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Abstract

This paper explores second-generation return migration to the Caribbean and how this is facilitated by social capital generated through transnational family relationships. My analysis is positioned and contextualised within broader theories of migration studies. The family narrative constructed around the ‘myth of return’ is integral to the young people’s accounts of return migration. Of particular interest in the analysis is how these narratives act as important social resources in sustaining the second generation’s emotional attachment to the family homeland and in influencing the decision to return alongside other pragmatic and practical constraints. Drawing on fieldwork data, the analysis also examines issues of adjustment and settlement, particularly ways the ‘insider/outsider’ status and existing gender and social class relations inform experiences of return migration among the second generation.

Introduction

Return migration by particular ethnic communities in the UK has received considerable academic attention (Gmelch 1980; King 1986; Byron 2000). Increasingly, research interest is turning towards second-generation return migration to highlight the significance of diaspora and social networks informing the return migration process. This paper explores second-generation return migration to the Caribbean1 and how this is facilitated by social networks and resources generated through family relationships. In simplistic terms, second-generation migration refers to migrants’ children who ‘return’ to their family place of origin or ancestral homeland.2 To date, much of the growing body of research in Britain on second-generation Caribbean return migration has focused on problems concerned with cultural differences and social adjustment as these individuals settle into their ancestral homeland. Debates also examine how these returnees utilise their social space to construct and negotiate identity, belonging and ‘home’. Whilst some of these issues are also addressed in this analysis, the primary aim of my study is to complement the growing body of work on Caribbean return migration among the second generation by positioning and contextualising this within broader theories of migration studies. To date, this has been a rather neglected focus of research within existing studies of second-generation return migration to the Caribbean because of the emphasis on providing descriptive accounts of the empirical data.

Utilising the concept of social capital, a second aim of the study is to investigate the way in which second-generation return migration is produced and sustained by transnational family networks. The family narrative constructed around the ‘myth of return’ is also integral to young people’s accounts of return migration, particularly the way in which these narratives are imbued with personal meanings concerning identity, home, and belonging. Of particular interest in the analysis is how these narratives act as important social resources in sustaining the second generation’s emotional attachment to the family homeland or country of origin, and represent an important consideration in influencing the decision to return alongside other pragmatic and practical reasons.

The discussion opens by outlining the research context and background to the study. I then provide a broad summary of the key migration theories that have guided the research and examine issues of social capital and family narratives of ‘return’, which inform the second generation’s experiences. I draw on related work

1This specifically refers to the English-speaking countries in the region.
2 It is important to acknowledge that this simplistic definition of ‘second generation’ does not critically interrogate or problematise the complexity and ambiguity of the concept and the multiple ways it has been used as both a descriptive and an analytic category. King and Christou’s (2008) analysis concerning the conceptualisations of ‘generations’, particularly the term ‘second-generation’, in migration studies provides a detailed review and critique of this issue.
currently emerging on the return of other migrant groups to highlight points of similarity and departure in the analysis. The third section uses fieldwork data to examine the experiences of second-generation return migration to the Caribbean. The main themes and focus of debate include an investigation of the networks and resources that are utilised, generated by, and are a product of, the second generation’s existing connections to the family’s homeland. The fluid and contextual nature attached to notions of identity, belonging and ‘home’ are issues that emerge in the young people’s accounts. A further emergent theme is the impact of gender and social class relations on the second-generation returnees’ experience of return migration. A review of the main arguments is given in the concluding section of the paper.

Research background
The study was informed by a qualitative ethnographic research approach, seeking to elicit people’s own interpretations of the social realities faced and their understanding of their own private experiences of return migration. In-depth qualitative data was collected from second-generation returnees to the Caribbean. Data was generated through unstructured and semi-structured interviews, together with observational methods. The aim of these research approaches was to examine the participants in their natural settings whilst at the same time allowing their voices to come to the fore in narrating their own stories. Social and cultural anthropologists have a longer tradition of sustained interaction with the research participants in their natural settings in order to investigate the social worlds of the individuals under study. In sociology, feminist epistemological approaches have long argued for the centrality of people’s voices in documenting their experiences so that the construction of knowledge and theory is grounded in the critical analysis of people’s lives (Hill-Collins 1991; Ashfar and Maynard 1994; Reynolds 2002). These researchers place a value on the importance of participants using their own language to construct and distinguish aspects of their identities and experiences which may otherwise go unnoticed (Maynard and Purvis 1994).

The primary focus of the study was 12 recorded in-depth interviews with second-generation young adults who had ‘returned’ to their ancestral homeland in the Caribbean. These interviews took place in Jamaica during the summer of 2007, and were part of a six-month postdoctoral fellowship at Sussex University’s Centre of Migration Research (SCMR). These interviews and period of study followed on from a much wider research project entitled ‘Caribbean Young People, Social Capital and Disaporic Family Relationships’. This project was one of eleven projects within the Families & Social Capital ESRC Research Group at London South Bank University (2002–07). The ‘Caribbean Young People’ project investigated the experiences of second-generation and third-generation Caribbean young adults in the UK to establish how they utilised the concept of social capital within their family relationships and community networks as a social resource in ethnic identity formation.

The larger project was based on 80 qualitative interviews, comprised of 30 interviews with second-generation and third-generation Caribbean young adults (aged between 16–30 years old) and 50 of their family members across all age groups in the UK (Birmingham, London, Manchester and Nottingham) and the Caribbean (Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, and St. Kitts and Nevis). A main research finding was that the vast majority of these second- and third-generation young adults continue to ethnically identify as Caribbean and affiliate themselves to their parents’ or grandparents’ country of origin. This was primarily achieved through the young people’s efforts in creating and maintaining strong ethnic ties of solidarity within Caribbean diasporic and transnational family networks. The young people’s participation in transnational family care provision and ethnic associations within their local communities and
neighbourhoods further strengthened these ethnic bonds. There were similarities to young people belonging to other ethnic communities, especially second-generation Italians in Britain, who also practiced similar ties of ethnic solidarity to their ancestral homeland (see Reynolds 2006a, 2006b, 2007; Reynolds and Zontini 2006; Zontini 2007; Zontini and Reynolds 2007).

It was during these initial (2004) fieldwork interviews with family members in the Caribbean that I first encountered and interviewed second-generation return migrants from the UK (six respondents), alongside migrants from the USA (five respondents) and Canada (two respondents), who had decided to ‘return’ to their parents’ homeland. These second-generation return migrants provided the impetus for the later fieldwork that followed in 2007 and the data generated from these earlier interviews were used to guide and complement the current analysis. A third group of participants whose views are reflected in this paper are the many informal discussions and conversations that took place in Jamaica with second-generation returnees who chose not to be formally interviewed but who were nonetheless interested enough in the project to voice their opinions about their experiences and introduce me to others who had similarly returned. It is difficult to quantify the number of people I met in this manner because these discussions were mostly unplanned, impromptu affairs occurring in locations that were not very conducive to writing field notes (for example standing in a bank queue, hotel reception area, on the beach, in supermarkets and restaurants). Where possible I attempted to write up notes of these informal discusants from memory and have maintained basic records of 16 of these more causal informants including details of their personal background, reasons for return migration and experiences since return. Their views also constitute part of the broader analysis on second-generation Caribbean return migration.

In addition to using social capital to understand and theorise second-generation return migration, it is important to understand this concept’s significance in terms of the research process. The networks and ties of trust and reciprocity that are established through social capital informed my research relationship with the participants (Reynolds 2004). My access to them largely depended on the ‘snowballing method’ generated through existing networks I had established through my previous interviews with participants, and my own familial and social bonds within the Caribbean community in the UK and various Caribbean territories. These networks were particularly important in terms of accessing the second-generation return migrants because, unlike many first-generation returnees, they do not generally reside and settle in geographical areas that are known to be ‘established’ returning resident communities. The second-generation returnees are much more dispersed and ‘hidden’.

One of the benefits of being positioned as ‘insider’ within a study is that it provides the researcher with additional insight and knowledge of the community being studied (Sudbury 1998). I relied heavily upon my ‘insider’ status, and knowledge of researching within the Caribbean community, to play up or play down my ‘sameness’ and ‘difference’ in order to access the research participants. I would stress our ‘sameness’ of being second-generation British-born Caribbean children. In the Jamaican interviews I often referred to my Jamaican partner as coming from this same region as a further point of connection. During meetings with the ‘gatekeepers’ – who were typically family, friends and other resident association or community members seeking to establish control over access and research setting – I also used my ‘insider’ status to stress sameness and difference between us. Thus, in some instances I played up the fact that I was researching a community that I belong

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3Whilst I met and interviewed second-generation migrants from Canada, UK and USA during the 2003-4 fieldwork, this current study on second-generation Caribbean return specifically focuses on the views and experiences of the British returnees.
to. Yet, in other instances I would stress my ‘outsider status’ and the fact that not being a member of the group or community (i.e. returning resident) meant that I could better safeguard the confidentiality and anonymity of others who agreed to participate in the research. Another primary advantage of my ‘insider’ knowledge is that I could recognise and understand many of the unexplained and undefined customs and practices that gatekeepers performed to control my access to second-generation returnees. For instance, I anticipated that the gatekeepers would ask many questions about my personal life, family background and understanding of the political climate of the region. I always went to these meetings fully prepared to be questioned extensively about my professional and personal interest in the study. To this end, my ‘insider’/‘outsider’ status enabled me to utilise both social and cultural capital (Bourdieu 1986) to establish further contacts that would assist me with cultivating a non-purposive research sample.

The 2004 interviews took place with second-generation migrants who were dispersed throughout the region in Jamaica, Guyana, and St. Kitts and Nevis. In contrast, all of the fieldwork and interviews in 2007 were conducted in Jamaica. The majority of these formal and informal interviews took place with second-generation migrants living in three neighbouring north-east-Jamaican coastal parishes of St. Ann, St. Mary and Portland, although a small number of interviews were in the capital city of Kingston including follow-up interviews with two participants I first interviewed in 2004.

Most of the prior research into return migration to Jamaica has focused on the area of Mandeville in southern parish of Manchester, where there is an established resident and thriving returning resident community (Goulbourne 2002; Horst 2005). I purposely chose not to use Mandeville as a research site for a number of reasons. Firstly, this area is experiencing ‘research fatigue’ in terms of the number of studies emerging from the UK, Caribbean, Canada and North America that have explored return migration (Goulbourne 2002). In contrast, the northern coastal towns have returning resident communities that are largely under-researched. Secondly, much of the Jamaican tourist industry is concentrated in these north-eastern parishes. Tourism is recognised as an important vehicle in providing returning residents of working age with employment prospects and economic opportunities (Planning Institute 2004). Employment opportunities are limited in Mandeville because of the limited economic development in the region (Planning Institute 2001). Mandeville is recognised as a geographical area which is primarily dominated by retired returning migrants. Importantly, this group of returnees had previously built up their economic capital in their migrant country of destination before returning to their country of origin.

This study of second-generation Caribbean return migration adds to the growing body of empirical research within return migration that draws on case studies of particular migrant groups. Much of the growing body of research in Britain on second-generation Caribbean return migration, principally emerging from recent work by Potter and Phillips, has focused on problems concerned with cultural differences and social adjustment as these individuals settle into their parents’ homeland (Potter 2005; Potter and Phillips 2006a, 2006b). Also documented in the literature on Caribbean return migration are descriptive accounts of the migrants’ reasons for leaving the host country to return to the Caribbean, and the social resources these returning migrants bring back with them (Plaza 2000; Duval 2002; Bauer and Thompson 2006; Chamberlain 2006; Fog Olwig 2007).

The next section of the paper intends to complement and build on existing work in two ways. Firstly, it positions second-generation return migration within broader theoretical models of migration studies. Secondly, it will develop a framework for understanding the factors that facilitate and motivate second-generation return migration.
migration by utilising the concept of social capital and by highlighting how the family narrative centred on the ‘myth of return’ operates as an alternative form of capital through which Caribbean ethnic identity is maintained across the generations.

**Framing second-generation return migration within migration theories**

One of the main strengths of the current body of work focusing on return migration to the Caribbean is its emphasis on data-rich descriptive accounts of people’s views and experiences in their country of origin; especially important here is the recent research by Potter and Phillips cited above. Yet this form of empirical investigation can be challenged because of its limited exploration of theoretical models that position return migration within its broader migration context. Baldassar (2001: 9) suggests such research should provide an avenue for considering transnational interaction and generate understanding of ways in which theories of cultural transmission are underpinned by the migration process. It is not within the scope of my discussion here to critically interrogate the complexity, multiplicity and diversity of migration theories. However it is important to acknowledge two migration theories which have informed my analysis: the migration–development nexus and transnationalism.

A key theoretical standpoint advanced by researchers working in the field of return migration concerns the impact of labour migration on the development of migrant-origin societies. Supporters of this typology view return migration as a process driven by the migration–development nexus. King’s (1986) edited volume considers the impact of return migration on economic development in the ‘home’ society. The directionality and continuity of migration flows benefit the original sending society because migrants accumulate human, economic and social capital in their host country. Following return migration, this is directly focused on and fed back into the original sending area. It could therefore be argued that one of the benefits of second-generation return migration is that it facilitates inter-generational accumulation of human, social and economic capital for the original sending society. The significance of cross-generational accumulation of capital achieved through return migration has certainly been recognised within the Caribbean region. In recent years various schemes have been launched to attract the second generation to invest skills and financial capital back into their parents’ homeland. For example, in 2004 the Jamaica High Commission (London, Toronto and New York offices) and a private corporation, the Grace Kennedy foundation, launched their annual scholarship scheme to provide funding for newly qualified graduates of Caribbean descent to undertake a one-year management and technology work experience programme in Jamaica. Other governments in the Caribbean region have also called for the need to encourage the second and third generation overseas to provide social and economic investment to the region, although they have yet to translate this into a definable policy framework. The accumulation of capital generated through return migration provides a basis for development in developing societies and counteracts the ‘brain drain’ effect which is a continuing phenomenon in many Caribbean territories (UNITAR 1971; Thomas-Hope 1988; UNECLAC 2003; Millennium Development Report 2004).

Another related issue with migration–development theories concerns the relationship between remittances and return migration. In economic terms, migrants return to the country of origin with particular types of economic remittances which in turn impact on local development and future migration flows (Jones 1998; Carling 2002). Appleyard’s (1989) analysis of economic remittances notes that poorly devised frameworks limit attempts to examine the expenditure patterns of remittances in a systematic way. The main focus of debates by opposing schools is whether remittances lead to the development of the local economy or
contribute to its demise. The structural school of thought believe that remittances contribute to a dependency and consumption culture, rising inequality and long-term economic decline. The functional school views remittances in terms of providing economic improvement and investment to the local community and explores how cross-national networks between migrant communities of origin and in the host country are also established and sustained through economic remittances (Russell 1992; Carling 2002; Adams and Page 2005).

Empirical studies exploring the impact of economic remittances in the Caribbean have by and large positioned themselves between these two schools of thought. The Millennium Development Report (2004) highlights that economic remittances to the region are primarily focused around consumer goods and family/domestic consumption, such as building and maintenance of family property, medical expenses, and food, clothing and education fees. In Jamaica, for example, financial remittances have overtaken tourism as the largest foreign earner, with over US$1.1bn a year received in remittances for family/domestic consumption. In 62% of Jamaican households financial remittances constitute over 60% of the household economy.

Generally speaking, financial remittances are widely regarded by policymakers and researchers as having a positive contribution to families, households and local economies. Such flows are viewed as contributing towards family income and in many poor and working-class households it is the primary source of family income (Vickerman 1999; Nettleford 2003). My previous work also suggests that financial remittances provided by those migrants in the UK also reinforce notions of responsibility and attachment to family members in the Caribbean. This sustains transnational family ties and networks which may later encourage and facilitate inter-generational return migration (Reynolds 2004, 2006a). In terms of developing the local economy, research has also identified that remittances provide financial compensation for the economic losses sustained throughout the region as a result of international labour migration and the ‘brain drain effect’. Therefore this form of remittance encourages reinvestment and redistribution of income from North America and the UK back into the economies of Caribbean countries (UNECLAC 2003; Millennium Development Report 2004).

Yet, despite the benefits of economic remittances to the family and local economy, several commentators in the Caribbean region have expressed concern about the way in which economic remittances directly hinder family relationships and economic development in the region. It is argued that overseas remittances have reduced families' ability to independently care for themselves. Moreover there is limited commitment and motivation by government and policy agencies to develop social welfare and educational services because of the social expectation that family overseas, through economic remittance, will address their own family members' social and welfare needs (Conway 1993). Another argument put forward is that economic remittances contribute to what is perceived as a declining work ethic and thus to a dependency culture among the younger generations in the region (Chevannes 1996). Supporters of this viewpoint attribute high rates of youth unemployment to the fact that Caribbean youths now depend on family overseas or returning family members to the region to provide them with material goods when required, and as a result they have lowered aspirations towards educational or professional success (Hillman and D'Agostino 2003). Economic remittances also stifle local development because people are spending dollars that have not been generated in the Caribbean economies. In Jamaica, for example, much of the ‘remittance dollar’ is spent on imported goods. This in turn creates a culture that discourages savings and long-term investment. Consequently, while
consumer demand is strengthened, production is weakened.

In order to channel remittances so that they benefit the economy, the Jamaican government is talking publicly about finding ways to harness investment from migration by utilising remittances provided by Jamaicans abroad to develop productive investment and nation-building instead of consumption or savings. However, policy plans to do this have so far met with strong resistance borne out of the fact that economic remittance in Jamaica, as throughout the Caribbean, is still largely viewed as a private and domestic arrangement. Family members overseas who send money ‘back home’ and returning residents who bring income and capital back with them want to maintain their independence in deciding how their money should be used. My own analysis of the interview data points to a general feeling by respondents that it is the responsibility of government to develop the country’s infrastructure and generate productive investment opportunities. Individuals or hometown associations overseas, as well as migrants who have returned, should not be relied upon to harness investment towards collective economic development.

This is in contrast to other migrant communities, for example Mexican migrants, where there is evidence that hometown and collective associations have been active in using remittances to develop the local infrastructure (Díaz-Briquets and Weintraub 1991). This issue of an absence of collective associationism within the Caribbean context reflects the social and cultural factors which structure relations in the Caribbean and its diaspora. Individualism is a dominant aspect of Caribbean society. For example, there exists greater autonomy for individuals to choose their lifestyles, family forms and living arrangements. The historical incidences of enforced enslavement and voluntary economic migration created more fluid, ‘loose’, dynamic and diverse forms of Caribbean networks and household patterns compared with Western European family models which, until very recently, were understood as ‘structured’ and patriarchal with married conjugal unions at their centre (Silva and Smart 1999; Reynolds 2005). Caribbean people have been successful in sustaining their family connections and providing collective and individual responsibility for care, including economic remittance, within this individualised framework because the individualised self is understood as relational and situational to others within their networks (Smith 1953, 1962; Peach 1968, 1991; Burman 2002).

Through most of the widely available literature on economic remittances we have come to think of them as solely having an economic function. Also debated within migration–development theories are other forms of remittances. Levitt’s seminal study on social remittances defines these as ‘the ideas, behaviour, identities and social capital that flow from receiving to sending country communities’ (1998: 926). In essence, social remittances constitute the social practices, values, networks and resources that originate in the sending society and are reconstructed in the receiving country. These are then transferred back to the sending society, primarily via family visits ‘home’ and return migration. Social remittances have the potential to transform society in terms of developing family and community resources, business entrepreneurship and new ways of thinking concerning legal and political organisation. To what extent macro-level global flows precede social remittance exchanges is an important issue for consideration. It could be argued, for example, that social remittance transfers encouraging increased campaigning for greater economic equality for Caribbean men and women in the region are directly informed by feminist discourses addressing universal gender inequality rather than the views, attitudes and experiences of gender relations that migrating women may return with.

The Caribbean second generation in the UK

Particularly important in the work on second-generation return migration are the
ways in which transnational activities among the second generation influence their articulations of identity, home and belonging (Wessendorf 2007). Transnationalism involves processes of ‘linking immigrant groups in the advanced countries with their respective sending nations and hometowns’ (Portes et al. 1999: 217). Numerous studies examining Caribbean migration and diaspora suggest that transnational identities are created and sustained through diasporic and transnational ties to family and community (see, for example, Thomas-Hope 1992; Barrow 1996; Chamberlain 1998; Goulbourne and Chamberlain 2001; Duval 2002; Fog Olwig 2002; Potter et al. 2005; Plaza 2006; Reynolds 2006a). For the second generation, these Caribbean transnational ties are further strengthened by the relative ease and affordability of air travel, increasing the frequency of family visits and holidays to the region; greater choice and immediacy of contacting family members through improved telecommunication systems and other electronic forms of communication; and, increasingly, the phenomenon of return migration among the first generation to the region (Reynolds 2004).

Wessendorf (2007) refers to the many studies that have explored the impact of transnationalism on the integration process. In her work on second-generation Italians in Switzerland, she reflects that, growing up as children and adolescents, the second generation lead ‘highly transnational lives’ and have engaged in many ‘transnational activities’ (2007: 1084). Not only did this provide them with a ‘third space’ in which to articulate their identity, but such transnational links provided the means through which return migration among the second generation could occur. Her findings parallel many of the themes and issues raised in my own work. In my own study, the second generation in the UK offered many examples of the transnational activities that they actively participated in. These included family holidays, and in particular the ‘family reunion’ where dispersed family members came together from different parts of the

world (primarily the UK, US, Canada, Europe and other Caribbean territories), reflecting their different migrant trajectories (Reynolds 2006a). The principal aim of the family reunion was to strengthen family ties and connections that are sometimes weakened and lost as a result of serial migration (Sutton 2004). The young people also highlighted ethnic customs and traditions around food as an important ritualising aspect of Caribbean collective ethnic identity. Food is regarded as an essential part of cultural identity but the obviousness and taken-for-granted nature of food means that, as a subject of investigation in its own right, it has received limited attention outside of the fields of anthropology and health and nutrition research. Yet, food is a cultural artefact imbued with meanings and values (Counihan and Esterik 1997). The type of food goods chosen, and the preparation and presentation of certain foods, all re-affirm cultural belonging and a strong ethnic group consciousness that is linked to the Caribbean homeland. The young people identified specific food types specially prepared by their Caribbean parents for specific family occasions; examples are ackee and saltfish, breadfruit, pepperpot, curried goat, garlic pork, and fried plantain. Such cross-island ethnic-specific foods are strongly associated with a Caribbean cultural identity. The preparation of these ethnic dishes represented a means through which ethnic group identity was sustained from the first generation down to the second and subsequent generations. Families use ethnic-specific transnational activities and household rituals and practices as a social resource in maintaining cross-generation ethnic group identity (Gardner and Grillo 2002; Zontini 2007).

Studies on second-generation return migration reflect the transnational networks that the second generation are embedded into and the personal and social relationships that connect place of birth, ancestral homeland and diaspora (Levitt 2001; Foner 2002; Glick Schiller 2004; Christou 2006, Wessendorf 2007; King and Christou 2008). Nostalgia and yearning for
the place of homeland are essential to the family narrative. The capital and resources that are generated by, and are a product of, the family narrative of ‘return’ directly inform family experiences and practices in the UK and create contested notions of home, belonging and identity among the second generation. In Caribbean context, the promotion of the ‘myth of return’ represents an integral feature of Caribbean people’s lives. In many ways this is not dissimilar to the family narrative of other migrant groups. King (1979) reflects that an important typology of return migration is the ‘return’ to the familial ancestral homeland. Moreover, first-generation migrants derive personal status within their ethnic communities from telling their migration stories and these often include their expectant return to their ancestral homeland. These stories enable individuals to make sense of their lives and establish social relationships within their migrant communities because they act as a source of conversation and point of connection for individuals. Collective ethnic bonds are further strengthened through these migrant narratives as a result of ‘home’ being re-constructed and re-imagined as an idealised place, free from the encumbrance of social and economic problems experienced by the migrants in the country of destination (King 2000). The collective migrant narrative shared by the Caribbean community in the UK is that many migrants only intended to stay in the receiving country for a relatively short period of time (on average five to ten years), in order to save enough money to return, and financially establish themselves, in their country of origin (Peach 1968; James and Harris 1993; Phillips and Philips 1998). However, for various reasons, including economic hardship, structural disadvantage and cross-generational family roots becoming firmly established in the UK, the plan to return was not realised for the majority of first-generation migrants.

The ‘myth of return’ is central to the Caribbean migrant experience in the UK regardless of whether or not this dream is realised. This has directly impacted on the everyday lives of the second generation. In family homes, the second generation grew up hearing stories of ‘home’, a distant place disconnected to England. Often recounted and repeated to them was the narrative that one day the family would return ‘home’. Indeed, such was the strength of this narrative that the parents’ nostalgia for ‘home’ was recognised as representing one of their earliest memories of family life among many of the second generation interviewed. Social resources and transnational activities were utilised by the first-generation migrant parents to keep this dream alive in their own and their children’s imagination. Examples included the practice of writing letters and sending ‘barrels’ of goods to family members in the sending country; the prominent place of cultural signifiers and artefacts in the household to remember ‘home’ such as maps, sculptures, paintings, and items of furnishing; and the recital of Caribbean folk-stories and poems passed down to the next generation. So central to the family narrative was this dream to return to the country of origin that their parents’ narratives of home and return became part of the second generation’s own narratives in terms understanding their personal identity and sense of self. Many of the second generation chose to ethnically and culturally identify themselves as Caribbean or their specific country of family origin (i.e. Jamaican or Guyanese) despite the fact that some had never visited these countries. There were similar instances whereby these young people regarded the Caribbean or their parents’ homeland as their spiritual or cultural home. Homeland is often characterised by the deep-rooted identification and emotional attachment to the place of origin. It reflects the migrants’ own interpretation of their roots, the celebration of cultural heritage, attachment to a sentimentalised place and the importance of ‘knowing where you come from’ for the construction of self-identity (Basu 2007). In contrast home is generally characterised as a place of residence, which provides a physical and emotional setting for private life and acts as a ‘safe haven’, providing a sense of familiarity and
security. Yet, for migrants and their offspring, this relationship between home and homeland is far more complex. Sometimes home and homeland are interchangeably and simultaneously used, thereby emphasising the ‘contextual slipperiness and multiplicity’ of these concepts. Whilst at other times they represent different things for these migrants. Rapport and Dawson’s (1999) edited volume explores this complexity in defining home and the various ways in which migrating people understand ‘home’ in a world of movement and globalisation.

For those second-generation migrants who have taken the decision to return to the Caribbean, meanings around home and homeland are further challenged by changing constructions of belonging and the important distinction between their own agency in defining ‘home’ and particular social relations that govern their understanding.

In this regard, it is important to acknowledge the interplay between internally formed, family constructions of ‘home’ as a result of young people’s own understanding of cultural and familial attachment to the region, versus external or imposed understanding, which reflects the young people’s racial and social positioning in the UK and results from the impact of immigration policies on second-generation migrants. The assimilation and integration policies in place towards the latter part of the twentieth century are crucial to understanding constructions and meanings of ‘home’ among the second generation as well as their motivation to ‘return’ to their parents’ homeland. Successive assimilation and integration policies have focused on second-generation migrant groups and their problematic relationship to the nation-state (Zhou 1997). Following on from the 7/7 and 21/7 terrorist attacks in London much of the policy concerns have been expressed around the apparent unwillingness of some of the second (and indeed third) generation of migrant groups to fully integrate into the nation and actively participate in a wide range of associational life (Faulkner 2004; Runnymede Trust 2004). Indeed, it has been suggested that different racial/ethnic groups’ comparative failure to integrate and work across ethnic and religious groups to resolve common concerns has contributed to a rise in racial tensions and feelings of social exclusion in Britain today among second-generation migrants (Parekh 2000; Ousley 2001). Most of these recent debates concerning integration and social cohesion have addressed issues related to social constructions of faith-based identity and religious difference among Muslim groups.

As a result, second-generation Caribbeans have been largely omitted from these debates. However, the Swann Report in the 1980s on race relations in Britain and the MacPherson Report which was published during the mid-1990s following the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry were in direct response to the feelings of racial discrimination and social exclusion experienced by many second-generation black and Caribbean young people living in this country. Research into the integration experiences of second-generation Caribbeans in the UK provides a complex and contradictory picture. One the hand commentators of popular culture identify the highly public profile among second-generation Caribbean sportsmen and women, musicians and entertainers and suggest that this is proof of the group’s achievement towards full integration. On the other hand, however, there is strong evidence to suggest that, despite the relative success of a small minority of individuals within a few niche areas, the majority of second-generation Caribbeans have encountered relative failure in achieving economic success and full participation in the UK labour market (Reynolds and Miah 2007). As a collective group, it is questionable whether the second generation have advanced and improved upon the socio-economic status of the first generation of Caribbean migrants who first arrived in Britain some 60 years ago. There is also the sense that the second generation in the UK have not socially and economically progressed as well as their Caribbean counterparts in the USA (Foner 1979; Vickerman 1999; Waters 1999). Gans (1992) refers to a ‘second-
generation decline’ and asserts that this generation of young people do not share their migrant parents’ aspirations of upward mobility and economic success in their host society as a result of existing social and structural conditions limiting their opportunities for economic mobility. Numerous studies within public policy continue to highlight problems for the second generation in terms of high rates of youth unemployment, over-representation in the criminal justice system and mental institutions, educational underachievement, and also street and gun violence (Peach 1991; Solomos and Back 1996; Modood et al. 1997; Solomos and Bulmer 1999). This social disadvantage and the structural economic conditions encountered by Caribbean youths could be construed as representing their failure to advance towards full and successful integration. Many of the second-generation returnees to the Caribbean in this study remarked on the limited social and economic opportunities they faced as part of their everyday lives in Britain and the restrictions placed on their ambitions and expectations for economic success and intra-generational social mobility. Their racialised and pathologised status impacted on their understanding of home and belonging, and made them question their full integration into British society as the following interview quotation suggests:

I was born in England but I always felt unwelcomed in my own country, so I can't call England home, if you mean home is as a place of warmth and comfort. I never felt that because prejudice and discrimination was always there. I didn’t go out of my way to experience it. In London you grow up constantly looking over your shoulder, when you’re out on the streets you go out with your guard up. I used to instinctively wonder what’s going to come at me next [...] I was always getting stopped by the police. That policeman who’s stops you for some so-called driving offence, I’d be thinking ‘now is he in a good mood today or has he had an argument that morning with the missus and if so he’s about to take it out on my black arse?’[...] It’s a fact of life for us that many people in England can never understand. They don’t understand the realities of being a black man and the feeling we’re not liked or wanted. I never felt comfortable in my own skin there [England]. Now here [Jamaica] I’m comfortable in my own skin. I’m a very hard worker, I can hustle for a living and if you come to Jamaica with that attitude to work hard there’s more options here to build your own business. I’m in a better position now to invest in a future for my family (Roystone, Jamaica, August 2004).

In this instance, for Roystone and other second-generation returnees, return migration to their parents’ homeland acted as a ‘survival strategy’ and represented an alternative and viable route in which to achieve economic success and social mobility, opportunities they felt were denied to them living in Britain. It is perhaps a strange paradox that first-generation parents migrated from the Caribbean to the UK in search of better opportunities and economic success for themselves and their children. Yet, their children are motivated to return back home to their parents’ homeland to achieve these same ambitions for themselves and their own children (the third generation). 4 Second-generation return migration could therefore be construed along Cerase’s (1974) success/failure binary model of return migration. On the one hand, this return migration process also represents a migrant narrative of failure in terms of the limited success of Caribbean migrants to become fully integrated and accepted members of British society. On the other hand however, it could be said to represent a migrant narrative of success and points to the particular strength of ‘reverse’ migration wherein Caribbean migrants are embedded into their transnational family

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4 I have chosen to define the children of the second generation who have migrated to the Caribbean as ‘third-generation’ because there is no analytic category to differentiate this group of migrants. However, I accept that they might not be viewed or choose to define themselves as ‘third-generation’.
relationships and transnational identification of ‘home’, which is sustained through their cultural, emotional and spiritual connections to the region. Yet, this latter issue raises further questions and challenges for this particular migration process. If these migrants achieved collective success and a sense of cultural belonging in Britain, would they put so much effort into maintaining these ties? To what extent is second-generation return migration contingent upon the failure of British integration policies to address issues of racial disadvantage and improve the collective structural positioning of Caribbean migrant groups in this society?

Second-generation return: who returns and what facilitates this?
The desire to return home to their parents’ and grandparents’ homeland was expressed by many of the second-generation respondents. This was a direct consequence of their participation in internal familial transnational activities, nostalgic reminiscences of ‘past lives’ in the Caribbean passed down across successive generations (Chamberlain 1997); alongside external constraints of exclusive practices and policies in the UK, which continue to create harsh structural conditions for the everyday lived experiences of the second generation. However, some of the respondents who expressed an interest in return migration were able to translate this dream into reality. The decision and choice to return among the second generation relied upon specific circumstances such as these young people’s continued family ties to the region (and the cross-generational networks and resources that emerge from this); particular stages in the life-course for the second generation (single professionals or parents of young children); levels of educational qualification and past work experiences. Most of the respondents had professional/vocational or degree-level qualifications and this factor was important in terms of influencing future employment and career prospects. Generally those second generation who did not have these strong familial ties to the region, and transferable skills and qualifications, could not return, despite an intention to do so. This meant that a large cohort of people who might have benefited from returning to their family’s homeland was prevented from returning, particularly young people with low levels of skills and educational attainment, living in poor and disadvantaged communities. Return migration to the Caribbean among the second generation thus exists as a ‘survival strategy’ for the privileged minority with access to social and economic resources generated through their family networks and socio-economic factors.

Return migration and social capital
Social capital is a particularly useful concept in exploring relationships between intent, opportunity and resources. Social capital can be broadly defined as ‘the values that people hold and the resources that they can access, which both result in and are the result of collective and socially negotiated ties and relationships’ (Edwards et al. 2003: 2). Social capital creates bonding networks within family and community. Robert Putnam (2000), often regarded as one of the founding fathers of social capital theory, stresses the importance of social capital in terms of its relationship to societies, communities and families. Networks of trust, values and reciprocity are significant to making family and community relationships work and sustaining the connections that bind societies together. Social capital used in this way fosters social cohesion, provides individuals with a sense of belonging and offers opportunities (Franklin 2007). Family networks comprised of ties of trust and reciprocal relationships enable social capital to be built up over time and transmitted across generations. There is an integral link between social and cultural capital, the latter of which comprises ways of thinking and being as well as cultural goods produced, that generate social resources for individuals, families and communities (Bourdieu 1986). It is not within the scope of this study to fully explore the relationship between families
and social capital but various projects within the Families and Social Capital Research Group at London South Bank University have addressed the diverse way in which social capital is reproduced, generated and sustained through family networks for the good or ill of family members (see www.lsbu.ac.uk/families).

Family bonds themselves are utilised as a social resource by individuals in the construction of ethnic identity and belonging (Reynolds 2006a; 2006b). Family narratives which promote the ‘myth of return’ and a cultural diasporic identity, together with transnational family bonds and activities, all represent important forms of social capital which are utilised within family/kinship networks to re-affirm the young people’s membership and belonging to Caribbean ethnic identity. Potter notes (2005: 14): ‘return migrants are best viewed as people endowed with social capital, potential and realized’. Certainly, the analysis of my data indicates that, for the second generation who have taken the decision to return to the Caribbean, this migration is facilitated through the social relationships and resources which are generated and sustained through their family networks. It is these family networks which make the difference between the dream or intention to return and the actual reality of doing so. Other studies also highlight that strong family ties and connections to the homeland provide the primary reason for return over and above other economic, social and political considerations (Gmelch 1992; Thomas-Hope 1992; Byron 1999; Goulbourne 2002). Consequently, empirical data on return migration among the second generation is dependent on anecdotal evidence and the growing number of small-scale localised studies on this issue.

In terms of my own study, a number of common characteristics defined the profile of the second-generation returnees. Thirty out of 34 respondents had some form of university education and/or vocational/technical qualifications, skills and experience. Women comprised 19 of the combined sample and 15 male participants were interviewed. Twenty-two participants were parents with primary or school-age children, or they migrated as single professionals but have since met partners in their country of destination. Ten returnees were single mothers. All returnees had two parents which came from the region. All were frequent visitors to the region prior to making the decision to return (i.e. family holidays every two to three years). Over half of the respondents (18 people) had parents who had recently returned (within the past ten years). Indeed, it is this factor that acted as the driving force behind the return for many of the respondents. These older family members were part of a large cohort who had reached retirement age and were choosing to return to their country of origin (Byron 2000). Prior to the second generation themselves returning, the return among parents encouraged regular and extended

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5 This figure is based on data collected from respondents formally interviewed and informal discussions during the fieldwork stages that took place 2003-4 and 2007.
visits to the region and this enabled the young people to view the country with a fresh perspective, beyond that of conventional tourist, before they made their final decision to return.

**Social and economic benefits of return**

There was a perception among young returnees that they would have a better quality of life in their parents’ homeland compared to their lives in the UK. This was borne out of increasing disillusionment with life in the UK, particularly perceived experiences of racial disadvantage, and limited education and employment opportunities for their children and themselves.

The [teachers] are very negative towards the Black children. It made me think about my own children, what type of education they would receive, that’s when we were saying yes, we have to go home to St Kitts. The children needed to have an education where they will be loved and supported (Yvette, St Kitts, June 2004).

One second-generation single mother who returned to live in Jamaica three years ago spoke of the fact that she was motivated to return because her oldest child was continually getting into problems at secondary school in the UK. Therefore, when her parents returned to Jamaica she saw this as an opportunity to also migrate in order to move her son away from negative peer pressure at school:

He [son] got in with the wrong crowd and I could see the path that was set out for him. The school had already labelled him as a trouble-maker because of the crowd he was moving with. I thought about moving him to another school but I knew his reputation would follow him and I wanted a fresh start for [son] where he wouldn’t be judged. When mum and dad announced they were finally going home, I thought ‘right that’s it, here’s my chance, my prayers have been answered’. I didn’t know much about Jamaica other than a few holidays and what they told me, but it had to be better, right? I heard that the schools were ok and that the teachers were strict and he needed that discipline. Plus, dad would be there to give them the extra discipline. He’s excelled and really come into his own with his schooling. Next year he’s going to university because he’s on a degree programme and there’s no way that would have happened if I stayed in that environment in Nottingham (Beverley, Jamaica, August 2007).

Among many of the respondents there was the perception that some Caribbean countries, especially Barbados and Guyana, have a better education system compared to Britain as a result of the strong cultural educational ethos promoting discipline in the classroom and the high rates of literacy. In countries where the quality of public schooling was variable, such as Jamaica, the second-generation parents felt that they were in a better economic position to afford private schooling, which they could not afford in England.

These second-generation returnees also spoke of the other positive values derived from return migration, namely that their children would gain in terms of an improved quality of life and the maintenance of cultural and family values, even if at times this meant that they (the parents) sacrificed their own personal happiness by returning. It was the female respondents who especially considered return in terms of the gain made to family life and the children, against any personal cost to themselves and their own well-being, as the following quotations indicate:

You make your life for your kids, so whatever sadness I feel because I do get lonely sometimes I dry my tears because I can see how much the move has been good for the kids. They love it here and have settled in really well. There are opportunities here for them to enjoy the simple things in life, they walk to school on their own, they’re always playing out on the lane, I would never allow them to do that in London. And I have peace of
mind because I’m not constantly worrying about their safety (Monica, Guyana, July 2004.)

Culturally I wanted them to experience the Caribbean values I grew up with, and grow up with a strong identity. Where better for them to learn than by living in Jamaica and the Caribbean as a whole? In England, the kids are too spoilt, they take everything for granted and don’t appreciate the simple things in life. We live in a small community, and people still make time to talk to you and keep an eye out for the children. They have much more space to breathe; they’re outside more getting plenty of fresh air and exercise. And Sundays is beach day, which the children love. I don’t want to give you a rose-tinted picture of life in Jamaica because I can see some of the negative influences influencing the children here and I’ve had personal problems I’ve found hard to deal with but I’m 99% sure my children are getting a better quality of life now (Tanya, Jamaica, June 2007).

Among the second-generation returnees who were single mothers with young children, there were other pragmatic and practical reasons influencing their decision to return. Following the return of their first-generation parents, these mothers had lost the childcare support they provided. Many of these single mothers could not afford to meet the rising costs of childcare on their existing income, so they opted to return to their parents’ homeland in order to live nearby their parents and other relatives who could provide free or cheap childcare during their own children’s formative years. As the following quotation indicates, return migration was viewed as a pragmatic and rational decision born out of economic necessity:

[In England] I struggled with childcare costs because I don’t get any financial help from their father. Mum was always asking me to come live out here, [Jamaica], I think she missed the kids and wanted that contact. I wasn’t so sure at first. I was terrified of the serious upheaval to my life, how I’d fit in coming from a completely different society. How my children would adjust? Would I find work here? But financially it made sense because basically there’s a network of aunties and cousins who I can call on to help and there’s mum who’s always available. It took me six months to pack up my life in England. I haven’t regretted the move yet because the cost of living is so much cheaper here. I may go back when the children get older because I want them to experience more of the world and different cultures, but for now St Mary [Jamaican parish] is home (Sandra, Jamaica, August 2007).

The economic benefits of return migration were another feature highlighted by the second generation. These young people felt that they were in a better position to utilise their skills and qualifications gained in the UK to set up their own businesses and develop their entrepreneurial skills in the Caribbean. Interestingly, many second-generation migrants were aware of infrastructural problems and the need for economic development in the region. Therefore, as well as individualistic and family benefits derived from developing employment and business opportunities in the region, they regarded this as a vehicle through which to reinvest and ‘give back’ to society.

We have a big problem with all the talented people leaving the country, as soon as they get their papers [professional certificate] they’re off. In my small way I’m doing bit by contributing to society and I employ ten men from the village (Gavin, Guyana, July 2004).

The Jamaican tourist coastal towns provided young adults with ideal sites to set up their businesses. They could use their English accent to speak and relate to the many English and US tourists who holidayed in these areas. Having an English accent created particular advantages for them in terms of the ease in applying for and securing business loans compared to the indigenous residents. Others were able to
utilise their English accent to apply for work without formal or appropriate levels of qualification. This was particularly the case in the hotel and catering industry, where the returnees acknowledged that having an English accent alone could secure a receptionist/front-of-house post, because of the perception among native and other foreign businesspeople that an English accent established a professional atmosphere and would attract other English and foreign customers to the place of business. Potter and Phillips’ study (2006a) of second-generation return migration to Barbados explores the power of the English accent and its symbolic associations to whiteness in postcolonial discourses. Their respondents, too, reported similar experiences of social and economic privilege on account of their English accent and the way in which they accrued a ‘pseudo-white identity’ in the workplace and other professional settings that translated into power and racialised privilege over native-born black residents. Potter and Phillips (2006a) point to the ‘hybrid’ or ‘in-between’ status of their second-generation Bajan-British returnees on account of their symbolic whiteness. The returnees in my own study recognise that their English accent firmly re-establishes, but in a very different way, their ‘insider/outsider’ status, which was earlier afforded to them as UK nationals living in Britain on account of their subordinated racial identity.

Having an English accent and an ‘insider/outsider’ status in these instances was utilised as an important social capital resource in generating economic opportunities for these returning migrants. For many of the respondents who were working and living in tourist towns, the cosmopolitan feel to the area (such as regular contact with foreign-born nationals and tourists, supermarkets which sold English and foreign goods) provided them with a (false) sense of security, safety and familiarity, reaffirming their ‘insider status’. Yet, they recognised that outside of these specific contexts and in the perceptions of the native residents they were regarded, and indeed identified themselves, as ‘outsiders’. The respondents’ strong networks and ties to family members in the parents’ homeland celebrated their ‘insider’ statuses as a result of family belonging and communal bonds, whilst simultaneously highlighting their ‘outsider’ status on account of the obvious cultural differences between themselves and their native-born family members.

**Family relationships and return migration**

Despite the contextualised and shifting ‘insider/outsider’ boundaries of belonging for the second-generation returnees, certain commonalities were shared in terms of the use of their family relationships in the return migration process. These young migrants utilised their parents and native kin to develop their social networks. Also, and more importantly, they used them to assist them with practical details of return such as the building and purchasing of homes, finding work and other employment opportunities, and information concerning duty and tax concessions.

The contacts that emerged through family bonds were especially crucial to the second-generation returnees finding work because securing suitable employment heavily depends on existing contacts and reciprocal trust relationships. There is a strong culture of gaining employment through ‘who you know’ as a result of less stringent recruitment legislation. Many of the returnees used their family and social contacts to find employment or develop business opportunities. The following quotation is an example of this:

> I was clueless about finding work here and how the system works so I was phoning around and completing application forms but nobody got back to me. In the end my mum took me in hand, she said ‘I know you’re a big independent woman and don’t want my help but I’ll just phone and check with auntie to see if she will know who can help’. My aunt invited me over to her house, her friend was there and auntie said ‘do you know anyone looking to hire my niece?’. Then a couple of days later I got the call and she said ‘so your Miss
Walker’s family from England, she’s a good woman, I need some help at the clinic so come in tomorrow and I’ll see how we get on’. I asked if I should bring my CV or my degree certificate and she was like ‘no, no problem, its cool, from when your Miss Walker’s niece that’s all I need to know.’ That’s how I got my first job as a health adviser (Sherry, Jamaica, August 2007).

On the matter of home purchase and property building, the second generation also provided examples whereby they used family contacts to assist them in avoiding being taking advantage of with unscrupulous builders and property agents. Among first-generation returnees, when they had first returned to build their home or had supervised the building work in England prior to return, there were many reported incidences in the local newspaper of people being ripped off by builders. These first-generation returnees who had encountered this disappointment were able to draw on this experience to advise their returning children on selecting appropriate builders. Gaining a positive reputation of providing good-quality services established through ‘word of mouth’ was important to these builders. Much of the builders’ income is generated by returning residents because large multi-national building companies have the monopoly on larger contracts for hotels and businesses in the coastal towns. Utilising the contacts of their native-born family members to assist them with building property or home purchases also ensured these second-generation returnees were not financially exploited as a result of their ‘outside’ and ‘foreign’ status.

Uncle Winston said to me, ‘When you go to negotiate the price for the cement blocks with the contractors, whatever you do make sure one of your cousins go with you, so that they can see you’re someone who got family within the community. Otherwise the contractors, they’re con-artists, they will see you’re from foreign and will try to sell you the poor quality cement and charge you treble the price! Or they’ll sell you the cement, then arrange for someone to steal the cement out of your yard and then try to sell it back to you!! If they know you’re related to someone within the community they won’t take advantage of you because they know we’ll spread it about how they’re ‘ginnals’ [crooks] and it’s bad for business, it will look bad for them’ (Mark, Jamaica, July 2003).

These cases provide examples of care, support and reciprocal trust – all vital components of social capital – coming from the family network. However, there were other examples which showed that family networks of support sometimes broke down and relations quickly soured. The following quotation describes a case whereby family members used the expectation of reciprocal support and trust relationships to take advantage of one of the second-generation returnees:

My cousin lost her job but she had some financial problems. I loaned her the money and we had arrangement that she would collect the children from school and fix them a light supper until we got home from work. But she was always borrowing money and final straw was when I found out the children weren’t getting anything to eat until we got home in the evening. I had to let her go but then we were faced with the problem of all the lies and malicious rumours she was spreading. It caused bad feeling in the final and at the time I decided we needed to distance ourselves and try to get by on our own without depending on them so much. Families can be strength but they can also be a burden (Georgia, interviewed and re-interviewed, Jamaica 2004 and 2007).

Adjustment and settlement
All of the second-generation returnees were aware that they are considered as ‘outsiders’ by the local native-born residents. Indeed they returned with the expectation that they would be perceived in this manner. This directly contrasts with the experiences of many first-generation returnees who migrated back ‘home’ with the expectation that they would be fully
accepted by the homeland residents and integrated back into their communities. They subsequently encounter feelings of loss, trauma and rejection when this does not happen (Goulbourne 2002). Freed from this burden of looking for social acceptance, the second generation were more able to adapt to the cultural and social changes required to settle. They developed survival strategies to compensate for their position ‘outside’ society, including seeking out friendship and support networks with other second-generation returnees and, more importantly, maintaining frequent contact or visits back in Britain to sustain the social support provided by these family and friendship links:

My sister lives in Tottenham [London, UK], and we’re in contact every day. If we’re not on the phone then we’re IMing each other. Fortunately my business means I’m coming back every six months, so I still keep up with all my friends there and I don’t feel like I’m missing out and it’s so easy to send a quick email or IM just to say ‘hi what’s up?’ I’m always persuading my sister, brother and my best friends to come out and visit me [...] and they do so, someone is here every summer. I have quite a network of people to call on when I need it (Patricia, Barbados, June 2003).

However, despite their pragmatic approach to adjustment the young people still found themselves frustrated by their ‘outsider’ status and the steep learning curve they experienced in terms of adjusting to local customs and practices. The most common frustrations were expressed in terms of adapting to the slower pace of life, the poor level of customer service in shops and businesses, electrical power cuts, and their lack of familiarity concerning the many unspoken rules and customs that are a part of daily life. This chimes with many other studies that address this issue (Plaza 2000; Potter et al. 2005).

Driving is one example where I’ve had problems. I had to literally re-learn how to drive. Everyone ignores the speed limit signs. Everyone overtakes even on narrowest country road. People get vex [upset] if you don’t move over quickly enough. People flash their carlights to signal they’re going to overtake you [...] There’s another type of flashing which means something else completely and I never remember which is which! No-one knows where these rules come from (Sandra, Jamaica, August 2007).

Race, class and gender relations

Adjusting to the different social and cultural environments is also informed by an understanding of the internal dynamics underpinning the intersectionality of race, class and gender relations. In Jamaica, for example, as with many other English-speaking territories in the Caribbean region, the significance of race and ethnicity and the correlation between race and class underpins the social structure of this society. Notions of status and power are strongly associated with a white or European ideal. Colour is still widely regarded as a significant determinant of wealth and poverty. Thus, being white or light-skinned is still seen as an important contributor towards wealth and/or upward social mobility. White and light-skinned people dominate the upper and upper-middle echelons of society. Indeed, the 21 families that are said to control the private sector in Jamaica have European or Jewish heritages with plantation/landowning, commercial and merchant family ties to the region. Black or dark-skinned persons are afforded lesser status and they are concentrated in the poor and working-class categories (Nettleford 2003).

To some extent this relationship between race and class has changed and nowadays there is a less obvious demarcation of social status according to race/skin complexion. A number of significant factors have informed this change concerning race and class divisions. First, the growth of private and public-owned business enterprises and tourism in these societies has resulted in a broadening of professional and educational opportunities for black and dark-skinned people, and these opportunities have allowed them to move
into the middle classes. Second, on a related point, there was wide-scale migration of lighter-skinned people to North America during the 1970s. This was a result of the socialist political orientation of Prime Minister Manley’s incumbent People National Party government which removed the racial barriers for upward social mobility. Quite simply, black (dark-skinned) educated people filled professional and managerial gaps left by those who had migrated. It was during this period that the black middle class greatly expanded and became an influential force (Stone 1985). Third, the development of political nationalism within the region and the influence of the Black Power movement of the 1970s on the Caribbean created a platform by which people could publicly question understandings of race and notions that only white/European identity has social and cultural significance. From that period onwards, individuals began to celebrate their black racial identity and recognise the importance of their historical ties to Africa. The latter part of the twentieth century also led to an increase in the exportation, consumption and consumerism of Jamaican cultural activities (such as Jamaican reggae music) and the multi-billion dollar trade involved in narcotics and drug trafficking. Not only have these created alternative routes for upward social mobility, other than through inherited wealth and education, but they have also resulted in a new generation of individuals accumulating great wealth (and social status) within a relatively short period of time (Nettleford 2003).

Interview evidence

Debates exploring the intersections of race, class and gender in determined social relations among the second-generation returnees were particularly prominent in the 2007 interviews. During this period the country was building up to its national elections and the two prime ministerial candidates – Bruce Golding and Portia Simpson – were sharply divided according to race, class and gender lines, with the former representative of the white/light, male, ‘plantocracy’ classes and the latter representative of subordinate groups such as women and the dark-skinned/black working classes. One respondent spoke of the shock she experienced about the direct overt references made in relation to people’s skin colour and the way in which this positioned people’s class and social interactions in Jamaican society. However, her ‘outsider status’ enabled her to distance herself from this racial stereotyping and herself being stereotyped.

I was disappointed by work colleagues and their treatment of Portia Simpson [at the time of national election]. People were saying ‘We can’t have a black woman representing us; it looks bad for the country’. Well I’m black and I assumed I was middle-class, but now maybe I’m not so sure what I am. When I approached my work friend about the Portia issue she said, ‘Jennifer you’re different, you’re English but if you were from Jamaica do you think that you as a black woman could get so far, so quickly?’ That’s when I noticed the colour and class issue because I was the only dark-skinned woman in that senior position. Jamaica hasn’t changed in that respect (Jennifer, Jamaica, 2007).

Another respondent also used the national elections to highlight issues of race and class in Jamaican society:

Portia must get in again [re-elected] because she’s a woman and she’s black, and they’re in the majority, so she’ll get the majority of support. I never realised this race thing ran so deep still but it’s very much part of Jamaica though we like to think that we’re all one people.

TR: How do you define your class?

I have working-class roots but here I’m ‘foreigner’ and I don’t think if people think of me in class terms (Wayne, Jamaica, 2007).

These quotations are indicative of the fact that social status is still irrevocably linked to colour despite increased opportunity and the possibility of upward social mobility for the masses. From an early age, children
internalise the disadvantages of being black as opposed to white or fair-skinned in Caribbean society, and the family acts as the main agent in transmitting these values of skin colour and racial values (Barrow 1996). Various customs, beliefs, attitudes and behaviour continue to explicitly and implicitly valorise white identity whilst at the same time pathologising black identity in a number of different ways. For example, skin bleaching is still very popular amongst dark-skinned women in order to achieve a lighter skin tone. Skin bleaching is a highly successful commercial business, as evidenced by the large number of skin bleaching products readily available in shops. One respondent who admitted to using these products shared anecdotal stories with me around her fears of being ‘too black’ and the belief that brown-skinned women, colloquially referred to as ‘brownings’, are favoured by men over dark-skinned women and are much sought after by males as partners. Such notions of physical beauty and desirability are by no means exclusive to Jamaica; indeed, such understandings of female beauty, sexuality and desirability are common across the Caribbean and African diasporas (Cooper 1995).

It is an important paradox that in Britain the second generation have recognised that their black racialised identity has unified and constructed Caribbean migrants as a homogenous entity; their racialised (and class-based) experiences have been framed around this collective identity. Yet in the Caribbean they were exposed to the hierarchal structure underpinning the different shades of blackness and the implications this had for social class, privilege and power status among diverse groups of homeland residents. During my fieldwork interviews with the native-born homeland residents in the Caribbean, there was a general reluctance to explicitly acknowledge this issue of colour privilege as a significant determinant of class location and social status. The second-generation returnees, in contrast, were very willing to highlight and reflect on this issue, because their ‘outsider’ status excluded them from being structurally positioned in this manner.

**Returnees and local gender dynamics**

Existing gender patterns and the peripheral role of men in the family, which have remained virtually unchanged across successive generations, constituted a further issue highlighted by the second-generation returnees in the context of their adjustment and settlement. Understanding the contextual nature of gender relations is central to individuals’ experiences of return. Caribbean societies in the region and across the diaspora are conventionally defined as matrifocal because of the high proportion of female-headed households. However, despite the high prevalence of female-headed households, patriarchal structures and relations are a defining feature of these societies, particularly in the region itself (Barrow 1996; Reynolds 2005). Gender-related cultural expectations and practices presented challenges for the women. All of the female returnees spoke of the loss of freedom. Activities that they took for granted in the UK could not be so in their return homeland because of cultural expectations about gender roles. They reflected that, outside of work, church-related activities, the home and other kinship contexts, it was very difficult to socialise with other women in public spaces. Rum-shops and bars were exclusively masculine spaces, restaurants family and/or couple spaces. Other social activities were also viewed within this context.6

If women are out with female friends without their children or family relations, [it’s] assumed that you’re up to no good, you’re looking for a man. Men get very insecure and threatened when they see a group of women out together maybe because the men are very chauvinistic

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6 There were some differences to this according to urban-rural settings. Female respondents who were unmarried, single and lived in the capital city of Kingston, reported more spaces to socialise with their female friends (e.g. going to the cinema or gym) compared to women who lived in rural areas where social spaces outside of the home and work were very restricted for both married and single women.
here, they [men] know how they behave when they’re out, so they think that it must follow that another man is trying to do that [chat-up] with their woman (Denise, Jamaica, August 2007).

All of the female participants spoke of the culturally defined sexual dynamics as something which presented a challenge to them. They live in a society where broad patterns of gender segregation operated. Outside of family or romantic interests, men and women do not really interact with each other and it was difficult to establish cross-gender friendships. It was difficult for the women have platonic male friends without people assuming a sexual relationship. Married women in platonic friendships with other men were especially criticised within their community and family networks because it was expected that these women should only socialise with husbands or male family members.

One of the female returnees, Denise, spoke of the pressure and difficulty she experienced in relation to conforming to prescribed notions of female behaviour and friendship patterns because she had a close friendship with a platonic male friend. When Denise married her Jamaican partner, Trevor, her husband’s sexuality was called into question for allowing her friendship to continue in such a public manner and he faced pressure from his friends and family members put an end to the friendship, and by doing so, assert his manhood. However Denise was allowed to continue the friendship on account of her being ‘foreign’. In this instance her ‘outside’ status allowed her to negotiate a gendered identity which fell outside of culturally prescribed norms.

The female returnees noted that, compared to their lives in England, they were much more home-centred. They also faced issues of isolation and alienation because their cultural differences made it difficult to establish close friendship bonds with the local female residents.

'I have loads of acquaintances, I know lots of people that I’ve met now in church, and stuff like that. Friends? I don’t have many [...] I’m different. We just think differently, and I have a problem communicating with them on a genuine level’ (Beverley, Jamaica, August 2007).

Yeah, I have some people I’m friendly with but I don’t really have them as close friends here, because I have a serious problem with them. We’re just ... we’re not ... we don’t think alike. I’m too open, and because of that, you’re subject to all sorts of ... abuse and liberty taking. They can’t help it! When I used to open my home and invite the friends, you know, they’d just come, and, you know, at first it was cool, you know but then they just started to come whether they’re invited or not. They’d come, and they eat out your food. You know, they don’t contribute anything. In England, you just bring something, you know, just to put back. But here, they don’t have that concept, you know. Its food, it’s free. They’ve got nothing to put back (Sandra, Jamaica, August 2007).

The unmarried female returnees also spoke of the sexual jealousies and tensions that being English created with other women and how this in turn created difficulties in developing genuine friendships with other women who lived in their community. Being ‘foreign’ and the racial privileging of the English accent were perceived by the homeland women as giving the returning women an advantage over them in attracting a mate. In such instances it could be suggested that the ‘power of the English accent’ represented an important social resource for second-generation female returnees in subverting cultural notions of beauty and desirability which are conventionally defined around skin complexion and shades of blackness.

It’s very competitive here, that’s why you see so many well groomed women. They may have spent their last cheque getting the hair, nails and clothes just perfect and have no food to live on for the rest of the week but the mentality here is that women dress up and always look sexually desirable, always there’s no let up and I find that really frustrating. Sometimes I run to the corner shop with
my old shorts and jeans on but I know if I’m seen out like that people will talk about me and what I’m wearing, when I say people I mean the women because they are very judgemental and always in each other business. [...] I miss about my old life in London you are anonymous and there’s not this pressure to look good all the time […]. Being English you’re definitely more at an advantage though because you don’t have to be the prettiest or [wearing] expensive designer clothes because your accent alone can carry you through. The men love the accent and that you stand out and are different to same old women they are used to. The women can’t stand it because they may be really pretty but they can never get the accent and they hate it! (Georgia, interviews Jamaica 2004 and 2007).

Similar to Wessendorf’s (2007) study of second-generation female returnees, the women in this study were also actively engaged in new ways to negotiate and adjust to different expectations of gender roles, whilst at the same time keeping elements of their identity and gender roles that they migrated with. Frustrations around the lack of friendship and social bonds established with the local residents were not something that emerged in relation to second-generation men’s experiences of return migration. Part of this could be attributed to the different ways in which male and female friendship bonds are formed. Female friendships stress the significance of emotional and intimacy bonds, and the value in ‘being there’ for each other. In contrast male friendships are seen to be more social and recreational, lacking the focus on intimacy connections (Reynolds 2007).

The men regarded their friendship ties as formed in more instrumental ways and because they did not depend upon these male friendship bonds for intimacy and emotional support, they were able to establish good friendship networks with the local men relatively quickly after they had settled. However, it should also be highlighted that the men’s freedom of movement in public spaces also facilitated their ease in adjusting. Their ability to negotiate public spaces and participate in many aspects of social life meant that they did not experience as many problems as the female returnees. This in turn allowed them to meet and establish friendly relations with these local men. The rum-shops, bars, beachfront life, cultural practice of ‘lyming’ (hanging out on the street) and their participation in sporting clubs such as the local football and cricket teams all facilitated this contact. Being ‘English’ or the ‘English boy’ marked them as ‘different’ or ‘outsider’ and this sometimes made them the brunt of jokes and friendly banter from the local men. Yet it did not create any real difficulties for them in terms of establishing local bonds and networks within the community.

Conclusion
This working paper, based on interviews and conversations with second-generation Caribbean returning migrants, offers an in-depth account of their experiences of return and the factors which facilitate this migration process. By situating second-generation Caribbean migration within broader theories of migration studies, this analysis complements and adds to the growing body of work emerging in this field, which thus far has been largely descriptive. One migration typology views return migration as a process driven by the migration–development nexus. The directionality and continuity of migration flows benefit the original sending society because the human, economic and social capital accumulated by migrants in their host country is then fed back into the original sending area following return migration. My findings suggest that Caribbean return migration among the second generation encourages cross-generational and transnational accumulation of capital for the original sending society. This migration process also constitutes a counter-measure against the ‘brain drain’ effect which has seen a loss of many educated and skilled workers in the
Caribbean region to industrialised societies such as Britain.

The analysis confirms that the Caribbean second generation are embedded into transnational networks. Their everyday lives in Britain show many examples of the transnational activities, connections and practices that the young people actively engaged in prior to migrating back to their familial homeland. Importantly, the young migrants’ family and kinship relationships acted as a primary vehicle sustaining their emotional, cultural and spiritual ties to the region. These family and kinship networks also later acted as an important social capital resource in facilitating their return ‘home’. Nostalgia for the ‘place’ of homeland is essential to the Caribbean family narrative in the UK because it creates contextualised meanings around home, belonging and identity among the second generation. So essential is the ‘myth of return’ to the family narrative that the first-generation parents utilise social resources in their parenting practices, household rituals and family life to keep this dream alive in their own and their children’s imagination. The family narrative of return also represents a form of capital in itself, through which the first generation’s narratives of home and return become a part of the second generation’s own narratives in terms of understanding their personal identity and sense of self.

Consequently, many of the second generation living in Britain choose to ethnically identify themselves as Caribbean, and regard the Caribbean their spiritual and cultural home. Much of these young people’s understanding of ‘home’ involves a juxtaposition and interplay between internally and externally formed understandings. The former relates to self-definitions framed around cultural and familial attachment to the region; whilst the latter reflects externally imposed understandings resulting from British integration and assimilation policies and their impact on young black people’s structural positioning in Britain. Many second-generation young people in Britain express the view that they have not achieved full integration and acceptance into society because they continue to encounter racial discrimination and social exclusion on various levels, and attain only limited socio-economic success. Not only did their experiences in Britain make them question meanings around ‘home’ and belonging, but they also encouraged the dream to return ‘home’ where it was perceived they would experience an improved quality of life. In this instance, return migration to their parents’ homeland acted as a ‘survival strategy’, an alternative viable route to achieve greater social and economic success.

The findings therefore suggest that return migration to the Caribbean among the second generation is motivated by a number of intersecting factors. These include young people’s participation in transnational familial activities, and nostalgic reminiscences of island life transmitted across the generations through the family narrative. It is important to acknowledge that particular forms of social capital were required to facilitate this return migration process, and translate this dream into reality. There were a number of common characteristics that defined return migration among the second generation. For example, all of the respondents maintained strong ties to the region, including parents who had returned to the country of origin within recent years, which they could utilise to develop reciprocal trust relationships, further social networks and to assist them with the practical details of return. Most of the respondents also had some form of university education and/or vocational technical qualification which, alongside the privileged status afforded to ‘the English accent’ in post-colonial English-speaking Caribbean territories, made it relatively easy for them to secure employment and economic opportunities in their parents’ homeland.

The second-generation returnees experienced a contextual and shifting understanding of ‘home’, ‘belonging’ and ‘identity’ which are continually being questioned, re-defined and re-constructed according to time, location and audience.
Their ‘insider/outsider’ status in both place of birth (i.e. England) and parents’ homeland mean that their continual reflections and negotiation around home and belonging are not new or specific to their experience of return but something they have been used to doing as part of their everyday lives. The second-generation returnees also utilised their ‘insider/outsider’ status in relation to social and cultural adjustment and to position themselves within the race, social class and gender dynamics which underpin the cultural environment and social structure of Caribbean societies. Despite some issues and tensions encountered by second-generation returnees concerning cultural and social adjustment, it must be pointed out that the overwhelming majority of respondents perceived that the benefits far outweighed the costs of return migration. This raises a related and more general question as to whether second-generation return migration to the Caribbean can best be considered a success story or one of failure.

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