The new Commission under the Lisbon Treaty

By Prof Alan Mayhew
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The new European Commission was finally voted into office by the European Parliament on 9th Feb 2010. This Commission, which will serve for the next five years, is of course the first to work under the new Lisbon Treaty. It therefore faces a period during which the institutional complexities of the new Treaty will only gradually be resolved.

The Commission is one of the three major players in the battle for influence in this new institutional architecture. In the new world of Lisbon, the Commission faces a strengthened European Parliament, a new institution - the European Council with its longer term President, an EU Council with its foreign affairs powers confirmed by the Treaty and a High Representative who is responsible to the Council while being Vice President of the Commission itself.

There is little doubt that the powers of the European Parliament have been significantly increased by the Lisbon Treaty. The extension of co-decision to many more areas of policy, the abolition of the distinction between compulsory and non-compulsory expenditure in the annual budget and its consent power on the financial framework, will allow the Parliament to exert pressure on both the Council and the Commission to extend its powers even further.

The Parliament has already achieved a success against the Commission President in forcing the resignation of the proposed Bulgarian Commissioner. It is using every possible weapon to exert influence on the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS), the new foreign service, on which it must be consulted. This continual probing to increase its authority will continue throughout the life of this Commission.

The European Council has become an EU institution for the first time under Lisbon. Its semi-permanent President Mr. Van Rompuy is quietly building up his position, hampered no doubt by his need to rely on the Council’s Secretary General for resources beyond his cabinet. The President will obviously compete with the President of the Commission and the High Representative as spokesman for the Union on foreign affairs issues.

The Treaty states that the European Council will define ‘the general guidelines for the common foreign and security policy’ (CFSP), shall

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Activities

‘frame the CFSP’ and that ‘the CFSP shall be put into effect by the High Representative and by the member states, using national and Union resources’. Here in article 26 of the Treaty, there is no room for either the Commission or the Parliament.

CFSP remains then in the hands of the member states in the Council, is subject to unanimity even when the Treaty apparently introduces QMV and the Commission has a rather minor role to play.

In fact there has to be a unanimous decision in the European Council before QMV can be used in the Council.

It is true that the High Representative chairs the Foreign Affairs Council and has a certain right of initiative, but this is exercised subject to agreement by the member states.

In article 27 of the Lisbon Treaty, the High Representative is clearly in day-to-day charge of the CFSP. She will be responsible for the new EEAS, the organisation of which will be decided by the Council on a proposal from the High Representative. However trade, enlargement and development assistance, the main tools of EU foreign policy, clearly remain the responsibility of the Commission, in which the High Representative coordinates foreign policy as a Vice President.

The EEAS, according to the Treaty, assists the High Representative and works in cooperation with member state diplomatic services. It has personnel from the member states, the Council Secretariat and the Commission. The EEAS will be an extremely powerful instrument of EU policy combining the main country desks in the External Relations directorate general and the delegations throughout the world. This could easily amount to a service of around 2500 people.

It is quite obvious that the member states will wish to place their officials in senior positions in the Union delegations. These delegations have up to now been exclusively governed by the Commission. In the future it is not clear to whom the delegations will report. Theoretically they should report to the High Representative in the Council on CFSP issues and to the High Representative in the Commission (or to responsible Commissioners) on trade, enlargement neighbourhood and development issues.

At the time of writing, Brussels is convulsed by this institutional infighting. The Commission tries to win the support of the Parliament in its fight to defend its role in external relations. The Parliament plays its own game to win competence, control the Commission and reduce the power of the Council.

At the same time, major world issues receive less attention than they should and the Union’s citizens are being badly served by their institutions. In addition to these institutional issues there are the personal rivalries between the key players, notably the President of the European Council, the President of the Commission, the High Representative and senior figures in the Parliament.

“The time of writing, Brussels is convulsed by this institutional infighting.”

The Lisbon Treaty has not at all simplified these institutional issues, just the reverse. It will take many more months for the new system to settle down and bring the advantages of better coordination, which the Union promised its citizens. The Commission will not lose its influence because it controls the key tools of foreign policy, trade and foreign assistance, and relations with our neighbouring countries. However it plays a dangerous game if it attempts to marginalise the member states in foreign policy.

The challenges for this Commission should rather lie in domestic policy, where obvious challenges are economic growth and reform of the Monetary Union, strengthening the internal market after the strains of the economic crisis, fixing financial regulation, ensuring inter-connection and solidarity amongst member states in the energy field, pushing ahead with the climate change agenda and preparing a new financial framework. It is on these issues that the second Barroso Commission will be judged, not on whether it is Mr von Rompuy, Ms Ashton or President Barroso who shakes Mr Medvedev’s hand on that red carpet in the Kremlin or says ‘hi’ to Mr Obama in Washington.
Features Section: Political parties in the 21st century

The Features section of this edition of *euroscope* has a special theme and presents articles discussing research currently being done at the SEI on political parties and what they’re doing in the 21st century. It includes articles on the UK Conservatives, discussing their renewal and gender representation, change in Communist parties, minority nationalist parties and europarties (see pages 11-16).
Message from the Co-Director...

By Prof Aleks Szczerbiak
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This theme of this term's issue of Euros-cope is 'Political parties in the twenty-first century'. Political parties are frequently alleged to be in 'decline' in the established democracies, while struggling to institutionalise themselves in new ones. They are confronted by expressions of popular dissatisfaction with the processes and institutions of representative democracy, at both national and supranational levels. Election turnout is falling, experiments with direct democracy increasing and there is a widespread perception of a 'democratic deficit' within the EU. Yet it remains impossible to conceive of politics operating in advanced industrial democracies without these vital mechanisms of democratic linkage.

Expertise on parties and elections

Research on party and electoral politics is one of SEI's most important specialisms and core strengths. It is no exaggeration to say that SEI encompasses one of (if not the) largest collections of scholars working on these themes of any academic institution. That expertise is reflected in the contributions to this issue of Euroscope which includes feature articles by SEI-linked faculty, doctoral researchers and visitors on subjects as diverse as: renewal and gender representation in the British Conservative party, changes in Western communist parties, minority nationalist parties and European integration, and the future of the Europarties.

As you can see on page 30, SEI recently published working papers on the Scottish National Party's changing attitude towards the EU and the rise of populist parties in contemporary Dutch politics. Our summer term research seminar series (see page 10) also includes paper presentations on the topics of: populism, state party funding, and the party politics of corruption. And the SEI-based European Parties Elections and Referendums Network (EPERN), which I co-convene with my Sussex colleague Paul Taggart, continues to go from strength publishing briefing papers on the (non-) impact of Europe on the most recent Serbian, Norwegian and Ukrainian elections (see pages 28-29); the latter by SEI Visiting Fellow Nat Copsey, who has also an article on the Ukrainian presidential election in the 'Dispatches' section on pages 42-43.

Change of government in Britain?

As this issue of Euroscope goes to print, the UK news is, of course, dominated by the forthcoming British general election, scheduled for Thursday May 6. Although the election is a closely fought one, and the outcome remains uncertain, indications are that we are likely to see the end of thirteen years of Labour rule in Britain and a new Conservative-led administration emerging. SEI will be quick off the mark with scholarly analysis of election results, and particularly the implications of a change of government for both the UK and the EU, with a special round table discussion scheduled for Tuesday May 11 (see page 10).

Although Europe is extremely unlikely to emerge as an issue in this election, a change of government will mean a significant re-shaping of Britain's relations with the EU. The Conservative party is committed to passing legislation that would ensure that any treaty transferring powers from Britain to the EU must go to a referendum and that 'ratchet clauses' in the Lisbon treaty permitting further transfers of powers without new treaties can only be invoked with parliamentary approval. A Conservative government is also likely to seek more opt-outs from EU legislation.

To explore these, and other, issues, the SEI round table will be led by two of the leading academic specialists on British party politics, Tim Bale and Paul
Webb, SEI-based scholars who are outstandingly well placed to comment on the election. Tim Bale has just published an extremely timely and highly praised book on *The Conservative Party from Thatcher to Cameron* which provides the first definitive account of the fall and rise of the ‘new Tories’ (see page 11). Paul Webb is author of, among other things, a major research monograph on *The Modern British Party System* and is currently working on an ESRC-funded project on ‘Gender and the Conservative Party’, the findings of which he outlines on pages 12-13 of this issue of Euroscope.

Our expertise on the British Conservative party reflects the fact that SEI is now one of the leading centres of academic research on British politics and, apart from parties and elections, has particularly strong expertise in the fields of: representative politics, public policy (particularly migration and energy), and citizenship.

Thanks and welcome

Last but not least, I would like to take this opportunity to thank outgoing Euroscope co-editor Dan Keith for all his hard work over the last four years. Apart from being an outstanding young scholar, Dan has helped to raise the profile of Euroscope and transform it into an extremely effective communication and marketing tool. At the time of writing Dan is on the cusp of submitting his doctoral thesis on organisational and programmatic change in West European communist parties and will be presenting his findings at an SEI seminar on May 15. Dan, you have my sincerest thanks and all our very best wishes in your future academic career.

I am also delighted to welcome Kim Brayson, who is joining the Euroscope editorial team to work alongside Amy Busby. (Amy is taking a short ‘sabbatical’ in May as she embarks on a six-month internship in the European Parliament.) Although enrolled as doctoral researcher at Queen Mary University London, Kim works as an Associate Tutor in the Sussex Law Department and has strong links with SEI having previously worked as a Research Fellow on the JURISTAS project (see pages 18-19) in 2008-9. Since last autumn, SEI has been based in the new Sussex School of Law, Politics and Sociology. Kim joining the editorial team provides us with an excellent opportunity to further develop the strong links that we already have with Sussex-based lawyers working on contemporary Europe; such as Prof Sue Millns, a report on whose professorial lecture you can read on pages 35-36. Welcome aboard Kim!

Prof Aleks Szczerbiak
Co-Director
Sussex European Institute

Post-script - at the time that this issue of Euroscope was going to print I learned of the awful news of the death of Polish President Lech Kaczyński, his wife Maria and 94 others, including many senior Polish leaders, in an air crash at Smolensk in Russia on April 10. On behalf of the SEI, which has always enjoyed exceptionally strong links with Poland (as many of you will know, I am from a Polish family myself), I would like to express our deepest sympathies to the people of Poland, and especially to the family and friends of those who died in this terrible tragedy.
The SEI Diary provides snippets on the many exciting and memorable activities connected to teaching, research and presenting on contemporary Europe that members of the SEI have been involved in during Spring 2010.

**January: Arrivals**

**January: New editor**

Euroscope has welcomed a new editor for this spring edition; **Kim Brayson**.

I will just say a few words by way of introduction. My connection with Sussex dates back to 2008 when I worked as Research Fellow on the JURIS-TRAS project with Prof Susan Millns.

I am now an Associate Tutor in the Law Department here. I am simultaneously enrolled as a PhD candidate at Queen Mary University of London working on the rights of Muslim women in the context of the European Convention on Human Rights. I am very excited about becoming part of the Euroscope team, I hope it fosters more interdisciplinarity between Politics and Law. Many thanks to Amy for handing over in such a welcoming, professional manner!

**January: SEI welcomes Chevening fellows in European political economy**

SEI welcomed its 5th cohort of Chevening Fellows. This innovative FCO-funded programme is designed to give a group of mid-career high flyers from EU candidate and new member states an opportunity to study and engage British and other European policy makers and practitioners on the EU’s economic agenda. This year there were 14 Fellows from Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Turkey and Ukraine working in: the media; central bank; agencies responsible for economic analysis, state aid, technical services, banking and exchange, national security and defence; together with the European affairs and economy ministries. Last year SEI won the competition for the re-tender to run the programme for another two or three years (see page 31).

**January: Publication**

Aleks Szczerbiak, Tim Bale and Sean Hanley’s (SSEES/UCL) co-authored paper “May Contain Nuts? The reality behind the rhetoric surrounding the British Conservatives New Group in the European Parliament” was published in the Political Quarterly.

**January: Boxes, boxes, boxes**

The SEI staff and researchers are now settled in their new temporary home in the Friston building for the foreseeable future.

**January: Research**

Dr Sergio Catignani has been carrying out a new research project on Turkey and NATO in the Spring term.

**January: Winter Graduation**

Last years MACES and MAEP students attended the winter graduation ceremony to collect their
certificates.

January: Co-director becomes academician
The Academy of Social Sciences has conferred Prof Jim Rollo with the award of Academician. He was nominated by UACES for his research contribution to European studies, editorship of the JCMS and contribution to the 2008 RAE process. Prof Rollo said; “I must say that I would not have received this honour but for my good fortune to have come to SEI and the University of Sussex in 1999 after more or less 30 years as a practitioner in Whitehall. I cannot think of any other academic environment in the UK that would have allowed a long time practitioner to convert himself to a reasonable simulacrum of a career academic and to enjoy such a varied and intellectually exciting ten years.” Michael Shackleton, a distinguished SEI Practitioner Fellow, also received this honour this year.

19th January: SEI RiP
Dr Eiko Thielemann (LSE) gave a research in progress seminar entitled “Fortress Europe? Does European Co-operation Undermine Global Human Rights Standards?”

20th January: Security Lecture
The Sussex New Security Challenges lectures hosted NATO’s Director of Policy Planning, Jamie Shea.

22nd-24th January: USMUN
The Sussex Model UN Society held their 4th annual debating and diplomacy weekend conference which allows students from universities from across the UK to practice public speaking skills on an array of UN committees (see www.usmun.eu).

26th January: SEI Roundtable
The SEI held a roundtable discussion with staff and students on the ‘Challenges facing the new European Commission’, chaired by its own Profs Jorg Monar and Alan Mayhew. (See feature article on pages 1-2)

28th January: Question Time with Shami Chakrabarti
Shami Chakrabarti has been Director of the human rights organisation Liberty since 2003. She joined Liberty as In-House Counsel on the eve of September 11th 2001 and quickly became involved with Liberty’s engagement with the ‘War on Terror’ and with the defence and promotion of human rights values in Parliament, the Courts and wider society. At Sussex, she talked about the work of Liberty, the cases and campaigns in which it has been involved and its current efforts to secure civil liberties in Britain today. The event was a lively and informative discussion with many students asking questions.

February: Presentations

February: Regulation
Dr Lucia Quaglia attended the meeting of the network on ‘Institutional Change in the Regulation of Financial Markets’, organised by the Max Planck Institute in Cologne, where she spoke about the EU regulatory response to the global financial crisis.

February: SEI hosts new EP Research Network
Amy Busby and Ariadna Ripoll Servent launched the European Parliament Qualitative Researcher (EPQR) Network. The webpage aims to promote and collate research using methods which come under the broad banner of qualitative research,
March: Publications

Dr Nat Copsey (SEI Visiting Fellow) published “Public Opinion and the Making of Foreign Policy in the ‘New Europe’: A Comparative Study of Poland and Ukraine” (Ashgate, 2009). The book is the first comparative study of the impact of public opinion on the making of foreign policy in two eastern European states that live on either side of the new European divide: Poland and Ukraine. It draws on results of both opinion polls and a series of innovative focus groups gathered since the Orange Revolution. The book takes a closer look at the business community and how important economic factors are in forming public opinion (also see page 42).

March: Travelling lecturer

In March, Dr Lucia Quaglia attended a Conferences at the College of Europe, Bruges and also the European Consortium of Political Research joint session workshop, University of Muenster, where she presented the paper ‘The Old and New Politics of the EU: The Role of National Narratives’.
of Financial Services Regulation in the European Union’. She also gave a seminar at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute on this topic. She has also published her research in a monograph titled; *Governing Financial Services in the European Union*, Routledge, London. (2010)

**2nd March: SEI RiP**

Tim Judah, from The Economist, gave a well attended presentation on ‘The Yugosphere: What is it? Could it be good news from the former Yugoslavia?’

**4th March: Keynote lecture**

Prof Paul Taggart gave a keynote lecture on 'Political Parties in Europe and Europe in Political Parties' at the Annual Graduate Conference on Political Parties Sciences Po, Paris.

**5th March: Viva success**

SEI doctoral student Lyubka Savkova passed her viva successfully, on ‘The Nature of the European Debate in Bulgaria’. Lyubka was supervised by Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak.

**9th March: Democracy**

Prof Richard Rose (University of Aberdeen) gave a research in progress seminar on ‘Representing Europeans: Democratically, Virtually and Otherwise’.

**22nd March: Citizenship**

Dr Sue Collard gave a paper at the UACES conference on 'Communicating European Citizenship' at Lancaster House called: 'Lifestyle Migrants or European Citizens: Communicating European Citizenship to British Residents in France', ([http://www.uaces.org/pdf/papers/1002/Collard.pdf](http://www.uaces.org/pdf/papers/1002/Collard.pdf)). She has also had an article in the JCES called ‘French Municipal Democracy: Cradle of European Citizenship?’ which looks at political participation of non-French EU citizens in local elections since the application of the Treaty of Maastricht, as well as being on duty at a polling station in France during the regional elections.

**22nd March: Award**

Dr Anna Sydorak-Tomczyk has been nominated for the prestigious UACES best PhD thesis award. Anna, who was supervised by Dr Peter Holmes and Dr Lucia Quaglia, was awarded her thesis on ‘The EU and International Cooperation on Competition Policy: Public Interest or Public Choice?’ in December 2009.

**29th March-1st April: PSA Conference**

Dr Tim Bale organised a roundtable at the PSA on the next Conservative government and Europe, co-sponsored by the specialist group on Conservatives and Conservatism, PSA and UACES. Jonathan Isaby (ConservativeHome) gave a presentation on feeling on the issue in the grassroots and new parliamentary party, Robert Hazell, (Director, the Constitution Unit) cast a doubtful eye on their plans for more referendums, repatriation of powers and the British Bill of Rights, Mats Persson, (Director, Open Europe) suggested what they could, should and would do, and John Peet, (Europe Editor, the Economist), suggested to him that there was a good deal of unrest in EU capitals at the prospect of a Conservative government.

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**April: Migration**

**April: Chevenings**

Dr James Hampshire led a delegation of 12 Chevening Fellows on the Managing Migration programme for a study visit to Brussels where they met with Jean-Louis de Brouwer at DG JLS, Claude Moraes (MEP), the UK Permanent Representation, as well as UNHCR and ECRE.

**9-10th April: Migration**

Dr James Hampshire chaired a meeting for the Migration to Europe in the Digital Age (MEDIa) project at Koc University, in Istanbul. It brought partners from the six countries involved to discuss the 4 pilot studies they’ve conducted at Sussex and agreed upon a research design for the full proposal which is due 30 April.
Activities

Forthcoming Events:

11th May: Election Roundtable!
The SEI will hold a post UK General Election Roundtable to discuss the implications of a change in government for the UK and the EU - all are welcome to attend.

3-10 July 2010: Summer School
The Centre for Public Policy (CPVP) will hold the European Summer Institute 2010 on the Future of Europe: Lobbying in Brussels in Prague. It is a seven-day academic program designed to bring together 30 undergraduate and graduate students of various nationalities and academic backgrounds to deepen their knowledge of the current EU politics through exchange of ideas with academics, policy practitioners and fellow students from different cultural environments (see http://esi.cpvp.cz and apply by 30th April).

October 2010: ‘Our rights - Our Freedoms’ competition
To celebrate the 60th anniversary of the European Convention on Human Rights, the Council of Europe and ELSA International are launching a competition for law students in Europe. It has a writing and artistic section designed to appraise the history and performance of the European Convention and Court of HRs. Participants must submit an essay, assessing achievements and shortcomings of the Strasbourg legal system, or a photo reportage showing the HR Convention’s impact on European citizens’ day-to-day lives. It was launched at the International Council Meeting of ELSA in Malta (21-28 March) and the award ceremony will take place in Strasbourg in October (see ourrightsofourfreedoms.org).

Politics Society Facebook Group:

SEI Research in Progress Seminars
SUMMER TERM 2010
Tuesdays 16.00 - 17.50
Arts A71

27.04.10
Analysing the effects of institutional reform in Britain
Dr Ben Seyd (University of Kent)

04.05.10
Different faces, same logic: explaining the electoral performance of populist parties in the Netherlands and Poland
Stijn van Kessel (University of Sussex)

11.05.10
SEI round table on ‘The implications of a change of UK government for Britain and the EU’
Prof Paul Webb & Dr Tim Bale (University of Sussex)

18.05.10
State party funding in Poland, 1993-2009
Monika Bil (University of Sussex)

25.05.10
SEI study visit to Brussels

01.06.10
The Party Politics of Corruption Reform
Dr Dan Hough (University of Sussex)

08.06.10
European citizenship through participation in local elections: the case of France
Dr Sue Collard (University of Sussex)

15.06.10
Organisational and programmatic change in Western European (post-)Communist Parties: lessons on party transformation and importing theory from Central and Eastern Europe
Dan Keith (University of Sussex)

Everyone is welcome to attend!
To be included in our mailing list for seminars, please contact Amanda Sims, email: polces.office@sussex.ac.uk
Dr Tim Bale’s book charts the fall and rise of ‘new Tories’

A book by the SEI-based scholar Dr Tim Bale on the British Conservative party has attracted a fair amount of attention since its launch at the end of January.

'The Conservative Party from Thatcher to Cameron' is published by Polity Press and is based on interviews with some of the key players in Tory politics during the past two decades. It aims to provide the first definitive account of the years between the departure of one of Britain's most iconic leaders and the man who may well be the next Conservative Prime Minister.

At the heart of Tim's book are two questions. First, why did it take a party renowned historically for its appetite for power so long to do what was necessary to put it within touching distance of electoral victory? Second, how and why, after nearly ten years of time wasted, was David Cameron able to come in and finally make the Party do what it needed to do, namely to project the message that it had listened, that it had made mistakes, that it was moving back to the centre ground and into the twenty-first century, and that it recognised the need to balance competence and caring? According to Tim Bale, the answer may not be simple but it is intelligible, and depends on us approaching politics as an interaction between ideas, institutions and interests.

Judging by media mentions so far, (see http://www.amazon.co.uk/Conservative-Party-Thatcher-Cameron/dp/0745648576) - Tim seems to have succeeded in writing something that is academically rigorous but also very approachable, and at times even amusing. Anyone interested in British politics, in political parties more generally, or in Europe, which of course has played a big part in the Conservative Party’s problems in the last two decades, should find the book a profitable but also an enjoyable read.

To formally launch the book Tim gave a public lecture entitled 'From Doldrums to Downing Street?' at the LSE. You can catch a podcast of the lecture here: http://richmedia.lse.ac.uk/publiclecturesandevents/20100203_1830_doldrumsToDowningStreetTheConservativePartysLongJourneyFromOppositionToTheBrinkOfOffice.mp3 and for more about the book, research process and elections, see the following link: http://www.sussex.ac.uk/newsandevents/?id=3077
Can Conservatives be feminists? Does it matter for the Tories’ electoral prospects that they have only a handful of women MPs?

If they actively seek to promote the selection of more women candidates will it sow the seeds of disharmony within the party? And do they need to embrace a manifesto of ‘women’s issues’ as part of their agenda for government in order to attract greater electoral support from female voters? These and related questions are the focus of research that I have been conducting since 2007 with Professor Sarah Childs from the University of Bristol, drawing on a mixture of quantitative (survey) and qualitative (focus groups, elite interview and documentary analysis) methods.

The feminization of British politics over the last decade or so has so far been largely party-specific—women have constituted no less than 23% of the post-1997 Parliamentary Labour Party, compared to 9% of the Conservatives and 16% of the Liberal Democrats. Yet consider David Cameron’s leadership acceptance speech in the autumn of 2005: just two minutes into this, Cameron announced that he would act to ‘change the scandalous under-representation of women in the Conservative party’. Since then he has introduced several phases of reform to the party’s parliamentary selection procedures in an effort to rectify the perceived anomaly. As a result, current projections suggest that the number of Conservative women MPs will more than double at the election of 2010.

With the data-gathering phase of our work almost complete, the analysis is underway and initial findings suggest a number of interesting results. For instance, our survey shows that women party members show a significantly greater sympathy for progressive-feminist positions than men, especially on issues of equal pay, childcare rights and abortion. However, Tory males generally share the view that the party should have more women in the Commons. While members are broadly accepting of the main steps that Cameron has taken to achieve this, such as the special ‘Priority List’ of approved candidates (which includes a higher than usual number of women, BME and disabled people) and the occasional use of ‘open primaries’, they are reluctant to embrace more radical measures such as quotas of women in seats where Tory prospects are good; this would be seen as ‘political correctness’ and fundamentally anti-meritocratic. Multivariate analysis reveals that the more left-wing, feminist or post-materialist an individual is, the more inclined he or she will be to support gender-related reforms, regardless of age or sex. At the aggregate level, Conservative women are a little more likely to adopt (comparatively) feminist and leftist attitudes, but not be more post-materialist or libertarian.

All of this notwithstanding, few party members regard gender-related issues as likely to be salient at the election which, at the time of writing, is close upon us; the economy, asylum and immigration, and law and order are rated as the three most frequently mentioned key issues for our respondents. But this is very likely beside the point, for gender issues have rarely been electorally salient in the UK. David Cameron has almost certainly not made a point of insisting on more Conservative women in the Commons because he believes that this is an issue which will bear directly on the voting considerations of electors in 2010. More probably, it is a question of ‘de-contaminating’ the image of a party which had come to seem so disconnected from the mainstream of society and politics in the country that...
the majority of voters refused to take it seriously. Only when the electorate as a whole is able to see the party as once again in tune with contemporary Britain will it be able to take the substantive policy appeals of the Conservatives seriously. This is how the feminization strategy might help deliver electoral success to the Conservatives.

Such a strategy sits quite well with the 'One Nation' and socially liberal elements of the Conservative Party, though perhaps less well with the more traditionalist and Thatcherite groups. To win the consent (tacit rather than explicit) of his own party on some of these reforms, David Cameron will therefore rely on mobilizing the more progressive elements of the 'One Nation Tories' and liberal Conservatives. It is worth observing, however, that if there is potential for conflict within the party after the election it is far more likely to emerge over questions of political economy than on matters of gender politics.

At the time of writing, the opinion polls are uncertain about whether or not the Conservatives can win an overall majority, but they still seem destined to be the largest party in the Commons and therefore to have a good chance of at least forming a minority government. If this happens, they will undoubtedly have to assume responsibility for a major programme of financial deficit-reduction that will entail extensive cuts to public expenditure and services. Our survey of party members shows that, although the government would most likely enjoy the support of a majority of its grassroots adherents for such action, there could well be disquiet among the very sizeable contingent of One Nation Tories.

“current projections suggest that the number of Conservative women MPs will more than double at the election of 2010.”

These supporters constitute nearly two-fifths of the membership. Demographically, they are a more female and working class as a group than the Thatcherites or Liberal conservatives, and they are far less well-disposed to the prospect of cutting public expenditure or taxation. Members of Parliament cannot easily ignore the views of their local constituency members, and one can therefore see the potential for internal Conservative Party opposition to the inevitable pain of deficit-reduction. For those with long enough memories, this calls to mind the notorious conflicts between Tory 'Wets' and economically liberal 'Dries' under Margaret Thatcher's government of the early 1980s.

(ESRC Grant RES-062-23-0647)

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West European Communist parties (WECPs) had long struggled as the 'enemy within'.

They faced internal crises triggered by events such as the crushing of the Prague Spring and most encountered numerous electoral defeats and organisational decline during the 1980s. The revolutions in East Central Europe in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union appeared to put the final nail in their coffin.

Political scientists paid little attention to WECPs and their post-Communist successor parties after 1989. However, they often remained significant players in their party systems and sometimes reformed themselves to become parties of government. It is puzzling that WECPs and their post-Communist successor parties took remarkably diverse programmatic directions. Some stubbornly resisted abandoning Stalinism. Others tried to reform it along less dogmatic lines, sought expansion by embracing mainstream social democracy or took up non-Communist radical left identities that coupled socialism with environmentalism and feminism.
My doctoral research, funded by the Economic and Social Research Council, seeks to shed light on the reasons why WECPs adapted so differently. To do this it draws on ideas from Anna Grzymała-Busse’s study ‘Redeeming the Communist Past’ (2002). This explained why only some East Central European Communist parties managed to reform their programmes and to break with Communism after the revolutions in 1989. Grzymała-Busse found that such changes rested on two organisational factors – parties’ elite advancement practices and their leaders’ organisational strategies.

The research found that the prior experiences available to WECPs’ leaders shaped their ability to transform their parties just like in East Central Europe. Some WECPs including the Portuguese Communist Party had restrictive elite advancement practices that promoted obedient functionaries with little experience in working with other political groups or institutions and who failed to carry out reforms. They had been employed in the highly orthodox party apparatus before they could enter professions outside the party bubble. This limited their exposure to new ideas and jobs that involved practical decision making or promoted pragmatism.

In contrast, parties including the Communist Party of the Netherlands and the Swedish Left Party advanced leaders who had encountered pressures for ideological moderation through working with other political organisations, social movements and public institutions. Elected officials were also more represented in their national leadership bodies. These leaders encountered pressures for moderation and saw opportunities to exchange radicalism for increased influence. Their leaders’ prior experiences gave them a plethora of ideas for reforms and which contributed in no small part to their diverse programmatic directions.

Most significantly, my research found that WECPs promoted students at their peril. Young academic upstarts regularly led calls for reform and breaking with Communism. However, unlike in East Central Europe, reformist party leaders were more likely to seek reforms aimed at broader appeal and breaking with Communism rather than social democratisation.

The second part of my research looked to party leaders’ organisational strategies. It found that some WECPs like the Portuguese Communist Party had hard-line leaders who resisted implementing reforms following the revolutions of 1989. They used their powers under the authoritarian, Leninist organisational structures of democratic centralism to crush and expel reformers while packing party congresses with obedient hacks.

Parties that successfully reformed themselves and broke with Communism in East Central Europe had done so by replacing democratic centralism with new highly centralised organisational structures. Ironically, a lack of internal democracy and debate enabled their leaders to control policy making and to force through painful reforms required to re-position their parties for democratic competition. In comparison, when parties democratised this empowered an army of orthodox Communists in the rank and file to block reforms. Grzymała-Busse also found that leaders that had made earlier reforms saw the need to centralise after encountering internal opposition.

My research found that organisational centralisation could offer WECPs a route to social democratisation programmatic reforms. For example the leaders of the Dutch Socialist Party used this to change their party like a chameleon and sacrificed old commitments with little opportunity for debate and resistance. However, similar programmatic reforms also occurred in WECPs that democratised like the Swedish Left Party. Other leaders shifted power to their parties’ elected officials rather than the central leadership to promote reforms.

The research found that WECPs’ leaders’ experiences in making earlier reforms also acted to encourage them to transform their parties’ programmes by democratising rather than centralising, unlike in East Central Europe. It shows that political scientists seeking to gain a fresh perspective for studying West European parties should take a second look at theoretical frameworks developed in East Central Europe.
Reflections about the role of minority nationalist parties as political ‘ethnic entrepreneurs’ in the contemporary age.

By Valeria Tarditi
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According to cosmopolitanism, contemporary processes of globalization and supranational integration would have caused the ‘end of the territories’ [Badie 1995] through the overcoming of the traditional nation-state and of cultural particularisms, in favour of the diffusion of global culture and economy. Consequently, every form of territorial and nationalist claims would have disappeared. In reality, in recent decades, territory and relative collective territorial identities not only have not disappeared, but have also acquired more relevance in the political life of European states. In fact, one of the opposite and interconnected tendencies to global forces, has been the return to the local dimension.

An important role in the revitalization of territorial identities has been covered by minority nationalist parties, which have been described by Tursan as the main political ‘ethnic entrepreneurs’ [Tursan 1998 in De Winter and Tursan 1998]. Effectively many of these parties have a long history, but many of them are also the product of more recent political processes. They play the fundamental function of articulation of the nationalist narrative, contributing to reinforcing the collective identities at the base of the territorial communities which they politically represent. Some specific features distinguish minority nationalist parties from the other parties: a sub-national territorial border, an exclusive group identity and, above all, the ‘demand for political reorganization of the national power structures, or for some kind of self-government’ [De Winter and Tursan 1998: 5-6].

These parties are usually described as niche or peripheral parties and are categorized as expressions of new politics, along with the Greens and extreme-right parties. In reality, almost all minority nationalist parties have representation in three institutional levels: the regional, state and European level. Furthermore, many of them, recently, have assumed relevant positions in the regional or state contexts, becoming, in some cases, parties of government. In this regard, scientific debate is now orienting towards understanding how minority nationalist parties pragmatically modify and expand their political agendas in relation to the change of their political statuses in different institutional contexts [Elias 2009]. Certainly, many minority nationalist parties have, in some cases, moderated their territorial requests or have challenged their political competitors about non-territorial issues, in order to expand their electoral support. Finally, acquiring mainstream positions, they have to face new challenges, deriving from the necessity to respond to more general problems, not linked only to the particular interests of their specific electorate.

However, in this context, I would like to reflect more generally on the relevant role that minority nationalist parties have had and still have in introducing or reinforcing the territorial and nationalist question in the contemporary age, characterized by integrative global dynamics and by the apparent weakness of traditional ideological categories. It is through the political mobilization and the discursive ‘reconstruction’ of preexisting or invented territorial and local identities that these parties, particularly in recent decades, have grown electorally, influencing always more, the political contexts in which they act.


The Europarties after Lisbon

The transnational parties (TNP) or ‘Europarties’ of the EU are among its lesser-known institutions. Confined largely to a role within the European Parliament (EP), the TNP are seen by some Europhiles as a positive force in the process of European integration. More sceptical critics, including some academics, see them as mainly irrelevant. Most observers would probably agree that the development of the TNP has always been determined by the evolution of the EU’s institutions and that latterly such development has been stalled. With the final approval of the Lisbon treaty, it seems therefore a good time to examine how far the institutional changes embodied in the treaty might help or hinder the forward march of the TNP.

The nature of the TNP

We should start by recalling that these parties were formed in a very different way from the various types of national parties that grew up in modern democracies. All such parties, from communists across to conservatives, have their origin in the socio-economic development of their respective nation states. The TNP were only formed in a second phase of party building, as national parties (NP) of all families were forced to embark on some kind of transnational collaboration, either to seize new opportunities for influence or because rivals were doing the same thing. This led to the various party Internationals before 1939, and since then, in response to the rise of European integration, the formation of party groups (by family, not nationality) in the various assemblies of the EC/EU down to the present EP. The growing power of the EP led the NP of all families to set up first confederations of parties, then federations, then finally TNP that actually bore the name ‘party’. At the same time the EP groups continued to exist, as strongly as ever. Thus we have the following line-up of transnational forces after the election of the current EP in 2009:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party family</th>
<th>TNP</th>
<th>EP group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Christian-Democrat / Conservative</td>
<td>European People’s Party (EPP)</td>
<td>EPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democrats</td>
<td>Party of European Socialists(PES)</td>
<td>S&amp;D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberals</td>
<td>European Liberals Democrats and Reformers (ELDR)</td>
<td>ALDE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>European Green Party (EGP)</td>
<td>Greens &amp; EFA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regionalists</td>
<td>European Free Alliance / Democratic Party of the Peoples of Europe (EFA/DPPE)</td>
<td>Greens &amp; EFA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ex-communists / left socialists</td>
<td>Party of the European Left</td>
<td>GUE (United European Left)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eurosceptics</td>
<td>EU Democrats</td>
<td>European Conservatives and Reformers (ECR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Europe of Freedoms and Democracy (EFD)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All the party families have their EP group, then, though some of them (Eurosceptics) have not bothered to create a TNP. This might give a hint as to the relationship of TNP to the NP that are their ‘parents’.

NP and TNP

This relationship has a number of features, all of which attest to the congenital weakness of the TNP. TNP are always top-down creations; NP only ever set them up to discharge limited functions. They have no intention of ever becoming subordinate to these creations; in this they resemble national governments within the EU, who, as Moravcik argues, only ever cede sovereignty on a limited, piecemeal and hopefully recoverable basis. This applies to all the families, even those like the Christian Democrats and Greens, who talk about
transnationalism more readily. NP have always been passive and reactive in the face of changes brought about by others (governments); they have shown no entrepreneurial spirit whatsoever in their sponsoring of TNPs. As a result, the latter can usefully be understood in Principal/Agent theory as weak agents in thrall to powerful, albeit multiple, principals.

These principals only want the TNP to discharge limited functions – information-sharing, debate, enabling elite and leadership contacts, and giving a certain legitimacy or credibility to members duly admitted to the club. Party Internationals have long done this, but today’s TNP have additional roles within the EP and within (and slightly beyond) the wider EU.

In the EP, the groups (not coterminous with the TNP) have amassed 50 years of legislative expertise. They have gained hugely in coherence, and their internal differences can be brokered as well as any that exist within an NP. They are well financed and staffed (the bigger ones would have 8 or 10 times the staff of their corresponding TNP). Indeed until the regulation of 2004 which first set the TNP on a legal and community-financed footing, the groups had to carry the TNP in terms of finance, expertise, premises and sometimes staff. Staffers in the groups tend to regard the TNPs as Johnny-come-latelys and wonder what purpose they serve.

Outside the EP, the TNPs have come more into their own, especially with the vast process of party-building which went on in the states of Eastern and Central Europe (ECE), as, following the collapse of communism, numerous states prepared their candidacies for EU membership. The TNP helped with mergers between small parties, weeding out dubious ones and training cadres in running modern democratic parties. This largely successful effort is probably their best achievement. Yet it is the groups who do the EP work, and while the TNP co-ordinate the increasingly important summits of NP leaders prior to EU meetings, this is still not a huge role. Especially when we remember that the TNPs do not pick candidates for EP elections, have no real individual members to mobilise, cannot impose a common line on any issue or nominate candidates for top EU posts. All these functions continue to be discharged by national governments and the NP who form them.

“Looking at the TNP bonsai, the sceptic might think: very pretty, but what are they for?”

Lisbon and after
Will Lisbon improve this weak position of the TNPs? It seems unlikely. The big innovations (stable presidency and foreign policy suprema) were heavily intergovernmental in their logic; the appointments and their conduct so far confirm this impression. It is true that many see the increasing amount of QMV as a move towards further integration. But in practice it means that governments will just have to work harder cobbling together varying majorities on ad hoc issues; there seems no obvious role for the TNP here.

Other provisions include greater power for national parliaments to get involved in the EU legislative process. But such opportunities existed already, and when they have been used (not that much) the TNP have been bystanders. Similarly, the increased budgetary powers of the EP are as likely to see national governments putting increased pressure on their delegations of MEPs to follow a national line as they are to make use of the TNP.

All in all, it seems that Lisbon offers the TNP little new. They still have party building work to do in the Balkans, and their summits to organise, but within the EP the groups seem set to retain their dominance. Sceptical observers might conclude that the overall balance sheet of the TNP is slight. Using the para-medical vocabulary beloved of Panebianco, we might describe them as weak offspring of powerful parents, condemned to remain weak and manipulated forever, because of their genetic code. A more appropriate analogy might be drawn from horticulture. We are familiar with the bonsai trees of Japan, which present all the features of adult plants while being contained in a small space from which no escape is possible. Looking at the TNP bonsai, the sceptic might think: very pretty, but what are they for?
On-Going Research

This section presents updates on the array of research on contemporary Europe that is currently being carried out at the SEI by faculty and doctoral students.

Report on the JURISTRAS Project

By Dr Gabe Swain
SEI-linked Research Fellow

The JURISTRAS project, which began in 2006 with a grant from the EU Sixth Framework Programme, analysed the relationships between the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and nine Council of Europe member states (Austria, Bulgaria, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Romania, Turkey, and the United Kingdom).

The initial aim of JURISTRAS was to examine violations of Articles 8-11 & 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights (the Convention), as those were considered to best represent the core civil liberties valued in the European community. Articles 8-11 & 14 are, respectively: right to private and family life; freedom of thought, conscience and religion; freedom of expression; freedom of association; freedom from discrimination. Those nine states were selected as case studies because they have generated the largest number of judgments under those five articles. The Universities of Sussex and Kent were chosen to represent the UK team.

The margin of appreciation doctrine of the ECtHR gives states flexibility in their interpretation of the Convention. States also have the freedom to decide how they implement judgments finding violations against them. This means that individuals in each Council of Europe (CoE) member state experience rights protection and abuse in often quite different ways. JURISTRAS has sought to shed light on that variation by analyzing the various relationships between the ECtHR and domestic human rights actors (both governmental and non) in CoE member states.

After completing a number of work projects – which included country case studies, state of the art reports, comparative reports, and national and EU policy recommendations – the nine partners met in Strasbourg in June 2009 for a final meeting and conference with governmental representatives from the nine states. The three-day event concluded with a discussion of a forthcoming volume to be published by the University of Pennsylvania Press.

This final volume analyses patterns of ECtHR judgment implementation by the nine countries in question. The UK research produced some interesting results. Perhaps most interesting is the extent to which various groups are (or are not) successful in winning cases, which factors contribute to that success, and which groups are likely to see violations translated into policy reforms that favour their group’s interests, and why.

There is a substantial variation in the answers to those questions, and to highlight the difference and help explain the reasons behind it, the UK team’s contribution to the final volume looks first at cases brought against the UK by homosexuals and transsexuals, two groups which have managed to use the Court to change discriminatory policies that directly affect them. Focus then shifts to vic-
tims of wrongful death and illegal imprisonment in Northern Ireland as an example of a group that has been relatively unsuccessful at utilizing the Court to their advantage. Homosexuals have a substantial history of successfully bringing cases against the UK. Our research suggests that high levels of organization and the extent to which they were able to mobilize support from civil society made the success of the homosexual and transsexual communities in the ECtHR possible.

A number of cases brought by homosexuals and transsexuals have been supported by various human rights organisations and this seems to have been quite influential in their success before the Court. Indeed, many of those cases produced ECtHR judgments that initiated changes in policies deemed discriminatory by the Court, and while many organisations are active in supporting applicants to the Court, UK’s Liberty is by far the most active. For example, in 2002 Liberty submitted third party interventions on behalf of applicants in two cases (I v. UK and Christine Goodwin v. UK) brought by post-gender reassignment surgery transsexuals arguing that the UK’s refusal to issue them with identification documents acknowledging their new gender violated their right to private and family life. Liberty’s support helped them succeed in persuading the Court that the UK was in violation of Article 8. In response to these violations the British government introduced the Gender Recognition Act 2004, which allows post-operative transsexuals the right to be recognised as their new gender on official documents.

While a number of factors come to influence, to a greater or lesser extent, the likelihood of an applicant’s success before the Court, as well as the manner in which violation judgments are executed in individual cases, there will always be unexpected variables that affect these outcomes.”

We then compared the relative success before the ECtHR of the homosexual and transsexual communities with the less successful experience of victims of illegal imprisonment and wrongful death in Northern Ireland, a group who often won their cases but did not see similar proactive action from the UK government. In 1996, the case of John Murray v. UK involved an applicant claiming that he was denied access to a solicitor while being detained for involvement in IRA activities. The case was supported by an array of NGOs, including Amnesty International, JUSTICE, Liberty, British Irish Rights Watch, and the Committee on the Administration of Justice. This abundance of organizational support helped the applicant win a violation judgment, yet 14 years on, the case remains unimplemented by the UK government. In other words, the government is yet to enact legislative changes that satisfy the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers (the body responsible for supervising the execution of the Court’s judgments). This case does not stand alone. A number of similar cases whose applicants were successful in Strasbourg are still waiting for their judgments to be fully implemented by the UK.

It quickly became apparent that while organizational support undoubtedly gives applicants an advantage and quite often contributes to the Court finding a state in violation, it cannot be expected to have such an impact on the implementation measures a state adopts in response to those judgments. Political sensitivity plays a substantial role in determining a government’s dedication to resolving violation judgments, as is now the case with the outstanding cases regarding security forces in Northern Ireland.

While a number of factors come to influence, to a greater or lesser extent, the likelihood of an applicant’s success before the Court, as well as the manner in which violation judgments are executed in individual cases, there will always be unexpected variables that affect these outcomes. Nevertheless, the importance of organizational support of ECtHR applicants should be highlighted, for it has repeatedly contributed to the success of applicants in cases brought against the UK. Indeed, the UK has the highest number of human rights organizations active in supporting cases in the ECtHR, and prospective applicants would do well to employ their services when considering applying to the Court.
One of the lesser publicised effects of Lisbon should be to give a greater role to the regions in EU decision-making: their competences must be taken into account in any new EU legislation, and any legislative proposal must now be accompanied by an analysis of its financial and administrative impact on regions and municipalities. The Committee of the Regions (CoR) will now be able to challenge new EU laws in the ECJ if it believes that they violate subsidiarity, and it will have a stronger consultative role vis-a-vis the Commission, Council and Parliament. Lisbon also enshrines for the first time the idea of ‘territorial cohesion’ as a fundamental objective of the EU, and recognizes local and regional autonomy. Thus the French politician, Michel Delebarre, a former CoR president, has claimed it is ‘no longer a paper tiger’.

It was against this wider European context that the French regional elections took place in two rounds on March 14\textsuperscript{th} & 21\textsuperscript{st}. These elections were of obvious political interest in that they represented a mid-term test for the popularity of the Fillon government and Sarkozy’s presidency. The results were pretty much as predicted: the parties of the Left, with 54.3\% of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} round vote (in alliance with Europe Ecologie), retained leadership over 21 of the 22 regions in metropolitan France, and although it lost 2 of the 4 overseas regions (Guyana and Reunion Island) to the Right and failed to take Alsace, it gained Corsica, albeit with the help of the nationalists. So while PS leader Martine Aubry didn’t quite get the ‘grand slam’ she was hoping for, and was personally snubbed by the resounding victory of the dissident socialist leader of Languedoc Roussillon, the Right (36.1\% overall on the 2\textsuperscript{nd} round), had to recognize a major sanction from the electorate, only about half of which actually bothered to vote (46.4\% on 1\textsuperscript{st} round and 51\% on 2\textsuperscript{nd}). In some Paris suburbs the abstention rate was over 70\%, confirming the ‘crisis’ of democracy in France.

But analysis of the number of actual seats won (based on a semi-proportional system) rather than vote share, (EluNet.org) shows a more nuanced picture: the big winners of this election are clearly the ecologists, and main losers the Front de Gauche (communist and other left of left parties), and the MoDem, the centrist party created by François Bayrou to fight the 2007 presidential election, which has been more or less wiped out, getting through to the 2\textsuperscript{nd} round in only one region. The National Front has also lost 38 seats, having gone through to the 2\textsuperscript{nd} round in only 12 regions as opposed to 17 in 2004. Whilst the presidential majority has in fact gained 39 seats, Sarkozy’s party the UMP has lost 15, and the others have been won by those that joined the presidential alliance for the first round (centrists, and various others including the hunting party).

However hard the PM had tried to argue during the campaign that ‘regional elections’ would only have ‘regional significance’ the results were in fact impossible to ignore: immediate repercussions were the ‘postponement’ (sine die) of the much resented carbon tax (taxing CO\textsubscript{2} emissions) till adopted at EU level, and the sacking of Employment Minister Xavier Darcos, but Sarkozy announced after the first cabinet meeting that he would not fundamentally change direction in the reform process which he had pledged to undertake as president in order to break the sense of ‘immobilism’ in France. This means he will be ploughing on with a controversial set of bills that will affect the nature of the regions themselves, known as the reform of the ‘territorial collectivities’. The first bill will merge the roles and functions of regional and ‘departmental’ councillors (départements are roughly equivalent to English counties), into ‘territorial councillors’ from 2014 onwards, and therefore the councils just elected will only serve for four years instead of six. The proposed system of electing the new ‘territorial councils’ is causing particular criticism, and the bill has been attacked from the Left as representing a covert ‘recentralisation’. The bills are in for a rough ride through the two chambers of Parliament, though it is quite obvious to any outside observer that the complex system of overlapping
local authorities that has grown up with the process of decentralisation is wasteful, costly and inefficient, and is in need of considerable rationalisation. But there is a tension between the perceived need to develop the fairly recently created regions in order to compete within the European framework, and the affective and entrenched attachments to the departments and communes that are the traditional backbone of the French Republic. This is a reform which will seriously test Sarkozy's ability to carry through his ambitions, but if he succeeds, local governance in France could soon be undergoing some significant changes.

Voting rights for expats

By Dr Sue Collard

The upcoming British election has revived a smouldering fire of discontent amongst British expats, with regard to their UK voting rights. In a general election, this is dependent on their having been previously registered in their last constituency, and elapses after 15 years residence abroad. Ex-pats cannot vote in local, mayoral, Scottish Parliament, Welsh National Assembly or London Assembly elections (http://www.aboutmyvote.co.uk/). There is some compensation for this - British residents in France can of course invoke their rights as EU citizens and register to vote in their place of residence in European and local French elections. But this does not placate the small but vociferous minority of ex-pats who claim to have been disenfranchised, because they left the UK more than 15 years ago.

The blogosphere is currently buzzing with indignant and angry Brits who feel they should be able to maintain some kind of representation in the UK, and an application for judicial review of the relevant British law has just been lodged by lawyers for a British man living in Madrid, who is arguing that he is being penalised for exercising his fundamental right to move freely between European countries, and that Britain is thus infringing the guarantees of the European treaties, upheld by the ECJ.

Against this background there have been increasing calls for Britain to emulate a proposal by French President Nicolas Sarkozy, currently being taken through Parliament, to give French overseas voters direct representation in the National Assembly, through députés des Français de l’Etranger. There will be 11 new constituencies created specifically for overseas voters, one of which will include the UK, Ireland and the Scandinavian and Baltic states. Given the fact that the number of French citizens registered in the UK (107,914 in 2007) far surpasses those in all the other countries put together, it is not surprising the British media have been reporting that this will mean ‘an MP for Britain’. These new députés, who will be elected for the first time in 2012, will complement the existing system of representation for overseas voters, who currently elect members of the Assemblée des Français de l’Etranger (http://www.assemblee-afe.fr/), which in turn elects 12 specific overseas members of the Senate. French ex-pats also retain, without time restrictions, their right to vote by proxy in all elections in France, including local, presidential elections and referendums, they can choose to cast their vote in the embassy or consulate of their country of residence. France’s long republican tradition of encouraging the participation of ex-pats thus makes for a strong contrast with the British approach, though Denmark and Ireland have even more restrictive policies. Others such as Austria, Belgium, Spain and the Netherlands give unrestricted voting rights to their ex-pats, and Spain, Italy and Portugal provide theirs with representative bodies similar to the French. If the legal argument is won by the British man in Madrid, perhaps this would open the path to a ‘European policy on Europeans resident outside their country of origin’, as called for in the Paris Declaration of the Assemblée des Français de l’Etranger during the French Presidency of the EU in September 2008. This would involve persuading all member-states to allow their nationals to continue to vote in the national elections of their country, regardless of their place of residence, and without time restrictions: a challenging prospect, but one which could give new meaning to the concept and practice of European citizenship in the 21st century.
DPhil Research Outline Presentations

On the 3rd February, the SEI’s new DPhil students presented their research outlines to staff and fellow researchers in order to get some feedback and advice and as part of their first year formal assessment. Their projects are described below:

Amy Busby
“The Isle of Europe: an ethnography exploring norms, organisational culture and socialisation at the European Parliament”
alb40@sussex.ac.uk

This interdisciplinary project takes an anthropological approach to the European Parliament to explore everyday political processes there. Starting from New Institutionalist assumptions, it aims to understand how the EP political groups shape the experience and influence the behaviour of MEPs. It responds to recent findings that the Groups are becoming more cohesive, but there remains little research on them as organisations and how they operate within the institution and co-ordinate members at the everyday level. Taking an organisational anthropology approach, it uses ethnographic methods to explore internal processes such as organisational culture, norms and socialisation and how they affect MEPs’ experiences through a case-study of ALDE, a key political player in the EP who has as yet received little academic attention.

Firstly organisational analysis will assess the formal institutional environment in which the actors operate, examining relevant rules and structures. I will also carry out participant observation via a 6-month internship with an ALDE MEP to observe backstage political group processes, as well as a program of elite interviews to allow MEPs to discuss their experiences of socialisation and the role of groups. The project contributes to a growing body of qualitative research done at the EP, which enhances understanding of the institution’s internal processes as it becomes an increasing important actor in the EU policy process.

Peter Simmons
“Spreading Democracy from Europe: Explaining EU Democracy Promotion”
petersimmons@gmail.com

This project is a comparative study of EU democracy promotion looking at both EU and domestic level factors. Three empirical case studies will be investigated: Croatia, Ukraine and Poland. It is not only accession to the EU to be investigated, but also how the EU seeks to safeguard democracy among existing member states. With the EU facing a far more challenging task than previously, and with attention focused elsewhere in the world, there is a real danger of the neighbouring region being neglected with potentially serious implications for EU foreign policy and the lives of people. The EU is aiming for a more co-ordinated and coherent approach to its democracy promotion activities, and I am aiming at a synthesis of these different activities in order to answer the question ‘under what conditions and through which mechanisms does EU democracy promotion work most effectively?’

I also intend to investigate: (1) The different policy instruments that the EU has developed for democracy promotion and how they are being applied and evaluated, (2) How the political elites in the case study countries respond, or do not respond, to EU democracy promotion, (3) What ways actors within civil society use EU democracy promotion as a lever to further their domestic political goals.
Marko Stojic
“The attitudes of political parties in Serbia and Croatia towards the European Union”
M.Stojic@sussex.ac.uk

This study examines the positions of the national, parliamentary political parties in Serbia and Croatia towards the EU and European integration from 2000 to 2010. The thesis aims to offer a plausible explanation of why and how parties adopt and change certain stances and what the decisive factors that determine the formation of their attitudes are. It also intends to explore the role of political parties in the national preferences formation towards the EU, as well as in the process of Serbian and Croatian integration with the EU. By looking at the under-researched and peculiar cases of two former Yugoslav republics, this study aims to draw a general conclusion on how contemporary political parties in Europe form and alter attitudes to the EU.

The study preliminarily draws on five factors that may influence partisan responses to Europe: party ideology and identity, party strategy and tactics, party position within a party system, relation with electoral constituency and social-economic groups, and transnational and bilateral party linkage. The thesis will argue that the stances of political parties towards the EU in both countries are primarily the result of a unique context and historic experience in the last two decades, particularly in the case of Eurosceptic political parties.

Taking off: The Area of Freedom Security and Justice

By Ariadna Ripoll Servent
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After a difficult inception and ratification process, the Treaty of Lisbon saw the light on 1 December 2009. The new Treaty introduces considerable modifications for the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ), which will need to reconfigure itself under the new provisions.

In terms of substance, the Treaty does not introduce many new competences but it does widen the scope of existing ones, (such as asylum) and it streamlines some other policy issues such as data protection previously divided between the first and third pillar. The treaty also introduces some major institutional changes which overhaul the governance structure of the AFSJ. First of all, it eliminates, at least formally, the pillar structure, ‘communitarising’ the old policy area dealing with police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. Most AFSJ issues will now be dealt with under the ordinary legislative procedure, namely co-decision, with the EP and QMV in the Council. However some matters will remain outside the community method. Family law will still be ruled by consultation with the EP and unanimity in the Council. Other issues such as maintenance of law and order, internal security cooperation and coordination among national security authorities, passports and other identification documents will continue to have an intergovernmental character or be outside the EU framework.

The Treaty also foresees the possibility that a group of member states initiates legislation in certain matters. These exemptions from the rule, together with other AFSJ particularities, such as the British, Irish and Danish opt-outs, will maintain an element of exceptionality in the area. Despite these limitations, the AFSJ will certainly become more transparent, easier to understand and with a higher degree of protection due to the extended role of the European Court of Justice, always welcomed in such sensitive issues.
The treaty has entered into force alongside the Stockholm programme, a multi-annual working programme setting the priorities for the AFSJ for the next five years. A follow-up to the Tampere and The Hague programme, it sets out the policy priorities of the EU, both in terms of general principles and specific operational instruments. In this sense, it does not introduce substantial changes to the policy area, although there is a bigger emphasis on the external side of the AFSJ, but it develops and complements the previous programme, by stressing for instance the importance of implementation and evaluation of past measures.

In this new institutional and policy framework, the EP will need to develop some strategies to reaffirm its prerogatives. Given the past performance of the EP, it will probably try to increase its power and be more active in new areas. What opportunities do the Treaty of Lisbon and the Stockholm programme offer to the EP? Institutionally, the EP has several chances to continue its fight for full involvement in EU decision-making. Three options are available: First, the most obvious possibility is for the EP to continue insisting on the full extension of the ordinary legislative procedure to those areas still covered by consultation and unanimity. Second, the EP can use the new provisions regarding the control of subsidiarity by national parliaments. The early-warning mechanism foreseen in the treaty is easier to invoke in the AFSJ. In this area, only a quarter of national parliaments are needed to stop a proposal and force the Commission to issue a new text. For any other issue, the number of national parliaments necessary to stop an act raises to one third. Therefore, the lower number of negative opinions related to subsidiarity might make it easier for the EP or some of its groups to mobilise national parliamentarians in order to oppose a proposal, especially in an area where national sensitivities are still at stake. However, the control by national parliaments has not raised a lot of enthusiasm in Brussels. Most actors involved in decision-making think that national parliaments generally lack expertise and they have doubts about their capacity to coordinate and react in the short time foreseen by the treaty.

Finally, the most promising change is the new consent (previously assent) procedure. The EP has now the possibility to decide whether it supports or not any agreement signed by the EU, thus giving it a say in external affairs. The witholding of its consent on the TFTP case (known as SWIFT agreement), shows the willingness of the EP to participate and be fully involved in the negotiation of international agreements. This is probably the starting point of a long inter-institutional battle in the quest for more powers in external relations.

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In policy terms, the new perspectives offered to the EP by the Stockholm programme are important for the future developments of the AFSJ. Although the programme does not make any U-turn in the policy area, it does introduce a fault line between EU citizens and non-EU citizens that was not there before. Thus, the emphasis put on fundamental rights in the programme is spelt essentially in relation to EU citizens. This difference is especially important for the EP, whose members can use this nuance to strengthen the long cherished issue of data protection, since it affects mostly EU citizens. They can also use this new framework to emphasise other issues such as criminal and civil law. The consequence is thus that in other areas such as asylum or immigration where the beneficiaries are not EU citizens, the emphasis on fundamental rights and high human rights standards might be given less importance.

All in all, what the Lisbon treaty unveils is a most dynamic and crucial policy area, still in very rapid development that merits our full attention in the years to come.
By Jamie Wallis Barnes  
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I am currently completing the MSc in Comparative and Cross-Cultural Research Methods in preparation to commence a three year DPhil in Anthropology at Sussex. The focus of my research will be a relational network of Christian communities located within southeast Europe.

Over the last twelve years I have played a significant role in the formation of this relational network and so, to some extent, will be practising a type of ‘anthropology at home’ within Europe.

The themes that are of particular interest to me are ‘perceptions’ and ‘transition’. I wish to explore the ways in which individuals kinetically re-model their internal ontological and epistemological maps, thereby transforming the ways in which they perceive, inhabit and reshape their social landscape. I am particularly interested in exploring these processes through the emergence of new spiritual communities within a Balkan context.

Over the last twelve years our spiritual group, based in Thessaloniki, has witnessed flows of migratory movement within the region, and has engaged with families and individuals involved within these flows. We have observed influxes of immigrants from a variety of Balkan and post-Soviet countries, and often seen the subsequent outflow of these same people as they have returned to their ‘homelands’. Very often these movements, in which individuals are forced to grapple with new economic, political and social realities, are linked with processes entailing renegotiations of selfhood and identity. Sometimes, within these dynamics, strong regional, ethnic and national differences are actually reinforced. At other times, individuals open up to other ways of ‘being’ and ‘seeing’ in the world.

Southeast Europe

Much research within southeast Europe has focussed upon nationalist movements which, by their very nature, are defined by strong boundaries. I wish to focus upon the antithesis of this phenomenon. I am interested, through observing the emergence of particular types of spiritual communities, in exploring the ways in which linguistic, cultural and religious borders are often traversed and how conceptions of communities with ‘permeable boundaries’ are embodied in practice.

In order to do this my field site itself will cross national boundaries. A contemporary snapshot of the relational network which is the focus of this study would reveal particularly strong connections between communities in northern Greece, Albania and Bulgaria. In fieldwork, I aim to position myself primarily between the first two countries, examining the ways in which linked communities are involved in concomitant processes of transition. I am thus interested in exploring a ‘world in motion’, where committed relationships across borders are perceived as containing dynamic forces for change.

I anticipate commencing fieldwork in January 2011. In the meantime, the completion of the MSc remains a priority and part of a number of key processes in preparing me for this next stage of research.
After the break-up of USSR and Yugoslavia, new waves of self-determination and secession are challenging the current world order. In cases such as Kosovo and Chechnya, a denial of (external) self-determination and the human rights abuses perpetrated by the host state presented the international community with a choice: to tolerate the situation for the sake of respecting sovereignty and the territorial integrity of states, or to intervene, change the regime, build peace and possibly, a new state.

To discuss the current challenges of secession, the Institute of Government and Politics at the University of Tartu in Estonia is organizing a conference “After the Melting of Frozen Conflicts: Systemic Transformations and Legitimation of Secessionist Bids” at the end of May 2010. The conference will discuss issues such as the sustainability of de facto states; parent states and external powers; popular sovereignty vs external recognition; solutions to the problem independent statehood; and the role and approach of international community towards de facto states.

Having lived in Kosovo for the first 23 years of my life, I have experienced ethno-political conflict, humanitarian intervention, international administration and the economic, social and civic dimensions of post-conflict reconstruction. The inspiring academic environment at the SEI has given me the opportunity to engage with these experiences critically. Motivated by these experiences and my long-term partnership with Grace Bolton, who is writing her thesis on remedial secession at the University of Oxford, we decided to present a paper at this conference, to describe the unique nature of Kosovo’s ‘separation’ from Serbia.

Evidently, Kosovo’s declaration of independence on 17th February 2008 met a divided international response: 65 UN member states recognised Kosovo while other members of the international community have delayed their recognition.

Our paper examines the main justifications for recognising Kosovo’s independence: ‘remedial secession’ and ‘earned sovereignty’. Our paper will begin by examining the applicability of the doctrine of remedial secession to Kosovo, the justifications for which can be seen clearly in decade from 1989 to 1999, if not earlier. In his justice-based normative theory of secession, Allen Buchanan proposes the doctrine of ‘remedial secession’, defined as ‘secession justified as a remedy of last resort for persistent and serious injustices perpetrated by the host state. However, we will argue that the doctrine of remedial secession insufficienly ripe, in political and legal terms, to be used in 1999 to justify Kosovo’s independence. We argue that the doctrine of remedial secession was further weakened (or even abused outright) in August 2008, when Russia explicitly invoked remedial secession when it recognised Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

We will present the case that the path to the ‘recognisable remedial secession’ of Kosovo from FRY/Serbia can be divided into three phases of negotiation based initially on self-administration within FRY, then towards the development of Provisional Institutions of Self-Government under UNMIK supervision and finally towards independence. In an effort to explain this process, Williams et al. have proposed the concept of ‘earned sovereignty’ which is ‘designed to create an opportunity for resolving sovereignty-based conflicts by providing for the managed devolution of sovereign
authority and functions from a state to a sub-state entity’, resulting either in independence or rehabilitated autonomy within the host state. However, we will argue that this concept is limited as it fails to distinguish between the internal and external dimension of the process.

Based on the case of Kosovo, we propose an alternative explanation to this observed path towards ‘recognisable’ statehood: ‘remedial sovereignty’ whereby a people realise statehood by invoking remedial secession and undergoing a transitional period of mediated international administration, characterized by elements of sovereignty which are externally designed and internally earned. Externally-designed sovereignty relates to the set of actions and norms imposed by the international administration in order to create the political, economic and social infrastructure whereby the entity consolidates its statehood capacities with functioning democratic institutions, a self-reliant market economy, the capacity to make and implement law and contribute to regional stability. Meanwhile internally-earned sovereignty refers to the efforts of people within the entity to comply with all conditionality mechanisms to achieve the above described statehood capacities. Therefore, we will propose ‘remedial sovereignty’ as a useful paradigm to provide the international community with a framework to confer statehood on those peoples for whom there is no other choice, thereby resolving the ‘recognition dilemma’ experienced in the aftermath of the Kosovo’s declaration of independence.

Agenda 2014 or a Balkans with “3-speeds” towards the EU?

By Geron Kamberi
SEI MAEP Alumni 2005-2006

A few days after being elected as Prime Minister of Greece, (9/10/2009) George Papandreou addressed a message to the Foreign Ministers of Southeast Europe. He made it clear that following the Lisbon Treaty, a new moment would be established for the Western Balkans on their way towards the EU. By defining the EU as the greatest peace project in human history, (which came as a result of two world wars and long-standing Franco-German conflicts) he did not hesitate to remind the Balkans of a date which could initiate a historic turning point: 28 June 2014, which marks the 100th anniversary of WW1 which began from the Balkans. He wanted to generate "Agenda 2014" - a simultaneous membership of all Western Balkan countries to the EU.

This proposal came from the former Foreign Minister of Greece in 2003 during the Thessaloniki Agenda after the EU Summit (June 2003) where Greece had the EU rotating presidency. The enthusiasm it raised has already been diminished as other priorities have arisen such as enlargement fatigue, Lisbon and the financial crisis. Despite the interest, it was overshadowed by sceptics (or euro-realis) who expressed great doubts, as well as by the current Greek crisis. EU relations with the Western Balkans have moved through different phases since 1990. At the fall of the Berlin Wall, the EU not only heard the noise of communism being overturned, but also shots coming from the "back yard" of the former Yugoslavia Federation.

The EU Stabilization and Association Process (SAP, since 26/4/1999), accompanied with a "cocktail of regional integration initiatives" which particularly were reflected through the Stability Pact (now Regional Cooperation Council based in Sarajevo), failed to quench the thirst of these countries for greater integration speed. Despite EU efforts to keep a balance between stabilization and association, the first has a heavier weight in EU policy. The CARDS program primarily took a security driven approach. Not accidentally, this period coincided with the completion of recent ethnic conflict in the Balkans as it was Kosovo and also a security agenda within the EU. The Tampere Summit established an EU area of freedom, security and justice, creating the Tampere Program (1999-2004) followed by The Hague (2004-2009) and Stockholm (2009-2014) programs. They continue to condition a large part of EU relations with third countries.

If a return to Papandreou’s idea for an en bloc
Research

Membership of the Western Balkan countries and a possible date is set in 2014, developments through the SAP have proved that the Balkans is running under the concept of variable geometry or different integration speeds. Such an approach is, to a large extent, also determined from SAP itself which has the principle of a tailor made approach. In this way, a rough division by 3-integration speeds would mean the first group would include Croatia and Macedonia, second group Albania, Serbia and Montenegro, and third group Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, but the states within each group also move with different speeds. Croatia is close to full membership, while even though Macedonia took candidate status in 2005, it still faces opposition from Greece which has not forgotten "the anger of the Balkans".

However, the idea of "Agenda 2014" could significantly help the Western Balkans to move more quickly towards reform as a similar pattern was followed for Central and Eastern Europe where a regional approach assisted a block membership. In the Agenda 2000 report, (16/7/1997), the Commission said Romania, Bulgaria and Slovakia didn’t meet the Copenhagen political criteria. Consequently, the negotiation process began separating the countries into two groups: firstly Hungary, Czech Republic, Poland, Estonia and Slovenia and secondly Romania, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Latvia and Slovakia. The Czech goal to join in 2002 and the second group objections about discrimination, prompted the Berlin Summit (March 1999) to decide their membership no later than 2002 and reshaped the financial policies for 2002-2006 to cope with this enlargement. The Nice Summit (December 2000) adopted a road map to membership for each country. Despite rhythms of reforms and problems in Romania and Bulgaria, their determination helped a “big-bang” enlargement to the EU which motivated political elites.

From an idealistic view of international relations, Agenda 2014 would be a welcome goal to transform the Balkans "in the flowering back yard of Europe". In this case, it would be redundant to blame such an experienced politician as Papandreu for a lack of realism. But as long as the integration processes in the Balkans continues to be witness to "hyper-real politics", we have to acknowledge that the way these countries have done so far looks like the glass is only half full. It will depend on the pace of the above 3 speeds as to when they fill the other half.

New EPERN Briefing Papers

The SEI-based European Parties Elections & Referendums Network (EPERN) produces an ongoing series of briefings on the impact of European integration on referendum and election campaigns. There are three new additions to the series. Key points from these are outlined below. EPERN papers are available free at: www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/1-4-2-8.html

ELECTION BRIEFING PAPER No. 48

“Europe and the Norwegian General Election of 14 September 2009”

Prof. Nick Sitter
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Email: Nick.Sitter@bi.no

Key Points

- Despite the global economic crisis, the centre-left majority coalition government led by Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg of the Labour Party won re-election in September 2009. The coalition, which also included the Centre Party and the Socialist Left, had served the full 2005-09 parliamentary term (it is not possible to call early elections in
### ELECTION BRIEFING PAPER No. 49

**“Europe and the Ukrainian Presidential Election of 2010”**

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**Key Points**
- On 7 February 2010 Viktor Yanukovych won a narrow victory with 48.95% of the vote to Yulia Tymoshenko’s 45.47% and was thus elected President for a five-year term on a turnout of 69% of the electorate.
- Yanukovych’s election victory in the second round can be explained by two factors: first, the lower turnout of 69% in comparison with 2004 in the second round where 77% of voters cast their ballots; second, the increase in support for Yanukovych in the central regions of Ukraine where ultimately all Ukrainian Presidential elections since independence have been decided.
- The result made early parliamentary elections in Ukraine a distinct possibility.
- Yanukovych will not bring a halt to Ukraine’s European integration rather he will seek to conclude the present negotiations with the EU.

### ELECTION BRIEFING PAPER No. 50

**“Europe and the Serb Parliamentary Election in May 2008”**

Marko Stojic  
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**Key Points**
- The Serbian parliamentary election was held at a time of extremely high political tensions, following the proclamation of the independence of Kosovo that led to the collapse of the coalition government.
- The election gave a landslide victory to the coalition For a European Serbia based around the Democratic party and G17 Plus against the grain of opinion polls that had predicted a victory for the right-wing Serbian Radical Party.
- The issue of Europe was the single most important issue during the election campaign as the election was widely perceived as a referendum on Serbian EU membership.
- The election proved to be a ‘political earthquake’ that re-shaped the party scene: the Democratic Party of Serbia shifted towards an anti-European position, the Socialist Party of Serbia became a legitimate left-wing party within a ruling pro European coalition, while the new Serbian Progressive Party was formed, following the split within the Serbian Radical Party.
SEI Working Paper: No 112 / EPERN
Working Paper 22
“The Scottish National Party’s changing attitude towards the European Union”
By Valeria Tarditi
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Abstract

Minority nationalist parties have been considered for several years as the most pro-European parties. However, the concrete evidence and more recent studies have demonstrated that not all minority nationalist parties support the EU and the European integration process and that many of them, over time, have often changed their European positions. This paper concentrates on the study of one case: the Scottish National Party (SNP). It can be considered as a typical example of minority nationalist parties that, have, over time, adopted different European attitudes. The aim of this paper is to identify the main factors that explain the SNP’s changing position towards the EU. In order to do this, the paper examines the historical evolution of the SNP’s European positions and it particularly analyses the party’s transition from euroscepticism to euro-enthusiasm at the end of the 1980’s and its actual European position. Through the analysis of the different political contexts in which the party acts, the paper concludes that the SNP’s previous and present European policy and perspective can be understood more in relation to the “structure of political opportunities” existent in the past in the UK and presently in Scotland, rather than in relation to opportunities offered at the European level.

SEI Working Paper: No 113
“Swaying the disgruntled voter. The rise of populist parties in contemporary Dutch politics”
By Stijn van Kessel
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Abstract

This paper accounts for the rise of populist parties in the Dutch political landscape. Party politics in the Netherlands has long been dominated by three established party families, but since the rise of Pim Fortuyn in 2002, populist parties seem to have taken an important position in Dutch politics. This contribution will argue that the upsurge in populist electoral success can be explained by taking into account a combination of independent variables: the openness of the electoral system, the availability of the electorate, the responsiveness of established parties and the supply of credible populist parties. Accordingly, populist parties in the Netherlands have benefited from the highly proportional electoral system and the availability of a large reservoir of floating voters. At the same time, the established parties failed to sufficiently address the salient issues of immigration and integration of minorities at the time of the 2002 general elections. Finally, in the eyes of the electorate the List Pim Fortuyn and Geert Wilders’ Freedom Party have proven to be credible alternatives to the established mainstream parties. Although the explanatory model is here only tested by means of the Dutch case, it can be expected that the populist electoral performance in other countries rests on the same logic as outlined in this paper.
The SEI Chevening Experience

By Bojan Brkic
SEI Chevening Fellow 2010
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I have never been a favourite of Fortuna. It took me ten years of buying lottery tickets, none of which won, to conclude this. Call me a slow learner. At university I watched my classmates learning only half of the matter for exams relying on good luck with the professor's hat while I unmistakably always drew exactly the question I failed to learn the answer to. So, all I could do was adopt Thomas Jefferson's thought "I am a great believer in luck, and I find that the harder I work, the more I have of it," as my life motto and move along. My participation in the Chevening Fellowship programme at the SEI has made me wonder if the tide is turning.

Firstly of all the promising eligible young executives in Serbia, I was one of only three selected by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office for the Programme. Attribute it to achievement if you want; I will stick to pure luck. Although I am not an economist but a journalist, I was selected for the European Political Economy course which I believe to be the most important and relevant of all this year's Chevening courses for my country which is struggling to overcome ever more numerous obstacles to EU membership, introducing the single market being the most immediate challenge. It will be at the core of my job as an editor for years.

The course is held at the SEI and its professors Jim Rollo, Alan Mayhew, Peter Holmes, Jorg Monar, Francis McGowan and David Dyker demonstrated apparently endless knowledge and competence clearly gained through vast, lifelong experience in both academic research and practical work on European economic and political integration. To be honest, this philologist turned journalist was quite humbled and a bit intimidated during initial lectures. Then I began to understand. And when someone whose graduation work was on Shakespeare's tragedies begins to understand trade creation, trade diversion (and we are not talking about the Merchant of Venice), the rationale behind free trade agreements, principles of the single market, all the shenanigans of exchange rates, fiscal and monetary policies and even begins to wonder whether he is more of a Keynesian or monetarist (thank you Dr. Holmes) – this says more about his lecturers' ability to relate knowledge and stir interest than anything else.

It was a great privilege, which we owe to Profes-
sor Rollo’s connections, to hear the thoughts and analyses of wise (wo)men from some of the UK’s most prestigious think tanks and schools such as Chatham House, the National Institute for Economic and Social Studies, the University of Edinburgh and the LSE to name but a few.

The sequence of lucky circumstances does not end there. We could have come to the UK in times of dull economic prosperity and uneventful political tranquillity. But no, since day one it was tin hats all around, the electoral campaign was beginning and it invigorated heated debate about the pros and cons of the government’s measures to fight recession. We were lucky to watch, and we did, with great deal of interest, persuasive arguments, and the way in which they were presented, of both those in favour of cutting deficit and controlling debt and those who think expanding monetary base in order to boost domestic demand is a better approach. Topics like how they will be able to avoid the free fall of sterling and if they will manage to put the inflationary toothpaste back into the tube was something we discussed between exploring the everyday life benefits of the single market in the wine section of Asda and hiking from Falmer Village to Lewes (stopping at the Juggs Arms pub in Kingston naturally).

But if you still insist that all of this wasn’t a spate of pure luck, think about the following. What is the chance that you will end up in a group of 14 people from 10 different countries and that after sharing your daily bread with all of them for almost three months you not only still find them agreeable but you feel you can’t wait for the time after lectures when you will meet in the kitchen and exchange impressions and opinions? And that’s how it is. Virtually all of them are, I am now certain, great professionals in what they do for their governments and I heard so many interesting things from them, so many different perspectives and learnt so much about their countries, cultures and ways of life that the “kitchen talks” later expanded to badminton courts, which became one of the most important parts of my education here. Every one of the Fellows is an intriguing character and I can safely say that I am a richer man for knowing them. Not to mention another lucky circumstance that all of them are, just like me, eager travellers and explorers. To that I owe wonderful moments we spent in Brighton, Lewes, Seaford, Hastings, Battle, Rye, Leeds Castle, Canterbury, Oxford, Windsor Castle, Salisbury, Stonehenge, Bath, the Scottish Highlands, the Lochs and Inverness. Quite an impressive list for just a few long weekends we had.

“Every one of the Fellows is an intriguing character and I can safely say that I am a richer man for knowing them.”

But, as the Swedes say, luck never gives, it only lends, and so this programme quickly comes to an end. Time to return home as wiser (and in my case also fatter) (wo)men. Except that I am pretty sure this is not the real end. Friends, I challenge you to a badminton match and a debate on the benefits of joining the EMU anywhere between Talin and Ankara.
By Eszter Juharos  
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The fourth conference of the Chevening European Political Economy programme didn’t start as usual. Due to the financial crisis, which has caused varying degrees of damage to the European economies, some Chevening alumni didn’t have the opportunity to visit the 2010 Chevening conference. The conference was rather a closed event for the 2010 Chevening fellows, some representatives of British ministries and institutions, and some SEI and linked scholars.

The topics were divided into 4 sessions; macro-economic environment, 2014-2020 financial frameworks, economic reform agenda and climate change. The whole conference was organized in a post-crisis atmosphere, discussing whether we should continue the crisis-management policies or return to the pre-crisis topics through the exit strategies. It seems to me that it is time to think about the exit strategies, although the crisis will dominate the political agenda of several countries for some years. Simultaneously, we are entering slowly the phase where the crisis has more effects on the real economy than on monetary policy, which is more perceptible for the population, as 20th century European history has already shown us.

The conference suggested that the European governments have done a good job during the short-distance post-crisis management; the economic situation would have become worse if governments had behaved differently. Simultaneously, we heard about economic forecasts for the period after the recession. The forecasting is already optimistic, in most of the EU member states GDP growth is expected for 2010. Several proposals were delivered about European governments’ tasks after the short-distance financial post-crisis measures in ‘usual’ EU policy fields like the Single Market, trade, cohesion and R&D policies. On the conference agenda the EU budget also appeared as a significant topic, since the debate about the EU’s next 7 year financial framework will begin in 2011. The final session speakers highlighted some opinions about the Union’s emission trading policy and the Copenhagen Climate Summit.

This year Poland dominated the foreign speakers’ contributions, giving us the opportunity to learn more about Poland’s official position and the speakers’ unofficial opinions about raised questions. Most of the challenges in connection with different EU policies, which were mentioned by Polish colleagues, were familiar for the Chevening fellows, especially for those who arrived from new EU member states. Our Polish Chevening fellow introduced us to them at the beginning of the conference.

It was very useful for the Chevening fellows that after all of the sessions, lively conversations developed among the participants when they had further opportunities to share their experiences from their home countries, which will be useful when we return to work in our home countries.
EPQR Network launched at the SEI to build understanding of the European Parliament

By Amy Busby and Ariadna Ripoll Servent
SEI DPhil Candidates

We have recently joined the SEI DPhil community to carry out projects using qualitative methods to investigate internal processes at the European Parliament. Having found this common ground quickly, this spring we decided to launch the European Parliament Qualitative Researchers (EPQR) Network, hosted on the SEI website to bring other fellow qualitative researchers together. The site can now be found at the following link: http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/epqr

The site aims to promote, collate and encourage research using methods which come under the broad banner of qualitative research, which can further our understanding of internal processes occurring within this institution and how it functions. It provides a space for researchers using these methods to discuss their experiences and share ideas.

The site keeps a rolling list of publications which have used qualitative methods, (to which people are welcome to add) presents a list of researchers taking similar approaches and their research interests, promotes relevant academic events such as conferences, panels and workshops, and provides information about qualitative research methods and what they can contribute to scholarship of the European Parliament as well as other useful resources on methodology. The website encourages people to join the mailing list and links to a Facebook group which provides space for further discussions: http://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=367613058391&ref=ts

The empowerment of the EP, particularly since the introduction of co-decision, has meant it has attracted increasing academic attention. A great deal of valuable statistical analysis has been done on voting behaviour and the EP’s institutional relations. Whilst this has contributed significantly to explaining institutional behaviour and outcomes, there remains a gap in the literature and a need to further enhance our understanding of processes, interactions and behaviour occurring within the EP itself. We currently know relatively little about the everyday life and functioning of this institution, interactions and processes occurring within it, all of which contribute to policy processes. Qualitative methods have much to contribute to this field of inquiry.

Qualitative research aims to enhance understanding of social processes and phenomena and focuses on meaning and understanding rather than quantification. It is a tradition which cross-cuts disciplines. Research studies actors and processes within their context and aims to understand their point of view. An array of methods are used including interviews, focus groups, observation, participant observation, discourse analysis, historical analysis, case studies and process tracing. The site brings together people using these methods to promote their work and exchange ideas.

Amy Busby is working on a project using ethnographic methods to explore the everyday functioning of the EP political groups, and Ariadna Ripoll Servent is using elite interviews to examine the politics of co-decision focusing on justice and home affairs. We will present papers at the UACES Student Forum Conference in Bath on a panel called “Understanding the European Parliament” and at the UACES Annual conference in Bruges in September 2010 on EP focused panels.
Professorial Lecture: Rights Politics, Legal Mobilization and Gender Equality in Europe

By Prof Susan Millns
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On 2 March 2010 Susan Millns, a member of Sussex Law School, gave her Professorial lecture to an audience comprising past and present colleagues, students and family and friends.

Outlining Professor Millns’ academic career, the Vice Chancellor, who introduced the lecture, noted the frequent periods of study and work abroad (notably in France and in Italy) before Professor Millns joined the University of Liverpool in 1991, moved to the University of Kent in 1997 and came to Sussex in 2006.

Professor Millns in her lecture began by acknowledging the influence of her studies in Europe upon her work over the past 20 years. With research interests in the areas of European comparative law, the law of the European Union and the protection of human rights, many insights had been gained through interaction with researchers in other European countries. Not surprisingly Professor Millns used the opportunity of her lecture to share with her audience some ideas and thoughts on European comparative legal studies, on the interaction between European and national laws and on the way in which legal rights are claimed and asserted in the European sphere, particularly before the courts in Europe.

In terms of its substance, the lecture drew on two European comparative research projects in which Professor Millns had been recently involved. The first was a European Union funded project called JURISTRAS (which ran from 2006-09) and entitled The Strasbourg Court, democracy and human rights: patterns of litigation, state implementation and domestic reform, has explored the relationship between judicial review of human rights at the supranational level and domestic politics and policies in Europe. The second research project was a European Science Foundation funded project on ‘Rights, Legal Mobilization and Political Participation in Europe’ which began as an exploratory workshop in Athens in October 2009. This project covered the system of rights protection under the European Convention on Human Rights and also that of the European Union.

While the research projects themselves covered a broad range of rights claims made by minorities and subordinated groups, the focus in Professor Millns’ lecture was the claims made in pursuit of gender equality in Europe. This focus was chosen for a number of reasons. Professor Millns explained that for many years she had had an interest in feminist legal theory and had written throughout her career about the way in which law treats claims made by women and sexual minorities (including gays, lesbians and transgender persons). Secondly, the gender aspects of the projects were focussed upon since in both of them Sussex (as project partner) was given specific responsibility for looking at the gender aspect of the research. Notably, in the JURISTRAS project the Sussex team of researchers (comprising Professor Millns and Ms Kim Brayson) wrote the final comparative report on gender equality and for the ESF project Professor Millns co-authored a paper with a colleague from the Law School, Dr Charlotte Skeet, on gender equality and associated rights claims in the UK context.
Professor Millns began by outlining reasons as to why rights claims are seen to be beneficial. However, despite these benefits, Professor Millns acknowledged that there may be reason to be cautious about the utility of making rights claims in order to bring about change in society. Many critics of rights have highlighted the dangers of the politics of rights. This critical perspective suggests that legal rights are individualistic and unsuitable for tackling wider patterns of social and structural injustice. They may often be more formal than real, respected on paper rather than in practice. Also, rights claims asserted on behalf of one individual or group inevitably produce counter claims on behalf of competing groups. It falls upon the judiciary to adjudicate upon the balance between competing claims and begs the question: who are the judiciary to be doing this? Would it not be more democratic and constitutionally legitimate for the legislative assembly of parliament to determine the appropriate balance between competing interests in society?

Feminists, of course, are one particular group which contributed to the powerful critique of rights. Arguing in addition to the above that the rights of women are not observed in the same way as the rights of men, feminist legal scholars have suggested that harms done to women may be invisible in the national and international systems of protection of rights. They are often harms of a sexual or reproductive nature which have no equivalent as regards harms carried out on men. They may be carried out in the domestic sphere and thus escape the net of legal and state intervention.

Professor Millns followed her discussion of the JURISTRAS project with a few words about her involvement with the more recent and evolving European Science Foundation project which again is focussed on the mobilization of rights on behalf of less privileged social actors and civil society. This project had begun a series of case studies focusing on specific areas of rights claims, analysing the question of the extent to which citizens activate legal processes and judicial institutions to claim rights that emanate from both national and European (EU and European Convention on Human Rights) sources and why they do this. Three particular areas of public interest litigation had been selected for study - namely gender equality, the rights of immigrants and the rights of historical minorities and minority nations.

In conclusion, Professor Millns argued that, based on the evidence from the two research projects, we can see that social activism and litigation at the supranational level can provide mechanisms to bring about change in the protection of fundamental rights at the European level. This means that individual litigation strategies and the legal mobilization of groups can lead to reforms in the rules and procedures that govern human rights in Europe. As such we can see changes in the protection of rights, in access to the courts and in opportunities to bring rights claims. Equally, supranational litigation can sometimes enable individuals and groups who are disadvantaged in their domestic legal systems, to pursue successfully rights claims at the European level – offering protection and judicial remedies that they may not otherwise have achieved. Judicial decisions, in particular, can be very powerful tools for the way in which they expand the scope of European legal norms.

This is true for many minority rights claims but is increasingly true also of claims made in pursuit of gender equality in Europe. The opportunities presented by litigation at the supranational level have undoubtedly had a positive impact upon gender equality rights and policies at the national level. Professor Millns noted that of course much remains to be done. There is a danger that rights may in some quarters continue to be empty rhetoric and observed in theory rather than in practice. – especially when they relate to the more privatised forms of harm which can only be carried out on women because they are women.

Nevertheless Professor Millns concluded that her research shows some causes for optimism in the increased highlighting of the gender specific nature of rights abuse and rights claims across Europe. Certainly the impact of European laws from a top-down perspective has had a positive effect on the bottom-up mobilization of individuals and social groups in the pursuit of gender equality claims.
A letter to euroscope regarding my SEI experience

By Tringa Lila
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I am not quite sure how six months flew by, but my days in Sussex have been tense mixed with bitter sweet senses. As I came here my low expectations turned out to be promising and fruitful when I quickly realised that Sussex was fun and a good place to study.

I knew that the expected confusion in the beginning would be complemented by future pressure, knowledge and excitement. In other words life in Brighton and studies in the SEI have been both fun and stressful. There were times where questions had no answers and answers led to other questions. Actually this was the first thing that we were warned about when we came here. That we will be given lots of questions where our job was to find out answers, but at the same time we left classes with lots of new unanswered questions. Was this a stimulus? I am sure that all of us would admit it was.

Very quickly I found Sussex to be a borderless knowledge institute, where economic, political, and social changes require innovative legal analysis and solutions through education. The capacity for interest by students in the class was routinely preached through debates and discussions taking place in classes where competition of minds, ideas and information flooded and professors were always there trying to push us for more. I do not remember one single time that I left the classroom without at least learning one thing and at the same time wanting to learn more. At the same time I have to admit that in the beginning the most confusing class was Prof. Saggar’s lesson in Public Policy, where I uncovered things that I never thought before and knowledge turned out to provide good results in the end.

As a MAEP student, I had to do three assignments and one exam. The second term found us more prepared regarding the whole system, while at the same time it divided and distanced us a bit more due to the differentiation of course choices and interests. However, I am pleased that in the first semester we all got to know each other where formality was officially left away and talks were many times tense, interesting and fun. These students were the reflection of different cultures, languages and inspiration for all of us. We all got used to each other in a very short period of time. Meetings once a week – usually Wednesdays or Thursdays – were a lot of fun, where socialization proved to be a very important task for each of us to make life even better in Brighton. A promising experience will be the visit in Brussels which we are all looking forward to. I am sure that this already infamous trip will result in one of our best times together and at the same time will add practical knowledge regarding our studies that will be reflected in our last piece of work, the dissertation.

At this time I have to admit that I enjoyed life in Sussex more than I thought I would, and I am looking forward to making it even better during the time left. I am sad that all this will be over soon and life will take all of us in different directions. Our ways and inspirations will differ, but our ambitions I am sure will always remain the same. We all came here to find some progress and devote ourselves to a better future. Let this future serve for good purposes and be successful. Nevertheless, the SEI will always be part of our useful knowledge and future perspective which made me realise that if our days will come to an end here, the reality and practice has opened doors and now I am sure I am ready for it!
By Anne Wesemann  
LLM student 2009-10

44 universities offering 56 different LL.M programmes connected to European Law were on offer. However, the University of Sussex was in my Top 5 and one of the first institutions I completed the application form for.

Its main advantage was: I had heard of this university before. Several German study colleagues had studied at the University of Sussex and had recommended it.

The University’s facilities simplify the academic challenge. There is always the impression of being well supported. One is not inhibited from acquiring knowledge. The library and the electronic library in particular put the student into the position of organising their studies according to their own personal needs. I myself need a very comfortable environment to study. So I had the possibility to borrow the books I needed via self lending machines and download the articles I wanted to read with the help of the electronic library. I then took a seat in my living room or in one of the several cafés on or off campus to study there.

The international student’s office was the office I visited most frequently and there was always help with every single issue. The same can be said about the Law School office. Special mention must be given to Doreen Young who had to deal with me as a nervous student, always afraid of missing courses and deadlines!

Upon choosing the LL.M in European Law, I did not realise that it was a new programme. There are no tell-tale signs that somebody could guess this from. The lectures and seminars are closely connected to contemporary issues and developments in European Law, as well as traditional approaches and theories. The broad mediated knowledge and the professional standard of support never gave the impression of a new LL.M. programme.

At first the way of studying was so different from the system I knew that it took me a while to get used to it. Now I appreciate the focus on self studies and reading. The advantage of a focus on self studies is clearly the possibility to direct the studies in the direction of one’s own interest. The supply of academic articles by the tutors was of such a good mix that every topic was not only sighted from a high academic and contemporary level but also from a sophisticated point of view. The discussions in the seminars were led by the tutors but in the end it was the student’s choice where the main discussion points lay. The Professors Malcolm Ross and Sue Millns as well as Dr. Yuri Borgmann-Prebil offer a broad field of knowledge and always support different ideas, views and approaches.

In addition to the above, the programme structure needs to be mentioned. Part of this postgraduate programme, is the opportunity for students to take part in an exchange, which is the reason for my current stay in Toulouse (France). It was a general offer to all students to take advantage of an exchange with University Paris V or the University Toulouse I. As the whole LL.M. programme is new, this exchange has not been tested before. But again I have to say that the whole organisation and support is at a high professional level. Both Universities made and continue to make a big effort to make this exchange as valuable for me as possible. Not only according to the academic knowledge but also according to daily life and administrative issues.

However, I am looking forward to coming back to Brighton and the University of Sussex and I will enjoy the third part of this year. This programme has much more to offer than I expected. I will definitely be the part of the next student generation recommending the University of Sussex and the LL.M. in European Law to others!
The University of Sussex Politics Society is a student run event organising group for everyone at Sussex University with an interest in politics. Everyone is welcome to come along to all meetings, events and nights out. Our main aim is to provide an outlet for opinion from any political persuasion in an environment of debate and tolerance.

The society aims to create and stimulate debate about political issues within the University. We organise riveting speakers, lively debates and legendary socials - what's politics without a good political party!

**Events in 2009/10:**

We took a trip to Northern Ireland and met Gerry Adams following a previously highly successful study trip to Brussels and the EU institutions. In autumn 2008 we packed out Falmer bar for a US Election all-nighter to see Barack Obama elected. Sparks flew and debate raged in an Israel/Palestine debate we hosted with leading academics.

As part of our array of speakers, the society has hosted Gary Gibbon, Political Editor of the Channel 4 News as well as Caroline Lucas MEP, Leader of the Green Party and Parliamentary candidate for Brighton Pavilion, keeping students in touch with very local as well as national political developments. We have also had an open discussion with Alison Phipps, head of Gender Studies on feminism. To end the term, we ran a ‘rebels and rulers’ themed night at Funky Buddha in November in Brighton.

This spring, we have questioned Charlotte Vere and Nancy Platts, the Conservative and Labour candidates for Brighton Pavilion respectively, for this hotly contested seat as the election campaign has heated up.

Our own Dr. Dan Hough gave a fascinating talk on the future of socialism in Europe, and the challenge left wing parties have faced to rid themselves of the old soviet image and become electorally popular in contemporary Europe.

Recently Saul Lehrfreund, head of the Death Penalty Project, gave us an insight into human rights and global justice, and the challenge of trying to get people off death-thrown.

**Upcoming this summer:**

The summer term will see the widely anticipated Brighton Pavilion candidates’ debate in April, as part of our build up to the general election. On Wednesday 21st April, 1pm, in Chichester Lecture Theatre, Dr Tim Bale will chair the debate between Charlotte Vere, (Con) Nancy Platts, (Lab) Caroline Lucas (Green) and Bernardette Millam (LD). This will be followed by a General Election all-nighter pulled in East Slope bar on 6th May to see who triumphs nationally and locally.

Once the contest is over, we will be celebrating the end of the academic year with a Joint summer ball for the new Law, Politics & Sociology School in July. We will then be thinking ahead with a joint talk with CDEC (the careers service) on possible future careers, with journalists and politicians as special guests, before the return of the legendary politics Pub Quiz!

Everyone is welcome to join, political or not! See our facebook group at: http://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=2221375650&ref=ts or email politissoc@ussu.sussex.ac.uk
Can it be that, out of the exhausted silence following the endless haggling over the Lisbon Treaty, voices can again be heard arguing for further European integration? Alarmed by the financial crisis in Greece and its potential to destabilise the entire euro-area, the German government has embraced the idea of a European Monetary Fund – a potentially huge step towards an EU economic government. Now this may come to nothing and would require a new EU treaty. But the French government among others – while uncertain about an EMF – also advocate stronger euro-area governance not least to ensure that reductions in budget deficits by some EU countries are balanced by demand stimulation in Germany.

Meanwhile negotiations to give the EU powers to regulate financial markets – unimaginable before the near global financial meltdown – are edging to agreement (in spite of a UK hold up on hedge funds). The appointment of Baroness Ashton as the EU’s foreign policy chief now focuses attention on whether there is the political will for the EU to speak and act in a more united way on foreign affairs. Significantly, even the UK government defence White Paper argues for closer integration of British and French defence forces.

Public support for greater European integration has declined in recent years - admittedly in varying degrees across the EU. But the challenges posed by global economic, environmental and foreign policy developments still exercise a remorseless pressure on member states to integrate even further. This is not entirely a new story. The Rome Treaty creation of a Common Market in the mid-1950s was in large measure triggered in response to the earlier crisis triggered by the failure to agree a European Defence Community. The Single Market was in large measure driven by fears that the continued Balkanisation of the west European economies would otherwise result in an irreversible domination by the United States economy.

In the 1990s even the most fervent federalist would have put internal security, migration, crime and terrorism pretty much at the bottom of any list of subjects likely to become subject to supranational EU decision-making. The attack on the World Trade Centre and the realisation that criminals and terrorists were proving quicker than governments to exploit the new European open markets changed all of that.

The media episodically proclaims that the era of European integration has passed. Some even predict an era of gradual but increasing European disintegration. But developments on the ground suggest that further integration, however messy and confused the process of negotiation, remains possible and even probable.

After the financial and then the economic crises, some now warn of a looming social crisis. Could EU governments find themselves debating at least a partial Europeanisation of social and welfare policy at some point in this decade, with its the consequences for the European Union budget? If so, how long before measures to further strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the EU institutions are back on the agenda?
What do Europeans have in common?

By Prof John McCormick
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Few exercises in democratic institution-building and policy-making can have been declared dead, dying or comatose more often than the European Union. It seems that no crisis—whether a failed vote on a treaty, a policy dispute among Europe’s leaders, or even declining birth rates—can be allowed to pass without new declarations of the failure of Europe.

Yet behind the headlines there are signs that ordinary Europeans are mainly working off the same script. They have mixed feelings about integration, to be sure, and since Maastricht there has been a growing eurosceptic backlash. But there is also ample evidence that Europeans—long divided along national or state lines—are thinking increasingly alike on a host of issues.

Convinced that much of the debate over the EU has been missing the bigger picture, I embarked on a research project in 2005 to examine the parameters of Europeanism, or the political, economic and social values and qualities that bind Europeans. I bypassed the standard assertion that Europeans are champions of democracy, capitalism, human rights and the rule of law (who isn’t?) - and instead sought out what, if anything, makes Europeans distinctive.

A point of departure was offered by Juügen Habermas and Jacques Derrida, who were prompted by the mass demonstrations in February 2003 against the impending invasion of Iraq to write of a shared European “mentality”, including support for welfarism, secularization and multilateralism. This was a useful start, but it did not go far enough, and my research has revealed a convergence of opinion on a wide range of additional issues, including the following:

Remodelled identities. The state is dying in Europe as Europeans rediscover their national cultural identities, rethink the meaning of patriotism, and reinvent themselves as Europeans.

Cosmopolitanism. Europeanism supports an association with universal ideas and a belief that humans belong to a single moral community that transcends state boundaries or national identities.

Communitarianism. In contrast to the liberal emphasis on individual rights, Europeans support a balance between individual and community interests.

The collective society. Accepting that societal divisions will occur in spite of attempts to ensure equal opportunity, Europeanism supports the role of the state as an economic manager and guarantor of societal welfare.

Perpetual peace. Europeanism identifies with a rejection of war and conflict as a means of resolving disputes, allowing the region to make progress along the path to achieving the Kantian condition of perpetual peace. Europeans no longer threaten one another, nor do they pose a threat to others.

Smart power. Eschewing threats and coercion (hard power), Europeanism supports a balance with diplomacy and encouragement (soft power) to produce an emphasis on smart power (balancing the stick and the carrot).

There are other features of Europeanism including a redefinition of the family, distinctive attitudes about work, support for sustainable development, a greater emphasis on individual rights in criminal matters, and opposition to capital punishment. What we can conclude from all this is that Europeans have more that unites them than divides them, that integration is not just about the work of the EU institutions and national governments, and that—if better understood—Europeanism offers us a valuable means of appreciating how Europeans think and organize the world around them.

‘Europeanism’ will be published with OUP in 2010.
Ukrainians went to the polls in 2010 to elect a President for the fifth time since independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. No one candidate won more than 50% of the vote in the first round, which was held on 17 January, necessitating a second round play-off three weeks later between Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko and opposition leader Viktor Yanukovych. On 7 February 2010 Viktor Yanukovych won a narrow victory with 48.95% of the vote to Yulia Tymoshenko’s 45.47% and was thus elected President for a five-year term on a turnout of 69% of the electorate.

Although Yulia Tymoshenko promised to contest the second round result in the Ukrainian High Administrative Court, claiming that Yanukovych’s Party of Regions had falsified the result, both rounds of the election were found to have been conducted in a free and fair manner by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) which commented that the ‘professional, transparent and honest voting and counting should serve as a solid foundation for a peaceful transition of power’. Although the race was far closer than had been anticipated during the campaigning season in late 2009, this positive endorsement by the international election observation team combined with the fact that Yanukovych won almost 900,000 more votes than Tymoshenko meant that any attempt to challenge the legitimacy of the result was highly unlikely to succeed. Thus on 25 February 2010, Viktor Yanukovych was sworn in as the fourth President of an independent Ukraine for an initial term of five years until 2015.

Ukraine’s 2010 Presidential Election was the first to follow the Orange Revolution of 2004 that swept President Viktor Yushchenko (in office 2005–10) to power, after mass demonstrations in Kyiv and other major cities overturned attempts to falsify the election result in the initial second round, forcing a re-run of the second round play-off that culminated in a convincing victory for Yushchenko on 26 December 2004. History will probably be kinder to ex-President Yushchenko than most political commentators were during his Presidency from 2005 to 2010, and his reputation in the future may be analogous to that of former General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev – hailed in the West as the man who brought the Cold War to an end and freedom to central Europe, yet reviled in Russia as the man who brought about the fall of the Soviet Union, which Prime Minister Putin called ‘the greatest geopolitical catastrophe’ of the 20th century.

“History will probably be kinder to ex-President Yushchenko than most political commentators were during his Presidency”

Ukraine in 2010 is a very different country to Ukraine in 2004. It is undeniably a democracy and has broken decisively away from the authoritarianism that characterizes many other post-Soviet republics, (such as Russia, Belarus and the central Asian states). This is a huge achievement. But this does not change the fact that the five years that followed the Ukrainian election were bitterly disappointing for those Ukrainian citizens who had backed the Orange leadership and vested so much hope in the new administration, and even more frustrating for the 44% of Ukrainians who had voted against Yushchenko in 2004 and interpreted the judicial decision to overturn the result of the (first) second round of the election as electoral fraud perpetrated by the Orange revolutionaries. President Yushchenko’s election (or selection depending on one’s political viewpoint) was a profoundly polarizing moment in Ukrainian politics in a country already riven by stark regional divisions. The politics of identity was, and remains, a crucial determinant of voting behaviour in Ukraine and Viktor Yushchenko struggled (and failed) to pre-
sent himself as a unifying President of all Ukrainians, regardless of their preferred language or their regional loyalty. In contrast to the revolutions of 1989 in central Europe, it is important to underline that the Orange revolution was backed by only a slender majority of the Ukrainian people, which meant that President Yushchenko suffered from a legitimacy deficit in the eyes of around half of the population.

It is possible that President Yushchenko could have enhanced his legitimacy and credibility in the eyes of eastern and southern Ukrainian domestic opinion by acquiring a reputation as a competent manager, capable of getting things done. Yet within months of taking office in 2005, President Yushchenko became mired in a power struggle with the Ukrainian Parliament that pitted him head-to-head against both his arch-rival in the 2004 election, Viktor Yanukovych, and his erstwhile ally from the Orange Revolution, Yulia Tymoshenko. Ultimately, Yushchenko promised much and delivered little. He vowed to lead Ukraine into the EU, yet he did not manage to persuade the EU’s Member States to shift one centimeter on their opposition to Ukraine acquiring even a prospect of eventual accession. Whilst it could be argued convincingly that Yushchenko never stood much of a chance of changing the opinions of the anti-enlargement Member States anyway, and moreover that he did make a certain amount of incremental progress on Ukraine’s European integration agenda, the chasm that opened up between the aspirations he touted and the achievements his administration actually clocked up, only served to further weaken his reputation and credibility.

President Yushchenko ducked out of prosecuting those who had tried to rig the election of 2004 early in 2005, and his Presidency was marked by a similar lack of drive and authority – a situation not aided by the fact that a crucial part of the deal that had brought the Orange Revolution to a close was an agreement to reduce the executive powers of the Presidency in favour of the Parliament, the Verkhovna Rada, which increased the independence of the Prime Minister considerably. Crucially, however, the new constitutional deal did not transform Ukraine entirely into a Parliamentary democracy – key powers of appointment were preserved by the President, for example, in the appointment of the Defence and Foreign Ministers and Chair of the National Security Council. The new Constitutional framework came into force one year after the Orange Revolution in 2006, in time for the March elections of that year – which theoretically gave Yushchenko one year to change the shape of Ukrainian politics. That Viktor Yushchenko did not take advantage of the opportunity to clean up Ukrainian politics or to introduce much-needed reforms in the course of his first year in office set the tone for the rest of his Presidency which became bogged down in frequently acrimonious disputes with his two main rivals, Viktor Yanukovych and Yulia Tymoshenko.

“A bitter and drawn-out struggle for supremacy between President, Parliament and Prime Minister was the principal distinguishing feature of Ukrainian politics between 2004 and 2010. This served to discredit all three titans of the Ukrainian political scene between 2005 and 2010: Viktor Yushchenko, Viktor Yanukovych and Yulia Tymoshenko and explains why a few more Ukrainians chose to stay at home on election day in 2010 in comparison with 2004 – or voted ‘against all’ candidates in record numbers.”

Before we take leave of the post-Orange revolution era, it is worth re-iterating the key achievement of the Yushchenko administration: democracy. After the Orange revolution, Ukraine became a democracy: a state where power and authority can be questioned and where it can be transferred from one President to another following free and fair elections. Ukraine also developed a diverse and highly critical media under Yushchenko. Thus by 2010, Ukraine had become a highly pluralist, competitive electoral democracy, and it was very unlikely that a future Ukrainian President or Government could undermine this seriously. This was perhaps Yushchenko’s legacy – and it is of immense value.
Opportunities at the SEI

Doctoral Studies in British politics at the SEI

It may or may not be ‘an awkward partner’ in the EU, but the UK has always been a part of Europe. It should come as no surprise then, that many of the SEI’s scholars are experts in British, as well as European politics. That means that we are always interested in hearing from students interested in doing a doctorate focusing on the UK.

We particularly welcome candidates interested in the following areas in which our staff has particular expertise:

- **Party politics** (Paul Webb and Tim Bale)
- **Public Policy** - particularly migration & energy (Shamit Saggar, James Hampshire, and Francis McGowan)
- **Citizenship, political theory, and representation** (James Hampshire, Paul Webb, Tim Bale and Paul Taggart)

Certainly both Paul Webb, who is working on a book on the feminization of the Conservative Party, and Tim Bale, who has just published a book on *The Conservative Party from Thatcher to Cameron*, would be particularly keen to hear from anyone interested in pursuing a DPhil (which, at Sussex, is what we call a PhD) on the British Conservative Party.

SEI ELECTION ROUNDTABLE!

On the 11th May 2010, the SEI will be holding a post UK General Election Roundtable. The Roundtable will be chaired by Professor Paul Webb and Dr Tim Bale. The discussion will take place in the wake of the UK General Election to be held on 6th May 2010. Come and join us for your chance to discuss the outcome of the election with Faculty and peers alike and hear what others have to say.

Was the outcome as you expected? What will be the implications of a change of Government for the UK? From a European perspective, what effect will a change in UK Government have on the UK’s relations with Europe and its position within the EU? All interesting questions which we hope to hear some answers to!

All are welcome to attend.

Masters Programs at SEI

The SEI has established an international reputation for the quality of its research and study of Europe, providing a focus for postgraduate study and research that brings together students, researchers and faculty from across the University. It is truly a unique academic environment in which to study Europe and the people make up a rich and diverse community from nearly 30 countries. Programmes are interdisciplinary, innovative and truly European in academic orientation. They are also distinctive in their explicit and integrated coverage of western and eastern Europe.

- **MA in Contemporary European Studies** A multi-disciplinary, innovative, Masters at the very top level of contemporary European studies.
- **MA in European Politics** The MAEP programme offers a broad ranged curriculum to allow students to further their knowledge and understanding of modern European politics.

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