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‘New migration’ in the 1990s: a retrospective

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Summary

This paper examines the relationship between international migration in the last decade of the 20th Century and the changing discourses in the UK around issues of multiculturalism, citizenship and the need to develop and implement effective anti-racist agendas. The starting point is a framework proposed in 1993 by Stephen Castles which describes the existence of a ‘new age’ of migration that translates into new challenges for nation states in respect of issues of multiculturalism, citizenship and the salience of racism. The paper considers some of the key theoretical and conceptual issues raised by Castles against the empirical realities of trends and developments over the last decade. The paper argues that whilst there is no direct causal link between the growing diversity of global migratory processes and current UK issues of multiculturalism, citizenship and racism there is a need for better targeted research to examine the effects and impacts of new migrant flows as distinct from the ongoing progression and development of well established and mature minority ethnic communities within the UK. Finally the paper offers some conclusions that build upon and develop the ‘eleven hypotheses’ set out in Castles’ earlier work.
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1. Introduction

The restructuring of the economies of the developed countries of the West, the break up of the former Soviet Union, and the resurgence of nationalism in the Balkans and elsewhere was seen by many commentators in the early and mid 1990s as ushering in a 'new age' of migration. The changing geography of migration flows, the increasing diversity and complexity of those flows and the emergence of new migratory processes, were considered to amount to a new phenomenon, which could be considered as quite separate and distinct from what had gone before. This 'new age' of migration was seen to pose fresh challenges to nation states, requiring them to develop new response strategies and to revisit their approaches to issues of multiculturalism and plurality.


Castles encapsulates this idea of the beginning of a new, different era of migration in his 1993 paper entitled 'Migrations and Minorities in Europe. Perspectives for the 1990s: Eleven Hypotheses', which was first published in the Wrench and Solomos book referenced above, and re-printed in his later work 'Ethnicity and Globalization' (2000). Castles sets out his own analysis of the reasons why a 'new age of migration' has come about (within the first set of five hypotheses) and goes on to describe how, in his view, these changes play through into issues of ethnic diversity, national identity and citizenship (the second set of six hypotheses). The overall thrust of his position appears to be that the world has, for various reasons, entered into a new phase of mass migrations and that, as a consequence of this phenomenon, it has become necessary for nation states to revisit and reformulate previously held concepts of ethnic diversity, national identity and citizenship.

This paper examines that posited causal relationship, using the benefit of nearly ten years of hindsight, and will seek to demonstrate that the salience of racism and the current discourses around citizenship and multiculturalism do not so much arise from step changes in the patterns and processes of migration as from other socio-economic and socio-political factors in Western society. It will address the question of whether the 1990s did, in reality, mark the beginning of a 'new age of migration' or whether, in global terms, the 1990s simply witnessed the continuing evolution and development of migratory processes that had been set in train decades previously.

Castles situates his argument within the framework of the eleven hypotheses of the title, and these explore, firstly, the nature of the new migration and, secondly, the response strategies that need to be adopted by nation states. Castles’ paper is focused on the situation in Europe, although he rightly argues that migration to Europe can only be understood in a global context.

This paper seeks to examine Castles’ perspectives for the 1990s in the context of his ‘eleven hypotheses’ to assess whether the perceptions of a ‘new age of migration’ that were prevalent in the academic discourse of that period remain relevant in 2002. Some of the key conceptual and theoretical questions that arise from the hypotheses will be re-visited and examined in the context of current literature and in the light of post-1993 events and trends. Finally the paper will attempt to construct a new set of propositions that build upon and develop Castles’ work.

2. Castles’ Eleven Hypotheses

The paper appears as a chapter of a book on Racism and Migration in Western Europe edited by Wrench and Solomos and, given the book’s Western European focus, it is unsurprising that the chapter is written from a mainly Western European perspective. At the time that it was written Europe was going through a period of great uncertainty. Events in the Balkans were still unfolding.
and the recent break up of the Soviet Union was causing fears among Western European states of a flood of immigration from former Soviet bloc countries (Carter et al. 1993). The countries of Southern Europe, traditionally countries of emigration, were becoming for the first time in their history countries of net immigration (King et al. 1997). Northern European states, led by Germany, were beginning to introduce tougher immigration laws in an attempt to reduce what were perceived as dangerously escalating numbers of refugees and asylum seekers. The year 1993 also marked the founding of the International Centre for Migration Policy and Development, which saw its role as ‘Advising Governments on the prevention of migratory movements from East to West and South to North.’ At the same time Western Europe was beginning to experience changes in the geography of migration as human smugglers and traffickers sought new migration routes and techniques to circumvent harsher and more sophisticated state controls over asylum and immigration (Koser 1997).

Against this backdrop, Castles sets out his first five hypotheses, which deal with the changes in global migration movements (see Box 1 in Appendix 1). His second set of six hypotheses address the responses of nation states to this ‘new migration’ and the issues that are raised in respect of concepts of citizenship, multiculturalism and the salience of racism (see Box 2 in Appendix 2).

These hypotheses give rise to a range of theoretical and conceptual questions, some of which would need to be the subject of further research, others of which can be critically examined within the context of existing research and in the light of events and trends since 1993.

The main thrust of Castle’s position however appears to be the posited existence of a causal link between what is happening in respect of global migration processes and the various discourses around racism, ethnicity and citizenship taking place within Western Europe. He describes a series of such issues within the UK and Western Europe that he portrays as becoming elevated in significance as a result of the changes in migration patterns, processes and volume.

This paper sets out to challenge that position, contending that what has been depicted as a ‘new age of migration’ is simply an evolutionary continuation of processes that had their genesis decades earlier. It will seek to show that the current discourses around citizenship, multiculturalism and the salience of racism, do not derive from recent changes in migration patterns, processes or volumes but rather from other, more deeply rooted, socio-economic and socio-political issues in Western society.

In order to frame this analysis it is proposed to examine two sets of questions that arise out of Castles’ hypotheses. The first set is concerned with the patterns, processes, types and volumes of migration, and it explores, firstly, whether there can truly be said to be a ‘new age of migration’ which commenced in the 1990s (questions 1-3) and whether the response of nation states is likely to lead to the emergence of further new patterns (question 4). The second set (questions 5–8) looks at the premised links between the ‘new’ migration and current discourses around citizenship, ethnicity, plurality and the salience of racism, with particular reference to the situation in the UK.

The first set of questions to be addressed is:

1. Is the ‘new age of migration’ an essentially European phenomenon or are there indications of a major shift in global migration patterns, processes, types and volume?

2. Are previous distinctions between types of migration becoming meaningless because of a new breaking down of the boundaries between different migration categories, or is it that pre-existing complexities of migration processes and flows are now better understood?

3. Can growing disparities between the countries of the south and the north (and east and west) truly be said to result, as Castles suggests, in a greater potential for future mass movement,
having regard to the impact of development on mobility?

4. What will be the effect of nation state political responses to immigration and asylum issues on the future patterns, processes, types and volume of migration?

- and the second set -

5. Do the processes of social, economic and political change described by Castles in 1993 as producing an increased salience of racism remain the main causal factors in 2002?

6. Is the current discourse on multiculturalism and national identity driven by the presence of 'new' minorities within communities or by the continuing development of processes, structures and systems that address the need for social inclusion of longer established minority groups?

7. To what extent have the 'potential contradictions in anti-racist positions’ been examined over the past decade and are current political agendas contributing to the creation of 'democratic, multicultural societies’.

8. Is there a need for further research that seeks to examine issues of ethnicity, national identity and citizenship in relation to new migration flows?

It is not suggested that these are the only questions that arise from Castles’ paper but they have been selected in order to examine the overarching issue of whether there are demonstrable links between changes in migration flows, patterns, processes and types, and the issues of citizenship, ethnicity and racism as Castles’ paper would appear to suggest. Initially these questions will be considered individually as self-contained lines of inquiry but will be drawn together in the conclusions, both to address the overarching theme and to seek to formulate new propositions for the first decade of 2000 that build upon and develop Castles’ work.

3. Global migration in the 1990s

Was the ‘new age of migration’ an essentially European phenomenon?

The only certainty in the field of migration studies, as with most other areas of life, is the certainty of change. Since records were first kept migration flows have grown and diminished, changed qualitatively and quantitatively, created new patterns and geographies, and altered the societies of both sending and receiving countries. Some changes have been precipitous and momentous, for example where war has resulted in a mass exodus; others have developed over a long period, for example through pioneers and followers.

During the latter part of the 20th century the world saw a growth, but hardly a spectacular one, in the totality of global migration. Although reliable worldwide data are not available, the start of the new millennium saw an estimated 150 million migrants living outside their country of birth (IOM 2000) representing just under 2.5% of the then population of 6,100 million. However despite enormous advances in technology, the restructuring of global markets and the growth of air travel in the final third of the century the percentage of migrants does not appear to have increased as much as might have been expected. In 1965 for example when the world population stood at around 3,400 million there were an estimated 75 million migrants, representing about 2.2% of the global population (UN World Population estimates).

More detailed analysis of the figures shows that in the latter years of the 20th century the rate of growth of in the migrant population becomes increasingly larger than the rate of growth of total world population (IOM 2000) but not to the extent of marking any sort of step change in the number of global migration movements.

It would appear that when Castles and other writers refer to a 'new age of migration' they are probably referring, not to a significant step change in the total volume of global migration, but to changes
in the patterns, geography, types, processes and effects of migration and to what is perceived as an increased complexity in all of these elements. But are these new complexities an essentially European phenomenon or symptomatic of trends within other worldwide migration systems?

To take a broad overview of global migration patterns, and the changes in those patterns, presents its own difficulties. The data from some areas, particularly those that are not traditional areas of immigration, are sketchy and there are no reliable data on numbers of people emigrating from countries. Since emigration is seen as a basic human right, and since nation states have not regarded people leaving their country as a problem (although it may well be in some cases) it is not usual for governments to try to collect data on migration departures. A further factor is the growth of irregular migration, which seems to be a significant factor within all the migration systems examined. Because irregular migration is by its nature unrecorded, no reliable data exist for either migration flows or stocks of irregular migrants. There are also considerable definitional problems when looking at changes in stocks of migrants since decisions have to be made as to who is or is not included in the count. Thus there is a distinction to be made between 'foreign nationals' and 'foreign born' (some of whom will have acquired the nationality of the host country). As there is no globally agreed methodology for data definition, and certainly no globally implemented method of data collection, all comparative statistics need to be treated with a degree of caution. However, with this caveat, it does appear to be possible to use the data that are available to gain a general impression of global trends.

A review of world migration trends can adopt one of two approaches. It can look at migration systems, based on the main immigration nodes, and seek to analyse the main characteristics and trends within that migration system. This is the approach taken by Massey in 'Worlds in Motion' (Massey et.al. 1998) that provides an account of trends within five significant migration systems – North America, the Southern Cone of South America, Asia and the Pacific, the Gulf Region, and Western Europe. Significant omissions from Massey's analysis are the Mediterranean migration system, Sub-Saharan Africa and the newly emerging migration system of Eastern and Central Europe. It should be acknowledged, however, that 'Worlds in Motion' does not set out to be a comprehensive account of world migration flows, but rather an analysis of the extent to which various theoretical and conceptual migration frameworks can be tested against the empirical data available from the migration systems studied.

The alternative approach, taken by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM 2000) is to look at world migration patterns on a regionalised basis. Definition of the boundaries of the geographical regions may to some extent be an arbitrary choice, and inter-regional migration will, by definition, be a more significant factor than in the case of a migration systems-based approach, but the selection of finite geographical boundaries allows the possibility of a statistical analysis that can remain consistent over time and enable comparisons to be made between different periods of time. The IOM World Migration Report defines nine such regions – North America (including Canada, Greenland, Central America and the Caribbean), South America, East Asia (including China, Japan, Hong Kong, Korea, Taiwan), South-East Asia (including Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam), Middle East and South Asia (including India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Syria, Egypt, Libya, the Gulf States), Sub-Saharan Africa, Central Europe and the CIS, Western Europe and the Mediterranean (including the Mahgreb countries), and Oceania (including Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Pacific Islands).

For the purposes of this paper, which seeks to take a broad overview of world migration trends, the migration systems identified by Massey are considered, together with Sub-Saharan Africa, but in the light of the more recent data provided by the IOM World Migration Report.
The USA and Canada

Traditionally, the USA and Canada have been the main countries of immigration, California alone taking more permanent immigrants than any nation, apart of course from the USA itself (Massey et. al. 1998:62). Massey records that in 1990 there were 19.8 million foreign born residents within the USA representing 8% of the total population and 4.2 million foreign born residents in Canada, representing 16% of the population. Since 1990 immigration to the USA has proceeded at the rate of around 860,000 per year (IOM 2000:242) and to Canada at the rate of around 225,000 per year (IOM 2000: 236). This represents an upsurge of immigration to both countries since the mid 1960s (Massey et. al. 1998:62). A feature of immigration to North America is its diversity and Massey notes that ‘virtually every country in the world sends at least some immigrants to Canada, the USA or both.’

The main discernible trend in terms of the geography of migration to North America is the increase in immigration from Asia. Massey notes that in the USA and Canada Asian migration arose from virtually nothing in the mid-1960s to become a pre-eminent source by the 1980s representing 47% of all Canadian immigrants and 37% of those to the USA. This trend continued through the 1990s, the main sources of immigration to the USA in 1998 being Mexico, Mainland China, India, the Philippines and the Dominican Republic (IOM 2000:243). In Canada the main sources were China, India, Hong Kong, Taiwan and the Philippines, with immigration from Asia representing more than half of the total.

The growth of Asian immigration to North America, and the decline in immigration from Europe is not a new phenomenon but one that has emerged from the 1960s onwards. However, as with any migration system it is susceptible to the impact of immigration policy, and successive USA and Canadian governments have subjected their policies to constant review and amendment. The full impact of September 11th on immigration policy has yet to be revealed, although its immediate effect was the suspension by the USA of its settlement programme for refugees (Gibney 2002).

South America

The South American migration system differs from other world migration systems in the extent to which it operates regionally rather than globally. Massey notes that the scale of movement is much smaller, it has only one core country (Argentina) and that little of the immigration to Argentina is transcontinental (Massey 1998:202). In some respects the South American migration system, whilst composed of complex and fluctuating intra-regional movements, driven by changing economic and political factors, is one which has shown a tendency to become less rather than more diverse. European migration, which has been surprisingly eclectic historically (e.g. Cornish tin miners in Hidalgo, Mexico, Welsh refugees in Patagonia, Volga Germans in Argentina from the 19th Century) has dwindled and whilst there are some new flows from outside the region, particularly from Mainland China, Korea, Ukraine and Russia, the flows are small compared with the intra-regional movements (IOM 2000:219).

Emigration from the region to the US and Europe has been of particular significance over the years, particularly due to the political upheavals that occurred in several countries during the 1970s. The political situation in Chile, for example, led to the number of Chileans residing abroad to more than double between 1970 and 1990 (IOM 2000: 221-223).

As with each of the other global migration systems recent years have witnessed increasing concerns about ‘illegal’ migration and calls within Argentina for stricter measures to prevent unauthorised entry. There is public pressure for increased controls, fuelled by economic austerity, rising crime and high unemployment levels, even though recent studies have demonstrated that immigrants do not affect unemployment rates or commit a higher than average level of crime (IOM 2000: 220).
Asia and the Pacific

This is the newest and fastest growing of all the established global migration systems. The Cambridge Survey of World Migration quotes Skeldon’s interesting observation that, from 4 May 1984, there were more aircraft above the Pacific than above the Atlantic (Cohen 1995: 508). This region is also the largest comprising as it does East Asia, South-East Asia, and Oceania, which together make up over a third of the total population of the world (Zlotnik 1996: 299 – 335). This calculation excludes the huge populations of the four countries of South Asia (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka) who export migrants to every part of the globe, and these countries will be considered below in the context of the Gulf migration system, in which they are key players.

The receiving nations of Asia and the Pacific are clustered around four geographically dispersed nodes – Australia, Japan, Singapore/Malaysia and Hong Kong/Taiwan/Korea and the South-East Asian countries are in the process of developing political and economic ties with one another, principally through the Association of South-East Asian Nations (Massey 1998: 161).

Although there is a high degree of symbiosis and interdependency between the countries of Asia and the Pacific, it would be wrong to characterise this region as having a single migration system but rather a series of interrelated systems that are evolving in different ways and at different speeds. Within East Asia the main destination countries are Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Korea, each of which has been through a process of transition from net emigration to net immigration (IOM 2000: 61). In South East Asia there are three identifiable sub-systems focusing on Singapore and Peninsular Malaysia, East Malaysia and Brunei Darussalam, and Thailand. In addition to the migration flows to these areas, mainly from Indonesia, the Philippines and Indochina a trend in recent years has been for new migration streams from South East Asia to the destination countries of East Asia. In Oceania, Australia and New Zealand, traditional countries of immigration, continue to attract large numbers of migrants with a continuing trend away from European and towards Asian migration.

Massey (1998: 169) notes that despite the Asia – Pacific system being a relatively new one it seems to be following the same evolutionary path as its predecessors in North America and Europe. A rapid growth in capital accumulation and technology, combined with a scarcity of labour is being met through a combination of legal migration, the entry of ‘temporary workers’ and ‘trainees’ and growing illegal migration.

A recent factor affecting migration within the region is the economic crisis that began in 1997 and the long-term impact that this will have on migration trends and patterns cannot be foreseen, although Skeldon’s view (2000) is that the crisis, despite its intensity, appears to be short-lived with relatively little impact on regional migration patterns. However it is already apparent that increased unemployment in the region has led to more restrictive immigration policies and in turn to a rise in unauthorised immigration (IOM 2000: 77-81).

Generally the region is experiencing an overall growth in migration and a diversification in terms of the geography of migration. This would appear to be the continuation of trends that began in the 1970s accompanying the rapid growth of the region’s economy, rather than a new phenomenon.

Migration in the Gulf system

Migration in this region is characterised by huge pull factors within the Gulf states themselves, wishing to use their huge reserves of oil income capital to deploy foreign labour in order to construct a modern industrial infrastructure and equally large economic and demographic push factors within the South Asian countries of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.

This has led to a situation where more than half the labour force in the six Gulf states is composed of non-nationals (IOM 2000: 108). Massey (1998: 135) notes however that whereas, like Germany and the USA, the Gulf States sought to implement
programmes that would buy foreign labour without resultant long-term immigration, the closed non-democratic social and political structures of their societies, enabled them to be more successful in maintaining strict control over their ‘guest workers’ and preventing long term settlement. Policies are now in place in all six countries to maintain or increase birth rates and so reduce dependency on foreign labour (IOM 2000: 108).

The trend in the Gulf, which has emerged over the last thirty years, has been for labour migrants from South Asia to replace migrants from other countries of the Middle East. The Gulf War in 1991 accelerated this process of change (IOM 2000: 109). There has also been a diversification of Asian migration with particular growth in immigration from Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines and Thailand (Massey 1998: 136).

The region has also seen a growth in irregular migration although the Gulf States have shown themselves to be extremely effective in carrying out mass repatriations with over a million returned from 1996 – 1998 (IOM 2000: 113).

In summary the migration patterns within the Gulf over the past decade do not appear to display any noticeable divergence in kind from what had gone before, but are more a development of pre-existing patterns with some diversification and changes as a result of political events and state imposed controls.

**Sub-Saharan Africa**

If there is any region in the world where the migration system could be said to be going through fundamental change it is Sub-Saharan Africa, which displays complex and shifting migration patterns arising from wars and civil strife, social and economic restructuring within individual countries and closer economic cooperation between groups of African states. The major host countries within the region are Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon, Botswana and South Africa and the main countries of origin Mali, Burkina Faso and Lesotho (IOM 2000: 134), and in numerical terms the overwhelming proportion of movements are intra-regional. Where a distinction can be drawn from the South American system however is in the propensity for transcontinental emigrations to assume greater significance, as the traditional migration strategies such as temporary long-term circular migration prove inadequate to meet the economic needs of families. There is a paradox in that, whilst African states seek greater economic cooperation through sub-regional and regional associations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) the South African Development Community (SADC) and the recently formed New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), high levels of unemployment within individual countries may well act as an incentive to the Governments of those countries to prevent immigration. An example of this is in South Africa itself where, in 1995, 40% of the country’s workforce – 6 million people - was unemployed (IOM 2000: 139). Similarly in Cote d’Ivoire the Government’s liberal immigration policy of more than three decades has now been ended through reasons of economic expediency (IOM 2000: 142).

The migration picture within the region is highly complex and analysis is made more difficult by the lack of reliable data on migration flows, by the enormous numbers of refugees and people in refugee-like situations displaced by wars and civil strife, and the growing extent of unauthorised migration within and from the region. There is also a marked duality in the labour market. Highly skilled professionals who once migrated to traditional destinations in Europe and elsewhere can now find suitable employment within the developing economies of South Africa and Botswana, whereas low-skilled who may have once found work through intra-regional migration are now seeking to find their way to destinations in Europe, the Middle East and Asia (IOM 2000: 153).

Another trend is the feminisation of migration with a significant proportion of women now emigrating alone in search of employment (IOM 2000: 154). Although this is a relatively new phenomenon in Sub-Saharan Africa, marking a departure from
the traditional pattern of male migration in which wives and children remain at home, the growing extent and diversity of female migration is apparent within each of the other world migration systems. By 1995 about 48% of all international migrants were women, outnumbering male migrants in about a quarter of receiving countries (Zlotnik 1999).

The relatively recent emergence of female migration as a significant area of study in migration research can be attributed to two factors. The first can be seen as no more than a long overdue counterbalancing measure against the extent to which older studies and narratives were gender blind, either ignoring female migration altogether or portraying the process, implicitly or explicitly, as male-led and male-dominated (King 2002). More recently there has been a greater awareness of the diverse roles that women may play in the migration process (Castles 1998: 9).

The second factor is the growing ability for women to access labour markets, to function as principal wage-earners for themselves and their families (IOM 2000: 49) and to take advantage of social networks to fulfil child-care responsibilities (Faist 2000: 154). Alongside this greater mobility however there is also greater vulnerability, through various mechanisms of female exploitation, the most extreme of which is the growing extent of trafficking.

In conclusion, Sub-Saharan Africa is going through a rapid, and painful, process of change, with the likelihood that pressures for emigration will accelerate in the coming decades. Adepoju (2000) believes that as political and economic crises intensify, refugee flows and irregular migration will increase in intensity and impact, and that structural adjustment and the current economic downturn will be an important push factor towards emigration.

4. A new age of migration?

It is not within the scope of this paper to catalogue the growing complexities of the European migration system and the successive events that have led to what Castles characterises as a 'new age of migration'. It is beyond dispute that since the oil crisis of 1973, the collapse of the former Soviet Union, the wars in the Balkans, the southern European migration turnaround, the creation of a 'Fortress Europe' and the attempts of individual migrants and organisations to find ways of circumventing increasingly harsh asylum regimes, migration patterns within Europe have undergone fundamental changes. As countries of Western Europe raise the stakes in their continuing endeavours to prevent unauthorised immigration, so the means used by trafficking and smuggling organisations to overcome such barriers will become increasingly devious and sophisticated. This means more hazardous and circuitous journeys, and increased costs, for the migrant and adds to the vulnerability of those seeking to gain entry. As a result migrants find themselves entrapped in trafficking situations or stranded in central European or North African transit countries. Those who do make it to Western Europe may find themselves in a country other than that of choice, cut off from their social and family networks.

To characterise this situation as amounting to a new age of migration is accurate in that it presents new challenges to nation states, to humanitarian organisations seeking to protect the rights and the welfare of vulnerable people, to international institutions concerned with maintaining the structures, frameworks and integrity of human rights law and, not least, to the migrants themselves.

In global terms however there remains a marked difference between the migration systems of various regions. Whilst all show a tendency towards greater diversity, in the case of the Americas, the Gulf system and the Asia-Pacific system what has been apparent within recent years is the continuation of trends that had their genesis in the 1960s, 1970s or 1980s rather than any fundamental shift. The case of Africa seems different in that recent changes in the social, political and economic environment appears to be resulting in quite new and different migration imperatives, with new patterns and scenarios yet to emerge.
A common thread that runs through each of the global migration systems is the tendency for all receiving countries to impose stricter and/or more selective immigration controls as a response to social, political or economic conditions within that particular country. This is inevitably accompanied, throughout the world, by an increase in irregular migration to those countries.

To return to the original question ‘Is the new age of migration essentially a European phenomenon?’ the conclusion is that each global migration system seems to be developing in different ways at different speeds. Fundamental changes in the character and geography of migration, as opposed to the development and continuation of well-established trends, appear to be confined to the migration systems of Europe and Africa. There are however a number of imponderables - what will be the long terms effects of September 11th 2001 and the so-called 'war on terrorism', will the potential for mass movements from East Asia and from South Asia be realised, what will be the outcome of current political hostilities in South Asia and the Middle East and how will these impact on migration flows?

Are previous distinctions between types of migration becoming meaningless?

This section of the paper considers some of the migration dichotomies to examine whether, as Castles suggests, the traditional boundaries between different migration categories are breaking down, and whether this is indeed undermining government policies. Castles points out that migration policies have been premised on the belief that movements could be divided up into neat categories such as economic migration, family reunion, refugees and illegals, and that today (i.e.1993) these distinctions are collapsing, making it harder for governments to regulate migration.

What may give an impression that previous distinctions are collapsing is the strictly contemporary problem of separating out the ‘deserving’ from the ‘undeserving’ migrant, as defined by the state itself. The ‘deserving’ migrant can be defined as belonging to at least one of two categories – (a) someone to whom the state recognises a clear moral responsibility (e.g. a refugee under the 1951 Geneva Convention) and/or (b) someone who is recognised by the state as being able to provide something that the state needs or requires (e.g. labour). The ‘undeserving’ migrant is someone for whom the state accepts no moral responsibility and from whose presence it believes it will derive no benefits. During periods when the state has an overriding need for immigration, normally because of a requirement for labour, it is not necessary for it to concern itself with the question of whether it also has a moral responsibility to the migrant. It is likely that the great labour migrations of the 19th and 20th centuries would have contained a mix of ‘economic migrants’ and people in refugee-like situations but, whilst analysts could theorise these distinctions, they did not need to be made in practice.

What is or is not ‘legal’ as opposed to ‘illegal’ migration is, in reality, entirely an artificial construct, formulated by states in pursuance of their own perceived self-interests. ‘Illegal’ migration can only exist where ‘legal’ migration possibilities are not available.

Because states have formulated immigration policies which seek to admit only those migrants that the state considers deserving of admission it becomes necessary to construct an elaborate system of categorisation that seeks to define which migrants fall within the ‘deserving’ (and thereby legal) categories and which fall within the ‘undeserving’ (and thereby illegal) categories. These categories, embracing as they do a wide spectrum of possible scenarios (temporary migration, contract labour, family reunification etc) will of necessity be arbitrary, blurred at the edges, and in all likelihood will contain inconsistencies and contradictions. The difficulty of distinguishing a ‘refugee’ from an ‘economic migrant’ for example is probably no more difficult today than it was a century ago – the difference today is that the need to try to make that distinction is deemed to be important. As Cohen (1995: 6) points out, it mattered little to the authorities in turn-of-the-century USA whether people presenting themselves at
Ellis Island were fleeing poverty in Ireland or pogroms in Russia, since all immigrants were positively welcomed.

It is perhaps not so much that previous distinctions between different types of migration are becoming meaningless, as Castles suggests, but rather that distinctions that can readily be drawn in theoretical terms at the macro level, are much harder to draw when applied to real people in real situations through the mechanism of state immigration policies. This is because the traditional migration dichotomies through which the state seeks to define and control immigration (legal/illegal, temporary/permanent, forced/voluntary) are not in reality dichotomies at all but continua, without discernible thresholds to mark the crossing of the boundary from one category to the other.

This is not to deny the possibility that genuinely new forms of migration and new types of migrant can emerge, although what may seem to be new forms can sometimes turn out to be older forms in fresh guise. Cohen (1995: 507) cites the case of contract-labour migration, which has pre-modern forms in the Asian indentured labour of the 19th century, the 'foreign Poles' recruited for work in 19th century Germany, the mine workers in South Africa, the Bracero Program in the USA and the European 'guestworker' system.

King (2002) seeks to draw what he calls a 'New Map of European Migration' in what he describes as a 'qualitative exploration of a changing typology', but his analysis is not so much a revelation of genuinely new types of migration as an identification of new and significant trends within pre-existing, but possibly unresearched or under-researched, areas. Thus, earlier forms of student migration can be seen not only in the medieval wandering scholar referred to, but also in the 18th century 'Grand Tour', and in the Swiss 'finishing school' among other examples. That student migration to Europe has become an increasingly important element of the economies of the destination countries however is undeniable. Similarly, whilst love-inspired migration (the transnationalisation of intimacy as King calls it) is certainly a newly conceptualised migration type, it most certainly is not a new migration form. Examples of love migrations are apparent throughout history and have to a large extent shaped history itself - alliances formed during wars, intermarriage following colonisation and settlement, rulers seeking to strengthen international alliances etc.

To return to the question of whether the distinctions between different types of migration are becoming meaningless, it could be argued that it is not so much that the categories and the distinctions themselves are changing but rather that there is now a greater understanding, by academics if not by governments, of the subtleties and complexities that lie within the individual migration decision. The roots of the failure of nation states to control immigration may well lie in their inability to recognise and understand these subtleties. Thus when Germany, for example, implemented its 'guestworker' programme as a means of recruiting foreign labour it may have overlooked that it was not labour that it was importing, but people – people who brought with them their whole range of needs, motivations and aspirations. Similarly an over-simplistic view in nation state immigration policies towards 'traditional' migration categories – economic migration, family reunification, refugees and 'illegals' – is not only likely to prove counter-productive to the success of those policies but also to the interests of the state and the migrants themselves.

**Do growing disparities between countries result in a greater potential for mass movement?**

This question derives from Castles' third hypothesis, which is that growing disparities in economic, social and demographic conditions in the countries of the south and north (and east and west) provide the context for future mass migrations. He qualifies this in his next hypothesis by recognising that migration is not caused by economic, social and demographic disparities alone. But if such disparities are not the cause of the migration then why should growing disparities increase, rather than lessen or
leave unchanged, the propensity to migrate?

In order to address this question it is necessary to consider the types of disparity to which Castles refers, which he categorises as economic, social and demographic. These need to be examined in the context of the various theoretical positions adopted by migration scholars to seek explain why, in Faist’s words, there are so few migrants out of most places and so many migrants out of a few places (Faist 2000: 1 - 8). A recent study by the United Nations Population Division (UN 1998) indicates that 90% of the world’s migrants live in about a quarter of the world’s countries. It has long been acknowledged that it is not the poorest countries of the world that give rise to the largest migration streams and more than half the world’s migrant population remain within developing countries (IOM 2000: 6). Massey comments (Massey 1998: 277) that ‘studies consistently show that international migrants do not come from poor, isolated places that are disconnected from world markets, but from regions and nations that are undergoing rapid change and development as a result of their incorporation into global trade, information and production networks’. This has consistency with Zelinksy’s mobility transition model where an increase in the scale of migration follows the initial stages of transition from a pre-modern to a newly industrialising society (Zelinksy 1971: 219-249).

Within the standard push-pull model of migration growing demographic imbalances would result in an increased propensity for migration. A large population increase in the sending country provides an excess of labour supply that cannot be absorbed within the economy of that country and encourages migration to destination countries which are unable to meet their labour demands from within their native populations (e.g. Schaeffer 1993, Straubhaar 1993). This over simplistic explanation is inadequate however to explain why many countries with rapid population growth have low levels of emigration, whilst others with low rates produce high levels of emigration.

Similarly growing economic imbalances would, in simple push-pull terms, have a similar effect. As wage differentials increased between countries of origin and destination so increasing numbers of migrants would find that the benefits of migration outweighed the costs. Again a simplistic cost-benefit approach provides an inadequate explanation in that high wage differentials are not in themselves a determinant of migration flows. Conversely, in support of the proposition that a widening economic gap between rich and poor countries creates pressures for mass migration into the richer areas, Gould (1994) references the situation of the economic ‘cliffs’ of the US/Mexican border and the Mediterranean divide between Southern Europe and North Africa.

The effects of increasing social disparities, as a discrete factor, are more difficult to conceptualise since social disparities are not only inextricably intertwined with economic disparities, but also give rise to issues around human rights, social justice and those conditions that are likely to result in forced migration of one kind or another. There is plenty of evidence that an increase in social disparities in their most extreme manifestation – oppressive regimes, persecution of minorities, abuses of human rights – do lead to increases in outmigration through the creation of refugee streams.

Castles’ point however is not that increasing disparities between countries of the north and south will in themselves lead to an increase in migration, but that such disparities provide a context within which migration can be expected to increase. This appears to be a theoretical position that would be difficult to prove or disprove through empirical evidence since one would be unable to measure economic and demographic disparities against migration outcomes in isolation from other influential factors that could be simultaneously in play e.g. incorporation of the country into global markets and global information and production networks. What seems likely, as in the case of the new participation of South East Asian Countries in global migration networks, is that disparities between countries are a pre-condition for mass migration that can then be triggered
by some process of transition within the sending country. This would seem to indicate that policies designed to stimulate development within potential sending countries, with the sole motivation of reducing the propensity for emigration, are unlikely to achieve the desired outcome, but are instead more likely to result in an increase in global movements.

What will be the effect of nation state political responses to immigration and asylum issues on the future geography of migration?

In recent years much of the political discourse around migration issues has been about ways of controlling or preventing immigration, and there is evidence from each of the global migration systems referenced above, that the governments of the receiving countries wish to maintain as close a control as possible over the question of who may or may not be admitted. Immigration control remains high on the agenda of the USA and Canada. The receiving countries of East Asia and South East Asia all operate exclusionary immigration policies and permit the importation of labour only to fill specific labour needs (IOM 2000: 74 and 102). Control over immigration remains to the forefront of government policies in Australia and New Zealand, and the countries of the Gulf continue to seek to prevent permanent settlement of imported workers, particularly in view of demographic changes which are increasing the indigenous labour force (IOM 2000: 128). In Sub-Saharan Africa host countries such as South Africa and Cote d'Ivoire are seeking to restrict immigration as a counter-measure to high unemployment among the indigenous population. The restrictive immigration policies of Western Europe continue to be reinforced as governments seek to prevent 'illegal' entry into fortress Europe, and only recently has the impracticality of preventing all migration shifted the agenda from one of migration prohibition to one of migration management (European Commission 2000; Home Office 2001).

Throughout the world governments are seeking to impose tighter controls over immigration, in terms of limiting the numbers of admissions and/or controlling the conditions of entry and status of entrants. State imposed restrictions on immigration have been followed, within all the major migration systems of the world, by an increase in unauthorised or 'illegal' migration. The extent to which nation state political responses to immigration and asylum issues will impact on the future geography of migration will therefore depend on the ability of individual nation states to maintain control of immigration against the current of the other economic, social and political forces that are driving migration. To some extent unauthorised or 'illegal' migration, which in the past has been overlooked or ignored by many governments throughout the world, has acted as a 'pressure valve' that has prevented any rigorous testing of the robustness of the nation state to withstand those migration-driving forces.

Within this context the current discourse about the future of the nation state and its ability to withstand the forces of globalisation seems particularly relevant. Papastergiadis (2000: 80-85) describes the new pressures that globalisation has exerted on the authority and the autonomy of the nation state. Transnational corporations, who account for half of the hundred most important economic units in the world and whose prime loyalty is to their shareholders on the global stock markets (Papastergiadis 2000: 81) are able to shift their operations to any place where economic opportunity can be maximised. With this power they are able to exert tremendous influence over national governments both by the carrot of new investment and by the stick of threatened withdrawal. The extent to which the objectives of the nation state coincide with global economic forces will vary from region to region and it might be expected that where there is a strong correspondence between the objectives of each it will produce conditions under which controlled and orderly migration will occur. Where, for socio-political or other reasons, the objectives of the nation state do not coincide with the economic and social forces driving migration it is likely that unauthorised or 'illegal' migration will increase.

As countries of the world assemble themselves, through closer economic and
political co-operation, into economic groupings, such as the EU in Europe, ASEAN in South East Asia, COMESA, ECOWAS and NEPAD in Sub-Saharan Africa and MERCOSUR in South America, so the country of destination for migrants will become less important than the destination region. This is already apparent in Western Europe where irregular migration routes and destinations are seen to change according to the effectiveness or otherwise of the border controls maintained by individual countries (Morrison 1998: 41 – 47). There is evidence that irregular migrants who put themselves into the hands of smugglers and migrants lose control over both the route and the destination of their migration, finishing up in a country not of their choosing and isolated from family and social networks (Koser 2000).

One discernible trend that seems to be emerging is what might be called the ‘commodification’ of migration, paralleling the commodification of warfare described by Hobsbawm (2000: 7-13). In other words a function that appeared, at least during the first half of the 20th century, to fall clearly within the sphere of influence of the nation state has been progressively ‘privatised’ and transformed into a business venture with predominantly commercial, rather than political, imperatives. Cohen (1998: 355) refers to the ‘lawyers, travel agents, employment bureaux and ‘fixers’ of all kinds’ who provide services to those who wish to migrate and Salt and Stein (1997) have modelled migration as a business, with particular reference to issues of trafficking. This commodification of migration looks likely to increase within a number of specialised areas – particularly elite labour migration, retirement migration, student migration, smuggling and trafficking – further lessening the influence of the nation state which is now but one player in a panoply of global forces driving change.

Whilst it would be an unfeasible act of clairvoyance to draw up a cartographical map that predicts a future geography of migration there are some general conclusions that may be drawn from the foregoing. Firstly, the influence of the nation state over future migration flows is likely to lessen both on account of the increasing forces of globalisation and the propensity for migration streams, once started, to perpetuate themselves (through family reunification, the establishment of transnational communities, the logistical difficulties of enforced return etc). Secondly, where the nation state seeks to impose controls that work against the various forces driving migration there is likely to be an increase in unauthorised or ‘illegal’ migration. Thirdly where unauthorised or ‘illegal’ migration takes place the destination region, rather than a specific destination country will assume greater importance as the would-be migrant, or her/his agent, seeks the line of least resistance for entry. These factors together are likely to produce an increasingly diffuse and diverse array of migration patterns throughout the world.

5. The link between the ‘new age of migration’ and the multiculturalism discourse

The preceding sections of this paper sought to examine questions which arise from the first five hypotheses of Castles’ paper – that the world is entering a new phase of mass population movements, that previous migration distinctions are becoming meaningless, that growing disparities provide the context for future mass migrations, that transnational interdependence perpetuates migration and that the new migration has been the outcome of economic restructuring globally. It has addressed some of the questions posed by these hypotheses in the light of more recent global trends and analyses. The general conclusions that were drawn from this examination are that, in global terms, the world is not so much entering a new phase of migration but witnessing an uneven development of migration patterns that had their genesis during various periods since the Second World War, but with an overall trend towards increasing diversity of flows. So far as the distinctions between various migration categories are concerned, it is not that they are becoming meaningless but rather that distinctions that are relatively easy to conceptualise in theory are far harder to draw in practice. This difficulty is becoming apparent as nation states, which previously did not see
the need to draw such distinctions, now seek increasingly to do so.

Regarding Castles’ third and fourth hypotheses concerning increasing disparities between countries of the north and south (and east and west) the conclusions are that increasing disparities are not in themselves likely to lead to greater migration, although disparities between sending and receiving countries do appear to be a pre-condition for mass migration to occur. So far as the global restructuring of economies and labour markets is concerned, the conclusion is that forces of globalisation will become an increasing challenge to the primacy of the nation state and that where there is a conflict between the objectives of the nation state and the economic forces driving migration, this is likely to result in the growth of irregular or ‘illegal’ migration. This is clearly an issue that Castles recognised in 1993, although the exponential growth in the power base of transnational corporations and international business organisations during the last decade has possibly outstripped any predictions that might have been made at that time. As well as the growth in size and influence of individual transnational corporations - for example, of the 100 largest announcements of mergers in history, 84 were made in the years 1996 – 2000 (Draffan 2002) – there has been an increase in the influence of international trade associations, business lobby groups, think tanks and multilateral trade and development agencies (Ainger 2000). Groups such as the Transatlantic Business Dialogue, established in 1996, have added their collective muscle to longer established international business organisations such as the International Chamber of Commerce, the Business Roundtable and the World Economic Forum. No longer can individual nation states or international groupings of nation states such as the United Nations dominate the international political agenda, which is increasingly hi-jacked by the interests of international capitalism.

The next set of hypotheses in Castles’ paper examine the responses of nation states to the global migration phenomena that he identifies and the issues that they raise in respect of multiculturalism, citizenship and the need to tackle racism. The following sections of this paper focus on some the issues raised by Castles’ hypotheses with particular reference to current discourses within the UK and Western Europe.

Do the processes of change described by Castles in 1993 as producing an increased salience of racism remain the main causal factors in 2002?

Castles’ paper sets out two sets of causes of racism in Western Europe, the first rooted in colonialism and the construction of nation states, the second deriving from current processes of social, economic and political change. He sees the increased salience of racism as reflecting the rapid change in living and working conditions, the dissolution of the cultural forms and organisational structures of the working class and the weakness and ambivalence of the state.

It is not within the scope of this paper to seek to position the discourse of racism within any particular conceptual and theoretical framework. The development of a suitable theoretical model, founded in social theory or in Marxist analysis, is an issue that has exercised the minds of scholars for well over half a century. Benedict (1943) described ‘race’ as a classification based on hereditary traits (skin colour, stature, hair colour etc.) as distinct from learned behaviour such as language. She identified ‘culture’ as the term for learned behaviour and showed that where ‘culture’ is held as a constant, ‘race’ is a variable. Cox (1948) took the Neo-Marxist view that ‘race conflict’ was unknown amongst the ancients and has only arisen in modern times as a phenomenon of capitalist exploitation of peoples and its complementary social attitude. Rex (1970) also emphasised the need to link the analysis of race relations to issues of class as well as other social processes.

During the same period, in a development of the Neo-Marxist line of thought, Castles and Kosack (1972, 1973) published work that analysed the position of immigrant workers within the capitalist economies of Western Europe and in the context of the
class structures of those economies. The conceptualisation of racism as a primarily economic, rather than cultural, issue is one which is also prevalent among other contemporary left-wing writers (e.g. Sivanandan 2001).

This paper does not seek to make any comparative evaluation of the various theoretical and conceptual explanations of racism but rather to examine some of its various manifestations as an empirical reality, pre-supposing some measure of agreement that such manifestations do indeed exist and are capable of being recognised as such.

Castles makes the point that racism as an empirical reality changes over time, with regard to its targets, its forms of expression and its intensity and this is concordant with Banton’s warnings of the danger of ‘presentism’ in any conceptualisation of racism (Banton1980). Just as, over the last twenty years or so the discourse has shifted from that of ‘race relations’ to concepts of ‘ethnicity’ that find their expression through multiculturalism, so the empirical manifestation of ‘racism’ is continuing to find different forms of expression. No longer is it possible, if indeed it ever was, to consider the question as if there were a single issue of ‘racism’, since it has become increasingly a multi-layered and multi-faceted phenomenon, affecting different communities, organisations and individuals in differing ways within different contexts. Miles (1993) also refers to ‘distinct racisms, each of which can be located in a distinct space and time’ although he suggests that any discussion of a multiplicity of racisms should first be situated within a programme of conceptual analysis. Whilst accepting this point and the limitations of a discourse that does not place the various forms of racism within a well-conceptualised and robust theoretical typology, this paper does not seek to offer such a conceptual analysis, but rather to comment upon some of the diverse manifestations of racism brought about by the equivocal, ambiguous or inconsistent policies of the state.

In a sense whilst we may not have entered a ‘new age of migration’ we have possibly entered a ‘new age of racisms’ where the forms, manifestations and effects of varying types of racism are becoming increasingly subtle and diverse. Of particular significance in the UK and Europe during the last decade has been the dichotomy between, on the one hand, the growing socio-political effort to tackle racism by seeking overtly to eliminate discrimination and institutionalised racism from within organisations and, on the other, the implementation of state policies which are racist in their impact and result in the continued marginalisation of, and discrimination against, minority ethnic groups within particular circumstances or situations. This may be what Castles means when he refers to ‘the weakness and ambivalence of the state’. Indeed he refers to this ambivalence in one of his later works (2000: 146) in relation to the situation of young people of Algerian origin in France who experience considerable racism and exclusion despite the official ideology of equal rights and assimilation. He also references Kastoryano’s account (1996) of young people of Turkish origin in Germany turning to Islam because of the failure of secular organisations to achieve genuine political participation.

A more detailed analysis of the diverse and multifaceted nature of various racisms is set out in Castles’ other major work from this period, ‘Ethnicity and Globalisation’ (2000: 163-186) in which he constructs the rudiments of a typology of racisms. These include racisms based on exploitation and/or inferiorization on the one hand and racisms based on exclusion and/or extermination on the other, and Castles points out that the two types can exist side by side. He also deals with the links between globalisation and racism and demonstrates how the racist battleground has shifted from an emphasis on ‘race’ to an emphasis on ‘culture’, leading some observers to speak of a ‘new racism’. The ‘new racism’ or ‘xeno-racism’ as it has also been labelled emerged during the 1970s from within Right Wing political thought, premised on the proposition that it is a natural and acceptable condition of humankind to preference one’s own culture above that of others.

In order to consider the impact of migration in relation to these issues it is first
necessary to examine the development and the position of anti-racist agendas over recent years.

Despite the existence of diverse structural and deep-rooted forms of racism within Western society it is undeniable that a succession of social and political events in the mid to late 1990s have produced, at least within the UK, a climate where major public, voluntary and even private sector institutions are taking significant steps to eliminate discrimination and institutionalised racism from their employment and service delivery policies, practices and procedures. A significant catalyst for this change was undoubtedly the murder of Stephen Lawrence in 1993 and the subsequent McPherson Inquiry Report (1999), with its findings of institutionalised racism within the Metropolitan Police Force. In this respect McPherson’s conclusions can be contrasted with those of Scarman in his report following the 1981 Brixton riots. Bourne (2001) notes that Scarman’s Report denied the existence of institutionalised racism in the police force and in society in general. The result was a situation where the solution to the problem of racism was not perceived as requiring change at the structural and institutional level but rather was simply a matter of dealing with the issue at the level of the individual, for example through race awareness training. The view at that time was that if racism could be eliminated from the actions of individual people then the rest would take care of itself.

By contrast, the McPherson Report was heralded as a watershed in the fight against racism and led eventually to the passing of new legislation in the form of the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000. The Act places a new duty on public bodies to ensure that all their existing and proposed policies, practices and procedures are audited and monitored to avoid institutionalised discrimination. This recognition of the possibility that institutional racism can exist outside of individual racist actions marks a major step forward, although some commentators remain critical of McPherson’s conceptualisation of institutional racism as something that remains grounded, in some way, in individual consciousness rather than existing outside of, and independent from, the individual response (Bourne 2002).

As well as the formulation of new legislation, the 1990s saw an increasing move away from the discourse of ‘equal opportunities’ and the development of a broader, ‘diversity’ agenda within the public, private and the voluntary sectors. Within the public and voluntary sectors the principles driving the change have been founded in concepts of human rights, fairness and equity, whereas increasingly there has been recognition within the private sector that a commitment to diversity adds to the efficiency, economic strength and profitability of the organisation that embraces it (Guardian newspaper 29 May 2002).

Black and minority ethnic communities within the UK, who have long been the victims of overt as well as institutionalised racism within the workplace and as recipients of services provided by public, voluntary and private sector organisations, are now able to benefit tangibly from the new policies, practices and procedures being implemented within those organisations. Public bodies such as local authorities, health authorities, prison and probation services, as well as being required to deliver on the requirements of the Race Relations (Amendment) Act will also be subjected to the scrutiny of the Commission for Racial Equality, who are given additional powers to enforce the new regime. Watchdog bodies such as the Audit Commission will also have an important role in producing progress reports such as the recently published ‘Equality and Diversity’ report (Audit Commission 2002). The new regulatory framework is far from being a panacea that eliminates all such discriminatory practices, but there is a degree of evidence from the actions taken by organisations to implement the requirements of the legislation that considerable steps have already been taken to address and remedy problems of institutionalised discrimination.

There is also evidence however that these processes, whilst developing equality of opportunity for elite members of Black and minority ethnic communities, leave many
sections of those same communities disenfranchised and socially excluded. The inability or unwillingness of the state to tackle structurally-embedded forms of discrimination was highlighted in the response of anti-racist campaigners to the recent Challenge Inquiry report on Race and Housing (National Housing Federation: 2001), who criticised the Inquiry for ignoring the key issue of segregation in housing and being seemingly more concerned with the issue of employment opportunities for Black housing professionals (Guardian newspaper 25 July 2001).

It is also apparent that, at the same time as some attempts are being made to dismantle the economic and social barriers that exist for Black and minority ethnic groups, other members of those same communities become excluded or marginalized as a result of the increasingly harsh asylum and immigration regimes being operated within the UK and throughout Europe. Sivanandan (2001: 3) notes the paradox whereby the state, in its avowedly liberal mode, is prepared to implement the McPherson recommendations whilst, in its self-justifying regulatory mode, it brings institutional racism back into the system through the Immigration and Asylum Act.

It is within this context of a clear determination on the part of the nation state to tackle individual racism, its rather ambivalent approach towards institutionalised racism and its failure to recognise or acknowledge the possibility of an embedded state racism that the impact of the ‘new migration’ needs to be considered.

One group of ‘new migrants’ that is particularly vulnerable to expressions of racism and other forms of exclusion and exploitation is the growing population of ‘irregular’ migrants in Western Europe. The closure of legal migration routes following the oil crisis of 1973 and the implementation of effective, and increasingly sophisticated, border control measures throughout Europe have resulted in a well-documented rise in the number of ‘illegal’ immigrants to Western Europe. By its very nature ‘illegal’ immigration is either clandestine or deceptive, so it is not possible to quantify with any accuracy the numbers of people entering Western Europe by irregular means. Jonas Widgren (1994) estimated, through a statistically dubious methodology, that between 100,000 and 220,000 migrants entered Europe illegally in 1993, and although the basis of his calculation is highly questionable¹ there has been no further plausible estimate that has challenged Widgren’s figure. Most researchers (e.g. Ghosh 1998, Morrison 2000, Koser 2000) seem to agree however that the figure has risen and is continuing to rise. Many of the ‘illegal’ immigrants place themselves into the hands of people smugglers and, as national governments raise the stakes by imposing more effective measures to try to prevent smuggling, the greater will be the propensity for would be migrants to fall under the control of large trafficking organisations. This makes the migrant particularly vulnerable to exploitation both in transit and within the destination country and the range of exploitative situations that may occur is well documented (e.g. Ghosh 1998, Morrison 1998, Koser 1997). Immigrants who have entered a country ‘illegally’ are in double jeopardy, both from the traffickers that exploit them and from the state that is unwilling to offer them protection against that exploitation. There is evidence from Germany for example that victims of traffickers were discouraged from bearing witness against their oppressors for fear of being revealed to the authorities and deported (Ruggiero 1997).

‘Illegal’ immigrants, working within the informal economy, could indeed be viewed as the new underclass conceptualised by Neo-Marxist theorists such as Sivanandan (1982) who saw the capitalist system being maintained by an underclass reserve of labour supplied by immigrant populations.

¹ Widgren’s figure is arrived at through a number of untested and untestable assumptions, including the percentage of migrants using the services of traffickers and the percentage of irregular migrants who are successful in escaping detection. The possible margins of error on either side of the assumed percentages are so wide as to render the calculation statistically meaningless.
‘Illegal’ immigrants, who are likely to find themselves employed within the informal economy devoid of the protection and the ‘equal opportunities’ offered by the state’s new diversity agenda, could be viewed as the new hidden underclass, that allows the free market capitalist system ostensibly to embrace new egalitarian values and norms. The emergence of new racist tendencies that have resulted in the recent rise of the far right in countries throughout Europe could well be fuelled by tensions between the ‘legitimate’ working class, who have long fought to achieve, and have begun to achieve, better pay and conditions of employment and those working within the informal sector who might be viewed as allowing that preciously gained ground to be cut away.

As well as the marginalized situation of the growing number of ‘illegal’ immigrants, those asylum seekers who have managed to enter the country legally (or who enter illegally but claim asylum on or soon after arrival) are also in a seriously disadvantaged situation. Denied access to employment, offered minimal support (or in some European countries no support), stigmatised by measures that preclude or militate against their integration into local communities, vilified by the media as ‘bogus’ or ‘illegal’ and subject to racist attacks, they are already victims of a de facto institutionalised racism. The recent report on Poverty and Asylum in the U.K., published jointly by the Refugee Council and Oxfam (Refugee Council: 2002) concludes that asylum seekers are suffering from poverty levels and hardships unacceptable in a civilised society and recommends independent scrutiny of asylum seeker support mechanisms by the Social Security Advisory Committee.

In conclusion, the processes of change described by Castles in 1993 as producing an increased salience of racism, appear equally relevant in 2002 although much of the responsibility can be laid at the feet of the state’s inability to identify and deal with those processes within the context of a clear and unambiguous anti-racist agenda. Failure or unwillingness to understand the global socio-political and economic imperatives that drive migration coupled with an obstinate determination to avoid examination of racisms that are embedded in state policies and practices have led to a situation where Western European governments appear to face in two directions simultaneously. At the individual and at the institutional level they ‘celebrate diversity’ and instigate measures to tackle racism, whilst at the state level they pursue policies that are inherently racist or which ignore the structural economic and social divisions that breed racist outcomes.

**Is the current discourse on multiculturalism and national identity driven by the ‘new’ minorities or by established immigrant communities?**

The last decade has seen the full emergence into the public arena of the debates about citizenship, multiculturalism and national identity that have been taking place, mainly in academic circles, for many years, led by influential social scientists such as T.H. Marshall and Max Weber.

Van Gunsteren (1998: 6) examines the changing role of the nation state in relation to some of the classical theoretical and conceptual ideas about citizenship. He argues that the status of the nation state is changing from that of the dominant form of political organisation to one form among many, citing external threats to the autonomous power of the nation state from supra-national public and private sector organisations, and internal threats from a powerful mass media, financial institutions and a consumption-led society. Van Gunsteren describes the classic varieties of citizenship theory (liberal, communitarian, republican) and stresses the need for nation states to ‘accept proliferating and unpredictable plurality and make it an ally.’ He offers an approach based on Neo-republican citizenship where the community of the state has a hegemonic role among a plurality of communities, and where state interference in the workings of those other communities is mediated and legitimised by citizens.

This breaking down of definitive boundaries produces what Van Gunsteren refers to as the ‘unknown’ society, as opposed to the ‘modern’ society which preceded it. Thus the characteristics of the unknown society include creolisation within a global structure
as opposed to a national unitary culture, 'lifestyle' politics replacing the politics of emancipation, diversity rather than equality, networks rather than hierarchy, and fleeting, multiple identities rather than fixed identities. In this context plurality has to be understood and accommodated at the individual level, since assignment of the individual to membership of a particular group may merely result in a different form of social exclusion.

Castles' 'Eleven Hypotheses' paper identifies the need for nation states to address issues of multiculturalism and national identity but he appears to predicate this need on the formation of new minorities resulting from the increasing diversity of migration flows. It is not clear whether he considers the necessity for nation states to re-examine their policies to be driven by this increasing diversity per se, or whether it simply makes the need for such re-examination even more pressing. To take the example of the United Kingdom, where the discourse around issues of multiculturalism has been thrown into sharp focus by a series of events throughout the past few years (successive changes to the asylum regime, the McPherson report of the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry, riots in a number of northern cities, the Parekh report on the future of multi-ethnic Britain commissioned by the Runnymede Trust, the earlier Runnymede Trust report on Islamophobia, the Challenge Report on Race and Housing, the current debate around faith schools etc), the arrival of new migrants from additional source countries (e.g. from Central and Eastern Europe) does not appear to have been a significant factor in stimulating debate on these matters. Rather the discourse appears to be driven by second and third generation members of established Black and minority ethnic communities, who are beginning to make their collective voices heard within national, regional and local political arenas. Not surprisingly, it is the mature and well-established Black and minority ethnic communities, who have developed significant national, regional and local support networks, and who have an understanding of, and an ability to access, socio-political systems of decision making, who appear to be leading the discourse. In doing so they are able to take full advantage of various supranational, national, regional and local policy agendas as well as significant funding regimes that are being implemented to demonstrate the commitment of the organs of state to social justice, inclusivity and diversity. Whilst some of the well-established Black and minority ethnic communities find themselves able to make significant advances through these developments, new immigrant communities appear to remain disadvantaged and excluded. Because of increasingly harsh and exclusive asylum and immigration regimes imposed within the UK and other Western European countries, recent arrivals (who are most likely to be asylum seekers or 'illegal' immigrants) are more concerned with the pragmatic issues around their asylum claim, or their ability to find employment within the informal economy than with engagement in debates on national identity, multiculturalism and citizenship.

These current debates do not come about (at least in Western Europe) because we have entered a new, more diverse, age of migration, but rather because of nation-states' previous failures fully to engage immigrant communities in the political, economic, cultural and social life of the state. Belated attempts to achieve such engagement, through diversity policies, community development agendas and regeneration programmes, have empowered the more established and mature immigrant communities to pose questions of the state which have not previously been considered other than by researchers and theorists. Castles' point that the increasing diversity of migration makes the need for governments to address issues of pluralism and national identity more pressing remains valid however, since although newer migrant communities may take longer to build the social capital to enable them to engage in the debate, it will only be a matter of time before they are in position to do so.

Nevertheless there is a sense in which the engagement of mature and well-established Black and minority ethnic communities with organs of the 'establishment' can produce its own forms of social exclusion. Government initiatives that seek to promote community cohesion through improving the
social and cultural mobility of established minority groupings may, paradoxically, merely widen the gulf between those immigrant groups who are able to access such programmes and a disenfranchised ‘underclass’ that remains isolated and unable to key in to such initiatives. It is likely that this includes ‘illegal’ immigrants working in the informal economy, newly arrived immigrants who do not have access to well established familial, social or community networks, those older people who are not fluent in English and who may find it difficult to access healthcare or to participate in the life of the community, and non-University educated young people who find it increasingly difficult to identify productive and secure career paths or to obtain adequate housing. It is notable in this context that the violent confrontations with the police in Oldham, Burnley and Bradford in the spring and summer of 2001 were not from members of new immigrant communities but rather second and third generation Asian youths reacting against the absence of opportunity for social mobility within their community. There appears to be a new polarisation within society between the new social and cultural mobility enjoyed by some privileged sections of the Black and minority ethnic communities and the situation of those who remain essentially disenfranchised and excluded from these changes. Marxist theorists would doubtless see this as an extension of the principle that capital requires there to be a reserve of available cheap labour, which in this case is provided by ‘illegal’ migrants working in the informal economy, by the continuing ‘casualisation’ of the labour force and by the lack of social mobility among the immigrant working classes.

There is also a view (see Kundnani 2001: 68) that the overtly multiculturalist approach pursued by successive UK governments over the years has simply been a device by which racial tensions arising from economic and power imbalances can be channelled and defused. Kundnani sees this as having given rise to ‘ethnic fiefdoms’ in which black communities were re-formed as a parallel society within the British class system, with their own internal class leadership, which could be relied on to maintain control. The result, in Kundnani’s view, was that different ethnic groups were placed in a position of competition with each other and that black communities thus became fragmented, horizontally by ethnicity, and vertically by class.

In conclusion it would appear that the discourse on multiculturalism, at least so far as the UK is concerned, is not one that is driven by the increasing diversity of migration but rather by the failure of the state to deal adequately with the underlying structural socio-political factors that give rise to manifestations of racism. The triggers that have changed the political nature of the discourse do not appear to relate to new immigrant communities but to occurrences involving mature minority ethnic communities. For example the recent shift away from an approach based on ‘multiculturalism’ towards a concept of ‘community cohesion’ would appear to spring directly from the Cantle report (2001), which in turn was brought about by the violent confrontations between mainly second and third generation Asian youths and the police during the early part of 2001. These events have also triggered the opening up of new debates around faith schools and about the disestablishment of the Church of England.

The question remains however as to whether the increasing diversity of migration will, in the longer term when the ‘new’ immigrant communities become confident and well-established, impact upon or make more complex or pressing the need to build democratic, multicultural societies. It could be posited that increased diversity within nation states will actually make it less likely that hegemonic domination by a single privileged group will persist and that this will assist the path towards a more democratic and multicultural society. Gundara and Jones (1992) point out that almost all of the 190 or so of the sovereign states in the world are already culturally and ethnically diverse. It could be therefore that the imperatives around multiculturalism, citizenship and the fight against racism are not driven by the increasing diversity of migration but by the polities, structures and mechanisms within societies that are already diverse in their composition.
To what extent have the ‘potential contradictions in anti-racist positions’ been examined over the past decade and are current political agendas contributing to the creation of ‘democratic, multicultural societies’?

In order to examine this issue it is necessary to consider what Castles may mean when he refers to ‘potential contradictions in anti-racist positions.’ Racism manifests itself in a variety of ways and each form of racism has its counterbalancing anti-racist position. Anti-racism exists because of, and is defined by, the existence of racism in one or other of its forms. Anti-racism and anti-racist positions can only therefore be understood in terms of their binary opposition to the various manifestations of racism, and by the specificities of those manifestations. Racism can be individual or collective, it can be elective or institutionalised, it can be active or passive, it can be covert or overt and it can be exclusionary or exploitative. The latter terms refer to the racism that excludes by expelling the ‘other’ from territory, or even from life, and the racism that exploits by inclusion and subjugation.

Racism that is individual, elective, active, overt and exclusionary is generally outwardly condemned by all groups and institutions, even those of the far right. For example, there are few individuals, groups or institutions that would seek to offer moral justification for a physical attack on an asylum hostel, although racist apologists might no doubt offer what they saw as plausible explanations as to why such events might occur and propose racist ‘solutions’ to the problem.

The more subtle forms of racism however, which are still endemic in western society, can be present and ingrained within polities which declare themselves to be anti-racist and which indeed do take some steps to demonstrate their commitment to anti-racist policies and values. Castles’ paper refers to the extent to which the urban working class has seen its economic and social conditions eroded, and how immigrants and new minorities have become the visible symbol of this erosion and the target for resentment. He refers to Balibar’s assertion (Balibar 1988) that racism is not a result of this crisis but simply one form of its expression. In such a situation can the racism be attributed only to the perpetrators of racist incidents or rather to the state’s inability or unwillingness to identify, acknowledge and tackle the racism-producing situation at a structural level? In this example the active racism of the perpetrators is brought about as a result of the passive racism of the state.

This is not perhaps so much a question of a contradiction in an anti-racist position as an ambivalence and unwillingness on the part of the state to recognise and tackle all the possible causes of various types and forms of racism. There appears to be a degree of political ‘blindness’ to some of the more subtle causes that lead to manifestations of racism. Bourne (2001) contends for example that whilst attempts are being made to tackle racism at the individual and the institutional levels, there is no recognition that the fight against institutional racism is part of the larger fight against state racism, which manifests itself in various ways including discriminatory stop and search procedures, deaths in custody and exclusion from schools. A further example is in asylum laws, where the closure of legal migration channels and the ever-stricter enforcement of nation state border controls results in increased illegal immigration and the increased vulnerability of migrants to exploitation. Part of this political ‘blindness’ is undoubtedly due to expediency in situations where inherent moral conflicts seem incapable of resolution – thus states may seek to impose human rights standards on other states while remaining prepared to sell them arms – but also due to the conflicts inherent in the diverse and often conflicting portfolios held, and strategic objectives pursued, by different departments within the same government. Just as it is an oversimplification to refer to any migrant community as if it were one homogeneous entity, it is also an oversimplification to regard the political aspirations of any nation state as resulting from a single ideological genitor. The various individuals, institutions, mechanisms and structures that, in combination, dictate and control the
governance of the nation state’ may be equally diverse and contradictory.

Bearing this caveat in mind, is there evidence that current political agendas are, at least, cognisant of these issues and therefore seeking to address these contradictions so as to tackle the hidden causes of racism? Sadly, such evidence as does exist would seem to point in the opposite direction – that national governments remain stubbornly determined not to allow the discourse on racism to leave the arena of the actions necessary to tackle overt, active racism at either the elective or the institutionalised level. The new UK Nationality, Asylum and Immigration Act for example contains provisions that will continue to deny asylum seekers access to employment, will remove asylum seekers’ children from mainstream education and do nothing to lessen the vulnerability of trafficked migrants. The recent Anglo-French discussions around closure of the Red Cross refugee camp at Sangatte were framed by politicians and the media in language that characterised the migrants as ‘bogus asylum seekers’ even though such a term seems by definition contradictory (is an unsuccessful job applicant a ‘bogus job seeker’?). The recent United Nations Protocols on Trafficking and Smuggling (United Nations 2000) do little to protect the human rights of those migrants who find themselves in an exploitative situation. Policy development and discussion at the European level has focused on control, enforcement and exclusion, rather than on human rights and measures to tackle institutionalised racism at the international level.

More recently the political discourse, following the violent confrontations between young Asians and the police in various northern towns including Oldham, Burnley and Bradford during the spring and summer of 2001, has moved away from multiculturalism and towards the concept of ‘community cohesion’. Kundnani (2001) sees this development as ‘the death of multiculturalism’ and draws parallels between the Cantle report (2001) on Community Cohesion and the UK Government’s proposals for an oath of allegiance and English language tests for immigrants seeking naturalisation (Home Office 2001). Other commentators (e.g. Fekete 2002) see ‘seismic shifts’ occurring within the political culture of Europe as a direct result of the events of September 11th. The political response throughout Europe has been to conflate immigration issues with the security risks posed by terrorism and to create a ‘culture of suspicion across Europe against foreigners, with Arabs, asylum seekers and those of Middle-Eastern appearance emerging as the new enemy aliens’ (Fekete 2002). This, according to Fekete, has led to a rise in Eurocentrism based on cultural chauvinism and cultural intolerance towards immigrant communities. She believes that a new popular racism has emerged based on the Huntingdon (1993) proposition of a potentially dangerous cultural clash between Islam and the West. In this scenario the old ideological ‘enemy’ of the West, Soviet Russia, is replaced by a new enemy in the form of Islamic fundamentalism.

In support of her case Fekete cites a number of cases, from Sweden, Austria, the Netherlands, France and Germany where extraditions and deportations have occurred in respect of people who had previously been receiving protection. In her view Governments are using hastily introduced terrorism laws to justify actions based on suspicion alone, and she refers to the EU working document issued in December 2001 that suggests that after September 11th the European Court of Human Rights may need to rule again on the ‘balance between the protection needs of the individual set off against the security interests of the state’.

Apart from the anecdotal cases cited by Fekete however there appears to be no evidence that the so-called ‘culture of suspicion’ against people of Middle Eastern appearance is impacting on the outcome of asylum procedures. In the first quarter of 2002 around 50% of asylum applications from Middle Eastern countries of origin were granted (either refugee status or exceptional leave to remain) compared with around 30% of applications overall. This figure is considerably up on 2001 when only around 23% of Middle Eastern
applicants were successful (Home Office 2002).

To conclude it would appear that over the past decade governments have not addressed the issue of ‘potential contradictions in anti-racist positions’ and that, far from current political agendas contributing to the creation of ‘democratic, multicultural societies’, there has been a move away from multiculturalism and towards a more assimilationist approach. Kundnani (2002) cites the example of faith schools, initially supported under the U.K. New Labour Government, on the basis that encouraging a Muslim identity in schools was likely to produce responsible respectable citizens. From the new perspective of ‘community cohesion’ however Muslim schools are viewed as dangerous breeding grounds for separatism. Kundnani’s perspective is that ‘multiculturalism’ has merely been used as a smoke-screen that has prevented deep-seated inequalities in society from being tackled – ‘not so much celebrating diversity as kissing and making up, reconciliation without remedial action’ – and he welcomes what he regards as the ‘death of multiculturalism’ in that it enables the left-wing critique of this approach to be revived. Timur (2000) also points out that a criticism of multiculturalism is that it has led to the definition of ethnicity purely in terms of culture and identity and is disassociated from the issues of discrimination which many societies face.

Despite these criticisms of multiculturalism, and concern about the possible negative repercussions of September 11th, the hope remains that, in the longer term, a climate will prevail in which the need to engage in a constructive political debate on issues of multiculturalism and citizenship within a globalised society will be recognised. Such a debate must not consign multiculturalism to the realms of cultural camouflage that seeks to disguise the root causes of discrimination in society but should be open to a constructive examination of the ‘potential contradictions in anti-racist positions’ to which Castles refers.

**Is there a need for further research that seeks to examine issues of ethnicity, national identity and citizenship in relation to new migration flows?**

The nature of the relationship between new patterns of migration and the changing role of the nation state in relation to alternative models of citizenship, the avoidance of social exclusion and the construction of democratic, multicultural societies would, however, seem to be a complex issue requiring further targeted research. It is not sufficient simply to conclude that the current discourses result from changes in the socio-economic and socio-political forces at work in Western society, rather than from the onset of a ‘new age’ of migration. Whilst there may not be a direct causal relationship there is quite clearly a connection between migration, as one factor, and the continuing metamorphosis of society as a result of a changing economic, social, cultural and political environment.

There would appear to be something of a research lacuna in seeking to establish these linkages in a robust and methodologically sound way. Thus, whilst there is much research conducted by geographers, demographers and statisticians of the flows, patterns, processes, types, geographies and volumes of migration over time, and a similarly large amount of research by sociologists, political scientists, philosophers and psychologists on issues of citizenship, ethnicity and identity, there seems to be a lack of studies that seek to link the two aspects together in a meaningful way. This is not to denigrate the work of those eminent academics whose work recognises the connections and who have written eloquently about the impact of migration processes on the identity of the migrants themselves – Papastergiadis (2000), Faist (2000), Rapport and Dawson (1998), Soysal (1994) not to mention Castles’ own body of work. However where such writing does exist it either appears to situate the discourse within a macro-perspective, based on the polities and institutions of nation states e.g. Soysal (1994), or at a micro-level examining the identities, perceptions and experiences of individual migrants or groups of migrants e.g. Rapport and Dawson (1998). There does not appear to be a substantive body of
research that directly seeks to examine identity and citizenship issues in relation to the empirical evidence of changes in migration flows and patterns. To take the example of the U.K. whilst there are data about changing trends in the numbers, types and sources of immigration, there does not seem to be any systematic attempt to track these through in order to examine whether and how these changes are played out in terms of the various current discourses on citizenship, ethnicity and identity.

Thus whilst at the micro level there is research as to the narratives, perceptions, needs and aspirations of individual migrants or groups of migrants, the citizenship, ethnicity and identity discourses at the macro level are situated within a framework that appears to regard immigrant communities as a homogeneous entity. It would be valuable, for example, to study the position of different types of immigrant group within the citizenship and identity discourse. Is there a difference, for example, between the position of long established, mature, minority community groups such as Pakistanis, and relatively recent arrivals such as eastern and central Europeans? Is there a difference in position between those who arrived as asylum seekers and subsequently obtained refugee status (or other form of protection) and those who obtained entry through other migration channels? How have the changes in successive migration regimes, and the resultant changes in flows and types of migration, impacted on the citizenship and identity discourse? Are there mechanisms through which ‘illegal’ immigrants seek to access democratic processes or does their irregular status exclude them totally? What are the perceptions and attitudes of established refugee groups towards ‘new’ asylum seekers?

These are but a few examples of the questions that might be examined within a research programme that sought to examine the relationship between trends and changes in migration patterns and the various discourses around nationality, identity, ethnicity and multiculturalism. There is however, a need to avoid such studies being conducted from a narrow, policy-driven perspective. Black (2001) has pointed out, in relation to refugee studies, that a policy-led approach, where research is commissioned by operational agencies with specific requirements for knowledge, can be of limited usefulness in wider application. This could be equally relevant to research that sought to examine the social policy outworking of new migration streams.

6. Conclusions

In this paper I have sought to place the theoretical and conceptual propositions put forward in Castles’ 1993 ‘eleven hypotheses’ paper within the context of more recent literature, trends and events in order to test their veracity and robustness. The over-arching conclusion that I would draw is that whilst there is clearly a growing diversity of world migration patterns as a result of national, supranational and global factors, these are the result of longer-term evolutionary trends rather than an indication of a fundamental paradigm shift. How, within individual nation states, specific migratory trends may impact on the discourses around multiculturalism, citizenship, racism and social exclusion remains an under-researched area. The effects of increasing diversity, caused by new sources of migration, on countries that are already diverse in their ethnic and cultural composition as a result of previous migrations (whatever model of citizenship the particular nation state seeks to impose) remain a matter for conjecture.

Within the U.K however there appears to be little evidence to suggest that new migrations from new source countries will be a key factor in bringing about any re-evaluation of the state’s approach to issues of multiculturalism and citizenship or of tackling the root causes of racism. Rather, I would suggest, it has been the failure of the U.K. and other western European countries to understand and to respond appropriately to the long-term causes and effects of previous migrations and the structurally-embedded nature of state racism, that has led to the current schisms in Western society.

The complacent approach of simply seeking to identify and tackle racism at the
individual and institutional level is not sufficient, since there are also structurally-embedded racisms that permeate Western society. To seek to tackle individual and institutional racism without acknowledging this factor is likely to perpetuate other forms of exclusion and exploitation and add to, rather than reduce, the salience of the overt racism of the far right.

Racism does not enjoy hegemony among forms of discrimination however, any more than does class, and it is necessary to examine the relationship between all forms of discrimination and social exclusion in order to bring about what Castles refers to as 'democratic, multicultural societies'.

To conclude I would offer the following set of propositions based on the format of Castles' eleven hypotheses but deriving from the foregoing analyses.

That the world is likely to see a continuation of past migration trends towards greater diversity and steadily increasing volumes of migration. As global economic, social, communication and political networks continue to expand so will the propensity for increased migration from those countries that are connected, or become connected, into such networks.

That where state policies seek to prevent migration or place increased prohibitions on conditions of entry or stay, so will their ability to draw practical and meaningful distinctions between an array of theoretical categories of migration become ever more problematic.

That increasing interdependence between sending and receiving areas as a result of globalisation, and the continuing decline in the primacy of the nation state, will provide the context for future increases in migration. Programmes aimed at preventing or reducing migration by assisting development within source countries are unlikely to succeed in their objective.

That state policies aimed at prohibiting, or greatly inhibiting, migration will continue to increase the propensity for ‘illegal’ migrations. As nation states raise the stakes by developing more sophisticated means of preventing smuggling, so migrants will be driven increasingly into the hands of larger international trafficking organisations.

That state policies towards new migrants need to be reconciled with the declared values and objectives of the state in respect of issues of citizenship, equality, diversity and human rights. It will not be possible satisfactorily to address and resolve issues such as the integration of minorities into social and political institutions until this conflict has been resolved.

That the current discourses around citizenship, ethnicity, identity and multiculturalism do not come about as a result of recent immigrations from new sources but rather are an expression of the state's previous failures to understand the nature, impact and effects of earlier migrations. There is a need for the discourses to be inclusive of all parts of the community if feelings of resentment between different minority ethnic groups are not to be provoked.

That racism in Western Europe operates in several arenas and takes many forms, at individual, institutional and state levels. Partial attempts to tackle racism that do not recognise and embrace all these levels and which are not inclusive of all parts of the community are likely to lead to resentment among the victims of racism as well as fuelling further hostility from racist elements within society.

That in order to tackle discrimination/exclusion in all its manifestations it is not sufficient to rely on theoretical and conceptual explanations of the causes of discrimination/exclusion, but to combine these with a pragmatic and empirical approach that seeks to identify and overcome the barriers that exist within specific places at specific times. That in view of the multifaceted links between the world economy, migratory processes, minority formation and social change, research in this area can no longer be monodisciplinary and national in focus. There is a particular need to examine the linkages between migration trends, minority formation and issues of identity and citizenship at the micro, macro and meso
levels so better to understand the nature of those relationships.

Generally these propositions are consistent with Castles’ eleven hypotheses but with amendments based on the analyses set out in this paper. However it remains unproven that changes in the flows, patterns and diversity of migration are significant in shaping the challenges that Western countries face in order to develop ‘multicultural, democratic societies’ and to tackle the causes and effects of racism.
Bibliography


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Appendix 1

Box 1  Castles’ first set of five hypotheses dealing with global migration movements

1. The world is entering a new phase of mass population movements in which migration to Europe and the situation of ethnic minorities in Europe can be fully understood only in a global context.

2. Previous distinctions between types of migrations are becoming increasingly meaningless. This is undermining government policies.

3. The growing disparities between economic, social and demographic conditions in south and north (and east and west) provide the context for future mass migrations.

4. Economic, social and demographic disparities alone do not cause migration. Rather, the movements are an expression of the interdependence between sending and receiving areas within the political economy of the world market. Once movements start, they often lead to chains of migration, which continue even when the initial causes or policies have changed.

5. The new types of migration correspond with the restructuring of the economies and labour markets of the developed countries in the last twenty years.
Appendix 2

Box 2 – Castles second set of hypotheses dealing with the response of nation states to the ‘new migration and how this translates into issues of multiculturalism, citizenship and the salience of racism

6. State policies towards migrants and minorities have become increasingly complex and contradictory, as governments have sought to address a variety of irreconcilable goals, such as:

- provision of labour supplies
- differentiation and control of migrant workers
- immigration control and repatriation
- management of urban problems
- reduction of welfare expenditure
- maintenance of public order
- integration of minorities into social and political institutions
- construction of national identity and maintenance of the nation state

7. Racism in western Europe has two sets of causes. The first concerns ideologies and practices going back to the construction of nation states and to colonialism. The second set derives from current processes of social, economic and political change. The increased salience of racism and the shift in its targets over the last twenty years reflects the rapid pace of change in living and working conditions, the dissolution of the cultural forms and organisational structures of the working class, and the weakness and ambivalence of the state.

8. The constitution of new minorities, with distinct cultures, identities and institutions, is an irreversible process, which questions existing notions of national identity and citizenship.

9. Western European countries of immigration are being forced to examine the relationship between ethnic diversity, national identity and citizenship. Multicultural models appear to offer the best solution, but there are substantial obstacles to their realisation.

10. In view of the multifaceted links between the world economy, migratory processes, minority formation and social change, research in this area can no longer be monodisciplinary and national in focus. There is a need for a multidisciplinary and international social science of migration and multicultural societies, combining elements of political economy, sociology, political science, law, demography, anthropology and related disciplines.

11. The increasing volume and changing character of migration, together with the emergence of ethnically heterogeneous societies in Europe makes a re-examination of political positions essential. We need to redefine the meaning of ‘international solidarity’ with regard to migration policies and the north-south divide, to examine potential contradictions in anti-racist positions, and to work out political agendas which can lead to democratic, multicultural societies.