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Welcome to the first ever Sussex Undergraduate Politics Journal. This journal was a joint creation between the University of Sussex Politics Society and the Politics Department. We hope that you enjoy reading this selection of undergraduate students' work and that this journal may continue into the future, showcasing the talents of those whose interests fall under this wide umbrella.

Contributors

Emma Lucy Aston
-Chief Editor, Contributor, and
Designer

I am in my final year at Sussex studying Politics and Philosophy. My research interests lie within the area of Social and Political Theory: I am particularly interested in Socialist Theories and their relationship to Capitalism; Critical Theory; the Concept of Freedom; Democratic Theory; and the ideas of Immanuel Kant and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Hoping to pursue a doctorate in the future, I will (dependant on final grades) be doing an MSc in Political Theory at the London School of Economics next year. When I'm not roaming the halls of the Friston building, I can normally be found researching my dissertations on Marx, Rousseau and Freedom and Responsible, Moral Capitalism, or at St Peter's church in Brighton.

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I am a 20-year old final year (B.A.) Politics undergraduate. I have studied some political philosophy classes during my time at university, but have been focused primarily on studying the structures of governance or the workings of political institutions – mainly those of the European Union and the United Nations, for instance - during my time at university. I am currently preparing to write final undergraduate dissertations on populist politics and political corruption. It is my aim to continue in education at some point in the near future but not before taking some time out of the system.

Ricky Blair
-Editor

I'm a final year politics student. My particular areas of interest are in the fields of Comparative European politics, Party Politics, and the Politics of the EU. Upon graduation, I am hoping to take a MA in Contemporary European Studies at Sussex in the next academic year. I hope to gain a career in either disability advocacy, or perhaps in local government and/or working for the Conservative Party.

Dean Bygate
-Editor

I'm studying History and Politics at Sussex University, completing my degree in 2012, and part of the Politics Journal editing team. My research interests include Commonwealth nations' perspectives of the Cold War and the internal effects of EU policy and politics. I also work on the University radio team presenting my own show and hope to pursue a career in media after completing my degree, hoping to use my research and presenting skills as learnt whilst at University.

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I am a 3rd year Politics student with a specific interest in gender and politics and having lived in Mexico for a while before University, Latin American politics and culture. I am very keen to pursue a career in broadcast journalism, hopefully as a producer and/or reporter for an international news analysis radio programme or as a lobbyist. Further study is also something that appeals to me – I'm not done thinking yet!

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
I am reading Politics and am currently in the third year of my Bachelors degree. I plan to continue my studies next year with an MA in Peace and Conflict Studies, after which I hope to join either the civil service back home in Germany or work with an international NGO such as the UN. My particular research interests include conflict prevention, peace building and the concept of human security.

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-Editor

I am a final year student in Politics at the University of Sussex. In addition to Editing the Politics Journal, I have previously written several articles for Sussex's student newspaper, 'The Badger'. My main research interests lie in the areas of public policy including regulatory bodies, contemporary British politics and political corruption. Outside university, I possesses an interest in the aviation industry, having worked within this sector throughout my studies at Sussex and upon graduation hope to either embark upon a career with the regulator in this sector or a political communications and lobbying role in the UK, Europe or US.

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
I am currently an Undergraduate third year Politics student with interests in French political culture and Communist regimes. I'm currently researching the decline of the French Communist Party and the way corruption is used for political purposes. I hope to work in journalism but before that I plan to do postgraduate study in Europe.

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I am a third year undergraduate with an interest in feminism, anti-war movements, and social justice. Currently writing on women's rights under Socialist President Francois Mitterrand, as well as on the anti-corruption methods of the IMF and World Bank. Looking to work in campaigns for political organisations.

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I am a 22 year old student in my third year at the University of Sussex studying Politics and Philosophy. My interests include creative writing and music. Originally from east London I studied my A-levels at Raine's Foundation sixth form and the City of Westminster College.

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-Contributor

I am a final year Politics and Philosophy undergraduate with particular interests in Political Philosophy, German Idealism, Critical Theory and Nietzsche studies. After completing my undergraduate studies, I hope to pursue post-graduate study at Sussex on the SPT masters program. Prior to my undergraduate study I was a craftsman and lived in Oslo for a number of years. I was raised in Cornwall, and hope to return there to teach in the future.

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I am studying for a degree in History from the University of Sussex. My main interests lie in the relationship between Politics and Economics and specifically between Capitalism and the formation of the Nation State. I am currently writing my dissertation on the failed attempts to integrate Ireland into Britain economically without corresponding political integration in the late 18th century. I am hoping to go on to study Political Economy at postgraduate level, preferably looking specifically at Europe.

Edward Harvey
-Contributor

I am in 3rd Year studying for BA History and Sociology, with current research interests in Social and Political Theory and Cold War politics and culture. I am presently working on a dissertation which focuses on the liberal economic reforms in China, and the relationship between the Deng Xiaoping's administration and the UK government regarding trade links and arms deals. I have also recently submitted an undergraduate thesis which analyses the works of Jean Baudrillard in which I attempt to place his theories of identity and consumption within the historical development of capital; discussing whether his theory is an adequate theory of the postmodern, or could more realistically be described as postmodern theory itself. I hope to continue within education after completion of my BA, with interests in the areas of social and political thought.

Lauren Hogan
-Contributor

I am in my third year of undergraduate study reading Politics and Development Studies. Throughout my three years here at Sussex I have mostly focused my research and chosen my academic modules for each year to suit the issues of international politics and development. I have a keen interest in how international issues translate into policy through bilateral and multilateral means. I am currently researching for my politics dissertation on corruption, specifically looking at how corruption is being combated in Thailand through the use of social media. I am looking to further my career within the international development sector and I hope to earn a place on the UK Department for International Development graduate programme launched this year.

Gabriel Raeburn
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I am a Second Year American Studies and Politics student. My particular areas of interest are American Foreign Policy, contemporary British Politics and examining whether Social Justice can be achieved under modern capitalist economies. For the academic year of 2012/13 I will be studying at the University of Pennsylvania, USA where I hope to campaign during the American Presidential election. As a career I aim to work in the civil service or as a Member of Parliament.

Why did the 'revolution' of May 1968 not bring about the collapse of the Fifth Republic?

Joe Power

Abstract: In this essay I will explore why May 1968 was the revolution that never was. I will look at how events unfolded to bring the Gaullist regime to the brink of collapse, but how De Gaulle was able to restore state power. The events of May shocked almost everyone in their scale and size with the spontaneity of the students setting the pace. Whilst the government stood in disarray political parties prepared for a regime change. Ultimately the image of a co-ordinated mass movement betrays the plethora of aims espoused by students and workers, with this disunity and lack of leadership being its downfall. The revolution is often perceived to have failed as it did not bring about a regime change. However, I find the revolution was not aimed at the state so much as at an outdated society. The revolutionary tradition is strong in France, and in the Fifth Republic De Gaulle may have created a system without any 'revolutionary safety valves' but one capable of restoring law and order.

"In this country which loves revolution so much, we had to have one fail so that everything could change"

Laurent loffrin

The events of May echoed those revolutions which have defined French political history — 1789, 1848, 1871 and 1936 all shared similarities with 1968. Where 1968 differed, or perhaps perceived to have failed, was its inability to bring about regime change. Since 1789 France has had 15 different constitutions including 3 empires and 5 republics, alternating between too strong and too weak Governments (Gretton, 229). The assumption that a revolution the size of May '68 would bring about a new republic is clearly well founded in French history and the republican tradition. So why did the 'revolution' not follow the 'republican reflex?' Had De Gaulle finally resolved the constitutional pendulum and created a system for both stability and democracy? The revolution may not have been successful in terms of regime change, but whether hostile or supportive, there is little doubt that it had a profound effect on French society. For many French sociologists May represented

une breche with the past, and freed society from a matrix of conventions that were no longer in sync with neo-capitalism (Seidman, 8). Despite the individualist message, in 1968 — personal liberation was tied to justice for workers. Critics of the revolt termed it a "false revolution" against a regime that was not as repressive as was depicted. They say the Gaullists were more concerned with the protection of private property than the defence of morality by 1968. The defining feature of May must be that despite the enormity of the strike action across the country, unlike previous revolutions, it only weakened state power momentarily (Seidman, 5-12).

In this essay I will address —

n   The Constitutional Causes

n   The Disunity of Aims

n   The Return of the Republic

By the end of this essay I will have shown that the movement's spontaneity inevitably proved its downfall. That the forces of revolution were often disorganized and disunited, which when placed against the might of the modern state struggled to maintain its momentum. De Gaulle created a system in which there was no creative input for the opposition, which led people to the streets. However the institutions of the Fifth Republic proved their capability to deliver order and stability, and de Gaulle's skill in creating and utilising crisis politics proved too effective. De Gaulle was also heavily aided by events and it was his ability to use these opportunities that gave him the initiative again. I will also suggest that the sheer size of the movement shocked the French who found themselves' reeling for authority by June. The revolution happened because the climate was ripe for it, but it was not explicitly aimed against the Gaullist regime. Instead it was a mass movement with a plethora of aims, co-ordinating these aims being the real challenge and what was lacking. Had the opposition been united in aiming to bring down the Fifth Republic they might have succeeded. As Hobbsbawm pointed out, no one expected a revolution to happen in an industrialised western society, and the fact that it did makes it all the more significant (Nairn, 106). It was also the first mass movement ultimately ending in a general strike, which began with a student movement - Mouvement du 22 Mars (Brown, 132).

Constitutional Causes

In the fallout of May what surprised many commentators was the survival of the Fifth Republic, which represented the technocracy and the social and political conservatism which largely ignited the revolt. Clearly the question demands a constitutional understanding of the crisis. I will

look to explain both the constitutional causes of May, and then how the institutions of the Fifth Republic helped bring about order.

The creation of the Fifth Republic was born out of de Gaulle's contempt for the Fourth Republic. For de Gaulle the Algerian crisis had shown the weakness of the fourth republic as a system which produced short lived coalition Governments which were ineffective in a crisis (Shennan, 77). In short, de Gaulle wanted the system to fail before he stepped in, as for him to be given emergency powers would have only temporarily increased his prestige, only to be ousted from power afterwards by the party political 'game' (Shennan, 81). De Gaulle's ideology and style of politics was based on a war time psychology, it was fundamentally opposed to Parliamentary democracy, de Gaulle did not want to return to power through the system (Shennan, 63).

As the Fourth Republic refused to imitate the Third by 'committing suicide,' de Gaulle had to tactically exploit a crisis to bring about regime change (Shennan, 63). The opportunity for crisis presented itself to de Gaulle with the civil war in Algeria along with domestic economic problems which had long eroded the Fourth Republic's popularity (Shennan, 87). Critics saw de Gaulle's constitutional ideology as a combination of a modernising vision with an unshakeable belief in his own personal destiny. As a result he built institutions based around his personal view of France — a country whose survival is at threat from internal centrifugal forces (Shennan, 86).

The Fifth Republic represented a hybrid of Parliamentary and Presidential systems. It satisfied republican demands of executive accountability to the legislature as the Prime Minister could be removed by Parliament. However in marked contrast to both third and fourth republics, the President now had enormous powers. De Gaulle defended these as imperatives for national survival in the modern era. Since France was living through a period of rapid economic, technological and political change she needed a Government which could provide sustained effective leadership on the difficult road to grandeur (Shennan, 86, 164). Although Debre is largely credited with writing the constitution de Gaulle heavily intervened to ensure the President had the right to assume full powers in the event of a national emergency, and he liberally interpreted the constitution for his own ends. Many of the features of the new Republic had come to fruiting on de Gaulle's head, his threats to resign if referendums failed forced consensus out of a crisis (Shennan, 87).

The Fifth Republic did not solve the problems from the previous one however. It failed to resolve the weakness of parties, who were relegated to the background, approved by the electorate through de Gaulle's successive referendums (Gretton, 233). Gaullism was the latest attempt to combine the general will, the state, and the nation in one man (Gretton, 236). De Gaulle cemented and legitimated the Presidential nature of French politics in 1962 by making the role popularly elected, this prevented the re-emergence of the regime des partis he despised so much (Shennan, 110). Following the 1967 election the Gaullists assumed decree powers for one year, in doing so the

Government deprived the republic of the legitimacy that is its shield against adversity (Brown, 141). For de Gaulle the lack of a strong executive was the fatal weakness of the French parliamentary system. The radical change in governance inevitably had repercussions, principally the opposition who could no longer influence policy. It was an odd kind of democracy where the opposition had no creative role in the system despite having the majority of votes. Their bitterness found a vent with the crisis (Brown, 140).

Origins of Revolt

Tom Nairn points out that revolution is rarely caused by material misery, deprivation or tyranny. People are tied in to such alienation by an ideological consensus of some sort which makes suffering appear 'natural' and inescapable. Only if this is broken by a sense of some possible alternative does misery become abruptly 'insupportable' (Nairn, 114). Alex de Tocqueville noted that revolutions come from a period of prosperity followed by a depression, like in France in 1967. The Gaullist Government took deflationary measures to strengthen the Franc against the dollar but the gamble did not pay off (Brown, 133). Bernard Brown thought the detonator set off an explosion because the surrounding materials were combustible. Elements of a revolutionary situation existed at each stage of the escalating violence. French social structures were simply not adapted to the needs of the time (Brown, 128). In this light, the revolution of May was inevitable. The month of May seemed to some commentators like it would end the Gaullist regime, and replace it with a communist led popular front. But the left was fundamentally weakened by disunity and inner contradictions.

"Be realistic, demand the impossible!"

Cohn-Bendit best summed up the student position in 1968 when he remarked "it was less about changing Government than it was about changing society." French students in 1968 felt oppressed by the strict hierarchy and poor conditions that were synonymous with the university experience, it is in this environment where their aims were conceived. The student movement was less concerned with the Gaullist regime, although they would have been vehemently hostile, and more concerned with social liberation. Pompidou correctly recognised that "it is not the Government which is being attacked, nor institutions nor even France. It is our own civilisation" (Seidman, 2). For Castoriadis May was not about the individualist hedonism it was portrayed as, it was about "re-socialisation" where people looked for truth, liberty and community (Seidman, 6). Tom Nairn viewed the students as the products of a conjunction of circumstances without any real parallel in the past, a group of violent heretics who stood for the negation of the society which created them (Nairn, 116). It is what gave the movement its strength and made it incomprehensible for those in power.

Following this interpretation, it is clear why the students did not look for answers or solutions through the Gaullist state, or through any state. The real enemy was technocracy, they sought to challenge this with direct democracy and participation. For Touraine, students did not revolt because they were socialist or communists, but because they were anti-technocratic, sentiments harboured in the mass universities. Their aim was to liberate "an archaic society with a modern economy" (Seidman, 3). It is that very technocracy which led them to the streets - they were looking for a complete overhaul not a new constitution.

Of course as in much of the events of May disunity proved to be counter revolutionary. The student movement is often presented as a united group, rather than the nebulous groupuscules that it actually composed of. With a mix of Trotskyists, Maoists, Anarchists and Situationists each group had its own ideology, a devastating critique of the others and a compelling reason to maintain complete autonomy (Brown, 165). This division was reflected in the aims, and undermined their overall cause of societal change. With the students unable to agree on proposals and run their own affairs, it inspired little confidence in the workers they encouraged to revolt. Spontaneity aroused the masses and crystallised political consciousness, but in order to continue against the forces of counter revolution, it is important to create a revolutionary organisation. Direct democracy is the essence of revolutionary cause but as one Le Monde correspondent pointed out the directly democratic Sorbonne was like a "bateau ivre" (Brown, 169).

Had the raw power of the student movement been directed at the state, the survival of the Fifth Republic and de Gaulle may not have been so certain. It is unlikely the General would have invoked article 16 against the sons and daughters of the bourgeoisie. The student disorganisation required a strong and dynamic leader for all to unite behind, this proved impossible and with no willing electoral candidate, by the elections the students once again went unheard. The students were fundamentally revolutionary, their aims went far beyond those of the traditional left in France.

Not in My Name

The events of May took the PCF by surprise and they could neither understand nor control it. The PCF's increasing commitment to a parliamentary road to socialism and its reformist practices created a void for revolutionaries that the groupuscules gladly filled (Seidman, 24). The aims of the students and those of the party were completely opposed. The students' anti-hierarchy sentiments and calls for spontaneous action were the antithesis to the party's democratic centralism and policy of gradual conquest. There was clearly no love lost between the two. It is also important to remember the PCF was effectively a puppet party for Moscow and their behaviour towards the crisis was

certainly inspired by this relationship. Any attempt at revolution would have affected the agreed spheres of influence and would have been detrimental to the Soviet Union.

The PCF initially condemned the actions of the student adventurers who they viewed as "petty bourgeois anarchists" but used the revolt to stake its claim to power (Absalom, 75-80). They claimed the students were Gaullist agitators who could not hide their contempt for the working class, and cited violence at the Flins factory as an example of working class provocation (Brown, 179). They largely understood the revolt in terms of their own position in the labour movement, the PCF could not afford to be outflanked by the ultra left, which were clearly opposed to the routine labour-unionism the PCF represented (Absalom, 81). It is this reactionary strategy that informed much of the way they operated throughout May. Their sense of bitterness towards the events reflected the fact they were not in control, and did not initiate the crisis. If the PCF did want revolution, they only wanted it on their terms. Party strategy in mid May was to respect legality, defend material interests of workers, and enter willingly into negotiations in order to win concessions (Brown, 181).

The crisis ultimately showed the failings of the party. To take lead of the movement, draw in radicals from the students, run strikes differently, and pose themselves as the main anti¬capitalist force they had to be a revolutionary party — when in fact they were still bargaining on Parliamentary terms. In the end it was divisions and fears that kept the party from supporting a potentially powerful ally in Mendes-France (Singer, 196). Ultimately the popular front never came and the alliance between socialists and communists made sense when the Gaullists were a threat, on the assumption the Gaullists were collapsing Mitterrand turned to the centre and the Communists showed their power by announcing a mass parade through Paris (Brown, 182). Schwartz thinks the PCF did not even dream of a revolutionary seizure of power. Its demand for a "popular government" was an attempt to appease the revolutionary sentiments in the factories, without challenging the institutions of the Fifth Republic (Schwartz, 2008). Their lack of interest in revolution was based on a belief that they could "only profit from a general election." When the election did come the Gaullists painted the communists red, while the alleged disciples of Lenin paraded as champions of bourgeois law and order (Singer, 207). Georges Lavau thought it was difficult for any party to remain revolutionary after 30 years, whilst Annie Kriegel optimistically credited it to the gradual conquest method, either way the revolution in 1968 was not going to be led by the Communists (Brown, 188).

For Hobsbawm, the real failing of the PCF was to recognise the seriousness of the student movement until the barricades were up, it was the readiness of the workers who forced the union's hand with spontaneous sit ins. The party was too concerned with electioneering to engage with revolutionary forces. The PCF ordered their execution through failure to act. They not only failed as a revolutionary party, but also as a reformist party, constantly trailing behind the masses. After the 29th of May they had lost the initiative and lost the game (Absalom, 81).

Revolution vs. Reform

For Seidman the students were overly ouvrieriste believing the workers would and must make revolution (Seidman, 8). Young French radicals went beyond quantitative demands of trade unions to challenge social hierarchy and property. The workers did not want to reject the consumer society, they wanted more of it! Nearly all workers strikes were intended to increase the value of labour and had little in common with either street protestors' idealism or their destruction (Seidman, 11). The workers were attracted by commodities like cars, whereas the revolutionary students criticised the trade unions for — in strictly Marxist terms — engaging in "economism" or seeking higher wages within the capitalist system (Singer, 191). While the students were demanding the impossible, the workers were demanding higher wages.

Return of the Republic

In 1968 the state's power was weakened momentarily, by a movement so diverse it proved difficult to attack, but it proved itself capable of restoring order. The Gaullist system however flawed or disliked had the merit of existing, fear was reinforced by the fear of the void (Singer, 214). The popular front however did not exist and was not ready to fill the void left by the disintegration of Gaullism (Absalom, 79). The lack of an electorally viable alternative resulted in many voters rallying around de Gaulle. De Gaulle's style of politics demanded a consensus to mobilise behind a common cause — in a period of peace this broke down. For Shennan it is difficult to conceive of a more effective institutionalisation of crisis management than the presidency of the Fifth Republic. De Gaulle's ideology and style of politics was based on a war time psychology, it was fundamentally opposed to Parliamentary democracy. So the institutions of the Fifth Republic were designed for stability over democracy. After the initial shock of May, and with the help of events turning his way, de Gaulle was ready to respond.

The election provided a heavy dose of institutionalism to a crisis where the battle pitch had been the streets (Shennan, 152). The opposition was incredibly divided and the election would give citizens participation, this sense of involvement would end the anti-regime or even anti-state sentiments the crisis had produced. The bourgeois elections would substitute politics as usual for the general strike, it was a trap for the far left, its strength had always been outside Parliament, there was no effective representation for the students (Seidman , 219). The speech was followed by a state organised protest which was given favourable treatment and media coverage. For the first time the dynamism was on the side of order.

Fear Politics

Following the poor results in the 1965 elections de Gaulle remarked that the French were no longer afraid of anything (Shennan, 115). Fear was key to the restoration of order. Cohn¬Bendit noted that "fear dampens militancy" and de Gaulle used the force to the state to generate such a climate. The CGT was so scared of the General's hints towards the army, and the presence of the military around Paris that it refused to participate in the proposed demo (Seidman, 220). OAS officers were released from prison to appease the far right and Civic Action Committees were established which terrorised students and strikers (Seidman, 218). De Gaulle was able to capitalise on the fear he created, the disunity on the left meant they failed to capitalise on any of the hope that the revolution had created (Gretton, 261). De Gaulle appeared on TV to scare the middle classes with the spectre of communism. Later Gaullists were willing to admit their electoral version of events bore little relation to reality (Gretton , 214). De Gaulle cleverly played on the initially enchanting but increasingly terrifying sensation of a complete absence of authority. This anti-communism was the Gaullism from 1947, but it worked.

The Fifth Republic media monopoly also helped restore order. Radio such as Europe One had boosted the spirits of protestors and barricade builders and kept them informed of developments. Several high ranking journalists were "unjustly" fired and only Gaullist journalists were allowed to enter the building (Seidman, 223-225). Gaullism was not about to abandon its favourite weapon of propaganda (Singer, 212). This monopoly allowed de Gaulle to frame the election as a choice between order, liberty, the Republic and the Communists who sought to install a dictatorship (Gretton, 224). In the subsequent election most Gaullist candidates simply distributed pictures of themselves draped in the tri-colour.

The state was able to restore order by delivering state services. The availability of gasoline was key with Alain Geismar concluding that 'gas killed the revolution.' Motoring during the long weekend proved more popular than occupations. The return of consumer society spelt disaster for revolution (Seidman, 226). The State's corporatist triad was enough to win over the lower middle classes. The petits were invaluable in breaking strikes to provide gasoline and food to Paris (Seidman, 12).

Conclusion

The Fifth Republic was born out of and designed for crisis. The real shock for the system was that May represented a different crisis from the one which they sought to perpetuate, and one which they did not expect. The spontaneity created a crisis as the regime tried to understand the events which unfolded, but every revolutionary movement needs a revolutionary organisation. The variety of

aims showed the true dissatisfaction with the regime which the Fifth Republic suppressed. The institutions proved they were effective in a crisis as the sudden restoration of normality showed. People retained faith in them and the democratic process, choosing in the end to vote rather than revolt. 1968 was very much in line with the revolutionary tradition in France, a system with no 'revolutionary safety valves' needs to vent when the people feel oppressed or ignored. The size of the revolt was totally unexpected and the forces of counter revolution proved equal to the task. In the Fifth Republic de Gaulle created a system which satisfies demand for democracy, with the authoritative lead the French have grown accustom to. His 'republican monarchy' has endured proving the need for stability is greater than that for democracy (Shennan, 116). By analysing the revolt in terms of the aims of those involved, it becomes clear why the Fifth Republic survived. May represented the profound desire for change that went beyond calls for a new constitution. Georges Seguy noted that '68 was a political failure but social success, as a member of the PCF politburo this may seem like a fair appraisal (Seguy, 2010). The reality is that '68 was not a political failure as what they sought to achieve was not limited to the political confines of the Fifth Republic.

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List of Abbreviations —

CGT — General Confederation of Labour

PCF — French Communist Party

OAS — Secret Armed Organisation

ORTF — French Organisation for Radio and Television

'Is the 'institutional turn' a bridge to unite

Rationalist and Constructivist approaches in EU scholarship?'

(Written for Politics of Governance: European Union 2010/2011. Politics Department. Francis McGowan)

Jonathan Bailey

Abstract: This essay will argue that the 'institutional turn' in European Union scholarship presents the most positive solution to the scholarly antagonism between rationalist and constructivist approaches. A 'meta-theoretical impasse' had developed amidst interdisciplinary warfare between social theorists and social scientists; culminating in confrontational exchanges between proponents of the 'Copenhagen School' of constructivist scholars, and intergovernmentalists. The contentiousness of meta-theory has raised two significant problems. The first is the ontological one; broadly that meta-theoretical approaches highlight a common set of core assumptions, uniting all the rationalist sub-disciplines of political science. The second problem is one of operationalization; the 'impasse' reached between the two disciplines. The problem is two-fold. The initial charge is that constructivists are over-focusing on meta-theoretical critiques of rational choice theories, effectively rendering the project of EU scholarship inert. This imbricates the second fold of the problem: what can be done to remedy the impasse? Moreover, how may it be remedied so that the divided disciplines can feasibly integrate themselves to fruitfully to explain the puzzles thrown up by researching EU phenomena? The essay will first explore the coextensive nature of the ontological, epistemological and methodological problems arising from the respective disciplines. The essay will sketch these problems against the changing background of EU integration and the problems that this presents for both disciplines. The essay will then forward the argument that the 'institutional turn' and its proposed reconciliation of these disciplines, is a viable and potentially profitable solution.

This essay will argue that the 'institutional turn' of Jupille, Caporaso & Checkel (2003) and Caporaso & Jupille (1999) in European Union scholarship represents the most positive solution to the intractable ontological antagonism between rationalist and constructivist approaches. A 'meta-theoretical impasse' (Pollack, 2005:p.336) had developed amidst the 'interdisciplinary warfare' (Risse, 2010:p.145) between social theorists and social scientists during the late 1990s; this culminated in a confrontational exchange between proponents of the 'Copenhagen School' (Moravcsik, 1999:p.669) of constructivist scholars (Christiansen, Diez, Jørgensen, Marcussen, Risse, Smith & Wiener), and intergovernmentalists - more specifically Andrew Moravcsik (1999a). The contentiousness of meta-theory has raised two significant problems. The first problem is the ontological/normative one;

broadly that meta-theoretical approaches highlight 'a largely common set of core assumptions' (Checkel & Moravcsik, 2001:p.219) uniting all the rationalist sub-disciplines of political science. This in itself may seem unproblematic, but it coextensively highlights the narrowing of the research focus these assumptions entail. Risse (2010:p.145) contends that the constructivist insight was to illuminate the theoretical problem 'that human agents do not exist independently from their social environment' and that 'social structures and agents are mutually codetermined'. The rational actor , in other words, could not be wholly extricated from embedded social or institutional norms.

The second problem is one of operationalization, or the 'impasse' that Pollack (2005:p.336) alludes to. The problem is in fact two-fold, and as described by Moravcsik (1999a:p.678-679), the initial charge is that constructivists are effectively over-focusing on meta-theoretical critiques of rational choice derived theories; detracting so far from empirics as to render the project of EU scholarship inert, less pursuing any fruitful research. Checkel and Moravcsik (2001: p.219) also contend that as a result, the important puzzles facing EU research remain unsolved. This imbricates the second fold of the problem (again a normative one): what can be done to remedy the impasse? Moreover, how may it be remedied so that the ontologically and epistemologically divided disciplines can feasibly integrate themselves (if the possibility exists) in order to fruitfully to explain the puzzles thrown up by researching EU phenomena ?

The essay will first explore the coextensive nature of the ontological, epistemological and methodological problems rising from the respective disciplines. In so doing, the essay will sketch these problems against the changing background of EU integration and the problems that this presents for both disciplines. The essay will then forward the argument that the 'institutional turn' of Jupille and Caporaso (1999: p.440), and its proposed reconciliation of these disciplines, is a viable and potentially profitable solution.

The essay so turns to a detailed preamble of the ontological antagonism that has precipitated between rationalist and constructivist approaches, and palpably manifest in EU studies. The latter day corpus of EU scholarship has been characterised by an antinomical discourse, divided both ontologically and methodologically, and comprising a dense taxonomy of theory. Within EU/European Integration studies, the sub-disciplines of political science – namely international relations (IR) and comparative politics, are subsumed under a Foundationalist-Positivist ontology-epistemology. The agent-biased, realist theories of this tradition are historically the preserve of IR, most notably within intergovernmentalist approaches (Hix, 1994:p.3). Andrew Moravcsik's (1993:p.480) 'Liberal Intergovernmentalism' rests on 'the assumption of rational state behaviour, a liberal theory of national preference formation, and an intergovernmentalist analysis of interstate negotiation.' It should be noted however, that not all scholars, Moravscik included (1993:p.481), would lend Liberal Intergovernmentalism to a realist description (Rosamond, 2000:p.142).

Comparative Politics, a newer foundationalist strand, is less concerned with questions of European Integration, and instead studies the European Union as a political system (Hix, 1999: xvii-iii & p.2-3). Although Liberal Intergovernmenalism and Comparative Politics approach EU scholarship with differing methodological toolkits and notions of 'what' the EU is (a process of regional integration and a political system respectively), they are both derived from foundationalist ontology – and furnish EU scholarship with positivistic, agent-biased epistemologies.

By contrast, constructivist approaches take their ontological (anti) foundations from structuralism. Broadly, constructivist approaches subsume cognitivists, post- structuralists, postmodernists, critical theorists, and structurationists (Hix,1994:p.9). Constructivists see their task in European scholarship as 'meta-theoretical reflection…and the desire to interrogate established categories and concepts.' (Rosamond, 2000:p.171). What becomes problematic for practitioners of established political science, is that constructivism places itself in almost diametric opposition to their rationalist presuppositions. An approach that treats the interests and identities as 'endogenous to interaction…so that neither structural determinism nor intentionalism are viable theoretical starting points.' (Rosamond, 2000:p.172). Indeed, a meta-theoretical move of this type eo ipso threatens antagonism with the established Political Science research. And this antagonism reached a critical juncture in the 1999 special edition of the Journal of European Public Policy where the Copenhagen School opened a strong debate with Andrew Moravcsik over the efficacy of established theory in Liberal Intergovernmentalism (Pollack, 2005:p.365).

This schism in EU scholarship had become a perceived 'disciplinary tribal warfare' (Risse, 2009:p.145) between positivists and 'post-positivists'. However, for Risse (2009:p.145) it rested on 'the epistemological divide between those who deny the possibility of intersubjectively valid knowledge claims, on the one hand, and those who stick to more or less conventional methods in the social sciences, on the other.' Chryssochou (1999:p.128) posits a 'battle of the theories', where he identifies the intellectual problem beginning as one of differing perceptions of general concepts such as 'integration', 'cooperation', 'governance', 'autonomy' and so on. 'Normative' and 'narrative' interpretations are then at risk of either under or overestimating the importance of both central institutions and national executives.

This competitive strand of the discourse is exemplified in Moravscik (1999a) (1999b), Risse & Wiener (1999), and Smith (1999). Moravscik (1999a:p.669-671) charges the Copenhagen School (identifying Christiansen, Jørgensen, Risse, Diez, Smith, Marcussen & Wiener) with formulating theories that are 'in principle indeterminate, and therefore untestable'. The concern for Moravscik is that no clear epistemological ground can be reached by advancing constructivist, meta-theory. Instead, 'mid-range' empirically testable theories should be offered. To this end, meta-theory serves only as a principled excuse to disengage itself from competitive theory testing (Moravscik, 1999a:p.679).

Moravsciks corresponding dual with Diez (Moravscik, 1999b) strongly reinforces the idea that while methodological and epistemological disagreements can be understood in terms of what 'different theories aim to achieve' (Moravscik, 1999b:p.388), the underpinnings of these debates will always derive from the ontological disjunction – Rationalism vs Constructivism. Moravscik (1999b) explicitly demarcates the ontological divide by discipline, 'Social Science' (rationalism) and 'Social Theory' (constructivism), in a way that Risse (2010:p.145) describes as a 'device to distinguish the 'good self' from the 'bad other'. However, Moravcsik (1999b:p.390) points out that, 'If theories are not designed to be confirmed or disconfirmed why bother to conduct or criticise empirical research?' To this Risse and Wiener rebuff,

'Let us reiterate here that social constructivism per se does not offer an alternative to substantive theories of international relations or European integration. It can, thus, not be tested against realist, liberal, institutionalist or neo-functionalist hypotheses. Social constructivism is a meta-theoretical approach offering an ontology which differs from, say, rational choice. While we can evaluate empirically substantive propositions derived from a 'rationalist' ontology, we cannot 'test' rational choice as such in any meaningful sense. The same holds true for constructivism (or reflectivism, or any other meta-theoretical approach).'

(Risse & Wiener, 1999:p.778)

The division is further demonstrated in Risse & Wieners rebuttal (1999:p.780), where they contrast the differing perceptions of how the 'instrumentally rational' policy-makers underlying interests are shaped, 'Rationalist accounts including liberal intergovernmentalism bracket and exogenize these interests and identities, while constructivism tries to bring them into the light of investigation…the shared experience and social structure of a society contribute to, and if so how, actors know their interests.' This ontological antagonism is congruent with Mjøsets (1999 in Chryssochoou 2001:p.6-7) celebrated categorization of Constructivism as comprising of theories that question whether any of the assumptions social science theories (positivist) make, are distinguishable from any 'every day' heuristic notions. Indeed, Rosamond (2005:p.16) weighs in with similar criticisms, 'Standard rationalist discussions grounded in IR orthodoxy have two broad problems. The first is that they struggle to escape from a notion of 'actorness' that is not only welded to the norms of Westphalian statehood, but also understands actors as purposive, rational, unitary and motivated by exogenous material interests.' Interestingly, Pollack (2005:p.365) notes that constructivist theories are, like rational choice, not substantive theories but rather orientations. Pollack reflects,

'it appeared that this debate might well turn into a metatheoretical dialogue of the deaf, with rationalists dismissing constructivists as "soft" and constructivists denouncing rationalists for their obsessive commitment to parsimony and formal models'

(Pollack, 2005:p.368)

In light of this academic fracas, what positives do these respective approaches bring to the field of European Integration/EU studies? Outside the 'negative' meta-theoretical project what 'positive' insights can constructivist approaches offer? And, can these insights sit congruently in any meaningful sense with established rationalist scholarship? Risse (2010:p.159) suggests that both approaches can give complimentary accounts of differing strands within a given phenomena. His contention is that actors within the EU often employ various 'logics of action', so they may indeed have rational preferences, but that is levied by their embedded disposition in a society constitutive of collective identities. To this end, Risse (2010:p.157) provides sociological-institutionalist research that demonstrates that the normative obligations embedded within the EUs collective identity (i.e sharing commitments to rule of law, democracy, human rights etc) on the one hand, and rational, egoisitic preferences on the other, explain the difficulties faced by the existing EU members leading up to the eastern enlargement in 2004. The thought is that a given EU phenomenon can be researched profitably along both approaches.

Marcussen et al (1999:p.631) offer a positive project to 'explain continuity and change in the extent to which 'Europe' enters collective nation state identities in the discourses among political élites'. Counter to the prevailing literature, the study (empirically centred) reveals that the British example shows little convergence with any 'European' state identity, whereas the French and German examples have more integrated European identities. The research, as expected of a constructivist approach, centres upon a 'resonance' assumption, in which 'they (ideas) resonate with given and pre-existing consensual identity constructions and concepts of political order embedded in a country's institutions and political culture.' (Marcussen et al, 1999:p.631 my parentheses). It may be reasonably concluded that the constructivist movements in EU scholarship, although broadly speaking a meta-theoretical endeavor (Risse & Wiener, 1999:p.778), holds genuinely valuable insights - positively applicable to the study of EU political affairs.

Rationalist approaches in political science have an embedded and rich history of empirical study. Liberal intergovernmentalism proficiently and exhaustively explains the creation of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in the 1960s. 'Intense preferences, clear positive-sum benefits, and clear credible commitment problems' (Moravcsik & Schimmelfenning, 2010:p.76) create the ideal conditions for the application of intergovernmentalism to give accurate explanatory power. That the French and German farming interests converged so closely, and the resulting CAP was a decentralized and further removed article than the Commission had bargained for (Moravscik & Schimmelfing, 2010:p.79), gives credence to liberal intergovernmentalisms early explanatory efficacy. The more recent insights gained by comparative politics (Hix, 1999:p.357) on the multi-level governance structure and 'politics' within the EU, reveal the processional nature of executive politics

in the Council, the legislative politics of the Council and European Parliament, and the judicial politics of the European Court of Justice. The remaining taxonomy of rationalist approaches (including Realist, Neo Liberalist, Federalist approaches etc) are beyond the scope (and size) of this work, although the rationalist strand of institutionalism will be explored in the next part of this essay. So it remains, as demonstrated, that amid the antinomical skirmish between rationalists and constructivists, there is a shared striving to explain the integration process/EU politics.

The reconciliation of this striving (as outlined at the beginning) is the emergence of institutionalism across both structure-biased (constructivist) and agency-biased (rationalist) approaches. Broadly, institutionalism across the corpus of EU studies is disparate, with diverging disciplinary origins straddling two dimensions of institutional analysis (Jupille & Caporaso, 1999:p.431-33). The first dimension describes the role of institutions in the building of theory – institutions are either endogeneous or exogeneous in position, they are either the dependent or the independent variable. If the former, it is the institution(s) itself being explained, if the latter it concerns how the institution might 'structure incentives, instantiate norms, define roles, prescribe or proscribe behaviour' (Jupille & Caporaso, 1999:p.432). The first dimension is therefore drawn along ontological lines. The second dimension is that of actor preference. Again, the ontological division is demarcated by preferences being either endogeneous or exogeneous to institutions. The key for Jupille and Caporaso is that it would be difficult to imagine what an institution free world would look like, and thus regardless of the ontological foundation of a theory, be it rationalist or constructivist, is still thought of in terms of its institutions.

This framework provides a condition for the possibility of some meaningful reconciliation between the structure-agency antinomy. Subsequent to this work by Caporaso and Jupille, Thelen (1999:p.369) undertakes a 'borrowing' of perspectives in institutional analysis, akin to a harmonizing of historical and rational choice variants of institutionalism. By synthesizing the rational choice emphasis on institutional mechanisms as static (sustaining equilibria), and the historical emphasis on institutions as emerging and shaping over time, Thelen suggests a fruitful 'borrowing' from different perspectives,

'…one can imagine conceiving and analyzing consequential policy collisions as "nested games", for example employing some of the tools of rational choice to sort out the logic of the situation and the responses of the actors…It will not, however, substitute for the process oriented analysis that is characteristic of historical institutionalism, which is often the only way to understand how some games came to be nested within others in the first place .'

(Thelen, 1999:p.400)

Jupille et al (2003:p.7-8) extend this logic and make a case for the integration of institutional research across the rationalist/constructivist divide in European Union scholarship. Crucially, this juncture is a consequence of their belief that the meta-theoretical debate has run its course, and should be substituted for 'theoretical, methodological, and carefully structured empirical dialogue' (Jupille et al,2003:p.8). Jubilee and Caporaso (1999:p.440) had already alluded to this ambition. By appealing to both sides of the Political Science spectrum (IR and Comparative Politics), they effectively steer themselves away from the more specialized and parochial applications in IR and comparative politics, and embrace more generic forms of institutionalism.

The subsequent reproach to meta-theory, and 'bridging strategies' (Jupille et al, 2003:p.11) proposed for integrating rationalist and constructivist approaches, took a further cue from the 'heated debate occurring more generally' between rationalist and constructivist scholars. This is of course an acknowledgment of the 'tribal warfare' between Moravcsik and Risse et al. As such, Pollack (2004:p.363) also identified this ontological antagonism, and indeed identified the work of Jupille et al (2003) as narrowing the meta-theoretical gulf between rationalists and constructivists. With the ontological/epistemological problem in mind, Jupille et al (2003:p.24-30) sketch an outline for theoretical integration (dialogue) matrix, comprising of four models of dialogue. The idea runs that by increasing methodological transparency, the tension between 'theory and evidence' and 'epistemology' will be eased. Admittedly, the notion is given naturally to a more positivistic disposition, however Jupille et al (2003:p.24) are careful to note that theory and 'evidence' do not, of necessity, entail empirical evidence. Rather, the model allows for: parsimony, normative validity, deductive power and so on, as criteria to measure proofs against. Furthermore the model is amenable to both statistical and qualitative information to accommodate and aid the differing strands of research design. The four modes of dialogue: 'competitive testing', 'domain of application', 'sequencing approach' and 'subsumption' - outline a framework for comparison, juxtaposing theories against 'rules of the game'.

Prior to this, Checkel and Moravcsik (2001) had advanced a paper whereby Checkel outlines a proposal program for constructivist research design, emphasizing a 'substantive theory and operationalization' for 'self-styled constructivists of the middle ground' (Checkel & Moravcsik, 2001:p.219-220). The thought is to advance a theory of social interaction, 'as a process during which agent interests, and perhaps identities, change. Rational choice has little to say about these core actor properties as it is premised upon a strong form of methodological individualism that reduces interaction to strategic exchange with pre-social givens.' (Kratochwil & Ruggie, 1986:p.707 in Checkel & Moravcsik, 2001:p.220). Checkel then offers five scope conditions that determine when actors will become open to socialization and preference change, and a qualitative empirical methodology, incorporating interviews, media content analysis and official document analysis. This scheme of 'theoretically and methodologically self conscious' research is then submitted back to Moravcsik for methodological scrutiny. In a similar fashion, Jupille et al (2003) and Checkel and

Moravcsik (2001) have made conscious, conciliatory gestures toward a methodological synthesis between rationalist and constructivist approaches to EU scholarship. A post 'meta-theoretical impasse' endeavor should be what Rosamond (2000:p.189) describes as one of 'enterprise to play the requisite academic 'games' successfully'. Certainly, the prospect of closer and more cohesive scholarship between constructivists and rationalists, filtered through the institutionalist turn is, to a larger degree, a more fruitful prospect than the standard meta-theoretical alternative.

This essay has examined the onset of an ontological antagonism between constructivist social theory, and rationalist political science that had descended into a meta-theoretical 'dialogue of the deaf' (Pollack, 2005: p.368). In light of this it has advanced the view that the work of Jupille et al (2003) and in extension, of Checkel and Moravcsik (2001), are viable options for, if not a synthesis or bridging, then at the very least more meaningful dialogue between the two disciplines. Constructivist social theory brings valuable insights to EU scholarship, most notably the idea of mutual constitutiveness between structure and agency (Risse, 2010: p.151). Meta-theory can in addition, either help set up a fruitful future research agenda (Risse & Wiener, 1999:p.777) or obstinately subvert the value of the positivist project in political science. Certainly the objections of Moravcsik (1999a) (1999b), and Checkel and Moravcsik (2001), indicate a desire to readdress the balance between theories and ontology, and in so doing create a higher and more rigorous standard through which constructivist theories can be properly tested.

However, an irony arises in virtue of this essays endeavor. Chryssochoou (1999:p.126) writes, 'for the EU project to be subjected to effective normative scrutiny…the existing body of integration theory should become a object of study and/or a subject matter in its own right.' By attending to this matter explicitly in the essay, the project is by default a normative one. What is crucial to note however, is that while a reconciliation of normative and explanatory approaches are explored through refining (and ultimately a reduction) the methodology (as advanced by Jupille et al (2003) & Moravscik & Checkel (2001)), not all theories should automatically give themselves over to an institutional project as described. Checkel (2006:p.70) advises a call 'for conceptual and metatheoretical pluralism in the constructivist study of Europe' – and not a unity. The latter would be a 'recipe for a make-everyone-happy analytical and conceptual mush.' This circumspective position allows the meta-theorist to maintain a detached and critical eye on the one hand, yet constructively engage with the political scientist on the other. To this end, Wiener and Diez (2010:p.251) describe European integration theory as an unfinished mosaic, one that will never be finished. If this is indeed the case, it speaks volumes for the nature of the EU as a phenomenon, and the trajectory of EU scholarship as a whole.

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Neoliberalism and 'Third Way' politics

The political spectrum today has moved beyond the ideological distinction between left and right. Discuss.

(Written for Political Sociology 2010/2011. Sociology Department. Dr Alana Lentin)

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Abstract: This essay attempts to explain the concept of ideology, intervening in the debate suggesting distinctions between left and right ideologies have been rendered meaningless in the contemporary political environment. I attempt to show, through the work of Italian political philosopher Norberto Bobbio, that these terms are indeed still pertinent. I argue that the debate surrounding the perceived redundancy of these terms is in itself ideologically motivated and entwined with the historically contingent factors, namely the development of neoliberal hegemony occurring since the 1980s. I attempt to argue that neoliberalism displays characteristics associated with the right of the political spectrum and I suggest that the 'Third Way' politics, which is cited as evidence of the redundancy of left/right ideological distinctions, largely supports the dominant neoliberal ideology. I analyse the record of the New Labour government within the UK to argue that the 'Third way' politics which was utilised by the Blair administration firmly supported neoliberal policies, and the debate surrounding the end of 'left' and 'right' merely masks a failure of the old social democratic left to adequately represent those in favour of 'left' policies. I show that despite its domination the neoliberal hegemonic order is being challenged globally, and that the debate surrounding the redundancy of the terms 'left' and 'right' is simply ephemeral.

For any discussion on the utility of the ideological distinctions of left and right within 21st century politics, it is clear that one must first define the concept of ideology itself and that of left and right ideologies in particular. The concept of ideology grew out of the French Enlightenment and its greater desire to understand the social world through reason; with the term first appearing in the work of philosopher Antoine Destutt de Tracy as being used principally to describe a "science of ideas" (Vincent 1995, p.1). The term began to be used in political discussion frequently from 1800, first denoting attachment to liberal republican ideas whilst holding negative connotations of intellectual detachment and sympathies for violent radicalism, with it eventually becoming to refer to any kind of political doctrine. Marx developed the concept further, using it in a disparaging manner in his critique of German Idealism, using the term to denote "not only practical ineffectiveness but also illusion and

loss of reality," with it further becoming to be associated with "the domination and power of certain classes" and with 'bourgeois ideology' in particular (Vincent 1995, p.3).

The concept was further developed by Lenin, proposing 'socialism' as an ideology in opposition to that of 'bourgeois ideology'; removing the negative connotations the term had held previously with that of bourgeois class domination. Further important developments in the concept of Ideology are those of Antonio Gramsci and Georg Lukacs. Both see ideology as being "deeply embedded in all social, economic and political life... embedded within language and culture" (Vincent 1995, p.7). For Gramsci, ideology is the tool by which the capitalist system dominates; through the hegemony of the ruling classes and the mass acceptance, or naturalisation of their ideas by ordinary people (Vincent 1995, p.7). The importance of ideology in social control from this perspective cannot be understated; for Gramsci, destruction of bourgeois hegemony has to be challenged at the level of ideology. This theorising of ideology developed into the popularly held concept of ideology as a political doctrine, but with versions which are diametrically opposed.

It is now clearly essential to at least attempt to define those ideological oppositions, namely what is meant by the terms 'left' and 'right' ideologies. 'Left' and 'Right' ideologies are terms which have come to represent political views which are mutually exclusive and in opposition; the horizontal metaphor created describe a bifurcated political sphere in Europe since the French Revolution (Bobbio 1996, p.39). The terms have connotations which may be positive or negative depending on perspective, yet the words themselves contain no value judgements. Yet a definition of what represents either 'left' or 'right' ideologies would appear to be difficult without taking into account contingent and historical factors; left and right can mean different things, in different spaces, in different times. The 'right' can stand to represent conservatism, nationalism, clericalism, traditionalism, as much as it can to stand for both fascism and liberalism in certain situations. The 'left' is equally diffuse representing egalitarianism, secularism, socialism, radicalism as well as both anarchism and welfare capitalism. Despite the difficulty in successfully articulating a precise definition, it has been suggested by political philosophers such as Norberto Bobbio that 'left' and 'right' ideology can be reduced to the drive towards 'equality' compared with 'inequality' (Bobbio 1996, p.54). Whilst Anthony Giddens would seem to suggest that 'left' and 'right' were distinguishable by 'radicalism' against 'traditionalism'(Giddens 1995). It would be easy to get caught up in this debate, however, it is clear that descriptions of what 'left' and 'right' ideologies have broadly stood to represent in the period after WWII can be made. The 'left' has represented ideologies which advocated state socialism or social democracy with Keynesian economic models, in opposition to the 'right' ideologies of anti-communism and neo-liberal free market models.

The end of 'really existing socialism' in the Soviet Union and across Eastern Europe prompted a wave of response from commentators, notably that of Francis Fukuyama, who proclaimed

that the collapse of state socialism may usher "the end of history...the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalisation of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government" (Fukuyama 1989, p.1). What Fukuyama means to say is that any alternative to Western liberal democracy, and its twin, a neoliberal economic system, would no longer be possible. Fukuyama suggests that this is an "unabashed victory of economic and political liberalism", ostensibly a massive symbolic victory for the right, destroying the ideology of state socialism and discrediting the left to the point that the term was argued to be meaningless (Fukuyama 1989).

For Giddens, the terms 'left' and 'right' have become redundant in the face of massive social changes he suggests are caused by globalisation; the development of what he describes as increased social reflexivity, the appearance of a 'risk-society' and loss of societal tradition (Giddens 1995, pp.78-86). He argues that tradition is "vital to conservatism" and that in a de-traditionalised society, tradition can no longer be defended as this leads to fundamentalism. He suggests that those on the conservative right have now become radical, breaking with tradition and dismantling institutions and that "conservatism has collapsed" (Giddens 1995, p.49).

With regards to the 'left' of the political spectrum, Giddens argues that socialism has become consigned to the past and that it has rejected radicalism and turned its attention to the preservation of social institutions, such as the welfare state. In short, he argues that socialists have become conservative, and conservatives have become radical. He suggests that a "drawing-back from the ambitions of the Enlightenment is surely necessary," and with that the distinctions of 'left' and 'right' (Giddens 1995, p.79). He argues that deindustrialisation and globalisation have been key factors in this alteration in the political landscape, processes which have been advancing since the 1980s (Giddens 1995, pp.51-81). Much of Giddens assertions are in no doubt a response to the failure of the parliamentary 'left' throughout this period.

Neither socialists nor social democrats in most of Western Europe enjoyed much success from the 1980s, with much of popular political opinion swinging towards the right. As the collapse of post-war Keynesian economic policies pushed right-wing governments, like the Thatcher government in Britain, towards monetarism social democratic parties turned in on themselves' throughout the continent. A wave of revisionism took place in France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux, with social democratic parties abandoning old redistributive policies; a response to the programs of deregulation and market liberalisation that were taking place under the right-wing governments in power across the continent (Driver and Martell 2006, pp.40-41). The left essentially began to undergo what has been termed 'neo-revisionism', a period whereby European 'socialists' rejected their old values and in Donald Sassoon's view decided,

that markets should be regulated by legislation and not through state ownership...accepting that the object of socialism is not the abolition of capitalism, but its co-existence with social justice (Driver and Martell, 2006, p. 42).

This move towards 'neo-revisionism', or abandonment of socialism is even more marked in the reform of the Labour Party in the UK. 'New Labour' has developed what has been termed as 'Third Way' politics, a term which by definition attempts to makes redundant the old ideological distinctions between 'left' and 'right.'

This 'Third Way' politics, which theorists such as Giddens espouse, claims to walk a new path between left and right. It is a term which is at the heart of the discussion regarding the apparent transcendence of left and right, and their redundancy as ideological distinctions. It has been embraced by New Labour in the UK, and is has been copied by other social democrats throughout Europe. Alex Callinicos' critique of Third Way politics suggests that New Labour betrays any ideals of equality; ideals Bobbio suggests are definitive of the left (Driver and Martell 2000, p.148). The pursuit of 'equality of opportunity' rather than any tangible redistributive policies simply marks a continuation of the Thatcherite neoliberal economic policies (Wood 2001). Alan Ryan, another critic of 'Third Way' politics, argues that at the core of this politics is neoliberalism, characterised by reduced intervention in the marketplace, yet combined with an almost authoritarian intervention in the social sphere, in areas such as crime and education (Giddens 2001, p.14). These characteristics of what has been argued to be the rejuvenation, or modernisation, of the left would certainly appear to embody characteristics more commonly associated with ideologies at the right of the political spectrum.

However, the type of 'Third Way' politics produced by New Labour is argued by some to be held together firmly by social democratic principles; that if anything New Labour's 'Third Way' is leftist in its ideology and practice. Driver and Martell argue that New Labour's acceptance of a neoliberal economic agenda did not eradicate their social democratic principles, and that,

 New Labour has proved business-friendly, but the government has placed significant limits on the market and free enterprise to address traditional social democratic concerns around low pay, poverty, the length of the working day and balance between work and family life...these policies...show a government that combines free market policies with social democratic instincts (Driver and Martell 2006, p.185).

Whilst one cannot deny that policies such as the adoption of a minimum wage and the EU working time directive took place under New Labour, it is important to look at the real outcomes of their time in government to ascertain which ideology was motivating them. It would be useful to recall Bobbio's distinction of left/right in terms of equality/inequality when approaching New Labour's record. The New Labour government oversaw a period in which inequality of income in

Britain rose dramatically, with the top 20% now earning more than seven times that of the bottom 20%; and the top 1% increasing their share of the countries' total wealth from 17% to 21%. There was also a massive increase in the dominance of the financial sector and coupled with its continued deregulation, the City became "'Wall Street's Guantanamo'", a place where dubious practices were overlooked in the name of non-intervention in the marketplace. (Wood 2010, pp.13-14) As Tony Wood argues, that under New Labour,

for the bulk of the population, low wages and flexibilization have increasingly become the norm, thanks to non-enforcement of the minimum wage and what Blair lauded as 'the most lightly regulated labour market of any leading economy in the world'. (Wood 2010, p.13)

It can be argued that the social democratic principles which Driver and Martell allude to, at the end of the day amounted to "little more than electoral window dressing," and were ultimately superceded by the need to carry through a 'right' neoliberal agenda (Wood 2010, p.13). That in fact 'Third Way' politics, in the UK and elsewhere, neither treads a middle ground, or leans marginally to the left, but is firmly driven by a neoliberal ideology; a 'right' ideology.

This imagining of a 'Third Way', the creating of that special ideological place that claims to exist between the great dichotomies of left and right that had dominated political thought since at least the late 18th century, seemed to broadly coincide with the widespread proliferation of neoliberal ideology among most states throughout the globe. From the Thatcher/Reaganite revulsions to the dominant Keynesian social democracies of the post-war period, neoliberal ideology has spread over the globe, through the 'economic shock therapy' in post-Soviet Russia, to the significant retreat of the welfare state in Sweden. Neoliberal policies have come to be adopted, where they can, sometimes through coercion or sometimes through choice, almost on a widespread basis (Harvey 2007, p.14). The hegemony of neoliberalism as a totalising ideology cannot be understated. Through its advocacy in the media, in academia, in parliamentary politics, in business, it has come to dominate social life; it has become naturalised, it has come to represent the common-sense of ordinary people. Through global institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank, who since the early 1980s have been dominated by neoliberal monetarist economists, virtually all states globally have been forced to agree to their neoliberal agenda, or face being extradited from the global community (Harvey 2007, pp.2-14). Governments espousing 'Third Way' politics have been faced with the same pressures and whilst ostensibly forging a new path, have in fact been retracing familiar steps on the road to privatisation, welfare cuts, increased dominance of the financial sector and attacks on employment rights and real wage levels (Harvey 2007, p.18).

The development of New Labour's neoliberal credentials is asserted as proof that the political spectrum in terms of parliamentary politics has moved beyond ideological distinctions of left and right. For some in effect the right has won. The argument that we have moved 'beyond left and right' would

appear to stem from the failure of the left, in terms of both state socialism and of social democracy. As Norberto Bobbio argues, this debate does not arise when both left and right appear equally balanced and can command support of large sections of the population. It is only when one ideology or other assumes hegemony it seeks to eradicate potential alternatives; suggesting that it is "the only game in town" (Bobbio 1996, p.viii). This would appear to describe the current situation with regards to parliamentary politics; with the suggestion the terms are redundant due to the 'death of ideology'. There is now supposedly basic political agreement 'across the political spectrum' on the benefits of neoliberalism. Moreover, it is suggested that the marginalised nature of any parliamentary representation of what could commonly be described as the left has made ideology redundant; the political game is now to be played firmly in the 'centre', and that the pluralistic and fragmented nature of politics, and ideas, means that dichotomies such as left and right are useless (Bobbio 1996, p.3-5).

Giddens assertion that ideological distinctions of left and right are meaningless appears to have its own ideological basis when he suggests that, "the idea that the 'irrationalities' of capitalist enterprise can be overcome by the socialising of production can no longer be defended," that any attempt at collective action against the goals of neoliberalism is unacceptable (Giddens 1995, p. 67). He begins to suggest that global disparities are not the result of concerted attacks on poorer regions globally by those in the wealthy Northern hemisphere, and evens goes as far to argue that the dominance of monopoly capitalism is weakened by globalisation; "the demonising of large corporations...does not make sense now"(Giddens 1995, p. 89). Giddens shows that at the heart of his attempt to destroy the ideological distinctions of left and right, there would appear to be at least a degree of sympathy with the neoliberal agenda.

I will again return to Bobbio's definition of left/right in terms of equality/inequality. It can clearly be shown that there is a wealth of political activity occurring today which strives towards egalitarian goals in response to the stark inequalities lauded by proponents of hegemonic neoliberalism. It is clear that neoliberalism leads to, and indeed demands, through the fetishisation of competition, inequality. It is clear neoliberalism is a right-wing ideology (Harvey 2007). There are many social movements today, both locally and globally, which operate to restore equality. These movements are diverse and wide ranging, operating in all fields of political activity, but all follow a left-wing ideology. They are not fringe movements without any real importance, but have managed to successfully struggle against the domination of neoliberalism. Municipal socialism in Latin America has been able to react against neoliberal reforms from central government in enacting real reforms within their jurisdictions, including fiscal redistribution, extension of public services and welfare, and the provision of 'micro-credit.' One of the main characteristics of this broad movement has reliance on participatory politics, from public meetings on spending, to cooperative provision of services such as housing and nurseries. All this has been achieved against hostile reactions from neoliberal commentators and central governments (Goldfrank and Schrank 2009, p.452).

The Movimiento Intersindical Clasista is another example of a political movement which operates on egalitarian principles; this cooperative movement of workers promoting the virtues of self-management was able from 2007 to control some 170 factories across Argentina (Svampa 2008, p.89). These movements are not solitary, there are popular autonomous community movements to organise, to self-manage, to redistribute wealth and power, developing across Latin America and beyond (Trigona 2007, pp.107-114).

Even within the parliamentary sphere in Europe there still remains sizeable representation of the old social democratic left. In Germany, die Linke (The Left), a party borne of a merger of socialist parties has managed to increase its representation in the German Bundestag to over 10%, forming a sizeable opposition party under Germany's proportional representation system. (German Bundestag 2011) In the UK, community mobilisation has taken place against governmental cuts; with local and national anti-cuts alliances formed of students, public sector workers, pensioners all united in protest against the furthering of the neoliberal agenda which is taking place in the wake of the financial crisis and is egalitarian in its outlook (Henderson and Buchanan 2011). As well as these movements, both locally and globally, which promote 'left' ideologies, there are many exponents of left-wing ideology in academia; anarchists, Marxists, traditional social democrats. And there are many more people who share these views in wider society. Their lack of representation in contemporary parliamentary politics in the UK indicates a failing of some kind, but it does not indicate a failure with the ideological distinctions. The lack of clear left and right ideologies within party politics at this historical moment does not mean that the distinction will not return to that specific domain of political activity. The impact of the financial crisis of 2008 is yet to be felt within wider society. The crisis and the furthering of the neoliberal agenda in the form of barbarous governmental spending cuts may well lead to changes within party politics which will reassert the voice of the left, and hopefully once again put an end to this debate regarding the death of 'left' and 'right'.

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Three's a Crowd – The Incompatibility of Socialism, Capitalism and Democracy

Is it possible to be both socialist and democratic, or are the two contradictory?

(Written for The Death of Socialism? 2011/2012. Politics Department. Prof. Luke Martell)

Emma Lucy Aston

Abstract: This paper looks into the problems that the ideology of Social Democracy has had and is having in promoting the spread of socialism through democracy within global market capitalism, and come to the conclusion that it is not possible for socialism, capitalism and democracy to co-exist harmoniously. It looks into the real-world situation of Social Democracy and also to a normative dimension. By assessing the concepts as ideals, and considering Marx's distinction between 'political' and 'human' emancipation, it distinguishes between 'real' and 'bourgeois' democracy, finally arguing that 'real' democracy cannot exist within the confines of a capitalist world order.

Socialism and democracy are ambiguous concepts, but, as this essay will be arguing, there is nothing inherently contradictory about them. Socialism is a political movement, born from the excesses of its opponent: capitalism (Ake:1992:35). It aimed to make the economic affairs of society belong to the public sphere, seeing that this would generate greater equality and freedom (Schumpter:1996:150). Democracy, in an abstract sense, is a procedure for making political decisions that recognises the autonomy of individuals by letting those who will be affected make the decisions themselves (Schumpter:1960:250) .

This essay will come to the conclusion that socialism and democracy are not contradictory, by splitting into three parts. The first part will look into social democracy as an attempt at combining the two concepts and how it is finding the environment that it exists within problematic. Trying to practically combine socialism and democracy is made tougher within capitalist global markets. The second part of the essay will look at the ideologies of the two concepts, showing how they only appear contradictory when one confuses their functions as concepts. It will explain how democracy is actually a deeply socialist principle, using Marx's distinction between 'political' and 'human' emancipation to illustrate this. Social democrats, the essay will argue, are an example of a movement that are only

concerned with political emancipation. The final part will explain how there are two different realisations of democracy at play in this essay, socialist democracy and bourgeois democracy. Social democracy, by being concerned with political emancipation and private property, acts within bourgeois democracy. It is for this reason that social democracy appears to prove that socialism and democracy are not compatible, as it wrongly attempts to incorporate capitalism into its ideology when these three concepts are certainly unsuited.

This first part of the essay will analyse how socialism and democracy have fared when practically combined, looking at one of the main two types of actually existing socialism: social democracy (Hobsbawm:1991:19). The Soviet communist systems had a dictatorial tendency and denied true political democracy (Halliday:2009). Though they are often used to demonstrate that socialism doesn't require democracy, they are not useful for this essay, as they were not aiming towards a full realisation of democracy, and therefore cannot be looked at for a demonstration of whether democracy and socialism worked within them.

Social democracy, however, is perfect for an analysis of the practical compatibility of socialism and democracy, as an integral feature of social democracy is the acceptance of democracy as part of the ends that it is aspiring to (Berger:2002:21). Its roots lie in a revision of classical socialism (Gray:1996:24) and aims to tie capital into arrangements through state power and organised numbers (Pierson:2001:68-69) in such a way as to generate greater equality and alter the distribution of wealth (Pierson:2001:125). Rosa Luxemburg explained that the key difference between it and classical socialism is that social democracy does not question the notion of private ownership of the means of production (Berger:2002:14).

However, attempting to reach socialist goals through the established democratic institutions has meant that social democracy has had to embrace global markets, which makes it appear weak (Gray:1998:99). Global freedom of capital undermines the economic foundations of social democracy (Gray:1996:26) and globalisation itself appears to make social welfare difficult to pursue, unless on a rudimentary level (Pierson:2001:86). The global aspect of capitalism makes it difficult for states to pursue national policies without losing competitiveness. In fact, the state-centric aspect of social democracy is heavily criticised as being 'old left' and placing too much emphasis on redistribution instead of creating wealth in the first place, by modernisers on the social democratic path (Driver et al:2000:149).

Social democracy is having a rough time of it: some even go as far as to say its dead (Gray:1998:99). However, its challenge is the capitalist backdrop that it's trying to coexist with. The pressure of the international market and free capital is too much for social democracy to act as a buffer against, and the movement's perceived failings are not down to it itself, but this environment it must survive in.

Having seen that capitalism makes life tough for those that try to combine socialism and democracy practically, the next part of the essay will be looking at the two concepts on a purely ideological level and arguing that there is nothing inherent about them that makes them incompatible; the two concepts only appear contradictory when one confuses their roles. Democracy is a means-orientated concept, a political method of arranging institutions in a way that the 'demos' may partake in political decisions (Schumpter:1996:242). This implies that it cannot be seen as an end, a goal to be aimed at, but only adopted as a mode to arrive at ends. This is where social democrats, like Bernstein, get confused, as they wrongly put democracy in the position of being an end itself (Berger:2002:21). They simultaneously consider representative democracy as being both the means and the ends (Przeworski:1980:31) and enter into politics in order to win elections and to reform or legislate socialist society into existence (Przeworski:1980:33). Socialism and democracy appear contradictory as concepts when one confuses their functional roles.

An argument against socialism and democracy being compatible, is that when one considers democracy as it should be, as a range of possibilities and content (Ake:1992:34), then there is nothing inherent within socialism preventing it, like the Soviet bloc, being undemocratic as there is nothing intrinsic to socialism that specifies procedure; socialism is itself an end goal (Schumpter:1996:238). However, Wright argues that this is not true. In ideal democracy, state power is instead social power and this power is in direct contrast to economic power, which is upheld by private ownership under capitalism, and is socialist, as it refers to the exercise through which resources are allocated in a socialist society, when the means of production are owned collectively (Wright:2006:93). The inference here is that democracy is a deeply socialist principle. When economic power and state power are replaced by social power, then we have a form of democratic organisation, as the power over how the state is run and resources are given out is held by society as a whole. Indeed, the kratos (power) is held by the demos (people) and demos-kratos (democracy) exists in its purest form.

We can look at Marx to illustrate how democracy and socialism are not intrinsically contradictory, but could appear so. For him, both the Soviet bloc and the social democrats would have it wrong. Marx saw a great distinction between what he called 'political' emancipation and 'human' emancipation, the latter being true freedom and existing through socialist society (Marx:1844). The social democrats are too hung up over what Marx would have called 'political emancipation', which he felt could only make people free within the "prevailing scheme of things" (Marx:1844). By making winning elections and legislation their vehicles of driving socialism, they make the mistake of being subsumed into the scheme of things, and try to change things from inside. Human emancipation is only possible when the private life of man is made social (Marx:1844), in other words, when the conflict inside of man between the general interest and private interest is overcome (Marx:1844) and civil society is rejected, as it is the sphere within which man behaves as egoistic (Marx:1844). What Marx is saying, is that when we are politically emancipated, we are still split between the market,

where we pursue individual goals and follow private wills, and the state, where one is expected to see oneself as a member of a community, and act in a way that drives the common good of all. Social democrats seek to democratise the state, thereby pushing political emancipation but never reaching to human emancipation, as to do this, society as a whole must be democratized (Held:2006:109) not only the state but the markets too. The Soviet bloc clearly falls at this hurdle too, as Marx explains that it is only through democracy that human emancipation is realized, as human emancipation is 'true' democracy (Pierson:1986:26).

In summary, socialism and democracy are not only compatible, but necessary for the each others existence. Marx saw democracy as the only way of uniting two principles which he saw as conflicting: the universal and the particular (Marx:1843-44), and thus being the only way to true human freedom. Marx's conception of socialist society is clearly democratic as Engels even went as far as to say that democracy is communism, as democracy is a principle of the masses (Engles:1845). Socialism is an end goal and democracy is a means to an end, thus proving them compatible, but trying to combine them in capitalist society is wrong, as neither can be fully realised and only political emancipation can be achieved.

We have asserted so far that, ideologically, socialism and democracy are not contradictory, though they have appeared so when attempts have been made to unite them in real, practical situations. Marx saw attempts at democratization within current institutions as political emancipation, explaining that it is only when human emancipation occurs that we will see the true compatibility of socialism and democracy. As human emancipation cannot happen within the free market system, all attempts to combine socialism and democracy will not work. Socialism and democracy are contradictory when attempting to coexist within capitalism, but would be compatible if they were to be co-established in a society where human emancipation has been achieved, and free market capitalism no longer survives.

This last part of the essay will explain how the social democrats, by attempting to combine socialism and democracy within capitalism, actually champion a bourgeois realisation of democracy, entrenching the negative relations that exist within capitalism and undermining the socialist aspect of their goal. There are two interpretations of democracy at play here: socialist democracy and bourgeois/capitalist democracy. Whereas only true socialist democracy aims for self-government by the masses in a post-capitalist state, social democrats, by accepting private property, are supporting capitalist bourgeois democracy (Berger:2002:14). Private property and private control over the means of production concrete the relations that exist within capitalist society, of one class exploiting another and having strong influence upon political affairs, and this leads to the conclusion that there cannot be true democracy while that power exists (Schumpter:1996:235) as the demos aren't equal and, therefore, social democrats are utilising the wrong type of democracy. Pierson explains that though

Marx was supportive of the struggle to ameliorate the immediate condition of the workers through the expansion of democracy, to arrive at their 'political emancipation', he never thought that this reform of institutions would eventually lead to socialism without a revolutionary break (Pierson:1986:24); democracy and the state are incompatible, true democracy requires the annihilation of the political state (Marx:1843-44).

Thus, democracy, to classical Marxists, means more than what bourgeois democracy can provide. Integral to the co-existence of socialism and democracy is the removal of capitalism, but the social democrats, by aiming for a combination of socialism and democracy through bourgeois democracy, only entrench capitalism and, therefore, can never arrive at human emancipation. The "poisonous fumes" of capitalism that asphyxiate democracy must be removed, in order to bring it to life in its true form (Schumpter:1996:236). It is not socialism and democracy that are contradictory, though they may appear so; socialism and democracy are only incompatible with the addition of capitalism.

In conclusion, this essay has argued that socialism and democracy are not contradictory concepts. Though they appear incompatible when looking at the example of the social democratic movement, ideologically, it is clear that democracy is socialist and socialism is democratic because it is only through abolishing the institutions that force us to split into private individuals and public members of society that we can have pure democracy, and rule ourselves as equals. Social democracy makes its own existence questionable, by accepting private property and, therefore, only adhering to a bourgeois democracy that entrenches capitalism. The capitalist global market, in turn, makes it tough for social democrats to carry out anything social, as it demands competitiveness. Social democrats are stuck in a dark place with two ways out: carry on trying to force this awkward triangle of capitalism, socialism and democracy into their round hole, eventually succumbing to the fact that capitalism will win out overall; or, join the Marxists and truly unite the two concepts in a happy union of real socialism and true democracy in post-capitalist society.

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Hegel and the State

According to Hegel, how does the modern state actualize freedom?

(Written for Modern Political Thought 2010/2011. Politics Department. Dr. James Hampshire)

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Abstract: In this essay focused on the nineteenth century German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, the link between the state and the degree of freedom enjoyed by the individual, the citizen, is explored. In particular, Hegel's ideas on how the state enables freedom to be actualized are addressed. It was Hegel's view that the idea of the state, concurrent both to the ideas of freedom of the individual as well as of the philosophical human 'mind', progressed through time in four sequential stages or *Volksgeister*s (those being "Oriental", "Greek", "Roman", and finally the modern "Germanic" state). It is demonstrated in this essay how each of these stages of human political community in Hegel's view had at their core a distinct relationship between the will of the individual and the will of the community. It is shown how Hegel identifies aspects and characteristics of the relationship between individual and communal will within each successive *Volksgeister* that are new to that stage, or are developed as a response to the structure of the previous *Volksgeister*. As a result, these four state relationship structures yielded progressively different levels of freedom. The essay ends by demonstrating Hegel's arguments for the "Germanic" or modern state actualizing freedom with a final look at what, for Hegel, makes a state "rational".

It is Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's belief that the modern state is the only phenomenon of political organisation that actualizes freedom. When physically writing the Philosophy of Right in the Germanic realm, Hegel perceived himself to be residing in the manifestation of what he considered the modern state (Knowles, 2002: 78). No other human invention until its conception, in his view, has ever been able to fulfill the criterion required for freedom. Hegel's conception of the modern state is a hybrid; it is neither liberal nor totalitarian but it combines both individual and communitarian features (Hampshire, 2010). In his view, a person is only completely free when they are able to exercise their particular will and immediately and always find that it is recognised by the community in which they live, as well as by its social institutions. These institutions are, for instance, laws and ethics found in the modern state (Hampshire, 2010). The modern state must have a system of laws, and as Hegel (1830: §538) said the laws of the modern state "express the special provisions

for objective freedom". Objective freedom is true freedom. Subjective yet liberal (Hampshire, 2010) as well as reason-based freedom are both freedoms to be enjoyed by the individual, but for Hegel they are insufficient when isolated. If they were to come together this would create objective, or true, freedom. According to Hegel, this unification can only occur in the modern state. Moreover, history (and the purpose of history) is also crucial in this issue for Hegel. Within history, Hegel advocated that there is a progression of the human mind (translating as Geist, or alternately as 'spirit'), and since in his view mind has an objective dimension in social structures (Knowles 2002: 14), it will be shown in the exploration of historical and cultural progression of states how mind also comes to actualize freedom in the modern state.

The modern state in Hegel's view is the culmination of the evolutionary process, following both a spatial and historical tract moving in a westwards (Knowles, 2002: 78) direction that saw a sequence of attempts to organise the relationships between institutions, the community and the individual. Hegel sees this world history as a succession of four key cultures, or Volksgeisters, with each culture representing a newer stage of consciousness - the consciousness of human freedom (Avineri, 1972: 222). It is observed that each of these four world historical stages gradually introduces new, or corrects failing, features of freedom and features of the state that were not present in the preceding stage(s). Thus the modern state is ultimately the only cultural and historical stage that combines all necessary features for freedom. Understanding how Hegel viewed the four stages of state development is crucial in understanding his logic of how the modern state actualizes freedom. Broadly, the progression of human history is parallel to, as well as part of, the development of ideas. The development of ideas is integral to the progress of the consciousness of freedom. Consciousness of freedom grows as humans organise themselves politically in increasingly more rational ways, and according to Hegel freedom is finally reached with self consciousness realised in the modern state. Mind is what will eventually become self conscious, yet mind is only free in principle or potentiality - not yet in actuality. Actual freedom does not therefore belong to the mind in its immediacy but has to be brought into being by mind's own activity (Hegel, 1830: §382). This will come about, for Hegel, when the idea of self consciousness is fully realised.

Each one of the Volksgeisters in Hegel's division of historical periods gives its name to the manifested attempt at state organisation (Avineri, 1972: 223). The first stage of world history he termed 'Oriental', encompassing historical China, India and Persia. This stage sees no separation between the individual or communal will. This actuality may sound slightly similar to Hegel's concept outlined in the introduction to this essay that a person is completely free only when they can exercise their individual will and have it recognised by the community in which they live and its social institutions, but here the lack of separation is detrimental. Consciousness of freedom, unlike where it is actualized in the modern state, is expressed only in the one individual person who heads the 'Oriental' political structure, the 'despotic leader' (Avineri, 1972: 224). For all but one, there is no

freedom. In regard to the development of mind, this Volksgeister can be compared to the establishment of sense certainty; one person has freedom, the community does not.

The second Volksgeister Hegel calls 'Greek', and in his view it has a limited principle of freedom. This is due to the fact that on the one hand the notion of a polis - a body of citizens - is established, parallel however to the retention of slavery. Slaves obviously are not free, and in the 'Greek' case they are put to work so the polis is free from labour in order to discuss their political issues in their many city-states. The 'Greek' stage is insufficient to actualize freedom compared to the modern state because once the polis is realised, it is necessary to look beyond (Taylor, 1975: 396). It is observed by Hegel that the Greeks found their identities through social participation but were simultaneously incapable of realizing all types of practical freedom (Neuhouser, 2000: 231). In regard to mind's progression, it can be said within the 'Greek' Volksgeister there is a perception of freedom in place.

Building upon the 'Greek' state, the third stage is described by Hegel as 'Roman'. Compared to the many 'Greek' city-states, there was one 'Roman' polis. The one 'Roman' polis evoked a degree of unity in 'Roman' society. However, with the transformation of the 'Roman' republic into an empire, citizens thus became subjects - and all subjects were made equal before the law. So, for Hegel, while there were advances towards freedom (a single polis and some legal freedoms), the stripping of independent power from the subject - to the Emperor - limited these advances (Avineri, 1972: 227). Here, in the development of mind there is an understanding of freedom; there are laws and some institutions that begin to show recognitions of the actions of individuals. But the fact that there remains a discrepancy between the individual will and the collective will (the wills of individual subjects are not mutually recognised by the collective will; the collective will is determined by the one individual who is free from others - the Emperor) shows that it is the modern state's subsequent solution which, according to Hegel, actualizes freedom.

An important link between the 'Roman' Volksgeister and the modern state is the emergence of Christianity. This is because Christianity began to permeate through to the political sphere during the 'Roman' era. Moreover, Hegel viewed the 'Germanic' world of his time - the final historical period that for him is the manifestation of the modern state - as coeval with Western Christendom. It should be noted that Hegel had no overt intention of implying supremacy of Germany itself (Avineri, 1972: 228). For while the 'Oriental' culture knew a single person (the despot) to be free, and the 'Greek' polis knew some persons to be free, Christianity starting in the 'Roman' period but flourishing by the 'Germanic' era for Hegel demonstrated that all persons can be free (Avineri, 1972: 228).

In company with Christianity's impact on the progression of history, for Hegel the modern 'Germanic' state is reached at what he perceived as the apex of history - which in his view is the end

of the historical process. Freedom is actualized at this point because not a single state, but the mind (or the spirit) is now dominant in the world (Avineri, 1972: 223). The mind externalises itself and becomes objective and man's consciousness reaches awareness of itself (Avineri, 1972: 221). Thus there is, by the 'Germanic' Volksgeister, the identification between the individual and the community which according to Hegel actualizes freedom; the wills of both the individual as well as the community are fully able to be mutually recognised by the other. Hegel identified this point as the post-1815 A.D. period; in his view culture and thus freedom had finally been actualized because "we can find poetry, fine arts, science and also philosophy in all world historical peoples", not a single dominant state (Avineri, 1972: 223). The modern state, then, actualizes freedom, according to Hegel, through its unique function of being the only forum where the synthesis of the individual and the community can occur (Hampshire, 2010).

Further actualizing freedom, in Hegel's view the modern state reconciles the close relation of citizens and the state (which he attributed to the polis of the 'Greek' era) with the individual freedoms that are characteristic of modern civil society (Hampshire, 2010). This is done through what Hegel terms three essential 'modes' of social relationship. Each of these 'modes' foster among their members a distinct identity that enables them to solve the question concerning the role social institutions play in actualizing freedom (Neuhouser, 2000: 13). When a person is part of all three 'modes' in the modern state they are brought to work freely for the collective good of all (Neuhouser, 2000: 13), and freedom is actualized.

The first 'mode' is the state itself. The state is the sphere of individuality that integrates both the family (the second 'mode') and civil society (the third 'mode') within the political order (Knowles, 2002: 17). The family 'mode' of the modern state is the sphere of universality (Knowles, 2002: 17); it helps actualize freedom through being a microcosm of the collective will. Civil society, in contrast, is the particularistic 'mode' because it is the sphere in which a citizen can express their particular will (Hampshire, 2010). According to Hegel the overlap of all three of these 'modes' occurs only in the modern state and actualizes freedom. In his view people are free only when they consent to rational institutions; indeed, Hegel himself says that his Philosophy of Right (1821: 21) is

"...nothing other than an attempt to comprehend and portray the state as an inherently rational identity."

The three 'modes' of the modern state qualify as rational for Hegel when they are not only able to satisfy basic needs that necessitate individuals' participation in them, but also to work in service of the higher end of freedom (Neuhouser, 2000: 150). Freedom is actualized in the modern state because the synthesis of the three 'modes' was not possible in any of the previous Volksgeisters. Furthermore, for Hegel a crucial function of the laws of the modern state - a key institution of the state 'mode' - is expressing society's collective will. This is because freedom depends on citizens'

ability to assent to the laws that direct and constrain their actions in the modern state (Neuhouser, 2000: 12). Citizens' individual freedom is preserved but they remain subject to their community's laws.

In summary, it has been shown that for Hegel the modern state is the only form of state organisation that is able to actualize freedom. In his view, the modern state has come into existence due to a process of historical development. The elements present in the modern state necessary to actualize freedom have been gradually accumulated in the sequence of state development that ended, he observed, in the 'Germanic' state. It has been demonstrated that the progression of human history and the development of ideas are interlinked; and since according to Hegel a person is only truly free when the exercise of their particular will is recognised by their community and its social institutions, the realisation of mind's self consciousness at the formation of the modern state illustrates how it actualizes freedom. Finally, according to Hegel only the modern state is able to reconcile the individual freedoms characteristic of civil society with the close relation between the citizen and the state - this it does through rationalising the overlapping state, family and civil society 'modes'. Citizens are subject to their community's laws but still preserving their individual freedom; this, according to Hegel is how the modern state actualizes freedom.

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John Locke and the Acquisition of Private Property for Self-Preservation

Is Locke's Theory and Defence of Property Rights Flawed?

(Written for Modern Political Thought 2011/2012. Politics Department. Dr. James Hampshire)

Gabriel Raeburn

Abstract: While studying Modern Political Though I became continuously interested in how many modern writers, and not just Marxists, still justified their ideologies with the texts of philosophers who were writing over hundreds of years ago. I became more aware of how right-wing libertarians and, in some cases, conservatives still used John Locke's *The Second Treatise* firstly as a defence of private property and land ownership and secondly as a defence of inequality within modern societies. Locke famously argued that property rights were required for the self-preservation of the individual. This justified both excessive amounts of property consumption and mass inequality. My essay is a critique on Locke's arguments. I have attempted to show how Locke's theory fails to provide a solid and coherent defence of the right to private property. Furthermore I have attempted to show how Locke's theory is actually detrimental to self-preservation, making his aim self-defeating. Locke's arguments are, in my opinion, nothing more than a defence of the acquisition of private property by the Whig land-owning classes of his era.

John Locke intended to create a solid theory and defence of the right to private property. Locke believed that the fundamental Law of Nature was 'much as we may be should be preserved' (Locke 1967, p.409). Locke argued that property rights were natural rights, and that they were required for preservation. This essay will argue that Locke's theory of property rights is flawed, as is his defence of private property. Firstly this will be seen through Locke's theory of appropriation, which fails to defend individual property and lacks clarity on the boundaries of appropriation. Secondly it will argue that labour does not give a right to private property. It will then state that private property as a reward for labouring is ineffective. Most importantly it will argue that preservation and property rights are incompatible, making the latter's defence self-defeating. Fourthly it will argue that people would choose a state based on equality, not a Lockean state to protect property rights. Finally it will criticise the Lockean state as, in protecting property rights, it is harmful to the fundamental Law of Nature. Overall this essay will argue that Locke fails to give a coherent and solid defence of the right to private property. At the most he achieves a theory of preservation for the property-owning classes.

Locke believed that private property arose from the appropriation of the earth's land and resources. In the Second Treatise he states 'God, who hath given the world to men in common, hath also given them reason to make use of it to the best advantage of life and convenience' (Locke 1967, p.304). From this he declares that if a person labours on land, that land becomes his property. An example Locke gives is 'the deer that Indian's who hath killed it; it is allowed to be his goods who hath bestowed his labour upon it, though, before, it was the common right of everyone' (Locke 1967, p.307). However there are two key flaws with Locke's theory of acquiring property. Firstly what Locke fails to acknowledge is that Native Americans would generally hunt in groups. Therefore labouring on land or a resource does not make it the property of an individual because labour is normally co-operative and gives rise to communal, not individual, property (Lloyd Thomas 1995). As Attas (2004, p.542) states 'joint production encompasses virtually all production in society'. Therefore it is incorrect, as Locke does, to suggest that property can be gained for an individual through labouring because the labour, generally, would belong to the collective group and not purely the individual.

Secondly Locke's theory is flawed because it fails to outline the amount of labour needed to acquire the land. It only states that property is gained when 'the labour of his body and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly mixed' (Locke 1967, p305). But this description fails to identify any boundaries that the labourer must meet for the land to be gained. As Levine (2002, p.106) argues 'spitting in the Pacific Ocean would hardly make the spitter the owner'. Therefore a person could acquire a field by cutting the grass once. In comparison to someone who had tirelessly ploughed their fields for years, this is unjust. Nozick (1974, p175) further emphasises the ambiguities with this theory when he states if by throwing a can of tomato soup into the sea 'do I come to own the sea, or have I foolishly dissipated my tomato juice'? Therefore the basis of Locke's theory of property rights is further flawed because it does not identity the boundaries of land and resource appropriation.

If, for the moment, we place aside these flaws in Locke theory, Locke also fails to give an adequate defence of the reason why labour gives a right to the acquisition of private property. He argues in the Second Treatise that 'labour, in the beginning, gave a right to property' (Locke 1967, p.317). This is because 'it is labour indeed that puts the difference of value on everything' (Locke 1967, p.314). Locke's defence, therefore, rejects any notion that land is of value itself. It is only the labour of the individual that increases value. Here Locke is wrong. Take for example a combine-harvester that could yield thousands of crops per day. Previously only a few crops could be yielded per day by hand. It would be absurd to presume from this situation that as the harvester is responsible for yielding 99% of the crops, that the land itself yielded only 1% (Cohen 1995). As Cohen (1995, p.185) states, this argument asserts that 'since land without labour produces hardly anything, and land with labour produces an enormous amount, labour contributes vastly more to output than land does'. This is clearly false because labour without the fertile land would create nothing. Therefore Locke's argument

that the right to private property is based on labour increasing the value on everything is incorrect. He fails to acknowledge the importance of the land (or the resource) itself. Here Locke fails to defend the right to private property.

Locke views property as a reward for labour. As Ashcraft (1991, p.317) argues, for Locke 'property was the reward for man's initiative and effort'. Therefore, according to Locke, man gained property as a reward for his toil and labour. However the defence of property rights based on reward is also inconsistent. In Locke's theory, the creation of money allows for men to gain private property, which has been laboured on by another. Over time a feudal aristocrat may acquire thousands of acres of land, on which none he has laboured himself. Through the establishment of money the property-owner has completely avoided the necessity of labour (Lloyd Thomas, 1995). Therefore the gaining of private property, through gold and silver, allows land-owners to skip labouring altogether. This means they are purely gaining a reward for having wealth, not labouring for their own preservation.

The main, and over-whelming, flaw in Locke's defence of property rights is that it is self-defeating. Locke argues that the reason for private property is that it is needed for preservation, the fundamental Law of Nature. However there is a clash between preservation and the right to acquire property. Locke argues that due to creation of money people can acquire as much land as they desire as the 'invention of money gave them the opportunity to continue to enlarge them (selves)' (Locke 1967, p.319). Locke supports this by stating that 'there is land enough to suffice double the world's inhabitants' (Locke 1967, p.311), therefore no-one can remain propertyless. However if in the future all land is acquired by people under Locke's theory of property rights, then subsequent generations will be barred from accessing the land and fruits of the earth. This will contradict the fundamental Law of Nature; preservation (Lloyd Thomas 1995). Money itself allows for people to acquire as much individual property as they wish and in doing so endangering the preservation of the propertyless and the future generations. As Locke is defending property rights because they are essential to preservation, his argument is self-defeating. Nozick responded to this critique by arguing that from this no grievances resulted, as the landless were in no worse situation than they would have been if the acquired land had remained un-owned (Cohen 1995). However Cohen (1995, p.187) correctly states that 'Nozick supresses other paternal questions such as how they would have fared had they, or their forbears, had the opportunity to do some appropriating.' Land, in the modern world, is almost all appropriated and therefore Locke's defence fails the fundamental Law of Nature because it prevents the landless and future generations from preserving themselves.

Locke argues that the reason men put 'themselves under government is the preservation of property' (Locke 1967, p.368). Locke's individualism, rooted from his belief in private property, allowed him to accept the huge inequalities that his theory embraced (Macpherson 1962). Locke states this himself in the Second Treatise when he says 'the consent of men have agreed to a

disproportion and unequal preservation of the earth' (Locke 1967, p.350). However, if people were moving from the state of nature to a commonwealth, the logical system for their preservation would be a state of equality. In this situation no person would be in a position to exploit others, as they would be on an equal level to all other citizens. In a system of individual property, some citizens will own more property than others. Some will be completely landless. Therefore they are able to be exploited, which will affect their chances of preservation. In this respect the creation of an unequal society through property rights hinders preservation. Furthermore those with disabilities will be unable to labour effectively and subsequently not in a position to gain private property. Therefore they would not consent to a state based on property rights. According to Locke, in the First Treatise, 'but that he has given his needy Brother a Right to the Surplusage of his Goods; so that it cannot be justly denied to him, when his pressing want call for it' (Locke 1967, p.188). However this is an unfair result for those that cannot labour effectively. In an exploitative capitalist system, such as the one Locke is advocating, the chances of surplus being available are scarce. Particularly after the invention of money which allows property-owners to acquire more land than need. The creation of a state based purely on the protection of property rights effectively ends the preservation of many of those who are unable to labour or are landless. For those unable to labour, a state which provided welfare would be a more rational objective. This further empathises that Locke's defence of property rights is self-defeating because it contradicts its primary aim.

Locke, as previously stated, believed that men would put themselves under government for the preservation of their property. Locke states 'the enjoyment of property in the state (of nature) is very unsafe' (Locke 1967, p.368). Locke believed the role of the state was to uphold and enforce property rights, therefore protecting the fundamental Law of Nature; preservation. He argues 'all this to be directed to no other end but the peace, safety and public good of the people' (Locke 1967, p.371). However the Lockean state envisioned does not achieve its aim. To Locke the public good appeared to be the maximization of the nation's wealth. (Macpherson 1962). As continual acquisition and protection of property was the only reason for political authority, the Lockean state rejects the views of all those who are propertyless. Political power would be concentrated into a property-owning oligarchy while the propertyless mass would have no say in public affairs (Gough 1950). In doing this the government is designed to protect the preservation of the property-owning class and not the preservation of the people as a whole. Therefore, while Locke may have created a state to aid the preservation of a property-owning class, such as the Whig politicians of his era, he has not created a state that adequately defends the preservation of the landless.

Other aspects of this limited state reduce the chance of preservation. Firstly Locke argues that taxation 'without such consent of the people, he thereby invades the fundamental Law of property' (Locke 1967, p.380). Locke is arguing that if property owners are taxed without their consent, this abuses their property rights. However the Lockean state requires taxation, purely for the purpose of

defending property rights. Armies would be required to protect individual property from other nations. Banks would be required to accumulate property owner's money and prisons required for those who abuse the right to private property. Therefore the protection of individual property depends on a larger state than the Lockean one.

Locke's theory of property rights is flawed because it fails to successfully demonstrate how individual property is required to uphold the fundamental Law of Nature. Preservation, for the landless, is significantly worse where property rights are enforced. Locke's theory is not a defence of property rights for preservation. It is purely a defence of the preservation of those who own property. As Sir Fredrick Pollock states 'the right of everyman to personal safety are wholly distinct from rights of property' (Gough 1950, p.77). Locke fails to show how labouring allows the acquisition of property and furthermore how this can then be a basis for defending property-owners to accumulate wealth within an unequal society. Locke was seeking support from Whig merchants (Lloyd Thomas 1995). Therefore his defence of property rights was aimed at defending upper-class land owners, not society as a whole. His entire argument fails to take into account the right to preservation of the propertyless, who would be preserved better in a state of equality or one in which property rights didn't restrict them from acquiring land.

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What impact did the Thatcher governments have on women's lives and the Feminist Movement?

(Written for Political Change: The Thatcher Years 2011/2012. Politics Department. Prof. Paul Webb)

Emma Close

Abstract: Margaret Thatcher became leader of the Conservative party at the height of the women's movement, yet arguably, she was completely apart from their campaigns, passions and identity. The ambition of this essay is a simple one: it will probe to what extent the Thatcher governments altered the experiences of women during the three terms in office. It argues that Conservative thinking during this period characterized parts of both liberal and traditional conservatism but ignored feminist concerns about women's barriers to self-actualization, depending on a model of the free and independent individual that women were encouraged to aspire to but were excluded from in practice. Despite Thatcher breaking the norm in terms of descriptive representation as the first female prime minister, it seeks to illuminate how women's substantive representation was greatly depleted during this period. It will briefly discuss ways of defining conservatism and elements of feminism in order to try and place Thatcherism in an ideological framework. It then turns to assess three areas where women felt the largest impact: the labour market, government cuts to social spending and the stifling of advocacy networks. Finally, it considers the possibility that such changes owed less to Thatcher or the conservative vision than to economic globalization.

"My Lords, in view of the fact that the two top jobs in this country are both held by women, is there really any need for this commission in future?" Baroness Vickers on the Equal Opportunities Commission (August, 1980, Lord Sitting).

It has been said that the 'feminization' of the Conservative Party is part and parcel of Cameron's attempt to deliver the image of a more compassionate conservatism; one that contrasts sharply with the 'nasty party' label so greatly associated with Tories prior to his leadership (Webb, 2011). However, when one explores the premises that underpin conservative ideology and indeed, those that have characterized Conservative governments in the past, it can be said that few, if any, strands of conservative thought support the robust analysis that would be needed to tackle entrenched gender inequalities and injustices (Bryson and Heppell, 2010, p.32). This essay is specifically concerned with women's lives under the Thatcher governments and the feminist movement more widely during Britain's three terms under Margaret Thatcher's rule. It will argue that many of the party's underlying assumptions are deeply anti-feminist (Bryson and Heppell, 2010, p.36) and despite

Thatcher breaking the norm in terms of descriptive representation, as the first female Prime Minister, the Thatcher governments still maintained the core conservative assumptions and failed to change the substantive representation of women in society (Childs, 2008, p. 109).

The essay will firstly briefly discuss ways of defining conservative ideology and elements of feminist ideology in order to try and place Thatcherism in an ideological framework. This is to help provide a grasp of the context within which policies that affected women's lives in the 1970s, '80s and '90s were brought about. It will then assess three areas that saw great changes under the Thatcher governments. These areas have been labelled by Sylvia Bashevkin as: the 'work crunch', which addresses changes in labour structures and laws; the 'Spending Crunch', which deals with the 'rolling back' of the welfare state; and finally the 'Advocacy crunch', focusing on the organization of women's interests in society (Bashevkin, 1998 p. 97). All three areas are distinct enough to warrant their own attention, but they are interrelated in the ways that they affected women's lives and the feminist movement. The essay will conclude by considering the possibility that such changes owed less to Thatcher or the conservative vision than to economic globalization (Bashevkin, 1998 p. 106).

Sarah Childs describes two ways of defining women's representation: Substantive and Descriptive (Childs, 2008, p.108). Descriptive refers to the 'number of women the party returns to parliament' whereas Substantive is concerned with the 'adaption of party rhetoric and policy to integrate women's concerns and perspectives' (Childs, 2008, p.109). Due to the limited space available to discuss such a vast and rich topic, this essay will largely focus on the Substantive representation of women in society. Notwithstanding the very fact that the most powerful position in parliament at this time, was held by a woman, it will illuminate how the descriptive representation in Thatcher's case proved that being female mattered less than 'gender ' consciousness' for achieving feminist substantive representation (Childs, 2008, p.110). In short, Thatcher, as a woman, did not increase the presence of women's issues on the party agenda.

This is best understood in the context of the Thatcher governments' ideology. It is clear that feminism is a heterogeneous concept, and in some forms, it can be seen to have some overlaps with conservatism (see Campell 1987, Bryson and Heppell, 2010). However, for the purpose of this essay it will contend that an ideology or policy is compatible with feminism if it recognises the collective, structural and socially produced nature of men's domination and women's disadvantage and treats the promotion of greater gender equality and justice as a political priority (Bryson and Heppel, 2010, p.38)

Like feminism, identifying the ideology of the conservative party is notoriously problematic (Lovenduski, 1993, p.32). Not least because the stance is often resolutely anti-ideological, with adherents claiming that their party's conservatism is: "instinctive, not theoretical; a disposition, not a doctrine" (Dorey, 2009, p.43). One strand, 'Traditional conservatism', emphasises the importance of natural hierarchy, sentiment and tradition as the basis for social cohesion to defend the 'naturalness' of

the patriarchal family unit and gender roles (Bryson and Heppel, 2010, p.41). 'Liberal conservatism' on the other hand, based on the Darwinian logic of the competitive market place, points to full meritocracy, thus leaving no room for discrimination against competent and qualified women from economic or political life (Bryson and Heppell, 2010, p.42). For liberal conservatives, free-market variants of conservatism leave unproblematized women's and men's resources. As a consequence they are unable, or unwilling, to support a role for the state to provide or fund childcare for example, in order to equalize resources (Webb and Childs, 2011, p.9). Therefore, despite liberal conservatism's individualist, gender-neutral rhetoric, it has never questioned women's traditional role. Rather, it has continued to assume that stable families will provide the shared norms that prevent competition from getting out of hand (Bryson and Heppell, 2010, p.45). This can be seen to underpin the ideology during the Thatcher governments, setting her distinctly at odds to the feminist cause which would see legislative reform as the key means by which opportunities have to be opened up to allow women to become equals in society (Webb and Childs, 2011, p.11). Conservative thinking during this period characterized parts of both liberal and traditional conservatism and ignored feminist concerns about women's barriers to self-actualization, depending on a model of the free and independent individual that women were encouraged to aspire to but were excluded from in practice (Bryson and Heppell, 2010 p.24).

The essay will now look at the labour market, social policy and women's movements during this period to show that the 1979- 1997 Conservative governments confirmed not only this neo-liberal rejection of state intervention and tax subsidies but also the neoconservative suspicion of social engineering and its defence of traditional family life and gender roles (Bryson and Heppell, 2010, p.33).

'The Work Crunch'

Shifts in patterns of work, pay and taxation resulted in a large part from the actions of the Conservative government (Bashevkin, 1994, p. 204). High inflation rates in the 1970s meant that more women were forced to enter the work force to make ends meet (Campbell, 1987, p.183). A large proportion of the inflation was in property values. In fact, property prices increased at a rate well above that of general consumer prices in both the 1970s and 1980s (Krieger, 1987, p.185). This was exacerbated by the 'Right to Buy' policy as it further drove up the expenditure on property and the level of personal debt (1987, p.186). In addition, many well-paid jobs that men held, including in unionized industries like steel, automobiles, and mining, began to disappear, leaving more households without a main breadwinner (Bashevkin, 2010, p.128). The issue for women here was that the market was mainly creating part-time jobs in segregated occupations that paid low wages and offered little prospect of progression (Krieger, 1987, p.186). In addition, conflict between union leaders and the

Conservatives during this period created a hostile climate for women's claims for better pay and greater job security (Bashevkin, 1994, p .209). This was particularly difficult given the rise in divorce rates, and the increase in life expectancy meaning more women were supporting themselves and for longer (Campbell, 1987, p.89).

The wages of part-time earners, however, were only part of the problem. According to the British Statute, employees had to be on the job for sixteen hours a week to meet the minimum threshold for maternity benefits or compensation due to redundancies and unfair dismissal (Bashevkin, 1998, p.101). For the Conservative government, these arrangements were seen as both good for women, and employers. Firms could hire workers on a flexible basis and wages could compete with those in dynamic economies like the high-growth "tigers" of South Asia (1998, p.103). Plus, women benefited because part-time work fitted neatly around family life (Campbell, 1987, p.90). However, the Government appointed Equal Opportunities Commission (EOC) claimed "the government's notion that mothers worked for frivolous "pin money" while their children were at school denied basic realities. About 15% of households were headed by a single parent, more than 90% of these were women" (Bashevkin, 1998, p.128). Rather, the fact that many mothers worked part-time was more of a commentary on the lack of subsidised child-care than on women's preferences. This demonstrates the harsh effect of the conservative ideology on women (Bryson and Heppell, 2010, p39).

'The Spending Crunch'

The Thatcher government's attitudes to social policy were nearly as severe as their actions on work issues (Bashevkin, 1998, p.127). Typifying the neo-liberal attitude towards welfare (see Murray, 2006) they set in motion a series of shifts that replaced relatively generous, universal benefits with a system of narrowly targeted, means tested grants and loans (Bashevkin, 1998, p.103). For example, the Universal Child Benefit declined in value because it was de-indexed and then frozen in value (Pierson, 1996, p.4). This exacerbated the issue with childcare already highlighted in relation to changes in work patterns above.

Margaret Thatcher did not represent herself as identifying with the world of women who do go out to work and have children, because even in 1980s, this was not the Conservative world (Campbell, 1987, p.172). "In Conservative ideology woman as working woman is still individualized, and the most famous working mother of all is still trying to explain herself in the rhetoric of the 1950s rather than the realities of the 1980s. So much so that women's – not to mention children's – need for childcare had no impact on the political agenda" (Campbell, 1987, p.178). Despite there being an increasing demand for child care from the 1970s, the Thatcher government consigned supply to the voluntary or private sector (Campbell, 1987, p.180). In fact, the United Kingdom was a the bottom of

the European scale on public child care funding, with about 2 per cent of children under the age of three receiving publically funded day care compared with nearly 50 percent in Denmark (Randall, 1995, p.329).

Finally, given that women tended to be poorer, particularly single mothers, (about two-thirds of the adults on welfare in Britain during the 1980s were women (Bashevkin, 1998, p.101) the 'right to buy scheme' was divisive. This was because changes in housing policy weakened rent controls and tenant succession rules in the private market (Krieger, 1987, p.19). Rental fees imposed by local councils increased so that people who remained in public housing, effectively subsidised discounts given to new owners under the scheme (Krieger, 1987, p.19). This disproportionately affected women, as more single mothers remained in public housing than any other social group (Bashevkin, 1998, p.102). Because of the stock of rent-controlled private housing and affordable public housing declined, the number of homeless grew over time (Pierson, 1996, p. 198). A social trend that Thatcher blamed on "young single girls who deliberately become pregnant to jump a housing queue and get welfare benefits" (Campbell, 1987, p.179) reiterating, once again, her distance from the collective feminist cause.

It is important to note that some commentators have contemplated whether said changes would have occurred with or without Thatcher (Prasad, 2006, p.46). For example, Thatcher's decision to weaken trade unions and to eliminate wage floor for the most poorly paid could have been, following this line of argument, local consequences of economic globalization (Bashevkin, 1998, p. 127). In addition, the influence of market-driven economic forces was so strong that political leaders could no longer control the actions of private sector actors. Too much labor market regulation, too much personal or corporate taxation, or too much public spending, from this perspective, were intolerable to business investors who could simply pack up and move elsewhere (Bashevkin, 1998, p.128). However, this essay argues that although one can't deny that market-driven economic forces were becoming increasingly preponderant at this time, the policies that Thatcher implemented were also consistent with a wider remit of Conservative ideology (Campbell, 1987, p. 98). Therefore, it is reasonable to suggest that the Conservative leader did affect women's lives beyond what might have happened in her absence (Campbell, 1987, p.96). In addition, her supply-side approach to the economy heightened the role of markets to an extent not typical of other Western European countries (Prasad, 2006, p.45) indicating that her strategy was at least in part driven by ideology and not just pragmatism.

'The Advocacy Crunch'

However, the argument that the Thatcher governments made a difference to women's lives is most directly confirmed by evidence of the 'advocacy crunch'. When it came to dealing with political protesters, pro—market, anti-intervention Thatcher seemed to lose her patience with opponents who took on their agenda (Bashevkin, 1998, p.128). Moreover, her campaign against feminist advocacy in the United Kingdom was indirect, often unnoticed, but very effective (Bashevkin, 1998, p.130). One way that it occurred was through radical reductions to the budget of the Equal Opportunities Commission (EOC). As an agency dependent on central government funds the EOC was charged with the task of enforcing equal rights at work (1998, p133). The Conservatives had opposed any kind of intervention in the workplace so they were quick to strip the Commission of its power. A second means of undermining advocacy work was through Tory attacks on local government (Bashevkin, 1994 p.206). Central government shut down municipal governments such as the GLC in 1986 that were sympathetic to movement organizations (Krieger, 1987, p.20). Controlling advocacy by redirecting funding meant that the impact of the Thatcher government on women's lives remained unknown to all but a small core of committed activists – to make it worse this minority were made out to be 'crazed campaigners' from a 'lunatic fringe' (Bashevkin, 1998, p.105). Without advocacy, issues like low pay and reduced social benefits remained women's private troubles as long as they were not the focus of well-organized, well-publicized protest campaigns (Campbell, 1987, 161).

Ultimately, Margaret Thatcher in terms of policy was not interested in issues of concern to women. She downgraded the Equal Opportunities Commission and believed women who had what it takes would make it on their own (Bashevkin, 1998, p.97). She was not committed to women's equality at all. It was a side issue for her. She was committed to individualism based on experiences in her own life. She paid little attention to how merit was defined in a masculine way. She had conformed, and she had succeeded (Basevkin, 1994, p.200). The essay reveals 'a triple whammy effect' (Bashevkin, 1998, p. 107). Work pressures, cuts to government spending, and the advocacy crunch taken together meant women faced low pay and no job security, less of a government safety net on which to rely on when they were sick or unemployed, and fewer opportunities to protest. In refusing to provide or fund childcare, to allow affirmative action to promote gender equality in the workplace, to extend maternity rights for women workers or to introduce paternity leave, conservative thinking during this period depended on a model of the free and independent individual that women were encouraged to aspire to in principle but were excluded from in practice (Bryson and Heppell, 2010, p.) In the light of this analysis, it would seem that 'feminist conservatism' is an oxymoron (Campbell, 1987, p. 153).

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The Political and Economic Position of the Working Class after World War One - Revising Arthur Marwick's "The Deluge"

To What Extent did the First World War Improve the Political and Economic Position of the Working Class in Britain?

(Written for Britain in the 20th Century 2010/2011. History Department. Dr. Hester Barron)

Niall Finn

Abstract: Arthur Marwick's book "The Deluge" broke new ground when it argued that although the First World War had a devastating impact on those who fought; the War's radical nature brought some improvement to the society the soldiers had left behind – especially for the working class. This essay seeks to challenge this theory, arguing that the War did indirectly have a progressive impact on some sections of the working class, but that these gains have been exaggerated as gains to the working class as a whole, or over attributed to the impact of the War. This essay argues that in terms of economic position of the working class the key issue is one of employment. While there were wage gains for some workers in the War economy, this was outweighed by unprecedented level of unemployment caused by the War. In political terms the War saw the introduction of universal male suffrage and the growth of the Labour party which helped defend the wage rises. These political gains were not however caused by the War, the failure of political Liberalism allowed the political space for a growth of working class politics that had long preceded the conflict.

The First World War was undoubtedly one of the most horrific events of European history. It marked the beginning of what Eric Hobsbawm called the "age of extremes (Hobsbawm, 1994). A "total war" the like of which had never been fought before had profound effects upon the societies which participated (Greaves, 2007, p. 130), and as Arthur Marwick has pointed out, war is by no means separate from the sphere of society: "Wars spring out of society. Societies engage in war." (Marwick, 2006, p. 16). Britain, playing a central role in both conflicts was undoubtedly changed by the war. It is no coincidence for example that English Literature is roughly split into pre and post 1914.

This social upheaval had considerable effects on many aspects of society including class. For many years the historical orthodoxy was that wars had had completely dire social and political consequences (Bourke, 2006, p. xi), making "for instability, for disintegration, for despotism and for

inadaptability" (Wright, 1942, p. 272). In 1965 however, Arthur Marwick published The Deluge, arguing that although war had horrific consequences for those fighting, it benefitted those in the domestic society away from the battle (Marwick, 2006, p. 15). For Marwick this was especially true for the working class. He based this on early writings by Stanislas Andrzejewski, and especially the historian R.M. Titmuss who argued - "Mass war involving a high proportion of the population tends to a levelling in social class differences" (Summerfield, 1986, p. 179). Marwick argued that the First World War directly bolstered the position of the working class in both economic and political terms through things like the rise of the Labour Party (Summerfield, 1986, p. 180). While there were undoubtedly positive political and economic changes for the working class after the War. These were not however all caused directly by the War, and the negative impact of the War in many ways cancelled out any gains.

The issue of class has always been a powerful and controversial issue in Britain, even before it emerged as the first truly capitalist industrial nation (Macfarlane, 1978, p. 255). It is equally controversial in terms of its definition. Marwick's definition is based a combination of occupation and wages (Marwick, 2006, p. 62). While not completely satisfactory, it works as a good basis from which we can begin to analyse the changes to class caused by the First World War Class was a hugely important issue in the time period, with 3/4s of the nation being classified as working class between 1900 and 1940 (Brooke, 2007, p. 45) and 1/3 of those employed in manufacturing in 1911 (Brooke, 2007, p. 47). This is crucial in many historians' views (including Marwick's), as to be victorious in war the Government must successfully mobilise the workforce, (the majority of whom are working class) within which the industrial workers are of particular importance (Marwick, 2006, p. 19). This lead to a 100% income rise across all working class households between 1914 and 1920, an unprecedented rise aimed to satisfy a vital element of the war economy (Marwick, 1968, p. 62). This rise in incomes was then successfully defended after the War by an organised labour movement strengthened by skilled labour shortages in some sectors and political bolstering from a newly emboldened Labour Party (Marwick, 1968, p. 62). This meant that the workers, who managed to remain employed after the War, saw an increase in wages of 10-20% in real terms as compared to before the War (Marwick, 1968, p. 63).

The key issue here is employment, for while there was a rise in wages this was irrelevant if you didn't have a job. This was a huge issue in the inter-war years, with unemployment averaging 14% between 1921 and 1938, and never falling below 9.5% (Benjamin & Kochin, 1979). Although the reasons for the inter-war depression are complex and based on various long term factors, it is widely accepted that the First World War helped cause or exacerbate many of them (Price, 2007, p. 145). Therefore, although Marwick is probably correct in the fact that the First World War helped raise and maintain real wages for workers this was at least counterbalanced by the effect of long term mass unemployment after the War, as unemployment disproportionally affects the working classes (Brooke,

2007, p. 45). It cannot therefore be said with any certainty that the First World War increased the economic position of the working class as a whole. While many skilled workers undoubtedly saw and managed to defend a rise in wages, this was at least counter balanced by the effect of long term mass unemployment between the First and Second World Wars.

While the economic gains of the First World War were mixed for the working class, there was definite political progress. The most obvious example of this is the Representation of the People Act which enfranchised all men over the age of 21 (Brooke, 2007, p. 48). Voting had previously been restricted by property qualifications disenfranchising disproportionately the working class (Pugh, 2007, p. 98). There is then the interlinked example of the rise of the Labour Party, formed from an amalgamation of trade unions in an attempt to fight for workers' rights (Thorpe, 1997, p. 5). While these were all strong improvements in the political position of the working class, there is debate however about how far this political change was caused directly by the War.

For Marwick both the enfranchisement and the fact that the Labour Party managed to establish itself as the second biggest party in 1922 are direct consequences of the War (Marwick, 2006, p. 27). Firstly, he credibly argues that the War posed an insurmountable challenge to the laissez-faire ideology of the Liberal Party which allowed Labour to make progress (Marwick, 2006, p. 191). A "total war" such as World War One required state intervention in the economic, public and private spheres (Greaves, 2007, p. 128). For example the Ministry of Munitions alone directly employed 2million workers by October 1916 (Greaves, 2007, p. 128), while by 1918 80% of food consumed at home was subject to state control (Greaves, 2007, p. 129). Such state intervention was beyond the ideological capabilities of a Liberal Party, defined in many ways by its attachment to no government intervention (David, 1970, p. 523). This is further backed up Hobsbawm's writings on the failure of liberalism to deal with the effects of the First World War, in Europe as a whole (Hobsbawm, 1994, p. 132). The War can in this sense be seen as having a directly positive effect on the working classes by effectively undermining the Liberal Party, and allowing a more directly pro-working class party to make strong gains and by 1923 be in a position to form a minority government (Marwick, 2006, p. 28).

Less credibly, Marwick argues that the main reasons for the extension of the franchise were two direct consequences of the War; first that those fighting abroad naturally lost their residence qualification requiring a voting amendment anyway; and second, that many men had served their country bravely in the most horrific circumstances and still had no democratic rights at home (Marwick, 2006, p. 30). This has rightly come under attack from other historians like Henry Perkins and Rodney Lowe. Lowe makes an especially compelling argument that rather than the War directly causing the extension of democracy to the working class it instead "forced choices to be made [...] long debated but largely evaded during late Victorian and Edwardian England" (Lowe, 1996, p. 50).

This points out a glaring admission in Marwick's work. He has failed to include in his analysis the affect of popular struggle for universal male suffrage that had existed in England since the Chartist movement of the early nineteenth century (The Six Points of The Peoples Charter). Therefore Marwick is right to the extent that war increased the need for universal male suffrage, in that it did create some new pressures, but it did not create the issue. Lowe's argument is stronger that these need to be seen in the context of a longer history of popular struggle. So while the First World War can be seen as having aided political change in favour of the working class, it was by no means the direct cause of such political change.

The First World War therefore had mixed consequences for the working class. Those with skilled jobs were definitely in a strong position after the War. Having had their wages boosted during the conflict to maintain their vital support, the failure of liberalism and the rise of the Labour Party meant many of them managed to maintain high wages after the War had come to an end. However, those out of work faced an era of almost unending unemployment, in many ways caused by the damage to the economy done by the War itself. Arguably many of the improvements in political and economic conditions could have happened without the need for such a bloody conflict. Universal male suffrage probably had its implementation hastened by the effects of the War, but the War by no means can be seen as the only reason behind a popular demand since at least the 1830s. Had this gone through it may have naturally seen the rise of the Labour Party anyway (without the need for the Liberal Party to collapse under its own contradictions) as the new working class voters voted in their own class interests. The First World War can therefore be seen more as a catalyst for change rather than the cause. It did help improve the political position of the working class, and directly improved the economic position of the skilled section of it, while at the same time destroyed the economic position of the unemployed section.

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A new security paradigm

What is human security and how does it differ from national security?

(Written for Issues in International Security 2010/2011.

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Abstract: While 'human security' is a term often loosely applied in recent academic literature, this essay seeks to deconstruct the term to fully explain its meaning and relevance today. It is compared directly with the current dominant approach to security which focuses almost exclusively on the role of the nation state, and emphasizes its priority in matters of safety. After discussing the origins of the concept this essay will describe how conflict has been transformed by, for example, the forces of globalization and the end of the Cold War, resulting in more diffuse 'new wars'. As this development has rendered the national security doctrine severely lacking, it will be shown that the new focus on the protection of human life as advanced by the human security approach is a highly important aspect which needs to be incorporated into our security strategies and policies. This will be further proven through examples such as the case of Rwanda where many elements of security were lacking, creating an environment conducive to the outbreak of violence. It will be concluded that human security is the clear answer to the inadequacies of the national security approach and requires thorough, far-reaching implementation.

Due to an almost exponential increase in the use of the term 'human security' by political scientists, politicians, journalists and commentators in recent years, accusations of it being a mere rhetorical device, or simply an overused buzzword, are not rare. It is not, however, as void of meaning and significance as some of its critics may claim. The rise of human security presents a kind of paradigm shift by which security doctrines both present and future will be, or have already been, significantly altered in such a way as to focus on the protection of human life in a conflict situation. This essay will deconstruct the term 'human security', explaining its key features and comparing and contrasting it with national security. As elements of human security have already been implemented in certain conflict areas, adequate examples from the past few decades will be outlined in the text to further elucidate how the concept of human security has influenced the more traditional, state-centred approach to security. The ways in which human security differs from national security are multifold, involving such diverse issues as the definition of security, the identification of key actors, and the

implementation of measures to ensure security. These will all be discussed in order to fully elucidate the idea of human security as well as to confirm its high relevance in our world today.

As the concept of human security is quite broad, a definition that is not heavily disputed simply states that human security means freedom from fear (McRae, 2001). The idea was first propagated in the Human Development Report by the United Nations Development Program in 1994 (Kaldor, 2007). Salih (1999, p. 127) describes it as a perspective which

" transcends the orthodox security approach by questioning the notion that nation-states can maintain regional peace and global tranquility on the basis of multilateral institutions dependent on the use of military coercion."

Alternatively, "human security describes a condition of existence in which basic material needs are met, and in which human dignity, including meaningful participation in the life of the community can be realized" (Thomas, 2000, p. 6). According to Mary Kaldor (2007), after the publication of the UNDP Report, the concept of human security developed in two directions, emphasizing security from political violence and the interrelated nature of different types of security respectively. The first was an approach taken on by the Canadian government; in 1998, they launched the 'Human Security Network" in "an attempt to institutionalize a 'coalition of the willing' to motivate international action on a broad range of human security initiatives" (Small, 2001, p. 231). The UNDP approach, on the other hand, was more concerned with how different types of security and particularly development are merged in human security to best protect the individual.

From this clearly follows the most important difference between human and national security, namely the abandonment of nation states as the key actors involved in a conflict. The UNDP Human Development Report previously mentioned states "that the concept of security has 'for too long been interpreted narrowly'" and that it has been "related more to nation states than to people" (Kaldor, 2007, p. 182). This is highly relevant today due to the transformation of conflict and war – whereas up to the middle of the twentieth century most wars were fought between rival nations' armies in set-piece battles, most conflict situations today are found within a country. Stein writes of a "sharp decline in armed conflict involving the state"; in 2003, 40 per cent fewer state-based conflicts were being waged than in 1992 (Gross Stein, 2010, p. 4). This shows that the more traditional notion of national security, focusing on two or more distinct nation-states, is becoming increasingly outdated. Similarly, Kaldor (2007, p. 182) speaks of 'new wars' that are fought by "networks of state and non-state actors" and "take place in the context of the disintegration of states, typically authoritarian states under the impact of globalization".

In such 'new wars', the civilian population is most vulnerable to attacks and their human rights are not guaranteed. Guerrilla wars, terrorist attacks, and insurgencies all inevitably entail

significant civilian casualties. Human security thus "takes the individual as the nexus of concern" (McRae, 2001, p. 15). This is another highly important feature of human security that sets it very much apart from national security: in lieu of simply 'defeating the enemy', as is the goal of the more militarisitc approach which pervades the concept of national security, human security seeks to protect the civilian population (Kaldor, 2010). Kaldor (2007, p. 185) writes that "the primacy of human rights is what distinguishes the human security approach from traditional state-based approaches". One can argue that such a shift in priorities has already taken place as for the first time, over the past 15 years, more wars ended by negotiated settlement rather than by military victory (Gross Stein, 2010). Furthermore, this trend appears to be accelerating. Between 2000 and 2005, 17 conflicts ended in negotiated settlements as opposed to four which ended in military victory (Gross Stein, 2010). However, some claim that since the end of the Cold War, after the shift from a bipolar to a unipolar global order, the world has nonetheless become "more unstable and less predictable", greatly to the detriment of civilians (McRae, 2001, p. 15). This is due to the fact that, during the Cold War, the international system only focused on the protection of states, their sovereignty and their security, rendering it, one can argue, considerably inadequate to defend civilians within these states today (McRae, 2001).

The Cold War, however, was not the only shaping agent of the current international system. As previously mentioned, another highly influential factor was – and remains today – globalization. Although surely overused in many instances, this term does offer some insight into why human security is much better suited to protect the civilian population and their human rights. The exponentially increasing interconnectedness of states, and its populations, can not be denied – with a free flow of capital, labour, and information across vast distances in very little time we are more mobile and connected than ever before. In the past decade scholars have started to incorporate the idea of a global civil society in their writings, which is "linked to the interconnectedness of states, the emergence of a system of global governance, and the explosion of movements, groups, networks and organizations that engage in a global or transnational debate" (Kaldor, 2007, p. 134). For this reason it would be difficult for states to be solely responsible for their citizens' safety as decreed by the traditional, state-centred national security doctrine. In fact, in a more normative sense, states shouldn't be the sole protectors of their citizens – there has been an abundance of instances in which the state itself was the aggressor and violated the human rights of its own population. This problem would be solved if human security was implemented through multilateral action, as Kaldor (2007, p. 188) suggests.

In addition, the new focus on the individual instead of nation states as key actors also influences the scope of issues included in human security. Whereas national security will emphasize, for example, weapons stockpiling or border security, the more holistic approach offered by human security will include some slightly more tangential issues such as natural disasters or famine and

poverty. The UNDP Human Development Report previously alluded to identifies "seven core elements, which together make up the concept of human security – economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security" (Kaldor, 2007, p.182). All of these elements, although they may not be included at all in national security doctrines, have a direct impact on human security. Since, as was previously illustrated, the nature of conflict and war has changed considerably in today's world, one can easily recognize within these seven elements the potential to directly incite violence, or create an environment highly susceptible to the outbreak of conflict.

A good example of this is the case of Rwanda. Chossudovsky (1999, p. 117) explains the underlying economic and social causes that predated the violence of 1994 and criticizes the international press for failing to mention "that the civil war was preceded by a deep-seated economic crisis". He further writes that "it was the restructuring of the agricultural system that precipitated the population into abject poverty and destitution" (Chossudovsky, 1999, p. 117). When coffee prices started to fall in the late 1980s, Rwanda was not the only producer country in Africa whose economy suffered significantly, particularly since, having gained independence only around 20 years earlier, their economy was still fragile and highly dependent on the coffee revenues (Chossudovsky, 1999, p. 117). The situation was further exacerbated by the imposition of certain economic programs by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, as well as a lack of response to the widespread famines in the south of the country (Chossudovsky, 1999). This example clearly illustrates the interrelated nature of different types of security. In this case, economic and food security, and later on community and political security, were not assured, which created an environment in which other potential causes for violence, such as ethnic tensions, could spark a conflict. Famine and economic hardship within a developing country are not relevant to national security, and may be addressed in terms of aid or within a donor country's department for development. Yet such issues are highly important to human security and, when adequately addressed, could pre-empt violent conflict and render a humanitarian intervention unnecessary. It is crucial that such issues are addressed within a security context – otherwise they will not be awarded the priority necessary for a speedy resolution. In this sense, it is clear that development and security, too, are very closely intertwined. As the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund Michel Camdessus (stated in Thomas, 2000, p. 3) stated in 2000, "Poverty is the ultimate systemic threat facing humanity" and can as such be conducive to conflict.

Finally, it is important to remember that human security encompasses both civilian and military elements (Kaldor, 2007). As there has been some emphasis on the civilian, the following paragraph will focus on the military aspects of human security, which also differ noticeably from its national security equivalents. One example of such apparent differences between human and national security is civilian control (Kaldor, 2010). This is particularly relevant because, although some aspects

of human security previously discussed appear to be partially implemented in some areas today, civilian control remains largely unexplored. Close cooperation with the local population, including communication, dialogue, and consultation is crucial in order to gain intelligence. Also, since the 'new wars' have no clear boundaries, a regional focus is highly important (Kaldor, 2007, p. 190).

In conclusion, human security presents a crucial development and expansion of our notion of security. Within the framework of a unipolar world order in which the role and importance of the nation state is gradually eroded, the idea of national security does not adequately address the issue of security. This also clearly holds true in light of the transformation of conflict: considering the significant rise in intrastate and the decrease in interstate conflict, the conventional national security paradigm is beyond insufficient to protect individual, civilian lives. It is apparent that the human security approach can be clearly distinguished from the traditional national security approach. And it is equally obvious that, considering it is the civilian populations who are facing the greatest danger today rather than national armies as was the case in the first half of the past century, a paradigm shift to focus more on individual human life was both necessary and inevitable.

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What has been the impact of the World Bank on development?

(Written for Politics of Governance: International Institutions and Issues 2010/2011.

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Abstract: I wrote this essay as part of my International Institutions and Issues module in my second year of study. This module focused on how power within the international political system is distributed and examined the emergence of institutions including the UN, the IMF and the WTO among others. I chose to explore the international frameworks for trade and development with a focus on the role of the World Bank and its interaction between the international framework and domestic politics. Debate on the role of the Bank is ubiquitous, not solely within the economic and political fields but also within the development sphere. Thus, I felt looking at the role of the World Bank and its impacts on development would be ideal. My essay argues that the World Bank as a development institution has had a very negative impact on development in many less developed countries around the world. I found that the Bank's universal, technocratic approach inevitably ignores each country's complex structure but also the poor populations the Bank aims to help. Rather than facilitate growth and development the Bank has contributed to growing inequalities and unsustainable development.

The World Bank was created post World War II as an agency of the Bretton Woods system assigned with the reconstruction of the war torn economies of the developed nations, mainly throughout Europe. However, decolonisation during the 1950s and 60s saw many new independent nations also in need of economic assistance (Thomas: 2001). By this time the economies of the war effort were back to their original strength and so attention switched to the world's developing countries in an attempt to integrate them into an increasingly globalized world economy. The Bank now describes itself as a cooperative providing a vital source of financial and technical assistance to developing countries around the world (World Bank: 2011). The Bank's aim is to 'fight poverty' (World Bank: 2011) and is recognised at the forefront of research into global poverty reduction and development (Williams: 1994). Robert McNamara's leadership of the World Bank (1968-1981) saw an unprecedented expansion of the Bank's activity in its role as a development agency (Rich: 1994). Yet, there is a great assumption on behalf of the World Bank that any development is good development (Rich: 1994). In fact, actions taken by the World Bank especially during the McNamara years have had an extremely negative effect on development resulting in huge debt, growing

inequalities and destruction of the environment and further leading to renewed dependency of the developing countries on the West (Rich: 1994). In this case, 'the west' is to mean the economically developed countries that also share certain fundamental political ideologies mostly found in the western hemisphere including the USA, Canada and Europe.

Colonial assumptions held by western governments added to the prevailing opinion that the 'Third World' was in need of development (Thomas: 2001). The 'Third World' was considered economically 'backwards' while the western world's lifestyle and economic structure were superior and viewed as idealistic (Thomas: 2001). The World Bank adopted a top-down approach with the dominant idea that positive economic growth within a context of a free market international economy would trickle down to the poor triggering development (Rich: 1994). The end of the Cold War was a catalyst for globalisation as additional newly independent countries from Eastern Europe turned to the successful capitalist nations like the USA and the UK for guidance and assistance. Neo-liberal economic and political philosophy paved the way for countries seeking economic might (Thomas: 2001). Neo-liberal policies favoured a minimalist state and enhanced the role of the free market (Thomas: 2001). However, countries previously 'cushioned' (Thomas: 2001) by the state as periphery economies which were dependent on the core western economies for trade relations, development and structure (Frank: 1967) were not developed enough economically, politically or institutionally to actively engage in a rapidly globalising, competitive economy (Thomas: 2001).

In the wake of the Marshall Plan's success throughout Europe the World Bank thought it widely fitting that investment capital was essential to economic growth which would lead to foreign investment and in turn development (Moyo: 2010). By the beginning of the 1960s around US$100 million had been transferred to Africa and Latin America, as the main beneficiary of loans (Williams: 1994). Debt heightened at US$315 billion in 1983, 50% of the regions Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Moyo: 2010). Developing countries' economies did grow on average at a rate of 4.9% according to their GDP from the 1950s to the end of the 1980s, a figure much higher compared to that of developed nations with a growth of 3.5% for the same period (Thomas: 2001). However, economic growth, which the World Bank insisted to be necessary for development, was marked by significant regional diversity with Asia achieving substantial growth rates while Africa lagged behind significantly (Thomas: 2001).

The 1979 oil crisis produced major financial pressures as the developed world, in fear of escalating inflation levels raised interest rates. Loans to developing countries from the World Bank were based on floating interest rates, so as interest rates rose so did the cost of borrowing (Moyo: 2010). Africa's debt reached US$8 billion by 1982 (Moyo: 2010). As the world faced recession there was in turn less demand for the primary products exported by developing nations and so countries like Mexico and eleven of the African states including Mozambique, Nigeria, Tanzania and Zambia were

unable to meet their debt obligations (Moyo: 2010). International creditors were faced with global financial crisis and economic depression. The World Bank in response implemented the heavily criticised Structural Adjustment Programmes of the 1980s which lent more money to nations to pay back what they owed with specific conditions attached (Williams: 1994). These conditions entailed minimizing the role of the state, privatising previously nationalised industries and liberalising trade (Moyo: 2010).

In the case of Latin America, economic reforms conditional to the structural adjustment policies (SAPs) achieved some positive growth in the early 1990s (Birdsall et al: 1997). However, average growth rates remained low and the results of reforms and increased social spending were not enough to induce positive development (Birdsall et al: 1997). Consequently, positive income distribution failed to occur and the number of people considered as 'poor' rose to 60% (Birdsall et al: 1997). Secondly, Ghana which was considered a 'success story' by the World Bank during the 1990s is now amongst the most indebted poor countries of the world (Kwabena: 2010). The World Bank reports assumed that if Ghana were to adopt a set of their approved economic policies it would become attractive to foreign investment and in turn capitalist expansion would occur (Kwabena: 2010). However, private investment was very weak and due to new conditions set out by the SAPs Ghana's economic markets were open to free trade. Ghana's infant industries were faced with a strong, developed, global economy which they could not compete in (Kwabena: 2010). The country's exports were uncompetitive leading to a fall in revenue and external inflows (Kwabena: 2010) landing the nation in a heavily indebted situation with no hope of development.

Ghana wasn't the sole African nation to follow this pattern; many African countries faced falling income due to reduced trade. The price of oil dropped by 60% in 1986 and sugar was selling at just 7 cents per pound from 65 cents (Moyo: 2010). Along with the heavy burden of debt and high interest rates it became evident that the newly independent nations were again dependent on the West (Moyo: 2010). A prevalent similarity among the unsuccessful developing countries trying to thrive under the capitalist system was that the institutional preconditions for a capitalist economy to flourish did not exist (Kwabena: 2010). This illustrates the major flaw of the World Bank's approach to development; Bank staff through 'missions' (Rich: 1994) lasting just days along with desk research assumed they have the knowledge and expertise to prepare a 'development plan' (Rich: 1994) to help the welfare of the poor. Complex social systems were undermined and a universal 'technocratic approach' was intensified using quantifiable targets to measure the progress of complex societies (Rich: 1994).

Furthermore, the Bank also assumed that political leaders in the developing countries would make institutional and structural changes for the benefit of its citizens (Rich: 1994). The top-down approach lacked accountability and any informed consultation with the beneficiaries, who were often

so poor they were unable to access credit provided by World Bank development projects (Rich: 1994). Development projects such as the Malaysia Muda Irrigation Project which was deemed 'successful' by the Bank in 1975 actually increased inequalities as some of the population became worse off than before with lower real incomes than in 1966 when the project began (Rich: 1994). What's more, the Bank ignored anthropological advice arising over a futher Bank project, the Rwanda Mutura Agriculture and Livestock Development Project, which ignored critical political and ethnic factors following a military coup in 1973 (Rich: 1994). The dynamics of the local situation and the advice given to the Bank was completely ignored, a recurring theme of development projects throughout the 1970s and 80s (Rich: 1994).

To summarise, the World Bank's impact on development with the aim of economic growth and poverty reduction has been in fact disastrous and the consequences are undeniably occurring today as developing country's debt increases and inequalities worsen. The World Bank can be criticised further over its negative impact on environmental development projects (Birdsall et al: 1997). The World Bank was criticised heavily by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in the 1970s and 1980s due to its support for schemes which contributed to deforestation in Brazil and Indonesia (Birdsall et al: 1997). Environmental concerns and particularly sustainable development were starting to gain political salience during the 1980s under the Brundtland Commission (Birdsall et al: 1997). These factors among others helped develop the image of the Bank as an organisation unconcerned with environmental effects if it hindered Bank economic goals (Birdsall et al: 1997).

In Malaysia, the Bank provided numerous loans for the Jenka Triangle land settlement scheme (Rich: 1994). The scheme involved clearing 100,000 acres of tropical rainforest and consequently the resettlement of 9,600 families to grow unsustainable cash crops such as oil palms and rubber trees (Rich: 1994). Continuing projects funded by the World Bank in Malaysia accounted for the destruction of about 6.5% of its forest cover in the 1970s (Rich: 1994). The intentional clearing of prime rainforest for the construction of palm oil factories further contributed to pollution as well as the increased danger posed by displaced, rampaging animals due to their loss of habitats (Rich: 1994). Wood from deforestation in Cameroon for rubber plantations was not even salvaged for commercial use (Rich: 1994). By the late 1980s it became clear that agricultural programmes implemented by the World Bank were not having a positive effect. More often than not projects failed even cancelled or rather than benefiting the landless poor they further assisted rich landowners, increasing inequalities (Rich: 1994). Increasing inequalities and damage to the environment are both factors seen as barriers to development (Birdsall et al: 1997).

The fact that the World Bank's actions are influenced greatly by powerful western nations, mainly the US, fits neatly into the discourse on 'development' being an extension of colonialism or 'financial imperialism' (Parekh and Weinrib: 2002). The World Bank has tremendous power over the

policy decisions of developing countries, decisions that affect individuals are made not by their governments or local institutions but by an international financial institution (Parekh and Weinrib: 2002). The Bank fails to be accountable (Rich: 1994) or democratic as the USA, Canada, Japan, Germany, UK and France control 45% of the decision making power while China and India representing 39% of the world's population control just 5% of the total vote (Parekh and Weinrib: 2002). It is evidential that the actions taken by the World Bank are clearly in the interests of the rich and powerful. Developing nations have been forced to 'rewrite laws concerning trade, budgets, labor, the environment and healthcare' which have subsequently contributed to the erosion of state sovereignty, adding to such exploitation by the economically powerful (Parekh and Weinrib: 2002).

The Bank's initial role was to fund the restructuring of the developed nations economically affected by the war and this role was fulfilled effectively yet, as an institution of development the World Bank has had a detrimental impact. The Bank's view that economic growth equals development is flawed, countries require particular institutional structures for capitalism to flourish as seen in Asia (Thomas: 2001) thus far, it is clear such preconditions were evidently ignored within Bank projects. The Bank instead adopted a universal, blueprint approach ignoring the complex structures of individual countries and furthermore its individual beneficiaries, the poor. World Bank lending and subsequent programmes have consequently led to huge debt amongst the poorest nations, massive inequalities, poverty and mass destruction of the environment. Most significantly however, Bank activities have led developing countries not to develop but to continue to be exploited and dependent on the powerful nations of the World.

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