Migrants on the edge of Europe  
Perspectives from Malta, Cyprus and Slovenia

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Abstract

On 1 May 2004 ten new member states\(^1\) joined the European Union, pushing the EU’s external borders further east into parts of the former Communist bloc, and south along the Mediterranean and Adriatic Seas. The political and media focus in the run-up to the expansion of the EU, however, was primarily on the potential scale of East-West migration from Central and Eastern Europe, to some extent echoing fears generated in 1986 over an influx of migrants from the then new EU member-states of Spain and Portugal. Not only did this give the unfavourable impression that Polish, Latvian or Czech citizens, for example, would jump at the chance to emigrate (overlooking how feasible or even desirable such a decision would be for some), but the hyperbole surrounding EU enlargement did not readily lend itself to painting a more accurate picture of who or what made up the ten new member states. In the following account the focus is on three of these countries, Malta, Cyprus and Slovenia, which did not feature in discussions about the potential for mass emigration from the new accession states; the effect of this was to largely ignore the changing migration dynamics taking place along the EU’s southern borders, in particular the growing, and in some cases established presence of migrants in those three new member states. Their location in Southern Europe serves as a reminder of key South-North – as opposed to East-West – migration routes into the EU.

\(^{1}\) The Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Cyprus and Malta.
Malta, Cyprus and Slovenia in the EU

Levels of prosperity in Malta, Cyprus and Slovenia are today approaching income and welfare levels found elsewhere in Southern Europe. At the time of their accession to the EU, the three countries were notably more affluent than most of the other new member states; indeed levels of prosperity in all three were comparable to those in Portugal and Greece. Looking first at Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, measured in 2004 in terms of purchasing power standards (PPS), Cyprus and Slovenia were about 20% below the average for all twenty-five EU member states, whilst Malta was around 30% below. In comparison, figures for other EU accession countries such as Slovakia, Poland, Estonia and Lithuania fell to roughly half the EU-25 average (Eurostat 2005). The Human Development Index (HDI)² in 2003 provides similar indicators of growing prosperity in Malta, Cyprus and Slovenia: the latter two countries ranked above all the other new EU accession states, whilst only the Czech Republic amongst the remaining new EU member states was placed above Malta.

Reflecting these improved levels of prosperity in Malta, Cyprus and Slovenia, none of the EU-15 decided to impose restrictions on the free movement of their citizens upon EU enlargement, unlike the (up to 7-year) moratorium applied by all but the UK, Sweden and Ireland to nationals of the seven other accession states. The rationale behind this decision to immediately allow Maltese, Cypriot and Slovenian citizens to live and work in other EU states was not only indicative of the relatively small size of the respective populations³ (indeed, Estonia has a smaller population – around 1.4 million – than Slovenia), but was also based on the view that rapid socio-economic development in all three countries would continue to act as a disincentive to emigration. The high levels of postwar emigration from Malta and Cyprus – mainly to Australia, Britain and North America (Cypriots also migrated to Greece, particularly in the years following the partition of the island in 1974) – had already slowed to a trickle by the 1980s. In both countries the tail-off in emigration coincided with a growth in the service sector of their national economies, especially in tourism. Growing prosperity on both islands encouraged many emigrants to return to their country of birth.

The picture in Slovenia is slightly more intricate, bound up as it is with the country’s recent past as part of the former Yugoslav Republic. Prior to gaining independence in 1991, Slovenia had from the 1950s been both the source and destination of migration: whilst Slovenes emigrated as ‘guest-workers’ mainly to Austria and Germany up until the 1970s, people from the other Yugoslav Republics arrived in Slovenia principally in search of better job opportunities as a result of higher unemployment levels at home (Zavratnik Zimic 2003). Although net migration to Slovenia was consistently positive over this period, the mid- to late 1970s saw an increasing number of Bosnians, Croats and Serbs arrive in Slovenia, in part due to the end of the European guest-worker programmes following the oil crises during that decade. The 1990s represents a turbulent period in the history of migration to Slovenia, above all because of the break-up of the former Yugoslavia. Slovenia gained independence in 1991, but the effect of this was to deprive tens of thousands of migrants from the other Yugoslav Republics of their legal status in Slovenia (see Andreev 2003; Dedic et al. 2003).⁴ Temporary refugees arrived in the early 1990s, first from Croatia and then from Bosnia-Herzegovina, as people fled war in the Balkans. The late 1990s witnessed the arrival of Kosovan refugees in Slovenia with the outbreak of conflict in Kosovio.

Since the turn of the century immigration to Malta, Cyprus and Slovenia has in some ways taken on even greater political, social and economic salience, partly because of their location

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³ An index which aims to give a more holistic picture of a country’s welfare by bringing into the equation a country’s life expectancy, adult literacy, and educational enrolment rates alongside the measurement of living standards by GDP per capita in terms of PPS. These figures are published annually by the United Nations.

⁴ Between 18,000 and 40,000 people from the other former Yugoslav republics were in February 1992 unlawfully removed from Slovenia’s registry of permanent residents. In brief, under Article 40 of the new Slovenian Constitution permanent residents in Slovenia from the other Yugoslav republics were given the opportunity in 1991 to apply for citizenship there. There was, however, a significant minority who did not apply, for a variety of reasons (see Andreev 2003: 10-11), or were refused. Many subsequently lost their previous rights as permanent residents, such as the right to work, entitlements to pensions, access to healthcare and education, when their names were removed from the registry (Dedic et al. 2003; ECRI 2003). To date the issue remains unresolved, in particular the question of compensation, despite subsequent legal amendments enabling a good number of the ‘erased’ to acquire permanent residence status or Slovenian citizenship.
on the southern ‘front-line’ of the EU and the growing reliance in some economic sectors on migrant workers. Moreover the small size of these countries has made the relative scale of the immigratory phenomenon all the greater. It is also important to note how contemporary migration to Europe has become more diverse and less within the control of nation-states than it was forty to fifty years ago. In contrast to the postwar decades when much immigration to Europe could be explained by reference to state-run guest-worker programmes, countries’ colonial ties or Cold War dynamics, migrants today are arriving from an increasingly diverse number of countries, for a range of different reasons, and through a variety of migration channels and routes. Malta, Cyprus and Slovenia are, to varying degrees of success, coming to terms with this ‘new geography of migration’ (King 1993), along with the issues associated with being new destinations for migrants. Internal debates are occurring in all three countries over the economic need for migrant labour, about how they ought to receive and integrate migrants, and of course over the implementation of border controls. These debates inevitably display their own particular national characteristics, but need to be understood within the wider international context that affects contemporary patterns and features of migration: that of globalisation and European integration. Globalisation because of the opportunities it offers for international migration; European integration as the setting which increasingly delineates the terms or parameters of this migration.

**Globalisation, migration and the European Union**

It is only relatively recently that the links between globalisation and migration have begun to be explored in greater depth (see, for an overview, Hatziprokopiou 2005: 24-30). An agreed definition of globalisation would clearly be a good starting-point, yet definitions of the phenomenon tend to vary greatly according to the importance attributed to its different aspects (political, economic, social or cultural: see Sklair 1999). Integral to the concept of globalisation, however, is the sense that people’s connections to each other are ‘widening, deepening and speeding up’ (Held et al. 1999: 2). Modern information and communication technology (more advanced telephone networks, the internet, cheaper air travel, etc.) clearly makes it possible for individuals, companies and governments alike to develop more intensive and sustained ties across borders through the movement of capital, goods, services and people. The transnational networks which develop out of these cross-border flows are not only a feature, but also the organisational force behind globalisation (Castles 2000: 271). Other important cross-border flows include those ideas and images which, where migration is concerned, often act as a source of information that persuades people to move, for instance through exposure to aspects of what is perceived as a better life elsewhere. Two rather different examples can be given here: firstly, it has been suggested that foreign direct investment (FDI) can promote, rather than curtail, emigration through disruption of traditional work structures and exposure to Western material and financial affluence by the presence of export-led manufacturing in developing countries (Sassen-Koob 1984). Sassen-Koob interestingly develops the links between economic and cultural globalisation, drawing a linear path between the two, and reminds us how globalisation can impact negatively on people’s traditional livelihoods. Secondly, migrants already in the host country are themselves in a good position to recount their own personal stories of migration to friends and relatives back home; this may, or indeed may not, persuade others to move. Social, economic, political and cultural ties, it is argued (Glick Schiller et al. 1992; Portes et al. 1999), have in a similar fashion spread across borders to bind together communities in different nation-states, creating transnational social spaces in which people move, trade, form relationships, share experiences, and keep in touch with each other.7

International migration should therefore be understood not simply as a feature of globalisation, but also as a driving force behind global changes in how people interact with each other at different scales - the local, national and transnational. The oft-used term ‘global village’ singularly fails to capture these changes; neither

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5 It is important to note that the globalisation thesis does not go uncontested (see Held et al. 1999: 10-14 for a summary of such criticism). Hirst and Thompson (1996), for example, argue that the international economy of the late 19th to early 20th centuries was just as 'global', potentially even more so, than it is today.

6 Aspects of economic globalisation such as FDI, foreign trade (all too often on unequal terms with developing countries), and deregulatory policies by global financial institutions have served to exacerbate regional inequalities (Zhang and Zhang 2003), with the resulting effect of increasing pressures to migrate both internally and abroad.

7 See Kivisto (2001), for a critique of transnationalism, in particular the tendency to exaggerate the phenomenon through the lack of attention to factors which allow some migrants to maintain regular and sustained ties with the homeland but others not.
does it do justice to the rewards of life in multicultural places nor evoke the tensions and uncertainties that accompany globalisation. Similarly it fails to reveal how the opportunities for, and terms of, migration fall so unequally on different people. Indeed, this is often because discussion about the globalisation-migration nexus lacks a context or setting as an explanatory variable. Taking the ongoing project of the European Union as a context to explore this in a little more depth, we can then ask, for instance, why the EU is much more accessible to some migrants than others, or why the reception given by European host societies to some migrants is much more positive than to others. This is not to deny key differences in this regard between EU member states, but it is important to acknowledge that the EU is assuming a greater role in migration-related policies especially given its progress towards a common immigration and asylum policy across the Union.

How then does Europe (both at the national and EU levels) respond to the challenges and opportunities of globalisation? Can we understand European integration as a kind of filter to globalisation (Wallace 2000), potentially controlling its worst excesses whilst promoting those aspects which are seen to benefit the EU project (Rosamond 2002)? Clearly the ability of the EU to do so relies on a degree of consensus amongst its member states, yet some agreements have proved less problematic to achieve than others. A common EU migration policy is a case in point; consensus has been far easier to reach in areas where migration is designated as a security issue (coordination of visa policies, readmission agreements, common information databases such as the Schengen Information System, etc.) than where the rights of third-country nationals (TCNs) residing in EU member states are concerned. This is indicative of how EU-wide migration policy has evolved over time, initially through intergovernmental forums concerned with protecting the internal market – the strengthening of the EU’s external borders being an instinctive response to provisions in the 1986 Single European Act (SEA) to allow the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital within the Union (Huysmans 2000). It was only later on, with the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999, that most member states began to transfer sovereignty over migration-related policies to the Community institutions, including the nationally-sensitive issues of external border controls and the rights of TCNs (Kostakopoulou 2000). Whilst globalisation has increased opportunities for Europe to deepen its integration and become more prosperous, it has equally posed new challenges for the continent. This is most apparent in the EU’s approach to migration, first and foremost as a security issue with the rights of TCNs, for example, appearing very much as a secondary concern.

This brief description sets the background to the entry of Malta, Cyprus and Slovenia into the EU. Globalisation undoubtedly provides greater opportunities and incentives for international migration. Yet, European integration has, as the preceding paragraph suggests, been a dual process of inclusion and exclusion, most clearly in the fields of immigration and asylum. EU enlargement is inevitably tied up with this process (Favell and Hansen 2002), causing European nation-states to reconsider, in the words of Helen Wallace, ’where Europe shades into non-Europe’ (2000: 371). Europe’s borderlands can be seen as contested sites where the realities of globalisation at times confront the nation-state and the EU, most dramatically highlighted by migrants who regularly risk their lives to enter the Union in unseaworthy boats or over razor-wire fences. But these borderlands, in a more conceptual way, also exist within the national body politic, and are affected by the ways in which countries enact in policy and law the notions of citizenship and belonging; i.e. in terms of the rules governing national citizenship, permanent resident status (or denizenship), temporary migrants and asylum seekers, through to policies to deal with illegally resident migrant populations. The EU has, of course, exerted considerable influence over the development of such migration-related policies, especially in EU accession countries. As a condition of entry, all ten new member states in May 2004 were required to harmonise their legislation to come in line with common EU policies dealing with issues such as border control, immigration and asylum. As a result, the EU has significantly shaped these ‘borderland spaces’ on the edges of the EU. Focusing on Malta, Cyprus and Slovenia, it is important to ask how this evolving regime across the EU affects migration dynamics in those countries, as well as the situation of TCNs there who sit to varying degrees at the juncture between inclusion and exclusion.

Recent immigration trends in Malta, Cyprus and Slovenia

The findings presented below are based on a small pilot study, funded by the Nuffield Foundation, into recent patterns of immigration into the three countries. Although an established phenomenon in all three, the issue has so far received little attention from the research community. The project involved both desk-based research and week-long visits to each of the three
new member states to gather information and data on recent migration patterns there. Interviews were conducted with academics, government officials, and representatives of migrant NGOs and communities in each of the three countries. Research in Cyprus, divided as an island since 1974, mainly concentrated on the EU-member Greek sector as it was felt that the Turkish sector displayed very different migration dynamics relating to the transplanting of mainland Turks into the northern part of Cyprus. Whilst this remains a sensitive political issue, it is important to note the movement of migrants from the north across the partition or so-called ‘green’ line into southern parts of Cyprus.

Malta

Two separate but interlinked issues have framed recent debates about immigration in Malta: entry to the EU and irregular immigration. Both issues have drawn on fears that the country, as a small and densely populated island, would not be able to adequately cope with the potential arrival of large numbers of immigrants from the EU and the South (Amore 2005: 16). Its location in the Mediterranean between mainland Southern Europe and North Africa has added to these fears and to the prevailing discourse of exclusion. The island’s sense of its own vulnerability to perceived negative aspects of globalisation, such as irregular migration flows, has been translated into adopting a protectionist stance vis-à-vis immigration. Malta hence succeeded in negotiating a 7-year moratorium on the free entry of EU workers prior to joining the EU out of concern that the island would face high levels of immigration from Sicily if entry restrictions were dropped for EU citizens. Those wanting to work in Malta are today still required to first apply for a work permit. Permits are only granted in exceptional circumstances, for a determined period of time (usually 1 year but may be renewed) and for a specific employment purpose. Employers must also demonstrate that efforts to employ a Maltese national had proved fruitless.

In the run-up to EU enlargement there was also concern that by joining the EU Malta would possibly be exposed to higher levels of irregular immigration from the South. It is worth quoting in length a pamphlet distributed by the Malta-EU Information Centre (MIC) to illustrate the context and dilemmas associated with EU membership.

As an island surrounded by the sea, Malta is already targeted [sic] by illegal immigrants who travel here by boat sometimes in very difficult conditions and at the risk of their lives. More often than not, we only get those immigrants who actually fail to get to their original destination, usually Italy.

Immigrants should not increase unless they actually want to land here. But if in time Malta is perceived as an economically advanced EU country, it may start to attract illegal immigrants in its own right.

Membership of the EU will certainly put on Malta a greater responsibility to police its coastal borders and this is included among the obligations of membership. Since the EU territory has no internal borders between EU countries it is more important for all countries that have an external border to control them well. Greater co-operation with EU countries will be necessary with respect to security checks at our ports and airport as well as with respect to coastal border controls (MIC 2002: 13).

This extract raises several key points about immigration to Malta. Firstly, that the island has become a de facto destination for undocumented migrants, the majority of whom make their way by boat from Libya but do not want to be in Malta. Amongst a disparate group of nationalities (very few are in fact Libyan), the greatest numbers are from East Africa (Somalia, Eritrea, Egypt and most recently, Sudan). In 2002 a total of 1686 irregular immigrants arrived on the island. The number fell in the following year to 502, only then to rise again in 2004 to 1388 (Government of Malta 2005: 5). This situation has, secondly, arisen despite the island not perceiving itself as economically advanced - it is seen to be neither attractive to migrants nor able to deal with the impact of their arrival. Such discourse clearly feeds into the small and vulnerable image that Malta portrays for itself within the wider EU and global contexts. Not only does this, as a third point, bring the issue of irregular immigration into the realm of national security and public order (hence justifying the policy of detaining all but the most vulnerable undocumented immigrants and asylum-seekers for lengthy periods of up to 18 months8), but it also puts pressure on the EU to provide aid to Malta such as through the European Refugee Fund (e.g. for accommodation facilities, repatriation schemes, etc.) as well as highlighting the need for greater burden-sharing amongst EU member states. A recent government policy document, for example, reads in parts as a plea for help to the EU, emphasising how the

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8 The Maltese authorities, in line with the European directive on minimum standards for reception of asylum-seekers, have now decided to release asylum-seekers after 12 months in detention.
island ‘as the southern most gateway to the EU ... cannot be expected to carry the burden brought about by this human tragedy on its own’ (Government of Malta 2005: 13).

The depiction of the situation as a ‘human tragedy’ sits uncomfortably alongside the policy of detaining most irregular migrants, but refers to their perilous journey from Libya which has claimed many lives over the past few years. The question of where responsibility falls to deal with irregular migration lies at the heart of the issue, particularly as Malta rightly or wrongly does not associate the rise in migrant numbers on the island to its own economic development. There are assertions that Italy pre-empts migrants’ arrival on its own shores by directing Maltese search and rescue patrols to pick up boats which are not always in distress.9 A bilateral agreement with Libya allowing Malta to send irregular migrants back has so far proved elusive, whilst Libya is often accused of being negligent in clamping down on irregular migrants resident there. Rumours circulate of more than a million migrants in Libya awaiting their chance to sail to Europe; the fear being that many could potentially claim asylum in Malta. As a condition of EU entry, Malta assumed responsibility for receiving, processing and determining asylum applications by adopting in 2000 its first Refugee Act (prior to this Malta simply implemented decisions made by the UNHCR in Rome). Carrying the ‘burden’ of processing claims, detaining applicants and eventually repatriating or assisting the integration of asylum-seekers is primarily financial, but the arrival of migrants also has wider societal implications. Malta remains a conservative and predominantly Christian country. Catholicism for many is the defining feature of Maltese identity (Baldacchino 2002). Whilst rescuing migrants stranded in the Mediterranean is often described as a Christian duty, Catholic values (and hence national identity) are seemingly threatened by the presence of irregular migrants on the island.

This line of thought has most recently been put forward by the Maltese pressure group Alleanza Nazzjonali Repubblikana (ANR) for whom globalisation represents a threat, in their own words, to the Maltese values of ‘faith, nationhood and family’. To quote the group’s media spokesman, Martin Degiorgio, ‘we profess the Christian faith and are inspired by Christian values. Faith is part of our identity. We believe in a sense of nationalism, a love for our country ... families are the building blocks that make up a nation’ (Fenech 2005). Protests against irregular immigration in the Maltese capital Valletta in early October 2005, although condemned by some as ‘immoral’ and against ‘the sacred values of society’ (Massa 2005), illustrate how the issue appears as a convenient hook on which to hang wider fears about social change and the dilution of Maltese identity. Admittedly we are dealing here with populist rhetoric that expresses confused and at times irrational fears about migration from the South; e.g. concerns about the impact of multiculturalism on social cohesion in Malta or tired assertions that irregular migrants bring sickness or crime to the island. The rhetoric, though, is indicative of a profound ambivalence in Malta to aspects of globalisation and, more pointedly, to European integration. On the one hand, the island looks to Europe as a source of wealth and as a cultural reference point. On the other hand, Malta sees Europe and Europeanisation as a threat to its values, traditions and integrity (Mitchell 2002). Although irregular migration to Malta pre-dates the island’s entry to the EU, membership of the Union is inextricably bound up with the issue. The point of contention lies in whether the EU is seen as part of the problem; i.e. through shifting responsibility to Malta for dealing with irregular migration flows; or as part of an eventual solution to the ‘influx’; i.e. through provision of EU funds, burden-sharing with other member states or common EU-wide readmission agreements with sending or transit countries such as Libya.

The dominant discourse of migrant exclusion prevails to such a degree in Malta as to detract attention away from the policy and empirical realities on the ground. The island does not present, contrary to impressions formed by the widespread practice of detaining migrants, a symbol of fortress Europe in practice: 54% of the 2866 people who claimed asylum from 1 January 2002 through to the end of September 2005 were granted either refugee or humanitarian protection status, entitling them to legally remain in Malta.10 The island received Albanian refugees both in the early 1990s and following the crisis in Kosovo in 1999, some of whom settled in Malta (Amore 2005: 29). There is a small but established business community of Indian descent whose presence in Malta dates from the late 19th century and the links to the British Empire, the vast majority of whom have been Maltese citizens for generations (Falzon 2001). Nigerians are a small,

9 Their remit is strictly to respond only to boats in need of assistance.

10 Only those granted refugee status, however, are entitled to work but would first be required to obtain a work permit. Full refugee status during that time period had been granted to just 5.4% of total claimants. Figures obtained through Refugee Commission in Malta.
but well-known migrant group in Malta. Most are involved in football, something of a national sport, and as a result are generally well received. A 3000-strong Arab-Muslim community has developed on the island over the past few decades, particularly during the late 1970s and 1980s under the leadership of Dom Mintoff when Malta enjoyed good diplomatic relations with Libya. An Islamic Centre with a mosque was set up in 1978, and more recently a Muslim primary school, recognised by the Maltese state, was established to teach Islam and Arabic but within the broader national curriculum. Religious tolerance is as a rule well observed (ECRI 2002), although racial intolerance towards Arabs is setting a worrying trend. Stereotypes of Arabs stem from disillusionment over Malta’s close ties to Libya under the Mintoff government, the criminal behaviour of some visiting Libyans to the island in the 1980s, and today from the arrival of irregular migrants (see Schembri 2004).11

On a final note, there is also largely anecdotal evidence about the presence in Malta of migrants who work in the construction and the hotel industries. Information on actual numbers is not readily available or seemingly compiled by the National Statistics Office, but it is claimed that both irregular migrants (e.g. only on tourist visas) and foreigners with the required work permits are doing work that Maltese citizens are unwilling to undertake. This challenges the notion, suggested above, that Malta is not sufficiently economically developed to attract foreign workers. The lack of available statistics and research on these migrants, however, prevents any further speculation on this issue, but features more prominently in the following account of migration to Cyprus.

Cyprus

Two main issues have recently featured in discussion about migration to Cyprus: the resident status of TCNs vis-à-vis EU citizens, and undocumented forms of immigration. The wider context of Cyprus’ membership of the EU is again pertinent to, and affects, debates about these issues.

First, let us consider the issue of the resident status of TCNs: Unlike Malta, Cyprus has removed all restrictions on the free movement of other EU nationals into its territory. Indeed, the idea was mooted in the run-up to EU expansion that EU citizens from the new accession countries would represent a new pool of migrant labour to Cyprus that could potentially fulfil the labour market function of TCNs already resident there. This line of thought betrays an endemic aspect of the wider EU project that achieves inclusion partly by excluding others. At the scale of nation-states, the process of EU enlargement can change relations between countries that subsequently find themselves on either side of EU borders (see, for an example, Wallace 2002). But this process also affects member-state relations with its resident migrant population as the recruitment of EU citizens is prima facie prioritised over others. The case of Cyprus, a country hosting a growing number of foreign workers as seen in Table 1 in Appendix 1, illustrates this well.

The upward trend in the number of migrant workers has been discernible for a number of years in Cyprus, and notably prior to EU expansion in May 2004. This is despite immigration policy, as in Malta, being protectionist in nature and formulated to ensure that migrants’ stay remains short-term, temporary and restricted to specific sectors (Trimikliniotis and Demetriou 2005). TCNs on the island fulfil particular roles in the labour market for which Cypriot nationals cannot be found. Work permits are only issued to them once employers can demonstrate that no Cypriots are available to undertake the required work, and, again as in Malta, the permit is tied to the one employer, preventing migrants from easily changing employer or occupation. Permits are issued on a short-term basis, the length depending on the type of occupation, and can now only be renewed for up to a total of four years (until recently permits expired after six years). This latest change in policy is a clear response to concerns that the recent EU directive on the long-term residence status of TCNs could grant them the right to settle permanently in Cyprus after five years.12 The issue of migrants settling on the island as seen through the experience of Turkish settlers in northern Cyprus is ever-present in Cypriot politics, but more recently violent clashes between Pontian-Greek and Cypriot youth have added to concerns about the effect of permanent migrants on social cohesion in Cyprus.13 Pontian Greeks have

11 Many irregular migrants, of course, are not Arab, but Africans from Somalia or Eritrea.

12 To qualify TCNs need to prove that they have resided legally and continuously within the territory of member states for five years, as well as have stable resources and sickness insurance for themselves and their family. Member states may also require that TCNs comply with further integration conditions such as language proficiency. Both Cyprus and Malta remain at a preliminary stage of implementing the directive into national legislation.

13 A bilateral agreement with Greece has long allowed its citizens (including Pontians with Greek passports) to
regularly been blamed in the media for rising crime rates and disrespecting local customs and traditions (Trimikliniotis 2003: 6).

This raises the question whether Cyprus’ entry into the EU has benefited its resident migrant workers. On the basis of the above an instinctive answer would be ‘no’ given, firstly, the recent changes to national policy to continue to prevent TCNs from settling more permanently, and secondly, the freedom granted to all EU nationals to live and work in Cyprus. Yet the situation is more ambiguous and certainly more complex than policy rhetoric would suppose. To the extent that the role of specific migrant groups is structurally embedded in the Cypriot labour market, it is less certain that new EU nationals would be able, or in fact willing, to assume occupations held for several years by TCNs. Live-in domestic workers employed in private households, for example, are an established migrant workforce on the island. Mainly from countries in South-East Asia (Sri Lanka, Philippines), they are ‘prized’ for their diffidence and non-threatening presence in the household. Suggestions that Central and East European migrants could, or would be willing to, fulfil this job function are met by a degree of scepticism: CEE migrants are seen as more assertive of their employment rights, a factor which must be seen against the cases of employers who have exploited and abused their working relationship with domestic workers (see Panayiotopoulos 2005). It is also claimed, quite plausibly, that the high rates of intermarriage between Cypriot men and CEE women dissuade households from hiring them as domestic workers (see Lenz 2006 for further discussion).

The objective of giving priority to EU and future EU citizens is nonetheless explicit in current labour policy on migration in Cyprus. The Cypriot government is attempting to set up agreements with other European countries to bring migrant workers to the island; e.g. with Poland to assist recruitment of Polish nurses, and with the future EU accession states of Romania and Bulgaria. In economic sectors such as agriculture, where Bulgarian workers have traditionally had a strong presence, the policy may simply serve to formalise recruitment processes. In sectors such as construction where migrants predominantly from Syria, Egypt and the Ukraine work, however, there appears to be a growing proportion of EU workers.14 Table 2 in the Appendix indicates this trend in the construction sector alongside similar, though more seasonally-affected, changes in numbers employed in hotels and restaurants. Cyprus’ recent economic development, as noted above, is thanks in large part to tourism, which has brought many CEE migrants to work in the hotels and restaurants.15 Domestic workers, though, are still predominantly recruited from countries outside the EU.

In Table 3 (see Appendix) these figures are broken down by country, and highlight how a growing number of Polish and Slovakian nationals in 2005 arrived in Cyprus to work in construction, hotels and restaurants in Cyprus. The two other main national groups are from Greece and the UK.

Considering together the figures noted in each of the three tables above it appears that the effect of EU expansion has so far been to bring additional workers into Cyprus from other EU member states, whilst the number of TCNs has continued to grow. Admittedly it is too early to speculate on how migrant groups in different economic sectors will fare in the future. Empirical research is needed to highlight how the new hierarchy of foreign workers is affecting different migrant groups in each sector, for example in terms of their employment conditions and wages.16 Research to date on migrant workers in Cyprus indicates that most – especially those employed in private households – do not enjoy in practice the same rights and treatment as their Cypriot counterparts, a situation not helped by their low levels of trade union membership (ECRI 2001). The terms of employment – number of hours, working conditions – are often violated by employers, yet checks on employers do not appear as a priority to the relevant authorities (Trimikliniotis and Pantelides 2003). This is despite Cyprus having implemented in May 2004 EU directives to combat discrimination and which establish a general framework for equal treatment in the workplace.17 So far these have had little impact as migrants remain unaware of the new

cross the partition line into southern Cyprus on a daily basis to engage in construction work.

15 Almost a quarter of those included under ‘restaurants’ are working as ‘performing artists’, often a euphemism for sex work in cabarets or bars. Most are from the Ukraine and Russia (Lenz 2006).

16 This does not imply that citizens from the new EU member states receive better treatment at work. A recent newspaper article has highlighted how a Latvian woman ended up working 18 hours a day in a restaurant (Hazou 2006).

procedures available to them (Trimikliniotis and Demetriou 2005: 10).

Although it appears that Cyprus’ entry to the EU has brought little immediate benefits to TCNs resident on the island, the continued reliance on them to fill specific labour shortages suggests that they will remain a necessary part of the workforce. Their long-term presence there will, it is to be hoped, bring pressure on the Cypriot authorities to implement in practice legislation protecting their employment rights. But attitudes towards migrants need also to be changed across the board in Cyprus. Government policy discourse should not favour EU nationals but treat all migrant workers as an integral aspect of the Cypriot workforce. Trade unions must stop blaming migrants for unemployment in Cyprus, and actively seek to prevent their discrimination in the workplace by helping migrants to take advantage of anti-discrimination procedures. It also appears that racism in general, particularly against people with darker skin, is prevalent (see Trimikliniotis 2003).

Undocumented migration is the second key issue: Debates in Cyprus about irregular immigration are still quite speculative as a result of little research on the phenomenon. Whereas in the late 1990s reports were made of irregular migrants arriving on the south-east coast of Cyprus across the sea from Lebanon, today it appears that the majority of migrants without papers have either overstayed their visas or crossed the partition line into southern Cyprus (in April 2003 the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ (TRNC) reopened the border which had divided the island for nearly 30 years, but border controls still take place). Government figures from mid-2003 estimated that 80% of irregular migrants arrived from the Turkish-occupied part of the island; a percentage that has risen to 90% according to more recent official estimates (Cyprus Mail 2006; Gil-Robles 2004: 7). This has encouraged further speculation about the number of irregular migrants living and working in Cyprus, ranging wildly from 6,000 up to 45,000.

The emphasis on irregular flows from the north forms yet one more area of dispute between the Greek and Turkish communities in Cyprus. Many migrants pass through mainland Turkey, the only country to officially recognise the TRNC, before entering northern Cyprus. The TRNC authorities, it is claimed by the south, display laxity in enforcing their immigration laws – mainland Turks only need their identity cards to visit the TRNC as tourists for 3 months, but have been found to overstay and work there illegally. Other nationalities, though, enter through northern Cyprus from mainland Turkey, perhaps in part because Turkey has not harmonised its visa requirements with those of the European Union. Irregular immigration from the north, whilst wrapped up as it is in the wider context of Cyprus as a divided island, also has implications for the EU. Cyprus, situated on the south-eastern edge of the EU, is responsible for the Union’s external borders there. However, the partition line does not officially constitute an EU external border since the TRNC is not recognised as a country in its own right. It remains to be seen what will happen when Cyprus joins the Schengen zone which allows passport-free travel in mainland Europe; the conflict between guarding entry into the EU’s territory and providing a lasting solution to the ‘Cyprus problem’ will then become even more obvious.

The focus on irregular flows from the north seems politically motivated to the extent that irregular immigration is a problem framed within discussions about the division of the island. This disassociates the issue from realities in the Greek sector of Cyprus which contribute to the number of undocumented migrants there. The figures above suggesting that 80% or 90% of irregular migrants arrive over the partition line appear somewhat convenient. It should be remembered that TCNs in Cyprus who lose their job also lose their residence status since work permits are tied to the one employer. The reluctance to grant long-term residence status to TCNs has also contributed to migrants overstaying their visas, adding to the number of irregular migrants. Neither can the rise in the number of asylum-seekers over the past few years, from 582 in 2000 to more than 10,000 in 2004, be solely attributed to migration flows through the north of the island. Towards the end of 2003 claims from Bangladeshis and Pakistanis, many of whom had arrived legally in Cyprus as students, rose dramatically as asylum was seen as a route to obtaining a work permit. Asylum-seekers in Cyprus, unlike students, are allowed to work but only in farming and agriculture. Agents for students from Bangladesh or Pakistan had wrongly advised them that they could work whilst studying, and would be able to send money back home. Other agents had promised, but failed, to

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18 There are interesting parallels here with Malta as many of these migrants had paid agents to take them to Greece, not Cyprus.

19 Turkey, as an EU candidate country, does not yet have to impose the same visa requirements as EU member states.
pay the college fees in Cyprus of some of the students (Strovolidou and Colville 2005).

The dramatic rise in asylum figures in Cyprus contrasts markedly with the fall in the number of claims made in the EU as a whole over the past three years. Although the island received 22% fewer applications last year than in 2004, the situation is worrying because of the lack of human resources and suitable training to deal with the workload. Up until 2002 the UNHCR heard all asylum applications in Cyprus. There is also a lack of appropriate housing for claimants. Whereas the Maltese government is insistent that the detention facilities for migrants are not akin to prisons, Cyprus places both irregular migrants and some asylum-seekers in prisons and may prosecute those who have entered the country illegally on criminal charges if they cannot first be deported. There is only one accommodation centre for asylum-seekers in Cyprus, located near a slaughterhouse and in a barren landscape with no trees for shelter.

Neither Cyprus nor Malta has much recent experience to help them deal with these spontaneous flows of migrants.20 The low standards of reception on both islands are quite alarming. This is in contrast to Slovenia, the third country in this study, to which people fled following the Yugoslav wars in the 1990s. In total, 58 refugee centres were initially established there to accommodate refugees. With this in mind, our discussion turns to migration dynamics in the Balkans, drawing on Slovenia’s recent history as a migrant-receiving country to discuss how membership of the EU has shaped its current migration profile.

Slovenia

The events surrounding the break-up of Yugoslavia defined Slovenia’s first attempts to formulate a national migration policy. As a young democratic nation, it neither had the policies in place nor the experience to deal with the forced migration flows from the Balkans in the early 1990s. Slovenia’s policy responses amounted to a process of ‘learning by doing’ (Andreev 2005: 4). Since then, however, migration policy has increasingly been worked out against the backdrop of its accession to the EU. The harmonisation of Slovenia’s migration policies in line with EU standards has provided a structure for this process, and has partly shaped the contours of its fledgling nation-state. The tightening of Slovenia’s border controls, alongside the recent downgrading of its asylum provisions, contrasts with the generally positive response in the 1990s to forced migration out of the Balkans. Then, the public response was largely welcoming to refugees from other states in the former Yugoslavia, many of whom found shelter with relatives already living in Slovenia. Around a third were accommodated in the 58 refugee centres mentioned above. The changing geopolitics in the region, not least Slovenia’s accession to the EU, have altered the conditions for asylum to such a degree that we may ask whether spontaneous flight of refugees would be similarly possible, yet alone receive such a welcome as in the 1990s. The experience of several thousand asylum-seekers in 2000 is illustrative. As Table 4 in the Appendix shows, that year witnessed a record surge in asylum-seekers, with a number arriving from countries outside Europe. The majority were from Iran who arrived first in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where a visa was not required of them, before illegally crossing the Croatian border into Slovenia (just over a quarter of all irregular migrants apprehended in 2000, it should be noted, claimed asylum).

20 Notwithstanding the 200,000 displaced Greek Cypriots following the Turkish invasion of the north in 1974.
The public reaction in Slovenia to migrants from outside Europe was mostly hostile at that time, fuelled by journalists writing articles about the supposed threat posed by their arrival (Erjavec 2003). The centres housing the migrants, particularly in the capital city Ljubljana, were the scenes of public campaigns vilifying asylum-seekers and irregular migrants, with only a few civil-society groups calling for a calmer, more rational response. The hostility outside the centres was seemingly translated into the poor conditions inside; rooms were described at the time as crowded, airless and dirty with little effort being made to separate vulnerable residents (Pajnik et al. 2001). The very presence of migrants from outside Europe on the streets of Slovenia’s cities brought a change to the Asylum Law restricting the freedom of movement of asylum-seekers as a means to improve national security (Erjavec 2003: 86).²¹

It is evident that the responses in Slovenia to the two migration flows (from the Balkans in the 1990s, and from further afield in 2000) differ for all-too-familiar reasons: the perceived and actual legitimacy of the claims for humanitarian protection, the nature or absence of ties between Slovenia and the migrants, as well as the issue of migrants’ nationality and race. These reasons of course reflect Slovenia’s particular historical development, which established much stronger social, cultural and familial ties with the other former Yugoslav republics than with those countries from which the majority of migrants arrived in 2000. But it is important to recognise, as described above, how the context for immigration to Slovenia has changed, especially in comparison to the early 1990s. EU membership has provided the rationale, incentive and justification behind its more restrictive policies to deal with immigration, not least irregular flows because of the perception that undocumented migrants mainly use Slovenia as a transit country.

This feeds into wider discussion about Slovenia as a country of immigration. Statistics on the foreign-born population resident there, as listed in Table 5 in the Appendix, show that the vast majority are from Europe, in particular from the former Yugoslav republics and a few hundred migrants from the neighbouring countries of Austria and Italy (but less so Hungary). Where Slovenia is defined as a country of immigration there is an implicit understanding that this refers to mainly European migrants. People from outside of Europe (i.e. ‘Asians’ as defined in the table) are deemed at best to be a transient population, on their way further west to Italy, France or the UK. The experience of 2000 served to reinforce this perception. Asians, it was suggested during one of the interviews, are not attracted to Slovenia because of its image as a ‘communist’ country.

The distinction between the two migrant groups is problematic for two reasons. There is first and foremost the risk of racially profiling migrants. It is the non-white population who seem not to form part of the Slovenia’s immigration profile. In the case of some Asian migrants residing in Slovenia, this has led to questioning their motives for being there. The recent growth in the number of Chinese migrants, who work mainly in Chinese restaurants, has become a source of intrigue and suspicion. There are doubts over the economic viability of the restaurants, and an assumption that the businesses are simply fronts for illegal activities.

There are secondly conceptual difficulties with dichotomising migrants, and hence their status in Slovenia, by their region of origin. Some European migrants are just as likely to pass through Slovenia on their way to neighbouring countries. An IOM study into the trafficking of CEE women for sex work illustrated how Slovenia is being used as a transit country (Zavratnik Zimic et al. 2003).²² Indeed, the transient nature of migration to Slovenia has a specific European aspect. A great deal of labour migration there has been on a temporary basis, in many instances for seasonal work. Migrants from the former Yugoslav republics have in the past found temporary work in construction, hotels and in agriculture, filling vacancies resulting from labour shortages in the Slovenian working population. Migrations on a weekly basis from Bosnia-Herzegovina to Ljubljana were prevalent in the 1980s, with Bosnian migrants using the money earned to construct family buildings back home. Ongoing labour shortages in Slovenia in these economic sectors – for familiar social and demographic reasons (low birth-rates, an ageing population and rising educational levels amongst the Slovenian population) – indicate that immigrant workers will remain a long-term feature in the Slovenian labour market. However, the lack of internal mobility in Slovenia is often highlighted as a factor exacerbating these shortages. The reluctance of people to sell family homes, often inherited from one generation to the next,

²¹ Irregular migrants are detained in the more secure ‘Centres for Foreigners’, although in practice in Ljubljana both asylum-seekers and irregular migrants were at that time housed together.

²² The study, however, also indicated that Slovenia has emerged as a destination (and in a few cases the source) for migrant sex workers, principally from the Ukraine but also from Russia and Romania.
The absurdity is that member states turn back a migrants to take greater risks to enter the Union. The EU external borders are tightened but only for outcome is again both predictable and elusive: European endgame is being played out. The Cyprus and Slovenia are today the sites where the borderland spaces is ever more apparent. Malta, enlargement, the contested nature of Europe's economic sectors, notably in the construction industry where wages are higher and the work more secure. Slovenia’s entry to the EU, however, has encouraged employers in construction, or more often their subcontractors, to look to Slovakia, as another EU member state, for migrant workers. Although immigration to Slovenia from the new accession countries is not picked up in the 2004 figures cited in Table 5 above, by the end of March 2005 more than a thousand Slovaks had found employment in Slovenia - 70 per cent in construction (Ferjan 2007).

It remains to be seen whether this indicates a trend amongst employers to look to new EU member states to replace migrant workers recruited from the former Yugoslav republics. The rationale, at least from the perspective of employers, is that through subcontracting they are able to employ Slovaks on cheaper wages. Many came to Slovenia to escape unemployment in Slovakia but appear unable to remit money back home because of their modest earnings (Ferjan 2007 and personal correspondence). Slovenian employers may also find it less bureaucratic and paper-intensive to employ EU citizens than TCNs. Bosnians and Croats are, on the other hand, in a better position to command higher wages. Their established presence in Slovenia, and the resulting stronger social ties and networks that collectively they have formed over the years, gives them a comparative advantage in relation to newer migrant workers who do not have similar contacts in, or knowledge of, the Slovenian labour market. Croatia, of course, is a candidate country to the EU. Its accession to the Union would again change the migration dynamics in the Balkans.

Conclusion

As European integration gathers pace through EU enlargement, the contested nature of Europe’s borderland spaces is ever more apparent. Malta, Cyprus and Slovenia are today the sites where the European endgame is being played out. The outcome is again both predictable and elusive: the EU external borders are tightened but only for migrants to take greater risks to enter the Union. The absurdity is that member states turn back a number of migrants on whom the EU as a whole is reliant to fill labour shortages, and seek instead to regulate their arrival. Migrants from outside the EU are as a result exposed to the vagaries of national migration policy, despite efforts to achieve common standards of reception throughout the Union. In the face of criticism by the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) – a body of the intergovernmental Council of Europe - Cyprus continues to detain irregular migrants and asylum-seekers in prisons (ECRI 2001). Malta is similarly criticised by ECRI for the conditions in which both migrant groups are detained (ECRI 2002), whilst the initial police check on asylum-seekers in Slovenia is certainly not an outcome that the EU had in mind as regards its common immigration and asylum policy.

Malta and Cyprus are seen to be playing a largely reactive role, unable to control the spontaneous arrival of migrants. Both islands are assuming an unreasonable level of responsibility over the external borders of the EU. Neither appears to have adequate resources to do so (although funds are available from the EU, for example, to build reception facilities), which has in part led to poor standards of reception for many migrants. Slovenia, on the other hand, has by way of tighter border management seemingly managed to reduce the migratory pressures on its southern border with Croatia. The cases are not, though, comparable. Slovenia has benefited from EU support, and indeed pressure, to set up readmission agreements with its southern neighbours. Malta is, however, unable to engage Libya in policies to stem migration from its northern shores. Cyprus, in the meantime, is attempting to deal with irregular migration within the politically sensitive issue of the ‘Cyprus problem’ - the division of the island and its diplomatic relations with Turkey.

Concerning regular migration flows into Malta, Cyprus and Slovenia, the research and statistics available only allow preliminary conclusions to be drawn on the latter two countries. Both rely on migrant workers to fill labour shortages in specific economic sectors, notably in the construction and service industries. This reliance has led to particular national groups predominating in certain types of work: Filipinas and Sri Lankans as domestic workers in Cyprus, and Bosnians and Croats in construction in Slovenia. The migration profile in Cyprus appears much more ‘global’, composed as it is of a much broader range of

23 Bosnia-Herzegovina, in addition, now requires a visa from Iranians - the largest national group by far arriving in Slovenia in 2000.
nationalities than are found in Slovenia. The impact of globalisation, and the resulting transnational connections between people across the world, is thus more apparent in Cyprus, although Slovenia hosts a small number of labour migrants from outside Europe; i.e. from China. The response to EU accession in Cyprus, to suggest that new EU nationals could replace resident TCNs, not only betrays a degree of insularity to globalisation, but also reveals a poor appreciation of how the global division of labour works there. Whilst employers prefer to hire particular national groups for the specific ‘skills’ they are seen to possess, migrants are able to find certain types of work much more easily because of the transnational ties linking different countries together. As far as Slovenia is concerned, social and economic ties between nationals of the former Yugoslav republics may well mean that migration to Slovenia from the Balkans continues. It will nonetheless be interesting to see what role migrant workers from the new EU accession countries will play in the future of Slovenia, in particular given the recent arrival of Slovaks there.

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Bibliography


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## Appendix 1

### Table 1 Foreign workers in Cyprus by economic activity, 1999-2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic activity</th>
<th>Number employed by year*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture, hunting and forestry</td>
<td>1,925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>1,653</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hotels and restaurants</td>
<td>4,117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed persons in private houses</td>
<td>6,613</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Department of Social Insurance, Nicosia

* The figures are averages across the year

* EU citizens who started their employment before 1 May 2004 are included. Corrections will be made by the Department in due course.

### Table 2 Third-country nationals and EU citizens working in Cyprus in 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic activity</th>
<th>Number employed by month in 2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Third-country nationals*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EU citizens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture, hunting and forestry</td>
<td>4,234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>4,575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hotels</td>
<td>2,544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restaurants</td>
<td>5,098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private households with</td>
<td>15,396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>employed persons</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Department of Social Insurance, Nicosia

* EU citizens who started their employment before 1 May 2004 are again noted as TCNs. Corrections will be made by the Department in due course.

### Table 3 EU citizens working in Cyprus by country, 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic activity</th>
<th>Number employed by month in 2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Polish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hotels</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restaurants</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Department of Social Insurance, Nicosia
### Table 4 Number of asylum-seekers in Slovenia by year, and by country of origin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Asylum-seekers</th>
<th>Iran</th>
<th>Iraq</th>
<th>Afghanistan</th>
<th>Bangladesh</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>Serbia and Montenegro</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>774</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>9,244</td>
<td>5,924</td>
<td>447</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>1,119</td>
<td>397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>1,511</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>532</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ministry of the Interior, Ljubljana, 2003

### Table 5 Foreign population in Slovenia by country of citizenship and region, 31 December 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/region of citizenship</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Europe</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>21,328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>6,831</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia, FYRO</td>
<td>4,134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia and Montenegro</td>
<td>7,949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>867</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Africa</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Asia</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>641</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>South America</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>North and Central America</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Australia and Oceania</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>