 hours each day reading print based media (Petty & Cacioppo,1986; Bennett & Yanovitzky, 2000). However it does appear that policy makers are more likely to follow media prescriptions of responsibility or solutions to a problem if they already fit into their own belief structure (Gusfield, 1981; Roessler, 1999). This would seem to show that it is in fact the government who hold the most amount of power in the agenda-setting process. Clearly the media possess no formal policy power. They do not have the right to block or delay bills – this is the right of the House of Lords and Parliament. While the freedom of press grants them the right to sway public opinion, or attempt to, those who have formal power are the government - and to some extent the judiciary. Consequently the media possess no formalized ability to directly set government agendas.

Conclusion

Having examined media framing and the role of the media in publishing policy-related information I have been able to draw the following conclusions. Firstly the media are an important source of policy information for citizens (Soroka, 2001). In this way the media are able to somewhat direct public focus to a particular policy issue. However, and most importantly, this ability is constrained by the necessity to sustain public interest and attention – something that has proved to be brief and easily re-directed (Kingdon, 1995). Secondly while the media have the ability to frame an issue, empirical studies suggest that the government also has power to influence media framing (Hess 1984; Kingdon 1984). By providing the media with selective information or using the media to promote government policy it is clear that the media can be both a powerful actor and a

tool utilised by government (Howlett, 2009; Spiess 2013). Based on the evidence presented in this essay the role of the media in the agenda setting process seems to be a limited one, constrained to a certain degree by two parties; the government and the public interest. Media institutions must appeal to the public in order to be of interest and thus remain financially afloat. Equally however the media can also be influenced by government in the ways outlined above (Kingdon, 1984). Consequently it would appear therefore that the media's power to set government agendas certainly exists; however the media are not commanding and 'all powerful' in the way that some would like to think (Chomsky, 1997).

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Is Minority nationalism a problem capable of solution or a perennial Issue that must be managed?

(Written for European Politics)

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Don Maclever rightly states in *The Politics of Multinational States* that 'most states' are 'ethnically heterogeneous and the claims of minorities are a perennial issue and a recurrent source of conflict' (MacIver, 1999, p. 28). However, Keating takes the view that a 'Europe of regions' (Anwen, 2008, p. 2) is the solution, whereas others believe that the only thing to do is 'recognise these natural differences, divide up the real estate and provide different peoples with their own homeland (Anwen, 2008, p. 6)' as was done in Czechoslovakia. Although, a range of proposed solutions including these ones have been somewhat effective in managing the issue of minority nationalism, in the states I am discussing tension is still prevalent showing the problem to be alive. The notion of minority nationalism being solvable is problematic because nationalists are motivated by a range of interlinking factors and their demands are incredibly volatile; any proposed solution would have to be flexible and multi-faceted. It is for this reason management is a more realistic approach, as it allows states to focus on the most pressing desires. In this essay, I will be focusing on the major demands that fuel minority nationalism which are economic autonomy or equity, a reform of the system of government and Linguistic autonomy. My countries of focus have all responded to the challenges through Federalism (Belgium), Devolution (UK) and the creation of Autonomous Communities (Spain), and I aim to show that these measures have not eradicated conflict, thus showing that nationalism is a perennial issue.

The responsiveness of minority nationalists' economic demands to the economic cycle and their underlying financial dependence on the state illustrates the difficulty in finding a solution for minority nationalism and the need for continual management. The difficulty in solving economic demands partially comes from an innately awkward relationship between minorities and the central government; whereby groups

simultaneously depend on the government for financial support (MacIver, 1999, p. 22) but despise it for its continual failure to aid them in the most effective way. Most 'ethno-territorial groups' demand ' greater control over their own affairs' believing that they can apply their own resources more efficiently, for the sake of furthering their own interests   (Ibid.). All three nations Scotland, Flanders and Catalonia perceive their majority groups as being a burden, stifling their economic potential; which has motivated them to desire greater economic independence. Catalonia gives 15bn euros more every year to Madrid than it gets back for funding services and public projects' (Burridge, 2012), Paluzie argues 'even if it had to pay for its own military and diplomatic corps, the financial benefit to Catalonia would be equivalent to seven per cent of its GDP' (Ortiz, 2012). Many Catalans question the benefit of being part of Spain, with some blaming the asymmetric financial system, which allows the Basque country to collect their own taxes, and pay a quota of that back to the government. Flanders too perceives itself as 'unable to adopt those policies necessary to maintain economic competitiveness' 'due to the effects such policies would have on the differing economy of the Wallonia'. The burden of subsidies of over 10bn Euros per year, which are likely to increase (Mnookin & Verbeke, 2009, p. 152) also contributes to demands for economic independence and increases hostility between the Flemish and the Walloon. Unlike Flanders, Scotland has not traditionally seen their economic problems in terms of oppression, mainly because of the benefit they gain from UK subsidies (Ishiyama & Marijke , 1998, p. 149). However, the discovery of 'oil wealth' (North Sea Oil), bolstered Scottish national shown by the election of 1974 that saw the SNP gain 30.4% (BBC, N.D)of the Scottish popular vote, facilitated by the slogan 'its Scotland's oil 'and led to the increasing belief that Scotland has begun to believe that it 'could make a viable independent state within the EU' (Bale, 2008, p. 42).

Seemingly the solution of independence would be enough to solve the economic grievances of each country, or full economic autonomy, however both these options are not viable. Belgium is plagued with limited regionalism, so communities without a 'clearly identifiable territorial basis' are passed over because they're harder to give fiscal autonomy to; this could lead to accusations of favouritism which would perpetuate conflict and nationalism, essentially worsening the problem of minority nationalism. In addition to this, many regions are dependent on federal grants or shared tax revenues for 2/3 expenditure (Swenden & Jans, 2006, p. 885), therefore many of these

communities could not afford to be financially independent. Despite its position as one of the wealthiest nations in Spain, Catalonia t requested €5bn (£3.97bn) from the central government rescue fund to manage its debt' (Traynore & Tremlett, 2012). This is also the case with Scotland who is reported to spend £11bn more than it contributes to the union (The Economist, 2012) as well as this it had to rely on the British government to aid them with the bailout of RBS and HBOS, whose balance sheet at its peak was reported to be 13 times Scottish GDP (Wilson, 2012). If Scotland were to become independent it would possess a debt only marginally smaller than its GDP (Ibid.), which some people estimate will make Scots up to '£500 worse off', and in the face of that debt only 21% of Scottish respondents said they were will to pay that price for independence (Fraser, 2012). This shows the volatility of nationalist demands and the underlying dependence of minority groups on their central government, this makes finding a solution to the problem of minority nationalism in an economic context difficult. If the nation decides to stay within the union nationalism will be a perennial issue as governments have to do what's best for the population as a whole, which might not always be beneficial to the minority group; continual management is the best option as it is flexible and so can respond to economic challenges.

The linguistic element of the minority nationalist problem will continue to be a perennial issue in a multinational state because one language will always dominate, much to the frustration of the other groups.. Adopting a model closer to Lipjhardt's theory of segmental autonomy (Lijphart, 1995) whereby you have communities with differing cultural identities, is thought to be a good method of dealing with minority nationalism because it means that 'internal differences do not pose a threat to the state… because they are incorporated into the state's culture and considered a part of it' (Guibernau, 2000, p. 35). This however does not eliminate minority as some nationalists seek to 'reverse the absorption into one … whole', refusing to accept the notion of a secondary or altered identity (Ishiyama & Marijke , 1998, p. 134). Allowing the usage of minority languages within Civic and public life has somewhat succeeded in raising their profile, undoing much of the propaganda that portrayed languages like Flemish 'as the language of the uneducated masses' (Ishiyama & Marijke , 1998, p. 111); thereby lessening the friction between the groups and the central government. This however has merely distorted the problem of minority nationalism not solved it, by creating divisions

within the group. This can be seen in Wales, where those who are bilingual English-welsh speakers have access to the best public sector jobs in comparison with English speakers; some people have interpreted this as racial discrimination leading to the 1985 Jones v. Gwynedd County Council case (May, 2000, p. 108). Many welsh people are unhappy about the compulsion to learn Welsh one respondent even commenting he felt that Welsh was unfairly 'elevated in front of other languages just because it happens to be the language of this country (Ibid, p. 121). The questioning of the 'primacy of the official language of the state, whilst English and its benefits go unquestioned' (Ibid.); illustrates that through devolution the problem of linguistic based minority nationalism has not been solved, and has merely exacerbated the problem.

Additionally, the system of linguistic autonomy is often asymmetrical with the government institutionalising and protection the dominion of one language. This can be seen in Spain, through the privilege of the Castilians who have an in built advantage and access to most public sector jobs because their language is the 'official language of the state' (Costa, 2003) and the only one that the constitution stipulates that people have a 'duty to know' (Senado, N.D). Any attempts to obligate other languages are deemed unconstitutional (Costa, 2003, p. 416), illustrating the legal framework's failure to protect minority languages (Ibid. p. 428) and its part in increasing resentment and ethnic tension. The recognition of Flemish as an official language has not eliminated conflict in Belgium as some Flemish people have 'homogenous and assimilationist attitudes towards speakers of other languages on Flemish territory, see their struggle as trying to regain their rights over the whole territory that was stolen from them by the French-speaking bourgeoisie (Blommaert, 1996, p. 239). So the recognition of their language changes nothing for them, and the pronouncement of Brussels as a bilingual region in Flemish territory is an outrage; Flemish people see federalism, multiculturalism and bilingualism as counterproductive to their struggle, and through government materials aim to undermine the prominence of French by promoting English as a second language through publishing its materials in both English and Flemish (Blommaert, 1996). Devolution and Federalism don't solve the problem of minority nationalism because they allow for insularity, which heightens tensions because it reinvigorates the importance of language to cultural identity and so makes minority groups less likely to compromise in that respect, and more protective of their

language; therefore the government has to manage this respect of nationalism to quell conflict.

Minority nationalism can also be considered a perennial issue because attempts to placate minority demands for a reformed government through devolution fail, and instead fuel tensions between the groups. Even in its conception devolution can be a failed solution, which doesn't directly address the demands of minorities; in all three countries the state is to different degrees seen as an 'alien force', with little right to legislate for the minority groups, because it amassed its power through colonialism (Guibernau, 2000, p. 30). Therefore attempts to satisfy minority groups with this mind set through increasing their autonomy are not effective because the groups believe they naturally have the right to this power and that the central government is wrongly withholding it from them, so go on to demand more power. The central government is also seen as out of touch or giving preferential treatment to certain groups, this sentiment was extremely palatable for Scottish nationals in Thatcherite Britain, socioeconomic needs were neglected by Parliament (Ishiyama & Marijke , 1998, p. 133). Despite not voting Conservative they were continually re-elected and then went on to pursue policies that were seemingly at odds with the Scottish interests , for example the government's passivity in the erosion of heavy industry, and decision to implement Poll tax a year earlier in Scotland than the rest of the UK; many began to wonder 'What's the use? It doesn't matter how we vote.' (Brown. 1998, p. 216). The introduction of the Scottish Assembly, which has both legislative powers and the ability to declare domestic policy has revitalised nationalism, leading to calls for increased levels of power in regards to taxation and spending. In both Spain and Belgium devolution and Federalism have has communities 'had the unintended consequence of promoting strong rivalry' among the different minority groups (Colomer, 1998, p. 47), instead of creating a greater desire to compromise. In Spain, this is the result of an asymmetric system which sees the Basques and Catalans gaining more autonomy than the other minority groups, whereas in Flanders the federal model has accentuated the 'bipolarity' and lessened the pressures for mutually acceptable compromises (Swenden & Jans, 2006, p. 890), due to its separatist nature. In the future it may be the 'institutional device' 'that will foster the velvet divorce', due to countless due unwillingness of politicians to compromise in Federal government.

In conclusion, minority nationalism is an issue without a solution that needs continual management. Although devolution and federalisation aid with quelling the frustrations of minority groups, it has the unintended consequence of bolstering minority nationalism and encouraging separatism, which is counter-productive. . Many people think the solution to the nationalist problem lies in European integration; however I think the end result would the same as what occurs in a national context; minorities being dominated by bigger, more economically powerful groups. Essentially as MacIver stated, there will always be conflict in multinational states, as one group will always dominate, and people will unwilling to compromise their own cultural values; in some respects the solution is to continually manage nationalism due to the evolving needs of the nationalist groups.

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To what extent are socialist and feminist aspirations complementary?

(Written for Death of Socialism?)

James Erskine

A critical perspective on leftist or socialist feminism would counter the movement's logic of progression by equating that there are now a fresh set of issues that radical and socialist-feminist movements have not yet begun to address. Though feminist socialist analysis has somewhat receded in the face of the challenges presented by neo-liberalism, I argue that a leftist view is still very much needed. More than a re-articulation of socialism is required however, and there needs to be a clearer distinction made between being a socialist who is a woman, and being a feminist socialist (Eisenstein, 1999, p. 197). Power, as presented by both radical feminist, and socialists who are women, is dichotomous; it is either gendered or economically determined. I share the view of Epstein that the job of feminist socialism is to address the individualist concerns that liberalism was able to begin to deal with in the 1970s.

In this paper I aim to address these concerns through an analysis of structural blockades within capitalist patriarchy. It is important to recollect that patriarchy existed before capitalism, and will arguably continue to exist in a socialist society if structures of patriarchy are not properly addressed. That said, the tenets of socialism; equality, egalitarianism, common ownership and so on, do lend themselves better to feminist aspirations than a capitalist system that is based on advantage and difference. Eisenstein choses the phrase "capitalist patriarchy," as I will at times. She emphasizes the mutual dependence between the existing class structure of capitalism and "male supremacy" and also combines radical feminism with Marxism (Eisenstein, 1999, p. 196). My approach is similarly dialectic. I use feminist socialism as the thesis, taking structural analysis as the antithesis and suggest the synthesis lies in a structural understanding of socialist feminism.

The problem for radical and leftists views of feminism is the dichotomous way in which power is dealt with. A woman's positions are defined either by her sex, her place in the family, *or* they are defined by her relationship to capital. "Even though women are implicated in both sides of these activities, 'woman' is dealt with as though she were not" (Eisenstein, 1999, p. 197). One concentrates on reproduction and social relations, domestic versus wage labour, the family, and the other concentrates on material conditions, the sexual division of labour and class relations. Socialist feminism seeks to bridge the dichotomy by analyzing both the patriarchal roots and class origins of female oppression in which patriarchy and capitalism are not simply autonomous systems, nor are they the same thing; they are a part of a symbiotic relationship. The equation of capitalist exploitation and patriarchal oppression; that wage slavery is the same as domestic slavery, is problematic as Eisenstein suggests, by "Marx's own categories of productive labour as wage labour, domestic slaves are 'exploited' in the same way as wage slaves" (1999, p. 204). For this to be the case, women would have to be paid for domestic labour, which they are not.

Socialist feminists believe that the root of female oppression lies structurally and ideologically in both a woman's class position and her position within patriarchy (Eisenstein, 1999)(Epstein, 1980)(MacKinnon, 1982) as neither can be understood when isolated from the other. The ideological component of this, which I discuss later in depth, refers to myths and stereotypes, which partly emanate from institutions and hegemony. We can see that patriarchy preceded industrial capitalism, and arguably the myths and stereotypes around gender roles are fortified and perpetuated by capitalist patriarchy. As we see though, both ideological and structural components still exist before and after capitalism, inferring that patriarchy is cross-cultural and not simply a mechanism of capitalism that is solely related to class structures.

The feminist's socialist position is in its own way problematic. Attempts to create a synthesis between Marxism and feminism and to reconcile the two do not tend to generate a coherent argument in which both exploitation and oppression are given non-preferential treatment. As MacKinnon points out, those with feminist sympathies urge left wing groups to look at women's issues and left groups tend to ask feminist groups to look at class relations to capital, ending in a view that encompasses issues that are

central to feminism, but that is essentially an unchanged Marxian analysis of capitalism.(1982, pp. 524-524). Women become a caste or a stratum of civil society. The level of freedom granted to women is often considered to be a measure of emancipatory progress in society, but women are but a subsection by such definitions, categorized as either "women workers" or "the family" (1982, p. 525). Thus women are singularly confined to a category. Moreover feminist socialist arguments sometimes turn to biological divisions in which bodily difference accounts for the natural subordinate socializing role of maternity. If such an analysis is of merit, it still fails to deal with female oppression; rather, it accepts it as a given and appeals to narrow feminist aspirations. In my opinion the centrality of class and reproduction, if not considered with other aspects of female oppression, are actually self-defeating as I will go on to explore.

If one takes the view that equality is equivalent to having equal choice, liberalism has to some extent alleviated some of the contradictions that opposed feminist aspiration. This is not to say that capitalist patriarchy does not exist, the contrary is true, but it is to say that the notion that the bodily difference between men and women does not wholly account for the subordination of women, or that such a claim is a simplification. More and more women have a choice. For example as middle classes have grown, women have increasingly been able to combine a career and a family, rather than choose between the two. It is not quite as MacKinnon claimed in 1982, that when woman's labour or militancy suits the needs of emergency, she is all of a sudden man's equal "only to regress when the urgency recedes" (p. 523). There are, particularly in the West, more opportunities for woman to reject the gendered roles that socialist feminism equates to class, capital and the sexual division of labour. More women choose not to have children and in many countries men are able to take paternity leave, to an extent reversing gendered family roles.

The contradictions still exist however, but in a different sense. Women can still be confined to marriage or partnership if such a choice is to be made. In these cases, if she wishes to have children, her ability to make choices after the act of child birth is contingent on either her relationship to the father or her relationship to capital—being able to afford private care for her children, or having a partner to stay at home.

Nevertheless, women are now in the workplace, and it is increasingly the challenges that they face in public—at work for example, that are voiced as feminist concerns. Sampson challenges structural blockades in work in education saying "The structural barriers can be seen in the cultivation of young male teachers in appropriate administrative and organizational tasks while in the first five years of teaching, many women concentrate on child centered tasks" (1983, p. 52). In this way, she claims, authority becomes associated with masculinity not just to teachers but also more profoundly to children (Ibid). Since 1983 the situation for women seeking professional advancement in education has improved, but there is still a considerable disparity and slower progression through the ranks (Coleman, 2007).

Here it is appropriate to introduce a third dimension to the relationship between capitalist patriarchy and socialist theories of feminism. In the next section of my analysis I look at structural arguments that are related to capitalism, and also to arguments that transcend the study of the family, the sexual division of labour or class, and that look more closely at the link between the private and the public oppression of women, the way in which women are perceived as a class at work. I look at structural arguments from Bourdieu and *The Habitus* (a set of structuring dispositions) and how feminism has adapted Bourdieu's ideas, before looking at Gramcian ideas of hegemony in feminism.

Bourdieu's Habitus defines a set of 'structuring dispositions', which the individual brings to day-to-day-life. These structuring dispositions incline the individual to behave in certain ways that are often taken for granted as natural or human. Such dispositions affect cognizance, attitudes and practice, which are perceived to be "regular" without being coordinated by any rule (Bourdieu, 1995, p. 59).

Bourdieu never specifically referred to such practices in relation to gender in society, but there have been many feminists that have taken his concept of the habitus and applied it to the structural patriarchy in capitalist society at a sociological level. Such theories explain how gendered roles, as articulated by socialist feminism, are reproduced in public life (McCall, 1992) (Skeggs, 1997) (Moi, 1991). Moi elaborates on Bourdieu's *Sociology of Culture* by drawing on/extending the habitus to show how and why male power appears to be legitimate in society (1991, pp. 1030-1031). Bourdieu is

heavily influenced by Marx, as is Moi, who posits that gender and class, rather than occupying separate fields, occupy each other. This is, so far, in line with the dialectical synthesis employed by feminist socialists. Bourdieu though, can be used for an analysis of the patriarchal construction of class and gender. Rather than simply viewing the ways in which women are oppressed in an almost inevitable way by relationships to capital and men, such theories as Moi's, see such oppressions as socially constructed and intertwined with each other and with the mechanisms of capitalism.

So then we can look at education and ask the still relevant question, why, as Sampson asserted in 1983, do women in education still stay in basic teaching roles for years after men begin to climb the administrative ladder (1983, p. 52)? I argue that institutions like education are gendered and have a propensity to assign the gendered roles that are laid out by feminist socialists outside of the home and into the work place, in this instance assuming that women are best suited to looking after children and men are better suited to positions of power. As described earlier, this perpetuates such structures of thought, as children learn that women are subservient to men. So we can see that archaic family dynamics continue to be reproduced in the workplace.

McCall cites the work of Sandra Harding and Joan Scott in her analysis of such relations, who proposed to divide gender relations into the three categories of 1) gender symbolism—referring to durable cultural expression of gender difference; and the persistence of hegemonic binary oppositions in core gender identity, even if such dualisms are often illusive/exclusive/contradictory. 2) Gender identity, referring to the constitutive role of gender in the construction of institutions. Feminist research is often focused on household division of labour, sex roles and so on. 3) Gender identity, the multiple and contradictory experiences of women and men which do not necessarily conform to hegemonic images of gender symbolism (1992, pp. 837-838).

McCall shows that such categories are helpful, but that the important task is to understand the interrelationships among/between these dimensions in order to explain gender inequality (1992, pp. 837-838). For socialism to be complimentary to feminist values it must not only be adapted to understand woman's relationship with men at

home but also gender symbolism, gender organization, gender identity, all of which are marked by class, race and sexual distinctions.

McCall uses the example of an office secretary. Gender symbolism in this case, she says, is exemplified by the stereotype of "blond bombshell" or "motherly drudge." Systematic gendered organization is exemplified by her position as a secretary, a job that is not considered to have much potential for upwards mobility, and in which her class identity is subject to the class of her employers much as in a family she has traditionally been subject to fathers or husbands. Subjective identity is shown in that she is expected either to have chosen the job as a career or she has taken it for a summer job between years at college, as is the stereotype. This introduces a whole new field of feminist analysis which I would argue socialist feminism has not tackled fully, but that is closely related to not simply gender, but also class and capitalism. Two crucial components of Bourdieu's conceptual apparatus, capital and habitus, speak to recurrent features of gender relations: "The persistence of nearly universal and binary gender stratification accompanied by varieties and multiplicities of gendered identity in practice" (McCall, 1992, p. 839). If socialism embodies feminism, it must embody an analysis of such aspects of female subordination, as they are still pertinent in today's societies.

Another perhaps better-known insight into structural phenomena which is heavily influenced by Marxist and socialist thought is that of Gramsci in his analysis of hegemony. Both habitus and hegemony are attentive to relationships between structure and agency and both have interests in cultural reproduction and show ways in which such reproductions are entwined within capitalism. Whereas with Bourdieu we can focus on the micro level of female subordination, Gramsci can give more general theories about the imposition of hegemony. As Gottfried distinguishes, Bourdieu constructs a sociology of culture in which he keeps separate the fields of economic, political and educational fields, arguing each are different institutions, each with their own habitus (1998, p. 452). Issues of class and gender are explicit in education because they specialize in the mal-distribution of symbolic capital, which correlates with physical capital (ibid).

Gramsci, like Bourdieu, did not explicitly address feminist concerns but has formed a basal underpinning for structural understandings of leftist feminism (Connel, 1987) (Acker, 1989)(Cockburn, 1991). As Hall states "Gramsci does not give us the tools with which to solve the puzzle, but the means with which to ask the right kinds of questions" (1991, p. 116). The word hegemony is used throughout political/social thinking in many traditions but the Gramcian use is taken to mean "...an historical process in which one picture of the world is systematically preferred over others, usually through practical routines" (Giltin, 1980, p. 257).

Heidi Gottfried cites one of the most compelling uses of Gramscian hegemony in feminist literature as that of Cynthia Cockburn in her historical materialist approach (1991). Cockburn refers to the way in which fathers maintain extra-juridical rights to and over women. This extends to a broader "male rights" through what she calls a "brotherhood of men under capitalism." Willis invokes the notion of the "hegemony of commonsense"(1977, p. 162), in which "lads," as working class boys/young men are colloquially known in parts of the UK, draw on ideologically produced cultural stereotypes. Young men form dichotomies of manual versus mental labour—masculine versus feminine labour, in which they enact the commonsense view of the world as to what male labour is and what a woman's labour is. If this is true of men, then the same may be true of women in reverse. Whilst it is perceived to be common sense that the division of labour is segregated along gendered lines there is an ideological dislocation in which gendered lines of division become "human nature" (ibid). It is easy to see how the "hegemony of common sense" changes as it crosses class lines as men's roles shift from "blue collar" to "white collar," but still, there appears to be hegemonic notions of woman's roles that transcends class differentiation. Women, and female characteristics - the maternal, the domestic, the caring, are still viewed frequently as a secondary, supportive, dependent. Therefore, it cannot be the case that the disintegration of the class system alone will facilitate the end of patriarchy and male domination.

I have posited that radical feminism and socialism are, on issues of feminism, too simplistic to articulate the concerns and oppressions of women, that they are too dichotomous in the sense that they focus either on class relations or sexual relations, and in this way are also reductionist. The most obvious discernible problem of feminist

socialism is that in such an analysis, women tend to become a caste or a subsection of a class. They are categorized by sex, by class and by race and reduced to their maternal function. Within the workforce, gendered roles are assigned, perpetuating structures of thought that women are subservient to men, so the family dynamic is reproduced in the public sphere. The three categories asserted by Sandra Harding and Joan Scott; gender symbolism, gender identity and gender construction must be adopted by a socialist theory if feminist aspirations and concerns are to be upheld and if its central tenets of egalitarianism and equality are to be attained but this in itself is not enough. What is required is recognition that class, race and sexual distinctions continue to mark these categories. My concluding argument, which I believe to be symbolic of problems faced by feminist socialism, is with reference to Gramsci's hegemony. I use the concept of "hegemonic common" sense to show that roles in society are defined by ideological stereotypes that become so strong that they come to be perceived as native wit, which in turn creates an ideological dislocation. The 'common sense' roles vary greatly for men according to class, race and so on, but for women they can remain much the same regardless of her class—she continues to fight the default categorizations of the maternal, the sex-object, the subordinate, "a bombshell or a drudge." It is these structures and concomitant restructuring that needs to be addressed by socialism if it is to be compatible with or complimentary to feminist values and aspirations.

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<u>'The decline of liberalism was inevitable in twentieth-century Britain.'
How far do you agree with this statement?</u>

(Written for British Political History)

<u>LaTisha Gordon</u>

The decline of liberalism during twentieth-century Britain is a widely contested topic, and can be associated with the downfall of the Liberal Party and rise of Labour. This essay shall discuss how, why and to what extent liberalism deteriorated and whether or not this decline was inevitable. Firstly, we need to distinguish between the downfall of liberalism as an ideology and the collapse of the Liberal Party. I would argue that liberalism itself did not decline to such a great extent during twentieth-century Britain, but instead took a different form, adapting itself to changes within society.

Nevertheless, several different arguments have been advanced to explain the cause behind this deterioration. These justifications can be divided into two schools of thought: "Inevitablist" and "accidentalist" (Thompson J. A., 1990, p. 66), and can be thought of in terms of structure, contingency, agency and institutions.

To begin with, let us look at structure. This line of argument focuses on class and the cultural shift in society as the main cause behind the downfall of liberalism. Advanced by the inevitablists such as Dangerfield and Hutchison, this view argues that "long-term social and economic changes" marked the rise of class politics before 1914 (Thompson J. A., 1990, p. 66), thus leading to the decline of liberalism. Throughout the nineteenth century, liberalism played a major part in British politics, reaching its peak in Gladstone's "first and greatest government", 1868-74(Dangerfield, 1966, p. 9). During this period, the Liberal Party was ideologically based around the core principles of classical liberalism; laissez-faire economics, free trade and minimal government. However, at the turn of the century, politics became increasing divided along class lines, and liberalism found itself stuck "in the nature of things" (Thompson J. A., 1990, p. 67). Some have argued that because of this, the decline of liberalism was simply inevitable. Dangerfield, for instance argues that after the success of Gladstone's government, liberalism "had entered a period of slow decline… its leaders had no answers to the

increasingly complex problems of industrial society, no fundamental appeal to the growing working-class electorate." (Dangerfield, 1966, p. 9). As well as this, the style of political participation changed with an increase in noisy, violent protests such the Suffragette movement and Irish nationalists conflicting against the old ways of politics. Therefore, from Dangerfield's point of view, there was simply no room for liberalism in this new 'modern' Britain. In this sense, the decline of liberalism was inevitable. However, Dangerfield's argument that the decline of liberalism caused the downfall of the Liberal Party is not completely convincing given that liberalism continues to survive despite the collapse of the Liberal Party.

Nevertheless, the rise of trade unionism and the expansion of industrial unrest after 1910 meant that supporting Labour was a 'natural development'(Lawrence & Taylor, 1997, p. 112). This therefore indicates that the growth in the working-class electorate gave rise to the gradual transfer of political power from the small ruling class to the "mass of the workers"(Hutchison, 1951, p. 14), causing a shift in society away from liberalism towards socialism.

Hutchison takes Dangerfield's argument further, describing the period from the late nineteenth century to the electoral victory of the Labour Party in 1945 as a "Revolution in Slow Motion" which bought about the "transformation of an individualistic economic system into one broadly socialist" (Hutchison, 1951, p. 14). Although Hutchison advances an essentially Marxist analysis on the decline of liberalism, he was writing in 1949, a time when Labour was at its peak and the Liberal Party fortunes were at their lowest(Thompson J. A., 1990, p. 68). It seemed as though Britain would continue to search for "broadly socialist solutions" to the problems it faced(Hutchison, 1951, pp. 270-271). Therefore, as political allegiance became more influenced by class self-awareness, the Liberals felt they could make no claim on the commitment of any class(McKibbin, The Evolution of the Labour Party 1910-1924, 1974, p. 244), and so, in this sense, the decline of liberalism was inevitable. Thus, it was "socialism that would inspire the progressive forces of the twentieth century as individualism inspired those of the nineteenth" (Thompson J. A., 1990, p. 67).

On the other hand, the accidentalist theory implies contingency is to blame. This argument suggests that events, such as World War I, led to the decline in liberalism. In his book *'Lancashire and the New Liberalism'*, Clarke challenged the inevitablist approach. He believed that "war upset the fragile balance of forces within the

party…painfully evident after 1914"(Thompson J. A., 1990, p. 69). Clarke denied the arrival of class voting was incompatible with the ongoing victory of the Liberal Party and instead argues that the Liberals' radical policies had established them as the "natural party of the working-class by 1914" (Lawrence & Taylor, 1997, pp. 107-108).

Furthermore, the First World War can be said to have caused the destruction of the Liberal Party as a radical, successful and independent force(Lawrence & Taylor, 1997, p. 108). Winston Churchill himself had said "war is fatal to Liberalism"(Thompson J. A., 1990, p. 69). And so it was. Like Clarke, Wilson believed a "liberal wartime administration was almost a contradiction in terms" (Thompson J. A., 1990, p. 69). In his book "*The Downfall of the Liberal Party*", Wilson used the analogy of an individual with symptoms of illness (Ireland, the Suffragettes) who had been run over by a bus (WWI) to describe the Liberal Party. Indeed, this suggests that the impact of the First World War caused the fragmentation of the Liberal Party.

However, it is arguable that all three major political parties suffered from the impact of the War and the "distortions of political life occasioned by coalition government" (Searle, 2001, p. 136). For example, the Conservative Party was divided between the 'Westerners' and 'Easterners' (those who wanted to concentrate the fighting on the Western front and those who favoured operations elsewhere) (Searle, 2001, p. 136).

Nevertheless, the war accelerated social changes, creating an environment that favoured Labour and encouraged socialism. From the accidentalist point of view, 1914 was the beginning of the end for liberalism (Thompson J. A., 1990, p. 71). Besides, even if World War I had not created a "fatal schism" among the Liberals, it is doubtful whether they could have remained a major force on the grounds that the British electoral system has never been kind to third parties(Hutchison, 1951, p. 137). Therefore, from this perspective, the decline of liberalism was not inevitable.

As well as this, the accidentalist analysis favours agency as the other contributing factor to the downfall of liberalism. Agency focuses on party strategy and the decisions of the Liberal Party leaders. The late nineteenth century saw the formation of a 'new' kind of liberalism, which Clarke called progressivism. Whereas classical liberalism had been mostly concerned with freeing people from the state, for example through free trade, the New Liberalism saw the need to free people from poverty and deprivation through government intervention. By the early twentieth century, liberalism was

gradually moving towards the left and seen as "intellectually better equipped than any other ideological force to handle the pressing social problems that had at last secured the political limelight" (Thompson J. A., 1990, p. 71). As a result, the Liberal Party's ideology of social reform was much more sustainable than socialism. This was evident in 1906 under Asquith and Lloyd George as the Liberal Party began to focus on social responsibility, with an emphasis on state intervention in social and economic policy (Thompson J. A., 1990, p. 73), by means of progressive taxation.

In addition to this, Lloyd George's coalition government saw the Liberal Party, which was characterised by a viable non-conformist culture, combine the middle class with leaders of the labour movement(McKibbin, Edwardian Equipoise and the First World War, 2010, p. 2) to form the 'Progressive Alliance', which, by 1914, had come to the forefront of Edwardian politics. So what went wrong?

Contrary to Lloyd George's belief that the Labour Party was not necessary as long as the "Liberal Party did its duty" (Thompson J. A., 1990, p. 73), it can be argued that the Liberals could only govern with the support of Labour and Irish nationalists (McKibbin, Edwardian Equipoise and the First World War, 2010, p. 3). Furthermore, following the creation of the Irish Free State, support from the Irish members ceased to exist, therefore contributing to the Liberal decline. In this way, it can be said that the Edwardian Liberal Party simply delayed its own demise by "striking a tactical alliance with the very group destined to secure its ultimate destruction"(Lawrence & Taylor, 1997, p. 82). As well as this, the "progressive bent" of the New Liberalism led to a significant social transformation of the party, driving "men of wealth" into the Conservative Party(Thompson J. A., 1990, p. 74), consequently reducing numbers within the Liberal Party.

Nevertheless, it can be said that the Asquith and Lloyd George Liberal governments were perhaps not abandoning liberalism, but simply "providing an alternative version that suited the prevailing circumstances"(Searle, 2001, p. 136). Therefore, although this shift led to a decline in classical (or nineteenth century) liberalism and created new opportunities for the Labour Party, I would argue that the growth in social liberalism indicates that the liberal ideology itself did not decline during twentieth century Britain. Despite this, it does appear as though this shift within liberalism was indeed inevitable.

The final argument centres on political institutions, specifically the effect of the electoral system. The inevitablists argue that the impact of Britain's single plurality electoral system, First Past the Post (FPTP), assisted the decline of the Liberal Party. Opportunities for Labour were created due to limited enthusiasm for the Liberal Party's national programme, and as a result, Labour's new ability to outpoll the Liberals prevented them from establishing a substantial parliamentary base(Lawrence & Taylor, 1997, pp. 112-113). First Past the Post is essentially a two-party system, and so from the inevitablist point of view, the rise of Labour meant that the Liberals were 'squeezed out' and thus suffered the third party penalty. In 1935, Labour's national vote was higher than in any other previous election, whilst the Liberals were no longer serious opponents as they had been in the 1920s(Lawrence & Taylor, 1997, p. 124).

However, did this mean the end of liberalism? It can be argued that despite the Liberals being marginalised due to the rise of Labour, liberalism did not decline. Instead, liberal values were adopted by other parties. This has been evident through the policies put forward by previous Labour and Conservative governments. For instance, Attlee's Labour government of 1945-51 exhibited social liberal values through Keynesian economics. Similarly, Thatcher's Conservative government of the 1980s advanced neo-classical economics such as privatisation, which draws on classical liberal theory.

In contrast to the inevitablist belief that political institutions aided the collapse of the Liberals, the accidentalists point out that the affiliation with trade unions and the transfer of Liberal MPs to Labour, increased the Labour Party's parliamentary representation (Thompson J. A., 1990, p. 72).

Nonetheless, the Representation of the People Act 1918 could have prevented, to some extent, the Liberals' electoral decline, by changing the voting system from FPTP to AV, allowing third and minority parties a larger share of the vote. However, this section of the Act was later dropped.

To summarise, the accidentalists argue the decline of liberalism was not inevitable and that contingency and agency are largely to blame. The inevitablists, on the other hand, argue structure and political institutions contributed to what they believe to be the unavoidable deterioration of liberalism and the Liberal Party.

Though the decline of liberalism in twentieth century Britain is a highly disputed subject, I disagree with the statement above on the basis that liberalism did not decline to such a great extent. Instead, liberalism seeped into other political parties, and

therefore managed to survive, even if the Liberal Party didn't. In addition, the formation of the Liberal Democrats (combination of the Liberal Party and SDP) suggests that modern (or social) liberalism at least is still present within British politics, although I do believe this shift from classical to modern liberalism was inevitable, given the cultural change in society.

Consequently, liberalism "never has been nor ever can be anything but a diversified crowd" (Marquand, 1999, p. 5), and so, as an ideology, liberalism can be adapted to suit the party in office, and will thus continue to flourish in Britain.

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To what extent is the Prime Minister's power limited?

(Written for Explanatory Concepts in Political Science)

Rose Whiffen

> "In Britain...the Cabinet rarely meets and plays no meaningful role, while Mr Blair takes the decisions in private with advisers and conducts his own diplomacy across three continents"
>
> (The Guardian, 6th October 2001)

There has been a long standing debate in British politics whether or not we have a prime ministerial government in which the prime minister's power is relatively unlimited, or if the prime minister's power is limited by a strong Cabinet. This essay, however, will attempt to look beyond these two positions by considering the dependency model and also by examining the limitations of the Prime Minister's power outside government. Four potential limitations will be investigated: firstly, the Party, followed by the Cabinet, then the Senior Ministers and finally the rise of Globalisation. Each will be assessed, as far as possible, on the Prime Minister's ability to exert power in a pluralist, elitist and institutional sense (Lukes: 1974). Tony Blair will be used as a practical example to explore these concepts.

The Westminster Model used in Britain means a single party, majority government generally forms in the House of Commons. There is no separation of power between the executive and the legislature. Thus, by relying on their Party's support, the government is able to pass legislation easily. Backbench rebellions, however, demonstrate that this Party support cannot be always be counted on. The Prime Minister himself does not have unilateral powers to dictate policy. He has to work with his ministers, cabinet and the rest of his party to achieve his goals, which is itself a limit to his power. The Prime Minister, ministers, cabinet and parliament form an interdependent relationship with each other; all exercising some influence over the next. Nigel Lawson (1994, O'Malley 2007, p.5) saw the UK government as a place 'where what might be called a mutual blackball system exists' where each of the actors are able to veto one another's actions.

The Prime Minister, nonetheless, has institutional resources at his disposable to ensure that he maintains his party's support. Once an MP has been elected to government by the public, the fate of his career is determined by the Prime Minister. Within the British political structure, it is the Prime Minister and his advisers who choose which backbenchers become frontbenchers. Heffernan (2005, p.61), for instance, states , he has great "troop gathering powers". Thus, there is much incentive for MPs to support the Party line. During Tony Blair's government , Hennessy (2000, cited in Kavanagh et al, 2006 p.214) suggests the phrase 'Tony Wants' was one of the most important in Whitehall, as careerist MPs would try to win favour with the Prime Minister by fulfilling his wishes, without the Prime Minister ever asking them to fulfil them directly. In this way, the Prime Minister is able to use his resources to pass legislation - he wields power in a pluralist way. Although, within Tony Blair's government there have been amendments to legislation, such as the negotiations over higher education finance reform, Blair never lost a Common's vote (Heffernan: 2005). This further demonstrates that the Prime Minister exerts pluralist power within his own Party which is relatively unlimited.

Within Cabinet, moreover, whilst the Prime Minister in theory remains 'first among equals', the Prime Minister has many institutional resources such as the Policy Unit in Number 10 and the burgeoning of special advisers and the press office. These institutional resources, coupled with the ability of the Prime Minister to fire and appoint MPs, have led politicians to believe that Britain has an increasingly prime ministerial government. Smith (2004, p.226), however, argues that members of the Cabinet have resources of their own, which creates a power dependency between the Prime Minister and the Cabinet. Resources have to be exchanged, similar to the aforementioned relationship between the Party and the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister has no statutory definition and thus has to depend on his ministers to "deliver the Party's electoral promises" (Rhodes, Bevir, 2003, p.57). The Prime Ministerial model, furthermore, may underestimate the rise of the 'hollowing out of the state' (Rhodes :1997). This term coined by Rhodes state the importance of the dilution of policy making powers to subnational and national levels rather than power being concentrated purely at the centre of government with the Prime Minister. In this way, the Prime Minister's pluralist power is limited by Cabinet and the fragmentation of policy making.

This argument is strong because it takes into account the greater complexities of power relations in government. By exploring Blair's use of 'sofa politics', however, it is revealed that Blair was relatively unconstrained by his Cabinet. Regarding the exercise of political power, one is able to see that Tony Blair was able to control the discussion of the decision to go into Iraq by the use of small informal or *ad hoc* groups. Paragraph 609 of the Butler Report states that during the period from April 2002 to the start of military action there were,

> *"some 25 meetings attended by the small number of key Ministers, officials and military officers ..... [providing] the framework of discussion and decision-making within Government" (own emphasis added)*
>
> (Rt Hon The Lord Butler of Brockwell, 2004, p.147)

This illustrates that political power was wielded unconstrained since such meetings sidelined the cabinet. The Prime Minister consulted those particular ministers and officials who he thought would support his intentions to invade Iraq and so, one might say, exerted pluralist power. This demonstrates, moreover, that the Prime Minister also has elitist power. Within the framework of Cabinet institutions, the Prime Minister sets the agenda for Cabinet meetings and chairs them. When the Cabinet did meet during Tony Blair's premiership, he had the institutional resources to allow the meetings to be quick and, as a result, was able to leave the plans to invade Iraq off the agenda. The Cabinet, furthermore, was deprived of the "excellent quality papers" that are written by officials. Consequently the Cabinet was unable to scrutinise policy and not given the opportunity to influence policy making (Rt Hon The Lord Butler of Brockwell, 2004, p.147). Tony Blair, therefore, by handpicking bias ministers and setting the agenda of Cabinet meetings, exerted both pluralist power and elitist power over Cabinet with minimal limitations.

Despite this, the Cabinet does pose another potential threat to the Prime Minister's power as, this it includes powerful senior ministers. In Blair's Cabinet, John Prescott and Gordon Brown were "semi-autonomous political actors" (Heffernan 2005, p.66) who had their own power base. John Prescott, the deputy Prime Minister, served an important purpose to Blair as he had the support of Old Labour. Thus, if Prescott disagreed with Blair's policies, Blair could not simply fire him as he would lose the support of Old Labour. Unlike other ministers in the Cabinet and Party, Prescott was not reliant on Blair for his job. Whilst Prescott might have been more able to oppose Blair and express his opinions than other ministers, this does not mean he had a great impact

on Blair's policy making decisions. Conversely, it was the personal advisers that Tony Blair had appointed himself who had a greater degree of influence. Leonard (2005, p.335) states that Alistair Campbell, Blair's head of government information services, was so close to Blair that he was "popularly known as 'the real Deputy Prime Minister'". This suggests that Prescott exerted less influence on Blair than might have been, at first, thought. Brown, on the other hand, did have a direct influence on Policy making. As Chancellor of the Exchequer, he was allowed great authority and autonomy over domestic policy. Heffernan (2005,p.64) states that "the Prime Minister could not pursue many of his preferences regarding...economic policy". This demonstrates that Blair's pluralist power was limited by Brown.

A Prime Minister's pluralist powers can also be limited by factors outside government. With the rise of globalisation this has reduced the capabilities of countries to protect their own self-interest. Economic activity and prosperity within their own country is heavily reliant on the health of the economy in other countries, in particular the USA (Norton and Jones : 2010). Within Parliament the Prime Minister may be the 'first among equals.' In global relations, however, he is negotiating with leaders who, in democratic nations, have been legitimately elected in their own countries. Norton and Jones (2010, p. 397) argue that the Prime Minister is "at best an equal among equals". This implies that for the sake of diplomacy and international relations, the Prime Minister may have to agree on decisions he might have otherwise opposed. In the case of the war in Iraq, Blair's decision to invade was limited by President Bush, as he applied great pressure on Blair to provide British troops. Thus, Blair's pluralist power was further constrained by globalisation.

Upon exploration of his premiership, we observe that Blair wielded a great degree of pluralist power and elitist power over Cabinet, ministers and Parliament. He was able to do this simply because he had the institutional resources of a Prime Minister, such as hiring and firing and agenda setting. Thus, it is the institutional power that a Prime Minister has which is the most important. Blair's pluralist and elitist powers would not have existed if he had not had the institutional resources to exert them. Although the Prime Minister may be limited by his Senior Ministers, it is Whitehall procedure that " ministers and civil servants accept the authority of the Prime Minister" (Smith et al : 2006, p.206) and, with the burgeoning of the Prime Minister's press office and advisors, the influence of these Senior ministers is being increasingly sidelined.

What does limit the Prime Minister's power, however, are contextual factors; the state of the global economy, the relative power of other countries or as Previous Prime Minister Harold Macmillan summarised 'events, dear boy, events' (cited in Jones and Norton: 2010, p. 398).

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On what grounds did Thomas Hobbes criticise democracy?

(Written for Democracy And War)

Tawanda Gavhure

Establishing the grounds on which Thomas Hobbes criticised democracy requires an element of inversion, for in order to understand Hobbes's criticisms of democracy we must evaluate his support of absolutist monarchy. The second requirement is an appreciation of the question's wider implication: the influence of context upon Hobbes's political science. Therefore, the essence of the question is: 'on what hypothetical *and* contextual grounds did Hobbes criticise democracy and elevate other forms of commonwealth?' Such an approach will enable us not only to analyse Hobbes's criticisms of democracy, but also encourage us to explore the motivation behind his criticisms to a greater degree. The foundations of our arguments will develop from a critical engagement with *Leviathan* and *De Cive*. The first section of the investigation will demonstrate that Hobbes's writings reveal a strong desire for stability rooted in the context of the English civil war, that this provides one key explanation for his condemnation of democracy and that the context of political instability is indivisible from his theories. From here, we will develop an argument that cites instability and a failure to guarantee security as forming the thrust of Hobbes's critique of democracy and that the grounding for his criticisms rest upon Hobbes's unique understanding of human nature. Finally, the question above is posed in a similar vein to the opinions of most commentators, who 'consider Hobbes the foe of democracy'[47]. In order to establish the grounds of his critique, the conclusion will seek to reverse elements of the question and engage with the proponents of Hobbesian democracy, whilst considering the validity of interpreting Hobbes as a democratic theorist as opposed to a critic of democracy.

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[47] Kinch Hoeskstra, 'A lion in the house: Hobbes and democracy', in A. Brett and J. Tully with H. H. Bleakley, *Rethinking the Foundations of Modern Political Thought*, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006), p. 192

Telos

The purpose of Hobbes's support of some and attack on other types of commonwealth was to determine how to maintain the state. This question is traditionally associated with ideas of Roman supremacy: primarily that the goal of later states was to replicate their period of stability. However Hobbes is asking this question because he believes that the state of nature 'is a mere state of war'[48]; he believes that an, 'aptitude to produce peace, and security of the people'[49] is a just measurer of a commonwealth. Carl Schmitt claimed that for Hobbes therefore, the 'goal and terminus is the security of the civil condition.'[50] Affirming the idea that there was a telos for which Hobbes's state was instituted, in his 'Introduction to Hobbes' Richard Tuck asserted that Leviathan was a utopian work.[51] This paper will demonstrate that Hobbes's support of monarchy over democracy is formed on the basis of a monarchy's ability to achieve security and stability for its citizens and democracy's failure to do so.

Democracy & civil war

In chapter 19 of Leviathan, Hobbes outlines his three different types of commonwealth as being 'Monarchy, Aristocracy and Democracy'[52] in a classical fashion, and attacks the latter two due to the unstable tendencies of assembly governments. Hobbes asserts the superiority of monarchy over democracy in six attacks, crucially his fourth attack charges assembly governments with the potential to produce civil war due to the fact that unlike a monarch, 'who cannot disagree with himself'[53], an assembly may develop conflicting interests, 'to such a height'[54] that *internal conflict* arises. In *De Cive*, Hobbes explains that these conflicting interests result in factions (a theme we will

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[48] Thomas Hobbes, *De Homine and De Cive*, (Hackett Publishing Company, Cambridge, 1991), pp. 191-204

[49] Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996), p. 124

[50] C. Schmitt, *The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes*, (Greenwood Press, London, 1996), p. 31

[51] R. Tuck, Hobbes, *A short introduction*, (Oxford university press, Oxford, 1989), 80-83

[52] Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996), p. 123

[53] Ibid. p. 125

[54] Ibid.

explore in our analysis of glory in democracy).[55] As a result of committing the slippery slope fallacy and declaring that disagreements in government lead to civil war, Hobbes has received criticism from recent, prominent scholars including Tuck, who claims that Hobbes employs some rather, 'low level reasons'[56] for placing monarchy over other forms of commonwealth. Yet this provides a pertinent example of where Hobbes's context synthesises with an initially abstract and scientific analysis. In this criticism Hobbes does not subscribe to Machiavelli's doctrine, which uses direct historical evidence to affirm ones assertions, but he does imply that a monarch with supreme authority could avoid civil war. It is admissible to claim that the civil war, which was being fought during the writing of Leviathan, significantly motivated the criticism that internal conflict arises from assembly government; largely owing to the fact that Hobbes was a royalist.

We cannot fully appropriate the conflict to his broader criticism of democracy for many of the arguments made in Leviathan are repetitions of those made in the pre civil war publication, *De Cive*. However it is necessary to appreciate that Hobbes's writings were written during a period of political instability that preceded and followed the Civil War. This could provide a valid reason, second to his state of nature, for why the goal of his civil science is to achieve stability. Internal conflict and disagreements are a clear breach of Hobbes's ideal, stable commonwealth.

Institutional flaws & security

In *De Cive*, Hobbes highlights situations in which democracy fails to achieve the goal of ensuring peace and security for the citizens. On the 'Three Kinds of Government, Democracy, Aristocracy, Monarchy'[57], Hobbes cites a problem for democracy when it 'may be brought into some danger'[58] or when an issue requiring immediate attention arises in recess (i.e. when members are not in parliament). This institutional critique arises due to the fact that a democracy would traditionally 'have some certain known times and places of meeting'[59], thus rendering such a system powerless when

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[55] Hobbes, *De Homine and De Cive*, (Hackett Publishing Company, Cambridge, 1991), p. 231
[56] R. Tuck, Hobbes, *A short introduction*, (Oxford university press, Oxford, 1989), 80-83
[57] Hobbes, *De Homine and De Cive*, (Hackett Publishing Company, Cambridge, 1991), pp. 191-204
[58] Ibid. p. 196
[59] Ibid. p. 195

responding to immediate and unexpected dangers. A democracy that meets more frequently does not solve this problem, and so, 'by reason of the defect of power'[60] Hobbes proposes that a democracy cannot function unless, 'the supreme authority be, during the interval, granted to one man or council'[61]. Hobbes is expressing the superiority of a single person, or a small council holding authority and claims that this is necessary in ensuring the 'defence and peace'[62] of a city. Hobbes argues that unless a single man or council is given supreme authority, due to democracy's inability to handle danger, its lack of protection for each citizen will mean that 'every man's right of defending himself at his own pleasure returns to him again'[63]. This is a greater charge than the ability to produce civil war. For Hobbes, a democracy that does not grant the supreme authority to a single entity during its intervals will fail to produce peace and security, resulting in a return to the state of nature; an explicit correlation between democracy and statelessness for want of *security*. As explained, Hobbes's main concern is, 'Which form of government best serves the purpose of securing the peace and *security* of the people'[64] and in returning citizens to the state of nature, democracy performs the direct opposite to this. Hobbes makes a second institutional criticism regarding succession, asserting that the right of succession must lie with, 'the present sovereign'[65] and that in a democracy, due to the problem of succession, the security of the people is, 'temporary.'[66] In *De Cive*, Hobbes claims that if succession is not handled by the monarch, the people quickly become an unstable, 'dissolute multitude'.[67]

The problem of multitude

A majority of the attacks on democracy are reducible: when more than one person is involved in one decision, instability arises because the supreme authority lacks a singular motivation and the ability to make constant decisions. This is consistent with the charge of inconsistency in *Leviathan,* where Hobbes claims that the 'resolutions of a

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[60] Ibid. p. 196
[61] Ibid.
[62] Ibid.
[63] Ibid.
[64] D. Baumgold, *Hobbes's Political Theory*, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988), pp. 77-79
[65] Hobbes, *Leviathan*, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996), p. 129
[66] Ibid.
[67] Hobbes, *De Homine and De Cive*, (Hackett Publishing Company, Cambridge, 1991), p. 200

monarch'[68] are more constant, and that assemblies are paralysed by inconsistencies and inaction. For instance: If *some* members are absent when decisions are taken, 'all that was concluded yesterday'[69] might be undone on the next. Concerning multitudinous government, Hobbes also believes situations arise in which government fails to receive good counsel. For Hobbes, whilst a Monarch can, 'receiveth counsel of whom, when, and were he pleaseth'[70], consequently receiving the, 'opinion of men versed in the matter'[71], in an assembly, none possess the right to judge the expertise of others, and therefore the state receives bad counsel, often concerned with the acquisition of wealth due to self interest rather than good governance. In extension, Hobbes argues that as a result of this multitude, counsel cannot be received with appropriate discretion.[72]

Hobbes's monarch is a solution to this problem of multitude, for the leviathan represents every member individually and exercises unity through 'the sovereigns will'.[73] The leviathan cannot disagree with himself; he can make decisions quickly and may receive proper counsel when he wishes. In summary, Hobbes's 'defence of monarchy represents a defence of unified sovereignty'[74] and a critique of multitudinous decision-making. The result is a critique that initially fails to address the idea that unified authority possesses far greater potential for tyranny, and that an assembly of many/mixed forms of sovereignty can check and balance authority. Whilst Hobbes does address monarchical tyranny[75], he appears to give primacy to immediacy and homogeneity in government, yet as previously addressed, Hobbes prioritises the conservation of the state above all things, hence the subsequent appropriation of Hobbes as the father of absolutist *conservatism*.

Democracy & human nature

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[68] Hobbes, *Leviathan*, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996), p. 124
[69] Ibid.
[70] Hobbes, *Leviathan*, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996), p. 125
[71] Ibid.
[72] 'Nor is there any place, or time, wherein an assembly can receive counsel with secrecy, because of their own multitude.' Ibid.
[73] Tuck, Hobbes, *A short introduction*, (Oxford university press, Oxford, 1989), 80-83
[74] Baumgold, *Hobbes's Political Theory*, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988), pp. 77-79
[75] 'They can do no injury to the subjects. For injury, according to the definition made in chap. III. art. 3, is nothing but a breach of contract; and therefore where no contracts have part, there can be no injury.' Hobbes, *De Homine and De Cive*, (Hackett Publishing Company, Cambridge, 1991), pp. 198-9.

Two key themes that lead to the reversion to the state of war are *competition* and *glory*. Hobbes asserts that democracy is more susceptible to these elements of human nature.[76] In the state of nature man possesses the 'jus naturale'[77], or the right to, 'use his own power...for the preservation of his own nature.'[78] Because of this foundation Hobbes is often cited as one of the founders of liberalism; despite the aforementioned appropriation of Hobbes as the father of absolutist conservatism. Hobbes believes that in the state of nature 'every man is a judge of the means which tend to his preservation.'[79] This judgement is the power man hands over to the sovereign, yet in a democracy, 'each individual will have his or her own ends to promulgate'[80] in the interests of his or her own preservation. Since men are naturally self interested, and a democracy encourages all to promote their own interests, democracy is a system that brings human nature to the forefront of a commonwealth; the state of nature is one of war for Hobbes and so the grounding for this criticism is self evident. Historian Alan Apperley argues that whilst democracy encourages self-interest, tangible power is scarce and democracy does not actually possess the means to distribute interests evenly. Therefore, 'some will not be given the chance to speak,'[81] producing competition for power, unlike a monarchy, where all renounce their chance to speak and compete for power. Hobbes maintains that in a democracy people will affirm their self-interest, and the private and public spheres become stratified. 'Private impediments'[82] or ambitions can harm the public interest of a democracy, whereas, 'Public and private interest are most closely united in monarchy'[83]. In Leviathan, Hobbes explains that in a monarchy private and public interests are, 'the same'[84] due to the fact that, 'no king can be rich...whose subjects are either poor...or too weak through want.'[85] Furthermore, we can assume that for Hobbes a monarchy eliminates competition; as with disagreements, a monarch cannot compete with his or herself.

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[76] A. Apperley, 'Hobbes on Democracy', http://www.academia.edu/1120952/Hobbes_on_Democracy, (1991), pp. 165-171
[77] Hobbes, *Leviathan*, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996), p. 86
[78] Ibid.
[79] Hobbes, *De Homine and De Cive*, (Hackett Publishing Company, Cambridge, 1991), p. 109.
[80] A. Apperley, 'Hobbes on Democracy', http://www.academia.edu/1120952/Hobbes_on_Democracy, 1991, pp. 165-171
[81] Ibid.
[82] Ibid.
[83] Baumgold, *Hobbes's Political Theory*, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988), pp. 77-79
[84] Hobbes, *Leviathan*, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996), p. 124.
[85] Ibid. p. 125.

In extension to a competitive disposition due to a desire for self-preservation, Hobbes also highlights that, 'vain esteem of themselves'[86] could reduce men to a state of war. This is another problem for democracy because it is the system in which this natural inclination towards *glory* is most amplified. Not only does Hobbes believe that people are naturally inclined to seek to govern themselves, glory encourages men, 'to gain the more esteem'[87] from their auditors. In a democracy each member of the assembly would seek to speak for long periods of time for the purposes of glory, and employ the tools of persuasion, 'to make that seem just which is unjust'[88] in order to achieve their own ends; in De Cive, Hobbes reinvigorates the Platonist connection between democracy and the problem of orators.

Glory also provides the grounds upon which Hobbes demonstrates the aforementioned argument that democracy leads to civil war, when groups are competing for power the desire of the conquered to, 'see the glory' of the conqueror, 'taken from him, and restored unto himself'[89] creates factions and civil unrest. On competition and glory, Hobbes criticises democracy on the grounds that it is susceptible to the flaws of human nature, or at least the, 'natural proclivity'[90] to hurt each other and that these inclinations will revert society to the state of war. This is typical of Hobbes's scientific approach which identifies natural constants in human nature from the ground up and later places them in a political context, hence the order of the first two parts of *Leviathan*: of man and then of commonwealth. Similarly, *De Cive* begins with an analysis of, 'the state of men without civil society,'[91] as Hobbes places his subjects in a test tube in order to uncover their nature.

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[86] Hobbes, *De Homine and De Cive*, (Hackett Publishing Company, Cambridge, 1991), p. 117
[87] Ibid. p. 230
[88] Ibid. p. 231
[89] Ibid. p. 231
[90] Ibid. p. 117
[91] Ibid. p. 109

<u>Conclusion: Hobbes & democracy</u>

'How can Hobbes be democratic, given his vociferous criticisms of democracy?'[92] That is the question posed by Kinch Hoekstra in her essay, 'A lion in the house', in which she attacks the proponents of Hobbesian democracy. Hobbes's state of nature forms the foundation for his appropriation as one of the earliest figures of modern liberalism, and has encouraged a handful of 20th century thinkers to develop a positive association between Hobbes and democracy.

Concerning liberty, Hobbes's reasoning behind the establishment of a state is mutual fear due to the fact that we are *naturally equal* and subsequently at equal risk from one another. Hoekstra explains that some scholars perceive this premise as 'setting in motion the argument for modern liberalism or democracy.'[93] Hobbes also asserts each mans individual right to preservation and that in the state of nature man possesses the right to *all* things. These natural liberties are however negative for Hobbes, who believes that their existence leads to an everlasting state of war. The conscious renunciation of our liberties in order to enter an absolutist civil society is a decision that guarantees our safety from the short and bloody state of nature in which all men are equally competing, driven by the passions of glory and their right to self preservation.

It is the transition from the state of nature that raises a contradiction with Hobbes's apparent condemnation of democracy. In his recent essay on Hobbes and democracy, Richard Tuck highlights that the creation of Hobbes's commonwealth is a democratic one, and explains that, 'extreme democracy'[94] was necessary in Hobbes's creation of the state. He contends that the conscious renunciation or, 'general submission'[95] of multiple wills to one single entity serves as a basis for viewing Hobbes

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[92] Hoeskstra, 'A lion in the house: Hobbes and democracy', in A. Brett and J. Tully with H. H. Bleakley, *Rethinking the Foundations of Modern Political Thought*, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006), p. 192

[93] Ibid.

[94] Richard Tuck, 'Hobbes and democracy' in A. Brett and J. Tully with H. H. Bleakley, *Rethinking the Foundations of Modern Political Thought*, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006), p. 170-190

[95] Ibid.

as a 'sophisticated and deep theorist of democracy'.[96] When faced with Ingrid Creppell's notion, that due to the democratic nature of Hobbes's social contract, 'democracy was the origination of all forms of government'[97], we must remember that Hobbes is primarily concerned with the stability of an *established* commonwealth, therefore even if democratic elements were necessary in the *creation* of a commonwealth, the idea that Hobbes is a theorist of democracy does not necessarily devalue his criticisms of that political framework. Admittedly, one may initially hold reservations over this idea; that democracy is charged with the potential to revert a civil society to the state of war, yet is also cited as the deliberative requirement in departing that state and establishing a stable commonwealth. In response to this, democracy is a system that arises in the state of nature and is therefore the political expression of human nature. Whilst it is necessary in the foundation of the state, a system that amplifies man's natural dispositions, which are inclined to violence, is homologous with the state of war. In the state of nature, as a result of the criticisms we have addressed, this extreme democracy subsequently gives rise to want of security, resulting in man's conscious submission to absolutism.

To conclude, if Hobbes believes that democracy enhances or enables human nature, monarchy suppresses it by determining the means of our most prominent instinct: self-preservation. Therefore, along with the context of political instability, humanity provides the grounds upon which Thomas Hobbes criticised democracy. This is compatible with our problem of multitude; humanity's traits of competition and a desire to pursue private interests provide the reasons for why multitudinous decision-making is so treacherous for Hobbes. This also serves as an explanation for the elevation of the leviathan as an *artificial* ruler, unsusceptible to the flaws of human nature, and the requirement for man to submit his individual will or humanity in order to establish a secure and stable commonwealth.

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[96] Ibid.

[97] Ingrid Creppell, 'The democratic element in Hobbes's Behemoth', *Filozofski vestnik 24*, (2003) pp. 29-30

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Approaches to Culture and Identity in International Relations

(Written for Introduction to International Relations)

Cezar Mihai Iordache

After the end of the Cold War, numerous attempts have been made to predict the evolution of the international order, especially from the point of view of international conflict. For some, the transition to a unipolar system, led by the US and the West, meant that ideology ceased to be the primary source of disagreement between states, and was bound to be replaced. It is in this environment that Samuel P. Huntington elaborated his 1993 thesis, The Clash of Civilizations.

The author attempts to predict the new trends in international politics, naming cultural differences as the main catalyst for conflict.[98] Huntington saw the post-Cold War era as a new phase, in which political differences would be replaced by cultural and religious criteria. In doing so, Huntington separates humans into 'seven or eight' different 'civilizations' which he sees as largely homogenous, based on religion and several other criteria (language, customs etc.)[99]. He then goes on to describe the effects these cultural differences will have on the world.

This essay will analyze the Clash of Civilizations thesis and its concept of culture, focusing on what I see as Huntington's narrow and unrealistic view of the world and of the numerous factors that come into play when discussing international conflict. The essay will then proceed to summarize several critiques to Huntington's view, such as Edward Said's 'The Clash of Ignorance' and Dieter Senghaas's article 'A Clash of Civilizations. An Idée Fixe?'. Finally, the essay will analyze several alternative approaches to explaining the concept of culture and cultural identity within the context of international politics, such as Jutta Weldes' 'Going Cultural: Star Trek, State Action, and Popular Culture'.

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[98] Huntington, Samuel P. (1993) *A Clash of Civilizations*, published in *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 72, Issue 3, Summer 1993, p. 22

[99] Ibid. p. 25

The Clash of Civilizations

Huntington's view is based on an 'us vs. them' mentality[100] that he attributes to a resurgence of tribalism[101]. The essential differences in culture are bound to turn international conflict into a fight against the stranger, the other, such as in Edward Said's 'Orientalism', where the long-standing rivalry between the West and the Arab world was explained as the Orient being 'one of the most recurring images of The Other'[102] for the West. Huntington himself uses this series of conflicts as an example in his thesis.

According to Huntington, the main factor in this new phase in international politics is culture, i.e. language, customs, tradition, and most importantly religion[103]; he goes on to say that culture makes up the essential difference between these civilizations, and that it will constitute the primary reason for future conflict based upon 'fault lines between civilizations'[104]. Huntington attributes this shift to several reasons, like basic differences, regionalism and a new focus on culture and ethnic origin. For instance, the world being 'smaller' as a result of globalization has the effect of emphasizing cultural fault lines, especially combined with a "return to the roots" movement that can be observed throughout the non-Western world. The emergence of Western values such as democracy in non-Western countries is seen as 'human rights imperialism'[105], and as the reason for the re-emergence of indigenous values.

In my opinion, it is bizarre that in 1993, a year in which the global shift toward individualism and free will was already underway (although not as prominently as after 2000), Huntington predicted this new model for international conflict based upon indivisible groups of people whose individual agency is overshadowed by their innate 'cultural differences'. The individual's self-identification with a certain civilization is, however, named as one of the components of culture[106]. A person can identify with varying degrees of conviction as a member of their ethnic group, such as an Italian

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[100] Ibid. p. 29
[101] Ibid. 1
[102] Said, Edward W. (1978) Orientalism, Vintage Books, 1978
[103] Ibid. 2
[104] Ibid. p. 29
[105] Ibid. p. 41
[106] Ibid. p. 23

identifying as a Roman, an Italian, a Catholic and a European[107]. Still, Huntington argues that unlike in the Cold War era's ideological conflicts, it is much harder to 'pick a side'.

Furthermore, the importance of self-identification is undermined by the importance of religion in drawing cultural fault lines. According to the author, a person can be 'half-French and half-Arab', but it is much more difficult to be both Catholic and Muslim. Religion is therefore a crucial factor in determining the causes of conflict, which is attributed to the 'return to the roots' movement, specifically the rise of religious groups seen as fundamentalist. Huntington calls this *la revanche de Dieu*[108], God's revenge, seeing it as a reason for the resurgence of tribal instincts.

Countries are therefore putting aside ideological differences and focusing on common cultural heritage when choosing allies. Combined with the rise of economic regionalism, this leads the way for the clash of civilizations that Huntington envisions; however, the author argues that conflict will (still) emerge along the lines of 'the West against the rest'[109], as other civilizations choose to reject Westernization. The conflict, therefore, emerges from the differences between civilizations' intrinsic values and mindsets, and even though Huntington argues that his thesis does not imply that civilizations are indivisible, the individuals' and individual states' free will is undermined by these cultural fault lines.

Critique

Huntington's thesis has been faced with criticism from numerous academics. In his 2001 article titled 'The Clash of Ignorance', Edward Said directly criticized Huntington's argument, calling it 'a gimmick' and calling Huntington himself 'a clumsy writer and an inelegant thinker'[110]. Said goes on to comment on Huntington's narrow and unrealistic view of the world, taking issue with the personification of civilizations.

 ...as if hugely complicated matters like identity and culture existed in a cartoonlike world where Popeye and Bluto bash each other mercilessly...[111]

In Said's view, Huntington ignores every civilization's internal dynamics; moreover, he divides people into civilizations arbitrarily, based on the idea of 'civilization identity'.

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[107] Ibid. p. 24
[108] Ibid. p. 26
[109] Ibid. p. 42
[110] Said, Edward W. (2001) The Clash of Ignorance, published in The Nation, October 2001 issue. Accessed online at http://www.thenation.com/article/clash-ignorance January 2014
[111] Ibid.

Said also calls Huntington's view arrogant, as his thesis assumes itself to be the only correct view; furthermore, he 'presumes to speak for every civilization', which requires 'a great deal of ignorance'[112].

This idea is followed by the fact that Huntington's thesis has been used as a justification for war by several politicians such as Benito Mussolini and Benazir Bhutto. This idea has been echoed by analysts like Noam Chomsky, who said that Huntington's work would be used by the United States to justify 'any atrocities that they wanted to carry out'[113]. Chomsky goes on to refute the idea of a clash of civilizations by invoking the effort the CIA made to support and train Al-Qaeda troops in the early stages of the fundamentalist organization.

Another article which critiques Huntington's work is Dieter Senghaas' 'A Clash of Civilizations: An Idée Fixe?'. Senghaas argues that culture does not play such an important part in the early stages of a conflict; instead, large-scale conflict appears as a result of socio-economic discrimination[114]. When it comes to the unrealistic personification of civilizations, Senghaas shares Edward Said's view, saying that Huntington sees civilizations as 'some kind of beings'[115] at the macro-level, which are completely constant and not adaptable to change, further pointing out the way Huntington overlooks the importance of individual agency.

Senghaas also comments on Huntington's view of the spread of Western values as 'cultural imperialism', saying that Western values are openly accepted by non-Western groups, specifically because they are founded in concepts like free will, democracy and individualism.[116] Furthermore, Senghaas shares Said's concerns again when he evaluates the concept of a 'soul of culture' (what Said called 'the vague concept of "civilization identity"[117]'). This idea is used by Huntington to express borderline racist views such as Islam being inherently violent and showing an enthusiasm for war[118]. He

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[112] Ibid.

[113] Chomsky, Noam (2001) Clash of civilizations?, transcript of a Q&A at the Delhi School of Economics. Accessed online at http://www.india-seminar.com/2002/509/509%20noam%20chomsky.htm January 2014

[114] Senghaas, Dieter (1998) A Clash of Civilizations: An Idée Fixe?, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Jan., 1998), pp. 127-132, Sage Publications, accessed online at http://www.jstor.org/stable/425236 January 2014, p. 131

[115] Ibid. p. 129

[116] Ibid. p. 131

[117] Ibid. 13

[118] Ibid 17, p. 127

once again uses the example of the conflicts between Christians and Muslims – in this case, the example of the crusades and 'sacred wars' that the two groups have carried out against each other. Senghaas expresses confusion at this idea, arguing that Huntington provides 'no systematic analysis'[119] of the relationship between the civilization identity and the actual behavior of its members. Huntington's thesis remains, in Senghaas' view, 'a pipe-dream without foundation'[120].

Alternative approaches

As a response to Huntington's thesis, numerous works have attempted to provide an alternative approach to the idea of culture and its integration into international relations. Jutta Weldes' article, 'Going Cultural: Star Trek, State Action, and Popular Culture', explores the complex concept of culture through the perspective of popular culture (or, as she more accurately names it, 'mass culture'). As Weldes moves past Huntington's cartoonish portrayal of civilizations, culture is defined here as 'the context in which people…make sense of their lives'[121], and even as a field of battle.

In her view, although culture has become an object of study in the field of world politics, the academic focus is still on the culture of the elites. Instead, academics should focus on popular culture, which is the basis for state action and the way state action becomes intelligible to the masses.[122] Popular culture is therefore of crucial importance to the study and practice of international relations. Weldes gives the example of US foreign policy, which has been shaped by the long-standing concept of racial hierarchy in US popular culture and the Americans' 'Indian-hating' attitude. This mentality has given way to conflicts such as Vietnam and the States' general attitude towards the Third World.[123] She goes on to examine the link between Star Trek, namely its presentation of

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[119] Ibid.

[120] Ibid. p. 128

[121] Tomlinson, John (1991) Cultural Imperialism, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1991, p. 160, quoted in Weldes, Jutta (1999) Going Cultural: Star Trek, State Action, and Popular Culture, published in Millennium - Journal of International Studies, 1999, p. 119. Accessed online at http://mil.sagepub.com/content/28/1/117.citation
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[122] Ibid. p. 118

[123] Weldes, Jutta (1999) Going Cultural: Star Trek, State Action, and Popular Culture, published in Millennium - Journal of International Studies, 1999, p. 117. Accessed online at http://mil.sagepub.com/content/28/1/117.citation
January 2014

new civilizations and 'the other', and US foreign policy. This example helps explain how the romanticized view of the US overseas intervention policies as 'liberation' and 'progress' stems from (sub)conscious instincts towards xenophobia.

Another work which presents an alternative understanding of identity is Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Morris' article, 'The True Clash of Civilizations'. Here, cultural fault lines are replaced by opposing views on democracy and human rights like gender equality. Inglehart and Morris examine the views held by citizens of Muslim countries in regard to these issues, and conclude that culture does not represent an unbridgeable gap, but the gap must be closed by encouraging human development in the Muslim world, instead of American intervention.

Conclusion

"The Clash of Civilizations" attempted to provide a model for post-Cold War international interactions. However, its portrayal of civilizations was at best inaccurate, as it failed to account for the volatility and adaptability of civilizations, as well as the spread of Western values through globalization. The massive global shift towards individualism and equality could not be predicted by Huntington's thesis, which saw the future of world conflict as a return to tribalism, and therefore a regression from rational thought to a world dominated by evolutionarily-dictated instincts. As Weldes has shown, we need to reach a deeper understanding of culture, one that includes mass culture and mentality and the way it dictates state action, since it is clear that the relationship between culture and international relations is more complex than the existence of 'cultural fault lines'.

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Does the global financial crisis demonstrate the need for the state to play a more active role in the developmental process?

(Written for Development and the State)

Juliet Grenville

The Financial crisis of 2008, referred to by Harvey as 'The Mother of all Crises" (2010:6), had an intense impact on the global economy. Its global reach and influence was compared to that of the Great Depression in the 1930s (ODI, 2010:vii). It originated by great borrowing and speculation in the western world, which led to the rise and fall of the American housing bubble, which had "supercharged" the American economy (Stiglitz, 2008:1). Faith in the market was lost, leading to a great selling of stocks and causing many investment banks to go under. These events induced a huge bailout costing US taxpayers more than US\$1.3trillion, as well as increasing numbers of housing foreclosures (Naudé, 2008:3-4). The American economy was left in tatters. Then, because of our increasingly interdependent national economies, the crisis went global; having negative impacts in mostly all countries (Read, 2009:144). In this essay, I shall focus on the state's role in the crisis. I argue that greater state activity could have been beneficial in preventing the crisis and in cushioning its effects. For my argument, I shall explore the causes of crisis and conclude the lack of proper regulation played a large part in the collapse. Thus the state should intervened in providing a macroeconomic structure to monitor and regulate the markets (Chandavarkar, 1993). The crisis of deregulation should be taken as an example for future policy-makers when developing their financial sectors. Second, I shall explore the impact of the crisis on developing countries; the harm was transmitted to these countries through three channels: remittances, FDI and trade (Ocampo and Griffith-Jones, 2009, ODI 2010, Naudé, 2009). The state should play a more active role in economic planning to cushion these effects and loosen the transmission ties.

It is agreed that the crisis was caused by a "combination of credit boom and housing bubble" (Acharya and Richardson, 2009:195). Firstly, there were widespread

availability of subprime loan products that led to increasing consumption and homeownership rates (Coleman, LaCour-Little and Vandell, 2008:272). Ferguson, for example, discovered that some investment banks were giving out loans worth as high as 90% of a house's value, which was frankly reckless (2010). A total of about US US$1.3 trillion was lent in subprime mortgages, according to Lin (2008 cited in Naudé 2008:2). The chances of repaying these loans were the low, as borrowers had "little ability to pay them back" (Acharya and Richardson, 2009:195). There was incentive in giving out these loan because the riskier they were the higher the profit for the bankers (Ferguson 2010). This is because they were received "short-term cash bonuses based on volume and marked-to-market profits, rather than on long-term profitability of their bets" (Acharya and Richardson, 2009:206). In addition, investment banks were able to free themselves from the risk by securitisation. This involved the investment banks selling back the risky subprime loans that were now in the form of mortgage-banked securities (MBSs) to investors (Acharya and Richardson, 2009:199). This meant that the high risks attached to subprime loans were spread around and almost gave the impression that they did not exist at all (Harvey, 2010:17). Furthermore, these very risky subprime mortgages were given high credit ratings, which facilitated the selling of the MBSs (Acharya and Richardson, 2009:201).

Everything collapsed when, unsurprisingly, people started to default on their loans between 2006 and 2007(Harvey, 2010). Increasing loan defaults led to decreasing housing prices, which meant the mortgages became greater than the value of the house. This eventually led to "the failure of mortgage firms and large losses incurred by financial institutions and investors in mortgage and mortgage-related assets" (Coleman, LaCour-Little and Vandell, 2008:272,). Indeed, investors "found themselves with worthless pieces of paper" (Harvey 2010:1). Liberal economist Robert Genestski argues that policy-makers relied too heavily on Keynesian economics and their interference worsened the crisis (2011). Firstly, as a classical economist, he believes that non-intervention will protect the competition that is vital in keeping market equilibrium (Peacock, 1993:12). The cause of the crisis, in his view, was that the Federal Reserve mismanaged liquidity. From 2001 the Federal Reserve was increasing bank reserves and interest rates, which provided the liquidity for a speculative boom. However between 2007 and 2008 bank reserves decreased but interests rates did not, therefore interest rates no longer became a point of analysis for reserves. Furthermore the Fed, in trying to

resolve smaller specific problems in the economy, removed bank reserves contributing to a shortage of liquidity in the whole economy, which contributed to the expansion of a speculation bubble. When the liquidity crunch finally arrived the Fed bailed out many of the banks, which Genestski argues, prolonged the crisis because they undermined the invisible hand further (2011:1-5). Thus the crisis was actually caused by a mismanagement of the Fed. From a classical perspective the states should intervene a minimum because the market should be left to 'the invisible hand'. Krugman critiqued this view that "markets are inherently stable" (2009). He points out that classical economist had not predicted the crisis in the first place. According to Krugman, this is due to the fact they had too much faith in the free market and in their rigid finance models. A critical flaw in this analysis is that they assumed that the market and those operating it were rational (Krugman, 2009). Human beings are by no means inherently rational, therefore the manipulation of markets is not either.

A Keynesian, on the other hand, would argue there was not enough state activity. According to them, the rise and fall of the housing market was due "reliance on self-regulation, by market participants"(Reddy, 2010:245). Indeed, private interests guided the free market not the state. These interests were unstable because they were narrow and were not subject to any checks by the state. For example, it is believed that Credit Rating Agencies, who manipulated the market, had vested interests in judging the risks inadequately, because they gained from doing so (Reddy, 2010:245). Without state intervention market participants, besotted with greed, manipulated markets and took risks because it was in their benefit to so, which generated the housing bubble (Ferguson, 2010). It is clear therefore that monitoring and regulation from the state was needed to stop this from occurring (Stiglitz, 2008:3). On a more practical level the inadequacy of risk assessments during the subprime bubble may have been due to the volume of business (Naudé, 2009:3). Thus regulation on a national level would be have more effective because they would have external overview of the system. Furthermore, this would also make it more transparent; preventing asymmetric information. Following previous arguments, I believe that this crisis should be lesson to policy-makers and the development of financial systems should be within a structure regulated by the state. This will prevent heavy risk-taking, monopolisation and manipulation, which caused and worsened the crisis. In addition, the state, in theory, should be acting

in the public's interest, and be trusted by the people; therefore it is a more rightful body to do this (Peacock, 1993:26). It is interesting to note that the Liberal vs. Keynesian debate was brought to the forefront during the crisis. This is because policies of monetarism and neoliberalism were being questioned, and Keynesianism became more popular (Resnick and Wolff, 2010:171).

However, both Liberals and Keynesians work within the framework of capitalism; their main debate surrounds state intervention (Booth 2012). Keynes is by no means left; he wanted to "fix capitalism not replace it" (Krugman, 2009:5). A Marxist would argue that the cause was much deeper than what Keynesians and Classical Economists analyse. From a Marxist perspective, capitalism is contradictory. Harvey explains it is a constant accumulation cycle and becomes destructive because there are limits to how much capital one can accumulate. Capitalism, therefore, reaches a crisis when growth halts but the structures of the society remain dependant upon it, leading to vast surpluses being devalued and destroyed, which is what occurred in 2008 (Harvey, 2010:45). To remain with this view, Resnick and Wolff explain that the borrowing during the housing bubble was due to the fact workers were being squeezed because real wages were decreasing. In the meantime capitalists were able to take advantage of this cheap labour and reap the benefits. This was during a period of high consumption, which thus led to the workers looking to borrow more money, which therefore resulted in the rise and fall of the housing bubble (2010). Marxist scholars, therefore call for an alternative to this system of exploitative capitalists and recurring crises (Beams, 2008). Therefore development policies, from this view, should focus on less capitalist structure to stop crises from occurring. Chomsky argues, "since financial liberalization was instituted about thirty five years ago, there has been a trend of increasing regularity of crises and deeper crises" (2009).

I shall now analyse how the crash of 2008 affected developing countries and how state intervention can contribute to cushioning these impacts. The economic crisis has negatively affected growth, employment and thus consumption all over the world, which has consequently increased poverty and inequality levels, on a global scale (Griffith-Jones and Ocampo, 2009, Harvey, 2010). Our interconnected world has meant it has had a very large rippling effect. For example, it was estimated in 2009 by the ILO, that the crash would cause unemployment to rise to 20 million people; furthermore that the number of people working for less than US$2 per day poverty line would increase by

100million (Naudé, 2009:8). A more recent study carried out by the ODI in 10 developing countries demonstrated how the crisis has affected growth, investment, employment, inequality, poverty and debt. Four channels of transmission changed these interlinked factors: Trade, private capital flows, remittances and aid (2010:2). This is because these countries were more liberalised and connected to the financial system. I shall therefore explore these transmission mechanisms and argue that more state-based solutions are preferable.

Remittances are very important to the economy of developing countries generally. During the boom before the bust, vast amounts of money were sent from migrant workers back to their motherlands (Lin, 2008:7). This meant that developing countries have acquired a dependence on them. In Ethiopia, for example, remittances grew between 1998-2008, and became an important source of revenue for the country (ODI, 2010:19). Griffith-Jones and Ocampo argued that remittances were one of many 'positive shocks' that occurred before the crisis to be reduced after it (2009:1). This is due to the fact migrants no longer had the resources to send money back to their countries; the crisis had greatly damaged employment and monetary security. Firstly, because those who invested in the financial market lost millions, therefore lost the ability to pay their employees, increasing layoffs (Harvey 2010:4). Secondly, banks lent less, which reduced investment, in the developed and the developing world alike, which damaged employment in developed world (Naudé, 2009:4). Finally, as house values plummeted, resulting in negative equity, many migrants living in America could not afford to send remittances (Reddy, 2010:243). Mexico, for example, saw an absolute reduction of remittances from the US in 2008 (Griffith-Jones and Ocampo, 2009:4). This decline in remittances was microeconomic and outside government control. However, there was the possibility for the state to cushion the effects by providing safety nets; these might include cash transfers from the rich to the poor (ODI, 2010:28). We have seen therefore that the effects of remittances are critical and there is need for more active state intervention when it comes to providing for its population, so that the vulnerable are less exposed.

Foreign Direct Investment from overseas declined after the crisis. Much like with remittances, direct investments flourished, prior to 2008, which contributed to developing countries attaining their "highest growth rate in decades". In 2007 alone, for

example, "net private capital flows to developing countries increased by $269billion" (Lin, 2008:8). However at the turn of 2008, FDI flows dropped very sharply and actually became negative in some cases (Griffith-Jones and Ocampo, 2009:5). The Tanzanian Investment Centre, for example, recorded a drop of about 30% in the value of investments during the first half of 2009 compared to the same period in 2008 (ODI, 2009:9). The crisis caused international consumption to drop; affecting all areas. Keynes argues that demand and consumption could be bettered by state investment to assure full employment (Peacock, 1993: 19-20). The decline was also caused by investors looking to move their funds to "safer havens" (Naudé, 2009:6). Naudé argues that the impact of this loss of investment may lead to reductions in private sector investments and household consumption, which will affect government expenditure because it "will now face the higher cost of raising funds coupled with less tax income". Together, low investment, consumption and government expenditure will spell higher unemployment and poverty across the developing world (Naudé, 2009:7). The Keynesian solution would be for active government intervention; to print more money and spend heavily on public works to fight this unemployment (Krugman, 2009:5). However, I believe that this would be a very risky because developing countries that do not necessarily have democratic governments to oversee this is carried out correctly (Chandavarkar, 1993:151). However, on the other hand, if government spending had occurred prior to the crisis it would have cushioned this impact because the country would be less reliant on foreign investment.

The third negative impact is the crisis in world trade. Harvey states that as a result of the crisis it declined by approximately a 1/3 in a matter of months (2010:6). This was caused a great collapse of commodity and primary goods prices, which was grave for developing countries because they are greatly dependent on the export of these (Grifffith-Jones and Ocampo, 2009:9). Ocampo looks at how this decline in world trade negatively affected Latin American countries. He puts forward the point that these countries are heavily dependent on exports mainly because during 2004 and 2008, the world had seen a large commodity boom over a period of five years (World Bank 2009A, UNCTAD, 2009 cited in 2009:706-707). Therefore, the recent pro-cyclical trade shocks hit Latin America quite intensely. He argues that the trade collapse was the most important transmission of the damages of the crisis; its strength of impact has been seen through the decrease in export revenues and has had negative impacts on GDPs across

the continent (2009:109). Affects like this occurring all across the developing world. Cambodia, for example exhibits a high dependence on its garment industry which has seen a steep decline; "export values were down by 19% for the first nine months of 2009 compared with the same in 2008" (ODI, 2010:10). We can see how the effects of the financial crisis have filtered through to many aspects of the world economy. One way to lessen the blow of the impact of trade is for developing countries to diversify its industries, so that they are not dependent on a few (ODI, 2010:31). A way to do this would be by nationalising industries to make sure this occurs; therefore a macro Keynesian approach would be suitable.

I believe that a way to further reduce the impact of these transmission channels is by using Listian and Neo-Listian framework. List provides a different economic structure to classic economists. He is a strong advocate for the infant industry argument as a means for "economic catch-up" (Selwyn, 2009:159). This states that that, in order for countries to be able to compete in free trade, the state must impose tariffs to strengthen the country's industries; he believes that "this is crucial to their success" (Winch, 1998:303). Indeed, it would enable developing countries to diversify their industries because they currently have heavily export-led economies that have been affected during this crisis (ODI, 2010, Griffith-Jones and Ocampo, 2009, Lin, 2008). Wade believes that free trade shrinks the 'development space'. He argues that the rhetoric of universal liberalisation and privatisation has meant states cannot pursue technological and industrial advances because they are stuck with what they are already specialised in (2003: 622). This is why the impact of the commodity fluctuations was so hard-hitting. I argue therefore that the Neo-Listian theory of protectionism for catch up development would have been beneficial for developing countries during the crisis; they would have been less impacted by the fall of commodity prices if they had the space to develop other industries. After having explored the crisis's impact in Latin America, Ocampo suggests they should focus on their domestic markets and "rethink the role active production development strategies", because these countries were reliant on exports due to the fact they had no space for other specialisations they were negatively affected by the crisis (2009: 722). In addition, Griffith-Jones and Ocampo also call for stronger state intervention on the subject of exports (2009). However, both studies suggest that protectionism would be a step-back and would be counter-productive (2009). I would argue however that protectionism would allow cushion the impact of trade.

It is important to note that, although the crisis did affect developing countries, its epicentre was in the developed world (Naudé, 2009:9). Indeed, it was most hard hitting with the countries that were most integrated into the international financial market. Harvey notes, for example, that China and India, who have not fully integrated their financial system into the global were more protected than others, therefore their impact was less intense (2010:37). Iceland, on the other hand, was greatly integrated into the financial system was very badly damaged by the crisis (Ferguson, 1010). I argue therefore, that Monetarism and Neoliberalism were bad development policies in the light of the crisis. Selwyn gives a different Historical Materialist view on Neo-Listian policies (2009). He argues that although these policies may benefit developing countries in the short run, within a system of capitalism they are still means of benefitting the capitalist classes; for policies to really be top-down they must come from social powers not from the state or the market (2009: 176). Essentially, this form of catch-up development supports the exploitative nature of capitalism because the state acts as a tool for its continuation. Chomsky, in an interview in 2008, clarifies this point by claiming we should live a system "state capitalism, not just capitalism". I agree with Selwyn, that Neo-Listians actually serve the purpose of the "globally competitive capitalist classes", and therefore may not actually be fully invested in aiding the world's poor (2009:176). I push therefore for another alternative for development policies that is not market or even state led, but that is truly bottom-up and in the benefit of the real public good.

My essay has shown that state intervention would have contributed to preventing the crisis first place if it had created a strong framework to monitor and regulate the market. This would prevent asymmetric information, monopolies and market manipulations. Furthermore a mix of Keynesian and Listian policies could have contributed to cushioning the impact, because, as we have seen, they have been grave in developing countries. However, without capitalism there would not have been a crisis, in the first place (Harvey, 2010). Thus the whole system is flawed. Furthermore, having explored Selwyn's critique of List and Post-Listian catch-up development (2009), I would agree that in order to achieve real fair development at a bottom-up level, I would call for an alternative state or market led development because they both uphold exploitative capitalist relations.

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