# SUPJ

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Welcome to the sixth edition of the Sussex Undergraduate Politics Journal. This journal is a joint collaboration between the University of Sussex Politics Society and the Politics Department. It seeks to celebrate excellence across all three year groups, presenting the work of Sussex undergraduate students from Politics and affiliated disciplines. We hope you enjoy reading this selection of essays and that this journal may continue in the future to showcase the talent of those whose work outlines the best Sussex has to offer.

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Is It Accurate to Describe the Events of 1989 in Eastern Europe as Revolutions?

(Written for Political Change: Eastern Europe [L2017], 3rd Year, Winter 2016)

Oliver Bayer

The events of 1989 in Eastern Europe led to enormous change throughout the region. However, whether such changes constituted revolution is a matter of fierce debate. Classical conceptions of revolution have often considered them to be violent, well organised, and class based affairs, whilst other interpretations have focused on their utopian outlook, often allied with the advancement of new ideologies. Although the events of 1989 cannot easily be described as well organised or class based, (Eastern European regimes did not often allow for mass organisation independent of the state, and the erosion of class was core to communist philosophy), the absence of a utopian vision was intentional, grounded in principles of anti-ideology and anti-politics, in contrast to the ideological nature of the communist regimes. These principles, alongside the innovative emphasis on civil society as a political actor, also constituted the new values that some scholars describe as integral to revolution. Perhaps more suggestive of the revolutionary character of 1989 however, is the speed with which the events took place. Aristide Zolberg has asserted that popular risings are 'moments of madness' (Zolberg, 1972), and thus generalising what features should and should not be present for an uprising to be quantified as a 'revolution' is folly. Similarly, George Lawson has noted that any analysis that views revolution as possessing 'essential' features is flawed, as it "reduces revolutions to static objects of analysis rather than seeing them as dynamic processes" (Lawson, 2005: 475). Instead, the focus should be on the scale of change and ultimately whether the attempts at change were successful. In this sense, the magnitude of change inspired by the events of 1989 can only be fittingly embodied using the term 'revolution' (Henderson & Robinson, 1997: p.34), though perhaps a 'negotiated' (Schopflin, 1992), 'democratic' (Thompson, 2000), or 'transcending' (Sakwa, 2006) form, rather than a classical embodiment. In order to best evaluate the success of such events though, a distinction needs to be drawn between revolutionary situations and revolutionary outcomes (Tilly, 1993: p.234). If revolution is quantified by the amount of change an event inspires, the extent of change can only be understood in terms of its overall outcome. For example, using the classical definition, Romania would ostensibly appear to be the most revolutionary state in the period, but this was only true of its initial uprising. After the death of Ceausescu, the outcome, as in Bulgaria, was

one in which the communists maintained power, due to a lack of effective opposition. The GDR and Czechoslovakia on the other hand were revolutionary in both make-up and outcome, whilst Poland and Hungary are best understood as 'refolutions' (Garton Ash, 1989), as the changes initiated were initially more representative of reforms, albeit reforms that led to monumental change. Ultimately though, it is accurate to describe the events of 1989 in Eastern Europe as revolutions, the question being to what degree rather than of what kind. (Tilly, 1993: p.234)

To ascertain whether it is indeed accurate to describe the events of 1989 in Eastern Europe as revolutions, one might first seek an understanding of precisely what is meant by the term 'revolution'. However, this is no simple task. Its exact definition is a matter of fierce debate, one that has only intensified since the events of 1989. As such, finding a uniform definition is impossible. Furthermore, if it is indeed accurate to describe the events of 1989 in Eastern Europe as revolutions, then the question remains as to what type of revolution they constitute, be it social, political, or some other form entirely. Crane Brinton (Brinton, 1938) identified five uniformities within revolutions, all but one of which are applicable to the events in Eastern Europe in 1989. These uniformities were an alienated intelligentsia, a psychologically insecure and politically inept ruling class, a society longing for economic advancement, and a government financial crisis. The misnomer being growing class and status antagonisms. Theda Skocpol defined social revolutions as "rapid, basic transformations of society's state and class structure, accompanied and in part carried through by class-based revolts from below" (Skocpol, 1979: p.33). An interpretation of 1989 as a revolution would seem inaccurate in this context. Zygmunt Bauman meanwhile drew a distinction between political and systemic revolutions, and placed the events of 1989 in the latter category (Bauman, 1994: p. 15). He reasoned that political revolutions merely involve a change in the way in which the style of political rule affects the politically administered social system, whilst systemic revolutions go further and involve a transformation of the system itself. Though Bauman's description appears more apt than Skocpol's, 1989 entailed mass transformation of the social, political and economic systems across the region and thus it is perhaps best not to try and mould it into one definitive form. Therefore, rather than considering the events of 1989 in the context of one specific definition, or in terms of specific social, political or economic considerations, preliminary discussion will assess the events of 1989 in relation to criteria common to many different definitions and theories of revolution.

Many scholars often consider revolutions to be either class based and/or well organised affairs. Only in Poland do we find either of these features though, a well organised opposition in the form of Solidarity. Thus, if one considers either factor to be fundamental to revolution, only in Poland could such an event be purported to have taken place. However, the absence of these factors can easily be explained through an understanding of the nature of the communist system. The notion of a class based society stands in stark contrast to communist ideology. Therefore, though the concept of class had not been completely eroded from the region, it had been distorted beyond comprehension and was not a dividing factor within society. Rather than the lower classes rising against the upper classes, society was united against a common enemy; the nomenklatura. This was perhaps best reflected in Poland through the notion of 'my' (us) versus 'oni' (them), with support manifested around Solidarity, the only viable opposition group within the whole region. Elsewhere, opposition movements were spontaneous and lacking in organisation due to the state opposing all forms of mass opposition. Indeed, it was often this lack of organisation that helped. As an East German dissident said of the Honecker regime, it "could only fall to this kind of popular uprising [spontaneous]. A more organised force would have had its head chopped off by the Stasi" (Reich, 1970: p.4). Though this quotation is specific to the GDR, its sentiment helps explain the overall lack of organised opposition within the Eastern Bloc. Poland was the exception to this rule. Linz and Stepan have suggested that this is due to the Polish regime being authoritarian in nature, contrasting markedly with the varying forms of post-totalitarianism favoured in Hungary, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and the GDR or the sultanistic Romanian regime (Linz and Stepan, 1996). This meant that Polish citizens were granted slightly more civil liberties than societies in the rest of the region, which allowed for greater interest articulation and a more 'ethical' civil society.

Some scholars have lamented the events of 1989 in the region for their lack of a utopian vision, and consequently dismissed their revolutionary status. However, such utopianism represented the very antithesis of the aims of these upheavals and their absence was intentional. Societies in the region had experienced first-hand the kind of autocratic regimes that could result from the proclamation of new and populist ideas. Consequently, their vision was based on the rejection of such principles, and grounded in concepts of anti-ideology, as set out in Havel's *'Power of the Powerless'*, and anti-politics, as promoted in Konrad's essay of the same name. In this sense, the events of 1989 in Eastern Europe can be considered what Jurgen Habermas has termed 'rectifying' revolutions (Habermas, 1990). Rather than seeking to advance some grand

vision of the future, they were based on a desire to 'return' to Europe and perceived normalcy. In addition, although revolutions are often associated with new ideologies, whether such new ideas were prevalent in the region during the period is a matter of dispute. Francois Furet has argued that "With all the fuss and noise, not a single new idea [came out of] Eastern Europe in 1989" (quoted in Dahrendorf, 1990: p. 27). However, such analysis is misguided. The ideological value of 1989 stands in its strident rejection of ideology and politics. The rejection of communism, which had been grounded in Jacobin thought, was itself a new phenomenon; as was the promotion of civil society as a fundamental aspect of the political realm (Falk, 2003; Isaac, 1995). Civil society was used as a form of emancipation, a form of resistance and as an act of historical reconstitution, returning to Europe via the traditional liberal discourse of the West (Sawka, 2006: p. 468). Moreover, samizdat literature, such as the works of Havel and Konrad, promoted ideas of 'humanness' (Krapfl, 2007: p.7). Communist regimes were not rejected on the grounds of anti-socialist thought but because of the inhumane and overly bureaucratic nature of 'real' or 'actually-existing' socialism. In terms of vision and ideology therefore, it is correct to label the events of 1989 in Eastern Europe as revolutions, despite claims to the contrary. Disregard for ideology, cultural considerations, and other related concepts has been a fundamental weakness of attempts to define revolutions prior to 1989 (Sharman, 2003: p.2).

Violence is another feature often considered vital to any theory of revolution. In fact, some scholars have even used the terms 'civil violence' and 'revolution' synonymously (Rule, 1988). In this regard, it is clearly accurate to describe the events in Romania in 1989 as a revolution. Here, the attempted eviction of Laszlo Tokes, a Hungarian Protestant pastor, on December 16th in Timisoara led to civil unrest that resulted in the reported killing of hundreds of unarmed civilians. This led to the outbreak of rioting, in response to which Ceausescu organised a televised rally for December 21st in Bucharest. During the rally, disruption occurred, which though small scale, helped to shatter the myth of Ceausescu's invincibility and led to a national uprising which ultimately pitted the Romanian people (including the army) against Ceausescu's Securitate. The uprising resulted in the overthrow of the Ceausescu regime and the execution of Nicolae and his wife on December 25th. Elsewhere though, the events of 1989 in Eastern Europe were remarkable for their lack of violence. As such, it is tempting to dismiss the revolutionary nature of these events on such grounds. However, though a common characteristic, violence is not a prerequisite of revolutions. The peaceful nature of the uprisings

in the region can be explained through context, as can the violent nature of the events in Romania. The reforms enacted by Gorbachev since he became head of the CPSU in 1985 had a two-fold effect on the role of violence in the satellite states. Firstly, it was unclear whether the Soviet Union would still support the use of force against opposition groups. Secondly, the increased autonomy granted to the Eastern Bloc states and the introduction of market mechanisms into the economy meant that international trade was now of greater economic consideration. As such, there was the lingering fear that any use of force might result in sanctions from the international community that would further damage these countries' already ailing economies. Furthermore, until the pronouncement of the 'Sinatra Doctrine' on October 25th 1989, it was unclear whether the Brezhnev Doctrine was still in place. Resultantly, opposition movements were wary of using violent means of protest for fear of invasion by the USSR and other Warsaw Pact states, with the 1956 Hungarian Revolution perhaps best exemplifying the likely outcome of any armed struggles in the Eastern Bloc (Goodwin, 1994: p.589). Such repercussions however, were not as much of a limiting factor in Romania as it had always operated with greater independence vis-à-vis the Soviet Union than the other satellite states. Furthermore, the 'sultanistic' nature of Ceausescu's regime meant a negotiated end to his rule was not feasible. The unwillingness of such regimes to negotiate with the opposition makes them far more susceptible to a violent uprising (Campenau, 1991). Ultimately, other than in Romania, the repudiation of violence was a core tenet of the 'rectifying' nature of transformation to which these societies aspired (Arato, 1993: p.613), a fact that should not lessen their revolutionary status.

Moreover, the speed with which communism collapsed is itself indicative of a revolution. The suddenness of the collapse is illustrated by the fact that at the beginning of 1989, Solidarity was a banned trade union and Vaclav Havel had just been imprisoned for 9 months (Crawford, 1996: p.56). In elections held in Poland in June, Solidarity won all but one of the seats available to them in the parliament and senate, and by the end of 1989 Havel was president of Czechoslovakia. Until 1989, there was little sign of organised social dissent anywhere in the region. Even in Poland, there was no sign of 'transformative' interests within much of society in 1988 (Bauman, 1988), and yet Solidarity would come to set the 'revolutionary bandwagon' in full swing in 1989 (Kuran, 1991: p.36). The events in Romania, Czechoslovakia and the GDR occurred far more swiftly than events in Bulgaria, Hungary and Poland however. In this sense, the latter three are better understood, as previously stated, in terms of what Timothy Garton

Ash has termed 'refolutions' (Garton Ash, 1990), rather than explicit revolutions. This is because they were elite led and mixed reforms with other, more radical aspects. In Poland, general strikes in 1988 led to the communist government agreeing to round table talks with the opposition that took place from February to April 1989, following the legalisation of Solidarity. These talks resulted in semi free elections in June 1989 in which Solidarity secured an overwhelming victory in the seats they were permitted to contest. In Hungary, round table talks began almost immediately following the Polish elections, after several motions had been made towards democratisation; such as the legalisation of independent opposition political parties in February and the opening of the Austrian border in May. Garton Ash only used the term 'refolution' regarding events in Poland and Hungary, but the description seemingly fits Bulgaria too. Here, the purging of Zhivkov in November 1989 set in motion a process of liberalisation, with the legalisation of opposition parties in December and the commencement of round table talks shortly afterwards in January 1990. What distinguishes Bulgaria from Poland and Hungary, and thus means it does not fit the concept of a 'refolution' quite so neatly, is the fact that Zhivkov's ousting followed protests in October 1989 that began as environmental rallies but swiftly became anti-regime. In this sense, Bulgaria is a mix of 'refolution' (as in Poland and Hungary) and 'people power' (as in the GDR and Czechoslovakia). On the other hand, Bulgaria is the only country in which no oppositional talks occurred in 1989 itself, and in this respect, could be considered more of a palace-coup.

What is clear from analysis thus far is that classical conceptions of revolution and its essential features do not correlate strongly with the overall events of 1989. However, the nature of the communist regimes accounts for the absence of many of these 'essentials'. Rather than indicating the inaccuracy of suggestions that these events constitute revolutions, this instead serves to highlight the inaccuracy of generalised theories of revolution. Revolutions are exceptionally complex processes, and as previously demonstrated, cannot be reduced to a simple assessment of the possession of certain factors. Revolutions are ultimately "an intricate conjunction of historical context, social conditions and political action" (Lawson, 2005: p.490), differentiated from other processes of social change by their scope, depth and effect (Sztompka, 1993). To constitute a revolution, change must come about through mass movements within civil society and involve the wider public (Lawson, 2005: p.480). This is clearly true of the uprisings in most of the region, but not necessarily in Hungary and Poland. Here matters were elite-led and arguably more representative of transitional politics. However,

assessment of these events as 'transitions' does not capture the enormity of change catalysed by proceedings, a transformation that can only truly be described using the term 'revolution'. Revolution then is best understood and assessed simply in terms of attempts at radical change (Kroeber, 1996: p.25) where all that matters "is the degree in which the vision differs from the reality of the present" (Stone, 1970: p.60). Therefore, it is accurate to describe the events that unfolded in the Eastern Bloc in 1989 as revolutions.

Scholars who consider it accurate to describe the events of 1989 in Eastern Europe as revolutions have often created new 'forms' of revolutionary theory as a result, with revolutions in the region described as 'democratic', 'transcending' and 'negotiated' amongst other things. In 'negotiated' revolutions, the description of how change occurs is modified and an explanation to what distinguishes it from other regimes is clearly presented (Henderson & Robinson, 1997: p.34). Such analysis is similar to Garton Ash's 'refolution' theory, but in the sense that change is effected through peaceful means, not necessarily through reforms. Accepting revolution in this form verifies events in Poland and Hungary as revolutions. However, though Poland and Hungary fit this description best, it is essentially true for all but Romania, given that round table discussions took place in each other country. The revolutions of 1989 are 'transcending' in that they not only overcame communism and their individual oppressive regimes, but also rejected the political practices and logic on which they were based in favour of democratisation and 'anti-politics' (Ost, 1990). Features that mark them as such include the repudiation of violence, Romania aside, and the presence of mass popular demonstrations, as were present to differing degrees in all but Poland and Hungary. Additionally, there was an emphasis on forum politics (e.g. Civic Forum in Czechoslovakia; Democratic Forum in Hungary) and the reiterated notion of the negotiated nature of the communist exit (Sawka, 2006: p.485). Lastly, they are 'democratic' in the sense that they were spontaneous, peaceful and urban based popular uprisings which toppled repressive regimes and signalled the process of democratisation (Thompson, 2000: p.2). This view of events beckoning democratisation is very important, as formerly analysts were doubtful as to whether peaceful protest could topple non-democratic regimes. Understood in these terms it is clearly accurate to describe the events in the region as revolutionary, given the near total abandonment of dictatorial regimes in favour of democracies.

Ultimately though, amidst the many differing notions of revolution there is one constant; that the event must be successful. If the events are unsuccessful, then dependent on context, they

merely constitute 'rebellions', 'uprisings', 'revolts' or 'insurrections' (Calvert, 1970: p.15). All the countries in the region were seemingly initially successful in their attempts to overthrow their respective regimes. However, to be truly quantifiable as a 'success', a revolutionary situation must have a revolutionary outcome; two distinct entities. For Eastern Europe that entailed complete discontinuity from the old regime and the establishment of an alternative system to communism. In this regard, Romania, despite seeming to be the most revolutionary, was in fact the least revolutionary. Though the initial uprising in 1989 toppled the Ceausescu regime, leading communists retained power under the guise of the 'National Salvation Front' and won the 1990 and 1992 elections. A similar outcome occurred in Bulgaria, where the 'Bulgarian Communist Party' became the 'Bulgarian Socialist Party' and won the June 1990 elections. The lack of viable opposition groups in both countries contributed to the communists' initial retention of power. However, Poland is the only other country in which a dispute can be made against there being a revolutionary outcome, since the initial elections were only semi-free. In Hungary, the communists were convincingly beaten in the March 1990 elections, winning a mere 33 seats and events in Czechoslovakia and the GDR were even more revolutionary, the only countries in which communists were not in power by the end of 1989. East Germany was the first country in the region in which democratisation came about through the peaceful overthrow of the communist regime, and ultimately inspired similar events in Czechoslovakia (Kavan & Wheaton, 1992: p.34). Furthermore, both countries had ceased to exist by 1993, the former dissolving into the Czech Republic and Slovakia, and the latter reunifying with West Germany, representing indisputably revolutionary outcomes.

Overall, it is certainly accurate to describe the events of 1989 in Eastern Europe as revolutions. Analysis that dismisses the revolutionary nature of 1989 is mistaken, often grounded in the erroneous notion that events need possess certain 'essential' characteristics to classify as revolutions. In this sense, the revolutions of 1989 have acted as a catalyst for change not only across Eastern Europe, but also in revolutionary theory, ushering in new understandings of revolution in a 'democratic' and 'negotiated' context. Furthermore, rather than be categorised by the presence, or lack, of certain features, revolutions should be defined by the enormity of the changes instigated. In this regard, the immensity of change that the events of 1989 brought across Eastern Europe is indisputable, and therefore, as Sasha Weitman has stated, 'perhaps the single most striking feature of the upheavals of 1989 [is] their revolutionary character' (Weitman, 1992: p.12). Opposition movements in the region propagated anti-politics and

placed great emphasis on the importance of civil society in the political realm, which stood in stark contrast to the ideological and totalitarian nature of their respective regimes and thus represented highly revolutionary notions. The speed in which events unfolded, especially in the GDR, Czechoslovakia and Romania, is also indicative of the revolutionary character uniform to the region. However, to fully evaluate the nature of the communist collapse, a distinction must be made between revolutionary situations on the one hand, and revolutionary outcomes on the other. The latter is of particular importance and in this regard Romania and Bulgaria represent the least revolutionary transitions, notable for their elite continuity. The 'refolutions' in Poland and Hungary however resulted in greater discontinuity, and thus were revolutionary in terms of outcome, if not their initial situations in 1989. Both the events and outcomes of 1989 in the GDR and Czechoslovakia were indubitably revolutionary, and represented the most monumental changes across the region. Ultimately any differences were mostly of degree rather than of kind, and it is nevertheless accurate to assert that each country underwent a revolution in 1989.

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To what extent has gender been an influence on Angela Merkel's rise and success in German politics?

Maya Burgess

Following the 2005 federal election in Germany, Angela Merkel was appointed the country's first female Chancellor. Electoral successes in federal elections in 2009 and 2013 confirmed her status as a political titan in Germany. This essay analyses the significance of gender during Angela Merkel's career, and how this factor influenced her rise to become the first female German Chancellor. In this essay, I adopt a feminist, new institutionalist approach, and I contend that although gender is of decreasing salience in German politics, much of Merkel's success stems from her ability to manipulate and subvert gender norms in response to challenging political circumstances.

New institutionalism recognises that 'political life is structured by formal rules, informal practices, and ideational norms', which differ between countries.[1] Feminist institutionalism argues that these rules, practices and norms are gendered, and therefore have different effects on actors depending on their gender.[2] Gendered formal rules are 'formally constructed and written down', and can thus be easily identified.[3] They include gender quotas and the feminised nature of German political institutions. Formal rules are found to be more salient in the early stages of Merkel's career, effective in increasing the percentage of women in legislative bodies, and subverting the traditional consensus on women in politics. However, this essay argues that once Merkel was elected as a cabinet minister, gendered informal practices and ideational norms were the key influence on her political success. Informal rules are unwritten, 'socially shared rules', which are 'created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels'.[4] Germany as a progressive culture carries a consensus that welcomes female

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[1] Annesley, Claire. "Rules of Ministerial Recruitment." Politics & Gender, vol. 11, no. 04, Dec. 2015, pp. 618–642, 10.1017/s1743923x15000434. pg 621

[2] ibid

[3] Lowndes, Vivien, and Roberts Mark. Why Institutions Matter: The New Institutionalism in Political Science. Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 24 May 2013.

[4] Annesley, Claire. "Rules of Ministerial Recruitment." Politics & Gender, vol. 11, no. 04, Dec. 2015, pp. 618–642, 10.1017/s1743923x15000434. pg 621

leadership and holds a modern view of gender roles. Social norms dictating the respective roles of men and women and the 'accepted ideas about feminine and masculine modes of behaviour' have been beneficial to Merkel throughout her rise in government.[5] Karen Beckwith proposes two meanings of gender; as a 'process' and as a 'category'.[6] These interpretations of gender are informal rules, used by Merkel throughout her career. Additionally, the desire for women in political crisis and the uncompetitive nature of relationships between men and women, are informal practices that greatly aided Merkel's success. This essay explores the various ways in which Merkel used these formal and informal rules as a political strategy, ultimately leading to her election as Chancellor.

German political institutions have been influential in increasing gender-egalitarianism within the country. Karen Beckwith alludes to this in her preposition of gender as a 'process', referring to 'behaviours, conventions, practices, and dynamics' engaged in by individuals, movements, institutions and nations.[7] Beckwith expands on her description of gender as a process, stating that it is manifested as the 'differential effects of apparently gender-neutral structures and policies upon women and men'. Therefore research which employs gender as a process centres on the notion that 'institutions and structures are themselves gendered and have differential implications' for men and women.[8] Gender as a process can be seen through the formal rules entrenched in Germany's political institutions, which aided Merkel's election into government. This is evidenced through Germany's dual executive parliamentary structure, which is considered 'less "masculinised" than other executive positions in the world'. Germany's federal-level electoral system uses both a plurality system and proportional representation (PR) lists. PR has been found to greatly increase female candidates' chances of election as, 'both male and female candidates from the same party can win seats in a given electoral district'. In a study on female representation in the Bundestag, women were found to be 'four times more likely to have been elected via PR than via plurality'.[9] Additionally, the

[5] ibid

[6] Beckwith, Karen. "A Common Language of Gender?" Politics & Gender, Vol. 1, no.1, Mar. 2005, 10.1017/s1743923x05211017. pg 132

[7] Beckwith, Karen. "A Common Language of Gender?" Politics & Gender, Vol. 1, no.1, Mar. 2005, 10.1017/s1743923x05211017. pg 132

[8] ibid pg 133

[9] Davidson-Schmich, Louise. K. "Implementation of Political Party Gender Quotas: Evidence from the German Lander 1990-2000." Party Politics, vol. 12, no. 2, 1 Mar. 2006, pp. 211–232, 10.1177/1354068806061338. pg 219

country's 'non-nuclear status' and 'taboo' regarding defence, further 'feminise' its executive branch, making it more accommodating to female politicians.[10]

Gender quotas are a formal rule enforced in Germany during the late 20th century. They were a significant catalyst to the increase of female representation in German legislative bodies. Second Wave feminism contributed to the introduction of gender quotas when the movement became involved in politics during the 1980s. The newly founded Green Party provided a 'political opportunity' for Second Wave feminists, as they shared similar values.[11] The party improved equality through actively promoting women to positions of leadership and was the first party to implement a gender quota. Gender quotas are party-set targets for gender balance among the individuals placed in office.[12] This strategy by the Green Party forced the other main parties in Germany to collectively recognise the importance of gender quotas as a means of gaining the women's vote. The introduction of political party quotas was a formal rule which increased political parties' incentive to select female candidates.[13] When Merkel became a Bundestag minister in 2001, less than 26 per cent of politicians in the government were female.[14] The introduction of gender quotas at this time made her a strong candidate for election. Wiliarty suggests that Merkel owes her initial rise within the CDU to her ability to satisfy informal, internal party quotas.[15] The CDU is considered a traditional, predominantly Catholic party, which values conventional gender roles.[16] Thus the conventional wisdom was that such a party would not be conducive to the success of a female politician.

However, critics have argued that, paradoxically, the CDU has elements which benefit female membership. McKay suggests that the party was originally conceived as a 'people's party, which aimed to attract a broad spectrum of voters, including, of course, women'. The CDU currently

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[10] Davidson-Schmich, Louise K. "Gender, Intersectionality, and the Executive Branch: The Case of Angela Merkel." German Politics, vol. 20, no. 3, Sept. 2011, pp. 325–341, 10.1080/09644008.2011.606566. pg 332

[11] Wiliarty, Sarah Elise. The CDU and the Politics of Gender in Germany: Bringing Women to the Party. New York, Cambridge University Press, 16 Aug. 2010. pg 8

[12] Davidson-Schmich, Louise. K. "Implementation of Political Party Gender Quotas: Evidence from the German Lander 1990-2000." Party Politics, vol. 12, no. 2, 1 Mar. 2006, pp. 211–232, 10.1177/1354068806061338. pg 212

[13] ibid

[14] Group, The World Bank. Proportion of Seats Held by Women in National Parliaments (%). 2016, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SG.GEN.PARL.ZS?end=2016&locations=DE&start=1990&view=chart&year= 1993. Accessed 29 Dec. 2016.

[15] Wiliarty, Sarah Elise. "Angela Merkel's Path to Power: The Role of Internal Party Dynamics and Leadership." German Politics, vol. 17, no. 1, Mar. 2008, pp. 81–96, 10.1080/09644000701855168. pg 81

[16] Davidson-Schmich, Louise K. "Gender, Intersectionality, and the Executive Branch: The Case of Angela Merkel." German Politics, vol. 20, no. 3, Sept. 2011, pp. 325–341, 10.1080/09644008.2011.606566. pg 334

enjoys high levels of support among older women, with 44 per cent of female voters over 60 voting for the party in the 2002 federal elections.[17] As a woman, a Protestant and former East German, Merkel represented three internal party groups, making her a desirable choice for a catch-all party.[18] Arguably, Merkel's gender was her most desirable trait for the CDU, whose interest in women's issues rose significantly when female support for the party fell in the 1970s. This greatly increased competition for the 'women's vote' in Germany, which contributed to the 'use of quotas as a political instrument'.[19] In comparison to the other major parties in the German system, the CDU party adopted quotas for women 'much later and much less willingly'.[20] However, in 1996, the party ultimately implemented a 'women's quorum' within the party, which required the use of a 'two-to-one ratio' when forming electoral lists[21] and 'aimed to achieve female representation of at least a third of all elected posts'[22]. The formal introduction of this quota in the party statute was a key contributor to Merkel's appointment as General Secretary in 1998 and ultimately, to her election as leader of the CDU in 2000.[23] Merkel herself once stated that her political success was aided by the fact that '[she is] a woman and at a certain time a woman was sought after'.[24] Merkel's rise to power must therefore be considered in the context of a party system in which formal rules, such as gender quotas, are a widespread and accepted tool of party competition, which have been crucial elements in the increasing number of female politicians in Germany.[25]

The various gendered informal rules within German politics and society strongly aided Merkel's success. As noted by Inglehart and Norris, political culture has a significant affect on

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[17] Mckay, Joanna. "Women in German Politics: Still Jobs for the Boys?" German Politics, vol. 13, no. 1, Mar. 2004, pp. 56–80, 10.1080/0964400042000245398. pg 68

[18] Wiliarty, Sarah Elise. "Angela Merkel's Path to Power: The Role of Internal Party Dynamics and Leadership." German Politics, vol. 17, no. 1, Mar. 2008, pp. 81–96, 10.1080/09644000701855168. pg 84

[19] Wiliarty, Sarah Elise. "Angela Merkel's Path to Power: The Role of Internal Party Dynamics and Leadership." German Politics, vol. 17, no. 1, Mar. 2008, pp. 81–96, 10.1080/09644000701855168. pg 82

[20] Davidson-Schnich, Louise K. "Gender, Intersectionality, and the Executive Branch: The Case of Angela Merkel." German Politics, vol. 20, no. 3, Sept. 2011, pp. 325–341, 10.1080/09644008.2011.606566. pg 334

[21] Davidson-Schnich, Louise. K. "Implementation of Political Party Gender Quotas: Evidence from the German Lander 1990-2000." Party Politics, vol. 12, no. 2, 1 Mar. 2006, pp. 211–232, 10.1177/1354068806061338. pg 213

[22] Mckay, Joanna. "Women in German Politics: Still Jobs for the Boys?" German Politics, vol. 13, no. 1, Mar. 2004, pp. 56–80, 10.1080/0964400042000245398. pg 69

[23] ibid

[24] Davidson-Schnich, Louise K. "Gender, Intersectionality, and the Executive Branch: The Case of Angela Merkel." German Politics, vol. 20, no. 3, Sept. 2011, pp. 325–341, 10.1080/09644008.2011.606566. pg 334

[25] Wiliarty, Sarah Elise. "Angela Merkel's Path to Power: The Role of Internal Party Dynamics and Leadership." German Politics, vol. 17, no. 1, Mar. 2008, pp. 81–96, 10.1080/09644000701855168. pgs 82-83

women's chances of succeeding in politics.[26] As an 'affluent, post-industrial society with egalitarian values', Germany has a 'favourable culture' for female politicians.[27] In 2008, The World Economic Forum ranked Germany seventh in terms of gender equity and sixth regarding political empowerment.[28] In 2003, Germany was rated highly in the United Nation's Gender Related Development Index, showing that German citizens have 'attitudes among the most compatible with women's representation of any people in the world'.[29] Wiliarty argues that the feminist movement has contributed significantly to the German consensus on female politicians, which improved in the early 2000s.[30] Radical feminism is the strand of the feminist movement most prevalent in Germany. Radical feminists assume 'fundamental differences between men and women' and believe that women's oppression stems from the notion of distinguishing the two genders. Many radical feminists therefore believe that the solution to gender inequality is androgyny.[31] Radical feminism influenced Germany's attitude to gender, which has become less traditional in recent years. For example, Berlin introduced new rules for billboard advertisements, which reject gender stereotypes such as 'girls in pink with dolls' and 'boys in blue playing with technical toys'. Additionally, in advertisements adult women cannot be depicted as 'stupid', 'naive', or 'occupied in the household with pleasure'.[32] In this way the German government has attempted to destabilise traditional gender norms, which in turn benefits political equality. She states that the movement changed voter expectations and normalised female politicians.[33] Wiliarty notes that by the 21st century, the idea of a female Chancellor of Germany was far less outrageous than it would have been in the mid-1980s.[34] In this way, radical feminism was successful in diluting the differences between men and women

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[26] Inglehart, Ronald. and Norris, Pippa. "Rising Tide: Gender Equality and Cultural Change Around the World." Cambridge University Press, 2005. pg 8

[27] Wiliarty, Sarah Elise. "Chancellor Angela Merkel—A Sign of Hope or the Exception That Proves the Rule?" Politics & Gender, vol. 4, no. 03, Sept. 2008, 10.1017/s1743923x08000391. pg 487

[28] Wiliarty, Sarah Elise. "Chancellor Angela Merkel—A Sign of Hope or the Exception That Proves the Rule?" Politics & Gender, vol. 4, no. 03, Sept. 2008, 10.1017/s1743923x08000391. pg 487

[29] Davidson-Schmich, Louise. K. "Implementation of Political Party Gender Quotas: Evidence from the German Lander 1990-2000." Party Politics, vol. 12, no. 2, 1 Mar. 2006, pp. 211–232, 10.1177/1354068806061338. pg 213

[30] Wiliarty, Sarah Elise. The CDU and the Politics of Gender in Germany: Bringing Women to the Party. New York, Cambridge University Press, 16 Aug. 2010. pg 6

[31] ibid pgs 6-7

[32] Faiola, Anthony. "In Europe, Creating a Post-Gender World One Small Rule at a Time." Washington Post, 12 June 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/the-remarkable-ways-europe-is-changing-how-people-talk-about-gender/2015/06/12/af435d48-0df0-11e5-a0fe-dccfea4653ee_story.html?utm_term=.4a3afe181cb6. Accessed 6 Dec. 2016.

[33] Wiliarty, Sarah Elise. "Angela Merkel's Path to Power: The Role of Internal Party Dynamics and Leadership." German Politics, vol. 17, no. 1, Mar. 2008, pp. 81–96, 10.1080/09644000701855168. pg 82

[34] Wiliarty, Sarah Elise. "Chancellor Angela Merkel—A Sign of Hope or the Exception That Proves the Rule?" Politics & Gender, vol. 4, no. 03, Sept. 2008, 10.1017/s1743923x08000391. pg 487

and decreasing the salience of gender in politics. This lead to the majority of German people feeling more open to the notion of a female chancellor, as evidenced through Merkel's 76% approval rating in the year of her election.[35]

<u>Merkel in government</u>

Gender influenced Merkel's time in government in a positive manner. Merkel's gender was a key contributor to her appointment to Kohl's cabinet in 1990, which she joined as Minister for Women and Youth, an arguably feminised position.[36] Kohl required someone quiet, female and a former East German in his cabinet, a criteria which Merkel filled.[37] Merkel developed a strong relationship with Kohl, and was nick-named 'Kohl's Mädchen' (Kohl's girl), which demonstrates her ability to be visible as a female in a cabinet of men. This relationship along with Merkel's 'multiple-minority attributes' aided her promotion to deputy head of the Christian Democratic union in 1991.[38] Merkel recognised the political protection that her gender gave her, and therefore maintained this arguably patronising relationship with Kohl.[39] After gaining the opportunity to attend prestigious foreign trips, a similar bond was formed with President de Maizère, who referred to Merkel as 'my Angela'.[40] The informal practices in society dictate the nature of relationships between men and women. Generally, platonic relationships between men and women are often viewed as less competitive than platonic relationships of the same gender. Packer notes that in addition, Merkel 'never put herself in the foreground' and in this way, earned President de Maizière's trust.[41] Merkel was successful in using stereotypically female attributes to her advantage, portraying herself as un-threatening, yet not overly feminine, and was thus able to form mutually beneficial relationships with male leaders.

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[35] Nardelli, Alberto. "Angela Merkel: 10 Years in 10 Charts." The Guardian, 18 Sept. 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2015/sep/18/angela-merkel-10-years-germany-chancellor-economy-cdu. Accessed 10 Dec. 2016.

[36] Davidson-Schmich, Louise K. "Gender, Intersectionality, and the Executive Branch: The Case of Angela Merkel." German Politics, vol. 20, no. 3, Sept. 2011, pp. 325–341, 10.1080/09644008.2011.606566. pg 334-335

[37] The BBC. "The Making of Merkel with Andrew Marr." YouTube, directed by Mark Radice, 21 Sept. 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WvSA82z6Dig. Accessed 8 Dec. 2016.

[38] Thompson, M. and L. Lennartz (2006): 'The Making of Chancellor Merkel', in German Politics 15 (1): 99-110. pg 100

[39] ibid pg 104

[40] ibid pg 103

[41] Packer, George. The Quiet German: The Astonishing Rise of Angela Merkel, the Most Powerful Woman in the World. 16 Jan. 2016, http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/12/01/quiet-german. Accessed 22 Nov. 2016.

Informal rules which dictate stereotypical opinions of women can have a negative influence on their success in male-dominated careers, such as politics. Thomspon and Lennartz allude to the societal norms that view women as subservient and dependent on men, describing Merkel as a seemingly 'weak player in the government, having little independent standing on her own'.[42] However Merkel succeeded in using these gender stereotypes as a means of political advancement. In an interview, she stated that being undermined as a woman was 'a great advantage' as it allowed her to 'keep quiet', which at the time was her 'survival strategy'.[43] Cabinet Minister, Ursula Von Der Leyen recalls that male cabinet members "were very authoritarian" towards Merkel, and she "let them have their way, she was very soft, answering in a low voice".[44] By perpetuating the stereotype of women as submissive and benign, Merkel led older and more powerful male politicians to underestimate her, and 'pay a high price' for doing so.[45] An example of this can be seen during a televised electoral campaign in 2005, in which Gerhard Schröder, described by De Maiziere as being "full of testosterone", labelled Merkel as the "clear loser", adamant that she would never become Chancellor. However, Merkel did not rise to Schröder's aggression and demonstrated that politics could have a different, less masculine tone.[46] Merkel embodied the gendered norms that view women as calm and gentle in order to contrast herself to the hyper-masculinised Schröder. Merkel therefore exploited gender stereotypes, which have traditionally hampered female advancement, by using them to alter the expectations of those around her. In other words, she was not breaking gender norms as much as she was manipulating them in order to position herself in the optimum manner.

Merkel's success as a passive female politician is evidence of the gendered informal rules within society which dictate the acceptability of men and women's behaviour. Davidson-Schmich notes that younger, female leaders, who listen to older individuals before deciding on a position are likely to be met with greater approval. Merkel has carried this skill through to her chancellorship. When questioned on her leadership style, Merkel reaffirmed this gender

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[42] Thompson, M. and L. Lennartz (2006): 'The Making of Chancellor Merkel', in German Politics 15 (1): 99-110. pg 100

[43] Davidson-Schmich, Louise K. "Gender, Intersectionality, and the Executive Branch: The Case of Angela Merkel." German Politics, vol. 20, no. 3, Sept. 2011, pp. 325–341, 10.1080/09644008.2011.606566. pg 333

[44] The BBC. "The Making of Merkel with Andrew Marr." YouTube, directed by Mark Radice, 21 Sept. 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WvSA82z6Dig. Accessed 8 Dec. 2016.

[45] Packer, George. The Quiet German: The Astonishing Rise of Angela Merkel, the Most Powerful Woman in the World. 16 Jan. 2016, http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/12/01/quiet-german. Accessed 22 Nov. 2016.

[46] The BBC. "The Making of Merkel with Andrew Marr." YouTube, directed by Mark Radice, 21 Sept. 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WvSA82z6Dig. Accessed 8 Dec. 2016.

stereotype, stating "I see communication as my main role, and also my strength. When it comes to important issues, I must prepare the discussion, broaden the debate, and bring the topic along until it is ready to be decided upon. ... When I am able to do this, I view [my leadership style] as successful".[47] Time magazine comments on this leadership style when naming Merkel person of the year in 2015, stating that she is 'a master of leading from behind', or in other words, views leadership as a collective activity.[48] Merkel therefore embodies a stereotypically feminine leadership style, through showing an absence of vanity and power obsession, which are traits that are more commonly associated with male leaders.

Throughout her career, Merkel's gender has appeared to be fluid in its nature. Her actions do not appear to be constrained by stable forms of gender, and instead Merkel uses both masculine and feminine attributes to her political advantage. Gender stereotyping has led to a negative societal consensus on politically assertive female politicians. Baxter provides a psychological explanation for this, suggesting that 'both women and men unconsciously view men as leaders and women as followers'. Therefore when a women is in a senior position of leadership, she 'disrupts unconscious collective norms'.[49] Traditional informal rules of gender portray successful leaders as male, labelling them as 'heroic, charismatic', 'competitive', and 'cut-throat'. Due to this, Baxter argues that there is 'no room for women to fit into masculine archetypes of leadership'. Therefore female leaders are either viewed as 'cute, sweet or girly', but ultimately not seen as serious, or 'scary, tough, mean, bossy, or just like a man'. While the latter may have more success, she is predominantly disliked by society.[50] Throughout her political career, Merkel has been successful in moving 'skilfully' between these stereotypes, 'using them as resources to draw on' to achieve her political goals.[51] During her eight years in Kohl's cabinet, Merkel learnt how to 'sit out' of political controversies until they diminished, which the informal rules of her gender allowed her to do. Additionally, Merkel's feminine, un-confrontational approach towards journalists, allowed her to 'build up her media contacts',

[47] Davidson-Schmich, Louise K. "Gender, Intersectionality, and the Executive Branch: The Case of Angela Merkel." German Politics, vol. 20, no. 3, Sept. 2011, pp. 325–341, 10.1080/09644008.2011.606566. pg 336

[48] Mochari, Ilan. "The Leadership Qualities That Made Angela Merkel "time" Magazine's Person of the Year." Inc., 9 Dec. 2015, http://www.inc.com/ilan-mochari/time-person-of-year-angela-merkel.html. Accessed 21 Dec. 2016.

[49] Baxter, Judith. "How to Beat the Female Leadership Stereotypes." The Guardian, 9 Dec. 2013, https://www.theguardian.com/women-in-leadership/2013/dec/09/beat-female-leadership-stereotypes. Accessed 6 Dec. 2016.

[50] ibid

[51] ibid

which contributed to her positive portrayal in the press.[52] Merkel was therefore successful in using 'typical "female" ministry as a springboard to higher political office', whilst avoiding being placed into negative gender stereotypes.[53]

Merkel's gender was a key contributor to her success during the political disruptions within the CDU party, which took place throughout the late 20th century. An electoral loss for the party in 1988, due to general dissatisfaction with Kohl's leadership, led to his resignation. Wolfgang Schäuble became the new party chair and appointed Merkel as general secretary, 'a clear promotion in terms of both prestige and power'.[54] As a young, female, Easterner, Merkel 'diversified the party leadership', as she presented a contrast to former Chancellor Kohl.[55] In 1999, a major campaign finance scandal was uncovered. It was discovered that Kohl had accepted millions of Deutschmarks illegally, along with tax evasion and suspicions that his 'inner circle' had been 'bought' by 'secret campaign contributors'.[56] As Schäuble was revealed to be implicated in the scandal, he was forced to resign as leader of the party. Beckwith notes that gender can be seen to either enhance or hinder female candidates for elective office.[57] In the case of Merkel, the informal rules of her gender allowed her to be seen as uncorrupt and innocent of any political wrong-doing. Beckwith suggests that this is a common trait among male legislators, who often undermine women legislators, perceiving them as 'incompatible with the men's conceptions of power players'. Young furthers this argument, by theorising gender as 'an attribute of social structures more than of persons'.[58] Therefore, despite various demonstrations of stereotypically masculine political behaviours, Merkel continued to be characterised predominantly by her gender, due to informal societal rules.

Scholars have commented on the informal rule concerning the significance of gender during political crisis. Wiliarty states that 'women leaders are more likely to come to power during

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[52] Thompson, M. and L. Lennartz (2006): 'The Making of Chancellor Merkel', in German Politics 15 (1): 99-110. pg 105

[53] ibid

[54] Wiliarty, Sarah Elise. "Chancellor Angela Merkel—A Sign of Hope or the Exception That Proves the Rule?" Politics & Gender, vol. 4, no. 03, Sept. 2008, 10.1017/s1743923x08000391. pg 489

[55] Davidson-Schmich, Louise K. "Gender, Intersectionality, and the Executive Branch: The Case of Angela Merkel." German Politics, vol. 20, no. 3, Sept. 2011, pp. 325–341, 10.1080/09644008.2011.606566. pg 335

[56] Thompson, M. and L. Lennartz (2006): 'The Making of Chancellor Merkel', in German Politics 15 (1): 99-110. pg 105

[57] Beckwith, Karen. "A Common Language of Gender?" Politics & Gender, Vol. 1, no.1, Mar. 2005, 10.1017/s1743923x05211017. pg 132

[58] Young, Iris Marion. "Lived Body Vs Gender: Reflections on Social Structure and Subjectivity." Ratio, vol. 15, no. 4, Dec. 2002, pp. 410–428, 10.1111/1467-9329.00200. pg 422

times of instability or "unusual times" and Merkel's rise to power 'confirms the importance of this variable'.[59] During the CDU campaign finance scandal, 'gender seemed to work for Merkel, not against her'. Merkel had been close to Kohl, but not close enough to be part of his 'inner circle' of men, who became discredited through accusations of corruption.[60] Due to her being excluded because of her gender, Merkel enjoyed a 'clean image' in the public eye.[61] This facilitated her appointment to party chair, as among the limited choices of suitable candidates, 'Merkel represented the greatest break with the recent past', and Kohl's former admiration of her granted her strong political standing.[62] Thompson and Lennartz suggest that in periods of political crisis, traditional attitudes towards women become an assistance, as opposed to a hindrance, to their political success. When male political leaders are tainted by scandal, the 'cleaner', 'softer' style of women becomes more appealing.[63] Merkel gained support from the German public, who viewed her as a 'Trümmerfrau' an icon of the post-war period in which women uncomplainingly cleaned up the ruins of war in order to help rebuild the country'.[64] Whilst we cannot attribute Merkel's success solely to political disruptions, Wiliarty notes that these are 'one of the few ways by which women can advance', and until gender equality is achieved in a political system, women are more likely to succeed in a crisis.[65]

The ways in which Merkel utilised her gender aided her rise and success. In addition to her proposal of gender as a 'process', Beckwith presents gender as a 'category'. By this she means 'socially constructed, fluid, politically relevant identities, values, conventions, and practices conceived of as masculine and/or feminine', recognising that 'masculinity' and 'femininity' do not solely correspond to 'male' and 'female'.[66] Merkel uses gender as a category through her lack of femininity. Merkel has been described as 'grey', having a 'bland hair style' and 'drab

[59] Wiliarty, Sarah Elise. "Chancellor Angela Merkel—A Sign of Hope or the Exception That Proves the Rule?" Politics & Gender, vol. 4, no. 03, Sept. 2008, 10.1017/s1743923x08000391. pg 488

[60] Thompson, M. and L. Lennartz (2006): 'The Making of Chancellor Merkel', in German Politics 15 (1): 99-110. pg 106

[61] Wiliarty, Sarah Elise. "Angela Merkel's Path to Power: The Role of Internal Party Dynamics and Leadership." German Politics, vol. 17, no. 1, Mar. 2008, pp. 81–96, 10.1080/09644000701855168. pg 82

[62] Mckay, Joanna. "Women in German Politics: Still Jobs for the Boys?" German Politics, vol. 13, no. 1, Mar. 2004, pp. 56–80, 10.1080/0964400042000245398. pg 68

[63] Thompson, M. and L. Lennartz (2006): 'The Making of Chancellor Merkel', in German Politics 15 (1): 99-110. pg 106

[64] ibid

[65] Wiliarty, Sarah Elise. "Chancellor Angela Merkel—A Sign of Hope or the Exception That Proves the Rule?" Politics & Gender, vol. 4, no. 03, Sept. 2008, 10.1017/s1743923x08000391. pg 490

[66] Beckwith, Karen. "A Common Language of Gender?" Politics & Gender, vol. 1, 1 Mar. 2005, 10.1017/s1743923x05211017. pg 131

appearance', as well as 'acting and dressing like a man'. In an interview, De Maziere states that Merkel "didn't seem to care about her outward appearance at all, wearing a baggy skirt, Jesus sandals and a cropped haircut".[67] Wiliarty argues that Merkel presented herself in this way as a means of de-feminising herself, as she suggests that candidates described as having masculine attributes have more success than politicians who openly express their femininity.[68] She therefore attempted to make gender less relevant by presenting a fairly androgynous persona, a technique which radical feminists have argued is the solution to gender inequality.[69] Here, Wiliarty presents a counter-argument to new institutionalism, suggesting that Merkel has been able to exercise some agency over her role within the institutional framework. This can be seen through Merkel's ability to glide between and manipulate societal norms of gender in response to the exigencies of political circumstances. For example, Merkel benefitted from the stereotype of women being 'shy' and 'soft', often described as 'a "Mutti" to the nation'[70].[71] However she in fact used 'hard power'[72] in many aspects of her political life. One example of this was during the aforementioned CDU campaign scandal in 1999, in which Merkel saw an opportunity to publicly criticise Kohl. In a newspaper article she wrote, "the party must learn to walk now and dare to engage in future battles with its political opponents without its old warhorse, as Kohl has often enjoyed calling himself...We who now have responsibility for the Party, and not so much Helmut Kohl, will decide how to approach the new era."[73] This ruthless and 'audacious act of patricide',[74] masked by the innocence associated with female politicians, was a key contributor to Merkel's success, as within three months, Merkel was elected party chairwoman. Merkel therefore portrays both stereotypically male and female characteristics as a means of neutralising her gender. By doing this, she was able to enjoy the benefits of being a

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[67] The BBC. "The Making of Merkel with Andrew Marr." YouTube, directed by Mark Radice, 21 Sept. 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WvSA82z6Dig. Accessed 8 Dec. 2016.
[68] Wiliarty, Sarah Elise. "Angela Merkel's Path to Power: The Role of Internal Party Dynamics and Leadership." German Politics, vol. 17, no. 1, Mar. 2008, pp. 81–96, 10.1080/09644000701855168. pgs 82-83
[69] Wiliarty, Sarah Elise. The CDU and the Politics of Gender in Germany: Bringing Women to the Party. New York, Cambridge University Press, 16 Aug. 2010. pg 7
[70] Knight, Ben. "Angela Merkel: Germany's Mother." The Guardian, 20 Sept. 2013, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/20/angela-merkel-germany-mother. Accessed 29 Dec. 2016.
[71] The BBC. "The Making of Merkel with Andrew Marr." YouTube, directed by Mark Radice, 21 Sept. 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WvSA82z6Dig. Accessed 8 Dec. 2016.
[72] Thompson, M. and L. Lennartz (2006): 'The Making of Chancellor Merkel', in German Politics 15 (1): 99-110. pg 107
[73] Packer, George. The Quiet German: The Astonishing Rise of Angela Merkel, the Most Powerful Woman in the World. 16 Jan. 2016, http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/12/01/quiet-german. Accessed 22 Nov. 2016.
[74] The BBC. "The Making of Merkel with Andrew Marr." YouTube, directed by Mark Radice, 21 Sept. 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WvSA82z6Dig. Accessed 8 Dec. 2016.

female politician, whilst avoiding the negative gender stereotypes associated with heightened femininity.

Merkel can be seen to use her gender as a 'category'[75] through her advocation of stereotypically masculine values. Throughout much of her political career, Merkel did not actively pursue legislation deemed to be beneficial to women.[76] Research has found that the majority of women legislators 'place a higher priority than their male counterparts on policies that benefit women, children, and families'.[77] However, Merkel is an exception to this, as she does not place particular emphasis on 'women's issues' and has openly distanced herself from a feminist label, claiming "I don't come from the feminist scene"[78]. During her time in the former German Democratic Republic, Merkel enjoyed equality with men via full participation in the workforce, which was aided by state-provided childcare.[79] This reveals possible reasons as to why Merkel has claimed she finds feminism 'boring' and doesn't place particular emphasis on women's issues.[80] However, scholars have argued that Merkel has more strategic incentives to avoid being seen as 'a champion of women's issues'.[81] In order to succeed in a socially conservative, male-dominated political party, Merkel 'played down her gender, so much so that she was often labelled an "honorary man"'.[82] When asked in an interview if she was a feminist, Merkel replied, "a feminist? No...I don't think men have it easier than women these days. Fathers who take paternity leave have to fight against the same kind of stereotypes as women did."[83] Goetz argues that due to the majority of men in political bodies, these institutions hold a 'gender bias', which influences the nature of political arrangements in a gendered way.[84] Therefore she suggests that the male domination of the German executive has affected Merkel's ability to

[75] Beckwith, Karen. "A Common Language of Gender?" Politics & Gender, vol. 1, 1 Mar. 2005, 10.1017/s1743923x05211017. pg 131
[76] Davidson-Schmich, Louise K. "Gender, Intersectionality, and the Executive Branch: The Case of Angela Merkel." German Politics, vol. 20, no. 3, Sept. 2011, pp. 325–341, 10.1080/09644008.2011.606566. pgs 325-326
[77] ibid pg 329
[78] ibid pg 333
[79] Mckay, Joanna. "Women in German Politics: Still Jobs for the Boys?" German Politics, vol. 13, no. 1, Mar. 2004, pp. 56–80, 10.1080/0964400042000245398. pg 74
[80] Davidson-Schmich, Louise K. "Gender, Intersectionality, and the Executive Branch: The Case of Angela Merkel." German Politics, vol. 20, no. 3, Sept. 2011, pp. 325–341, 10.1080/09644008.2011.606566. pg 333
[81] ibid pgs 325-326
[82] ibid pg 334
[83] Ridge, Sophy. "Angela Merkel Is Finally Having Her Feminist Moment (and I'M Saying a Silent "hallelujah")." The Telegraph, 4 June 2015, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/women/womens-politics/11651033/Angela-Merkel-Germanys-Chancellor-is-finally-having-a-feminist-moment.html. Accessed 30 Nov. 2016.
[84] Goetz, Anne Marie. "Political Cleaners: Women as the New Anti-Corruption Force?" Development and Change, vol. 38, no. 1, Jan. 2007, pp. 87–105, 10.1111/j.1467-7660.2007.00404.x. pg 47

advocate feminist views. Critical mass theory can be employed as a tool for understanding the relationship between female legislators and legislation that is beneficial to women. Gender and politics scholars argue that 'women are not likely to have a major impact on legislative outcomes until they grow from a few token individuals into a considerable minority of all legislators'.[85] Additionally, McKay states that 'the impact of women on the conduct of politics only becomes significant once they have reached a "critical mass"', defined by Lowenduski as at least 30 per cent of a political body.[86] Throughout much of Merkel's political career before 2005, a 'critical mass' was not achieved in any legislative bodies. This suggests that Merkel has denied feminism and appeared uninterested in women's issues to avoid gender stereotyping and to protect herself from ostracisation by male peers.

This essay argues that the influence of gender was significant in aiding Merkel's rise and success in German politics. Taking a feminist, new institutionalist approach, this essay explores the gendered formal and informal rules within society, which Merkel was able to capitalise on. Formal rules, such as gender quotas, the PR electoral system and a dual-executive parliamentary structure, facilitated Merkel's entry into the political system, and had a significant influence on her early success within the CDU party. However this essay argues that informal rules and societal norms had a far greater impact on Merkel's political career. The egalitarian values of German society increased the acceptability of women in decision-making bodies. Radical feminism was responsible for subverting traditional gender roles within society, which successfully reduced the perceived differences between men and women. During her position as minister in Kohl's cabinet, Merkel benefitted from the informal rules which dictate the way men and women may behave. This allowed Merkel to have uncompetitive, patriarchal-like relationships with male leaders such as Kohl and De Maiziere, which enhanced her ability to succeed. Merkel used arguably negative gender stereotypes such as the perception of women being weak and under-qualified as a means of political advancement. These stereotypes allowed her to appear passive in government and deterred male leaders from viewing her as a political rival. Additionally, Merkel benefitted from the societal view of women as innocent and un-corrupt, allowing her to avoid association with the CDU's campaign finance scandal in 1999. This essay explores Merkel's use of gender as a category, discussing the salience of gender in

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[85] Childs, Sarah, and Krook, Mona Lena. "Critical Mass Theory and Women's Political Representation." Political Studies, vol. 56, no. 3, Oct. 2008, pp. 725–736, 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2007.00712.x. pg 725

[86] Mckay, Joanna. "Women in German Politics: Still Jobs for the Boys?" German Politics, vol. 13, no. 1, Mar. 2004, pp. 56–80, 10.1080/0964400042000245398. pg 56

politics and referencing the radical feminist solution of androgyny to prohibit gender inequality. Merkel practices this in her career, neutralising her gender through a disassociation with feminism and an un-biased view on gendered policy, as a means of transcending gender. This essay finds that gendered formal rules were an essential factor in the admission of women, and thereby Merkel, into the political sphere. Informal rules, however, were a crucial influence on Merkel's ability to remain a respected and popular member of Kohl's cabinet, and to ultimately become the Chancellor of Germany.

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Is there such a thing as an eastern German identity and, if so, what extent does this matter politically?

(Written for Politics of Governance: Germany [L2039], 2ⁿᵈ Year, Spring 2016)

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Before the reunification of Germany it was undeniably clear that there were two distinct German identities. Both sides were grounded in entirely different political values. West Germany, officially known as the Federal Republic of Germany, placed its faith in market forces, capitalism and democracy. East Germany, otherwise known as the German Democratic Republic (GDR), was run by the Soviet Union and grounded in the policies of state socialism. When unification came in 1989, the two states were politically merged together to live under one central government. Since this time there has been continuing debate over whether a distinct East German identity exists and to what extent this matters politically in a cohesive Germany. Much in line with changes that have occurred within the unified state, the debate has developed and evolved. The extent to which a divergent Eastern character exists has increased and decreased over time. This essay will argue that in contemporary Germany, a distinct East German identity is still evident. This has manifested itself in a number of ways, but primarily stems from the socialisation they received under the GDR. This socialisation created a framework which allowed the two sides to politically converge in a positive way. However, other elements of this socialisation, and thus their identity, has created significant areas of political divergence. An example of this is their inherent lack of trust in institutions. This essay will use this to account for their inclination towards political alternatives, including Easterners right-wing tendencies. Furthermore, it will use the concept of socialism to demonstrate the extent that this socialisation has impacted politics in Germany. Consistently throughout this essay there will be emphasise on how these aspects of their identity are more significant to political divergence than developments since unification such as economic inequality between East and West.

There is evidence to suggest that directly after unification, the East Germans' socialist past created a framework that enabled them to merge with the West to a large extent. This allowed the process of political convergence between the two to be relatively successful. There was very little continuing political distinction between the two directly after 1989, particularly in regard to major policy positions. However, this was not because the two had previously been inherently comparable. Instead it is theorised that this is because, prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall GDR, citizens were aware of a West Germany that offered an alternative and more

opportunities for a better life. Thus a mind-set was engrained into their identity which allowed them to unify on basic issues. This socialisation is outlined as a cognitive phenomenon;

> "This suggests that the adaptive potential of East German society was inherent in the conflicted values of the GDR's political culture. East Germans' primary socialisation under the GDR had generated sufficiently pragmatic outlook to resolve the cognitive dissonance between socialist and capitalist frames in order to thrive in their new world," (Hogwood, 2012).

Therefore, as a result of this divergent socialisation, centred on conflicting socialist vales and capitalist needs, they were able to embrace the western world as an opportunity rather than something that was altogether alien. In turn, this allowed Easterners to learn a whole new set of ideals. In other words, they wanted to incorporate the 'better' political alternative that they were aware of for decades into their new found society. This is supported by research which suggests that in the first few years after unification there was a striking amount of political agreement between East and West. One of the most important areas where this was present was in their similar levels of national identification; they both felt equally 'German' (Veen & Zelle, 1995). This was where both sides had political common ground; they could pragmatically reconcile differences around this central concept. This unity surrounding the notion of a single nation is continued in contemporary Germany with the celebration of 'German Unity Day' which has occurred each year on 3rd October since 1990 (The German Way & More, n.d.). It has also been evidenced that the political opinions of East and West on major foreign policy issues began to merge after 1989 (Veen & Zelle, 1995). This included support for NATO and scepticism of European integration. Furthermore, their socialisation under the GDR which facilitated a pragmatic outlook in regard to conflicting political values also played a fundamental role in other aspects of society. This can be observed in East Germans' approach to consumer culture following reunification. Instead of citizens seeing consumerism as an unknown, they viewed it as an opportunity to express their social and political identity (Hogwood, 2012). An example of this could be their choice to buy East German products over West German ones in order to 'contest and affirm the new order of a consumer market economy' (Berdahl, 1999). Even today, East Germans are inclined to buy GDR products such as '*Rotkaeppchen'* which is a translated to mean 'Little Red Ridinghood', an East German sparkling wine (BBC News, 2009). In addition to this, in the decade following reunification, Easterners were sometimes referenced to as a separate group; the 'Ossis'. This was often used as a result of prejudice in

regard to a disadvantaged feeling from the West that their taxes were funding the inequality that the East faced after unification (Stack, 1997). Although this could be indicative of the promotion of a distinct political identity and result in enhanced political dissidence, the term 'Ossi' has been more popularly used in regard to culture, such as distinct Eastern high rise apartments, than as an economic or politically fuelled notion (Deutsche Welle, 2009). This demonstrates Easterners ability to practically embrace such labels and also highlight their initial inclination towards unity. This can also be extended to other aspects of German life such as politics, as this essay has indicated. Moreover, it implies that differences regarding economics such as taxation have become less significant to both East and West. Instead it infers that claims of divergence can be considered an aspect of Eastern nostalgia regarding their past. Overall, the primary socialisation of East Germans created a distinct identity which is characterised by a mind-set that saw West Germany as the positive alternative. This in turn made the initial reunification period in regard to all aspects of society, especially politics, much easier.

On the other hand, their distinct socialisation and resulting identity has also led to less successful areas of reunification and thus points of political divergence. One of the most important and deviating norms created under the GDR is East Germans' inherent lack of trust in institutions. This is something that has manifested itself further into the reunification process. Under their state socialist government a deep scepticism of their institutions developed. This gave rise to a situation where the West's functioning democracy and market economy 'served as the positive counter-image to their own institutions' (Pollack, 1999). This is evident in the productive convergences that occurred directly after reunification. Nevertheless, this innate conviction to distrust appears to have survived unification. Although dissatisfaction with the current political system is evident in both East and West, East Germans inherent lack of trust has manifested itself more prominently in regard to Germany's Basic Law (Rohrschneider & Schmitt-Beck, 2002). This frustration was first evident in the degree of difficulty surrounding the implementation of certain legislation after the fall of the Berlin Wall. An event which sparked institutional distrust of this nature can be seen in the struggle to reconcile their differing abortion laws. The framework of the unification treaty still needed to be respected when deciphering a compromise between the more conservative West and the far more liberal East (Simons, 1990). The Federal Constitutional Court failed to promote internal unity and in doing so alienated many women in the East (Maleck-Lewy, 1995). This type of event facilitated the reigniting of distrust amongst East Germans towards their new government. Additionally, as a

result of their intrinsic deficiency in trust, the ability for Germany's bureaucratic political institutions to function and be effective have been lessened (Rohrschneider & Schmitt-Beck, 2002). These feelings have been most strongly expressed with the rise of anti-immigration, populist parties such as the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD). The catalyst for an increase in their popularity was the recent refugee crisis. Ultimately, Chancellor Angela Merkel's open-door policy has led to renewed declines in the trust in government and other political institutions (Richter, 2016). However, this support has been most pronounced in Saxony-Anhalt, which is situated in the former East Germany, where 1 in every 4 votes cast were in support of the AfD (Kayser & Leininger, 2016). A complementary explanation has been theorised that due to their socialist past, East Germans have a natural inclination to form networks which give them increased opportunities to complain about their relative situation (Rohrschneider & Schmitt-Beck, 2002). In other words, if groups of people continuously communicate and all feel similarly about their comparative disadvantage, this would inevitably lead to reinforcing feelings of distrust. As further support of this, a right-wing inclination of this nature tends to be less welcoming and less trusting of foreigners. Political manifestations of this outside of the polls are more evident in the East. In 2015, 47 per cent of the racist violent crime in Germany was found in the states of Berlin, Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Saxony, Saxony-Anhault and Thuringia, which are all situated in the East even though just 20 per cent of the German population lives there (The Local, 2015). This is reinforced by the idea that there has been a deep-felt disillusionment with Western capitalism that has led to support for right-wing politicians to fill the void left by communism (Noack, 2014). Therefore, the same logic which allowed the two sides to pragmatically converge, also explains the new found search for a political alternative and mistrust of current governance.

Nevertheless, it has been alternatively proposed that the rise in popularity of right-wing movements that is distinct to the East could be explained by income inequality. It has been suggested that racism has been an outlet for economic frustration felt by East Germans (Staab, 1998). Furthermore, the evident lower levels of institutional trust in East Germany have been linked to aspects of reunification where economic uncertainties surrounding the process disproportionally affected East Germans (Welter & Kautonen, 2005). Moreover, in 2002 it was claimed that East Germany will continue to suffer economically due to reunification, based on lower growth rates and continued mass unemployment (Munter & Sturm, 2002). As a result, it is easy to see how the economic inequality that East Germans have faced in the past could be

concluded to be the biggest driver of mistrust today and the increase in right-wing inclination. In spite of this, there is evidence to suggest that its significance is not as pronounced as it appears on the surface. Even though inequality between the two today is still present, it is far less evident in the new German states than in the decade following unification (Gaiser, et al., 2013). In addition, although Eastern Germany's GDP per head is 67 per cent of West Germany's, it is claimed that full integration between the two shouldn't be considered 'a fair benchmark' (The Economist, 2015). This is primarily because inequality of a geographical nature exists in countries across Europe, for example, Italy's North-South divide (*ibid*). In support of this is the notion that economic inequalities are more reflective of core-periphery differences than East-West. In other words, some areas of Germany will necessarily have more wealth than others but this is not inevitably going to be along East-West lines. Furthermore, if the East as a whole was compared to the West as a whole, it would unsurprisingly result in all possible differences being framed as an East-West divide (Maseland, 2014). This demonstrates that the distinct lack of trust and resulting right-wing inclination that we see today amongst East Germans should not be viewed as primarily driven by economics and an institutionalised inequality. Instead, as we have seen, it is largely driven by their socialisation under the GDR which has resulted in a negative view of institutions which includes the current government. This has been shown not only in support for protest parties in election results but in the political dissidence of the general public.

The ability for a positive union between the two to be formed directly after reunification, as well as the Easterners divergence in their lack of trust, can be illustrated in its totality if the idea of socialism is explored. This aspect of East Germans' socialisation is key to investigate based of its significance under the GDR. Moreover, it is particularly important to evaluate because it was actively promoted by the state before 1989 and therefore it could be assumed that it would impact on East Germans' identity today. Under the indoctrination of the GDR, the word 'socialism' came to have almost exactly the same meaning as the word 'good' and its' promotion relied on a system of reward and punishment (McKay, 2002). It may perhaps be concluded that because socialism played such a dominant role in the East German psyche, there would still be repercussions today. In fact, the idea of socialism still plays a pivotal role in both sides of a unified Germany but it has two very different meanings to East and West. To the West, even before reunification, 'socialism' has been predominantly linked to the welfare state (Rohrschneider & Schmitt-Beck, 2002). Conversely, in the East it refers to

systematic political alternatives (*ibid*). This is because under the rule of the GDR, socialism acted as the counter-image to the fascism of the West. As a result of this distinction there are a number of political implications. Principally, the maintenance of a welfare state on the part of the West is evidence of a positive political convergence after the fall of the Berlin Wall. It has been demonstrated that much like other political conflicts at the time of reunification, the two were able to reconcile. This can be understood as part of the pragmatism on the part of the East that resulted from their socialisation. It has been concluded that a 'dialectic movement' emerged, where politicians advocated a more comprehensive welfare provision that became stronger after the unification of Germany (Kurbjuweit, 2014). However, reforms of the welfare state have taken place over recent years which has clearly highlighted the more negative aspects of East Germans' socialisation. These reforms have been identified in a multitude of areas; the capping of welfare budgets, increased emphasis on private contributions to pensions and higher personal payments for health care provision (Green, et al., 2012). Attitudes towards this reform have varied between East and West. Although the reasons for this are complex, much of Easterners resentment towards reforms is as a result of their socialisation. Firstly, yet again it is claimed that the lower level of trust in institutions that are evident in the East has led to less supportive attitudes than in the more well-established West Germany (Gabriel & Trudinger, 2011). Secondly, achievements of the former GDR in regard to social security corresponds to a sense that there has been a lack of comprehensive cover for East Germans on behalf of the West after unification (Roller, 1994). For example, to many East Germans, they will see themselves as having a far superior social welfare state. Evidence of this can be seen in their view of GDR schooling, vocational training, housing, health care and job security (Pollack, 1999). In the area of health, for example, 'between 1970 and 1976 an additional 60,000 trained and untrained staff joined the sector' (Burdumy, 2013). This corresponds to the third claim about their socialisation which suggests that East Germans demand more governmental responsibility than West Germans, which is most prominent in their desire for the state to reduce income differences (Roller, 2015). Today, East Germans' socialisation under a more wide-ranging welfare state would provide a reference point for people in the Eastern part of reunified Germany to compare their relative situation for social provision. Overall, however, this has led to a diverging political identity amongst East Germans and has demonstrated their perception of socialism as a political alternative. The rise in popularity of the political party Die Linke (The Left) is the most noteworthy evidence of this. In the last German general election

in 2013, Die Linke gained 8.6 per cent of the vote overall; 22.7 per cent of their vote was from the former East German states compared with just 5.6 per cent of the vote in the former West German states (Spiegel Online, 2013). Furthermore, on Die Linke's official website, they claim that they are 'a socialist party' that is 'stands for alternatives', actively promoting a more comprehensive welfare state (Die Linke, n.d.). This illustrates that their popularity is not only distinct to East Germany, but the foundation of their policies is based on the Eastern conception of socialism as a political alternative. Overall, it can be seen that socialism still plays a pivotal role in a unified Germany. The diverging conceptions of it have had a significant impact on politics. The socialisation that the East received has resulted in a lack of trust in the West's understanding of socialism and their resulting welfare state. Furthermore, the recent reforms of the welfare state have also resulted in a distinct inclination to reassert Eastern conceptions of socialism; a political alternative.

To conclude, a distinct Eastern identity has manifested itself in a number of ways. Their unusual socialisation under an authoritarian socialist state has contributed significantly to this identity. Firstly, with the West as a reference point throughout their time in the GDR, there has been a persistent appeal to compare their relative situation to others. During the first decade after reunification this enabled the two to politically converge with reasonable success. This is evident in their similar feelings of patriotism towards Germany, as well as their comparable stance on foreign policy issues. Furthermore, the East's distinct culture was reconciled to a large extent under the new reunified government. Secondly, this desire to compare their own situation to others continued after reunification which has led to dissatisfaction with the current system. This is far more evident in the East than it is in the West. Crucially, this essay has outlined that this is not because hardships have affected the East more than the West but that the East's divergent socialisation has facilitated this frustration. Thirdly, some more specific aspects of Easterners socialisation were less welcome in Germany after 1989. Their inherent lack of trust in institutions has been exhibited continuously since reunification. It is the primary reason why there has been such success with populist parties like Alternative for Deutschland in the East who advocate the idea that the government is deceiving citizens with regard to the refugee crisis. Moreover, this lack of trust has also displayed itself on the opposite end of the political spectrum with the ever-growing popular support in the East for the socialist party Die Linke. They are gaining momentum on the basis of the idea that the current German government cannot be trusted with the welfare state that so many Easterners are supportive of.

Overall, their distinct identity that has resulted from these aspects of their socialisation has had a significant effect on the politics of a unified Germany.

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Did Thatcherism Signal the Death of Conservatism in British Politics?

Jack Jenkins

There can be little doubt that Margaret Thatcher truly revolutionised the landscape in British politics. Nevertheless, the question of whether Thatcherism really signalled the death of Conservatism remains a point of contention. To address this, it is necessary to consider what defined British Conservatism when Thatcher's premiership began in 1979; what values were entrenched in the party and which evolutions were taking shape. This will make it possible to evaluate the overall effect she had on Conservatism by observing the tangible alterations she made to Tory ideals, particularly in relation to One Nation Conservatism. As will become apparent though, there was a continuation of traditional Conservative principles that endured throughout her regime which must also be taken into account. Finally, to conclusively determine if Thatcherism signalled the death of Conservatism, it is essential to consider the return of traditional Tory attitudes throughout David Cameron's leadership of the party which has continued in the infancy of Theresa May's tenure.

The notion of inequality was a fundamental tenant of Thatcherism and has proven to be a troubling issue for the Conservative party from its very origins. Cowling (1978, p. 78) writes "the Conservative conception of a social structure assumes that marked inequalities are inevitable but also declines to justify them", implying that instead of comprising a valid explanation for social and economic disparity, Tories simply accept them as unavoidable. The first vigorous attempt by a Conservative to define an approach to this issue was constituted by Benjamin Disreali, Prime Minister in the mid-to-late nineteenth century, who conceived the principle of One Nation Conservatism. This ideology posits that, although the gap between rich and poor is inevitable, inequality should be maintained within reasoned bounds (Dorey, 2011). This pastoral approach to society became the predominant philosophy of Conservatism until the rise of Thatcher. However, as Evans (2009) points out, the Conservative party was experiencing an evolution before Thatcher came to power, mainly due to the declining number of One Nation Conservatives caused by the influx of career politicians. As such, many within the party began to favour the idea of privatisation and as early as 1970 under Ted Heath, the Conservatives promised to encourage the sale of council homes to tenants, admittedly with limited success (Francis, 2011). Clearly then, British Conservatism was beginning to change

palpably in the years preceding Thatcherism and it is important to consider this when evaluating its lasting effect on the party.

The election of Margaret Thatcher, nevertheless, saw the Tories shift inexorably to the right, with a profound emphasis on economic liberalism (Evans, 2009). Henceforth, there was a key change from paternalistic, state-centred policies to radical scepticism about the virtues the state could provide. Inspired by Milton Friedman and the Chicago economists, Thatcherites actively espoused the merits of cutting benefits and taxes in the belief that it would simultaneously reduce unemployment rates and increase tax revenue, a fundamental break from the post-war consensus (Sutcliffe-Braithwaite, 2012). This revolution of Conservative principles was significantly at odds with the traditional One Nation ideology and Thatcher herself aimed to distance herself from the concept. In her autobiography she links what she saw as the failings of the welfare state with the prevailing philosophy, claiming the whole concept collapsed during the Winter of Discontent in 1979 meaning a new approach was necessary (Thatcher, 1993). This 'new approach' aimed to create a self-sufficient society and manifested itself in the form of policies such as the Housing Act 1980 which allowed council tenants to purchase their homes at a reduced cost. The 'Right-to-Buy' policy was particularly profound and became synonymous with Thatcherism as she repeatedly spoke about her aim to create a 'property owning democracy', one full of vigorous individuals whose dynamism and aspiration would create an affluent economy (Francis, 2011). Therefore, from the very outset, Thatcherism began to redefine what it meant to be Conservative. The welfare state was rolled back, 'Big Government' was no longer the fundamental pillar of the economy, and people were given free rein to determine their own destiny.

There has been considerable debate, though, over whether Thatcher really did fundamentally alter the philosophy of the Tory party, or if she was simply using different means to meet the same ends. Evans argues that despite her palpable dislike for One Nation Conservatism, she in fact exploited it in name and nature to deploy an alternative patriotic thought of the ideal (Evans, 2009). Rather than maintain a society where the bourgeoisie buttressed the proletariat, Thatcherism aimed to create one in which people were capable of constructing their own prosperity through social mobility; hence Thatcher's claim that 'society does not exist' (Keay,

1987). Undoubtedly, this is a different attitude but ultimately, Thatcherism and One Nation Conservatism shared the mutual goal of ensuring the well-being of the poorer classes. Dorey (2011) supports the claim that Thatcher was somewhat supportive of traditional conservatism, highlighting that, although she referred to them as 'wets', many One Nation Conservatives remained in the Prime-Minister's cabinet for sustained periods of time, several even until the end of her reign. In addition to this, some of the main principles of Thatcherism are themselves traditional conservative objectives. Francis (2011) asserts the idea of creating a 'property owning democracy' may have been enacted by Thatcher, but the concept dates back to the nineteenth century when politicians of both sides faced the problem of justifying the unequal distribution of wealth to a property-less electorate. Even Neville Chamberlain had long fought to extend home-ownership among the working class. In this respect, rather than destroying Conservatism, Thatcher sought to achieve its goals simply through different methods and in certain cases by enacting old philosophy in contemporary context. It is therefore difficult to justify the statement that Thatcherism signalled the death of Conservatism in British politics.

To reinforce this claim though, it is necessary to consider Thatcher's legacy. When she resigned in 1990, supplanted by John Major, many expected a return to traditional One Nation Conservatism; however, this did not materialise. Instead, there was a visible intensification of Thatcherism, highlighted by policies such as the 'back to basics' campaign and the series of defections from the Tories to the Lib-Dems and Labour throughout the decade (Dorey, 2011). However, when David Cameron assumed the Conservative leadership in 2005 the party saw an avowed departure from Thatcherism. The new leader asserted the need for a different mode of Conservatism, embracing diversity and showing compassion towards the socially disadvantaged, a set of principles that clearly chime with the traditional One Nation ideology (Dorey, Garnett & Denham, 2011). Other prominent conservatives have echoed these views, notably Damian Green and Oliver Letwin who have both called for a return to traditional party values and to once again become the 'guardians of the One Nation philosophy' (Dorey, Garnett & Denham, 2011, p. 72). This desire has manifestly continued until the present day, evident from Theresa May's maiden speech outside of 10 Downing Street when she noted a series of social injustices, declaring that she would fight to right those wrongs (Perkins, 2016). Plainly, the Conservative party has returned to the centre after its shift to the right under the influences of Thatcherism and there can be little doubt that traditional Conservatism is still very much alive.

In conclusion, it is undeniable that Thatcherism had a profound and marked effect on the Tory party and therefore the British political landscape. There was a removal from pastoral values purporting to maintain the well-being of the poorer classes to a focus on self-determination and individualism. However, the desired goal of Thatcherism was ultimately to improve the standing of the working class rather than to destroy it, which is fundamentally also the aim of the One Nation ideology. In fact, some of the core pillars of Thatcherism were traditional Conservative ideas, dating back to the nineteenth century, notably the desire to create a property owning democracy. So rather than redefining the philosophy of Conservatism, Thatcher appropriated traditional conservative thought into the context of contemporary British politics. Finally, the fact that One Nation ideology has empirically returned over the past decade must also be factored into this debate. In consideration of this, it can be confidently stated that, although Thatcher induced a change in the thinking of the Tory party for a prolonged period, it did not signal the death of Conservatism in British politics.

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How Fair is Rawls' Difference Principle?

(Written for Modern Political Thought [L2031], 2rd Year, Winter 2016)

Phineas Jennings

Introduction

The difference principle is central to John Rawls' theory of justice as fairness. He argues that its fairness is proved by the fact that it would be agreed to by everyone in 'an initial position of equality'[87]. The principle asserts that any social and economic inequalities 'are to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society'[88]. In practice, this generally equates to a taxation system entailing wealth redistribution from the most advantaged to least advantaged people, increasing in line with growth in inequality. This essay will take an analytical approach to analysing the principle's fairness, studying the argument as Rawls poses it in the abstract, showing no contempt or sympathy based on its contexts or historical impacts that it may have had. It will examine the principle's fairness by challenging it from two opposing points of view: libertarian arguments take issue with the idea that inequality must benefit the least advantaged in order to be fair and egalitarian arguments that take issue with the idea that any kind of inequality can be fair. It will end by concluding that neither side succeeds in disproving that the principle is fair enough to justify its central place in the theory of justice as fairness.

Libertarian Challenges: State Intervention, Arbitrariness and Moral Desert

Libertarian arguments question the difference principle by contesting the state's part to play in wealth distribution. Before Rawls, F. A. Hayek[89] argued that a private sphere including property which cannot be subject to coercion by the government is essential to human freedom. Robert Nozick[90] took up this line of argument as a direct critique of the difference principle, asserting that an open labour market defined by voluntary exchanges of labour for money is fair, as is any distribution of wealth that it may bring. Therefore, in a free market, the wealth redistribution that Rawls' principle practically advocates is not necessary to achieve fairness. A central idea in Rawls' notion of justice as fairness is that 'it is not just that some should have less in order that others may prosper'[91], but Nozick argues that the application of difference

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[87] John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (revised ed.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) p. 10

[88] John Rawls, *Political Liberalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993) p. 6

[89] Hayek, F. A., *The Constitution of Liberty* (London: Routledge, 1960) pp. 139-147

[90] Robert Nozick, *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974) p. 186

[91] Rawls, *A Theory Of Justice*, p. 13

principle in a free market can create this very situation. Suppose in a society under institutional structure J, people in group G are materially worse off than they would be under structure I, which follows the difference principle. The switch to structure I, however, will make group F worse off. In other words, the application of the difference principle makes group F worse off so that group G may prosper. Surely this situation is unfair, even by Rawls' own standards[92].

However, the fact that one group becomes worse off and one better off than they were before the application of the difference principle would be seen by Rawls as fixing an existing injustice. If the principle, which effectively improves the position of the least fortunate group at the expense of the most fortunate, makes group G better off and group F worse off, then group F were materially better off under structure J (which we will assume is a free market), presumably because of their holding higher-paid positions. The differences between those in group F and group G, which allow this inequality, are differences in natural and social endowments which are morally arbitrary[93]. Underpinning the fairness of the difference principle is the notion that 'no one deserves his greater natural capacity nor merits a more favourable starting place in society'[94]. We are endowed with our social positions and natural skills completely at random meaning that no imbalance in wealth-creating ability is fair. This idea of a natural lottery means that those in group F were benefitting from their unfair share of natural and social resources relative to group G under structure J. In other words, group G were having less so that group F were able to prosper. Applying the difference principle with structure I simply fixes the unfair situation.

This use of the morally arbitrary distribution of assets to defend the difference principle's fairness is based on the uncontroversial premise that 'any person should morally deserve the holdings that he has'[95]. The reason why the imposition of institutional structure I is fair is because it ends (or at least lessens the effects of) a situation where those in group F have more than they morally deserve. Nozick[96], however, argues that Rawls explicitly rejects the fairness of distribution of wealth according to moral desert in his argument that it is unfair to allow those who are endowed with extensive skills and talents to benefit more than those who are not[97].

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[92] Nozick, *Anarchy, State, and Utopia,* p. 190
[93] Rawls, *A Theory of Justice,* p. 13
[94] Ibid. p. 88
[95] Nozick, *Anarchy, State, and Utopia,* p. 216
[96] Ibid.
[97] Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift, *Liberals and Communitarians* (2nd ed.) (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996) p. 60

This is a misunderstanding of what is actually a rejection of the distribution of wealth according to a misguided notion of moral desert. Libertarian conceptions of justice as desert ignore the fact that skills, talents and social positions are not deserved by those who use them for their material advantage. The natural lottery plays too large a part in determining our so-called desert to argue that we truly deserve it. For example, it is not fair that somebody born into a rich family with a range of natural skills that society takes to be valuable should be more successful in life than somebody born into a poor family with few valuable skills, as neither truly deserves the assets or position that they were born with. With this in mind, the premise that we should morally deserve what we have is very much consistent with wealth redistribution in line with the difference principle.

So far, the anti-libertarian arguments put forward from a Rawlsian perspective have all been based upon the claim that what separates the quality of one person's work from another's is purely arbitrary and provides no fair grounds for inequality, a premise that one might be inclined to take issue with. Rawls himself even admits that it feels natural to respond to the difference principle by arguing that the talented 'deserve their greater advantage whether or not they are to the benefit of others'[98]. Nozick[99] points out that Rawls fails to mention how people choose to develop and use their natural assets and positions after birth. What about, for example, if someone had little natural talent but a strong inclination to work hard throughout her life[100]? Under the difference principle, supposing her hard work merited a better paying job, she would be obliged to pay taxes to make sure that those who are less well off (and ostensibly less hard working) are also benefitting from her work, a clearly unfair situation.

Rawls deals with this argument directly in his revision of *A Theory of Justice* with the argument that our characteristics, being hard working or lazy for example, are largely dependent upon our families, social circumstances and upbringings[101]. This means that the outcome of the natural lottery is not settled at birth; in early life the way that we are raised (which is morally arbitrary inasmuch as we have no control over it) undeniably influences our temperaments and, therein, levels of success later in life. In other words, the ways in which we choose to develop

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[98] Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, p. 89
[99] Nozick, *Anarchy, State, and Utopia*, p. 214
[100] Michael J. Sandel, *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice* (2nd ed.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) p. 71
[101] Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, p. 89

our natural abilities (which are likely to impact our respective income levels) are just as contingent and morally arbitrary as our being born with unequal natural abilities.

Egalitarian Challenges: Greed, Freedom and Solidarity

Having withstood the libertarian line of argument that it is too egalitarian, the difference principle must now stand up to the less frequently levelled[102] criticisms from those who hold that no inequality can be fair, regardless of what it does for the least advantaged members of society.

Rawls claims that some level of economic inequality is fair because it acts as an incentive for people to cultivate their natural skills and talents which, through the application of the difference principle with wealth redistribution, will allow the whole of society to benefit[103]. This proves inequality to be rational, but this does not necessarily make it fair. G. A. Cohen[104] argues that Rawls' self-confessed focus on justice at an institutional, rather than individual, level[105] ignores the unfairness of the idea that those with natural endowments seen by society as more valuable should be economically better off. Inequality is not necessarily needed as an incentive to increase society's level of wealth, but is a reflection of the self-seeking ethos of the talented[106]. Cohen uses the example of a kidnapper to illustrate how the rationality of a principle does not make it fair. If a kidnapper (in this case, the better-endowed members of society) is demanding a ransom (economic inequality) in return for something that they have unjustly acquired (the benefits of their natural talents) it may be rational to pay this ransom but it is certainly not fair.

When studied from the point of view of the more talented members of society, however, this argument seems inconsistent with the idea of 'personal prerogative'[107] supported by Cohen himself, the notion that it is fair that everyone should be free to pursue their own interests within the framework of a just society. Suppose a taxation policy aiming at absolute equality was applied today, meaning increasing taxes for high earners. This would mean that they are effectively being paid less per hour of work, making leisure time less expensive as it would incur a lower opportunity cost. It is fair, given personal prerogative, that high earners may

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[102] Lawrence Crocker, 'Equality, Solidarity and Rawls' Maximin', *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 6: 3 (1977), pp. 262-266 (p. 262)

[103] Mulhall and Swift, *Liberals and Communitarians*, p. 60

[104] G. A. Cohen, *Rescuing Justice and Equality* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008) pp. 48-68

[105] Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, p. 7

[106] J. Donald Moon, 'Cohen vs. Rawls on Justice and Equality', *Critical Review of Social and Political Philosophy*, 18: 1 (2015), pp. 40-56 (p. 44)

[107] Cohen, *Rescuing Justice and Equality*, p. 61

choose to respond to this price change by taking up more leisure time, thus lowering everyone's level of material wellbeing[108]. Therefore, a structural framework that makes leisure time more expensive for high earners through taxing them slightly less, allowing some inequality but still ensuring that this inequality benefits the least advantaged by not doing away with wealth redistribution completely is both rational and fair. It allows the more advantaged members of society their personal prerogative whilst ensuring that the less advantaged do not lose out due to their less valuable arbitrary endowments.

Other egalitarians have argued that the difference principle, in concerning itself solely with the absolute position of the least advantaged, ignores the moral importance of their relative position in society[109]. Lawrence Crocker[110] argues that these relative levels of material welfare are significant due to the role that they play in solidarity. People enjoy being 'a part of a team', where solidarities can be forged through sharing similar welfare levels. Inequality opens social and economic cleavages, meaning that this solidarity is lost. This critique, however, seems only to be pointing to goods that are not provided by the difference principle, which is not enough alone to support the statement that it is not fair. It is clear that dispositions of solidarity 'become irrational in situations where they conflict sufficiently strongly with desires having to do with absolute levels'[111]. In other words, although solidarity may be something to strive for in conditions where everyone has a level of material wellbeing sufficient to live comfortably, it would be unfair to force it as a central value which could well force down the living standards of all members of society. The fact that some desirable goods are not provided by the difference principle does not sufficiently prove that the principle is not fair.

Conclusion

The negative argument presented in this essay proves that Rawls' difference principle is fair enough to be justified in its central position in his project of creating a conception of justice as fairness by showing it to successfully resist criticisms from two opposite sides. It withstands libertarian claims that it causes the more advantaged members of society to unfairly lose out by asserting that it is only seeking to remedy the unfair situation created by the natural lottery, where they receive these advantages as a result of assets and positions that they have been

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[108] Moon, 'Cohen vs. Rawls', p. 45
[109] Christi Favor and Julian Lamont, 'Distributive Justice', *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, (Winter 2016 edition): http://plato.stanford.edu/cgi-bin/encyclopedia/archinfo.cgi?entry=justice-distributive
[110] Crocker, 'Equality, Solidarity and Rawls' Maximin', pp. 262-266
[111] Ibid. p. 264

granted in a morally arbitrary way. Conversely, egalitarian challenges to its fairness fall short by denying people the personal prerogative to react to changes in the relative price of work and leisure, or by presenting goods that other distributive systems provide better than those applying the difference principle as arguments for the principle's unfairness.

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What factors brought about the Polish crisis of 1980-81?

(Written for Political Change: Eastern Europe [L2017], 3rd Year, Winter 2016)

Beatriz Lacerda Ratton

The crisis of 1980-81 was a significant turning point for communist Poland, resulting in the first time the country saw an institutionalised opposition in the form of the Solidarity movement. It was also an important stepping stone in initiating the fall of Polish (and to a certain extent, Eastern European) communism. The factors leading to this can be classified into three broad groups: long-term structural factors, medium-term factors and short-term factors. The first group can be broken down into two key features: the deep-rooted dislike of (and therefore tendency to resist) Communism and the importance of the Catholic Church. Both were significant in contributing to sustained resentment of the regime. Major medium-term factors originated in the 1970s: the unravelling of the social contract and the cross-fertilisation between workers and intellectuals, with the creation of the Workers' Defence Committee (KOR). The former removed the system's only safety valve of a certain provision of goods, while the latter made it easier for a strong opposition to be organised. Short-term factors were significant in bringing about the crisis in 1980-81 specifically, and involved two key aspects: the accession and visit of Polish Pope John Paul II and the strikes of 1980, caused by increasing food prices.

It must be noted that while some of the above factors were unique to Poland, others were also seen in other Eastern Bloc countries. However, the specific way in which factors generic to the region unfolded in Poland, led to a crisis not seen elsewhere. Accordingly, in explaining what factors allowed for the crisis to develop in Poland, this essay also brings to light why a similar scenario did *not* occur anywhere else in the Eastern Bloc.

Long-term structural factors prevented Polish society from having a sense of loyalty to the communist regime. The entrenched anti-Soviet sentiment in Poland is illustrated by the long sequence of periodic revolts which characterised communist rule in the country. Having roots in Poland's border conflict with the Soviet Union after the First World War and its experience of being 'systematically dismembered'[112] by the Nazi-Soviet Pact, it is not surprising that Polish society would be suspicious of a Soviet imposed government. This, coupled with the

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[112] A. Touraine, *Solidarity, The Analysis of a Social Movement: Poland 1980-1981* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 20.

fact that the Communist Party in Poland had never had widespread support[113], made the regime vulnerable to resistance. Starting in 1956, the workers' revolt, as Touraine puts it, prepared 'the ground for the Polish October'[114]. Though the aftermath saw Poland avoid Soviet invasion and thus deem Gomulka a 'national hero defending Polish independence'[115], support for the communist regime in Poland was always conditional and subject to a certain standard of living being maintained. Accordingly, Gomulka's subsequent 'increased repression'[116] led to substantial protests, despite his earlier popularity. Examples of these are the 1968 student protests in Warsaw and the 1970 worker protests in the coastal towns – the latter of which resulted in the removal of Gomulka from office. The characteristically Polish dislike of communism was therefore significant in influencing the Polish crisis as it prevented any long-term peaceful relations between the government and the people. However, it is important to note that resistance in the long-term involved either the working class or intellectuals; the fact that they did not work together before the late 1970s was one of the reasons the crisis did not happen earlier.

The second structural factor, the long-term significance of the Catholic Church in Polish society cannot be underplayed when assessing the Polish Crisis. As Szajkowski brings to light, this was an authority which far predated the communist regime, and which 'strengthened immeasurably'[117] after the partition of Poland in 1795 – therefore making it an institution which was 'embedded in the national fabric'[118]. Illustrative of this was the 1956 reform that renewed the autonomy of the Catholic Church, which had experienced an increasing amount of censorship and restrictions from 1950[119]. This also increased respect for Gomulka among the Polish population in the process. The workers' chant of 'we want God and bread'[120] was a powerful reminder of the ideational significance religion had to the Polish people. Thus, the adaptation of the Soviet model to Polish needs became inextricably linked to greater church autonomy in the minds of the public. Additionally, the Church was both a moral and organisational alternative for those disillusioned with the regime. Even for non-believers,

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[113] *Solidarity, The Analysis of a Social Movement*, p. 21.
[114] Ibid, p. 23.
[115] N. Ascherson, *The Polish August: What has happened in Poland* (Suffolk: Penguin Books, 1981), p. 75.
[116] G. Swain and N. Swain, *Eastern Europe since 1945* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998), p. 77.
[117] B. Szajkowski, *Next to God... Poland: Politics and Religion in Contemporary Poland* (London: Frances Pinter Limited, 1983), p. 1.
[118] Ibid.
[119] Ibid, p. 13.
[120] Ibid, p. 17

attending rituals such as Sunday mass was a way of showing discontent with the government[121]. Being the only non-state-controlled institution which was not outlawed by the state, it became a 'unique source of the uncensored word'[122]. This would support Linz and Stepan's claim that, even during the Stalinist period, the regime did not have total control of the public sphere as it did in other countries, and thus could not be a totalitarian state[123]. Therefore, the Catholic Church was important was important in bringing about the Polish crisis due to both its ideational significance to believers, whose loyalty was to the church before the government, and in providing an outlet for people to display their discontent. The long-term structural factors discussed above were therefore significant in bringing about the Polish Crisis as it made it difficult for the communist regime to confirm any logistical basis for their governance, which was seen with scepticism from the outset.

Two medium-term factors stemmed from the Gierek leadership in the 1970s and were also instrumental in bringing about the crisis: the breaking of the social contract and the formation of KOR. The social contract, when used to describe Eastern Europe in the 1970s[124], refers to the trade-off between 'welfarism against depoliticization'[125]. Following the Prague Spring in 1968, the Brezhnev Doctrine set new limits to how far countries in the Eastern Bloc could introduce reforms: in practical terms, this meant that, in exchange for a number of social benefits, citizens would stay out of political life. Though Gierek's government was initially successful in providing this – with increased availability of Western consumer goods and the national income rising by 10% in 1972[126] – the unsustainable way in which this was achieved quickly resulted in a crumbling economy. In modernising its industry, Poland became highly dependent on Western loans, as well as imported Western goods[127]. With the oil crisis of 1973, the prices of these goods increased dramatically, leaving the country with a foreign debt of 27 billion dollars[128] by 1980, which Poland did not have the means to pay back. This, coupled with lavish investment projects with little to no profit – such as the Huta Katowice steelworks – made it even harder for the regime to keep up their side of the social contract.

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[121] Ibid, p. 3.
[122] Ibid.
[123] J. J. Linz & A. Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1996).
[124] A. J. Liehm, 'The Intellectuals on New Social Contract', *Telos* (Spring 1975), pp. 156-164.
[125] G. Schopflin, *Politics in Eastern Europe 1945-1992* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), p. 166.
[126] *The Polish August*, p. 108.
[127] Ibid, p. 109.
[128] *Politics in Eastern Europe 1945-1992*, p. 184.

Another example of this was the frequent increase of food prices. A social benefit which was especially significant to Poles, Schopflin argues that keeping food prices stable was 'tantamount to accepting an external veto on a certain range of policy-making'[129]. This is validated by the strikes of 1970 and 1976, both of which were in opposition to moves to increase food prices (which the government subsequently had to repeal in order to subdue the workers). Thus, the breaking of the social contract was significant in bringing the crisis as the government – whose support from the general population already struggled – lost its only safety valve in keeping the people satisfied by social benefits.

The formation of KOR, a phenomenon specific to Poland, was important as it saw the cooperation of workers and intellectuals, forming a strong organisational structure which could provide sustained resistance to the regime. Simultaneous to (and directly linked with) the eroding social contract, it was formed after the repression of further strikes related to increasing food prices in 1976. Its primary aim was to organise 'financial help to workers victimised after the 1976 repression'[130]. Yet its significance is highlighted by one of its founders, Jacek Kuron, when saying '[intellectuals] were ashamed that the intelligentsia had been silent in 1970'[131]. This statement highlights that one of the key factors behind the failure of previous strikes and resistance was the lack of cooperation between workers and intellectuals. Once KOR was formed, the conditions were made more favourable to strategize and stage nation-wide opposition. Therefore, medium-term factors led to the Polish crisis in two ways: they accentuated the discontent by taking away the government's only safety valve, and led to the organisation of a credible opposition, something other Eastern European countries lacked.

Short-term factors were significant in that they were catalytic in setting things off directly in 1980. Here, two key elements facilitated the crisis: the accession of Karol *Wojtyła* to Pope John Paul II and the strikes caused by a new increase in food prices. The Pope as a figure was instrumental in inspiring people to resist the regime, laying the groundwork for the events to come. As has been established, Catholicism had a unique significance in the country. It is therefore unsurprising that a Polish Cardinal's ascent to the papacy deeply resonated with Polish society, many seeing this as an 'international endorsement of the role and activities of the Polish Church'[132]. Yet his nine-day pilgrimage was more important still; with over 13 million

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[129] *Politics in Eastern Europe 1945-1992*, p. 182.
[130] D. MacShane, *Solidarity: Poland's Independent Trade Union* (Nottingham: Russell Press Limited), p. 42.
[131] Ibid.
[132] *Solidarity: Poland's Independent Trade Union*, p. 98.

people (one third of the Polish population) turning out to see him during the visit[133], it united the Polish people through their faith. It was also a moral blow to the regime – with such wide support, Acherson is valid in saying that 'no such manifestation of love and loyalty was ever seen in Poland'[134]. This was especially significant as the basis of the social contract had been to keep citizens in an atomised society, reducing them to their own families and private spheres. Therefore, coming together in an event that was not an obligatory display of support for the regime gave the Polish people the 'courage and motivation to stand up to their communist oppressors'[135]. Additionally, the Pope's visit had a spiritual resonance with the Polish people, many seeing his speeches blessing the land as a 'sign of divine favour towards faithful and tormented Poland'[136]. The crisis which followed, and indeed the birth of Solidarity, were thus seen as the fulfilment of the Pope's blessing.

Close to breaking point, strikes triggered by yet another increase in food prices served as the final impetus for the crisis in 1980-81[137]. The significance of this particular set of strikes was that it caused a series of local grievances to be elevated to the national stage. This was due to the widespread discontent endemic in Poland at the time. Many strikes stemming from specific issues continued despite demands being met, as workers attempted to ensure demands were met for those striking elsewhere in Poland too. This was seen in the dismissal of Anna Walentynowicz. The Lenin Shipyard workers went on strike and called for her reinstatement as well as a pay rise of 2,000 złoty, and authorities agreed to these demands, with a slightly smaller rise of 1,500 złoty[138]. Yet the workers did not end their strike upon these demands being met, instead establishing an Interfactory Strike Committee (MKS), which consequently coordinated 'strike activity throughout the tri-city area (Gdansk, Gdynia, Sopot)'[139]. Its chief demand was the call for free trade unions[140] – thus directly setting off the crisis that led to Solidarity emerging. Hence, the strikes in 1980 were significant in that they indicated to the regime that the discontent could not be resolved by meeting a set of short-term economic demands in certain places and ignoring others: demands would have to be institutionalised

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[133] Gracjan Kraszewski, 'Catalyst for Revolution Pope John Paul II's 1979 Pilgrimage to Poland and Its Effects on Solidarity and the Fall of Communism', *The Polish Review*, 57:4 (University of Illinois Press), p. 38.

[134] *The Polish August*, p. 124.

[135] 'Catalyst for Revolution', p. 29.

[136] *The Polish August*, p. 123.

[137] *Politics in Eastern Europe 1945-1992*, p. 166.

[138] D. Ost, *Solidarity and the Politics of Anti-Politics* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990), p. 80.

[139] *Solidarity and the Politics of Anti-Politics*, p. 81.

[140] Ibid.

through free trade unions. Furthermore, the continuing cooperation of workers and intellectuals – shown by Kuron being made a key adviser of Solidarity by Walesa – made for a stronger opposition than the regime had ever experienced.

It is clear that the Polish crisis was not brought about by a single factor; a combination of the long-term, medium-term and short-term factors ensured that the crisis happened the way it did, when it did. The long-term factors were significant in preventing any sense of loyalty to the regime, with a deep-rooted dislike of Communism being characteristic of Poland, linked to an unwavering allegiance to the Catholic Church. In turn, medium-term factors contributed to the crisis in different ways: while the unravelling of the social contract took away the regime's final protection, the formation of KOR made it easier for an effective opposition to be organised during the crisis. Short-term factors served as a more direct catalyst, with the Pope inspiring people to rise up against the regime, while the strikes in 1980 directly led to the cooperation across social strata and location that inflamed the crisis. Yet the question of why other Eastern Bloc regimes weren't similarly affected remains pertinent. The importance of religion clearly stands out here, something that did not have the same symbolic value in other countries in the Eastern Bloc. Additionally, a cross-fertilisation of workers and intellectuals was instrumental in ensuring sustained resistance across the country. Finally, the unravelling of the social contract, though significant in other countries, was especially damaging in Poland, whose economy suffered a bigger blow. Though ultimately crushed by General Jaruzelski, the Polish crisis of 1980-81 had a lasting legacy in Poland: the significance of the Solidarity movement in negotiations in 1989 and consequent election of its leader after the fall of Communism attests to that.

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How can the dictatorial regime in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (1932-present) be categorised? Which theoretical approaches best explain the regime's survival?

Daniel Marenghi

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is currently governed by a monarchical dictatorial regime. This regime has been in power since 1932, when Ibn Saud formed the country after successfully uniting the region through military conquest. Over this time, the regime has had to use a variety of methods to secure its position, to legitimise itself and to ensure its survival. Political scientists have produced a number of theories that attempt to explain how regimes can do this. These include theories of diffuse and specific legitimisation of the regime, and co-optation of potential rivals on a local and global scale. These theories focus on how the regime has maintained stability through the use of institutions and by appealing to the population's core ideas and interests. This essay will, firstly, explain how the Saudi regime can be categorised as an absolute monarchy by examining its defining characteristics. Secondly, it will explore several theoretical approaches that offer answers to the question of how the regime has managed to survive throughout its history. Finally, it will assess these theoretical approaches to ascertain if there is a theory which best explains the survival of the regime in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

When categorising the regime in Saudi Arabia, there are several defining factors that clearly mark the regime as an absolute monarchy. The most of obvious of these factors is that the head of the government in Saudi Arabia bears the title 'king' and is both the head of state and head of government and holds largely unrestricted power within the country. This has been the case since Ibn Saud proclaimed himself king in 1932. Clarke et al. (2012 p351-2) point out that a monarchical regime would be based around a close knit family and kin network with a hereditary succession process. This is clearly the case in Saudi Arabia, as alongside the king, the vast majority of political actors in Saudi Arabia are part of the Al Saud family and every king since Ibn Saud has been one of his direct descendants, highlighting the hereditary nature of the succession process. Also, most political decisions are made solely within the royal family. Therefore, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia can only be categorised as an absolute monarchy.

Moving on, the first, and one of the most important theoretical approaches to examine when looking at Saudi Arabia, is the theory of diffuse legitimisation. The main way it is argued that the Saudi regime has diffusely legitimised itself is by tying its doctrine to that of Wahhabi Islam and embracing the religious ideology of the population into the regime. Commins (2009 p3-4) notes how this was an imperative move by Ibn Saud when the kingdom was formed as Wahhabism had cemented itself into the culture and ideology of the peoples of Arabia - with its own customs and leaders - independent of any regime. This move instantly legitimised the regime in the region of Arabia as it embraced what was already the unofficial law of the land and turned it into state law. It has proved to be a key move in terms of the regimes stability over its existence. As Commins (2009 p5) points out, the Wahhabi political doctrine declares allegiance to the current ruler of the state as long as they do not command a violation of Islamic law. Therefore, the king of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia automatically maintains the loyalty of the religious authority, which in-turn harbours the loyalty of the people due to the long history and culture of Wahhabism. This tactic of tying the regime into the religious culture and fundamental ideas of the region provides a very strong explanation of how the Saudi regime has managed to survive. It allows the regime to implement strict sharia law without opposition from the population, and claim its authority comes from Allah (God). This means a criticism of the regime would be regarded by the regime, and devout followers of Wahhabism, to be a criticism of God. This legitimises the regime on a divine level to the Muslim people of Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia finds itself legitimised in the eyes of the larger global Muslim population. Niblock (2004 p4) argues that due to the fact that Saudi Arabia is the location of two of the holiest sites in the Islamic religion, Medina and Mecca, Muslims from around the globe are loyal to the regime in the respect that they are the guardians of these holy sites. However, it can be argued that this theory is losing prominence in contemporary Saudi Arabia. Commins (2009 p5-6) notes the criticism that has started to mount on the regimes implementation of fundamentalist Wahhabi Islam since the attacks on the World Trade Centre on the 11th of September 2001 and the rise of Islamist extremism in the Arab world. Overall, this theory of diffuse legitimisation through the use of tying the regime to the religious ideology of the land and its people provides a very good explanation of how the regime managed to survive in its early years. The piety and devoutness of the followers of Islam in Arabia ensured loyalty toward the regime so long as they implemented and followed Islamic law. However, as global terrorism continues and terrorist groups such as the Islamic State of

Iraq and the Levant thrive, the regime is likely to see continued criticism from the global community on its adherence to a fundamentalist strain of Islam.

A second theoretical approach that is important to examine when attempting to explain the survival of Saudi Arabia's regime is the theory of co-optation, in that the regime co-opted its potential rivals to dissuade dissidence and stabilise its position. It is generally accepted that the main tool Saudi Arabia uses to ensure that this co-optation is successful is the enormous wealth the country has accumulated through the exportation of its oil reserves, thanks to, what Hertog (2011 p15) calls, the "autonomously managed oil giant Saudi Aramco". This oil company is an institution completely owned by the Saudi royal family and is considered the most valuable company in the world. Abukhalil (2011 p1) highlights how "Saudi money has managed to buy off publishers and media owners in order to stifle any manifestation of criticism". This systemic co-optation of relevant media institutions ensures any opposition to the regime cannot voice its agenda to the wider population or easily gain support within the local region. Hertog (2011 p10) notes another example of such local co-optation by acknowledging how, throughout the relatively early years of the regime, especially 1950 through to 1980, there was extensive "oil-funded recruitment of many clients into the growing state apparatus, not least to co-opt and control society". This brought in clear elements of patronage toward Saudi subjects and tied their personal lives to the regime. The result of this widespread and sustained institutional co-optation seems to present a very strong explanation of how the Saudi regime has managed to survive. The sheer extent of the Saudi wealth, which Vassiliev (2013 p1) notes "exceeds that of the richest financial magnates of the US, Japan and Europe", has meant the royal family have simply been able to ensure their survival by buying off any potential opposition. Moreover, the extent of the co-optation employed by the regime has not been restricted to Saudi Arabia and local Arab world. Saudi Arabia has had long-lived ties and alliances with major world superpowers, such as the United States of America. These relationships are mainly monetary based, resulting from things such as trading oil. Adukhalil (2011 p1) makes the argument that the trading relationship and alliance that Saudi Arabia has managed to form with the United States of America means that "the United States leads a decades-long foreign policy that supports Saudi Arabia and protects it", and "never directly acknowledges the Saudi government's corruption, cruelty, and abuse". While the US has not been directly co-opted into the regime, they have been co-opted politically onto the side of the regime to work with the Saudis. Having this superpower behind the regime provides a very

good explanation as to how the Saudi regime has managed to survive. The United States is the most powerful nation in the world, both militarily and economically, and regimes have been created and toppled by its whim in the past. Thus having the United States as an ally undoubtedly goes a long way in terms of protecting the Saudi regime from external threats and ensuring its survival. However, Champion (1999 pp51) states "the heady oil boom of the 1970s and early 1980s is truly a phenomenon of the past" and makes notes of how the Saudi dependence on oil revenue has left them vulnerable to economic crises when prices fall, such as the oil price crash of 1986. This suggests that the type of co-optation utilised by the Saudis thus far will not be an indefinite means to ensure the regimes survival. Considering all this, local, institutional and global political co-optation is clearly one of the best theoretical approaches that attempt to explain the survival of the dictatorial regime in Saudi Arabia. The immense wealth controlled by the Saudi regime means that it has easily been able to successfully co-opt its way into a very secure position in the local and global community despite its dependence on oil for revenue.

The final theoretical approach that this essay will cover in regards to the survival of the Saudi regime is the theory that the Saudi regime has systematically used repression to subjugate the populace and to quell opposition to the regime. Many scholars reinforce this theory, such as Champion (1999 pp55), who notes that there were 140 executions in 1995 and, "apart from public executions, detention and arrest are common, particularly in socio-political cases". This highlights the significant threat faced to those who voice opposition to the regime in the form of this high intensity repression. Bradley (2015 p81) points out how specific this high intensity repression can be: "the late 1970s and early 1980s witnessed the worst repression of Shiites in the eastern province in the Kingdom's history". This subjugation of the minority Shia Muslim population not only ensures their cooperation due to fear of oppression, but also appeals to the interests of the majority Sunni population who believe the Shia follow an incorrect version of Islam. While this high intensity repression is effective in ensuring opposition is quelled on a local level, Champion (1999 pp55) makes note of the condemnation of this repression by international organisations such as the United Nations and Amnesty International. In summation, the theory that repression has worked to ensure the survival of the Saudi regime does hold some weight, but only on the local level deterring opposition from within the country. The repression also works against the regime globally by generating criticism and pressure from the international community.

In conclusion, it is clear that the monarchical regime in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has been extremely successful in ensuring its survival. This is made starkly evident by the regime's 84 years in power, and its notably secure position in the modern day. When assessing which theoretical approach best explains this survival, it is clear that it changed over the course of the regime's reign. Diffuse legitimisation best explains how the regime initially secured its position and legitimacy with the population of area. However, dictatorial regimes must adapt with time and the theory that best explains Saudi Arabia post 1960 is unarguably co-optation of its rivals made possible by immense oil revenue. This is due to the fact that the regime had already legitimised itself with the local population at this point, and the extremely advantageous relationships it has managed to forge through co-optation of local institutions and global powers, most notably the US, clearly makes the theory of co-optation the best explanation for the regime's survival in the contemporary world.

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What impact has corruption under Robert Mugabe's regime had on state building in Zimbabwe?

(Written for State Building and State Failure, 3rd Year, Winter 2016)

Poonam Mistry

Formerly Southern Rhodesia, Zimbabwe gained independence from the colonial government in 1980. After a Unilateral Declaration of Independence from Britain in 1965, Zimbabwe became an independent colony under Ian Smith.[141] However, it was only after Smith's departure that the native black population were able to gain control over their country. Zimbabwe's African National Union – Patriotic Front, (ZANU PF) won the 1980 election with Robert Mugabe at the helm of the party; and this would remain the same for over 35 years. Zimbabwe gained independence through a civil guerrilla war; and in the immediate aftermath of the conflict, it may have been expected that the post-war government would be unstable. However, the election of Mugabe may have been the most stable option for Zimbabwe to begin state building as a newly independent nation at the time. Mugabe was the first black Prime Minister of Zimbabwe: the previous leader, Ian Smith, was still very much a colonial white leader that did not have the interests of the black population at the forefront. ZANU PF gained power with the promise of appealing to the people's 'desire for peace and development.'[142] However, as Mugabe's regime has continued, ZANU PF's policies have become increasingly 'erratic and delusional'.[143] ZANU PF and Mugabe may have had a vision of prosperity and positive state-building for Zimbabwe, but their forced means of staying in power and attacks on their opponents, including the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), has led to a culture of corruption being normalised in society and therefore a lack of trust has started to emerge from the Zimbabwean people, which has been abundantly clear since the early 2000s. Whilst the MDC were created out of concern for the country and its undemocratic leadership, they have been unable to win any elections due to Mugabe's corrupt methods of winning, including an embedded system of patronage as well as using violence towards his political opponents. In Gedde's Coding of Authoritarian Regimes, published in 2000, Zimbabwe is defined as a 'single

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[141] 'Prime Minister of Rhodesia', Wikipedia, last modified 26th August 2016, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prime_Minister_of_Rhodesia

[142] Sara Rich Dorman, *Understanding Zimbabwe: from Liberation to Authoritarianism* (London: Hurst, 2016) p211

[143] Michael Bratton, *Power Politics in Zimbabwe* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2014)

party' authoritarian regime.[144] In comparison to military regimes, monarchies or personalistic regimes, single-party regimes have been classified by Chang and Golden as less corrupt.[145] Whilst this may be true for the majority of single-party regimes, President Mugabe's regime would not continue to be stable without the corruption that it now relies upon both in and outside of government. Mugabe's long time horizon can be owed to the corrupt nature of not only his party, but in government institutions and businesses around the country. Wright argues that longer time horizons provide more incentive to invest in public goods,[146] but it is clear that Mugabe's time as President has not seen Zimbabwe grow and develop in the expected way. Elites, government officials and institutions are all part of the corruption networks established by ZANU PF that help to maintain Mugabe's time as President and ensure ZANU PF's continued success at elections. Whilst academics such as Fjelde and Hegre argue that corruption in government institutions is a vital part of ensuring a regime's stability, and has enabled Zimbabwe to regain stability after the economic crises of 2008, Doig argues that in order for Zimbabwe to progress, donors require a clean government that stops corrupt officials holding power. In order to understand the reasons for corruption and how it has stopped Zimbabwe's potential growth, it must be understood that Mugabe is central to corruption in his party and country. His influence over all aspects of government and with the elites in Zimbabwe enable him to continue to rule over a country that has state building potential. This potential has been side-lined in favour of keeping a small elite circle loyal to the political regime of Mugabe.

One of the main explanations for Mugabe's long time horizon is the corruption that fuels the strength of his regime. Wright's findings indicate that dictators with long time horizons have more incentives to spend money social welfare and public goods, rather than saving money as a personal insurance in the event of the regime being overthrown.[147] However, this theory cannot be applied to Mugabe's regime, as he has been in power for over 35 years – but has been unable to develop infrastructure, deliver better public goods and ensure stability to Zimbabwe.

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[144] Eric Chang and Miriam E. Golden, 'Sources of Corruption in Authoritarian Regimes' *Social Science Quarterly* 91: 1-20 (2010), accessed 5th December 2016. DOI 10.1111/j.1540-6237.2010.00678.x

[145] Eric Change and Miriam E. Golden, 'Sources of Corruption in Authoritarian Regimes'
[146] Joseph Wright, 'To Invest or Insure? How Authoritarian Time Horizons Impact Foreign Aid Effectiveness' *Comparative Political Studies* 41:7 (2008) 971-1000, accessed 13th December 2016. DOI 10.1177/0010414007308538
[147] Joseph Wright, 'To Invest or Insure? How Authoritarian Time Horizons Impact Foreign Aid Effectiveness'

By treating Zimbabwe like a business,[148] Mugabe and ZANU PF have not sustainably used public spending money for the better of the country, but rather for patronage and corruption in maintaining the regime. In the past 20 years, government officials, ministers and members of state security have all formed part of patron-client networks that fund corruption in Zimbabwe.[149] By giving farms and illegitimate public resources that are otherwise unattainable[150] to elites, ZANU PF ensure support from these parties that in turn allows them to remain in power. This level of patronage allows Mugabe to continue to enjoy a long time horizon whilst not investing in Zimbabwe, but instead in his personal safety as President. These networks shape not only political loyalty and the exercise of power,[151] but also hinder the potential for the public to receive benefits and see development in public goods, such as infrastructure. Mugabe's long time horizon can also be accounted for by changes in law, such as the 1987 Presidential Amendment. This allowed the president to appoint 30 unelected, non-constituency members of parliament – and has been used by Mugabe to ensure ZANU PF maintain a majority in the legislature.[152] Measures such as these explain why Mugabe has such a long time horizon but acts in the way a dictator with a short time horizon would, according to Wright's study. Arguments put forward by Charron and Lapuente state that time horizons do not affect all regimes equally,[153] and therefore it can be argued that Zimbabwe is not so much of an outlier to Wright's findings, but the reasons for the regime lasting so long differ to the countries in Wright's study. Regardless of the reasons why, it is unusual for Mugabe to have such a long time horizon and simultaneously not aided in Zimbabwe's economic and institutional development.

Whilst ZANU PF may have initially created policies to aid state building and invest in public goods, the way in which the economic crises between 2000 and 2008 were dealt with by the government do not reflect a regime focused on state building, but on personal gain. Charron and Lapuente also argue that single party regimes are a more resilient form of authoritarianism, even in economic crisis.[154] But whilst poverty continued to grow in Zimbabwe as inflation rose, a

[148] Michael Bratton, *Power Politics in Zimbabwe*
[149] Alan Doig, 'Dirty Hands and Donors: Dealing with Corruption in a Post-Mugabe Zimbabwe' *Political Quarterly* 77:1 (2006) 71-78, accessed 16th December 2016. DOI 10.1111/j.1467-923X.2006.00732.x
[150] Hanne Fjelde and Hårvard Hegre, 'Political Corruption and Institutional Stability' *Studies in Comparative Development* 49:3 (2014) 267-299, accessed 14th December 2016. DOI 10.1007/s12116-014-9155-1
[151] Hanne Fjelde and Hårvard Hegre, 'Political Corruption and Institutional Stability'
[152] Alan Doig, 'Dirty Hands and Donors'
[153] Nicholas Charron and Victor Lapuente, 'Which Dictators Produce Quality of Governmnent?' *Studies in Comparative International Development* 46:4 (2011) 397-423, accessed 5th December 2016.
[154] Nicholas Charron and Victor Lapuente, 'Which Dictators Produce Quality of Government?'

small, politically-connected group of elites continually had access to international currencies, trading licenses and petrol in order to continue living to a high standard.[155] This demonstrates that whilst policies to stabilise the country were failing,[156] the priorities of ZANU PF were to ensure the needs of their patron-client relationships were still met. The reason for corruption becoming the norm outside of the political sphere in Zimbabwe was the necessity to survive – ordinary people turned to corrupt means to obtain foreign currency as well as other resources such as petrol, instead of having to queue for days at a time.[157] This 'vicious cycle'[158] of corruption has allowed Mugabe to stay in power and therefore have a time horizon of over 30 years whilst simultaneously not investing in the development of Zimbabwe.

Although the corruption in Mugabe's regime does stem from the President himself, the lack of state building in Zimbabwe cannot be entirely blamed on him. Government institutions and the army continue to fuel the corruption and patron-client relationships under Mugabe's rule, and this undermines any form of state building that may have the potential to succeed. Both the military and institutions 'prop up' Mugabe's regime,[159] and the influence of this feeds the existing patron-client networks in Zimbabwe. Institutions play a large role in ensuring state building is successful and development is completed across the world – but many civil servants in Zimbabwe are part of corrupt networks that divert money away from investment and welfare.[160] Adrian Leftwich argues that one of the main issues for countries in the developing world is liberating public institutions from private control.[161] In Zimbabwe, institutions such as the civil service can now be said to have been informally privatised by elites that work under Mugabe – thus prioritising the needs of elites over the general population. In 2000, the media and judiciary both lost their independence from ZANU PF,[162] and this further explains why corruption has continued to grow. Having the media under their control has allowed ZANU PF to extend their influence over voters and patrons, as well as holding on to their power in Zimbabwe. By rewarding members of the judiciary with televisions and farms, ZANU PF were able to further their influence over institutions that should be aiming to stop corruption. This

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[155] Michael Bratton, *Power Politics in Zimbabwe*
[156] Michael Bratton, *Power Politics in Zimbabwe*
[157] Michael Bratton, *Power Politics in Zimbabwe*
[158] Hanne Fjelde and Hårvard Hegre, 'Political Corruption and Institutional Stability'
[159] Michael Bratton, *Power Politics in Zimbabwe* p235
[160] Hanne Fjelde and Hårvard Hegre, 'Political Corruption and Institutional Stability'
[161] Adrian Leftwich, 'Theorizing the State' in *Politics in the Developing World* eds Burnall et al (Oxford University Press, 2014)
[162] Alan Doig, 'Dirty Hands and the Donors'

further damages attempts at state building, as with a corrupt judiciary and biased media, it is very difficult for reforms to be made that will benefit the population equally, and not just the political elite.

Additionally, Morris Szeftel argues that due to inflation and low wages paid to civil servants, in Zimbabwe and a number of other African nations,[163] more employees are likely to turn to corruption for their own personal gain, rather than investing in public goods. The lack of public spending in Zimbabwe has left public infrastructure at a poor quality and has forced corruption to become a normalised part of businesses and trade within the country. Manzetti and Wilson state that weak institutions are unable to provide public goods based on fair and rational agendas, and this makes them more susceptible to corrupt groups using them to 'carry out favours'.[164] However, whilst this is true in Zimbabwe, these corruption networks can also act to promote the stability of the country,[165] through keeping the power of the regime stable. Fjelde and Hegre found that officials often 'rely on corrupt exchanges to strengthen their hold on power',[166] and this can be said to describe Zimbabwe. The corruption within institutions provides a stable network that officials know will ensure political loyalty and therefore bring more stability to the regime – but perhaps not the country.

The election of 2008 demonstrated that although the MDC had a chance of winning with Morgan Tsvangirai as leader, the tactics employed by ZANU PF and their followers forced Mr Tsvangirai to stand down from the race. After winning the first round, the MDC received little coverage on television and radio, as well as an increase in politically motivated violence towards supporters of the MDC.[167] This demonstrates that although there were no explicit instructions from Mugabe himself, the normalisation of corruption and political loyalties created through patronage allowed for the elections to be sabotaged. This further weakened any potential state-building that the MDC could achieve, as they are blocked by the patron-client relationships and loyalty that has been created by ZANU PF and Mugabe. The MDC did gain control of the treasury after the 2008 election,[168] but ZANU PF continued 'side-stepping the formal state'[169] by

[163] Morris Szeftel, 'Misunderstanding African Politics: Corruption and the Governance Agenda' *Review of African Political Economy* 76 (1998), accessed 16th December 2016.
[164] Luigi Manzetti and Carole Wilson, 'Why do Corrupt Governments Maintain Public Support?' *Comparative Political Studies* 40:8 (2007), accessed 16th December 2016. DOI 10.1177/0010414005285759
[165] Hanne Fjelde and Hårvard Hegre, 'Political Corruption and Institutional Stability'
[166] Hanne Fjelde and Hårvard Hegre, 'Political Corruption and Institutional Stability' p288
[167] Sara Rich Dorman, *Understanding Zimbabwe: From Liberation to Authoritarianism*
[168] Sara Rich Dorman, *Understanding Zimbabwe: From Liberation to Authoritarianism*
[169] Sara Rich Dorman, *Understanding Zimbabwe: From Liberation to Authoritarianism* p195

using elites to ensure revenue was distributed under ZANU PF's rules. The effect of corruption created by ZANU PF on institutions and the rule of law clearly undermines the potential for state-building, as even when the MDC are able to hold power over certain government institutions, the corruption networks in place prevent change from occurring. This is not directly due to Mugabe but his party and the normalisation of corruption that allows government revenue to fuel the lives of the wealthier part of the population, and not used for public goods such as infrastructure.

Another explanation for the poor state building in Zimbabwe is the lack of trust that the government now receive from the general population of the country. Unlike other countries under authoritarian rule, Mugabe's regime came to power not out of fear, but belief of liberation from the colonial white, British governments beforehand.[170] From 1980 to 2000, ZANU PF held no less than 73% of seats[171], clearly showing their popularity in the earlier part of the regime, especially before the country faced economic hardship. After Mugabe's amendments to the executive and legislature in 1987, including merging the roles of prime minister and ceremonial president,[172] the accountability of the government became lost under the expanding power of the president.[173] Since these amendments and the government's inability to deal with the economic crises between 2000 and 2008, it has become clear that the public no longer regard the government as a trustworthy institution. Mugabe's 'narrow and self-serving regime'[174] has not aided Zimbabwe's development as a country, which ZANU PF aimed to do at Zimbabwe's liberation from colonialism. However, as Mugabe was able to gain the support of rural areas during the fight for Zimbabwe's independence, the population there have since remained loyal to ZANU PF and Mugabe.[175] This could be one factor which has aided Mugabe's long time horizon, as with the support of the rural population and ZANU PF's continual support of providing public goods, such as a food, these citizens could be vital to the continuation of Mugabe's rule as President. Although they remained supportive during the 1990s,[176] it is unclear whether they remain trustworthy of Mugabe after the economic crises in

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[170] Sara Rich Dorman, *Understanding Zimbabwe: From Liberation to Authoritarianism*

[171] Masipula Sithole, 'Fighting Authoritarianism in Zimbabwe' *Journal of Democracy* 12:1 160-169 (2001), accessed 10th December 2016

[172] Masipula Sithole, 'Fighting Authoritarianism in Zimbabwe'

[173] Masipula Sithole, 'Fighting Authoritarianism in Zimbabwe'

[174] Sara Rich Dorman, *Understanding Zimbabwe: From Liberation to Authoritarianism'* p4

[175] Carolyn Jenkins, 'The Politics of Economic Policy Making in Zimbabwe' *Journal of Modern African Studies* 35:4 (1997) 575-602, accessed 23rd December 2016

[176] Carolyn Jenkins, 'The Politics of Economic Policy Making in Zimbabwe'

the 2000s. Whilst the rest of Africa was experiencing an increase in 'real per capita incomes', Zimbabwe was suffering from the lowest growth rate in the world[177] during the economic crises. The lack of accountability now associated with the government provides less incentive for people to follow government policies. For example, more ordinary people began to turn to corrupt and illegal means of exchanging the Zimbabwe dollar for foreign currency during the highest rates of inflation. By forcing himself on the electorate, Mugabe has lost popular legitimacy,[178] and this can be seen in the results of public opinion polls that found that 4 out of 5 people were afraid to speak about politics,[179] as well as the slow but increasing growth of the MDC's seats in each election. Whilst the regime may not have been born of fear, the increasingly illegal ways of implementing the law, including the reliance on informal militias,[180] have made many people lose faith and trust in the party.[181]

One important area in which the lack of transparency has resulted in less trust is Mugabe's attempt to create a new constitution. Although the Constitutional Commission (CC) was set up by ZANU PF, after calls from the National Constitution Assembly (NCA) for a pro-democracy approach to government, its findings and observations on the best way to create a new constitution were ignored by Mugabe and his party.[182] The haste and lack of transparency at which the CC worked did not promote trust in the Zimbabwean people, as well as the fact that the CC was wholly under the discretion of Mugabe himself.[183] This allowed Mugabe to create a constitution without adhering to the wishes of the people that the Commission had researched. Additionally, in the referendum held to vote on the new constitution, it was rejected by 53% of the population.[184] This was a huge step back for Mugabe and ZANU PF, as it was the first large scale indication that the population was unhappy in the way in which the constitution had been drafted and created with only Mugabe's discretion. Since the referendum in February 2000, the government have not been able to regain the trust of the Zimbabwean population, and it can be argued that the way in which the government dealt with the new constitution was only the start of a slippery slope for ZANU PF prioritising their interests over those of the country.

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[177] Michael Bratton, *Power Politics in Zimbabwe'* p84
[178] Michael Bratton, *Power Politics in Zimbabwe'*
[179] Michael Bratton, *Power Politics in Zimbabwe'* p83
[180] Michael Bratton, *Power Politics in Zimbabwe'*
[181] Sara Rich Dorman, *Understanding Zimbabwe: From Liberation to Authoritarianism*
[182] Masipula Sithole, 'Fighting Authoritarianism in Zimbabwe'
[183] Masipula Sithole, 'Fighting Authoritarianism in Zimbabwe'
[184] Masipula Sithole, 'Fighting Authoritarianism in Zimbabwe'

Although Mugabe's regime has held power for the past 36 years, the elections of 2008 demonstrated the first glimpse of a Zimbabwe with the MDC gaining more power within the government, which may allow them to slowly begin to influence state building. The new power-sharing agreement in Zimbabwe between ZANU PF and the MDC could, in the future, provide more accountability and stability for the country.[185] By refusing to step down as President and forcing himself on the electorate for another term,[186] Mugabe and the MDC have not begun a power-sharing settlement with state building at the forefront, but rather a power struggle between the two parties. During the 2008 elections, media controlled by ZANU PF promoted the party in a positive light in 91% of stories, whereas the MDC were shown as negative in 89% of news stories.[187] Not only does this demonstrate the monopoly of power that ZANU PF had over institutions such as the media, but also their determination to exclude their political competition from having a fair election. Since the 1990s, ZANU PF have been unwilling to accommodate political diversity within the black community,[188] and this may be another reason for hostility towards opposition parties. The politically motivated violence towards Mugabe's opponents, NGOs and voters[189] also demonstrated that ZANU PF are continually unwilling to share power with the MDC. As Cheeseman and Tendi argue, ZANU PF refuses to 'make space for new political players, giving rise to the politics of continuity',[190] and this is also a cause for the high levels of corruption experienced by the government in Zimbabwe. Despite ZANU PF's best attempts and Tsvangirai pulling out of the presidential race, the MDC were still able to win control of some parts of the government, including the treasury.[191] A. Carl Le Van argues that power sharing can eliminate the idea of true leadership;[192] but in Zimbabwe it is clear that ZANU PF and Mugabe remain strong leaders of the country, as they not only control the majority of government institutions, but also the corrupt networks that run them. Therefore although power sharing could increase accountability and transparency in government, whilst Mugabe holds power over the patron-client networks that give his regime

[185] A. Carl Le Van, 'Power Sharing and Inclusive Politics in Africa's Uncertain Democracies' *Governance* 24:1 (2011) 31-53, accessed 13th December 2016. DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0491.2010.01514.x
[186] Michael Bratton, *Power Politics in Zimbabwe*
[187] Sara Rich Dorman, *Understanding Zimbabwe: From Liberation to Authoritarianism*
[188] Carolyn Jenkins, 'The Politics of Economic Policy Making in Zimbabwe'
[189] Sara Rich Dorman, *Understanding Zimbabwe: From Liberation to Authoritarianism*
[190] Nick Cheeseman and Blessing-Miles Tendi, 'Power Sharing in Comparative Perspective: The Dynamics of 'Unity Government' in Kenya and Zimbabwe' *Journal of Modern African Studies* 48:2 (2010) p206
[191] Sara Rich Dorman, *Understanding Zimbabwe: From Liberation to Authoritarianism*
[192] A. Carl Le Van, 'Power Sharing and Inclusive Politics in Africa's Uncertain Democracies'

stability, the MDC are unable to promote change and continue state building processes, even with some power in the government.

As the ZANU PF became accustomed to a regime without serious political competition, corruption developed as a culture in which officials could act 'in pursuit of the party's cause', with no justification for their actions.[193] This allowed patron-client relationships to grow and transparency to fade in institutions and policy making, therefore diverting money away from public goods and into corrupt networks. Bratton argues that Zimbabwe has never had a 'legitimate political settlement',[194] and this could explain why and how ZANU PF have been able to hold their influence over the country in an illegitimate manner for so long. However, whilst power sharing between ZANU PF and the MDC could lead to more transparency, it could also make it harder for the public to determine policy responsibility.[195] By creating a power-sharing agreement, Zimbabwe could either witness new state-building policies and changes as a result of another party's influence in the regime, or be held back further due to more political actors invoking a gridlock on decision making.[196] ZANU PF have been able to narrow the inner circle of decision makers since the start of the power sharing agreement, which has in turn allowed the party to continue to 'advance its own political interests'.[197] This exemplifies that whilst power-sharing could encourage state building to become more important within government, the addition of another party has simply made ZANU PF increase their hold on certain institutions. Additionally, whilst the MDC should have more power in the decisions made in government, the loyalty towards Mugabe means that it is unlikely, whilst he remains in power, that the MDC will be able to push through changes that will increase state building. The MDC faces the challenging task of gaining control over more government organisations and institutions that are currently held by elites that support Mugabe, who feel they have retained a 'right to rule'[198] since the liberation of Zimbabwe. It is clear that power-sharing could be a strategy to reduce corruption and increase investment into public goods, however without the co-operation of both parties it is unlikely to work. The tactics that Mugabe used in the election of 2008, in which many of his political opponents were treated as criminals by the police, demonstrate the unwillingness of both Mugabe and ZANU PF to work

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[193] Michael Bratton, *Power Politics in Zimbabwe*, p237
[194] Michael Bratton, *Power Politics in Zimbabwe*, p233
[195] A. Carl Le Van, 'Power Sharing and Inclusive Politics in Africa's Uncertain Democracies'
[196] A. Carl Le Van, 'Power Sharing and Inclusive Politics in Africa's Uncertain Democracies'
[197] Michael Bratton, *Power Politics in Zimbabwe*, p193
[198] Michael Bratton, *Power Politics in Zimbabwe',* p237

with MDC in the interests of Zimbabwe, not just for personal gain. As Doig suggests, in order for Zimbabwe to develop and receive help from donors, the corruption within the government must be tackled first.[199] Alternatively, as the first serious political competition to face Mugabe's regime, the MDC may have reflected the mood of unhappiness that the public feel towards ZANU PF. This may encourage the party and the regime to begin to look to new ways to govern the country and remind people the reasons for which they were first voted into power in 1980.

In conclusion, Mugabe's regime has seen corruption become a normalised aspect of government, as well as a consistent hindrance to state building measures. Whilst it cannot be ignored that Mugabe initially did bring peace and development to a newly independent nation, the long time horizon of the regime has resulted in a loss of these values that were promised to the Zimbabwean people. This time horizon does not reflect academic theory, and Mugabe's behaviour as a President is unusual in his lack of investment in the country throughout his time in power. As ZANU PF and Mugabe have not faced serious political opposition and therefore continued to become more powerful, both in the executive and legislature, it is clear that the regime has prioritised retaining power and providing goods for elites over aspects of state building and the provision of public goods. The corruption that fuels institutions through patron-client networks has allowed officials to ensure political loyalties remain with ZANU PF, whilst also providing elites with measures to survive whilst the majority of the country suffered through the economic crises from 2000 to 2008. Not only has Mugabe demonstrated his selfishness through his long time horizon, he has also lost the people's trust in him as a legitimate leader. His use of scaremongering tactics in previous elections has ensured that competition, such as Tsvangirai, have not been able to run or indeed win against President Mugabe. In order for Zimbabwe to continue the state building process, the MDC and ZANU PF need to co-operate in a power sharing agreement that allows both parties to put the importance of public goods such as infrastructure, education and welfare before the needs of elites and patron-client relationships. Zimbabwe has the potential to be a successful African nation in a growing global economy, and the initial prosperity that occurred in Mugabe's first few years as Prime Minister. In order for Zimbabwe to be able to function in a stable manner as a country, institutions must not place corrupt networks at the top of their agenda. Although it

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[199] Alan Doig, 'Dirty Hands and Donors'

is a high risk strategy to simply install an anti-corruption agency[200], there are other measures which could be taken to help reduce corruption within institutions, and therefore ensure that public money is spent on public goods instead of being diverted to elites. It is likely that ZANU PF will continue to win elections due to Mugabe's influence over the police, military, judiciary and opponent voters. To fully be able to eradicate corruption within the government, Zimbabwe's best hope is for Mugabe to step down as President and ZANU PF to allow the opposition party to take over. With Mugabe running for re-election once again the in the 2018 elections,[201] this is an unlikely prospect, and whilst the public themselves cannot do anything to combat the corruption within the government, their growing unhappiness may build up to the election of the MDC over ZANU PF in the hope of a more prosperous future.

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[200] Alan Doig, 'Dirty Hands and Donors'
[201] BBC News, 'Zimbabwe's ZANU PF confirms Mugabe as 2018 election candidate', *BBC News*, 17th December 2016, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-38353298

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What were the reasons for the different outcomes of the 1975 EC and 2016 EU referendums?

(Written for Political Change: The Evolution of Post-War European Integration [M1049], 3rd Year, Winter 2016)

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Introduction

For as long as post-war European integration has developed, in all its different stages and forms, the question of British participation and membership has always been left hanging in the air. Indeed, for the first decade of progressive post-war integration during the 1950s, Britain took a back seat and declined to take part. Winston Churchill, the Prime Minister for the first half of the decade, said at the time that "We are with them [Western Europe], but not of them" (Butler and Kitzinger, p.4), and some commentators have even suggested that Britain held a downright hostility towards the idea of a Common Market in the latter part of the decade (Moravcsik, 1998, p.129). Even during the 1960s, a decade in which two British applications to join the EEC were denied, the motive behind the applications was more of a response to an American advocacy of British membership, as well as a fear of being economically left behind the rest of Europe (George, 1998, p.39). Within Britain itself, however, scepticism towards Europe remained ever close to the surface both before and after it joined the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973.

The British referendums on Europe in 1975 and 2016 were both largely a result of the Prime Minister of the time seeking to put an end to the scepticism and inner party conflict regarding Europe, as well as striving for public approval for their leadership, government and party. In the years leading up to the referendums, both Harold Wilson and David Cameron suffered intense pressure from the Eurosceptics of their respective parties to hold a referendum. Agreeing to do so was a big political risk for both, but by renegotiating Britain's relationship with Europe, holding a referendum and winning the public's support for those renegotiations, each Prime Minister hoped to unite the party – and indeed the country – under a single ideology and attitude towards Europe. However, while the 1975 referendum resulted in a landslide victory to remain inside the EEC (referred to simply as the 'Common Market' in the referendum), the 2016 referendum on the European Union (EU) lost by a small margin of a 4% difference, effectively resulting in Britain's departure from the EU.

While there were elements of similarity in the reasons behind the referendums taking place – such as the inner party turmoil and Eurosceptic political pressure – the reasons for the different outcomes of the referendums are varied. This essay will seek to explain these reasons, providing qualitative analysis and evidence for them. It will argue that there are three main categories of factors behind the differing results. Firstly, it will look at the British political context of the times, arguing that there are some similarities between the two referendums, but also that these led to fundamental differences in public perception, such as the ways in which the campaigns were run – especially the 'Out' or 'Leave' campaigns – the arguments presented to the public and the hostility (or lack thereof in 1975) towards and within politics. Secondly, it will discuss the social factors behind the referendums, examining the attitudes of the public, and why immigration and an anti-establishment rhetoric played such pivotal roles in the 2016 referendum, yet were barely causes for concern in 1975. Similarly, it will discuss the role of populist figures for the 'Leave' campaign, such as Nigel Farage and Boris Johnson, and argue that they were far more effective at mobilising people to vote than figures for the 'Out' campaign in 1975. Finally, it will analyse institutional differences between the then EEC of 1975 and the EU of 2016, arguing that "The EU of the Lisbon Treaty is an altogether different animal than the European Economic Community" (Cini and Pérez-Solórzano Borragán, 2013, p.368) and that key elements of supranationalism have tipped the tide in favour of British Euroscepticism.

British Political Context

The political context in Britain at the time of both referendums are essential to our understanding of why the results differed so much. However, while there are undoubtedly differences between the two referendums, there are also two important similarities which need to be taken into consideration. Firstly, both referendums were preceded by a set of renegotiations with Europe conducted by the government and the Prime Ministers. In 1974, the chief role of the terms of a renegotiation was given to Wilson's Foreign Secretary, James Callaghan (George, 1998, p.77-78), whereas Cameron played much more of a prominent negotiating figure in 2016. Nevertheless, the broad terms of the renegotiations were of a similar nature; more independence for Britain with less interference from Brussels, as well as further

protection for British economic interests, whether in the form of a renegotiation of Britain's financial contribution in 1974, or the protection of the pound from discrimination in 2016.[202]

Secondly, the two Prime Ministers were both fighting inner party turmoil which had serious potential to damage future foreign policy and attitudes towards Europe. By renegotiating Britain's role in Europe and holding a referendum, each Prime Minister was hoping for a definitive answer to this divisive issue – an answer which would put to bed the cries of the Eurosceptics within their own parties for the foreseeable future. Indeed, in 1975 the Foreign Secretary, James Callaghan, stated that the idea of a referendum to settle this issue was "a life raft which we would all have to climb aboard", effectively holding the Labour party together on the European issue (Broad and Geiger, 1996, p.83).

These two factors together led to something of a similar line in the lead up to the referendums. Both Prime Ministers (and their respective parties) were largely unsatisfied with the current state of British membership in Europe. They renegotiated the terms of said membership with varying degrees of success dependant on the different issues, and then finally took those terms to the public in the form of a referendum. Similarly, both Prime Ministers supported the 'Remain' movement, although Cameron much more prominently and publicly than Wilson. Nevertheless, Wilson's position on the renegotiation deal and the referendum was known at the time, with him stating "My judgement is that it is now best for the future of Britain ... that we remain in the Community" (News.bbc.co.uk, 1975). On the other hand, while Cameron's public support of the 'Remain' side in the 2016 referendum was clear, it effectively reduced his credibility given his previous critical attitude towards Europe, coming across as ultimately pirouetting "from potential Brexiteer to committed campaigner for Remain" (Menon and Salter, 2016, p.1308).

Although the general line of events which took place leading up to the two referendums is somewhat similar, further inspection reveals a multitude of differing factors in the political context of the two referendums, which can undoubtedly help explain why the results were so different. One of the most important factors is the way in which the campaigns themselves were run. Endless comparisons can be drawn between the two campaigns, and there is certainly no

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[202] For full analysis of the renegotiation deals that were struck, see George, 1998 p.81-89 for the 1974 renegotiation, and Foster, P. '*EU deal: What David Cameron asked for... and what he actually got*' for 2016, accessible online at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/05/19/eu-deal-what-david-cameron-asked-for-and-what-he-actually-got/ [Accessed 28 Dec. 2016].

room for an exhaustive list of them in this essay, however there are important factors which need to be discussed.

When looking at the official government campaigns of the two referendums – both supporting the 'Yes' or 'Remain' vote – the parallels to be drawn between the two are almost countless. However, this reason precisely hindered the 'Remain' side's chances in the 2016 referendum. When drawing comparisons between the two official government leaflets vouching for 'Yes' and 'Remain' respectively, the arguments and tactics used are extraordinarily similar. For example, both leaflets contained economic arguments stating that Britain would prosper in terms of trade and economy far more under the Common Market or EU.[203] Similarly, there are elements of scaremongering in both, claiming that there would be a period of uncertainty and economic volatility if Britain were to leave Europe. Finally, both leaflets argue a line of optimism and sustainability for the future if we were to remain inside the Common Market or EU.

This is the true heart of the similarities between the two – but it is precisely this issue which caused so much of the political context to be different in 2016. It changed the pro-Remain's arguments into something of a recital and a repeat of the same (or very similar) narrative as the one the pro-Marketeers used in 1975. This ultimately isn't an issue for the younger generations, who might not have even heard about the referendum in 1975. But for the older generations who may have voted 41 years prior to 2016, the same optimistic narrative about the benefits Europe has for Britain could have been a major factor to vote Leave instead. It is essentially the same as what was promised in 1975, yet if the older generations saw no positive outcome of voting 'Yes' back then, why would they want to do the same in 2016? That is not to say that this is the whole reason for the older population voting so strongly in favour of Brexit – as will be discussed later, immigration plays a fundamental role – yet it undoubtedly has some contribution towards the percentage of older voters who voted to leave Europe in 2016, which came to 57% of 55-64's and 60% of over 65's (BBC News, 2016).

The 2016 'Leave' campaign also featured much more scaremongering than in 1975, with the ability to now focus on social aspects such as immigration instead of purely economic

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[203] 1975 'Britain's New Deal in Europe' Leaflet accessible at: http://www.harvard-digital.co.uk/euro/pamphlet.htm#front [Accessed 30 Dec. 2016]. 2016 'pro-Remain' government leaflet available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/515068/why-the-government-believes-that-voting-to-remain-in-the-european-union-is-the-best-decision-for-the-uk.pdf [Accessed 30 Dec. 2016]. For economic arguments and trade, see page 14 in the 1975 leaflet, and page 4 in 2016.

issues. Indeed, 'Leave' drove the point of immigration so hard and far that Will Straw, pro-Remainer and Labour party politician, eventually stated that they completely "snuffed out our opportunity to talk about the economy" (Menon and Salter, 2016, p.1309). Moreover, economic arguments were essentially not as effective in 2016 as in 1975 due to the nature of the economy itself at the time. Economic instability in 1975 led the pro-Marketeer's arguments to hit home with the public, who feared times getting more uncertain and more volatile. In 2016, however, the British economy was in a relatively good state. Similarly, given the Eurozone Crisis of the recent past, it emphasised the Leave campaign's argument that Britain and the pound would be better alone.

Ultimately, the political context of the 2016 referendum on Europe was much more of a toxic battleground of shouting matches between the chaotic figures of Boris Johnson and Nigel Farage, including substantially more emotive language. One of the key moments in the 2016 referendum was the BBC's 'Great EU Debate', which ended with Boris claiming that June 23rd could become "Britain's Independence Day" (Realclearpolitics.com, 2016). This is almost a completely different political atmosphere to that of 1975, where leading figures such as Tony Benn and Roy Jenkins sat down for a quiet televised debate on the issues (BBC, 1975). Indeed, the campaign itself in 1975 was much less rough than many had expected, with minor controversies surrounding Benn being the height of toxicity (Butler and Kitzinger, p.168). Essentially, unlike in 1975, the political context of 2016 was a result of the vastly different social issues and populist figures and movements which were prevalent at the time, which this essay will now turn to in more detail.

Social Aspects and Populism

Potentially the biggest differences between the 1975 and 2016 British referendums on Europe lie within the social aspects. Concerns over issues such as immigration were hardly prevalent at the time of the 1975 referendum. Indeed, it was such a non-issue that there was more concern over British workers leaving the country as opposed to European workers trying to join, with leading anti-Marketeer figure Tony Benn stating that "increasing emigration of our workers and their families to the Continent ... will be the painful consequence for this country of our continued membership of the EEC" (Newstatesman.com, 2015). This was largely due to the nature of the economy at the time, with Britain widely regarded as the 'sick man of Europe' for much of the decade, ridden with strikes and turmoil for workers (The Economist, 2005).

The political landscape for workers in 2016 couldn't have been more different, with worker's strikes at an unprecedented low, there being only 106 organised strikes in 2015 – one twentieth of the amount that took place in 1975 (Ruddick, 2016).

This positive political landscape for workers in 2016 had two effects; firstly, it reduced emigration to such a small figure that it was ultimately not a cause for concern as it was in 1975. Secondly, it increased the immigration of workers from Europe seeking economic stability and a fair wage in the UK. Due to the EU's rule for accepting free movement of European peoples, the UK must accept any European immigrants into their country if they hold a valid passport. This essentially limits the amount of control the UK can have over its own border, with the ensuing result being a large number of migrants freely able to move away from their economically less-stable country and into Britain.

In recent times, surveys have often stated that immigration is the topic which is most important to the British public, and the Leave campaign played to this message again and again throughout the campaign (Goodwin and Heath, 2016, p.328). As Goodwin and Heath state in their article, however, the areas with the most EU migrants generally voted in favour of Remain, with eighteen of the top twenty areas with the most EU migrants voting that way. By contrast, fifteen of the top twenty areas with the least number of migrants voted to Leave (p.329). But as they go on to argue, this doesn't mean immigration played no role in the referendum – data shows that a Leave vote was much more likely in the areas which had seen a sudden influx of EU migrants in the area over the last ten years (p.329). Moreover, it appears that immigration strikes a chord with the hearts of the British elderly working class like no other issue can. The scaremongering from the Leave campaign, aligned with the short, harsh messages they plastered across the media, such as Leave.EU's 'I want my country back' and Vote Leave's 'Take back control' left the Remain camps messages about the economy feeling "remote and arcane" (Menon and Salter, 2016, p.1310).

Essentially, the social attitudes towards immigration is undoubtedly one of the main reasons that Britain decided to leave the European Union in 2016. Compared to the 1975 referendum, it is easy to see how such an issue played little to no role in why people might have wanted to leave Europe, even though the free movement of workers and peoples was still a founding aspect of the Common Market, with some limitations (BBC News, 2016). The fact that Tony Benn was concerned with emigration, as opposed to immigration, was obviously a

cause for concern, fearing that the growing trade deficit between the UK and the rest of the EEC would lead to higher unemployment and people leaving the country, but it didn't strike the same chord of harsh social fear that immigration seemed to play in 2016. Indeed, no single issue took control of the referendum in 1975 as it did in 2016 – no theme triumphed over all throughout the campaign (Butler and Kitzinger, 1976, p.182) in the way that immigration repeatedly came to the forefront of media attention in 2016.

So far, we have established that immigration itself is one of the most important factors as to why Britain left the EU in 2016. However, the issue of immigration, alongside several other arguments of the Leave campaign, would have had much less of an impact if the populist figureheads of the Leave movement had been less prevalent. Nigel Farage and Boris Johnson had an enormous impact on the Leave campaign, appealing to the social issues such as immigration or promising that a Leave vote would see an extra £350 million pounds for the NHS – one of the greatest sources of national pride.

Nigel Farage exemplifies populist figures in his consistent anti-establishment rhetoric, something which undoubtedly appealed to the working class who feel as if they have been left behind by globalisation, and who might negatively perceive the increase of multiculturalism and European integration. Ever since the fall of the Berlin wall and the beginning of the global economy, the working class in the richest countries have seen their incomes flatline, or even fall (O'Brien, 2016). Literature has recently shown that there is a growing divide between the 'winners' and 'losers' of globalisation, whereby the 'winners' of globalisation (well-educated young people in urban environments) are more open to immigration, multiculturalism etc., whereas the 'losers' (the less educated and older) are against such openness (Hobolt, 2016, p.1265).

In 1975, the social aspects of the time were essentially arbitrary compared to that of the Brexit vote. The Soviet Union and Berlin Wall were still preventing a global economy, and Britain was generally only dealing with Western Europe, the Commonwealth and the USA. Similarly, as previously mentioned, Britain was faring so poorly economically that they were largely looking to Europe for help and a bail-out, as opposed to feeling that Europe were robbing them – and the NHS – of £350 million a week.

Comparisons of Farage and Johnson to similar figures in 1975, such as Tony Benn, leave Benn wanting when it comes to causing the same social waves. Indeed, Benn was seen as

something of a 'catalyst' – promoting more coverage of others than of himself. It is argued by Butler and Kitzinger that "the quality of his [Tony Benn's] impact was more significant than its weight", essentially stating that the general view of the press was that he was counter-productive to the 'No' campaign (Butler and Kitzinger, 1976, p.240-241). Farage and Johnson couldn't have been more dissimilar. By latching on to the social fears held by much of the people who were 'left behind' by globalisation, they effectively won the referendum for the Leave campaign with constant media attention in the run up, emotive speeches which appealed to the national pride and hearts of the British people, as well as a demonization of the rest of the EU. This brings us to the final issue which will be discussed in this essay – the institutions of the EU themselves and the way in which they have drastically changed from those of the EEC in 1975, and how this was, once again, demonised and used to the Leave campaign's advantage.

Institutional Differences

The EEC of the 1970s was an entirely different political entity than the one which exists today - it was merely an economic union as opposed to the political one we currently see in the EU. At the time, there were in fact more calls for deeper integration and an evolution of the EEC into a political union, such as the Tindemans Report of 1976, which recommended stronger EC institutions and the adoption of more common policies across member states (Cini and Pérez-Solórzano Borragán, 2013 p.22). A full political union and Common Market was still something of a distant dream for supporters of European integration in the 1970s – the institutions held some power over the member states, but nothing on the scale that we see in the European Union today.

The EU of today is, essentially, everything that has just been described; it is a full political union as opposed to just an economic union, with more pooling of sovereignty than ever before; it is a full Single Market, whereby trade barriers and tariffs between participating countries have been completely removed; and while it has the same institutions as in 1975 (the Council, Commission, Parliament and Court), these institutions have notably more power than they did in 1975. For example, they have become more supranational in nature, moving away from a state-centric view of the polity, towards one of multilevel governance, whereby state sovereignty has been diluted by collective decision-making in the European arena (Marks et al. 1996, p.342). As Marks et al argue in their article, the development of the EEC into the EU has gradually melded it from an intergovernmental platform into a multi-level polity where

supranational actors often make the decisions, and where individual member states' control over their own peoples has significantly weakened (p.371).

This issue of sovereignty was a cause for concern in 1975, with prominent Out campaigners arguing the case that remaining inside the Common Market would lead to unelected technocrats telling Britain what to do (Benn, 1975). But it wasn't driven to nearly the extent that the Leave campaign achieved in 2016, simply because the institutions didn't hold as much power. The EEC of the 1970s was, by and large, still an economic union based on state-centric governance, with member states having more of a say in decisions that were made. A further reason for this supranationalism which developed inside the EU was the Eastern enlargement which took place between 2004-2007. The EU proceeded to have such a large number of member states (28 by the time of the 2016 referendum) that supranational governance wasn't a choice but a necessity, without which no decision could ever be made.

This issue of enlargement, combined with the founding EU principle of free movement, saw Western states such as the UK, France and Germany suddenly receive an influx of migrants from the Eastern states which joined between 2004 and 2007. This led to immigration becoming much more of a prominent issue than in 1975 simply because there was a much larger number of states whose citizens could freely move to the UK, largely made up of Eastern European states whose economies are weaker. These institutional and social factors were played to their full extent by the Leave campaign in 2016, ultimately much more effectively than in 1975 where the concerns were not so great.

Conclusion

Amongst all of the issues that have been discussed in this essay, there lies one consistent theme; the Leave campaign of the 2016 referendum took full advantage of the different issues surrounding the EU. They successfully demonised the rest of the European Union by latching onto social issues which the last decade has seen rising, such as immigration and an anti-establishment rhetoric, while remaining the focus of media attention for both small controversies, as well as larger ones – such as the red bus stating £350 million would be sent to the NHS. While the 1975 referendum held similar conversations regarding issues such as state sovereignty, they were not played out to the extent as in 2016. Similarly, concerns over emigration by Tony Benn in 1975 did not hit at the fears of the British public as immigration

did in 2016 – they were essentially less concerned about people leaving the country as opposed to immigrants entering.

The 1975 referendum also came at a time of economic despair. As stated previously, Britain was considered the 'sick man of Europe' (The Economist, 2005), and economic turmoil resulted in Britain looking towards Europe for help, normality and prosperity. The well-faring economic times of 2016 allowed the public to focus on different, post-materialist issues such as sovereignty and immigration, with catchy Leave campaign slogans like "Let's take back control" dominating the Press, and ultimately playing to British patriotism to triumph over the constant economic scaremongering from the Remain side. Similarly, the anti-establishment rhetoric led to people wanting to go against the status-quo, leading prominent Leave campaigner, Michael Gove, to state that people had "had enough of experts" who were warning about the economic turmoil a Brexit would result in (Ft.com, 2016). In 1975, having only joined the EEC two months previously, the general public were much more open to the idea of European integration, and there was no demonization of the establishment in the same way as there was in 2016.

Ultimately, the 2016 referendum resulted in a different outcome to the 1975 referendum largely due to the fact that the institutions themselves were entirely different entities. Similarly, social factors prevalent in the 2016 referendum were not such an issue in 1975, with leading anti-Marketeers failing to get to the hearts of the British people in the same way that figures such as Farage and Johnson did in 2016. The Remain campaign had no answer for these social or institutional issues, and struggled to match them in the big televised debates. Finally, the way in which the campaigns were run were fundamentally different, with 2016 seeing many more controversies, shouting matches and misinformation than in 1975, effectively resulting in the Leave campaign managing to get their short, harsh messages across far better than the Remain side.

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Evaluate and account for the success of radical right neo-populist parties in Western Europe in recent years.

William Saunders

Recent years have seen the insurgency of radical right neo-populist parties (RRPs) in Western Europe. From the electoral support won by the PVV in the Netherlands and the Front National in France, to the result of the UK's EU referendum - which, despite not strictly being a formal endorsement of a party, was an endorsement of UKIP's existential issue-position - parties espousing a populist agenda of social conservatism and strong law and order have risen in strength, moving ever closer to forming governments of their own. There is much controversy over the explanatory factors in these successes, with academic literature engaging in a hotly contested debate on the matter.

Discussing in greatest detail the case of the Front National (FN) in France, though drawing comparisons with RRPs in other West-European countries where appropriate, I will argue that the "winners-vs-losers" hypothesis advanced by Kriesi et al (2006) among others, characterised by Mudde (2010) as the "normal pathology" thesis, is, as Mudde argues, misguided, as it regards support for RRPs as a pathology inexplicable under "normal" circumstances. Instead, using data from the European Social Survey and Eurobarometer, I will argue that there has been little underlying value change, but that contingent events have increased the salience of these values. This will largely agree with Kriesi et al's hypothesised ascendancy of the cultural dimension in a two-dimensional political space, but will reject the "winners-vs-losers" model's role in explaining it. Further, I will contend that, as Mudde argues, the supply-side has also been of critical importance, as radical-right parties have cast off much of their extreme image from old, disassociating themselves from fascism, and thus meeting demand that already existed. Finally, I will posit that the actions of mainstream parties are significant in raising the salience of issues that RRPs thrive on, and in giving them issue-ownership thereof.

To begin, it is important to briefly distinguish between the neo-populist radical-right and the 'extreme' radical-right. The latter "identified themselves with the politics of the boot-boys and

spoke the language of the street", while the former are "dressed in sharps suits and talk the language of the legislatures in which they have won seats" (Taggart, 1996, p.12). The distinction is not just sartorial, however: the new radical-right parties espouse an ideology which "albeit fundamentally anti-liberal, is compatible with the basic formal principles of democracy" (Betz & Johnson, 2004, p.311), supporting "procedural democracy" (Rydgren, 2007, p.43), in a way its predecessors did and do not.

Mudde (2007) divides the explanatory factors of the radical-right's resurgence into two categories: the demand- and supply-sides, the first including factors external to party politics that increase demand amongst voters for RRPs; the second refers to factors relating broadly to political opportunity structures. Earlier literature (Kriesi et al, 2006) not only gives greater weight to the demand side, but also an approach to it that Mudde (2010, p.1167) disputes and describes as the "normal pathology" thesis. Mudde asserts that this approach refuses, for not entirely apolitical reasons, to understand the radical-right's success using mainstream explorative theories and methods, instead insisting it a phenomenon impossible in normal circumstances. The correct approach, Mudde argues, is his own: termed the "pathological normalcy" thesis, it posits that RRPs' success is "first and foremost, explained by the struggle over issue saliency and positions". That is to say, there is, in entirely normal circumstances, agreement with the new RRPs' issue-positions, and their success relates to the greater saliency of the issues they favour, as opposed to any fundamental shift in values, though Mudde does recognise the importance of the demand-side.

Inglehart & Norris (2016) break down the demand-side further still, delineating two strands: first, that articulated by Kriesi et al (2006), arguing in favour of a dichotomous "winners-vs-losers" reaction to economic globalisation being of primary importance; and second, a theory of "cultural "backlash" (Inglehart & Norris, 2016, p.3), that explains RRPs' success as a "silent counter-revolution" (Ignazi, 1992) against the progressive cultural values of increasing prevalence that Inglehart (1977;2008) described as a "silent revolution".

If the globalisation approach is to hold, then changes should be demonstrable in agreement with the core values of RRPs, as its implication is that the "winners-vs-losers" effect of globalisation effects value change; these values should thus ebb and flow, and correspond to rises in electoral support for RRPs. Authoritative sources for testing this include the European

Social Survey (ESS) and Eurobarometer (EB). Among multitudinous other questions, the ESS asks respondents of the value they place on adherence to traditions and customs.[204] This is important, as appeals to traditional cultural values embody the ideological spine of RRPs in Europe. (Eremina & Seredenko, 2015, p.7; Zaslove, 2004, p.72)

The response to this question was revealing. From 2002 to 2014 (ESS), in six countries where RRPs have made varying degrees of progress, there was little value change. (Table 1) In no case had the percentage of respondents who expressed any degree of preference for traditional customs changed by any more than 2%, nor was there any significant change in strength of preference. In France, where FN support in regional elections increased from 14.7% to 27.73% (2004-15), there was virtually no change, this proportion of ESS respondents declining from 74.5% to 73.8%. Similarly, whilst the Danish People's Party increased its vote from 12% to 21.1%, the proportion of Danish respondents who expressed a preference for traditional values changed by only 0.4%; changes were also negligible in the UK, Sweden, the Netherlands and Germany, despite significant increases in support for RRPs.

Similarly, in each of these countries, there was little change in those expressing preference for a government that is "strong and ensures safety",[205] which appears largely analogous to support for the principle of strong law and order at the heart of RRPs' platform. (Mudde, 2012, p.8; Rydgren, 2007, pp.242-3) Only the UK and Denmark saw increases of above 2%. (7.6% and 3.8%, respectively). In respect to globalisation,[206] whilst a longitudinal comparison is not possible due to the recency of the question first being asked, attitudes varied across countries,

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[204] Full question: "Ha-u. Now I will briefly describe some people. Please listen to each description and tell me how much each person is or is not like you. Use this card for your answer. Tradition is important to her/him. She/he tries to follow the customs handed down by her/his religion or her/his family." Responses offered/received: "Very much like me"; "Like me"; "Somewhat like me"; "A little like me"; "Not like me"; "Not like me at all"; Refusal; "Don't know"; No answer". Data weighted as per ESS recommendation with design and post-stratification weights.

[205] Full question: "Now I will briefly describe some people. Please listen to each description and tell me how much each person is or is not like you. Use this card for your answer. It is important to her/him that the government ensures her/his safety against all threats. She/he wants the state to be strong so it can defend its citizens." Responses offered/received: "Very much like me"; "Like me"; "Somewhat like me"; "A little like me"; "Not like me"; "Not like me at all"; Refusal; "Don't know"; No answer

[206] Full question: "Could you please tell me for each of the following, whether the term brings to mind something very positive, fairly positive, fairly negative or very negative?" "Globalisation". Responses offered/received: "Very positive"; "Fairly positive"; "Fairly negative"; "Very negative"; "Don't know".

casting further doubt on the "globalisation" approach, as globalisation was viewed far more positively in Denmark (74% positive; 17% negative), as compared to the United Kingdom (51% positive; 17% negative) and Germany (50% positive; 40% negative), despite the Danish People's Party achieving much greater success than any equivalents in the UK or Germany.

The impossibility of a longitudinal comparison for the third of these three surveys renders it only very basic evidence, but when combined with the earlier two, significant difficulty is posed to the globalisation hypothesis, as globalisation neither seems to have increased preference for RRP-associated values over time, nor explains differing levels of support for RRPs between countries. Mudde (2007, pp.203-5) offers a more substantive rebuttal, describing evidence proposed to support the globalisation thesis as failing to explain differences between countries, often "contradictory", and ultimately showing that the support of RRPs comprises both "winners" and "losers" of globalisation, yet only a small proportion of all existing "losers". Lubbers, Gijsberts and Scheepers (2002, as cited in Inglehart & Norris, 2016, p.12) do demonstrate that, at individual level, support for RRPs is stronger among those more likely to be "losers", but Inglehart and Norris (ibid) explain that this did not operate on the international level: it was not shown that countries with higher proportions of "losers" saw more success for RRPs. Further, support for RRPs among social groups traditionally associated with RRP support by the "globalisation" thesis varies across different nations(Kitschelt & McGann, 1995, p.77; Inglehart & Norris, 2016, p.12), and unemployment has, in fact, a *negative* impact on support for RRPs. (Arzheimer & Carter, 2006, p.439)

More convincing is what is termed by Inglehart and Norris the "cultural backlash" thesis. Inglehart (2008) describes a shift in values with more expressive, socially permissive values becoming more prevalent in each generation. However, as Ignazi (1992, p.6) observes, the new radical-right, the "unwanted" child of this value-change, has risen against the postmaterial-left's permissivism. Some evidence supports this: Lubbers et al (2002, p.371) demonstrate that countries with a greater number of EU nationals see higher levels of support for RRPs, while Curtice (2016) demonstrated that, in the case of the UK referendum on EU membership, recognition of the economic benefits of membership was accompanied by considerable concern for its cultural consequences, the significance of which is clear given the UK's

subsequent "Leave" vote. However, as evidenced above, values relating to tradition and authoritarianism have not drastically changed since 2002, so it seems more likely that the story of the "cultural backlash" thesis is told by increased salience of issues connected to these values, rather than any demonstrable shift in the values themselves.

It should also be considered that the two demand-side theses are related, as Inglehart and Norris (2016, p.3) suggest. As they argue, heightened economic insecurity may lead to a turn toward exclusionary cultural values. However, Lubbers et al (2002, p.371) demonstrated that unemployment had a *negative* impact upon support for RRPs. This does not discount Inglehart and Norris's theory of linkage - Lubbers et al themselves concede that this dynamic may be an exclusionary one of voters wishing to hold on to what they have - but it does pose problems for the "globalisation" thesis in general, as this rests on the presumption that the negative economic impacts of globalisation are driving its "losers" to vote for RRPs, when, in fact, countries with a greater number of supposed "losers" are less likely to evince support for RRPs. Overall, while demand-side theses are in no way irrelevant, they are "best left to explain the existence of populist radical right attitudes at the mass level, not the electoral success of populist radical right parties." (Mudde, 2010, 1179)

To explain this requires an investigation of the supply-side. Mudde (2010, p.1179) here offers the most succinct exposition, arguing "the success and failure of populist radical right parties is, first and foremost, explained by the struggle over issue saliency and positions". Therein, Mudde (2007, pp.232, 256) delineates two facets: the internal, describing the conduct of RRPs themselves; and external, discussing the broader political opportunity structures.

The first internal factor to discuss is that of ideology, (Ibid, p.258) , where RRPs have achieved a fundamental ideological reinvention as a 'new' radical-right, a more moderate departure from the 'old' extremist parties, who tended to adopt more fascistic positions.

This has been integral to RRPs' success, as voters are more likely to lend their support to a radical-right party if they perceive them as 'normal' or 'legitimate'. (Halikiopoulou et al, 2013,

p.11) To perceive a party as such, they need not agree with its broader ideas, but must recognise its compatibility with "baseline national values", which usually includes respect for democracy, and preference for peace. This is particularly significant, as it describes the hurdle any RRP must clear before even being considered by most voters; they must disassociate themselves from "fascist, antidemocratic ... unconstitutional legacies". (Ibid) This is helpful in explaining the recent rise in support for the Front National, whose electoral fortunes increased sharply after long-time leader Jean-Marie Le Pen was replaced by daughter Marine in 2011. There was, following this, a sea-change in the FN's rhetoric, with the new leader extending a "friendly hand" to minorities the party had previously disenfranchised; "being French" was all that mattered now, according to the leader. (Dumitrescu, 2015, p.3) Additionally, there was a move away from the senior Le Pen's fond remembrance of Vichy France, symbolising a rejection of fascism, attempting to abandon its image as a "defender of the lost causes of the traditional far Right". (Goldhammer, 2015, p.135) Marine Le Pen also recognised the Holocaust's barbarism, something perennially denied by her father. (Mayer, 2013, p.175) Fundamentally, these changes reflect an attempt to move the party in line with "baseline national values", increasing its legitimacy. Indeed, in 2013, the proportion of French voters who saw the FN as a threat to democracy dropped below 50% for the first time ever. (France 24, 2013) When considered in juxtaposition to the relatively stagnant values amongst the French public discussed above, this appears to indicate support for the supply-side thesis: demand may have long preexisted the supply of a party willing to renounce (or at least appear to) the extreme-right principles of the FN's past, in favour of the 'new' radical right, which the FN finally met with supply.

Similar analyses can be made of the success of UKIP, who went from a 3.1% vote-share in 2010, when their manifesto was the target more of derision than alarm, to a 12.6% share in 2015. The latter result was achieved despite the Conservative Party appropriating their existential policy of pledging a referendum on membership of the European Union; and, though not a vote for UKIP per se, the subsequent victory for "Leave" a year later cannot be entirely separated from the forces exploited by UKIP in pursuit of its goals. Goodwin and Ford (2011) wrote of their advantages over the BNP: "UKIP also has an important advantage over the BNP – it is not tainted by a violent, fascist past. Free of extremist baggage, it is able to appeal to groups of voters such as women who regard the BNP as unacceptably extreme." This

bears a quite striking similarity to Mayer's (2013, p.163) work on the FN, which argues that key to the FN's success has been its ability to close the gender gap that sees women reject 'extreme' parties, "particularly those like the French National Front still associated with the pre-war extreme right". Of course, RRPs narrowing of the gender gap in their support is not the only success of their altered branding, but it provides an epitome of how changing their public ideology helped them supply a pre-existing demand. Indeed, it could be argued that RRPs' success has been enhanced by an approach of presenting trends of recent years as threats to the "baseline national values" that Halikiopoulou et al (2013, p.11) present the radical-right's perceived ambivalence toward as being such a hurdle in the past. From UKIP's criticism of the EU as a threat to the democratic system, to the Front National's presentation of Islamic migration as corrosive to their own country's sacred secularism and democracy (Zaretsky, 2016; La Libre, 2012), and the AfD's portrayal of mass immigration as dangerous to peace and order (Wagstyl, 2016), modern RRPs have become increasingly adept at presenting trends of recent years that invigorate the demand-side to present themselves, on the supply-side, as the only defenders of the baseline values that once disbarred them. This is a key example of how demand-side events can and have restructured supply-side behaviours.

Another aspect of the internal supply-side is the impact of leadership. A common trope is the prevalence of charismatic leaders amongst RRPs, but their impact is overstated; a not insignificant number of RRPs have prospered without charismatic leaders, and others have floundered with them. There is evidence that charismatic leadership is important at certain times, especially in the "breakthrough" stage of an RRP's life (Mudde, 2007, pp.261-2), but charisma is only the 'external' form of effective leadership (Ibid) , and more important may be its 'internal' counterpart of party management, the organisational factors of which are suggested to be particularly significant after the "breakthrough" stage, in that of "electoral persistence". Leadership, however, is an aspect not worth dwelling on, as the key concepts are ambiguous, perhaps even "tautological". (van der Brug et al, 2005, p.542)

The final internal supply-side factor is that of organisation. Whilst it is accepted that organisation is an important element of RRPs' electoral success, Mudde (2007, p.264) asserts that this importance is observed in the *persistence* stage, as opposed to the *breakthrough*. As he

details, there have been numerous RRPs outside of Western Europe who have achieved excellent results, with little to no party organisation. Indeed, there is some evidence that RRPs who achieve modest, initial electoral success, including the FN in the late 1990s (Ibid, p.266), and UKIP after 2004 (Abedi & Lundberg, 2009), are more likely to experience organisational breakdown in the wake of this success. However, despite the "cautionary note" Williams offered in 2011 (p.692), that the FN, in the wake of Marine Le Pen's ascension to the leader, "continues to struggle to maintain its presently successful internal balance", the party has gone from strength to strength in the five years since, and Ivaldi (2016) describes its improved membership and growing "sub-national middle-level elite", as of July 2015. Under Le Pen, office-seeking has also been prioritised (ibid), a typically tricky balancing act for RRPs, who must always be cautious not to alienate their base support in pursuit of office. Not only is this due to the danger of the requisite de-extremification losing votes in the hardline base, but the necessary professionalisation, by its very nature, is feared by many as a threat to the anti-establishment message that RRPs thrive on. (Tournier-Sol, 2015a, p.150) Across the Channel, UKIP have adopted some elements of modernisation (Goodwin, 2014), and the improvement of its independently audited 2015 manifesto on the 2010 predecessor, which attracted derision for several bizarre policy proposals (Mason, 2014), is not only demonstrative of UKIP's process of institutionalisation (Tournier-Sol, 2015b, p.4), but also symbolic of the similar organisational change to undergo RRPs in recent years. This may represent a transition analogous, if not yet to the FN's shift to office-seeking potential under Marine Le Pen stated above, then at least to something resembling electoral persistence; whilst there was little from UKIP's 2010 general election showing to maintain, the 2015 general election came only a year after the 2014 European elections, in which the party were the first in more than a century to defeat both the Conservative and Labour Parties in a national election. Both UKIP and the FN have also expanded to offer policy on the economy, not just immigration.

Interestingly, RRPs frequently have among the best websites of any party in their country. (Mudde, 2007, p.259) This increasing proclivity to embrace internet campaigning is a smart move for RRPs: whilst "mass media adhere to professional norms and news values", social media offer populist politicians "direct linkage to the people". (Erngesser et al 2016, p.2) Given that RRPs tend to have comparatively low memberships (Mudde, 2007, p.268), the rise of social media, and concomitant advent of increasingly targeted advertising techniques therein, it

is not outlandish to speculate that a factor in RRPs' recent success has been the opportunity afforded them to overcome low membership (and thus activist) numbers by using social media to have more direct interactions with voters instead of traditional canvassing. At the very minimum, this new medium allows populists to "circumvent the media institutions and journalistic gatekeepers" who would otherwise cross-examine them, allowing them to instead deliver messages that "do not have to follow the news values and are frequently more personal and sensationalistic in nature". (Erngesser et al, 2016, p.5)

It seems axiomatic that strong organisation is conducive to improved electoral prospects, and the changes undergone by UKIP and the FN that are typical of similar modernisations in other Western European RRPs appear unlikely to be unrelated to their success of late. However, the qualitative, subjective nature of any research into this, and the guarded attitude of RRPs over allowing access to any outsider to investigate their internal mechanisms (Mudde, 2007, p.267), mean that it is impossible to speak of any trends that apply to West-European RRPs' internal organisation and its impact on their success more specifically than to say that the former has broadly improved at the same time as the latter.

The more convincing supply-side facet is the *external*, covering political opportunity structures, the first of which to be discussed here is the institutional context, largely given over to electoral systems. In the case of the Front National, though the single-member-plurality electoral system has always constrained their success significantly, they have, as with other RRPs, been sustained by the existence of second-order elections, existing in political system with much more fragmented loci of power than in the past. (Gallagher, 2005, p.552) The advent of elections to the European Parliament has offered RRPs not just another second-order election to sustain their momentum, but one that elects representatives to a Parliament of some grandeur, as opposed to the dreary buildings of local authorities. Crucially, these elections, proportional by decree, have handed RRPs in countries otherwise operating majoritarian systems the opportunity to be competitive on the national level. Small, anti-EU parties perform substantially better in European Parliament elections than national ones (Hix & Marsh, 2007, p.506), and RRPs, usually smaller than mainstream rivals, generally adopt Eurosceptic, if nuanced, positions. (see: Vasilopoulou, 2011). A key motif of RRPs is the dichotomy they

portray of a "corrupt" establishment (Inglehart & Norris, 2016, p.6), against the virtuous 'people'. Certainly, the ability of Nigel Farage to go to what he illustrated as the temple of the former, claiming to speak on behalf of the latter was no hindrance to his party's communication of their anti-establishment message. Second-order elections, however, are interpreted by Arzheimer & Carter (2006, p.423) as subsidiary to a decentralisation facet, not electoral systems, and it seems reasonable to consider European elections opposite but similar. Aside from observing that the threshold system used in Germany has, until now,[207] successfully prevented the incursion of the radical-right into the *Bundestag*, I will not here discuss in detail the effect of different electoral systems at the national level, as whilst they are undoubtedly crucial in understanding the differing success of RRPs, there has been little change in them in recent years, and they are thus not germane to explaining RRPs' rise in this specific period.

Of much greater importance, however is the political context, which mainly comprises the actions of other parties. As Rooduijn (2015, p.7) details, increasing volatility has contributed to RRP success in Western Europe, though he categorises it as a demand-side factor, which has some merit, given that it operates on the basic level of what voters look for. Certainly, volatility is a prerequisite for any RRP - or indeed any other party - to break through, but Pedersen Index data (Leuven University) reveals it is not of primary explanatory importance: as with the UK in 1997, countries have experienced equal or greater electoral volatility in the past, without RRPs benefiting.[208] Whilst volatility is necessary for any party wishing to break through, the radical right is not its sole beneficiary; dealigned voters may choose any party.

The more significant facet of the political context is the behaviour of mainstream parties, both predating and in reaction to the niche threat of RRPs. Conventional wisdom (Betz, 1994; Kriesi, 1995; both as cited in Mudde, 2007, p.238) argues mainstream-party convergence, and the stigmatising of certain issues (immigration, in the case of RRPs) created political opportunity for new parties. However, there is disagreement over the application of this framework: Ignazi (1992) argues that mainstream convergence benefits RRPs only after a stage

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[207] Current polling (Forsa, 2016; IPSOS, 2016) shows the *Alternative für Deutschland* party comfortably breaking the 5% threshold in the upcoming German federal election, to be held in autumn 2017.

[208] E.g. Netherlands 1994, 1998, 2006; Sweden 1998, 2002, 2006; Germany 2013

of polarisation. Regardless, evidence indicates that, in recent years, the resurgence of RRPs in some countries not others can be attributed in no small part to the actions of mainstream parties. The central debate here is that of the effect of "copying"; in some cases, RRPs have been hindered by mainstream parties appropriating their policy and rhetoric, while in others it appears to have helped them. (Mudde, 2007, p.241) The solution to this conundrum is issue ownership: where the RRP is seen as the party most capable of 'handling' the issue, the increased salience afforded to said issue by a mainstream party appropriating it benefits the radical-right party. (Ibid, pp.241-2; Meguid, 2005, p.349) Bornschier (2011, pp.128-9) argues co-opting a radical-right party's agenda once institutionalised is much more difficult for a centre-right competitor. However, he departs from Meguid's analysis, and instead justifies this with the assertion that the reaction of the mainstream *left* is of supreme importance; if the mainstream left adopts a universalistic, pro-multiculturalism position, it increases the salience of the immigration issue, and voters will ultimately trust, to quote Jean-Marie Le Pen, "the original, not the copy", as it constitutes (Bornschier) a "more credible counter-pole". This can be seen in France, where FN issue-ownership of immigration can be traced back to polarisation by the mainstream left in the 1980s, which was followed by indecision on the part of the mainstream right, allowing the cultural dimension to grow in salience, and the FN to claim ownership of the issue. (Ibid, p.134) The 2007 elections saw a marked drop in support for the FN, however Bornschier (ibid, p.136) attributes their extremely strong 2002 showing to the mainstream right's convergence with the left in a universalistic position. The drop in the 2007 elections, then, must be viewed in light of the unusually favourable conditions in the preceding election, as the UMP, under Sarkozy, managed in 2007 to recover some of the votes it had lost to the FN through a hardline stance on immigration-related issues. (Ivaldi, 2016). This is substantiated by more recent events, as, after a wave of terrorist attacks committed in France by migrants, the FN continues to strengthen, despite attempts by the UMP to appear ever tougher on immigration-associated issues.

Bornschier's 2011 contribution compares France to Germany, hypothesising as to why Germany had not seen the rise of an RRP. He argues that, whilst the mainstream right had got across the issue of immigration in 1980s, at the same time as their counterparts in France, the crucial difference was in the reaction of the left: instead of increasing the issue's salience, by vocally advocating universalistic positions, the mainstream left responded to the mainstream

right's raising of the immigration issue by dismissing it instead. (Ibid, p.139) However, it may be observed that, since 2011, the AfD has strengthened, and now seems almost certain to break into the *Bundestag* for the first time in 2017. This does not disprove Bornschier's theory, however; rather, it simply demonstrates that there may be limits upon how far the mainstream right's grip upon an issue can hold, as the bulk of the AfD's current support has come since Angela Merkel instigated an open-door policy that has seen more than a million migrants arrive in the country in the space of a year.

Arzheimer and Carter (2006, p.439) find that the position of the mainstream *right* party is a strong predictor of RRP success, but Bornschier (ibid, p.127) explains that this may be the case because of difference in strategies for preventing RRPs' breakthrough from those for containing their success.

Ultimately, this constitutes a factor that transcends the supply-demand divide, as it demonstrates how the incipient success of RRPs has been contributed to by a supply-side conflict altering the demand-side. It partially endorses Kriesi et al's thesis, as it demonstrates the growing salience of the cultural divide in a two-dimensional space, but it does not substantiate the globalisation element of their theory.

In conclusion, the success of neo-populist radical-right parties in recent years is best explained not by any thesis of globalisation's economic drawbacks, but instead by a duet of a cultural backlash and supply-side factors, the most prominent of which is the ability the radical-right has shown itself to have in altering its image to cast off fascist connections. Trends of modernisation, in particular increased immigration, have allowed radical-right parties to position themselves not just as compatible with basic values, but instead as their sole defenders. One of these being democracy, they have been aided by elections to the European Parliament, which have allowed them to portray the Brussels government as distant, in contravention of democratic principle, and thus itself an enemy of sacred democratic principle. As shown, these trends have not increased agreement with RRPs' fundamental values, but instead increased the salience of associated issues.

TABLES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY OVERLEAF

Tables

Table 1 - European Social Survey 2002 & 2014 - "Important to follow tradition and customs".

Full question: "Ha-u. Now I will briefly describe some people. Please listen to each description and tell me how much each person is or is not like you. Use this card for your answer. Tradition is important to her/him. She/he tries to follow the customs handed down by her/his religion or her/his family." Responses offered/received: "Very much like me"; "Like me"; "Somewhat like me"; "A little like me"; "Not like me"; "Not like me at all"; Refusal; "Don't know"; No answer". Data weighted as per ESS recommendation with design and post-stratification weights.

France	2002	2014		Germany	2002	2014
Very much like me	18.7	16.1		Very much like me	15.9	12.3
Like me	19.7	20.1		Like me	27.1	31.6
Somewhat like me	17.3	15.3		Somewhat like me	24	23.6
A little like me	18.8	22.3		A little like me	16.2	15.5
Not like me	16.7	16.1		Not like me	11.6	11.6
Not like me at all	8.9	10		Not like me at all	5.3	5.4
Total				Total		
Total with tradition preference	74.5	73.8		Total with tradition preference	83.2	83
United Kingdom	2002	2014		**Sweden**	2002	2014
Very much like me	17.7	17.9		Very much like me	11.6	11.8
Like me	26.4	30.1		Like me	24.1	24.8
Somewhat like me	17.9	18.6		Somewhat like me	27.2	24
A little like me	17.3	14.7		A little like me	18.4	19.4
Not like me	15.6	14.5		Not like me	13.9	14.3
Not like me at all	5.1	4.2		Not like me at all	4.8	5.8
Total				Total		
Total with tradition preference	79.3	81.3		Total with tradition preference	81.3	80
Netherlands	2002	2014		**Denmark**	2002	2014
Very much like me	12.2	11.5		Very much like me	24.1	20.4
Like me	32	31.5		Like me	30.2	30.2
Somewhat like me	27.8	29.3		Somewhat like me	19.4	21.6
A little like me	16.8	15		A little like me	13.1	14.2
Not like me	8.6	9.7		Not like me	9.6	9.6
Not like me at all	2.6	3		Not like me at all	3.7	4
Total				Total		
Total with tradition preference	88.8	87.3		Total with tradition preference	86.8	86.4

Table 2 - European Social Survey 2002 & 2014 - "Important that government is strong and ensures security".

Full question: "Now I will briefly describe some people. Please listen to each description and tell me how much each person is or is not like you. Use this card for your answer. It is important to her/him that the government ensures her/his safety against all threats. She/he wants the state to be strong so it can defend its citizens." Responses offered/received: "Very much like me"; "Like me"; "Somewhat like me"; "A little like me"; "Not like me"; "Not like me at all"; Refusal; "Don't know"; No answer

France	2002	2014		Germany	2002	2014
Very much like me	31.6	25.4		Very much like me	27.4	25.8
Like me	24.9	29.5		Like me	34.8	42.7
Somewhat like me	19.5	20.1		Somewhat like me	20.6	17.7
A little like me	14.3	15.7		A little like me	10.6	7.9
Not like me	6.7	6.7		Not like me	5.6	5.2
Not like me at all	3	2.6		Not like me at all	1.1	0.8
Total				Total		
Total for strong government	90.3	90.7		Total for strong government	93.4	94.1

United Kingdom	2002	2014		Sweden	2002	2014
Very much like me	23.6	28.4		Very much like me	12.3	13.3
Like me	35.5	41.8		Like me	26	30.9
Somewhat like me	18.8	15.9		Somewhat like me	26	24.6
A little like me	14.2	9.8		A little like me	19.9	17
Not like me	6.4	3.2		Not like me	12.6	11.8
Not like me at all	1.6	0.9		Not like me at all	3.2	2.4
Total				Total		
Total for strong government	92.1	95.9		Total for strong government	84.2	85.8

Netherlands	2002	2014		Denmark	2002	2014
Very much like me	11.9	13.3		Very much like me	13.4	16.9
Like me	36.9	35.6		Like me	25.2	34.6
Somewhat like me	32.7	33		Somewhat like me	21.2	20.3
A little like me	13	12.8		A little like me	20.5	16.1
Not like me	4.4	3.7		Not like me	14.7	9.1
Not like me at all	1.1	1.7		Not like me at all	5	3
Total				Total		
Total for strong government	94.5	94.7		Total for strong government	80.3	87.9

Table 3 - Eurobarometer May 2016 - Globalisation

Full question: "Could you please tell me for each of the following, whether the term brings to mind something very positive, fairly positive, fairly negative or very negative?" "Globalisation". Responses offered/received: "Very positive"; "Fairly positive"; "Fairly negative"; "Very negative"; "Don't know".

France	2016
Total positive	34
Total negative	55
UK	2016
Total positive	51
Total negative	34
Netherlands	2016
Total positive	52
Total negative	33
Germany	2016
Total positive	50
Total negative	40
Sweden	2016
Total positive	70
Total negative	24
Denmark	2016
Total positive	74
Total negative	17

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