Cyprus as a Multi-Diasporic Space

Working Paper No 67

Janine Teeerling and Russell King
Sussex Centre for Migration Research, University of Sussex

August 2011
Abstract

This paper presents a detailed overview of migratory phenomena as they affect the island of Cyprus. There are several distinct yet overlapping migrations away from, into, and within the ‘divided island’, making it a multi-diasporic island space. We demonstrate how islands such as Cyprus can be used as ‘spatial laboratories’ for the intensive study of migratory and diasporic phenomena. The relative scale of migration is one of the highest in the EU-27: an ‘emigrant stock’ of 150,000, equivalent to 17 per cent of the island’s population, and an immigrant stock of 154,000, out of a total island population of 900,000. The paper reviews the various ‘migration realities’ of Cyprus: emigration during the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, largely to the UK but also to North America, Australia and South Africa; return migration, both of the first-generation emigrants as ‘retirees’ and of the second generation as well-educated professionals wishing to relocate to their parental homeland; the British (post-)colonial migrants, who are soldiers connected to the military bases on the island and largely retired ‘expats’; and ‘new immigrants’ from a wide diversity of origins, including East European labour migrants and sex workers, Russian businessmen, Palestinian refugees, and Sri Lankan and Filipino domestic workers. A separate set of migration dynamics – both internal and external – has resulted from the 1974 partition of the island and more recent moves to open up the Green Line dividing the Turkish and Greek sectors. In the final sections of the paper we re-examine the concept of Cyprus as a multi-diasporic island space of inter-migrant and inter-cultural encounter, drawing on some specific examples.

Introduction

This paper can be seen as a prolegomenon to a research project on Cyprus as a case-study of an insular, multi-diasporic space. Its guiding hypothesis is that islands, especially those which are large enough to have sustained a distinct historical and political identity, yet at the same time small enough so that a specific and relatively uniform island identity exists, are uniquely instructive geographical spaces for the study of migratory phenomena.

The enhanced attraction of Cyprus as a spatial laboratory for the study of migration and diaspora is that it encompasses multiple dimensions of movement, both outward in the form of emigration (until the 1970s) and inward in the form of immigration (especially since the 1990s). But that is not all. Its complex migration processes are framed by many geopolitical contexts – British colonial and postcolonial history, its position on the outer periphery of Europe yet close to the Middle East, its membership of the European Union, and, perhaps most significant of all, its de facto division since 1974 into two states, a ‘Turkish’ north and a ‘Greek’ south. As will be described in a little more detail later on, the division resulted from an imminent threat that the newly-independent Cyprus would unify with Greece, which prompted Turkey to invade the island to safeguard its independent integrity; but the result, somewhat ironically, was the fracturing of the island in two.

This territorial and ethnic schism has created not only its own dynamics of population migration and displacement, centred around the forced ‘exchange’ of populations in the mid-1970s (Greek Cypriots in the occupied north fleeing south, Turkish Cypriots resident in the south being transported to the north), but has also set in place two quasi-independent entities, each with its own external migration dynamics, especially regarding immigration. Recent population mobility within the island also presents a changing picture. For three decades the two ‘sides’ were almost hermetically sealed off from each other. Recent attempts at a political rapprochement, especially urgent since
Cyprus joined the EU in 2004, have seen some openings punched in the previously impregnable ‘Green Line’ separating the two communities, and cross-border movements are now possible for large sections of the island’s population.

This paper brings together the respective experiences and interests in Cyprus of the two authors, one a long-standing engagement, the other more recent. In compiling this documentary overview of the complex ‘migration story’ of Cyprus, we aim to set a research agenda for further work, based above all on the theoretical and practical attraction of islands as key nodes within overlaying migration systems and diasporas. Russell King’s research on Cyprus dates back thirty or so years to field studies on the political and settlement geography of population displacements consequent upon the division of the island (see King and Ladbury 1982, 1988), as well as a mapping exercise on the changing spatial distribution of Cypriots in London (King and Bridal 1982). Janine Teerling’s research centres around her Sussex DPhil thesis about the ‘return’ of British-born second-generation Cypriots to Cyprus (2010) as well as papers deriving therefrom (Teerling 2011, 2012). This doctoral research was attached to a larger AHRC-funded project on ‘counter-diasporic return’ to Greece based at the Sussex Centre for Migration Research and directed by Russell King (see King and Christou 2008).

Recent data published by the World Bank (2011: 102) show that Cyprus is an emigration and immigration country in almost equal measure. The ‘stock’ of emigrants, 149,600, represents 17% of the Cypriot population of just over 900,000; the immigrant total, 154,300, is equivalent to 17.5% of the country’s population. As with all migration statistics, the accuracy of these figures is open to question. One immediate perplexity is whether the World Bank data includes figures for Turkish North Cyprus, now known as the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ (TRNC) but not recognised as such. Probably they do not for immigrants, since immigration has mainly taken place post-partition, and Turks are not listed amongst the top ten immigrant groups, even though it is widely known that there has been a substantial migration of ‘mainland’ Turks to North Cyprus since 1974.

In terms of its broad migration trends, Cyprus can be seen as a late addition to that distinctive group of Southern European countries (Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal) which has experienced a dramatic ‘migration turnaround’ in recent decades – from mass emigration during the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s, to mass immigration during the 1980s and, especially, in the 1990s and 2000s (King et al. 1997; King and Thomson 2008). Cyprus has all the classic features of what has been called the ‘Southern European model of immigration’ (King 2000: 6-19). These features include worker immigration from a wide diversity of countries in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, South and South-East Asia, and Africa; retirement migration from Northern Europe; an economic link between labour migration and a post-industrial, tertiarised economy dominated by private services, tourism, construction and intensive agriculture; an immigrant labour market which is segmented into gendered and racialised niches; and a proliferation of informal labour practices which are weighted in favour of the employer and against the rights of the migrant worker.

Comparative EU data show that Cyprus has witnessed, proportionate to its population, the largest-scale immigration in recent years. Of the EU27, Cyprus had the highest rate of net immigration during the mid-late 2000s (followed by Spain and Ireland), a

---

1 In order of importance these are the UK, Australia, Greece, Turkey, the US, Canada, Germany, France, Jordan, Sweden.

2 Which are: UK, Greece, Georgia, Russia, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Bulgaria, Romania, Egypt, South Africa.
statistical fact that is all the more remarkable given that Cyprus also has the highest rate of emigration in the EU (compare the graphs in van Nimwegen and van der Erf 2010: 1361, 1370). Cyprus ranks high on two other indicators of immigration: population with foreign citizenship (second only after Luxembourg) and population with foreign birth (third after Luxembourg and Ireland). These indicators are, once again, all the more revealing bearing in mind the recency of immigration into Cyprus compared to most other countries of Western Europe, whose mass immigration dates back to the early postwar decades.

Islands, migration and diasporas

The above data and trends leave no doubt that Cyprus has an intense and multiplex relationship with migration, both past and present. It is a fountain-head of a widespread diaspora, mainly located in Anglophone countries of the ‘old’ commonwealth (in this respect it is similar to its sibling former British colony of Malta), and it is a setting for overlapping migrations from many countries worldwide. Like many of the larger Mediterranean islands (Sicily, Sardinia, Majorca, Malta, Crete, etc.), it has an expanding population, driven nowadays by in-migration linked to a prosperous service and tourist economy (King and Kolodny 2001: 246-247). It thus has a different demographic profile from most of the smaller islands of the Mediterranean (the lesser Greek islands, the Dalmatian islands etc.) and elsewhere in the world where remoteness, marginality, small size and slender resource base have combined to cause more or less continuous out-migration and depopulation in the modern era (Connell and King 1999; Cruz et al. 1987).

The notion of islands as multi-diasporic spaces derives from new thinking about the nature of migration and diasporic formations, and from newly-strategic roles that islands play in the geopolitics and flow dynamics of migrations between countries of different types and levels of development. Let us unpack this dense and rather bold statement.

First, we distinguish between three types of islands administratively and geographically. The first type are islands which ‘belong’ to a larger ‘mainland’ country to which they are often a peripheral region or space (e.g. the Azores, Corsica or the Outer Hebrides). However, if these ‘peripheral’ islands are close to another country, and especially if they are close to a migrant-supply area or route, from which high ‘migrant pressure’ emanates, then such islands acquire enormous geo-strategic significance in the evolving patterns of migrant flows to, or through, the islands, which are seen as stepping-stones to the mainland or to some larger, highly desirable, destination such as the EU. The most obvious cases here, in recent years, have been the Canary Islands, located close to the coast of North-West Africa, and Lampedusa, en route from Tunisia and Libya to Italy and beyond.

The second type is made up of islands which are sovereign states. In the Mediterranean arena, Malta and Cyprus are prime examples; there are several cases in the Caribbean and elsewhere, including many which are archipelago-states (the largest is Indonesia). Such island-states have autonomous control over their in and out migration flows, at least in theory. But again geographical proximity to a major sending bloc – such as Malta to Africa – may put enormous pressure on the ability of the island to manage such flows without outside assistance (again the case of Malta is emblematic – see King 2009: 69-75).

The third type is a much more select group: islands which are divided into two states. Cyprus is a case point, although obviously there are different interpretations over the
political reality and international legitimacy of the Turkish Cypriot breakaway state (King and Ladbury 1982). The other classic example is the Dominican Republic and Haiti, which share the Caribbean island of Hispaniola. The point here is that division sets up migration dynamics between the two constituent parts (e.g. from North to South Cyprus, and from very poor Haiti to not-so-poor Dominican Republic – on this latter case see Fletcher and Miller 2004).

The second element that derives from our earlier broad-sweep statement concerns the way in which migration nowadays is conceived as a variety of processes, driven by multiple forces and triggers, with a range of outcomes, and an increasing differentiation of mobility (see Adey 2010; Urry 2007). So, alongside ‘conventional’ labour migration, such as Cypriots’ migration to the UK in the 1950s and 1960s or Sri Lankan women moving to Cyprus to work in domestic service in recent years, we have ‘lifestyle’ and ‘tourist’ migrations, student migration, return migration, onward migration, circular migration, business migration etc., as well as the arrival on islands (and elsewhere) of refugees (political, economic, environmental) fleeing desperate circumstances in their home countries.

The third element has to do with the special nature of islands as micro-laboratories for the study of migration processes, and especially the interactions, not only between migrants and ‘natives’ but also between different migrant groups. An island, and its smaller towns and cities (smaller, that is, than those on mainland countries/territories), is a more ‘intimate’ space creating a more relaxed and fertile setting for inter-ethnic encounters. This paper will demonstrate how ‘new cultural spaces of belonging’ (Teerling 2011) have emerged via everyday encounters between various migrant, expatriate, exile, returnee and native groups. These new spaces of inter-ethnic cultural encounter raise valuable and intriguing questions about ongoing global and local social transformations, and call for a new focus on alternatives to so-called ‘ethnic enclaves’ on the one hand and ‘clashes’ expected to arise between ‘immigrants’ and ‘natives’ on the other. These types of experiences are based on cross- and multi-cultural socialities and inter-migrant interactions which are developed and located in Cyprus as a new cultural space of belonging and identification.

From these histories of multiple migrations, resulting in experiences of intercultural conflict and mixing, derives the hypothesis of Cyprus as a ‘multi-diasporic space’, or as a home for various ‘multi-diasporic spaces’. Unlike the rather placeless transnational fields which, although established across national borders, are often based on, and maintain, common cultural or ethno-national characteristics, the multi-diasporic spaces proposed here are geographically localised. Extending Brah’s (1996) concept of diaspora space, which focuses on a space shared by immigrants and natives, a multi-diasporic space derives from the interactions and relationships between members of various migrant and non-migrant groups, including inter-migrant encounters.

**Migration realities of Cyprus**

Cyprus has a long history of religious and cultural diversity. References to the multi-religious and ‘multi-cultural’ character of the island go back to medieval times (Varnava 2010). More recently, during the 20th century, Cyprus has frequently hosted refugees escaping war and disaster. Indeed, ‘it is common amongst Cypriot liberal intellectual circles to refer to and celebrate the island’s multicultural character’ (Philippou, 2008: 189). Yet, these references tend to privilege the established ethnic communities or religious

---

4 Although, having said that, the history of Greek-Turkish intercommunal conflict in Cyprus would seem to contradict this statement.

5 Such as the Armenians, Asia Minor Greeks, Egyptian Greeks, Jews in transit from Europe to Palestine and Lebanese fleeing the civil war.
groups of Cyprus – Greeks, Turks, Armenians, Latins and Maronites – which enjoy some degree of representation and have religious and secular institutions of their own, due to their long presence on the island. The thousands of new migrants, on the other hand, who have arrived on the island over the past two decades tend to be excluded from this definition of ‘multiculturalism’, simply being dismissed as non-Cypriot communities or even non-communities at all (Philippou 2008). Having said that, the complex historical and current situation of the Armenians, Latins and Maronites in Cyprus should by no means be disregarded or downplayed. Indeed, as pointed out by Costas Constantinou (2007: 248), ‘the most disturbing thing about being a Cypriot is that one can only be a Greek or a Turkish Cypriot’, as being simply and solely Cypriot is ‘a constitutional impossibility’. In the 1960 constitution, Armenians, Latins and Maronites were termed ‘religious minorities’ and were forced, at independence, to become members of either dominant community. Hence, who is ‘Greek’ or ‘Turk’ is based on religious beliefs, rather than on cultural or linguistic markers. The position of the Gypsies (or Roma) is even more precarious and ambivalent, as they did not choose either ‘side’, with the result that ‘Muslim’ Gypsies were officially branded ‘Turk’ and ‘Christian’ Gypsies ‘Greek’. Consequently, and unlike the Armenians, Latins and Maronites, they have no official organisations, hence no cultural rights and are – like elsewhere in the world – victims of marginalisation and discrimination (Constantinou 2007; Varnava 2010). We do acknowledge the ‘internal exclusion’ (Varnava 2010) and discrimination suffered by the established minorities in Cyprus, as well as the associated historical and political developments which brought about a static and artificial bi-communal system and ethnic homogenisation on the island (Constantinou 2007). However, this is a discussion that extends way beyond the scope of this paper, which is on the variegated and dynamic history in terms of socio-economic and migration patterns, and the various ‘waves’ of migration Cyprus has experienced in recent decades – from the development and the ‘return’ of the Cypriot diaspora to the arrival of new migrants to the island – and how these ‘non-communities’ (cf. Philippou 2008) transform and contribute to the social and cultural fabric of today’s Cyprus.

As a former British colony, Cyprus has been a source of emigrants living across the Anglophone world for several decades, with the largest community in the UK. Economic motives were the main push factor for migration from Cyprus during the 1950s and 1960s, while another wave of migration took place after the partition of the island in 1974. It was the Turkish occupation which, paradoxically, created the preconditions for rapid ‘modernisation’ and economic development in southern Cyprus, as the cheap labour initially provided by the Greek-Cypriot displaced persons who had fled from the north and settled in the south presented a stimulus for rapid development (while the inhabitants of the Turkish Cypriot northern ‘side’ found themselves living in isolation and poverty). Later on, in order to accommodate the economic revival in southern Cyprus, on its way to becoming a prosperous service society – as well as the native Cypriots’ increasing unwillingness to work in menial jobs – foreign workers were attracted to the island. During the last three decades Cyprus has experienced a ‘migration reversal’, transforming from a country traditionally exporting migrants into a society which hosts immigrants from many different countries. Today Cyprus has a large migrant population, from labourers, to professionals and entrepreneurs, as well as ‘expat’ retired persons. Migrants come from a remarkable variety of source countries, in Europe (both Western and Eastern), the Middle East, Africa, and South and East Asia. Additionally, Cyprus has seen a significant wave of return migration from the UK (and other Anglophone countries) of first-, second- and third-generation migrants, who are now confronted with a ‘homeland’ which has changed from a modest rural society into a modernised
capitalist state, indeed, Cyprus has transformed itself ‘from an agricultural economy to a kind of “post-industrial society” based on tourism and services without ever really going through an “industrial” phase’ (Trimikliniotis 2008: 13).

In May 2004, Cyprus became one of the latest members to join the European Union. It is also one of the latecomers to the ‘migration reversal’ described above, a phenomenon experienced somewhat earlier by other Southern European countries, such as Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal. Subsequently, the academic literature written on this development has primarily focused on these, much larger, countries (see for example Katrougalos and Lazaridis 2003; King et al. 1997; Ribas-Mateos 2004; but also King and Thomson 2008). What follows is an overview of these various migration ‘waves’ Cyprus has seen over the years, starting with the Cypriot diaspora itself.

**The development of the Cypriot diaspora**

Emigration from Cyprus in the early postwar decades was primarily economically motivated, but it took place against a political landscape which was shifting rapidly at two levels: the decolonisation process which was impacting former British colonial territories around the world, and inter-ethnic tensions within Cyprus between the numerically dominant Greek Cypriots and the less numerous Turkish Cypriots. A brief overview of these political and military events is necessary to set the emigration in its local and post-colonial context.

The British colonial period, which began in 1878 (after three centuries of Ottoman rule) and ended in 1960, was followed by a rise of Greek and Turkish nationalism. Greek Cypriots strove for enosis, the union of Cyprus with Greece, whilst Turkish Cypriots initially preferred the continuation of British rule and later called for taksim, the partition of the island.6 This opposition, and the British policies of aggravating divisions, led to violent confrontations between the two major ethnic groups (Xydis 1973). The end of British colonial rule led to the establishment of an independent state, the Republic of Cyprus, with a population of 80% Greek Cypriots and 18% Turkish Cypriots. The political outcome of independence supposedly guaranteed by the checks and balances written into the 1960 constitution was seen ‘as a compromise solution reflecting the opposed interests of the two antagonistic ethnic groups […] and of foreign powers that included Turkey, Greece, and Britain’ (Papadakis et al. 2006: 2). However, this was hardly a solution to the growing ethnic discord and both ethnic groups continued to pursue their separate political objectives. Consequently, three years after Cyprus was declared independent, inter-ethnic violence erupted throughout the island, lasting until 1967. During this period, the Turkish Cypriots suffered the greater losses in terms of casualties. Many abandoned their homes and were displaced to areas that gradually became armed enclaves under Turkish-Cypriot administration (Papadakis 1998; Purcell 1969).

By 1967 the Greek-Cypriot leadership began to gradually distance itself from the aim of union with Greece and started moving ‘toward the goal of re-establishing political stability in Cyprus and safeguarding the island from secessionist Turkish-Cypriot demands’ (Papadakis et al. 2006: 3). Later that year, however, conflicts were rekindled when a pro-enosis military junta took control of the government in Greece. Along with radical Cypriot pro-union factions (calling themselves EOKA B), the Greek Junta staged a coup against Archbishop Makarios, then the president of the

---

6 From 1955, the Greek Cypriot enosis struggle brought about an armed uprising led by EOKA (National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters), whilst in 1958 Turkish Cypriots established their own armed organisation, TMT (Turkish Resistance Organisation). From then onwards another violent – and largely unacknowledged – conflict started taking place, which persisted for much of the rest of the 20th century, this time within each ethnic group, between forces of the Right and the Left (see Papadakis et al. 2006).
republic, on 15 July 1974. Five days later, Turkey intervened militarily. The invasion divided the island and Greek Cypriots fled en masse to the south whilst Turkish Cypriots subsequently moved to the northern third of the island, which was now under Turkish occupation. This time, Greek Cypriots suffered the heavier human loss, as thousands of people were killed, missing and displaced. In fact, the number of displaced people accounted for almost one-third of the total Greek-Cypriot population (Loizos 1981).

The above brief sketch of the political conflicts which have affected Cyprus should be borne in mind throughout what follows. Let us now return to the post-1945 'migration story'.

As a former UK colony, many Cypriots – both Greek and Turkish – migrated to the UK, as well as to other Commonwealth destinations including Australia, South Africa, Canada and the United States. It is estimated that the number of Cypriots living abroad approximates half the population of the island (Anthias 1992; Trimikliniotis and Demetriou 2007; see Robins and Aksoy 2001 for Turkish Cypriots). The UK was a preferred choice during this period of postwar emigration for various reasons, such as familiarity with the colonial power and the economic boom in Britain at the time, whilst Cyprus was moving into a sphere of greater political uncertainty and experiencing rural economic deprivation. Therefore, the (rather limited) literature on the Cypriot diaspora mainly focuses on the UK. Though a small number of Cypriots settled in the UK during the 1930s, the bulk of the migration took place during the 1950s and 1960s. The majority of Cypriot migrants to the UK came from a rural background, where family loyalty was paramount (Oakley 1979). Many had been forced to internally migrate to urban areas in Cyprus due to the stagnation of the rural economy, following the failure of the colonial government to provide resources and staff for the improvement of agriculture. However, the government’s support of local industrial development failed too; hence the high levels of unemployment and the instability in the urban labour market encouraged the Cypriots to seek material improvement elsewhere (Anthias 1992). A further wave of migration took place after the partition of the island in 1974 (Anthias 1992; Oakley 1979).

According to the 2001 British census, the total Cyprus-born population was 77,156. This number demonstrates a slight drop since the 1991 census, which showed 78,191 Cypriots living in the country. However, estimations of the size of the UK Cypriot community fluctuate from lower figures of 160,000 to 220,000 (Anthias 1992; Oakley 1979), to upper estimates of 250,000 to 300,000 (Papapavlou and Pavlou 2001). The National Federation of Cypriots in the UK, an umbrella organisation representing the Cypriot community associations and groups across Britain, claims to represent more than 300,000 people in the UK of Cypriot ancestry. As for the specific case of the Turkish Cypriots, it is estimated that 40,000-50,000 have left the island since 1974. But, again, it is difficult to calculate the precise number of Turkish Cypriots in Britain, as they are not distinguished as an ethnic group in the censuses, but a common estimate is that there are around 100,000 (Robins and Aksoy 2001). Hence, although the numbers are not clear-cut, it is fair to say that the number of Cypriots in the UK is substantial.

The forms of employment the Cypriots took on were those least attractive to the indigenous population, and those where few English language skills were required, as is often the case with migrants. Many were initially involved in the catering business, working long hours as kitchen staff and waiters in hotels and restaurants. Others used skills traditionally practised in Cyprus, such as tailoring and dressmaking.

---

7 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/spl/hi/uk/05/born_abroad/countries/html/cyprus.stm
8 The registration of Cypriots in the Census includes only people born in Cyprus and not the British-born Cypriots that these estimations try to include.
9 http://www.cypriotfederation.org.uk
and became economically active in the clothing industry. Other typical examples were hairdressing and shoe-repairing. Later on, many managed to use their savings to set up their own restaurants, cafés and small factories. In fact, the 1971 census revealed that, in the self-employed category, Cypriots far out-performed the general population, with 23% of them being self-employed compared to a much lower 9% of the total British working population (Anthias 1992: 53-54). In her 1977 study, Pamela Constantinides stressed the occupational mobility of Cypriots, willing to experiment with a wide variety of jobs and small businesses beyond the clothing and catering trades, including ‘cake shops, travel agencies, dress shops, furniture stores, television and radio repair shops, butchers, builders, hairdressers, grocers and greengrocers, fish and chip shops, bakeries, dry-cleaners, mini-cab offices and estate agents’ (Constantinides 1977: 280).

Generally, Cypriot employers tended to employ Cypriot workers (both Greek and Turkish) and in turn the Cypriot workers preferred to work for Cypriot-owned firms. The same went for everyday activities and social life, with shops, banks and restaurants announcing themselves with Greek signs; banks, doctors, dentists and driving schools serving Cypriots, both Greek and Turkish; and Cypriot grocery stores selling traditional Greek and Turkish-Cypriot food and staples (Anthias 1992: 113). This wide range of goods and services supplied by the Cypriots reached beyond the occupation of a so-called ‘ethnic economic niche’ whilst strengthening their ‘internal economy’ (Constantinides 1977: 281). At the time, Robin Oakley stated that ‘almost anything one Cypriot needs can be bought from another’, enabling Cypriots in the UK ‘to meet their needs without leaving the bounds of their own community’ (Oakley 1970: 101). The latter statement, however, slightly eroded as time passed. The majority of Cypriots found themselves living in the UK for many years and having children who were born and raised in the UK, ‘the second generation’ (Constantinides 1977: 281).

The above picture draws mainly from sources about Greek Cypriots in the UK, partly because most of the limited literature on postwar Cypriot migration focuses on the UK and is about Greek Cypriots (the main exception being Ladbury 1977). Yet most of this portrayal applies equally to the settlement and characteristics of the Turkish Cypriots at that time. However, a couple of distinguishing remarks are in order. First, since Greek and Turkish Cypriots migrated to Britain in roughly the same proportions as their demographic weight in Cyprus (i.e. about four to one), Greek Cypriots were very much the majority community. This, combined with the fact that they tended to be less poor than the Turkish Cypriots anyway (reflecting again their pre-migration situation in Cyprus), gave them slightly the ‘upper hand’ in Britain; so it was, at least in the early years, a case of Greek Cypriots employing and renting to Turkish Cypriots, rather than the other way around (Ladbury 1977). On the other hand, this ‘inferior’ relationship was reversed when other ‘Turkish’ migrants arrived after the Turkish Cypriots, coming this time from mainland Turkey and including many Kurds. In this case, as the ‘pioneers’, Turkish Cypriots were able to trade on their earlier-established presence and their knowledge of English, turning this to their advantage in setting up businesses catering to the rapidly growing Turkish and Kurdish populations, especially in London (see King et al. 2008a; 2008b).

Meanwhile in Cyprus, reflecting ongoing political developments, the inter-ethnic divisions became ever-more important. And yet, it has been noted that such distinctions seemed less relevant in the UK (see for example Ladbury 1977). Particularly in terms of workplace and business relations, interactions between Greek and Turkish Cypriots reportedly remained good, even in 1974, immediately after the Greek-engineered coup and the resultant Turkish invasion of northern Cyprus (Anthias 1992: 115). Common origin and common working conditions in the UK provided for a greater shared outlook amongst the Turkish and
Greek Cypriots in the UK than could be achieved in Cyprus itself after 1963. Whilst hostility, feelings of insecurity and resentment increased between Turkish and Greek Cypriots back in the ‘homeland’, the two ‘communities’ in Britain maintained work and business ties with one another. The vast majority of Cypriots of both backgrounds had arrived before 1963; hence they had not experienced the inter-communal hostilities in Cyprus first-hand (Constantinides 1977; Ladbury 1977). Real or intense social interaction between the two ‘communities’ in the UK is rare though, as noted by Floya Anthias (1992: 114), at least amongst the first-generation Cypriot migrants. This statement, however, was partly countered by a more recent study (Teerling 2010), in which a number of Greek-Cypriot migrants in London spoke about the social interactions they (or their parents) had with Turkish Cypriots at places like Cypriot community centres and coffee-shops.\textsuperscript{10}

In addition to stressing the relatively good individual and working relationships between Turkish and Greek Cypriots at the time of her research, which was the early 1970s, Constantinides (1977) briefly touches upon the matter of intermarriage or co-habitation between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots. She stressed that, despite the fact that such relationships are more common in the UK than in Cyprus, they were generally frowned upon within the Greek-Cypriot community. Sarah Ladbury (1977) emphasised a similar discourse with regard to the Turkish Cypriots in the UK, stating that generally most relationships of this kind do not get far and ‘the problem of marriage to any non-Turk, let alone to a Greek, never arises’ (Ladbury 1977: 317). Also the Greek Cypriots in the UK, at least at that time it seems, preferred a Greek-Cypriot partner. Although, as Constantinides noted (1977: 277), there was some degree of intermarriage with British and other national groups, which incidentally outnumbered the intermarriages between Greek Cypriots and mainland Greeks, such unions formed a relatively small proportion of all marriages.\textsuperscript{11}

From our own, more recent, inquiry – based on interviews and informal discussions with Cypriots in London as well as websites dedicated to the Greek-Cypriot population in the UK – we can suggest that romantic relationships outside the ethnic community are quite common today, particularly amongst the second generation. Various key informants in the UK emphasised how ‘the community has become a lot more diverse with lots of mixed marriages’ and that ‘there is more mixedness involved with the second generation [as] they either are the product of a mixed marriage or are in a mixed relationship themselves’. A key-informant first-generation migrant (president of one of the organisations for Greek Cypriots abroad) expressed the view that about half of the Greek Cypriots in the UK today are married to partners with no Greek-Cypriot ancestry, which he considers to be ‘a natural development given that our children grow up in a multi-ethnic society’.\textsuperscript{12}

This development was also clearly reflected in the narratives of second-generation ‘returnees’ in Cyprus, who often tend to develop social and romantic relationships beyond the cultural and ethnic confines of the Cypriot ‘community’ (Teerling 2011), an angle that will be further elaborated in a subsequent section of this paper, where we discuss the return of the diaspora.

As for the second-generation Greek Cypriots in the UK, research conducted from the mid-1970s to the early 1990s found that, although they retained their sense of ethnic identity, kinship and family (see for example Oakley 1979: 16-17), their practices and values had been noticeably altered, particularly those related to engagement, engagement,

\textsuperscript{10} A point which is also stressed in Myria Georgiou’s (2000) study on ethnic identity construction in a Cypriot community centre in North London.

\textsuperscript{11} It is revealing, however, that Constantinides never quoted any figures for the proportions of endogamous and exogamous marriages relating to Cypriots, so we have no real idea of the scale of ‘in’ and ‘out’ marriages amongst the Greek Cypriot population in the UK.

\textsuperscript{12} Personal communication with J. Teerling, 28 June 2007.
marriage and the dowry. In the 1970s, in contrast to what was happening in Cyprus, the formal dowry began to disappear amongst UK Cypriots and there was a growing tendency for engagements not to be blessed by the church, as well as an increase in registry-office marriages (Constantinides 1977: 294-296). On the other hand, norms of reputation and female sexual modesty remained as important amongst UK Cypriots as they were in Cyprus at the time of the first generation’s departure. In fact many claim that such values had loosened up, or were no longer found, in urban Cyprus, but were maintained amongst Cypriot parents in the UK (see for example Anthias 1992; Charalambous et al. 1988; Josephides 1988a, 1988b; King et al. 2011; Teerling 2010).

Nevertheless, marriages outside ethnic boundaries did take place – albeit sparingly – amongst the first-generation migrants, and, as mentioned above, appear to have increased amongst their offspring. Constantinides (1977) argued that the initial ‘rise’ in Cypriot men marrying English women took place during the early period of Cypriot migration, due to an unbalanced sex ratio, but that as soon as the Cypriot population grew in size young men were ‘no longer frequently “lost” to non-Cypriot women’ (1977: 298). She stressed that marriage patterns amongst the second generation were largely pan-Cypriot as nearly all young people who participated in her study preferred to marry another Cypriot (1977: 294, 296).

This view, however, seems to be challenged by other research findings (see for example Papapavlou and Pavlou 2001) and statements of Cypriot representatives, like the one we heard earlier. Issues of ‘mixing’ and the (actual and potential) intermarriage of their offspring were also hot topics amongst visitors at the community centre in Georgiou’s (2000) research, where their at times ambivalent feelings of ‘being torn’ between two ‘sides’ were captured in expressions like: ‘Sometimes those English [women] are better than our own. My son’s wife is a very good woman’, and ‘my two daughters are married to Cypriots. My two sons are married to English. At first we were cold to the idea, but then we got used to it’. Upon which another man replied: ‘Well, if you have many children you don’t mind if one marries a foreigner, but otherwise it is a problem’. ‘Contradictory talk and ideology is often the outcome of the Greek Cypriot experience’, Georgiou (2000: 12) states after describing such conversations on marriage outside the Cypriot community. But are the internalisations of both ‘sides’ necessarily contradictory? For the second generation this certainly does not always seem the case. A British Greek-Cypriot youngster, interviewed by Anthias (2002: 505-506), expressed his passion for his ‘motherland’ Cyprus, his desire to return some day, and his connection to his English girlfriend in the same answer, without making it sound contradictory. This idea of the second generation being stuck ‘between two cultures’ (see for example Constantinides 1977) was also critiqued by various British-born Cypriots who attended the 1988 conference on ‘The Cypriot Community of the UK: Issues of Identity’ (Charalambous et al. 1988). Like this British-born 24-year-old male participant (Lambrou 1988: 13) who stated that:

One interpretation of the lives Cypriot youth live in Britain, which unfortunately is a widely held belief, is that we have a confused sense of belonging. That by and large Cypriot youngsters residing in Britain lead double lives. It is suggested that this double life is split between being either Cypriot or British, that we are Cypriot with our families and in other Cypriot circles, and English when in the company of British friends at school or work. This account suggests that Cypriot youth have an acute identity problem [...] In my view such an analysis is deeply faulty [...] We all adapt our behaviour to suit the particular situation we are experiencing. Even with the sphere or association with Cypriots, we behave differently with our cousins or friends,
than we do with our parents. The ability to alter our actions when appropriate is a valuable social skill and essential to fitting in anywhere. I feel it is not a case of falling between or torn between two cultures, but more that Cypriot youth develop a personality; a sound one, our own individual body of culture drawing from all influences.

The above quote shows that Cypriotness is important to the new generation of British-born Cypriots, but that they are 'more outward looking', whilst ‘the first generation, on the other hand, appeared more concerned with the role of identity in reproducing the ethnic group and gave the impression of an insular approach to identity’ (Josephides 1988b: 68). The point made at the very end of the above quote, about the development of a new ‘body of culture’ which draws from a wide variety of influences, is an important one, and surfaced also prominently in the narratives of belonging of British-born Cypriots in Cyprus collected by Teerling (2010, 2011, 2012).

One of Teerling’s first-generation key informants, a prominent member of the UK Cypriot community, expressed his disappointment that the first generation has not been able to prevent the gap between the two generations: ‘My main concern is the lack of effort we [the first generation] have put in keeping the community linked with each other’, which he mainly puts down to poor communication (‘the first generation often don’t speak English well whilst their children are more comfortable with English than they are with Greek’), as well as ‘professional gaps’. Another UK-based key interviewee, a second-generation British-born Cypriot, reflected on the gap and frictions between the generations in the following terms:

> I think that there’s an increasing gap between the generations and our outlook to life, ‘cause it’s influenced by different things. I guess we [the second generation] have similar Cypriot cultural influences, but our political outlook, our broader world view, where we are within the world is so much different [from the first generation]. We are used to living with people that are very different from ourselves, doing a much wider range of things and activities.

The different ‘wavelengths’ of the first and second generations in the UK were also stressed by Floya Anthias (1992), who observed the tension between the first generation on the one hand, who continued to be largely concerned with the maintenance of language, culture and traditional sexual and family values, whilst the second generation wanted to redefine their ways to be Cypriot in British society. Also in terms of education and employment some important shifts have taken place, as many migrants came to the UK with the wish to obtain a better education for their children (Oakley 1970), which resulted in many of their British-born children not taking on the same work as their parents. Hence, when some of these second-generation Cypriots eventually ‘returned’ to Cyprus, it was with their own set of experiences, values and life expectations. This, in turn, caused their visions of life in Cyprus to be different from those traditionally held, and experienced, by their first-generation parents, as we will see in the sections to follow.

The diaspora returns

As stressed in studies on the settlement of Cypriot migrants (Anthias 1992; Constantinides 1977; Ladbury 1977; Oakley 1970, 1979), their everyday lives were very much centred around a strong ideology of economic and material betterment, particularly for their children, a goal towards which most worked very hard and single-mindedly. With long working hours, often six or even seven days a week, leisure activities were not amongst their top
priorities. Many participants in our own research (on second-generation ‘return’ to Cyprus) stressed how any leisure time in that was available was largely spent with the immediate family, with wedding parties being one of the most important social events (King et al. 2011; Teerling 2010). Children of Greek-Cypriot migrants were often encouraged to attend weekend classes in Greek language and culture (see also Constantinides 1977). Life in the UK was very much focused towards future ‘rewards’, such as retirement or holidays (in Cyprus). The general perception amongst the first-generation migrants was that there was little to enjoy in the UK, where life was associated with hard work and economic improvement. With ‘life in Cyprus being the life to enjoy’, Floya Anthias observed that ‘many Cypriots say they only “live” when they are on their yearly holiday in Cyprus’ (1992: 58). Though for the earlier Cypriot migrants to the UK such holidays were initially rather rare, from the 1970s, with the increase in air travel combined with the growing prosperity of Cypriots in the UK, return visits to Cyprus increased progressively, and many bought houses, often in one of the rapidly developing urban or tourist areas rather than their own villages, especially if their villages had become inaccessible due to the 1974 partition of the island.

While the importance of the homeland and potential return is emphasised in most of the published work on Cypriot migration, research on the actual return to Cyprus has remained largely absent. One of the few mentions of return migration to Cyprus refers to the years 1965-1975, during which ‘many Cypriots, particularly men, obtained scholarships to study in East European Universities, mostly in Romania, Czechoslovakia and Russia, where they got married and returned to Cyprus with their [non-Cypriot] spouses’ (Trimikliniotis and Demetriou 2005: 9). Another small ‘wave’ of return migration is mentioned by Bertrand (2004: 99) when referring to the economic boom of Cyprus in the 1970s and 1980s. Also Mark Thomson (2006: 2) points out how the growing national economy – particularly in tourism – encouraged emigrants to return to the island. However, these return movements are merely mentioned, rather than discussed and investigated in depth.

With regard to second-generation ‘return’, the major study is that of Teerling (2010). Before that, a few studies focused on educational issues concerning British-born Cypriot youngsters, with the main emphasis on linguistics, both in the UK and in Cyprus. Papapavlou and Pavlou’s (2001) survey, conducted with 274 UK Cypriot youngsters aged 12-18, suggests that although Cypriot youth in the UK are aware, and in tune with, their distinctiveness (in both linguistic and social behaviour), they do not like to be placed in ‘traditional’ cultural moulds. Yet, 32% of the participants in their survey expressed a desire to return and settle in Cyprus. Christodoulou and Pavlou’s (2005) study, which focuses on the educational issues school-age second-generation returnees face once in Cyprus, suggests that British-born (or raised) youngsters in Cyprus experience various problems upon repatriation, mainly due to their limited proficiency in Greek, which often obstructs their smooth transition and acculturation into school and Cypriot society as a whole. It should also be noted that a large number of young returnees attend private English (or international) schools, because their limited competence in Greek prevents them from attending public schools, or because their parents prefer them to be educated in a more international environment (see Teerling 2010, 2011, 2012). However, until recently (Teerling 2010), there were no studies discussing the experiences of second-generation adult returnees.

Hence, one of the aims of our recently conducted in-depth research on the ‘return’ of British-born Cypriots to Cyprus was to rectify the lacuna in research on Cypriot return migration in general, whilst the unique focus on the second generation aimed to overcome the gap in research on their connections to the ancestral homeland, capitalising on this specific migrant cohort’s strategic positionality with
respect to questions of home and identity. From interviews with key informants in London, we infer that those of the first generation who return to Cyprus do so to retire, or live an easier life, often after having sold, or passed on, their businesses in the UK. Now, as Cyprus is part of the EU, it is easier to repatriate and take pensions to Cyprus, at least for Greek Cypriots returning to the southern part of the island. People return for financial reasons as well as to receive more inclusive health care services. Some return for tax purposes and establish their place of residence in Cyprus. Many have second homes in Cyprus, and divide their time between the UK and Cyprus, particularly if they have children and grandchildren in the UK.

Ethnographic data and life narratives collected by Teerling amongst British-born Cypriots in both southern and northern Cyprus showed that motives for ‘return’ vary: ranging from employment, to a desire for a more relaxed lifestyle and warmer climate, or to provide their children with a safer upbringing. Very few participants, however, claimed to have moved for national or ethnic ideology or to ‘rediscover their roots’ (cf. Wessendorf 2007). Rather their move was based around more personal, often pragmatic, reasons and a desire for a change in lifestyle. The data reflect how boundaries are blurred, eroded and re-established by a new generation of migrants, reflecting their time, experiences, choices and ideologies. One striking element in the narratives was the unique spaces of belonging the second-generation ‘returnees’ created beyond national, ethnic and fixed cultural boundaries. These migrants tend to create spaces of belonging in their personal, leisure, and work lives that are shared with individuals and groups whose ethnic, national, linguistic and ancestral backgrounds vary greatly. It is precisely that diversity that unifies them. The privileging of such experiences of belonging over ‘traditional’ classifications of identity brings about a sense of unity defined by one’s relations to (both actual and metaphorical) spaces, beyond the traditional ‘here and there’ and ‘them and us’ dichotomies. Feelings of familiarity and comfort were key in the participants’ narratives, but not necessarily defined by common ethnic or national characteristics. Yet, unlike ‘placeless’ transnational fields which, although established across national borders, often maintain (and are based on) common cultural or ethno-national characteristics, these new ‘spaces of belonging’ are localised in Cyprus while defying the dual ethno-national characteristics that usually define transnationalism (Teerling 2010, 2011). This observation is crucial when shaping an understanding of the social and cultural fabric of Cypriot society today, and of Cyprus as a ‘multi-diasporic space’, as we will see in due course.

Although it has been suggested that in recent years there has been a high immigration flow of persons of Cypriot nationality or of Cypriot descent who have returned to settle in Cyprus (Pavlou and Christodoulou 2003), there are no official figures on returnees in Cyprus, who are a hidden group in censuses and population statistics. The Statistical Service Department of the Republic of Cyprus (CYSTAT 2009), which is responsible for demographic reports, provides information on numbers of short-term (less than a year) and long-term (more than a year) immigrants. ‘Repatriates’ are included in these statistics, but their exact numbers remain unclear, as many are hidden within the numbers of people of various nationalities who chose to reside in Cyprus for a longer period – particularly in the case of second-generation ‘returnees’, who are most likely to be included in the total number of immigrants coming from their country of birth. Pavlou and Christodoulou (2003) point out the discrepancy between the official and actual numbers of repatriated Cypriots. Drawing on a study by Paschalis (2000) they conclude that in 1992 the actual number (4,351) of

15 The term ‘repatriate’ refers to a person of Cypriot nationality or of Cypriot descent who returned to settle in Cyprus after a long period abroad.
repatriates was at least four times higher than the 1,014 reported in that year’s statistical report (Pavlou and Christodoulou 2003). As for the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’, the numbers appear to be more concrete. There has also been a significant increase of British-born Turkish Cypriots returning to this part of the island, as stressed by Mete Hatay (2007: 39), who points out that 2,435 British-born Turkish Cypriots were counted in the TRNC census of 2006 compared to 1,322 in 1996. The Cypriot returnees, however, are not the only migrants from the UK residing on the island and influencing the multi-diasporic character of Cyprus. The island’s colonial links have contributed to a large presence of British nationals, discussed in the next subsection.

The British (post)colonial diaspora: soldiers and retirees

Britons who live abroad are spread across the globe, the most popular destinations for British people emigrating being the old settler colonies (Sriskandarajah and Drew 2006) and Cyprus is no exception. The island’s relationship with Britain and its colonial history have contributed to a large British expatriate community on the island, and there has been a significant growth in the number of British emigrants taking retirement to the island. According to Sriskandarajah and Drew’s book Brits Abroad (2006: 17, 104), Cyprus hosts 59,000 Britons living abroad for one year or longer, plus another 6,000 who live in Cyprus part-year. The aggregate figure, 65,000, makes Cyprus the tenth largest host country for Britons resident abroad (after, in order, Australia, Spain, USA, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, South Africa, France and Germany).

There is a general lack of literature on the British diaspora in Cyprus and that on British ‘expats’ is almost completely absent. The exception is unpublished work by Seán Damer – a seminar paper (1996) and his report on an ESRC pilot grant (1997). These documents give a rather vivid picture of the British community, most of whom reside in the Paphos area in the south-west of the island. It is clear that Damer had little sympathy for the people he was ethnographically researching. Based on six months research in ‘British’ associations and estates in and around Paphos, Damer characterises the British in Cyprus as predominantly retired and ‘a linguistic community’. Despite, in some cases, long years of residency in Cyprus, ‘very, very few expatriates speak Greek or make any attempt to learn it’. They follow the maxim that ‘if you speak loudly enough, the natives will understand’. According to Damer, ‘BBC World Service is widely listened to, and satellite TV provides a selection of the “best” British programmes’. The age profile of the expats ‘ensures that issues such as the Second World War, the monarchy and the Empire are alive and well’ and Damer gives plentiful examples of the iconography and jingoism of British imperialism within the community, concluding with the tongue-in-cheek statement ‘This is not a generation which understands the meaning of the word “ethnocentrism”’ (Damer 1997: 13-15).

Furthermore, although Cyprus has been an independent republic since the 1960s, Britain retains two areas of sovereign territory on the island, which are the bases for more than 3,000 personnel serving in Cyprus. No empirical research is available on the daily lives of the military staff of the British sovereign bases, but it has been claimed that ‘efforts have been made by the base authorities to recreate a “little England”’, whilst representing ‘an idealized version of Cyprus itself’ (Constantinou and Richmond 2005: 76). Set in rural Mediterranean sea-side locations, attempts have been made to mimic the local

16 Government figures also contradict the unofficial figures quoted by the associations of repatriated Cypriots, which estimate the number of repatriates to be approximately 25,000 for the years 1981-1992 (Pavlou and Christodoulou 2003).
17 It is important to note, however, that the recent economic downturn and the fall in value of the British pound are having an enormous impact on the retired population of Brits in Cyprus, with the result that some have been forced to return to the UK.
architecture and beautify the gardens, whilst typical English street names and social facilities such as British pubs and clubs are maintained, and green cricket and rugby fields within a parched environment project the aesthetics of colonial power, embodying a time long gone (Constantinou and Richmond 2005: 76). From the opposite side, however, the social outgoings of the military personnel have at times led to bad publicity and local hostility, with soldiers repeatedly being brought before local courts for acts of drunken and unruly behaviour in the island’s tourist resorts, which even led the Mayor of the resort town of Ayia Napa to ban British soldiers setting foot in the town.

**New immigrants: diversity of origins**

Mass tourism, the expansion of the service sector, including offshore companies, and considerable financial investment from Lebanese refugees drove the economic growth experienced in southern Cyprus during the 1980s and 1990s; an ‘economic miracle’ which, as mentioned earlier, was partly made possible by the cheap labour supplied by the Greek-Cypriot refugees, who fled from the northern part of the island. Cyprus’s transformation to a prospering service society led to a demand for menial, low-pay labour that exceeded the supply of the native population. Consequently, restrictive immigration policies have been abandoned and during the 1990s Cyprus started granting a large number of temporary work visas to foreign workers (Trimikliniotis and Demetriou 2005).

Additionally, there are political and global factors that opened the doors to migrants. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the sweeping away of communist regimes throughout its satellite states brought many Eastern Europeans, both business people as well as temporary workers, to Cyprus. This was linked with the migration of a large number of Pontic Greeks from the Caucasus region who received Greek nationality and were, thus, able to migrate to Cyprus with minimum formalities\(^\text{18}\) (Trimikliniotis and Demetriou 2005, 2007). Pontian migration to Cyprus started in the early 1990s and the number of Pontian Greeks in Cyprus was estimated in 2004 at around 12,000, of whom about two-thirds live in Paphos, in a specific area which is frequently referred to as the ‘Greek Pontian ghetto’. Although most of them were skilled workers, they entered the labour market as unskilled workers, with the men mainly working in construction and the women in retail, hotel and cleaning services. Despite their official Greek identification, they frequently fall victim of prejudice and discrimination. Often stereotyped in public discourse and by the media as ‘trouble-makers’ and ‘criminals’, Greek Pontians have been treated with xenophobia and racism by Greek Cypriots (Gregoriou 2009). In fact, the term ‘Russo-Pontiacs’ (*Rossopóntii*) is often used when denoting criminal activity, whilst ‘Greek-Pontians’ (*Ellinopóntii*) is the preferred nomenclature when emphasising the aspect of Greek ethnicity (Demetriou 2008). While half of the Greek Pontians in Cyprus are women, this group is almost always gendered as ‘male’, whether in reference to their alleged ‘trouble-making’ (police reports, school disobedience, youth violence etc.), or to the Pontian men who express the ‘voice of the community’ or ‘talk back’. Pontian women, on the other hand, are invisible or mute as workers (being employed in positions such as hotel maids, saleswomen in large department stores or in food-chain shops), and as mothers and wives. Their ‘silence’ may be due to the fact that the Pontian family seems more patriarchal and ‘traditional’ than the Cypriot family, though no empirical material is available to confirm this (Gregoriou 2009). Nevertheless, compared to some other migrant groups in Cyprus, the Pontic Greeks are in a relatively advantageous position since, although generally low-paid and excluded, they hold permanent residency, and hence cannot be expelled from the country. They have an

\(^{18}\) Greek citizens (including Greek passport holders of Pontic origin) enjoy permanent residence rights as well as the right to work in Cyprus.
active community life, with a number of cultural and social associations. Furthermore, their Greek language skills are often much better (if not fluent), which, in theory, facilitates better social integration as well as active participation in trade unions (Triminikliotiots and Demetriou 2005).

Russians, Yugoslavs (primarily Serbs), Bulgarians and Romanians were also attracted to Cyprus because of their common religion (Christian Orthodoxy). The war in Yugoslavia in 1999 also brought a significant number of Serbs to Cyprus. Several thousands of the Eastern Europeans in Cyprus are wealthy businesspeople working in offshore industries. Prior to its accession to the EU, Cyprus was the only country allowing Russian nationals to enter without visas in an effort to attract business, holidaymakers and capital. After its EU accession, Cyprus was forced to adopt a more restrictive policy. However, many of those who came to Cyprus in the 1990s reside under a temporary residence permit, which is easily renewable provided that they operate or hold a position in a business enterprise in Cyprus (Triminikliotiots and Demetriou 2007). The Russian community in Cyprus is quite large and well organised, active in the fields of business, education and culture, with its own newspapers and magazines and private Russian schools, particularly in the coastal town of Limassol. However, many of these activities and institutions are run by private companies, aimed at the wealthier business community.

The less affluent Russian and other Russian-speaking migrant workers are more organised around religion, particularly the Russian Church of Limassol, where sermons are delivered in various Slavic languages, and attended by Russians, Serbs and sometimes Pontian Greeks. The church acts as a cultural and social meeting place and offers advice to migrants about their rights. The church has also founded a shelter for victims of sex-trafficking, who mostly come from the former USSR and other eastern European countries. Alliantza Romana, a group founded in 1995 by Romanian immigrants, organises social and cultural activities for the (largely) female Romanian migrants, in association with the Romanian Embassy and the Romanian Church. Another small group active in the field of culture and social networking is The Cyprus-Bulgarian Friendship Association (Triminikliotiots and Demetriou 2005).

The long-running unrest in the Middle-East region and especially in Israel and Palestine has contributed to the influx of both economic migrants as well as political refugees from these regions, many from affluent backgrounds (Trimikliniotis and Demetriou 2005, 2007). In recent years, Lebanese and Palestinians have become two of the largest groups of migrants to Cyprus, whilst since the turn of the 21st century smaller numbers of economic migrants from other parts of the Middle East and North Africa have arrived (El-Issawi and Georgiou 2010). Nicosia has a well-established Arab community, which is reflected by the wide range of community centres, restaurants, shops etc. that can be found across the capital. Research and documentation on the experiences of Arab migrants in Cyprus are scarce, a rare exception being the work by Fatima El-Issawi and Myria Georgiou (2010), whose study focuses on their media consumption and associated sense of belonging. They observed a dominant tendency amongst their participants (both first- and second-generation migrants) of dissociation from the status of ‘immigrant’. Rather, they preferred to identify themselves as ‘cosmopolitans’, a discourse, they claim, which was much more widespread amongst the Arab community in Cyprus, than in any of the other European countries they studied.19

Today the total number of resident non-Cypriots is estimated to be 128,200 or 14.5% of the total population which resides in the south of the island (CYSTAT 2009). The World Bank’s Migration and Remittances Factbook gives a somewhat higher figure for 2010, 154,300 (World

19 France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the UK.
Female migrants from South and East Asia (especially Sri Lanka and the Philippines) – a group that will be discussed in more detail later on – are mainly employed as domestic workers. Asian men tend to be employed in agriculture, construction or manufacturing. The Asian domestic and agricultural workers are generally the lowest-paid migrant workers in Cyprus. While the domestic workers – being a rather large community, of the same gender, mainly residing in urban areas – are fairly active in self-help groups and social networks, such activities are low amongst the male agricultural workers, mainly because they reside in countryside locations, away from the urban centres. This isolation, as argued by Trimikliniotis and Demetriou (2005: 46), ‘may also account for the fact that the widespread violations of their terms of work by employers often remain unpunished, resulting in long hours of work with little time for engaging in any form of civic activities’.

Migrants from Eastern Europe – mainly from the Balkans – generally work in the trade and catering business and agriculture, or females as ‘artistes/dancers’ (prior to the collapse of the Eastern European Regimes the latter occupation was dominated by Filipino and Thai women). Workers from Middle Eastern countries are concentrated in production, services and farming, with the exception of the Lebanese (and to a lesser extent the Jordanians), who include a large proportion of managers/qualified personnel and technicians. The figures for irregular migrants are inherently hard to obtain, but it is estimated that there are between 10,000 and 30,000 undocumented migrant workers (Trimikliniotis and Demetriou 2005). These include people from Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Romania, the former Yugoslavia, Russia, the Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, amongst others), South-East Asia (particularly women who are employed as domestic workers), China and the Middle East (Syria, Lebanon, Iran, to name a few). Between 2003 and 2007, Cyprus received 39 asylum seekers per 1,000 inhabitants, the highest level in Europe (Mainwaring 2008).

Finally, it is important to consider the significant number of migrants from various western countries in Europe and the US – including the earlier discussed large British expatriate community, the military staff, and the returnees from the diaspora – groups which have, combined with recent forces of globalisation and mass tourism, to a certain extent ‘Anglicised’ and ‘Europeanised’ the island. Today the English language has significantly penetrated into day-to-day life (McEntee-Atalianis 2004) and is widely used for social and professional exchange on the island, albeit without enjoying official status (Papapavlou 2001), as well as being the lingua franca of the large numbers of foreign residents from other countries including, inter alia, Sri Lankans, Filipinos and refugees from Africa (Goutsos and Karyolemou 2004). It is worth noting that these developments have provided many foreign-born Cypriot ‘returnees’ with an accommodating social and professional setting (Teerling 2011).

All these developments we have discussed so far feed into our observation of Cyprus as a ‘multi-diasporic’ space. However, before further elaborating on this observation, it is worth taking a moment to discuss the migration dynamics in northern Cyprus. Although inextricably entwined with the overall dynamics island-wide (and beyond), these have their own distinct characteristics.

North Cyprus and its migration dynamics

The Turkish Cypriots, like their Greek-Cypriot counterparts, have experienced various types and levels of migration. However, the 1974 division of the island meant that north and south developed in different ways and at different paces, also in terms of immigration. While the influx of migrants has increased on both sides in recent years, each has been affected by it differently (Hatay and Bryant 2008a).

Around 60,000 Turkish Cypriots, originally from the South, were internally displaced to
the northern part of the island during the 1960s (following the intercommunal violence) and the 1970s (following the Turkish military invasion that portioned the island), whilst various waves of emigration – mainly to Britain – took place between the mid 1940s and mid 1970s (Gürel and Özersay 2006).

Since 1974, the self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), which has not been recognised by any country except Turkey, has seen various patterns of immigration. Turkey has established a strong military presence in North Cyprus, taking over much property, land and resources. There are said to be 40,000 soldiers from Turkey still in northern Cyprus; however as the exact number is not officially revealed, the speculative figure tends to fluctuate somewhere between 30,000 and 60,000 in everyday discourse.

The Turkish Cypriots initially rejoiced over the arrival of the Turkish soldiers, because they thought they would protect them from the Greek-Cypriot nationalists. However, they gradually began to feel uncomfortable about the soldiers’ presence – which turned out to be much longer and much more complex than Turkish Cypriots anticipated at the time – as well as about the presence of the thousands of Turkish settlers (Navaro Yashin 2006: 88-89), brought over by to bolster the population in the territory marked apart after Turkey’s military invasion.20 Hence, the initial ‘honeymoon period’, as stressed by Mete Hatay (2008: 151), was followed by negative reactions amongst the Turkish-Cypriot population towards the arrival of immigrants from mainland Turkey. Such tensions, he continues, derived from a sort of ‘Orientalism’ on behalf of the Turkish Cypriots, who perceived themselves as more ‘modern’ than the ‘backward’ – i.e. ‘uneducated’, rural, religious etc. – settlers from the mainland. Furthermore, Turkish Cypriots resented the ways these immigrants were ‘rewarded’ by the government, as many received vacated Greek-Cypriot land and property (Hatay 2008). Indeed, most of these immigrants initially settled in empty Greek villages, often in remote areas.

However, a second wave of immigrants arrived from mainland Turkey during the late 1970s and early 1980s, this time stimulated by employment opportunities found in Cyprus but not in Turkey. In addition, an increasingly large student population from Turkey was attracted to the several new universities set up in North Cyprus. In the 1990s, the northern part of the island witnessed a third wave of migration – mainly from Turkey – of entrepreneurs, business investors and highly skilled professionals. Furthermore, the late 1990s saw a boom in the construction sector and property development, mostly aimed at the foreign market. As the Turkish-Cypriot labour market could not meet this growing demand, combined with the local employers’ unwillingness to pay the wages demanded by the local Cypriots, manual labourers were brought from the poorer areas in south and south-east Turkey, many of whom are of Arab or Kurdish origin. Although most of these migrants’ work locations are on the north coast – where most of the construction sites are – accommodation for them is scarce there, as these areas are increasingly filled with bungalows and holiday villas. Consequently, many of these migrants have moved into the large and older houses in the northern sector of the old walled city of Nicosia, abandoned by their original Turkish-Cypriot owners who have moved to the more ‘modern’ areas on the outskirts of the city. Largely unrestored and often lacking basic facilities, these dilapidated properties provide the recent migrants with much-needed accommodation (Hatay and Bryant 2008a).

As a result, the old walled sector of ‘Turkish’ Nicosia has undergone dramatic changes over the last two decades or so – with shops, restaurants and coffee-houses

---

20 Turkish Cypriots often slant or confuse the settlers with soldiers from Turkey, not differentiating between these two social groups in their representations (Navaro-Yashin 2006: 88).
catering to the migrant clientele – and has taken on the character of an ‘immigrant ghetto’. In addition, young Turkish soldiers come to Nicosia when on leave, and so additional shops and cafes, aimed at these soldiers in particular, are now scattered across the walled city (Hatay 2008). These developments are often lamented in the media by Turkish Cypriots, nostalgic for the times when the streets were filled with sights and scents that were familiar to them, such as the street peddlers selling muhallebi (milk pudding sprinkled with rosewater), the fragrance of the jasmine blossom, and the scent of traditional Cypriot home cooking coming from the houses – rather than the smell of lahmacun, a type of spicy pizza from the Turkish south-east (Hatay and Bryant 2008b). This nostalgia, as pointed out by Hatay and Bryant (2008a), ‘uses symbols of cultural difference to portray the immigrants’ residence in the walled city as a cultural invasion, […] contrast[ing] “the jasmine scent of Nicosia” – a longing for a time when the area was purely Turkish Cypriot – with the odour of lahmacun’.

There is a striking similarity between the Turkish-Cypriot public perception of the northern part of Old Nicosia, which has now turned into a ‘migrant space’, occupied by people who are perceived not to care about its historical, cultural and social fabric, hence turning the area into a site of crime and neglect (cf. Hatay 2008), and the views held amongst some Greek Cypriots about the southern part of the old town, which is also inhabited or used for leisure by a wide variety of migrants, and hence too has turned into a ‘migrant space’.

Yet, despite inhabiting the same (albeit divided) walled town in very close proximity of each other, it is extremely unlikely for the inhabitants of the two ‘migrant spaces’ described above to experience any kind of interaction, as both the Turkish migrants in the north and the migrants from a variety of (mainly) non-European backgrounds in the south are unable to cross to the other side. Those who can cross (i.e. European passport holders, including Turkish Cypriots with a Republic of Cyprus passport) do so for a variety of reasons. One particular example are the ‘returnees’ from the Turkish-Cypriot diaspora, who in a sense are also immigrants to the northern part of the island 21 but, unlike their mainland peers, are able to cross, and do so for reasons ranging from shopping to entertainment, and for some even for work and to arrange education for their children (Teerling 2012). And this is not the only difference between these two groups of migrants in the North. Unlike the ‘mainlanders’, who tend to spend their spare time with people from their own home regions, in spaces owned by people from their home regions (Hatay 2008), the social and professional spaces of interaction of the Turkish-Cypriot ‘returnees’ tend to have more of an ‘international’ character’, made up by people from a wide variety of national or ethnic backgrounds (often on both sides of the Green Line), which produces new ‘hybridised’, yet localised spaces of belonging. Some interviewees stated that they consciously chose a school for their children that defies national and ethno-linguistic boundaries and has a more multicultural nature – yet the schools of their choice tend to be private international schools (sometimes in the south), rather than the public schools in the north (Teerling 2012), which, ironically, are criticised by ‘native’ Turkish Cypriots precisely because of the growing number of migrant pupils (Hatay 2008). Of course, there is a different between the multicultural characters of the public and private schools (beside the language of instruction of the latter being English), and that is the overall socio-economic status of the students (i.e. working class vs. middle class).

Whereas there is a clear difference between the mobility patterns of the generally well-off migrants who have ‘returned’ from the diaspora and those who have come as labourers from mainland

---

21 We say this because, if they are first-generation diasporans, they had left Cyprus before 1974 and the creation of the Northern Cyprus quasi-state, and if they are second-generation ‘returnees’ they are ‘immigrating’ to a territory they have never lived in before.
Turkey, there is an interesting similarity between the latter migrants and some of their indigenous Cypriot working-class counterparts. While workers from mainland Turkey are attracted to Northern Cyprus by the employment opportunities and higher wages there, a similar mobility pattern can be found within Cyprus – across the Green line – of Turkish Cypriots commuting daily to the higher paying jobs in the South. Like the Turkish economic migrants in the North, most of the Turkish-Cypriot commuter workers in the South are unskilled rather than highly qualified (Mehmet et al. 2007).

Hence, whether one belongs to ‘the “Western” south’ or ‘the “Eastern” north’ (cf. Hatay 2008) is not simply a matter of mobility patterns, place of residence or origin. Rather pathways of integration and participation in particular migrant (or ‘diasporic’) spaces are often a matter of class and other criteria of inclusion/exclusion. One may reside in ‘the “Eastern” north’ whilst inhabiting social and personal spaces that are mainly characterised by ‘the “Western” south’ (i.e. the ‘returnees’ from the diaspora), but along the same lines one may physically commute on a daily basis to the ‘the “Western” south’ from ‘the “Eastern” north’ (i.e. Turkish Cypriot labourers), without ever truly leaving the latter.

The migrants discussed so far, however, are not the only immigrants in northern Cyprus. Cyprus has a relatively large population of Bulgarian Turks, who started arriving from Bulgaria in the early 1990s due to discrimination and persecution under the former communist regime. In the late 1990s other Bulgarian immigrants began to arrive to the north of the island because of deteriorating economic conditions in their home country (Hatay and Bryant 2008a). Furthermore, in addition to Turkish students from ‘the mainland’, in recent years northern Cyprus has seen an influx of student migration from South Asia and Africa, attracted by the north’s universities.

While our previous discussion on migrants arriving from mainland Turkey mainly focuses on male labourers, let us now take a look at two sectors which are dominated by female migrants. Similar to southern Cyprus – and as will be discussed in further detail presently – two key sectors in which female migrants are employed are domestic work and the ‘sex trade’. There are clear differences between the demographic composition of migrant workers engaged in commercial sex and those employed as domestic workers (Güven-Lisaniler et al. 2008).

The earlier described economic ‘boom’ (particularly in the construction sector and property development) and the expansion of the tourist market in northern Cyprus have led to the development of a thriving ‘night life’ and ‘club’ industry, which mainly relies on women from eastern European countries. The lack of international recognition of the TRNC means that its tourism (and ‘night life’) market is highly dependent on clients from the Turkish mainland (Lockhart and Ashton 1990), responsible for 70-80% of the tourist population on the Turkish sector of the island, whilst the majority of ‘third country’ tourists are from the United Kingdom (Scott 1995). Like in the southern part of the island, the growth of the sex industry coincided with the collapse of the Soviet states and – again like in ‘the south’ – whilst these women are officially found under the classification of ‘artistes’, they are in fact hired as sex workers and often subject to exploitation and abuse (Hatay and Bryant 2008a). Yet opinions on the degree to which these women are subject to violence or are indeed victims of trafficking varies. Whilst Hatay (2008: 160) clearly states that the sex industry ‘relies on women who are trafficked’, findings from interviews conducted with sex workers in northern Cyprus by Güven-Lisaniler et al. (2005: 80) suggest that these women had travelled out of their own free will from their countries of origin to find sex work in Cyprus and ‘did not identify themselves as either subject to violence or victims of trafficking’. The authors repeat this observation a few years later in a paper focusing on the human rights of female migrant workers in northern Cyprus but do acknowledge that
these women ‘suffer human rights abuses at the hands of the state and the employer. Starting with the withholding of their passports by the police department and the differential treatment in contracts and work visas, their arrival in indebted conditions and their limited freedom of movement, these migrant women are denied … a number of basic migrant rights’ (Güven-Lisaniler et al. 2008: 446).

While Güven-Lisaniler et al.’s 2005 publication identifies the Eastern European (‘registered’) migrant sex workers as ‘the upper end of the sex industry in North Cyprus’ (2005: 88), their 2008 paper describes those who can be characterized as occupying ‘the bottom end’. The unregistered segment of the sex industry is dominated by Turkish migrant women, who – unlike the Eastern European migrants who cannot enter the TRNC without a visa – only need to show a Turkish identity card to enter the island. Although not legally entitled to work, the local authorities ignore the employment activities of Turkish nationals once on the island, allowing Turkish sex workers – who do not have to pay for health checks, taxes or boarding charges at the clubs – to operate at lower costs. The latter is, however, merely an assumption, as no information is available on the actual work conditions of Turkish sex workers (Güven-Lisaniler et al. 2008).

Whereas young Eastern European women are predominant in the sex industry, middle-aged Turkish women are most prevalent in domestic services (both registered and unregistered). Being in a relatively advantageous position – as native-speakers, with knowledge of, and access to, legal support and the Turkish embassy if needed, and often supported by their families and/or husbands – there are no reports of human rights abuses of Turkish immigrants in both the registered and unregistered segments of the domestic services sector. This is in contrast to the Turkish women working in the sex trade, whose conditions can be presumed to be much more vulnerable because of the illegal nature of their work and the lower likelihood of support of their families (Güven-Lisaniler et al. 2008).

Immigrants to North Cyprus face a number of problems that are very similar to those of economic migrants elsewhere. However, some problems are uniquely caused by the TRNC being an unrecognised state in a divided island, unable to sign conventions or treaties, including those that protect human rights. Most international agencies cannot officially operate in North Cyprus. Furthermore, the importance of demography in the Cyprus Problem particularly impacts Turkish migrants’ ability to integrate, claim basic rights, as well as their sense of certainty about the future. As Hatay and Bryant (2008a: 12) put it: ‘The pervasive presence of Turkey in the island – militarily, economically, and politically – has made those Turkish citizens who wish to work and live in the island scapegoats for Turkish Cypriots seeking a different future’.

---

Cyprus as a multi-diasporic space

Thus far, our overview has drawn attention to the rapid social transformation that Cyprus has undergone over the last decades in terms of migration – a development that has changed the social and cultural fabric of everyday life in Cypriot society. Today, Cyprus has a large and diverse migrant population – diverse in terms of social, cultural and economic background, as well as in terms of migrants’ social position in contemporary Cyprus. These various migrant ‘waves’ and diasporas all inhabit the island space that is Cyprus. Yet, while there is an increasing interest in the economic and social welfare of migrants in Cyprus – both by scholars and NGOs – research on the actual lived experiences of these migrants, their everyday feelings of belonging and their civic participation, has hardly started.

---

22 Because of this relatively ‘free’ movement of labour between Turkey and North Cyprus, a significant body of unregistered workers (between 35 to 40 percent of the total labour force) have accumulated in North Cyprus (Besim and Jenkins 2006).
Furthermore, the development of relationships between members of various migrant groups, and the impact that migrants and multi- and intercultural spaces have on the social, cultural and political fabric of the ‘host’ society, have been left unexplored. The island of Cyprus with its vibrant and newly emerging socio-cultural context, and its highly diverse migrant population, serves as an ideal space to observe such new processes. From these developmental aspects of Cyprus’ contemporary evolution derives the hypothesis of Cyprus as a ‘multi-diasporic space’ (or as a home for various ‘multi-diasporic spaces’). The idea of the multi-diasporic space can be explored on various levels. On an island-wide level, Cyprus is exemplary as a multi-diasporic space, with migrants from various countries of origin (Eastern European, Balkan, Asian, Middle Eastern etc., as well as British ‘expats’ and those with ‘hyphenated belongingness’, such as British-born Cypriots and Cypriot ‘return’ migrants from the wider Anglophone world) contributing to its cultural and social fabric and associated politics of identification. Rather than simply examining migrants’ experiences within, or set against, the cultural and national integrity held by the societies they inhabit (and hence placing them along the established marginality vs. assimilation continuum), or viewing each migrant ‘group’ as a isolated entity, it is important to consider what other types of integration pathways, or routes of interaction, can be observed in contemporary Cypriot society, in other words: who integrates into what? What are the sub-spaces that make up the wider multi-diasporic space that is Cyprus? Who integrates (or participates) where? Who is included or excluded, and what are the criteria?

Teerling’s research on the ‘return’ of British-born Cypriots to Cyprus (2010, 2011) has shown how migrants draw on the multi-diasporic character of Cyprus as a whole in order to create sub-spaces of belonging. Such spaces are based on shared experiences and life-views, drawing upon a variety of other sources, such as the same generational, age and life-cycle cohort; common interests; shared personal life-histories, struggles, ideologies, and so on. In fact, most respondents emphasised how the shared experience of ‘being a migrant’ or ‘having lived abroad’ is an important factor in developing a sense of mutual understanding. Hence one may say that the importance of a common ground based on national and ethnic identity seems to be weakened, and perhaps partly replaced, by an emphasis on broader and internationally shared experiences. These shared experiences and worldviews form the pathway for integration (or the criteria for inclusion) into this sub-multi-diasporic space, which derives from the multi-diasporic character of Cyprus. Hence, one could say that the multi-diasporic character of Cyprus accommodates the formation of these unique sub-spaces, causing particular migrants to integrate in their own way and into spaces that suit their circumstances or ‘criteria’ – which moves away from the assumption that migrants are either integrated (into the dominant host society) on the one hand, or marginalised on the other. Furthermore, it is important to acknowledge that the ‘dominant culture’ of the host society is also dynamic and constantly altered, precisely because of the influences and contributions of the various ‘migrant spaces’ and broader forces of globalisation. Indeed, for the British-born ‘returnees’ their multi-diasporic spaces of interaction were both influenced by their diasporic experiences and by contemporary Cypriot society. Participants described how they assemble those aspects of comfort and familiarity in Cyprus that create a feeling of home for them: a socio-cultural space to which they feel they belong and which they share with people from various national and ethnic backgrounds, Cypriots and non-Cypriots, based on a variety of experiences and views, yet located in Cyprus. In this sense, those new spaces of belonging, elsewhere referred to as ‘third-cultural spaces of belonging’ (Teerling 2011), differ from the often-used concept of ‘third space’. While the latter often refers to an
imaginary ‘third space’ (Bhabha 1990; Soja 1996), abstractly located ‘in-between’ national territories, our formulation suggests that the ‘locality’ of global processes (Cyprus in this case), where such new forms and spaces of belonging are constructed, needs to be taken into account, rather than presenting these migrants as deterritorialised, free-floating people who are ‘neither here nor there’ (cf. Guarnizo and Smith 2006). Hence the focus here is on a local space shared by a variety of migrants, examining the interactions and the reciprocity in exchanges that occur between the ‘members’ of various migrant groups.

The research landscape in Cyprus is still not very developed in the area of migration studies, although in recent years there is increasing interest by a new generation of scholars. Furthermore, accession to the EU has caused the rights and civic participation of migrants to gain some momentum. This has opened up new possibilities in terms of interaction and collaboration between international and European scholars in the field, as well as funding in these new areas of concern (Trimikliniotis and Demetriou 2005). Yet, in-depth research on the experiences and views of the migrants themselves remains very scarce, and there are no studies on the issue of civic participation of migrants. Two angles that have received relatively more research attention are the feminisation of migration to Cyprus and the role of education in the multicultural reality of Cyprus. These angles, each of which are unique building-blocks in the social and cultural fabric of today’s multi-diasporic Cyprus, will be discussed in the following sections.

The feminisation of immigration

Increased attention has been paid in recent years to the various conditions of female migrants on the island, particularly those working in domestic services and the ‘sex trade’, both in the north and the south. Violation of rights is reported in a number of studies that focus on female migrants (Anthias 2000, 2006; Lenz 2005; Panayiotopoulos 2005; Trimikliniotis and Fulias-Souroulla 2009). These stress the domestic workers’ complaints about work overload and underpayment, bad treatment and sexual harassment by employers, and the exploitative relations concerning employment and residence conditions of women in the ‘sex industry’. The migrant women working in the latter sector are found under the classifications of ‘artistes’, ‘dancers’ and ‘musicians’ mainly working in ‘clubs’ and cabaret-type venues. Migrant women working as waitresses or servers in bars and pubs are prone to enter into prostitution, sometimes forced by their employers. The ‘entrepreneurs’ of ‘this industry’ (i.e. pimps) are mainly Greek Cypriots (Trimikliniotis and Fulias-Souroulla 2009: 175). The artiste visas, which are granted to women entering Cyprus to work in these venues, are the most problematic work contracts. The fact that these establishments are not legally allowed to sell sex services, but in practice do, places these women in a very vulnerable position and often at the mercy of their employers, who often withhold their personal documents (Demetriou 2008).

Though more and more Cypriot women have been incorporated into the labour market, the gendered division of work within the household and the perceived responsibility of women for the home and childcare continues. The employment of female maids within Cypriot households pushes the potential transformation of social roles within the family more to the background. Since few local women take nursing and care jobs and as migrant labour costs significantly less, foreign domestic workers, mainly from the Philippines and Sri Lanka, are employed (Anthias 2006: 187-188). The employment of foreign – often exploited – domestic workers is a phenomenon which

---

23 Recently the ‘artiste visa’ for female third-country nationals to work in high-risk establishments for trafficking in women has been abolished. However, the Cyprus Mediterranean Institute for Gender Studies stresses that the Cyprus Government must take further steps to effectively combat the phenomenon.
'is not confined to families where the women work; women who prefer leisure to doing their own child care and domestic work may also employ an immigrant maid. In addition, more and more women [...] are hiring maids as part of a materialist status symbol’ (Anthias 2006: 188; see also Lenz 2006). These Asian women are particularly important to consider when discussing migration in Cyprus, not only because foreign domestic workers constitute over half of all immigrant women in Cyprus (Panayiotopoulos 2005), but also because – by virtue of their perceived characteristics: female, foreign and ‘poor’ – they find themselves routinely in a disadvantaged and marginalised position in a patriarchal and status-oriented society (Sainsbury 2007). As a consequence, a large and diverse population of women (in terms of national, cultural or social background, education or professional experience) ‘are commonly collapsed into a referent for a domestic worker [...] leaving no room for an alternative definition of their identity’ (Sainsbury 2007: 2), a perception that is consequently passed on to the children of the households where these women work (Spyrou 2009). Perhaps it is not surprising, then, that these migrant women are ‘visibly absent’ in Cypriot daily life, which becomes particularly apparent on Sundays, when domestic and other workers have their only contractual day off. They gather in large numbers in areas not used by Cypriots, like squares in the centre of the old town of Nicosia and in downtown parks and parking lots. ‘This visibility pattern (i.e. restricted to particular times and places) is both indicative of, but also sustains a general lack of interest in, and understanding of, the realities of migrants’ lives among the wider Greek-Cypriot population’ (Demetriou 2008).

Indeed, while the social and economic positioning of migrant women in Cyprus has been discussed by various scholars (see for example Kosiva et al. 2010; Trimikliniotis and Demetriou 2005; Trimikliniotis and Fulias-Souroulla 2009), with some addressing the views within the Cypriot families who hire domestic workers as well as those within wider Cypriot society (Lenz 2006; Sainsbury 2007; Spyrou 2009), articles presenting the actual voices of the women themselves are much scarcer. A notable exception is Prodomos Panayiotopoulos’ (2005) ethnographic study of a group of Filipina domestic workers employed by households in the coastal town of Larnaca. The personal stories of these women offer insight into their daily lives and how they are shaped by the complex relationships between individual domestic workers and their collective experiences, and between the private households, mediators and immigration officers, and the wider Cypriot society. They also provide an insight into the social control exercised by the employers, such as the gossip or accusations which are often disguised as cultural misunderstanding but in reality used to legitimise sanctions or the disciplining of a worker.

As with the perception of ‘the Asian female migrant’, best suited for domestic work, Eastern European women are also tied to a racially characterised stereotype. With physical characteristics such as ‘fair-skinned’, ‘tall’ and ‘blonde’, they are considered more sexually desirable, thereby sexualising and racialising the services migrant women provide (Agathangelou 2004, 2006). A number of scholars have discussed the racialised, gendered and sexualised class position of these women as highly ambivalent. Engaged in reproductive labour (both domestic and sexual), they are often perceived as a threat to national borders and traditional family relations, whilst on the other hand they serve to perpetuate the conventional gender roles in Cypriot society in times of change (Fulias-Souroulla 2008; Lenz 2005; 2006).

The way migrants are portrayed in public discourse influences children’s perceptions of ‘others’. How stereotypical images of migrant women are adopted by youngsters in a Cypriot middle school is perfectly demonstrated in Elena Skapoulis’s article ‘Transforming the label of “whore”:
girls’ negotiation of local and global gender ideologies in Cyprus’, which shows how ‘in the local peer culture, girls are placed on a fabricated and culturally widespread “virgin-whore” continuum along which different cultural groups – which are often equated with ethnic groups – are evaluated’ (Skapoulli 2009: 85). Another example of this awareness amongst children (both migrant and ‘native’) of the various social positions and stereotypes they occupy in Cyprus is discussed in Eleni Theodorou’s (2011) article, which explores the ways in which children of Pontian immigrants negotiate and perceive their class positions. While stressing how Pontian children’s ‘multiple minority statuses as non-Cypriots, as members of a negatively stereotyped cultural group, and as members of working-class families’ (Theodorou 2011: 12-13) often cause them to be discriminated by their Greek-Cypriot peers, her findings oppose the oft-encountered adult-construct of the naïve child unaware of the injustices and class positions in society. Rather, they indicate how children can have acute understandings of class and the financial status of their own and other families, and the effect these have on their own lives. With this in mind, let us now take a closer look at the role of education within this Cypriot multicultural reality.

Migration, education and the multicultural reality of Cyprus

A second area that has received increased attention, both in terms of academic research as well as projects and workshops initiated and supported by various NGOs and other non-profit organisations (local and European), is the role of education and pedagogy within this ‘new’ multicultural reality of Cyprus. A particular focus has been the responses by teachers and students to the growing diversity and multiculturalism in Cypriot schools – see for example the various outputs and projects by organisations such as ‘Multicultural Cyprus’,24 ‘Future World Center’25 and the ‘UNCRC Policy Center’.26 Yet, most teachers do not receive appropriate or adequate training in multicultural education (Panayiotopoulos and Nicolaïoud 2007; Theodosiou-Zipiti et al. 2010; Zembylas 2010a, 2010b) as it is not part of the mainstream curriculum of Greek-Cypriot education, but based on the initiatives of schools themselves or of individual teachers (Papamichael 2008).

Despite the increasing diversity within Cypriot classrooms,27 particularly within the inner-city schools (Partasi 2010), the myth of a homogeneous, monocultural and ethnocentric Cypriot society long cultivated by education and the media (Bryant 2004), appears to remain strongly embedded in today’s education system. The curriculum, explicitly or implicitly, is infused with nationalistic and Christian Orthodox values (Papadakis 2008; see also Kossiva et al. 2010), predisposing assimilation rather than multiculturalism (Panayiotopoulos and Nicolaïoud 2007; Zembylas 2010b), and leaving little space for diversity to be embraced (Trimikliniotis 2004).

In terms of academic literature on the impact of migration and diversity within Cypriot classrooms, the results vary. Theodosiou-Zipiti et al. (2010) point out how problems such as teachers’ prejudiced attitudes, lack of appropriate training and limited sense of responsibility towards the migrant students places the latter in a multi-disadvantaged position, creating a

24 http://www.multiculturalcyprus.net/
25 ‘Introduction to multiculturalism and building a multi-ethnic and multi-national Cyprus’ (Ferguson and Laouris, 2008); ‘Youth for a multicultural Cyprus’ (Wittig and Laouris 2008a); ‘Report of a structured dialogue co-laboratory elementary school Deryneia A’ (Wittig et al. 2008); ‘Report of a structured dialogue co-laboratory High Gate School Nicosia’ (Wittig and Laouris 2008b).
26 http://www.uncrcpc.org/node/8; ‘Using the Comasito manual in Cyprus’ (Papageorgio et al. 2010)
27 A 2007 report by The Cyprus Ministry of Education and Culture states that 7.3% of the pupils attending public primary schools do not speak Greek as a mother tongue (Cyprus Ministry of Education and Culture 2007), while in some of the inner-city schools non-indigenous students constitute a significant majority, even as high as 80 to 90%.
barrier to their academic success. The teachers who participated in their study also stressed how they believe that students from a migrant background are rejected and alienated by the native students. Another study focusing on teachers’ experiences of the growing diversity and multiculturalism in their classrooms (Zembylas 2010a) echoes these findings, emphasising the teachers’ discomfort with the presence of minority children (and especially Turkish Cypriots), their fear that immigrants (in general) threaten the national and cultural identity of Greek Cypriots, as well as the lack of emotional and professional support to cope with the teaching of immigrant and minority children. Such views, these teachers claim, are not only common amongst their colleagues, but also amongst Greek-Cypriot pupils and their parents. Spyrou’s (2004) study on schools in the South with Turkish-speaking children identified the inappropriate curriculum, the lack of a common language with teachers and classmates, as well as prejudice and racism as serious problems facing these children. Similar research (Demetriou and Trimikliniotis 2006) identified factors such as the language barriers and the lack of recognition of the contribution of Roma culture to society as contributing to the Roma children’s poor educational performance. These findings prompt the legitimate question raised by Panayiotopoulos and Nicolaou (2007: 75): ‘what kind of attitude should we expect from children when they are brought up in an environment with such values and principles?’ Indeed, overall, research on Greek-Cypriot youngsters’ feelings towards minorities (both immigrants and Turkish Cypriots) indicates a variety of negative attitudes (Philippou 2005, 2009; Spyrou 2004, 2009; Trimikliniotis 2004, 2010; Zembylas et al. 2010), reflecting similar trends in the wider Cypriot society (see for example: Council of Europe 2006; Kossiva et al. 2010).

Yet, some encouraging results can be found. For example, children who participated in studies by Hadjitheodoulou-Loizidou and Symeou (2007) and Partasi (2010, 2011) seem to be positive about having classmates or friends from other national or ethnic backgrounds. Both indigenous and non-indigenous students welcomed the opportunity to learn about other countries, religions, cultures and languages. They claimed to enjoy the multicultural character of their classes, but acknowledged that the language barrier can get in the way at times (cf. Panayiotopoulos and Nicolaou 2007). Also an EEA (European Economic Area)-funded pilot project, which included teacher training (guided by the Comapisto Manual, a tool developed by the Council of Europe in order to promote Human Rights Education), had a positive outcome. The study showed how the in-class activities clearly made children more aware, and more assertive, of their own (and fellow pupils’) rights, as well as more sensitive to notions of diversity and equality (Papageorgio et al. 2010). Papamichael’s (2008) article on Greek-Cypriot teachers’ understanding of multicultural education demonstrates – despite the observation that the intercultural activities implemented mainly belong to the ‘additive approach’ – teachers’ awareness and reflexivity on their own practices assumptions. This, Papamichael observes, is a small but positive step towards the reconsideration of intercultural education in Greek-Cypriot schools today. What these latter studies appear to have in common is the generally positive attitude and active involvement of the participating educators in the promotion of a multicultural classroom, confirming once again the influence their role and motivation has on the children’s attitudes and perceptions of ‘others’.

**Spaces of inter-diasporic encounter**

The discussion so far has documented the various waves and layers of migration

---

28 The highlighting of minority cultures in a ‘celebratory’ way actually reinforces the idea of the dominant culture as the normal one, an approach which does not necessarily challenge xenophobia or racist ideas.
contributing to Cyprus as a multi-diasporic space, which, in turn, is made up by a variety of ‘sub’ multi-diasporic spaces, both abstract and more tangible, into which people integrate and participate. The previous discussion on education and multiculturalism showed how a classroom or school environment becomes such a space of multi-diasporic interaction, on which pupils from a wide variety of ethno-national backgrounds draw in order to develop relations and friendships, as well as views of one another. It is important to note here that whilst both public and private (international) schools in Cyprus demonstrate an increasingly multicultural character, the student bodies (hence pathways of integration and inclusion/exclusion) of these schools are very different, as the migrant pupils attending the state schools are often children of working-class labourers and economic migrants, whilst those attending private schools generally come from more affluent backgrounds.

Yet, despite the diverse student bodies in these schools, youngsters are often stereotyped by virtue of their perceived characteristics, as we saw earlier in the example of Skappouli’s (2009) study, which illustrates how girls from certain national/cultural backgrounds are commonly collapsed in the referent of ‘virgin’ or ‘whore’. A similar situation is experienced by the Asian female migrants who, despite their extremely varied national, cultural, social and professional origins are often simply perceived as ‘domestic workers’ (Sainsbury 2007). For the latter a way to break out of this reductionist mould is through their weekly gatherings with other migrants from Asian backgrounds, creating a common space which – perhaps paradoxically – allows them to express their individualities and personal traits beyond uniformising labels such as ‘domestic worker’. Along similar lines, on the other side of the divide, the migrants in the old centre of north Nicosia – mainly from mainland Turkey, yet with different ‘roots’ (Arab, Kurdish etc.) – are drawn to each other (to socialise, share food etc.) because of their similar backgrounds and fates in Cyprus, whilst at the same time being able to (at least temporarily) escape the stigma of simply being settler ‘Turks’ (or ‘Türkiyeliler’).

Whilst the above examples of ‘migrant spaces’ are created by particular circumstances rather than by the migrants themselves, others have more of a choice when it comes to their spaces of integration or participation, and, thus, an input into what the ‘conditions’ of inclusion/exclusion within these spaces might be. An example are the second-generation ‘returnees’ mentioned earlier, who would speak of the highly ‘mixed’ character of their social circles, friendships and relationships, which provides them with a sense of familiarity and belonging in Cyprus. Certain social venues in Nicosia, popular amongst the returnees, clearly embody this atmosphere, and attract people from a wide range of national (or ‘mixed’) backgrounds, connecting on common grounds in terms of experiences, life-views, humour and so on. An important criterion for inclusion into this particular ‘multi-diasporic space’ is the experience of ‘being a migrant’ or at least having an ‘international/multicultural’ outlook on life (Teerling 2011).

Another fascinating example of a – on first examination – sharply heterogeneous group coming together based on common interests and lifestyle, is the clientele at the somateio (social club) of the Anorthosis Famagusta football team, described in a small case-study by Nicos Philippou (2008). The hard-core, mainly male, fans of Anorthosis – a club with nationalist roots that in the 1950s was associated with EOKA – use the space to socialise, eat, drink and watch football. The Nicosia-based somateio is run by a Cypriot manager and his Filipina wife, who decided to start serving Filipino food alongside the traditional grilled tavern-style food. This development attracted the attention of Nicosia Filipinos, who now frequently visit the place and also use it for their functions, weddings and christenings, and a karaoke machine was installed for their
entertainment. Many mixed couples are also regular customers and, despite the club’s nationalist roots, it is frequented by a number of fans of the most popular leftist football club in Cyprus, Omonoia. Other visitors include ‘an English man who often watches English Premier League games wearing a CCCP inscribed t-shirt and a Turkish-Cypriot man who has a taste for grilled lamb chops and KEO [beer] and enjoys watching Anorthosis league games with his Greek-Cypriot friend’ (Philippou 2008: 192). Hence, the pathway of integration into this ‘multi-diasporic space’ seems to be through commonalities in lifestyle, interests and (working-)class background, rather than ethnicity or nationality.

A final example of such a ‘multi-diasporic space’, also delightfully described by Philippou (2008), is captured within the setting of a Nicosia Halal butcher shop and neighbouring restaurant, where a wide range of low-priced dishes – very popular amongst Muslim migrants and others, including local Cypriots – are served. With clientele from a variety of Arab countries and the Indian Subcontinent, the establishment provides for an eclectic experience of Lebanese tea and nargileh (a tobacco water pipe popular across countries in the Near and Middle East), alongside Subcontinental curries and casseroles, which can be consumed in front of a large-screen TV, against a background of Arabic adornments. Thus, in this case, the integration pathways into this ‘multi-diasporic space’ are based on certain shared needs – i.e. food which is foremost tasty, Halal and/or cheap – rather than ethnicity.

**Conclusion: a research agenda for the future**

Examples of such spaces of participation and belonging, produced interactionally in the local context – whether captured within the highly mixed social circles of British-born Cypriots, friendships amongst pupils from a variety of ethno-national backgrounds, or the above-described examples of the Anorthosis somateio and the old-town butcher’s shop – encapsulate the complexities of ‘assimilation’ and challenge the idea that for a person to belong s/he has to assimilate to the language, traditions, values, behaviour and religion of the dominant group (see for example Yuval-Davis 2006: 209). Such examples reveals the need for further research not only into spaces of belonging within alternative, ‘post-identity’ socio-spatial settings – which is particularly relevant in a context of increasingly culturally diverse societies – but also into how such spaces draw on, overlap and co-exist alongside more ‘traditional’ local communities (Teerling 2010). So, following Antonsich (2010: 653), ‘rather than envisioning a passage from territorialized to de-territorialized forms of belonging, as some scholars have too simplistically advocated, it seems more plausible to think of contemporary societies as characterized by the co-presence of a plurality of forms of belonging’. Hence, rather than looking at the various migrant and diasporic groups in isolation from each other, Cyprus today should also be explored as a multi-diasporic space, which, in turn, is made up by various sub-multi-diasporic spaces that overlap, interact and influence one another – moving beyond primordial cultural referents, challenging the simple dichotomy of ‘home’ versus ‘away’ and revealing new similarities (and differences). The relatively small scale of an ‘island-space’ such as Cyprus – which is also a highly complex insular, multi-diasporic space – has the potential to illustrate the building blocks for new, contemporary, ways and spaces of belonging.

Our research agenda for the future thus involves building on the exemplary nature of Cyprus as an insular diasporic space, and its richness of migratory and inter-cultural encounters – both those which have been historically antagonistic (above all ‘Greek’ vs. ‘Turkish’) but also those which hold potential for creating a multi-cultural, cosmopolitan ‘third space’ rooted in Cyprus itself. The notion of Cyprus as a multi-
diasporic hub for migration and diaspora studies draws both on ‘the island’ as a unique spatial laboratory for study of social and ecological phenomena (King 2009), and on the global/local character of such an island, which has diasporic links to places both near (Greece, Turkey, Lebanon, Palestine etc.) and far (Britain, Eastern Europe, South and South-East Asia etc.). In addition to the field sites referred to immediately above (the Halal butcher’s, the sports club, the international classroom etc.), we envisage further work in a number of other sites: migrant and refugee support groups, women’s groups, (multi-)cultural event and festivals, the old-town crossing-point at the Green Line, (post-)colonial spaces of military and expatriate presence (access pending), as well as the casual and spontaneous sites of intercultural encounter (and exclusion) – the street, the park, the beach, the bar, the bus etc.

References


Lambrou, L. (1988) Contributions from second and third generations, in


