Gender mainstreaming in international security: Empowering women or facilitating US empire-building?¹

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This paper is a work in progress.

Introduction

This paper aims to investigate the implications of mainstreaming gender in conflict and conflict resolution (as a result of UN Security Council Resolution 1325) for women, transnational feminism and the global geo-political order. Based on interviews with US and UK officials and representatives of NGOs and multilateral organizations working on women’s empowerment in the context of Iraq, my paper identifies the emergence of a transnational discourse about ‘gender-mainstreaming’ and/or ‘women’s empowerment’ in situations of war and conflict and investigates how this is implemented with regards to Iraq. I argue that gender mainstreaming in international security constructs new networks for governing international security that facilitate the reproduction of the geo-political hierarchy, rather than challenging it.

¹ This paper is based on data collected for a British Academy-funded project entitled, ‘The role of women and gender in the political transition in Iraq’, conducted 2004-2007 in collaboration with Nadje Al-Ali, SOAS.
UNSCR 1325 and gender mainstreaming in international security

The passage of UN Security Resolution 1325, on ‘Women, Peace and Security’, in 2000, ushered in a new era of concern by the international community for women and gender in war and conflict. The resolution was the result of intense lobbying over several years by a coalition of international NGOs/movements, including many within the international women’s movement (Cockburn 2007; Cohn 2008). These actors, making up the NGO Working Group, were ‘concerned with women and war: the terrible things that happen to women in war; the failure of the UN and the international humanitarian aid community to meet women’s needs; the exclusion of women from peace processes; and the failure to see and acknowledge the incredibly hard organizing and peace-building work that women in war zones undertake’ (Cohn 2008).

The resolution, passed unanimously at a special meeting of the security council in October 2000, seeks to mainstream an official sensitivity to gender within UN institutions, as well as the decision-making processes of all governments, with regard to conflict resolution, peace-keeping and peace-building; to include more women in all institutions involved with the prevention, management and resolution of conflict; and to protect the rights of women, particularly an end to gender-based violence, in wartime (United Nations Security Council 2000). Many supporters of the resolution have welcomed the fact that women are not only considered as victims, in need of protection, but also as ‘agents of change’, who are key actors in rebuilding war-torn communities and ensuring peace (Cohn 2008). Much has also been made of
the fact that this is the first time that the UN Security Council acknowledges gender within international security concerns (Cohn 2008). Joan Rudduck MP, who helped to found Gender Action for Peace and Security—GAPS—a coalition of civil society groups that monitors the UK government’s implementation of UNSCR 1325, echoes comments by many concerned with women’s empowerment internationally, when she told me at the end of 2006, ‘1325 is ground-breaking and I’m amazed that it passed’.

It should be noted that UNSCR 1325—although emanating from the highest decision-making body of the UN—does not contain the monitoring and accountability mechanisms that other UN instruments, such as CEDAW (the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women), includes. It merely ‘urges’ ‘encourages’ ‘requests’ ‘invites’, etc. Nevertheless, the fact that it is a UN Security Council Resolution gives it a moral force and makes it potentially an important advocacy tool for improving the lives of women in conflict zones and ensuring women’s participation in conflict resolution and peace building.

Until now, criticisms of 1325 fall into two main categories—criticisms over its implementation (or lack thereof) and criticisms over the language of the resolution and what this entails for women’s agency and protection in conflict. The criticisms over implementation include the failure of the UN to systemize gender mainstreaming, lack of knowledge amongst UN workers about how to gender mainstream in security, lack of senior gender advisors, lack of resources dedicated to institutionalising gender expertise within the UN, a lack
of clarity about where responsibility for gender mainstreaming lies, lack of resources dedicated to monitoring and evaluation of gender mainstreaming (Hill, Cohn et al. 2004) as well as difficulties of ensuring accountability for the implementation of 1325 (Cook 2009). This has resulted in the continued failure of 1325 to meet its goals. Almost ten years since its passage, we find that less than 45 per cent of peace agreements signed since 1325 include any mention of women or gender (Aroussi 2009). Women continue to be excluded from or marginalized in peace negotiations and conflict resolution in the Congo (Women's Initiative for Gender Justice 2009), Iraq (Al-Ali and Pratt 2009) and Nepal (Upreti 2008: 8), amongst others. Violence against women in conflict continues to go largely unpunished in Mexico and Burundi (Grillenzoni 2009), Iraq (Al-Ali and Pratt 2009), Afghanistan (United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan and Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 2009), amongst others.

Criticisms over the language of the resolution focus on the notions of femininity and the nature of the international system represented in the resolution’s text, as well as the resolution’s absences. As Carol Cohn argues, whilst the resolution recognises women as victims of war as well as builders of peace, it does not condemn war itself (Cohn 2008) and leaves intact the whole international security architecture in which the use or threat of violence is perceived as legitimate (Cohn 2008) or as a ‘domestic matter’ (such as, in cases of small fire arms use in countries deemed to be ‘at peace’) (Santos 2009). In addition, the resolution essentialises women (Gibbings 2005; Shepherd 2008), and reproduces the international system of states, thereby
'fail[ing] to achieve the transformations of subjectivity and community that are sought in Resolution 1325' (Shepherd 2008: 164).

Despite these limitations and omissions of 1325, activists, practitioners and policy makers are using 1325 to frame policies, to allocate resources and to identify entitlements. For example, the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, which was central to lobbying for the resolution, has made 1325 one of its key campaigning tools. As Carol Cohn outlines, women’s groups in conflict zones have used 1325 to make demands for their inclusion in structures of government, claims for resources to be directed to women’s special needs and for protection of women’s rights—particularly, with regard to violence against women (Cohn 2008). The UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office has an action plan to implement 1325 and has allocated resources towards that end. The UN Secretary General is mandated to write periodic reports about the situation of women and girls in conflict. Therefore, it is necessary to examine what are the implications of these measures and allocations of resources for women and gender relations and for peace and security. The first section of this paper examines the types of subjectivities produced by the resolution and its implications for women’s agency in situations of conflict. The second section examines how the resolution leads to the creation of new transnational networks that contribute to the reproduction of the geo-political hierarchy.

**Subjectivities, agency and interests**
‘[…] as a site at which discourses of (international) security and (gender) violence are in contact’ (Shepherd 2008: 6), UNSCR 1325 is implicated in the production of particular subjectivities. It has been argued that ‘UNSCR 1325 perpetuates a representation of women that inscribes an essential link between womanhood and “the prevention and resolution of conflicts … and peacebuilding” (UNSC 2000a: preamble)’ (Shepherd 2008: 118) and that it fixes women ‘as the eternally protected … [and] functions to define men as responsible for protecting “their” women and children and the nation as a whole’ (Shepherd 2008: 119). In other words, UNSCR 1325 participates in the reproduction of the binary of victim/heroeine that occurs in other areas of life, from public policy making to popular culture. We may think about the reproduction of these notions of womanhood as ‘regimes of truth that stipulate[ ] that certain kinds of gendered expressions [are] found to be false or derivative, and others, true and original’ (Butler 1999: viii). In this vein, Laura Shepherd argues that ‘reproducing these essentializing gender stereotypes is counterproductive and counterintuitive’ (Shepherd 2008: 120).

Whilst agreeing with Judith Butler that production of an essentialised gender identity is problematic for the long-term construction of an emancipatory politics (Butler 1999), nevertheless, as Gayatri Spivak argues, essentialisation may be a necessary step to enabling marginalised groups to formulate projects of transformation and act in solidarity (Spivak 1987). Therefore, whilst it is true that UNSCR 1325 essentialises women, this does not necessarily mean that such essentialisation is problematic for ensuring women’s agency nor that it forecloses projects of social and political transformation.
There are many examples to demonstrate how women have organized based on an essentialised gender identity (usually that of motherhood) to protest against war, occupation, dictatorship and other injustices, such as, the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo in Argentina, the Greenham Common women’s peace camp in the UK in the 1980s, Palestinian women resisting Israel’s occupation and Irish nationalist women opposing the IRA, (amongst others, see (Cockburn 2007): 210-211). Similarly, Shirouk Albayachi, an Iraqi women’s activist speaking at a meeting in Norwich, UK, August 2007, said:

At first … there were so many women wanting to form their own organizations to help their communities, to help rebuild Iraq. When we voted for the first time, I was so happy. Despite the violence and threats, women went out to vote. Women voted not for this party or that party, but for a better future and for democracy. Unfortunately, the reality was not as rosey as we were promised by George Bush or Tony Blair.

Even recognising that an essential feminine, ‘peace-loving’ nature does not exist, we can still note that in reality women make up a disproportionate number of care-givers and this fact alone has an impact on defining women’s interests (Tickner 1992). Women in post-conflict/conflict zones are often the most active in contributing to the reconstruction of their communities (Sorensen 1998), whilst their marginalisation in ‘high politics’ can work to render their attempts at talking to the ‘other side’ less threatening (Cockburn 1998). Reflecting the significance of women in peace building, UNSCR 1325 ‘calls on all actors involved, when negotiating and implementing peace
agreements, to adopt [...] measures that support local women’s peace initiatives and indigenous processes for conflict resolution, and that involve women in all of the implementation mechanisms of the peace agreements …’ (United Nations Security Council 2000).

UNSCR 1325 also seeks to increase women’s representation and support their role in peace building and conflict resolution. Resolution 1325 ‘urges Member States to ensure increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention, management, and resolutions of conflict’ as well as other articles calling for increasing women’s participation in UN structures and missions to conflict zones (United Nations Security Council 2000). Although no exact quotas are defined in 1325, many call for a guarantee of women’s representation in relevant decision-making bodies of at least 30 per cent, in line with the recommendations of the Beijing Platform for Action. Many liberal feminists believe that ensuring women’s inclusion in peace building and conflict resolution will not only end conflict but will ensure less conflict-prone societies (Hunt and Posa 2001). This, of course, is very essentialising and unverifiable in reality, as the case of post-invasion Iraq demonstrates.

In Iraq, following the US-led invasion, Iraqi women activists lobbied the Coalition Provisional Authority to ensure women’s participation in the Interim Governing Council and the transitional constitution. Aliya J., an Iraqi-Kurdish
woman activist and parliamentarian, told me during an interview in spring 2007,

This is the best thing that we achieved as women. We lobbied and protested on the streets. … we were pushing for women’s participation and we called a day of demonstrations to demand a quota of 40 per cent. We knew that we wouldn’t get 40 per cent but we got a compromise of 25 per cent in parliament and in the municipal councils.

This was despite the opposition of Bremer to the notion of women’s quotas and a lack of interest amongst male Iraqi politicians. The 25 per cent quota in parliament and municipal councils has been welcomed by many women activists. However, many Iraqi women are also wary of the 25 per cent quota. For example, in a seminar in Washington in 2005, Rend Rahim, then Iraqi ambassador to the US and a member of the former opposition in exile, answering my question about the opportunities and constraints for women in the constitution drafting process, stated: ‘… the issue is not just the percentage [of women]. Do you have women who believe in women’s rights? Are the women who are currently sitting on elected bodies, just ‘yes’ women for their political bosses? Do these women have moral clout to make their voices heard?’ (For a discussion of the quota issue see also, Al-Ali and Pratt 2009).

Divisions between different groups of women inside and outside parliament became clear with regards to the drafting of the constitution and the fate of Iraq’s unified personal status code, governing marriage, divorce, child custody
and inheritance for all Iraqi citizens. Roughly, women were split between those who supported maintaining the existing code (despite the fact that it is problematic) and those who supported placing personal status issues under religious jurisdiction. For example, Razan A. from the Islamic Union in Iraqi-Kurdistan, told me, ‘I believe that women need to improve themselves according to Islam and not by imitating other societies or cultures’. Meanwhile, Jawan K., head of a women right’s organisation, also in Iraqi Kurdistan, told me, ‘Women here have fought a lot to get their rights but women in the rest of Iraq are calling for more religion in public life and this threatens women’s rights and democracy’.

These different visions of women’s rights have been an obstacle to unifying the women’s movement and women parliamentarians. Attempts at forming a women’s caucus in parliament have focused on finding common ground – which necessarily means avoiding issues of determining women’s rights, as well as thorny issues in the relations between Iraq’s main political groupings.

Nevertheless, despite these differences and difficulties, women parliamentarians from both Islamist and secular political trends agree that the women’s quota in parliament represents an important gain for Iraqi women and they would certainly live with it than live without it. Sundus Abbas, an Iraqi women’s activist, told an audience in London in summer 2006, ‘We still support the quota because society needs to see women in decision-making positions.’ I would add, it is also a question of justice that women, whatever
their ideological or political orientations, are able to participate in political decision making.

The third aspect of essentialisation relates to the UNSCR 1325’s concern with violence against women and girls: it ‘calls on all parties to armed conflict to take special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse, and all other forms of violence in situations of armed conflict’ and ‘emphasizes the responsibility of all States to put an end to impunity and to prosecute those responsible for […] sexual and other violence against women and girls (United Nations Security Council 2000). Radical feminists have argued that male violence against women underpins patriarchy and is also a result of it (amongst others, see, Brownmiller 1975; Reardon 1985). Rape, domestic abuse, sexual harassment and prostitution, verbal aggression, amongst other examples, represent a continuum of male violence, crossing private/public divides, and joined by the thread of male privilege and women’s subordination (Kelly 1987). Radical feminists’ assertion of a link between patriarchy and violence is predicated on an essentialised notion of masculinity (and, implicitly, femininity) and an understanding of a universalized patriarchy (Shepherd 2008: 95). Nevertheless, radical feminist attention to male violence against women has helped to put the issue on the political agenda (rather than being perceived as a ‘private issue’). It has become an important issue for the transnational women’s movement, beginning with the petitioning of the UN Conference for Human Rights in Vienna in 1993 and resulting in the UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women in 1994 (Bunch,
Antrobus et al. 2001). Moreover, transnational feminist action also resulted in
the definition of rape and other types of sexual violence as a war crime in the
statutes of the International Criminal Court established in 1998. In the context
of Iraq, most women activists spoke about the particular vulnerabilities of
women to violence by all sorts of actors (government-linked militias,
insurgents and multinational forces) and it was one of the issues against
which women activists campaigned (Al-Ali and Pratt 2009). Their evaluation of
the reasons for violence against women varied from blaming the US-led
occupation to the emergence of al-Qaida in Iraq, and sometimes linking these
(Al-Ali and Pratt 2009). Moreover, the issue of protecting women from
violence was seen as paramount in enabling women to participate in the
public sphere.

In other words, despite the failures of UNSCR 1325 to present more nuanced
notions of womanhood, the resolution is also sufficiently ambiguous to enable
it to be used by activists who do not necessarily subscribe to essentialist
notions of gender identities. Indeed, historically, women’s activism beyond
white, Western, middle-class circles has tended to stress women’s multiple
identities and affiliations with particular nationalities, religions and other social
groupings (Jayawardena 1986; Badran 1995; Eisenstein 2004), amongst
others). Gender essentialism may be used in a strategic way to make claims
on the international community to support women’s participation in official
structures and to protect women’s rights—something which has been lacking
in the past. In anti-colonial struggles, conflicts and wars around the world,
women, despite their important public roles—from factory worker to
combatant—have often found themselves pushed back into the home or marginalized from official structures as soon as open hostilities cease (Jayawardena 1986; Sorensen 1998). Post-conflict reconstruction has often meant the construction of supposedly ‘traditional’ gender roles and relations as part of the post-war settlement, rather than the consolidation in gender role transformation that often accompanies war (Jacobson 1999; Meintjes, Pillay et al. 2001). UNSCR 1325 opens up the possibilities for women to make internationally legitimate claims to be officially recognised as part of any post-conflict settlement and for violations of women’s rights, particularly, violence against women, to be taken seriously by international and national actors.

The problem is less the discursive construction of particular gendered subjectivities within UNSCR 1325 than the ways that these are operationalised and instrumentalised by different actors and the power differentials between these actors. In the case of Iraq, women activists feel that the international community, including the US has largely abandoned their struggle to guarantee women’s rights in the constitution, due to US strategic needs to build alliances with particular Iraqi (male) political leaders (Susskind 2007; Al-Ali and Pratt 2009). However, whilst the case of Iraq demonstrates the gap between rhetoric and reality in terms of protecting women’s rights in war, nevertheless, the US and its allies have come to regularly use the language of ‘gender mainstreaming’ and ‘women’s empowerment’ as part of their foreign policy discourse. This ‘openness’ to issues of gender in questions of international security must be contextualised within the post-Cold War environment.
Globalization and new networks of governance through gender mainstreaming

With the end of the Cold War, global institutions have been unleashed from the stalemate that they endured as a result of the polarization between the two Cold War superpowers. As Edward Newman argues, ‘The end of the Cold War coincided with—and, to an extent, was intertwined with—a challenge to the state-centric, power-based concept of international politics that prioritised “high politics” above all else. The “changing context” appeared to have brought an increased opportunity to address “global” problems—among them ethnic strife, the management of weapons of mass destruction, environmental and population problems, illegal narcotics, and HIV/AIDS—at the international level, and a growing acceptance of a wider conception of peace and security” (Newman 2000: 8-9). The Cold War made global governance virtually impossible. The end of bipolarity coupled with the expansion of new communications technology has made international cooperation on a range of issues more feasible.

Simultaneously, the end of bipolarity has brought with it new threats to international security. Opposition to US hegemony coupled with a breakdown in previous global hierarchies has led to the spread of civil wars, the emergence of ‘rogue states’, ‘terrorist’ groups and crime syndicates (Stares 2000: 152-53) and the blurring of the boundaries between home front and battlefront, with their devastating impact upon civilian populations (Giles and Hyndman 2004). Writing in 2000, Paul Stares argues that, ‘New or non-
traditional security threats call for broader, deeper, and more durable forms of international cooperation—broader in that they have to be globally inclusive, deeper in that they require states to accept further limits on their sovereignty, and durable in that they have to be sustainable over the long term’ (Stares 2000: 156).

There was much hope amongst proponents of Resolution 1325 that it represented a new way of governing international security through a focus on human security rather than national security (Anderlini 2007). Yet, rather than challenging dominant ideas about international security, the language of the resolution actually contributes to the reproduction of a global order based on the authority of national sovereign states and the superiority of the ‘international community’ in guiding those national states that are experiencing conflict towards a state of non-conflict (Shepherd 2008). In addition, in the words of Carol Cohn, ‘Protecting women in war, and insisting that they have an equal right to participate in the processes and negotiations that end particular wars, both leave war itself in place’ (Cohn 2008).

However, even if UNSCR 1325 does not represent a challenge to realist security approaches, I argue that gender mainstreaming in international security may be considered a new mechanism of global governance: that is, a complex ‘embracing states, international institutions, transnational networks and agencies (both public and private)—which functions, with variable effect, to promote, regulate or intervene in the common affairs of humanity’ (Held and McGrew 2002: 1). The production of the resolution itself represents the
outcome of alliances between different NGOs, national governments and UN agencies (Cockburn 2007; Cohn 2008). Its implementation similarly relies upon such alliances. National and international NGOs, UN agencies, the World Bank, foreign government donors and diplomats and even foreign militaries are being brought into networks for the purpose of implementing 1325. A good example of such alliances/networks, is the UK-based GAPS (Gender Action on Peace and Security), which brings together international NGOs, consultancies, voluntary organizations and women’s groups and is informally networked with the Associate Parliamentary Group on Women, Peace and Security, which, in turn, ‘maintains productive relationships’ between the government and civil society with regards to the implementation of 1325 (Gender Action on Peace and Security (GAPS)). There is also overlapping networks with the UK cross-government action plan to implement 1325, which involves the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Ministry of Defence and the Department for International Development. In addition, UK-based NGOs and movements have their own transnational connections, with organizations in other countries and with UN agencies. And so on.

In the United States, I also found similar types of transnational networks around issues of ‘women’s empowerment’. When I visited Washington DC in the spring of 2005, I met an Iraqi woman ‘stuck’ in the US for 8 years due to immigration issues, who embodied this transnational connectivity.

I have been active in speaking out about women in Iraq. I’m not affiliated with any party. I have contact with Iraqi women here and in
Iraq who are similarly active on women’s issues in Iraq. … I do
whatever I can to raise the issue of Iraqi women’s rights and needs. I
was invited to the White House before the war and was involved in a
project with the Iraq Foundation, headed by Kanan Makiya … I meet
with congress people who are interested [in the issue of supporting
Iraqi women], including Eddie Bernice Johnson and Hillary Clinton. I
talk to whoever is interested –irregardless of their politics.

The director of the Office for International Women’s Affairs also emphasised
the significance of networks. She told me,

Our office is all about networking—bringing people together. You can
do a lot with no money just by putting different people in touch with
each other. We see the bigger picture and build contacts to support
different people.

Some of these partners included the National Foundation for Teaching, the
Fortune 500 companies, as well as the former UK Gender Advisor in Iraq and
a number of Iraqi women activists.

These transnational networks are facilitated by a discourse about women’s
empowerment/gender mainstreaming in conflict situations and represent a
form of global governance. Held and McGrew argue that, ‘A central
characteristic of global governance … is the reconfiguration of authority
between the various layers or infrastructures of governance … a relocation of
authority from public to quasi-public, and to private, agencies’ (Held and
McGrew 2002: 10). Held and McGrew conclude that new types of governance
are necessarily less hierarchical in order to be effective (Held and McGrew 2002: 11). However, do these alliances challenge the hierarchy of world politics?

These networks may appear to be egalitarian and cooperative, yet it is necessary to examine what exactly these new forms of governance are attempting to achieve. Is it the transformation of the governance of international security or rather its adaptation to the needs of a post-Cold War and, in particular, a post-9/11 environment?

In the case of Iraq (like that of Afghanistan) ‘saving brown women from brown men’ (to use Gayatri Spivak’s famous phrase) was articulated by political leaders in the US, and to a lesser extent in the UK, as one of the major objectives of the military invasion (Al-Ali and Pratt 2006). However, Middle East women are not only seen as victims in need of rescue. Significantly, the then director of the Office for International Women’s Affairs in the US State Department told me, ‘Secretary Rice believes in the empowerment agenda—not seeing women as victims but as agents of change’. Building on the ways in which international NGOs have framed women in conflict as ‘peacemakers’, as ‘having a moderating influence’, as ‘democrats’ (Cohn 2008; Al-Ali and Pratt 2009), the Bush administration came to consider ‘women’s empowerment’ as an important element in the combating of new security threats. For example, the Middle East Partnership Initiative, established by the Bush administration in the wake of 9/11, ‘assists efforts to expand political participation, strengthen civil society and the rule of law, empower women and
youth, create educational opportunities, and foster economic reform throughout the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) (US Department of State n.d.) (author’s emphasis). This is not only an objective of the Bush administration but is also supported by the current US administration. As Hilary Clinton states, ‘…building civil society and providing tangible services to people help result in stronger nations that share the goals of security, prosperity, peace, and progress’ (cit. in US Department of State n.d.), thereby linking women’s empowerment (as well as democracy and economic development) with questions of security.

The types of projects that have been financed and implemented through the ‘women’s empowerment’ transnational linkages target aim at incorporating women into politics and the economy simultaneously as these spheres are being ‘reconstructed’ by the US occupation in Iraq and the general project for US hegemony in the Middle East. In Iraq, women were targeted for training as political candidates, election monitors, voters and civil society advocates within the US-promoted political process. Other projects aimed to train women to become ‘entrepreneurs’, whilst women’s centres were built across Iraq where women could learn ‘marketable’ skills, such as word processing and English. If ‘Reconstruction is about establishing from the get-go a market-based capitalist economic system, twinned with a political regime that is willing to promote and defend free market capitalism’ (Guttal 2005: 73), then ‘Mainstreaming gender ensures that notional equality structures economic, social and political institutions and thereby renders all members of society able, if not willing, to participate in economic, social and political activity (Shepherd 2008: 170-71).
In other words, the US and its allies have been able to capture the discourse of gender mainstreaming/women’s empowerment and create new transnational networks in order to facilitate the (re)construction of the public sphere in those countries that the West seeks to dominate. The promotion of particular types of women’s agency is an important dimension of this process. Applying a gendered perspective to the post-Cold War international states system, we should be mindful of the degree to which the gender mainstreaming discourse operates to renegotiate national sovereignty and belonging in the ‘international community’. It mediates hierarchies of power between states through post-conflict reconstruction ‘packages’ of gender mainstreaming ‘expertise’. However, the gender mainstreaming/women’s empowerment discourse not only facilitates the construction of new transnational links in the pursuit of Western geo-strategic interests. It also becomes a reason for the pursuit of these interests in the name of ‘white men saving brown women from brown men’ have long been a justification for colonial intervention (Spivak 1988). In effect, gender mainstreaming/women’s rights has become a ‘camouflage’ (Hunt 2007) or a ‘a sexual decoy’ (Eisenstein 2007) for the pursuit of Western geopolitical interests and, therefore, contributes to the reproduction of the global geo-political hierarchy.

Conclusion
There is no denying that the discourse of gender mainstreaming/women’s empowerment with regards to international security concerns is predicated on an essentialised notion of gender and an orthodox conception of the
international system. However, the greater danger of this discourse, given expression in UNSCR 1325, is the way in which it has been captured by the US and its allies as a means of pursuing its geo-political interests, as well as justifying these interests. In particular, the gender mainstreaming discourse has facilitated the creation of new transnational networks that, whilst not controlled by the US or any other particular national government, enable the co-optation of a whole range of actors into foreign-directed state-building, development and reconstruction projects, which have come to be an important element in combating the new security threats of the post-Cold War era. This capturing of the language of gender mainstreaming/women's empowerment by the US and its allies necessitates that feminists who really are concerned about the situation of women living under occupation and in war zones shift their gender lens towards the workings of neo-liberal empire.

References


