

University of Sussex
Sussex Centre for Migration Research

**Brexit, National Identity and the Print Media: A Discourse
Analysis of Britain's Pro-Leave Tabloid Campaigns**

Working Paper No. 96

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December 2019

Abstract

This paper uses Foucauldian Discourse Analysis to examine how Britain's right-wing tabloids constructed a sense of British national identity in the four months preceding Britain's 2016 EU referendum. I analyse news items taken from The Daily Mail, The Sun and The Express. I use three sub-questions to consider: how British people were discursively positioned in relation to RASIM (refugees, asylum seekers, immigrants and migrants); how British people were discursively positioned in relation to the political establishment (in Westminster and Brussels); and how historic reference points were used to imagine Britain's future. I found that anti-migration, anti-elite, anti-EU and inclusive populist rhetoric featured strongly, alongside a celebration of Britain's history and advocacy of British exceptionalism. These elements were connected through the act of voting Leave. I suggest that this consolidated the national community, albeit from an exclusionary standpoint, by (re)defining who can authentically belong to or represent it. I argue that the scapegoats targeted and divisions produced by the right-wing press, in their construction of British national identity, served to distract British people from the greater inequalities and harmful political decisions that structure British society.

Keywords

Brexit, national identity, print media, discourse analysis, immigrants

Introduction: research context and questions

On 23 June 2016, in what came to be generally known as 'Brexit', the United Kingdom voted to leave the EU. Brexit represents one of the most significant and divisive issues in recent British memory. It triggered a break from long-accepted political tradition and the formation of new political attachments – 'Remain' and 'Leave'. Rather than asking what Brexit will ultimately represent, a question which grows ever more complex and uncertain, even three years after the referendum, this paper questions how the referendum campaign influenced the construction of British national identity.

Newspapers cannot tell people what to think, but they can tell them what to think about (Fenton 2016). For decades, the right-wing press has taken an unyielding stand against the EU, whilst politicians have been reluctant to promote EU membership outright (Daddow 2016b). So even with their declining readership, strong partisanship, difficult relationship with the facts, and levels of mistrust unmatched elsewhere in Europe, right-wing national newspapers continue to dictate which EU-related issues are given importance in British media and politics (Daddow 2012; Martinson 2016). In the months preceding the EU referendum, they campaigned relentlessly for Britain to 'tack back control', with a negative emphasis on immigration, democracy and sovereignty.

In the Brexit debates, British national identity was constructed, and unequal power relations were reproduced, through narratives of race, populism and British exceptionalism (Anderson and Wilson 2017). I shall examine how the right-wing press influenced this using

Foucauldian Discourse Analysis and the questions outlined below. I nominate one primary research question and three subquestions. The primary question is this:

- How was British national identity discursively constructed by right-wing British tabloid newspapers during the Brexit campaign of 2016?

And the subquestions:

- How were RASIM (refugees, asylum seekers, immigrants and migrants) discursively constructed in relation to British people?
- How were the political elite and establishment (in Westminster and Brussels) discursively constructed in relation to British people?
- How were collective memories drawn upon to envision possible futures for British people, both inside and outside the EU?

Literature review

Discursive construction of national identity

Identity is not singular, given or unchanging but multiple, dynamic and variously constructed (Brace 2003). Accordingly, the geographical literature surrounding identity is rich and diverse, with no fixed understandings of national identity (Antonsich 2013). The politics of identity provide a lens through which to examine everyday and celebratory acts of nationhood alike, alongside the processes of inclusion and exclusion which operate through them (Agius and Keep 2018). National identity, like all social identities, is discursively constructed and transformed through language (De Cillia et al. 1999). Nations come into being through political histories but also through narration, and those who speak with the greatest authority have a greater impact on their construction (Bhabha 1990).

Traditional studies typically foreground the origins and ‘grand narratives’ of nationalism, to the neglect of everyday nationhood (Smith 2008; Skey 2009). Billig’s (1995b: 144) notion of ‘banal nationalism’ suggests that nations and populations are discursively constructed, both through emotionally driven and celebratory acts of nationhood, such as sporting events, and through routine practices and material artefacts which allow the nation to be ‘mindlessly remembered’ every day. According to Anderson (1983), nations are ‘imagined political communities’, constructed collectively through mundane acts such as reading the newspaper, yet in the knowledge that millions of others are doing the same. However, the idea that the press addresses an undifferentiated national public has not gone unchallenged (Smith 2008; Skey 2009). Multiple national identities (e.g. British and English) may be discursively constructed within one context (De Cillia et al. 1999). Furthermore, audiences are not ‘empty vessels’; they bring their own meanings to bear upon media discourse (Madianou 2005).

Discursive construction of difference

A stable sense of identity lends order to people's social realities, enabling them to relate to themselves and others with confidence and self-esteem (Skey 2010). Giddens (1990) describes this as 'ontological security'. Familiarity with national customs provides ontological security, thus enabling majority groups to position themselves as belonging to the nation without question and to make judgements about the status of others (Hage 1998; Flemmen and Savage 2017). Therefore, strengthened national identity can provide ontological security for some and insecurity for others (Skey 2010).

National identity is taken for granted, meaning that, outside of celebratory events, it is rarely expressed overtly, except in response to perceived threats on the national community, which can elicit a fearful and passionate response from those who wish to protect what they see as their way of life (Palmer 1998; Ivarsflaten 2005; Skey 2013). Skey (2010) argues that processes of globalisation have strengthened nationalism by destabilising many people's sense of place in the world and encouraging them to defend the distinctiveness of their national community. According to Social Identity Theory, individuals maintain collective self-esteem through positive comparisons with those who they perceive as not belonging to the national community (Tajfel and Turner 1979). Indeed, there is always a 'constitutive outside' to identity (Hall 1996: 3) and national identities are necessarily consolidated through the construction of difference (Hardt-Mautner 1995; Martin 1995; Benhabib 1996; Crang 1998; Gardner 2011; Jenkins 2014). Guma and Dafydd Jones (2018: 1) propose that 'Brexit should be understood as an ongoing process of "othering"'. Before the referendum, othering was directed at groups of RASIM and members of the political establishment, who were perceived as not belonging to the national community.

Discursive construction of RASIM

Difference is discursively constructed through a 'politics of othering', which defines who is perceived as belonging to the nation and the rights, or lack thereof, afforded by this status (Looney 2017). Orientalism (Said 1978) describes the historic and ongoing invention of 'the Orient' within popular Western imagination, through power-laden discursive practices. Eastern Europe was historically invented in a similar fashion (Wolff 1994), and the Balkans were perceived ambiguously, as 'semi-oriental, not fully European but semi-developed, and semi-civilized' (Buchowski 2006: 465). Such othering continues in the present, under a new spatial dynamic where Eastern Europeans have become 'internal others' within Western Europe (Ibrahim and Howarth 2015a). Despite being white, many groups are treated as 'not quite white', since they originate from regions culturally distinct from Western Europe (Ford 2011; Botterill and Burrell 2019: 24).

Within media and political discourse, Eastern European and other groups of RASIM are constructed as objects of moral panic, whose deviance from Western norms threatens host societies (Tong and Zuo 2018). People can be led to perceive difference as threatening to the national culture and identity, creating insecurity, fear and hatred (Ivarsflaten 2005) – as evidenced by the post-referendum rise in hate crimes (Guma and Dafydd Jones 2018). The right-wing media places undue emphasis on all manner of social and economic grievances, real

and imagined, for which RASIM are unfairly blamed (Calhoun 2017; Moore and Ramsay 2017). Discourses of criminality and terrorism further construct RASIM as physical threats (Ibrahim and Howarth 2015a). Tabloid journalism is especially problematic, due its unbalanced, decontextualised and ‘dispassionate’ reporting style, which serves to create distance between readers and those RASIM being represented, thereby denying them an empowering narrative of their own (Ibrahim and Howarth 2015b).

The referendum result is often attributed to voters ‘left behind’ by globalisation (for example, see: Goodwin and Heath 2016; Goodhart 2017). Yet analysis points to multiple groups of voters from wide-ranging backgrounds (Swales 2016), and most significantly middle-class voters in southern England (Dorling 2016). Furthermore, blaming abstract forces of globalisation for ‘leaving people behind’ absolves real governments of culpability, alongside years of destructive neoliberal policies, austerity, privatisation and public spending cuts (Watkins 2016; Looney 2017). ‘Foreigners’ provide a convenient and catch-all media scapegoat upon which to misdirect the latent grievances of an electorate who distrust their government (Naidoo 2016; Clarke and Newman 2017; Guma and Dafydd Jones 2018). Similarly, the EU is blamed for diminishing the government’s ability to control who enters the UK (Tong and Zuo 2018).

Discursive construction of elites and the establishment

National identity is often constructed through populist appeals to the majority of ‘ordinary, decent people’ at the heart of the nation (Canovan 1999: 5), against elite politicians and the establishment, who are treated as outsiders that neither belong to nor represent the national community (Freedon 2016). Within such discourse, majoritarian interests are perceived to have been silenced by politicians who have unfairly prioritised less deserving minorities that threaten the nation’s unity (Canovan 1999; Ivarsflaten 2005; Skey 2010). These ‘hierarchies of belonging’ (Skey 2013) and imaginaries of the people are problematic since they fail to differentiate the numerous non-elite groups who comprise the nation (Smith 2008). It is therefore important to question who exactly is being addressed, how categories of ‘deservingness’ are established, and whose legitimate concerns really do go unspoken for (Freedon 2016; Clarke and Newman 2017).

The concept of elite betrayal, a nationalist politics of resentment towards Westminster and Brussels, and a rejection of ‘government knows best’ were central to the construction of British and English national identity before the referendum (Gifford 2015; Marsh 2018: 1). Economic globalisation, deindustrialisation and austerity have been experienced unequally (Kenny 2012), whilst the evasive and irresponsible behaviour of the political elite has fostered distrust towards the political establishment (Canovan 1999; Kenny 2017). This contributed towards a rejection of Cameron’s ‘One Nation Conservative’ government as a champion for ‘hardworking British families’ (Calhoun 2017; Powell 2017). Contemporary Britishness is constructed upon notions of ‘unity in diversity’ (Condor et al. 2006: 125), where the English represent one group among many (Kingsnorth 2015). However, such multiculturalism has been disputed with reassertions of English identity (Condor et al. 2006), underpinned by a rejection of British cosmopolitanism and of London as a symbol for the entire nation (Calhoun 2017).

Gardner (2017) connects this to 2011 census data, which indicates the increasing popularity of sub-British identities over British national identity.

England has struggled to carve out its own identity within a cultural, political and media environment where Britain and England are addressed interchangeably (Freedon 2016; Oliver 2017). English resentment politics rose to prominence in the 1990s, partly as a reaction to British devolution (Kenny 2014), which ‘did not allow English people equal rights to political expression of their national identity’ (Condor 2010: 3). Most British newspapers address English readers implicitly, yet England is underrepresented within mainstream politics, and so politicians are often imagined as outsiders within the English national community (Kenny 2012).

National identity is also constructed in opposition to realistic and perceived threats coming from outsiders beyond the national community (Böttger and VanLoozen 2012). Continental Europe has historically functioned as ‘a negative reference point for the construction of British identities’ (Kumar 2003: 6). Resistance to European integration, in defence of British, and especially English, sovereignty and democracy, has strengthened nationalist sentiment (Wellings 2012), since ‘interference, or perceived interference, by outsiders is always likely to unite people in a short-lived manifestation of national identity’ (Buckledee 2018b: 58). However, the relationship between English – rather than British – national identity and Euroscepticism, examined by various researchers (for example, see Goodwin and Heath 2016; Henderson et al. 2016; Goodwin and Milazzo 2017), requires further analysis and is not necessarily causal (Democratic Audit UK 2016). As highlighted by Beaumont (2017: 380), ‘it is the quality of nationalism rather than nationalism per se that informs attitude to the EU’.

Collective memories

According to Temporal Comparison Theory, individuals maintain collective self-esteem through positive comparisons with their former national self, which requires an ongoing narrative of progress across time (Albert 1977). Halbwachs’ (1985) concept of collective memories is central to maintaining this narrative. Collective memories serve as a political tool, where common history is evoked to validate future plans and to preserve a ‘natural timeline’ of events (De Cillia et al. 1999; Cap 2016; Saint-Laurent et al. 2017). Collective memories rely not on specific historical facts, but on subjective experiences as they are selectively recalled in the present (Naidoo 2016). Gilroy (2004) argues that since World War II, British national identity has relied on ‘postcolonial melancholia’, and a ‘pathology of greatness’. Others have suggested this represents ‘the unresolved loss of an imagined past’ (Clarke and Newman 2017: 108), a ‘false memory of certainty’ and a desire to restore Britain’s perceived ‘greatness’ (Bowler 2017: 9).

Accounts of Britain’s history typically celebrate and glorify its ‘unique’ geography, constitutional arrangement, legal system, Protestant tradition, imperial supremacy, principles of freedom and democracy, and World War II victory (Kumar 2003; Condor et al. 2006; Daddow 2012; Wellings 2012; Cap 2016; Dennison and Carl 2016). ‘The War’ holds a mythological status within the national consciousness, where Britain’s historic triumph is celebrated through literature, film, television, education and public discourse (Beaumont 2017;

Dorling and Tomlinson 2019b). Tabloids frequently reference World War II heroism (Buckledee 2018a) and Winston Churchill, whose apparently infinite wisdom is used to justify certain courses of action in the present and future (Cap 2016; Hafiz 2018). Images of Britain ‘standing alone’ and defeating its continental neighbours then feature strongly in Eurosceptic arguments, where they are framed in parallel to Britain ‘taking back’ sovereignty from Brussels now (Daddow 2016a; Beaumont 2017).

Kumar (2003) argues that, for many EU nations, a slight loss of sovereignty is outweighed by the prospect of redefining and strengthening the national identity. Despite offering similar possibilities, EU membership threatens Britain’s sense of progression and represents a symbol of decline (Wellings 2012). To a nation which believes it still ‘rules the world’, or could *go back* to doing so, European integration presents a negative temporal comparison and therefore has provoked a defensive and exclusionary nationalist response from many (Beaumont 2017; Virdee and McGeever 2017).

Methodology

Theoretical understandings of discourse analysis

Since national identities are imaginatively and discursively constructed (Anderson 1983), language may be analysed to explore the shaping of national identities and social realities (Kitchin and Nicholas 2000). Poststructuralist discourse analysis scrutinises how knowledge is constructed and authorised as ‘truth’ (Dittmer 2009). Foucault (1980: 93) states that we are ‘subjected to the production of truth through power, and we cannot exercise power except through the production of truth’. Validating knowledge as truth serves the political interests of the producers (Barnes and Duncan 2013; Waitt 2016), and naturalises certain ways of seeing the world, known as ‘regimes of truth’ (Lees 2004; Berg 2009). Regimes of truth operate at specific historical conjunctures, enabling us to make sense of the world by defining the limits of what is considered natural, relevant and acceptable (Berg 2009; Barnes and Duncan 2013).

Rather than reflecting reality, discourse brings an otherwise meaningless reality into being (Phillips 2004). Poststructuralists believe that *nothing* is fundamental and encourage us to regard with criticism any knowledge that is claimed to be obvious, natural, ‘common sense’ or ‘truth’ (Wylie 2006). ‘Reality’ cannot be objectively understood, and everyone’s social realities are shaped uniquely by whichever discourses they encounter, alongside the subjective meanings they impose upon them (Dittmer 2009). The positioning of identities through discourse may be understood as the formation of ‘subject positions’ (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000). During the Brexit campaign, politicians manipulated the ‘truth’ according to their own motivations (Khan and Wenman 2017). As is characteristic of the right-wing media, pro-Leave tabloids made frequent appeals to the ‘common sense’ of the ‘ordinary people’ who were perceived to constitute their readership (Beckett 2016; Canovan 1999). Promoters of Brexit generally positioned themselves as ‘truth tellers and taboo-breakers – “telling it like it is”’ (Clarke and Newman 2017: 111), as exemplified by phrases such as ‘not being afraid to talk about immigration’ (Naidoo 2016: 44).

All discourses are culturally and historically contingent (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000; Barnes and Duncan 2013). Their meanings are not fixed (Waitt 2005), nor do they reside

within single texts (Waitt 2016), but rather, ‘truths’ are created and reproduced intertextually (Bennett 1996; White 2004). Discourse analysis is therefore best suited to collections of texts (Waitt 2005).

Poststructuralist philosopher Jacques Derrida argued that language is a system of difference (Wylie 2006), underpinned by a logic of violent dualisms such as mind/body, true/false, us/them and East/West (Schwandt 2015). Such logic was prevalent within the referendum campaigns, where migrants were frequently reduced to categories of acceptable/unacceptable and deserving/undeserving (Botterill and Burrell 2019). The referendum itself also presented voters with a false choice: ‘You decide! Stay or Go!’ (Reeves 2016: 480), when it could have been decided on more pragmatic questions of ‘how much, what, and where’ (Ison and Straw 2018).

Methods of data analysis

In this paper, I conduct a Foucauldian Discourse Analysis by focusing on unsettling ‘effects of truth’, examining intertextuality and the operation of dualisms. Foucault never laid out any explicit methodological template for discourse analysis, for fear it would be too ‘formulaic and reductionist’ (Waitt 2016: 290). Most poststructuralists agree that discourse analysis is better understood as a ‘craft skill’ (Potter 1996), underpinned by an implicit methodology of ‘learning by doing’ (Waitt 2005; 2016).

Whilst Foucauldian Discourse Analysis typically considers discourse as a whole, Fairclough’s (1992) Critical Discourse Analysis offers an effective way to simultaneously consider the multiple scales on which discourse operates (Dittmer 2009). The framework consists of three parts (Figure 1).




Figure 1: Three-dimensional conception of discourse (Fairclough 1992: 73)

This approach enables researchers to consider how society impacts on the press, and how the press shapes people’s social realities (Richardson 2007). Drawing on Rose (2001), Waitt (2005; 2016) lays out seven key considerations (Figure 2), which have been further elaborated on by Berg (2009), to provide geographers with a methodological starting point for Foucauldian Discourse Analysis. In her discourse-historical approach, Wodak (2006) outlines further discursive strategies used to construct, maintain and transform understandings of

national identity over time. Lastly, Antaki et al. (2003) outline ‘six analytical shortcomings’ that researchers should avoid to maintain rigour (Figure 3).

- 7 Key Components of Foucauldian Discourse Analysis**
1. Choice of source materials
 2. Suspend pre-existing categories: become reflexive
 3. Familiarisation: absorbing yourself in and thinking critically about the social context of your texts
 4. Coding: once for organisation and again for interpretation
 5. Power, knowledge, and persuasion: investigate your texts for effects of “truth”
 6. Rupture and resilience: take note of inconsistencies within your texts
 7. Silence: silence as discourse and discourses that silence

Figure 2: Waitt (2005; 2016: 291)

- 6 Analytic Shortcomings of Discourse Analysis**
1. Under-analysis through summary
 2. Under-analysis through taking sides
 3. Under-analysis through over-quotation and through isolated quotation
 4. Circular identification of discourses and mental constructs
 5. False survey
 6. Analysis that consists in simply spotting features

Figure 3: (Antaki et al. 2003)

Choice of research materials

I collected my data from British newspapers. Since most British papers carry distinct editions for different constituents of the UK, England usually constitutes their assumed audience (Billig 1995a: 111). Many have a ‘long tradition of EU-bashing’ (Daddow 2016b: 50) which, since the 1980s, has fostered a ‘climate of fear’ surrounding European integration within political and media discourse (Daddow 2012: 1236).

I focused on ‘emotional, not economic’ issues, since they underpinned so much of the campaign (Marsh 2018: 83). I chose the right-wing press, since it ‘helped (re)produce, facilitate and circulate the association of leaving the EU as a matter of national pride’ (Beaumont 2017: 387). The journalistic style of tabloids, as opposed to broadsheets, is characterised by the deliberate and extreme use of rhetorically and emotionally charged language (Kitis and Milapides 1997; Conboy 2006). Tabloids were therefore more likely to construct Eurosceptic discourse using the emotionally charged language of Anglo-British nationalism. In addition, tabloids frequently present Britain through the lens of its historic ‘greatness’ (Buckledee 2018b; Manners 2018).

I selected newspaper campaigns because they are designed to achieve political change and so are laden with discursive power (Richardson 2007). The Daily Mail, The Sun and The Express are perceived to be the most right-wing (see Figure 4), they published the most pro-Leave items and had the highest circulation prior to the referendum (see Figure 5). I have therefore chosen to analyse the news campaigns of these three newspapers because they held far-reaching power in the discursive construction of British national identity. I have focused on frontpage items because they impact greatly on readers, and even passers-by, through emotive language, large-print headlines and other rhetorical devices; they provide a standalone summary of the leading information and orient the reader’s interpretation of it (van Dijk 1991; Develotte and Rechniewski 2001).




Figure 4: (Smith 2017)




Figure 5: (Deacon et al. 2016)

Methods of data collection

Using LexisNexis, I collected each frontpage news item relating to the referendum. My timeframe started on 20 February 2016, when David Cameron announced the referendum date, and ended on 23 June 2016, the referendum date itself. I included items published in the Sunday Express and The Sun on Sunday, but not The Mail on Sunday, due to their pro-Remain stance.

After collecting my research material, I compiled it into tables according to particular themes. Each theme relates to one of my three sub-questions. These tables are included in the Appendix, since I used them to structure my results and discussion. In my discussion I have also included examples of images that were used to supplement the arguments made in each newspaper. Unless stated otherwise, each image was originally collected from the Twitter account @suttonnick. The source of each headline can be found in the Appendix, whilst I have cited quotes taken from news articles within my results and discussion.

Results and discussion

Constructing the migrant crisis

Each newspaper argued that EU migration had gone too far and positioned RASIM as objects of moral panic using numbers, metaphor and imagery. Scale comparisons, for example 'net immigration from the EU . . . adds a population equivalent to Oxford's each year' (Daily Mail, 01/06/16), and phrases such as '1M more', 'new influx', and 'soar yet again' (See Appendix, Table 1) emphasised that migration was increasing. Headlines about 'hidden migrants' (Table 1) suggested the government had kept the full extent of migration secret, whilst phrases such as 'true scale' and 'whole truth' were used to indicate that the press was revealing the truth. Whilst numbers 'suggest precision and objectivity, and hence credibility' (van Dijk 2000: 46), the numerical credibility of tabloid reporting is difficult to judge because it is often decontextualised (Moore and Ramsay 2017). Without adequate context, numbers dramatise migration, with panic-inducing effects for receiving societies (Oliveri 2012), revealing how nationalist sentiment can unfold from a perceived crisis (Palmer 1998). Furthermore, numbers

alone give RASIM no voice and conceal the complex realities of migration (Crawley et al. 2016).

Water metaphors such as ‘pouring’, ‘swamped’, ‘flooding’ and ‘sea of migrants’ (Table 2) further dramatised the perceived threat and indicated that migration could not be contained. They reflect a common trope which conceives Britain as an ‘open’ container that will ‘rupture’ if restrictive action is not taken (Cap 2016: 76). Warnings over such a ‘breaking point’ were voiced frequently in pro-Leave campaigns, often with racialised undercurrents and fabricated evidence (Bowler 2017).

Each newspaper displayed images of migrant and refugee crowds that were exclusively Middle Eastern or black, and sometimes Muslim, in appearance (Figure 7). Claims that they were ‘on the move’ towards Europe or Britain were supported with images of people queueing or travelling in overcrowded boats and may be viewed as a racialised othering strategy, similar to that of UKIP’s ‘Breaking Point’ poster (Figure 6). This promotes restrictive migration, and through deliberate omission of white people, specifically implies that non-white and Muslim migration threatens Britain (Virdee and McGeever 2017). Such imagery fed into the racialised constructions of ‘us’ – white British people – and ‘them’ – immigrant others – that featured strongly in pro-Leave arguments (Bowler 2017: 6), with problematic implications about who should and should not live in Britain.



Figure 6: UKIP’s ‘Breaking Point’ poster (Family Advertising Ltd 2016)

Metaphors may euphemise things too inappropriate to spell out literally (van Dijk 2000). Undercurrents about controlling migrants featured through animal or cargo related images and phrases, such as ‘crammed in like sardines’ (Figure 8). In a coded attack on EU migration, The Sun (15/06/16) stated: ‘Britain has been invaded by crop-ravaging moths from Europe that have swarmed across the Channel’. The Express (01/03/16) likened the Calais ‘Jungle’ to a disease, ‘allowed to fester for far too long’. Degrading metaphorical allusions delegitimise migrant and refugee suffering by portraying them as nonhuman, suggest Ibrahim and Howarth (2015b), who analysed coverage of previous ‘jungles’ and found that such language was used to legitimise their violent demolition, in similar fashion to coverage displayed in Figure 9.



Figure 7: Depictions of the migrant crisis



Figure 8: Depictions of 'Illegal Migrants'



Figure 9: Depictions of the Calais 'Jungle'

Constructing RASIM: victims or villains?

RASIM were positioned through a narrow binary of victims and villains. This reflects the polarising nature of right-wing populist discourse, which claims to speak for ‘the people’, whilst othering RASIM (Wodak 2015). ‘The people’ is an undifferentiated nationalist construct which elides ‘our’, often conflicting, interests (Smith 2008), by fostering humanitarianism towards others (Tong and Zuo 2018), or by pinning real and imagined grievances on them (Wodak 2015).

In the case of ‘victims’, refugees and migrants were denied agency, being presented either at the mercy or grace of strangers. Headlines emphasised how many had capsized or drowned attempting to cross the Mediterranean (Table 3) and one image depicted a capsized fishing boat (Figure 7). Another image depicted refugee adults and children reaching for handouts (Figure 7). By presenting RASIM as passive victims who urgently need ‘our’ help, the press ‘offers a positive self-presentation of Western societies “doing good things for migrants”’ (van Dijk 2000; Oliveri 2012: 801; Crawley et al. 2016). This was evidenced by the headline ‘Victory for compassion’ (Table 3), and a quote from a Tory MP stating: ‘Britain must do its bit and accept some of these vulnerable people’ (The Sun, 03/05/16).

In the case of ‘villains’, agency was negatively ascribed, by presenting RASIM behaviour as morally reprehensible or criminal. This reflects a pattern where RASIM are collectively essentialised, racialised, orientalist and criminalised (Oliveri 2012), and constructed as generalised, socioeconomic or security threats (Böttger and VanLoozen 2012; Tong and Zuo 2018).

Depictions of RASIM as generalised threats mainly concerned Britain’s powerlessness to stop migration (Table 4). Comments from the Archbishop of Canterbury, that it is ‘outrageous’ to accuse those who fear migration of racism, were misrepresented by The Sun, with an unexplained image of what appears to be a refugee or migrant camp, and crowds of Middle Eastern appearing men (Figure 7). This problematically indicated that it is not racist to fear Middle Eastern migration specifically, whilst quoting Justin Welby for legitimation. Articles which ignore the connections between racism and anti-migrant sentiment wilfully misdirect the latent disaffection of British readers (Naidoo 2016; Looney 2017), who ‘can be

taught to fear and hate immigrants . . . and any other group which is weak’ (Dorling 2013: 5). The political elite use such discourse to frame years of deliberate and harmful austerity as an apolitical necessity, and to pin its effects on catch-all scapegoats such as RASIM (Naidoo 2016; Tuckett 2017). This elides fractures within British society by promoting nationalist sentiment that emboldens people to defend their imagined communities and way of life (Ivarsflaten 2005).




Figure 10: Depiction of RASIM as a socioeconomic threat

RASIM were positioned as socioeconomic threats. Single, highly negative stories were used misleadingly to evoke a nationwide threat (e.g. Figure 10). RASIM were demonised for being ‘jobless’, or for taking jobs and ‘keeping British wages low’; for being health or welfare ‘tourists’ and fostering a “something-for-nothing culture’ (The Sun 10/05/16); and for placing unsustainable pressure on ‘our’ public services (Table 4). Phrases such as ‘welfare tourist’ belong to wider political rhetoric, first used by New Labour, which divides society into ‘hardworking families’ and ‘underserving skivers’ (Clarke and Newman 2017). Juxtaposing dependency and work is wrong, since ‘hardworking families’, RASIM included, can be welfare recipients (Powell 2017). As Britain’s ethnic majority, white people’s status remains ‘beyond question’, providing a taken for granted sense of ontological security and national identity (Skey 2010). By addressing ‘the people’, the right-wing press consolidates white working-class communities, enabling them to consolidate their grievances through ‘a racialised frame of white working-class victimhood’ (Skey 2010; Virdee and McGeever 2017: 1814). (Re)articulating the conditions of belonging, for example by arguing that migrants should ‘pay more for NHS’ (Table 4), preserves ‘hierarchies of belonging’ (Skey 2013) and the racialised privileges they entail (Bhambra 2017).

RASIM were positioned as security threats with labels such as ‘invaders’ and ‘illegals’ (Table 4). In similar fashion to David Cameron’s ‘swarm’ comments (Dhaliwal and Forkert 2015), this makes the imagined threat imminent. Comments from a human rights activist, that calling stowaways ‘illegal immigrants’ was dehumanising, were framed in one article as ‘bizarre’ (Daily Mail, 24/03/16). Unwillingness to use language which humanises RASIM reflects the extent to which politicians and the press deliberately maintain a ‘hostile environment’ on migration (Looney 2017) and blurs the lines between legal and illegal migration (Moore and Ramsay 2017). Calais was described as ‘the entrypoint into Britain for migrants and would-be jihadis’ (Daily Mail, 12/05/16). Conflating ‘would-be jihadis’ and migrants positions all migrants as potential threats. The threat of foreign ‘terrorists’ ‘killers’ and ‘rapists’ was dramatised with language such as ‘at large’ and ‘crimewave on our streets’ (Table 1, Table 4). By outlining real and imagined security threats associated with RASIM, the right-wing press ultimately created ontological insecurity which, in turn, fed into ‘the reproduction of identity and difference in the Brexit debate’ (Manners 2018: 1219).

Specific nationalities

Bulgarian, Romanian and Polish RASIM were demonised for their imagined poverty and for claiming benefits, for example: ‘you pay for Roma gypsy palaces’ (Table 5). Candidate countries, especially Albania and Turkey, were singled out to present continued EU membership as a threat. Decontextualisation, for example, of Turkey’s murder rate and human rights record, and single criminal cases (e.g. Figure 11), problematically positioned these countries as inherently dangerous and thus incompatible with Britain. The Express (31/03/16) blamed non-EU countries for failing to ‘adopt Western values’ and quoted Farage stating: ‘[Turkey is] too big, too poor, too different from us’ (05/05/16). Despite factual ‘evidence’, arguments such as these are devoid of migrant voices, positivity or sober analysis (Crawley et al. 2016; Moore and Ramsay 2017), but since they represent mainstream discourse, audiences have little recourse for hearing countervailing stories (van Dijk 2000). This promotes scripting



Figure 11: Depiction of RASIM as a criminal threat

of ‘non-acceptable’ and ‘even less acceptable’ RASIM, according to hegemonic Western norms and oriental hierarchies of whiteness and Europeaness (Ibrahim and Howarth 2015b; Botterill and Burrell 2019: 27). Stigma against Central and East European nations has increased since the 2004 EU expansion (Guma and Dafydd Jones 2018), but whiteness and cultural proximity to Britain offers relative protection (Botterill and Burrell 2019; Ford 2011). The imagined deviance and violence of non-EU, non-white countries is perceived as ‘even less acceptable’ (Botterill and Burrell 2019) and phrases such as ‘too different from us’ are often code for ‘keeping the nation Christian and white’ (Virdee and McGeever 2017: 1807).

Leave vs Remain: ‘a battle of the people versus the politicians’

‘The nation’ may be defined against internal elites, who are perceived to have acted against the interests of ‘the people’ (Freedon 2016). The referendum channelled the diverse subjectivities of voters into opposing subject positions – ‘Remain’ and ‘Leave’ – which did not previously exist (Elliott 2017; Ison and Straw 2018; Manners 2018). Right-wing tabloids generally present the mainstream establishment as ‘enemies of the people’ and ground themselves in legitimacy through appeals to ‘ordinary’ or ‘real’ people (Clarke and Newman 2017; Levinger 2017). Populist rhetoric relies on inclusive pronouns, such as ‘we’ and ‘us’, to persuade readers their national community has, or has not, been spoken for (De Cillia et al. 1999; Buckledee 2018b; Billig 1995a).

Each newspaper frequently appealed to ‘the people’, or ‘British people’, ‘voters’, ‘working families’, ‘taxpayers’ and ‘pensioners’. Leave was presented as ‘the will of the people’, and the mainstream political establishment as ‘the de facto Remain campaign’ (The Express, 06/06/16). Farage was quoted as stating: ‘it’s us against the entire political establishment’ (The Express, 23/04/16) and describing the referendum as ‘a battle of the people

versus the politicians' (The Sun, 07/04/16). Populism is 'of the people, but not of the system' (Canovan 1999: 3) and, whilst figures such as Farage and Boris Johnson are elite, wealthy and privately educated, they distinguished themselves from 'politics as usual' and positioned themselves as 'the last authentic representatives of the British people', through personalised leadership and populist rhetoric (Calhoun 2017; Clarke and Newman 2017; Virdee and McGeever 2017: 1808). Contrastingly, Cameron was blamed for trying 'too hard to be cool' and The Sun praised one 'hardworking' 'debate hero' for suggesting, on live TV, that Cameron had not experienced 'real life' (Figure 12). Personal stories from 'ordinary people' featured in Leave arguments to demonstrate that the pro-EU elite, insulated by their wealth and social position, are out of touch with working-class realities, so cannot authentically represent 'our' interests (Naidoo 2016).



Figure 12: Depictions of David Cameron (of the establishment)

Farage, someone who ‘puts his money where his mouth is’ (Figure 13) and ‘Brexit cheerleader Bojo’ (The Sun, 05/06/16), were celebrated as the ‘Brexit Dream Team’, ‘an irresistible force’ (The Express, 18/05/16), who would ‘lead the EU exit fight’ (Figure 13). They were praised for making ‘vows’, whilst the pro-EU elite were accused of ‘cons’, ‘shams’, ‘plots’, ‘swindles’ and ‘cover-ups’ (Table 6), of ‘hoodwinking voters’ (Daily Mail, 13/06/16), and talking ‘B*****KS’ (Table 6). Johnson was depicted rubbishing Cameron for claiming to want ‘what is best for our country’ (Figure 12). Cameron was blamed for ‘Project Fear’, a campaign ‘beneath the dignity of Britain’ (The Sun, 14/06/16). He was further accused of being ‘nasty’, ‘toxic’ and ‘vindictive’; of fearmongering over ‘war and genocide’ (Table 6); of attempting to ‘bully and frighten the British people’ and ‘blackmail the elderly’ over pensions (The Express, 13/06/16). The Treasury was blamed for being ‘a pro-Brussels propaganda machine’ (Daily Mail, 14/06/16), for spending £9.3million of ‘taxpayers’ cash on a pro-EU leaflet (Table 6) and of attempting to ‘to scare the pants off the British people’ (Daily Mail, 24/05/16). By scandalising the rest of the establishment, right-wing populist newspapers and politicians distinguish themselves as authoritative and ‘heroic truth-tellers’ (Wodak 2015; Davies 2018). Propaganda accusations helped convince Britain that the allegiances of pro-EU elites were with Brussels, not ‘the people’, and by undermining key figures, the whole establishment was delegitimised (Cap 2016).



Figure 13: Depictions of Nigel Farage and Boris Johnson (of the people)

Constructing the EU: 'a German-led superstate'

The nation may also be defined against external political entities and, for decades, British national identity has been constructed in opposition to perceived threats associated with Brussels (Daddow 2012; Freedon 2016). Some threats are realistic, but like RASIM, the EU also functions as a scapegoat for 'anything wrong with Britain' (Wellings 2012: 23), thereby strengthening the imagined community and fuelling nationalism (Daddow 2012; Freedon 2016).

Continued EU membership and integration were presented as threatening to sovereignty. The EU was described as 'hegemonic', 'shackling', 'bullying' and 'interfering'; a 'regime', 'empire' and 'law making machine'. EU elites were labelled 'arrogant', 'greedy', 'hubristic' and 'federalist ideologues' (Table 8). The EU was blamed for 'meddling' 'too much' in British people's lives, with headlines such as 'breast cancer victims denied lifeline', 'EU wants control of *your* pension', 'EU wants to ban *our* kettles', 'EU destroys British jobs', 'Brits have to do as EU say' and 'plot to seize control of *our* Armed Forces' (Table 8). It was held responsible for the previously mentioned threats associated with RASIM, with headlines such as 'deadly cost of *our* open borders', 'EU wants asylum control', 'EU tells Britain to build more homes', and 'EU threat to family life' (Table 8). It was further blamed for 'letting in' 'terrorists' 'killers' and 'rapists' (Table 4), and Farage was used to authorise this position (Figure 14).



Figure 14: Example of how The Express positioned the EU as a threat

In these examples, the extent to which EU membership undermined Britain's sovereignty, economy, security, identity and way of life was negatively exaggerated. Inclusive rhetoric (e.g. our, your – emphasis added above) was used heavily to consolidate the national community. EU membership is a perceived symbol of decline because Britain continues to define itself upon old-fashioned notions of sovereignty, which overstate its 'greatness' and advocate exceptionalism (Kumar 2003; Böttger and VanLoozen 2012; Calhoun 2017). Any relative loss of sovereignty is experienced as threatening, whilst resistance to further integration and scandalisation of Brussels promotes the unfounded belief that Britain can be the 'great' sovereign nation it once was (Wellings 2012). By sustaining such rhetoric, newspapers legitimise attempts to defend the distinctiveness of the national community (Ivarsflaten 2005), whilst othering 'us' (Britain) from 'them' (Europe) (Tong and Zuo 2018).

The EU was also positioned as a threat to democracy. It was labelled an 'oligarchy' and 'anti-democratic cartel' (Table 8); and accused of being 'undemocratic', 'grotesquely

unaccountable’ and ‘dictatorial’. EU elites were labelled ‘self-serving’, ‘unelected’ and ‘unpopular’ (Table 8). The belief that the EU is somehow not authentically democratic is unfounded (Daddow 2012), but exaggerated press coverage nonetheless fosters misunderstanding and distrust amongst British readers. Key figures across the political spectrum have also espoused such a view, with Cameron suggesting that national parliaments are ‘the true source of real democratic legitimacy’ (Cap 2016: 69) and UKIP advocating ‘British democracy, not Brussels bureaucracy’ (Wellings 2012: 24). Outwardly, restoring the ‘sovereign will of the British people’ was Brexit’s *raison d’être*, as exemplified by the mantra ‘take back control’ (Virdee and McGeever 2017: 1804). Yet, once the people ‘spoke’ – through an all or nothing ballot (Reeves 2016) – continued debate on democracy was shut down, eliding the 62% of the electorate who supported Remain or did not vote into ‘the will of the people’ (Freedon 2016: 7; Elliott 2017).

Collective memories and possible futures

Continuity with past events and traditions makes political decision-making appear legitimate (Cap 2016). Throughout the campaign, collective memories were used to define the limits of acceptable action, and to frame desirable futures (Bonacchi et al. 2018; Manners 2018). However, the future constructed by pro-Leave tabloids relied not on long-accepted pragmatism but on misplaced nostalgia for an imagined past, which offset the ontological insecurity generated by Britain’s perceived fall from ‘greatness’ (Beaumont 2017).




Figure 15: Depiction of key campaign figures through intertextuality

Appeals to tradition featured through intertextual and historical references such as ‘this country’s noble history of giving safe haven to those fleeing war and oppression’ (Daily Mail, 05/05/16), ‘the suffragettes did not fight and die only for power to be surrendered to Brussels’ (Daily Mail, 08/03/16), ‘Migrant army on beaches of D-Day’ and ‘Battle for Britain begins’ (Table 9). Cameron was compared to Neville Chamberlain over his EU deal (Table 9) and depicted as the hapless Captain Mainwaring, in reference to the BBC sitcom ‘Dad’s Army’ (Figure 15) – with the coded implication being that the EU poses a comparable threat to Nazi Germany. Britain has struggled to develop its contemporary identity, so reference points such as World War II, its former empire and the Royal Family continue to be foregrounded in its self-consolidation (Böttger and VanLoozen 2012; Hafiz 2018). This was further exemplified in the misleading headline ‘Queen backs Brexit’ (Figure 17)

and the statement that ‘[inside the EU] Britannia will no longer rule the waves’. The idea that Britain continues to ‘rule the waves’, and the prevalence of wartime romanticism, reflects a wider ignorance of the realities of empire, and the extent to which Britain has not moved on since 1945 (Daddow 2016a; Hafiz 2018).



Figure 16: 'Brexitfast Tea' advert



Figure 17: 'Who will speak for England?'

Figure 16 displays an advert for 'Brexitfast Tea', taken from The Express (11/06/16). This is one example, albeit hyperbolic, of how the right-wing press associated leaving the EU with collective memories, distrust of the pro-EU establishment and British patriotism. In a direct appeal to 'every reader' – itself a parody of wartime propaganda – The Express suggested that Britain 'wants you' to vote Leave, and the prescient image of Johnson outside 10 Downing Street (more than three years before it happened) implied that the anti-EU establishment was destined for political success. Tea is itself a banal symbol of the British nation, which hides complex histories of colonialism (Bell and Valentine 1997). The emblem of The Express is a crusader bearing Saint George's Cross, a symbol of England. It featured heavily in association with their 'crusade' to 'get *us* out of the EU' and was pictured on the White Cliffs of Dover, another symbol of identity, proclaiming '*we* demand *our* country back' (Figure 18). The Daily Mail also connected anti-EU and English nationalist sentiment (Figure 17: 'Who will speak for England?' through reference to Conservative politician Leo Amery's outcry against the appeasement of Nazi Germany in 1939, in which he proclaimed 'speak for England' (Bamfield 2016). The argument that England needs 'speaking for' reflects the burgeoning sentiment that England has been taken for granted and underrepresented within British culture and politics (Condor 2010; Kenny 2012). Inclusive rhetoric, direct appeals to readership and vernacular – the language of 'ordinary people' – help to shape reader subjectivity (Pajakoski 2017). By instructing the reader – *you* – to 'stick it to the EU!' (Table 9), 'get Britain out', 'vote Leave', 'free UK', 'fly the flag for Brexit', and 'beLEAVE in Britain' (Figure 17), each publication connected the act of voting Leave with the interests of the nation – *your country* – and thereby defined the limits of acceptable voting behaviour. Describing Brexit as a 'unique opportunity' (The Sun, 07/06/16) and a 'once-in-a-lifetime decision' (Daily Mail 12/03/16), emphasised that it was down to *you* to realise Britain's 'destiny'. A Remain vote ultimately signalled 'the death knell of *our* nation', having '*our* identity obliterated' and becoming 'nothing more than a German led superstate', whilst a Leave vote signalled 'the trumpet blast of freedom' (The Sun, 23/06/16), 'trading freely with the whole world', restoring '*our* historic right to self government' (The Sun, 14/04/16), 'Britain's resurgence' and 'a great future' (Figure 17). This profoundly unrealistic vision, where all possible futures were reduced to a binary of either collapse or greatness, served to uphold the false choice of Brexit and made it clear what the 'common sense' option was considered to be (Reeves 2016; Bonacchi et al. 2018). Such truth effects were further sustained through the prevalent assertion that Brexit was 'the only way' to 'take back control' of Britain's borders, economy and democracy.



Figure 17: Direct appeals to readers' sense of national pride

Talk of 'trading freely with the whole world' usually implied renewing Old Commonwealth trade links with Britain's 'Anglosphere', which pandered to the desires of those in Britain who do not see themselves as part of Europe culturally (Pajakoski 2017: 26). Such postcolonial melancholia, exemplified in Liam Fox's plans for 'Empire 2.0' and his tweet that Britain 'does not need to bury its 20th century history' (Dorling and Tomlinson 2019a: 56), reflects a wilful occlusion of the British Empire's brutal and racist history, and the ongoing colonial legacies which reinforce uneven capitalist development between the rich elite and the working class – both white and non-white (Andrews 2016; Virdee and McGeever 2017). Ultimately, the right-wing press helped to sustain Britain's selective memory and delusions of grandeur. This provided a short-lived sense of ontological security, by promising to restore Britain back on its natural progression of 'greatness' and fed into the reproduction of national identity and difference (Beaumont 2017; Manners 2018).

Conclusion

In this paper, I have examined the role that three right-wing newspapers played in the discursive construction of British national identity in the four months preceding the 2016 EU referendum. Using Foucauldian Discourse Analysis, I analysed how different social actors and British people were positioned in relation to each other, and the discursive strategies used to achieve this. The narratives presented within The Daily Mail, The Sun and The Express had much in common. Together they constructed a discourse which played on the legitimate fears and anxieties of their readerships by reinforcing antagonism towards RASIM, the pro-EU establishment and the EU. Alongside Britishness, and sometimes Englishness, multiple identities and subjectivities were constructed, often in binary opposition to each other. This

was underpinned by racialised hierarchies of deservingness and belonging, and populist ideas about who could authentically represent the national community.

Each newspaper used a range of discursive strategies to make their arguments persuasive. Metaphorical devices, images and numbers were used outside of their context, to position RASIM and the EU as scapegoats for Britain's real and imagined grievances, and as objects of moral panic which threatened the national community. Scandalisation strategies were used to delegitimise pro-EU opposition whilst intertextual references, references to the authority of key populist figures, and appeals to 'the people' were used to validate the arguments being made. Each newspaper used vernacular, populist rhetoric and inclusive pronouns to position themselves, and key populist figures, as the *only* 'authentic representatives' of their readership. This provided a false and short-lived sense of having been spoken for. With unfounded certainty, each newspaper issued doom-laden warnings about the kind of nation Britain would become if it voted to Remain and, through reference to Britain's history of exceptionalism, they made unrealistic promises about the kind of 'glorious' nation it would *go back* to being following a Leave vote. Together these strategies positioned the act of voting Leave as 'the only way' – the only course of action that was considered relevant, acceptable or 'common sense' and the only option in the nation's interests.

The promise of 'taking back control' provided a short-lived sense of collective self-esteem. This fuelled the construction of British national identity through the reproduction of difference, thus consolidating the national community from an exclusionary standpoint. Whilst the purpose of Brexit was to leave the EU, the divisions and scapegoats constructed by right-wing newspapers and politicians whilst campaigning for it ultimately distracted British people from deliberately harmful political decision making – a far better-founded explanation for social and economic suffering than migration or 'foreign bureaucrats'. These decisions will continue to fall disproportionately on the poor regardless of race or nationality and regardless of whether Britain leaves the EU.

Acknowledgements

My wholehearted thanks go out to Ben Rogaly, my Geography undergraduate thesis supervisor, who supported this project from start to finish. His feedback and suggestions were ever insightful, and his teaching could not have been more relevant to the thesis. I would also like to thank my other third-year lecturers, Ceri and Dan, whose excellent teaching has further broadened my knowledge of all things Geography.

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Appendix: Headline Groupings and Vocabulary

Table 1: Representation of the Migrant Crisis in Numbers

Daily Mail	
20/02/16:	EUROPE: THE REAL CRISIS As PM's deal is picked to pieces, police chief warns of 5,000 jihadis at large and 6,000 migrants enter Greece in 3 days
25/02/16:	1M MORE MIGRANTS ARE ON THEIR WAY As Gove says Britain has no control over who we let in, border chief warns of huge new influx to Europe this year
DAILY EXPRESS	
18/04/16:	BRITAIN 'HAS TOO MANY' MIGRANTS Poll boosts crusade to quit EU
13/05/16:	BRITAIN'S 1.5 MILLION HIDDEN MIGRANTS Quitting the EU is only way to control border
21/05/16:	MICHAEL GOVE: 5 million more migrants on way to Britain
27/05/16:	EU MIGRANT NUMBERS SOAR YET AGAIN Enough is enough ...it's time to give Brussels the boot
THE Sun	
19/04/16:	LET 3M MORE IN UK Migrant surge if we stay in EU
20/06/16:	WE JEZ CAN'T KEEP THEM OUT EU Cap impossible if Remain wins

Table 2: Representation of RASIM through Metaphor

Vocabulary	
chaos, crisis, flocking, flood, hopelessly out of control, mass influx, never-ending stream, pouring, soaring, spiralling, surge, swamped, sweeping, tidal wave, uncontrolled, unlimited, unsustainable, wave	
Daily Mail	
13/04/16:	MIGRANTS SMUGGLED TO UK FOR JUST £100 Revealed: British trafficking gangs making millions from refugee crisis
DAILY EXPRESS	
24/02/16:	MIGRANTS KEEP ON POURING INTO EU 110,000 arrive in 2 months...another good reason to quit
05/03/16:	ASYLUM CLAIMS HIT NEW HIGH Proof the EU has been swamped in last 12 months
06/04/16:	ILLEGAL MIGRANTS FLOODING INTO EU Record 1.8m border breaches in one year

06/05/16:	BRITAIN FACES MIGRANT CHAOS New 'summer of discontent' as thousands plot to storm border
	
30/05/16:	SEA OF MIGRANTS
08/06/16:	Checkpoint Charlies Euro judges 'open floodgates to illegals'

Table 3: Representation of RASIM as Victims

	
05/05/16:	Victory for compassion After Mail highlights their plight, PM pledges sanctuary for child refugees suffering along in European camps
	
26/05/16:	MIGRANTS IN BOAT HORROR
30/05/16:	Migrant crisis in the channel People-smugglers target UK by boat as 700 more drown crossing the Med
04/06/16:	THERE WILL BE BODIES ON OUR BEACHES Farage predicts migrant mayhem in the Channel
	
26/05/16:	MAYDAY <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 5 dead, 33 missing after boat capsizes • Navy pluck 6,000 from Med in 48hrs

Table 4: Representation of RASIM as Villains/Threats

Vocabulary		
Socioeconomic Threat: exploitative, health tourists, jobless, welfare tourists		
Criminal Threat: army, brazen, criminals, crooks, dangerous, drug dealers, extremists, foreign crooks, illegals, invaders, murderers, paedophiles, rapists, robbers, sneaking, stowaways, terrorists, thugs, would-be jihadis		
Generalised Threat		
	11/03/16:	ARCHBISHOP: IT ISN'T RACIST TO FEAR MIGRATION
	20/05/16:	Outrageous! Pro-EU MP brands voter 'racist' over migrant concerns
	25/02/16:	FRENCH TO LET MIGANTS HEAD FOR BRITAIN Outrage at threat to scrap border checks in Calais
	19/03/16:	WE CAN'T STOP MIGRANTS
	14/06/16:	PROOF WE CAN'T STOP MIGRANTS Five million new EU citizens have been given right to enter Britain

Socioeconomic Threat		
Daily Mail	25/03/16:	NHS SIGNS UP <u>MORE</u> FOREIGN NURSES With 14,000 more on way, bosses accused of using cheap labour
	26/05/16:	ENGLAND'S POPULATION TO RISE BY 4MILLION IN EIGHT YEARS
	27/05/16:	RECORD NUMBER OF JOBLESS EU MIGRANTS IN BRITAIN Hammer blow for PM as 270,000 EU nationals came here last year
	14/06/16:	BREXIT POLL AS MIGRATION FEARS GROW Out camp takes 7-point lead amid warnings of UK population surge
DAILY EXPRESS	29/02/16:	NEW JOBLESS MIGRANTS BENEFIT SCANDAL Almost £1bn is paid out in just one year
	16/03/16:	New fears over UK's baby boom Birth rate surge puts huge strain on public services
	02/04/16:	MIGRANT MOTHERS COST NHS £1.3BN Leaving EU would relieve strain on public services
	09/05/16:	MIGRANTS WILL PAY MORE FOR NHS New charges for A&E and prescriptions
	16/05/16:	SOARING COST OF TEACHING MIGRANT CHILDREN £3bn bill 'another reason to quit EU'
	17/05/16:	MIGRANTS COST BRITAIN £17BN A YEAR And getting out of the EU would slash bill by £1.2 billion
	19/05/16:	MIGRANT WORKER NUMBERS SURGE Mass EU migration blamed for keeping British wages low
	11/06/16:	MIGRANT CRISIS WILL COST £20BN Experts reveal shock price the EU has to pay
THE Sun	19/05/16:	BRITS NOT FAIR! 4 in 5 jobs go to foreigners
Criminal Threat		
Daily Mail	06/04/16:	'STAGGERING' NUMBER OF EUROPEAN JIHADISTS EU's own agency admits terrorists are exploiting migrant crises as illegal border crossings hit record 1.82m
	03/06/16:	EU KILLERS AND RAPISTS WE'VE FAILED TO DEPORT UK's failure to expel thousands of foreign criminals undermines case for EU, say MPs
DAILY EXPRESS	12/03/16:	KICK OUT FOREIGN CROOKS
	23/03/16:	7 MIGRANTS AN HOUR TRY TO SNEAK INTO BRITAIN
	23/05/16:	SCANDAL OF MIGRANT CRIMEWAVE ON OUR STREETS
	01/06/16:	MIGRANTS PAY JUST £100 TO INVADe BRITAIN Organised gangs ferry them across the Channel

	02/06/16:	THE INVADERS Sneaky migrants set up tents on French cliffs waiting for boats to smuggle them into Britain to join their mates
	03/06/16:	20,000 MIGRANTS READY TO SNEAK INTO BRITAIN
	10/06/16:	MIGRANT SEIZED EVERY 6 MINUTES Yet more evidence of Britain's border security shambles
	29/03/16:	EU LETS KILLERS INTO UK
	01/06/16:	HAUL ABOARD <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Migrant boat crooks on CCTV • Brit smugglers' £140k per trip • 100s of illegals feared here
	21/06/16:	LET US IN BEFORE YOU VOTE OUT Illegals storm ferry port to UK

Table 5: Representation of Specific Nationalities

Romanians		
	30/03/16:	YOU PAY FOR ROMA GYPSY PALACES Another reason to quit EU
Polish		
	10/03/16:	POLE CHANCERS Migrants' guide to raking in UK benefits
Albanians		
	02/06/16:	TRAFFICKERS' £3K EBAY BOAT EXCLUSIVE: Gang who smuggled 18 Albanians across channel bought inflatable online just 4 days earlier
Turks		
	13/02/16:	IF TURKEY IS IN WE'RE OUT Voters' verdict on plan to let 77 million more join EU
	05/05/16:	EU OPENS DOOR TO 79M FROM TURKEY Britain faces fresh influx of migrants
	22/05/16:	12M TURKS SAY THEY'LL COME TO UK Those planning to move are either unemployed or students according to shock new poll
	23/05/16:	Brexit MP: Britain can't stop Turkey joining EU
	13/06/16:	1million Turks to the UK
Syrians		
	14/04/16:	OUTRAGE SYRIAN REFUGEES TO COST UK £589M

Table 6: Representation of Pro-EU Establishment & Key Campaign Figures

Pro-EU Establishment		
	07/03/16:	AN HONEST MAN 'KNIFED BY N010'

Daily Mail		Downing St accused over ousting of anti-EU business chief
	12/03/16:	TELL US TRUE NUMBER OF EU MIGRANTS Whitehall covering up shocking figure ahead of EU poll, says MP's
	07/04/16:	£9m for pro-EU leaflet in homes
	09/04/16:	160,000 REJECT PRO-EU LEAFLET
	13/05/16:	The 800,000 migrant toll they tried to cover up
	31/05/16:	UK'S OPEN COASTLINE SHAMBLES: 4 MISSED WARNINGS Ministers' 'staggering complacency'
	13/06/16:	FURY OVER PLOT TO LET 1.5M TURKS INTO BRITAIN No.10 accused of cover-up before Brexit vote
DAILY EXPRESS	06/06/16:	'COVER-UP' OVER MIGRANTS SNEAKING INTO UK Fury as data on illegals is kept hidden
THE Sun	26/02/16:	THE GREAT MIGRANT CON <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Figures say 257k came to UK from EU • But 630k registered to work in 2015
	13/05/16:	GREAT MIGRANT SWINDLE <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 800,000 to UK from EU last year • Number is 3 TIMES official total

David Cameron

Daily Mail	22/02/16:	Boris goes in for the kill <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dagger blow to Cameron as Johnson backs EU Exit • He texted decision to No10 just minutes before going public • PM tried to buy him off with top Cabinet job
	23/02/16:	NOW CAMERON TURNS NASTY PM's savage attack on Boris for backing out campaign
	09/05/16:	EU VOTE: PM NOW WARNS OF WAR AND GENOCIDE Cameron's extraordinary intervention
	13/05/16:	WHAT ARE YOU SO SCARED OF, DAVE? PM under fire for ducking TV debate with Brexit Tories
	17/05/16:	EXPOSED: CAMERON'S EU SHAM Leaked letter reveals PM hatched anti-Brexit plot ... while still telling voters he could campaign to leave
	23/05/16:	Cameron's guru: Why we MUST quit the EU
	24/05/16:	KNIVES OUT FOR CAMERON Tories threaten no-confidence vote over PM's 'shabby' Brexit scaremongering
	28/05/16:	CAMERON'S SHOCK ADMISSION WE WILL THRIVE OUTSIDE THE EU
	30/05/16:	LEO McKINSTRY HOW CAN VOTERS TRUST ANYTHING CAMERON SAYS ABOUT THE EU?
	11/06/16:	ARISE SIR REMAIN!

		Cameron accused of tainting Queen's birthday honours by dishing out gongs for pro-EU bosses
	21/06/16:	CAMERON'S Migration DECEPTION PM knew FOUR years ago he'd never meet immigration target while inside EU, reveals former closest aide
DAILY EXPRESS	03/03/16:	CAMERON'S EU DEAL DISASTER New poll says 129,000 still want to quit
	25/05/16:	CAMERON HAS MOST TO LOSE FROM EU SCARE CAMPAIGN
	09/06/16:	OUTRAGE AT BID TO 'RIG' EU VOTE Row as Cameron backs extending voters' deadline
	12/06/16:	PANIC GRIPS DOWNING STREET <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Brexit surge forces desperate rethink • 'Toxic' Cameron told to take a back seat • Labour drafted in to win over the North • Secret contingency plans for leaving EU
	13/06/16:	FURY AT PM'S EU PENSION THREAT Now 'vindictive' Cameron tries Brexit blackmail
	27/02/16:	Priti blasts PM on EU
	02/03/16:	PM pal's backing for Brexit
	14/04/16:	Boris: PM is talking b*****s
	27/04/16:	CAM'S GROUP TEXT SCANDAL Aides use WhatsApp to keep EU plot secret
	04/05/16:	PM ban 'hits just 1 in ten migrants'
	09/05/16:	PM: BREXIT 'WW3'
	22/05/16:	PM: BREXIT HITS PRICES
	05/06/16:	BORIS: you can't trust pm
	22/06/16:	THE SUN SAYS 'Don't put your trust in David Cameron... vote Leave tomorrow'
George Osborne		
Daily Mail	19/04/16:	OSBORNE'S 3M MIGRANT BOMBSHELL Tories savage Chancellor over EU 'propaganda' dossier that admits Britain's population will soar
	28/05/16:	WHY STAYING <u>IN</u> EUROPE COULD HARM YOUR PENSION After Osborne warns of risk to pensions if Britain leaves EU, experts now say...
DAILY EXPRESS	17/03/16:	OUTRAGE OVER PRO-EU BUDGET Chancellor's speech leaves bitter taste despite his tax sweeteners
	20/02/16:	Osborne fights for political survival
	13/04/16:	OSBORNE SPARKS FURY OVER EU EXIT CLAIMS
	19/04/16:	NONSENSE! TREASURY'S EU EXIT SUMS DON'T ADD UP

	16/06/16:	OUTRAGE AT PLOT TO RAISE OUR TAXES Osborne 'is finished' over his plan for EU punishment budget
	23/05/16:	Osborne recession claim row
	24/05/16:	NEVER MIND THE B*****KS • Tory MP's X-rated rant at Osbo • Two ministers in threat to quit
Barack Obama		
DAILY EXPRESS	23/04/16:	OBAMA'S AMAZING THREAT TO BRITAIN Outrage at his scaremongering over EU exit vote
THE Sun	23/04/16:	OBAMA IN EU THREAT

Table 7: Representation of Anti-EU Establishment

Daily Mail	
01/06/16:	Immigration revolution! Boris and Gove: We'll bring in tough Australian style points system to slash arrivals from EU
DAILY EXPRESS	
16/02/16:	Why Ann Widdecombe is voting for Britain to quit the EU
20/02/16:	GOVE TO LEAD US OUT OF EU
22/02/16:	BORIS: I'LL GET US OUT OF EU Big boost for Daily Express crusade
23/02/16:	BORIS BOOSTS FIGHT TO QUIT EU He could swing Britain's exit says expert pollster
25/03/16:	TRUMP BRITAIN WILL LEAVE EU Brussels' barmy migration rules will lead to Brexit
26/03/16:	BUSINESS LEADERS WANT OUT OF EU 250 top bosses back vote to break free from Brussels
01/04/16:	Boris is now hot favourite to be the next pm
10/05/16:	BORIS: IT'S MAD TO STAY IN THE EU Johnson blasts claim that Brexit will spark conflict
01/06/16:	NEW POLL REVEALS DRAMATIC SWING TO BREXIT
19/06/16:	WHY WE MUST LEAVE THE EU
THE Sun	
04/06/16:	£100m a week for NHS vow

Table 8: Representation of European Establishment & Elites

Vocabulary	
Elites:	arrogant, bureaucrats, eurocrats, faceless bureaucrats, fat cats, federalist ideologues, foreign bureaucrats, greedy, hapless, hubristic,

incompetent, lying, old men, secretive, self-serving, unaccountable, unelected, unpopular

Establishment: ancien régime, anti-democratic cartel, anti-enterprise, anti-trade, arrogant, bloated, breathtakingly incompetent, broken, Brussels club, Brussels machine, Brussels regime, bullying, bureaucratic club, bureaucratic, catastrophic, corrupt, destroyer of jobs, destructive, dictatorial, dying, dysfunctional club, dysfunctional, economic sinkhole, edifice built on lies, empire, EU law making machine, EU regime, failed project, false, German dominated federal state, German-led superstate, gravy train, greedy, grotesquely unaccountable, hegemonic, hungry, incompetent, inefficient, interfering, intransigent, job transfer machine, oligarchy, one size fits all, outdated, powerful, sclerotic, secretive, shackling, statist, throttling, unaccountable, undemocratic, wasteful

Daily Mail

29/03/16:	DEADLY COST OF OUR OPEN BORDERS Catalogue of UK murders and rapes by criminals let in under EU rules
20/04/16:	EU BOSS: WE DO MEDDLE TOO MUCH Juncker finally admits the truth on bloated Brussels
20/05/16:	MIGRANTS SPARK HOUSING CRISIS Now EU tells Britain to build more homes as open borders send population soaring
07/06/16:	BREAST CANCER VICTIMS DENIED LIFELINE Wonder drug fast-tracked in US is held up by EU and NHS red tape
08/06/16:	WHAT A WAY TO TACKLE MIGRANT CRISIS! EU's plan to control influx – invite <u>more</u> from Africa and Middle East

DAILY EXPRESS

21/02/16:	'EU IS STUCK IN THE PAST' Michael Gove's withering attack on Brussels in flying start for Out campaign
27/02/16:	MIGRANT CRISIS WILL KILL OFF EU
28/02/16:	EUROPE TURNS AGAINST THE EU Fresh boost for exit campaign as strong anti-Brussels feelings soar in 25 out of 28 member countries
04/03/16:	MIGRANTS TOLD: KEEP OUT OF EU Panic as Brussels admits defeat over border crisis
08/03/16:	NOW EU WANTS ASYLUM CONTROL Madness as Brussels plots to tell us who can come and stay in our country
01/04/16:	EU SPEND MORE ON SPIN THAN FIGHTING TERROR
11/04/16:	EU WANTS CONTROL OF YOUR PENSION Brussels' secret plan revealed

20/04/16:	BRUSSELS BOSS: EU FACES RUIN We interfere too much, admits President
24/04/16:	Britain is Europe's £176billion cashpoint
04/05/16:	GERMAN PUSH FOR EU ARMY Plot to seize control of our Armed Forces
12/05/16:	NOW EU WANT TO BAN OUR KETTLES Toasters and hairdryers also targets
24/05/16:	EU THREAT TO FAMILY LIFE UK mothers set to back Brexit over fears for children's future
26/05/16:	DAVID DAVIS The EU destroys British jobs
20/06/16:	NEW EU TAX RAID ON BRITAIN Soaring cost of staying in is revealed as PM heckled on TV
21/06/16:	EU 'VERY BAD' FOR PENSIONS Yet another good reason to break free from Brussels



15/04/16:	BRITS HAVE TO DO AS EU SAY
25/04/16:	May: EU can't stop migrants'
02/05/16:	Euro MPs take home £1m each
10/05/16:	CAM'S IN HER HANDS Merkel secretly bossed his EU deal
31/05/16:	BREXIT 'TO CUT POWER BILLS'
15/06/16:	TIME TO MOTHBALL THE EU (vote leaf to protect our country...and our cabbages) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Remain poll lead collapses • Brexit rocket boost to shares • ..And nasty euro moths hit UK

Table 9: Collective Memories & Possible Futures

Daily Mail

20/06/16:	PM's TV mauling over migration Cameron jeered and compared to Neville Chamberlain for hailing his EU deal a success
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DAILY EXPRESS

06/03/16:	EU SEEKS CONTROL OF OUR COASTS Britannia will no longer rule the waves as Brussels threatens our island sovereignty
14/04/16:	NOW BATTLE FOR BRITAIN BEGINS Crusade to quit EU takes huge leap forward
16/04/16:	This great window sticker free inside today STICK IT TO THE EU!
22/06/16:	Free for every reader Brexit poster inside

22/06/16:	Queen issues EU challenge Give me 3 good reasons to stay, she asks guests
	
12/03/16:	Migrant army on beaches of D-Day
22/06/16:	GIVE ME 3 GOOD REASONS TO STAY IN EUROPE Sorry Ma'am, we can't think of ONE