In this issue:

Inside Story 2

Inside Story 2

Inside Story 2

Inside Story 3

Inside Story 4

Inside Story 5

Inside Story 6
Transatlantic tensions?: The Security Dimension
Adrian Treacher, SEI

September 11 has served to sharpen the focus on transatlantic relations between the EU and the US. But the debate on the nature of this longstanding association, and the growing tensions there within, has been underway ever since the end of the Cold War if not earlier. Having grown up from a position of post-World War economic dependence on American benevolence to one of self-sufficiency and of competition with the former donor, the EU members have subsequently been undergoing a similar process in the political field. To compound this transformation, the EU now has a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and is bestowing itself with the instruments to be an at least partially autonomous military actor.

The fundamental foundation upon which transatlantic (read EU-US) security relations have rested these past 50-odd years has been NATO. From the late 1950s, de Gaulle’s France questioned (correctly it seems) the true extent of the Americans’ security guarantee to Western Europe in the nuclear age. But even though he withdrew France from the Atlantic Alliance’s integrated military structures, de Gaulle and his successors maintained France as a staunch member of the looser political organisation. Clear plans were swiftly drawn up that would have enabled the French military to fight alongside their NATO counterparts on the occasion that Soviet tanks swept across central Europe.

Nevertheless, French policymakers consistently pushed their EU partners to embrace the concept of an autonomous European security and defence capability. The stumbling, incoherent and ultimately vacuous response of the EU to the crisis in Bosnia in the early 1990s would then be the occasion when these same policymakers had to acknowledge that France’s European partners, notably Britain and even Germany, were simply incapable, at that moment in time, to sanction such a project for European autonomy (from the US). As a result, they changed tactic and spent the next few years trying to “Europeanise” NATO by creating a functioning European pillar based around the Western European Union.

Since the end of 1998, and to the great surprise of the French leadership, the French vision for an autonomous European security and defence capability has most definitely been back on the agenda largely as a result of a volte face by Britain. Hence we now can speak of CSDP in the context of the EU.

Interpretations of this momentous development in terms of transatlantic relations can largely be divided into two broad schools. The first declares that ESDP is crucial to the very survival and endurance of NATO. The argument goes that unless the Europeans take up more of the burden for their own security, the American Congress will wind-up the Organisation in favour of a more Latin American and Pacific focus for US foreign policy. The second claims that ESDP will ultimately be in a position to make NATO redundant by becoming a one-stop shop for European security, with a capacity to deploy instruments for the whole range of activities from conflict prevention to defence. As this debate raged, EU and NATO representatives have been

“Since the end of 1998, the French vision for an autonomous European security and defence capability has most definitely been back on the agenda. Hence we now can speak of CSDP in the context of the EU.”

“EU and NATO representatives have been quietly working away to ensure institutionalised co-operation and consultation between the two entities. This was where we were on September 11 last year.”
quietly working away to ensure institutionalised co-operation and consultation between the two entities. This was where we were on September 11 last year.

The Alliance immediately, and for the first time in its history, invoked Article V of its founding treaty – the mutual defence guarantee – claiming that an attack on one member (the US) was an attack on them all. This was clearly highly emotive and symbolic, but did it have any impact beyond that? The US did not and does not formally need its NATO partners in order to respond militarily to the attacks on its soil. It has the means to act alone, entering into bilateral arrangements with certain countries as and when.

-invoking Article V for the first time clearly had more resonance in a country like Denmark with its traditional standoffish approach to military integration and action, but it hardly raised an eyebrow in Britain. The British have grown up with UK troops having been continually employed in Northern Ireland and constantly being deployed in various crisis and combat zones around the world. Put simply, the British are used to absorbing military casualties. And it is a similar story for the similarly battle-hardened French. Spain, meanwhile, has become hardened to terrorism.

US requests to NATO included access to Alliance members’ ports, airspace & airports (including British & French locations in the Indian Ocean) and the activating of naval forces in the Mediterranean and of the Organisation’s radar aircraft. These allies have also assumed some of the European duties of American forces in order to release them for the struggle against Afghanistan. But much of this could have been (and indeed has been) arranged bilaterally without recourse to Article V. Indeed we can ask ourselves just what the Alliance has done since making this unprecedented move? It is interesting that there was no need to invoke Article V during the Cuban Missile Crisis because Alliance solidarity was a given; this was not the case towards the end of 2001. The Americans have largely done it alone in this crisis because to have accepted any substantial assistance would have been to compromise the scope for a unilateral policy. From an American perspective, the NATO operation in Kosovo had been a war by committee and they were not about to repeat that constraining approach post-September 11.

Whether the Alliance can recover from this dramatic devaluation remains to be seen. It had already suffered from the demise of the unifying Soviet threat, the admission of new members, the growing imbalance in military capacity either side of the Atlantic and then the advent of the EU’s CSDP. At the upcoming Prague meeting in November, it is due to invite further new members. Two forces are at work. On the one hand we can point to a growing US isolationism in terms of the down-grading of the European arena as a foreign policy priority. On the other, we have the EU making itself a military actor and hence the ability to forge its own diplomacy in at least smaller-scale crises (as opposed to being led from Washington DC). Quite how far the EU governments want to go with this project will have a large baring on what becomes of NATO. The Americans cry out that there should be no duplication, but how can the Europeans become autonomous if they cannot duplicate?
Last February, the corridors of Arts A were filled with a number of seemingly SEI unrelated people. Seemingly, since this research student workshop dealt with a topic traditionally not associated with the institute. However, as the co-director, Jim Rollo, pointed out in his welcoming speech, migration has consolidated itself as one of the hottest issues facing contemporary European studies today... not only in terms of social and cultural implications but also for its economic impacts in the foreseeable future.

The workshop brought together a healthy mix of established migration scholars alongside current research students from SEI and the Sussex Centre for Migration Research and was well attended by both students, faculty and a few outside practitioners.

The morning theme of ‘New Patterns of Migration’ kicked off with Enric Ruiz-Gelices (SEI/SCMR) presenting on the efforts of the EU to create what he called the ‘new Europeans’ through student mobility schemes. The findings presented, extracted from postal questionnaire surveys, contrasted attitudes to EU membership from mobile and sedentary Sussex students and graduates.

Next up were Silvia Carrasco and Eva Bretones from the ELIMA Group of the Autonoma University in Barcelona (Spain). Their research began by challenging the somewhat established notion of Spain as a country of immigration in general by pointing to Catalonia as a traditional region of immigration. As well as being a long-established pole of attraction for internal migration, she highlighted the fact that not only are most residents of Catalonia not “ethnically” Catalan but consist different ethnicities both from the peninsula as well as from other countries. Carrasco used the example of the school as the main arena in which these different ethnic identities, cultures and language are renegotiated.

Finishing off the morning session was Louise Payne (CDE/SCMR) who discussed Ireland as one of the new countries of immigration. She also discussed a number of other issues; including Irish racism, the gentrification of Dublin, Ireland’s relationship with the UK.

The afternoon session, ‘Impacts of migration’ shifted the focal point towards how different types of migrants and migration affect the receiving countries. Richard Gale, a geographer from the University of Oxford discussed how Muslim groups in Birmingham have attempted to set up sacred spaces. Gale argued that these communities had faced a number of obstacles when pursuing these goals. Some success had however been achieved due to what Gale described as the religious communities situated agency as opposed to the operation of equal opportunity initiative at the supra-local scale.

Next up was Anja van Heelsum from the Institute of Migration and Ethnic Studies, University of Amsterdam. Her paper dealt...
On the road to Cambridge….

On January 18th, Pembroke College, Cambridge hosted the second of five OERN seminars funded by the Economic and Social Research Council, organised extremely efficiently by Dr Julie Smith and Agnes Batory. The objective of the seminar series is to bring together academic researchers and policy practitioners and thereby institutionalise what was previously a ‘virtual’ network as well as allowing consideration of conceptual issues and country case studies, particularly the rarer, less well researched cases. The 25 participants included specialists on the UK, Hungary, Denmark, France, Slovakia, Poland, Croatia, Slovenia, Austria, Estonia, Italy, Ireland and the European Parliament together with representatives of the Irish Embassy and Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

The morning session began with a paper from Professor John Gaffney (Aston University, Birmingham) on 'Political discourse and European integration' that focussed on the importance of the single market framework, Vickerman suggested that temporary labour migration could potentially benefit both sending and receiving countries. His main point was that the real issue facing European immigration and mobility policies should focus more on how to ensure that the quality of the mobile migrant is improved through better matching, than worrying about the size of aggregate flows of migrants.

The variety of issues covered during the workshop stimulated the participants to engage in a number of interesting debates. It also gave the SEI an opportunity to profile the itself in a field that is both up and coming as well important for the future of Europe.

Hot on the trails of the previous speaker, Pontus Odmalm (SEI/SCMR) presented some empirical findings on the political participation of two migrants communities in Sweden. He argued that the key variable to lower levels of engagement in local political life was not so much a consequence of a failure to integrate but rather due to lower levels of identification with the host society.

The grand finale was executed by Roger Vickerman from University of Kent at Canterbury. He presented results from research conducted within the realms of the One Europe or Several? - project. With reference to the opening of borders within...
symbolism and leadership in the development of the European project drawing particularly on French cases. This was followed by detailed analysis of the outcome and implications of the Irish referendum on the Nice Treaty by Professor Richard Sinnott (University College Dublin). The afternoon session had an East European focus. Dr Nicole Lindstrom (Central European University Budapest) outlined the internal debates on EU membership in two former Yugoslav republics at very different stages in the accession process: Croatia and Slovenia. Finally, Evald Mikkel (University of Tartu) gave an overview of party-based Euroscepticism in Estonia, the post-communist candidate state with the highest levels of public opposition to EU membership, focussing on how and why a divide in Estonian party politics has begun to emerge in relation to European integration.

...then on to Turin!

On March 22nd-25th members of the network were involved in a workshop on 'Opposing Europe and Political Parties' at the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshop in Turin organised by the OERN co-convenors. The workshop began with a conceptual and comparative overview on 'The Party Politics of Euroscepticism in EU Member and Candidate States' by directors Paul and Aleks. It went on to discuss country case study papers on party-based Euroscepticism (or the lack of it) in the UK, Belgium, Austria, Ireland, France, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Norway and the European Parliament. There were also comparative and theoretical papers on East European exceptionalism, party strategies in competitive party systems Euro-hostile non-voting in European parliamentary elections, transnational party linkages and a paper from SEI-affiliated scholar Dr Charles Lees on institutional setting and political agency. Downloadable copies of all the papers are available on the ECPR website.

As well as contributing a battery of fascinating and well-researched individual case studies, the workshop also made some important progress in getting to grips with some of the main theoretical and conceptual problems associated with researching party-based Euroscepticism. A major issue identified by the workshop was the problems of conceptualising and measuring party-Euroscepticism (as an iterative 'party position' on the European issue or as an exogeneous, actor-based manifestation of contestation?) and identifying its causes. Other recurring themes included the fact that in many countries (particularly, but not exclusively, candidate states) the Euro-debate tends to be conducted largely through the prism of domestic politics and the importance of measuring the salience of the European issue (or lack of it). These are all issues to which the OERN network will returning over the next few months.

OERN looking ahead...

OERN already has a range of activities planned for the rest of the year. On June 21st the University of Leicester will host the third ESRC funded seminar with a conceptual paper on Euroscepticism in Eastern Europe and case study papers on Greece and Italy (and one more candidate state). Further details are available from the convenors (a.szczepaniak@sussex.ac.uk and pt35@georgetown.edu) or from the local organiser Karen Henderson (kh10@leicester.ac.uk). Further seminars will follow in Durham at the end of September (with a largely British flavour) and at the LSE in December. OERN is also submitting two panel proposals to the ECPR Standing Group on the EU Conference at Bordeaux in September. Finally, a number of SEI/OERN working papers including those on Euroscepticism in Germany, Poland, Croatia and Slovenia, together with a comparative paper on Euroscepticism in EU Member and Candidate States will be published over the next few months. For further information or to keep up with all these developments then visit the OERN homepage at: http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Units/SEI/areas/OpposingEurope.html
Democratic deficit: Myth or Reality?
Professor Joseph Weiler speaks in SEI, 21st February, 2002.

The first takes its mark from the organisation of IGCs which, they state, occur regularly, are to a greater extent transparent processes and to all intents and purposes score democratic points for the European political process as a whole. It is argued, furthermore, that the European construction can claim democratic legitimacy via the founding Treaties in that the process of ratification guarantees popular consent. Given these circumstances, can we ask those defending the democratic credentials of the Union, realistically claim that there is a deficit in this regard? A second counter to the democratic deficit rebuts the criticisms of fictional parliamentary control of the executive. The weakness of the European Parliament has long been a target of those seeking to strengthen the political link between citizens and institutions. Here, it is often claimed, the democratic deficit is most keenly felt in a disillusioned and distanced electorate. Come the day of European elections, the polling booths will go little-used until such time as European citizens feel that they are voting for an assembly which wields some power. Indeed, it is not only the executive which is beyond real democratic control. The rise in number and competence of administrative committees gives cause for concern. It is even possible to suggest that it is no longer constitutional law which deals with values and power in this context but rather administrative law. Surely here are grounds on which the charges of democratic deficit in the European construction are well-founded. And yet the defence offered by some against this particular critique is straight forward enough: What of the situation in the member states? Is the situation really any better? After all, does the problem of administrative committees not exist to just as great an extent here also? Briefly put, is democratic control so much stronger within the context of each national political system as to allow criticism of the EU on these grounds? Thirdly, the critique of democratic deficit is often answered by in terms of a perceived legitimacy of a slightly different kind. Despite possible shortcomings in what one might term input legitimacy, surely the European construction has obtained a large degree of output legitimacy. That is, in terms of results, has the European construction not delivered with great success on what it set out to do? The goals laid down in Articles 2 and 3 of the Treaty of Rome have been in the most part accomplished. Peace, market integration, prosperity — all have been brought about and many have benefited. Ought we not, given this, be able to set democratic failings aside, or at least to some extent count our blessings?

Neither specious nor insignificant in the present climate, the claims of democratic deficit and the responses outlined above which suggest such a critique is difficult to sustain are two sides of a debate which deserves our continued attention. Indeed, Weiler would argue, certain elements of the argument yet require clarification and development in order to consider their full implications. With regard then to the first contested point, we must ask ourselves to what extent the system of IGCs and ratification legitimise the enterprise of European construction. Two points might suggest that the existence of such mechanisms does little to go beyond a formalism which scarcely leaves room to put flesh on the democratic bones of the process. Firstly, the model of the IGC is an ancient one from the world of international law dating form the turn of the 19th and early 20th century. It is a world where the government is sovereign and democratic legitimacy mattered little, a world where being a subject, subject of a monarch that is, went scarcely beyond being an object in international legal terms. This concept, argues Weiler, has not changed in international law to this day, even with the introduction of the protection of fundamental rights since these are given and not chosen. This system was developed in and adapted to earlier times, a Newtonian world where the agreement of treaties happened at a much slower pace, the terms and content were far simpler and could be discussed over time. In today’s Einsteinian world, this same system is used in situations which are incomparably more complex and involved, where reservations are difficult to uphold and deliberation is deadline-constrained. It is also a world where choice is effectively limited to “yes” or “no” and, what’s more, with so much at stake in each instance, a world where we must question the viability of rejection as a real option. Yet besides these problems of how such choices are made and the constraints of the adopted system in making them, we should be
aware of one further point with regard to democratic legitimacy. It is, Weiler points out, that in situations such as these choosing in itself, whilst it may formally confer democratic legitimacy, does not ensure democracy. Would we consider, for example, a democratically elected dictator a democratic regime? Clearly not, is Weiler’s reply, for ensuring democracy depends as much, if not more so, on daily practice as on major choices.

Secondly, in reply to those who claim that the EU is not inflicted by a democratic deficit any more than the national systems of the Member States, we must raise several issues. Some aspects of this point may well be valid but the story does not end here. Certainly, in this instance, two wrongs don’t make a right. We must consider the very real structural democratic shortcomings of the EU’s political system and the effect that these have on the political life of the European polity and in particular its civic culture. The similarities between the EU and the national political systems vary between the Member States and this is borne out by the differing criticisms and points of view which exist in each. However, Weiler stresses, there are two basic notions of democracy which must be present and which the Member States possess while the EU lacks. Firstly, there must be the possibility of democratic control which allows, if necessary, to “throw out the scoundrel”. Secondly, there must be a notion of representation which equates to citizens having the ability to influence policy. This failing in the EU is compounded by the fact that parties in the European Parliament are not elected on the basis of policy proposals. These two factors taken together are undoubtedly a serious flaw in the democratic system of the EU. Added to this is the problem of control and transparency of comitology which affects the EU to a far greater extent than the situation of committees in the Member States. Whilst some have argued that it is redistribution which forms the basis of policy for government and that the regulation involved in comitology is outside the realm of parliamentary politics, Weiler is of the opinion that this is not the case. The distinction, he states, does not hold up since at Community level, regulation and the allocation of risk involves huge norm creation and therefore should be very much part of parliamentary politics. Yet these European committees are not representative of citizens and operate, albeit under the auspices of the Commission, beyond control and outside the normal institutions. On the other hand, it is probably true that by traditional, national yardsticks, the transparency with which they operate is relatively good compared to Member States and often produces open dialogue. However, while this is carried out in good faith, there is no getting around the fact that risk allocation is also about values in deciding which risks are acceptable and which are not. In carrying out this task these committees, innocent and subconscious though it may be, bring their own views and values to bear in a process which ought to incorporate wider opinions involving citizens directly or indirectly and be subject to greater control.

The third and final aspect of the critique of democratic deficit and its detractors dealt with here returns, in the last instance, to a question of political philosophy. Can legitimacy be sought through results? In other words, ought we to be satisfied that the European construction has gained its legitimacy through all that it has achieved, to the extent that this success outweighs other democratic failings? And here, Weiler would say, we must not be content to rest on our laurels in the achievements of what the EU has delivered. For this kind of legitimacy is only half of the equation and true democracy ought not to be, or at least not for the most part, about results. Indeed, we return in some ways to the point made earlier concerning the fact that democracy entails daily practice. From this standpoint legitimacy must be sought rather through process than through results.

The attitude of certain phase of European development coined as the era of permissive consensus has, within the last decade, begun to break down and it is from here that the debate about democratic deficit draws its origins. In particular with the introduction of European citizenship, the time when the people of Europe allowed the European construction to take its course provided the benefits were tangible had come to an end. Serious democratic questions are being asked of the EU and it is for the time being on shaky ground. As one commentator has put it, no doubt with accession criteria in mind, “the EU, if it applied to join itself, might find its own democratic credentials a little short of its ideals”. Myth or reality? — the debate about the democratic deficit has elements of both. But in a topic which is sure to return to the centre of discussions again in the coming months it is as well to be aware which elements are which. As Weiler’s thoughts demonstrate, many years of debate, whilst clarifying some areas, have also blurred boundaries. If we are best to tackle the problem of democratic deficit and legitimacy in the supranational context we must be clear as to where the obstacles lie.
Rules of origin are complex and ill understood and best explained by example. If a pair of countries, “A” & “B”, sign a free trade agreement, *rules of origin* are designed to ensure that imports from another country do not enter that free trade area via the country with the lowest tariffs. Suppose country “A” has separate free trade agreements with both countries “B” and “C” such that each of these can export to “A” without paying tariffs. Now suppose “C” exported a product (say a gearbox) duty free to “B” which was incorporated in a final product (say an automobile) then exported to “A”. Depending on the rules of origin, it is entirely plausible that tariffs would then have to be paid on the car exported to “A” as it does not originate entirely in “B” even if the gear box exported direct to ‘A’ would have attracted no duty because of the free trade area between ‘A’ and ‘C’. *Cumulation* of rules of origin is a means to overcome this problem by allowing country ‘B’ to treat components imported from country ‘C’ as domestic products in trade with ‘A’. Because these are purely administrative rules with no tariff or quota attached, their effects have not until now been satisfactorily measured.

The EU has bilateral agreements and proposed bilateral agreements with a range of Southern Mediterranean Countries. The current situation is that except for between Morocco and Tunisia there is no cumulation of the rules of origin in any of these agreements. The aim of this research is to examine theoretically and empirically the possible impact on trade and investment of adopting, what is known as, the pan-European system of cumulation (which already applies for example between the EU and many of its partners in Central and Eastern Europe and EFTA).

A preliminary report sent to the EU Commission ahead of the Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference on Trade held in Toledo in March 2002 showed that rules of origin, and lack of cumulation of rules of origin can act to significantly distort patterns of trade. In particular the lack of cumulation between a pair of countries is likely to impact negatively on trade flows between that pair countries. Hence, rules of origin can be used as complex and highly opaque forms of protection. As well as the theoretical analysis, three main empirical exercises were undertaken – a descriptive statistical analysis of the impact of cumulation on Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs), a gravity modelling exercise, and a computable general equilibrium modelling exercise.

The descriptive statistical analysis suggests that there is indeed a prima facie case for suggesting that cumulation of rules of origin impacted upon the trade flows of the CEECs. The gravity modelling exercise suggests that trade between non-cumulating countries is at least 40% lower than otherwise would be the case. These results were then used in the computable equilibrium modelling which provides a more detailed sectoral breakdown of the possible impact of cumulation, as well as indicating a positive welfare effect arising from cumulation.
for most of the countries concerned.

As reported in an EU Commission press release, these results helped to inform the discussion at the ministerial meeting in Toledo. Ministers agreed to the principle of including the Mediterranean partners in the system of pan-European cumulation. Our research suggests that this will strengthen regional integration among Mediterranean states as well as integration with the wider European economy. Once more SEI based research has helped policymakers to take important decisions that allow people to trade better and prosper.

**SEI Publications**

Aleks Szczerbiak


**David A. Dyker**

In Brief

**Aleks Szczerbiak** has had a busy spring. On January 15th he presented a paper on 'The Party Politics of Euroscepticism in Eastern Europe' at the London School of Economics seminar on Post-Communist Politics and Policies, LSE, University of London.

Three days later he chaired and participated in the second in a series of five ESRC funded Opposing Europe Research Network seminars on 'The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism in Contemporary Europe', Pembroke College, University of Cambridge. *(see report)*

Charging is caring. On January 25th, Aleks organised and chaired an ESRC One Europe or Several? programme workshop on dissemination strategies, London Waterloo Novotel Hotel.

Not much persuasion was needed to get Aleks to chair another event. On February 15th, he chaired the afternoon session of the SEI/Sussex Centre for Migration Research workshop on 'New Patterns and Impacts of European Migration,' SEI.

On March 1st, Aleks presented a paper on 'Poland and the EU' at a Foreign and Commonwealth Office briefing on 'Poland after the Elections', FCO, London.

A couple of weeks of and then he and Paul Taggart directed a workshop on 'Euroscepticism and Political Parties' between March 21st-27th. Aleks presented a paper on 'The Party Politics of Euroscepticism in EU Member and Candidate States' at the European Consortium for Political Research Joint Sessions of Workshops, Turin. *(see report)*

Finally, at a conference held at School of Slavonic and East European Studies conference on 'Regionalization of Polish Politics', SSEES/UCL, University of London (April 15th-16th) Aleks presented a paper on 'Chaos out of order? Polish parties' electoral strategies and bases of support'

**Iwona Piorko** participated in a workshop on 'Current Level of Illegal Migration and Trafficking in Persons in Ukraine' organised by the State Border Guard Committee of Ukraine in Brussels on 30 January. On 23 March she also participated in a Centre for European Policy Studies academic network meeting on 'Trust and co-operation in judicial, extradition, immigration and asylum matters' organised in Brussels.

**Antonio Galvão**, SEI Dphil, participated in the seminar "Local models of development: clusters of firms and local innovative systems" at the Università dell Insubria, Varese, Italy, between 4th and 14th of April, 2002, where he presented his research project. On 12th and 13th, he participated at the "Innovation and change: regional strategies on policies in Europe" seminar. Antonio would like to characterise this as a good experience and is something he recommends other research students to do.
In February, Adrian Treacher attended the one-day conference on France, Britain and European Security and Defence at the Maison Française, Oxford.

In March, Adrian presented his paper “France and European Security and Defence Cooperation: Full Circle” at the annual conference of the International Studies Association, New Orleans, USA.

Also in March, Adrian gave an interview to Associated Press (AP) on the implications of the impending French presidential and legislative elections for European security and defence.

Former Euroscope editor, Alasdair Young has been awarded the Political Studies Association’s 2000 Lord Bryce Prize for Best Dissertation in Comparative and International Politics for his DPhil thesis, ‘Institutional Evolution and Multiple Modes of Cooperation: Explaining Adaptation in European Foreign Economic Policy.’ A revised version of the thesis, entitled Extending European cooperation: The European Union and the ‘new’ international trade agenda, will be published by Manchester University Press in July.

Conference announcements

On Friday 24 May the XXX are to organise a one-day conference entitled: Homage to Pierre Bourdieu: Interdisciplinary Effects The venue is Arts C233, University of Sussex between 10.30 – 17.30.

Speakers include renowned Sussex scholars such as William Outhwaite (Sociology/SPT), John Holmwood (GsiSS) and Nancy Wood (CulCom GRC), as well as external speakers.

Anyone interested should contact William Outhwaite (r.w.outhwaite@sussex.ac.uk) or Nancy Wood (n.wood@sussex.ac.uk)

The Third Annual Regional Conference of the UACES Student Forum will take place in SEI on Saturday 11th May. All presentations will be by research students from across Europe. This year, thanks to funding from the Commission and UACES, we will be joined by ten students from universities across Central and Eastern Europe. While the programme is now full, we would encourage as many research students as possible to come along to either conference. The Regional Conferences are marked by their relaxed and informal nature and are a great opportunity to meet with other research students and to become more involved in the UACES Student Forum. To register your interest in attending please contact Christine Stark - stark@dragoman.org.

Full programme details of both conferences are featured overleaf…..
UACES Student Forum Southern Regional Conference, SEI, University of Sussex, 11th May 2002.

10:00  Registration and coffee
10:30  Welcome and Introduction

10:45-12:00 Panel 1: The Enlargement of the EU

- EU’s Eastern Enlargement and the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad. The Need of and Ability for Co-operation of the EU and Russia
  - Guido Müntel, Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Birmingham.

- Economic transition in Poland and Romania or The Prince and the Pauper?
  - Carmen Stoian, University of Kent.

- Turkey’s Compliance with the Copenhagen Political Criteria in the Accession Process to the EU
  - Ozlem Caliskan, Marmara University, Turkey.

12:00-12:30 Panel 2: European Foreign Policy

  - Constanza Musu, LSE.

LUNCH

13:30-14:00 Panel 3: The Institutional Reform Process

- The Evolution of the European Council
  - Christine Stark, University of London.

14:00-15:40 Panel 4: European Identity

- Politics of the Collective Memory in Millennial Budapest
  - Emilia Palonen, University of Essex.

- Visions of European Union
  - Ksawery Sommerfield, Warsaw University.

- Language and Identity
  - Ondrej Matejka, Charles University, Prague.

- European Identity Re-shaped: Patterns and Eventual Results
  - Alexander Tevdoy-Bourmouli, Institute of Europe, Moscow.

BREAK

15:55-16:45 Panel 5: Aspects of European Migration

- Referendums on the EU
  - Min Shu, University of Bristol.

- E-Commerce Law Developments: European and Lithuanian Perspectives
  - Mindaugas Civilka, Vilnius University, Lithuania.

10:00-10:30 Coffee

10:30-12:00
- Nancy Wood (CulCom GRC): Bourdieu’s Algeria
- Lois NcNay (Somerville College): Bourdieu and gender
- Jon Mitchell (Soc.Anth): Belief and the Body

12:00-13:00
- Rod Kedward (History): The Concept of ‘habitus’ and the French Resistance
- Gisele Sapiro (CNRS): The Literary Field in a Context of National Crisis: France 1940-44

13:00-14:00 Lunch

14:00-16:00
- Chris Warne (French): Bourdieu and Popular Culture
- Caroline Bassett (Media)/Roger Silverstone (LSE): Bourdieu and Media technology
- Paul Betts (History): Distinction
- Les Black (Goldsmiths): Embodied Sense: Bourdieu and the critical imagination

16:00-17:30
- William Outhwaite (Sociology/SPT): Bourdieu vs Habermas on the Public Sphere
- John Holmwood (GsiSS): Bourdieu’s critique of neo-liberalism

Drinks—IDS Bar
Dinner

SEI Research in Progress Seminars

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Seminar Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 30th April | Dr. Valsamis Mitsilegas, Legal Adviser, House of Lords  
The Scrutiny of EU Legislation by the House of Lords and the House of Commons |
| 7th May    | TBA             |
| 14th May   | Michael Shackleton, European Parliament  
The European Parliament: Rising Star or Shooting Star |
| 21st May   | Prof Maes, National Bank of Belgium, University of Louvain  
On the Origins of the Franco-German EMU Controversies |
| 28th May   | Sean Hanley, Brunel University  
The Centre Right in Post-Communist East Central Europe - Comparative Issues and Comparative Analysis |
| 11th June  | Annike Bergman, DPhil, Sussex European Institute  
An Assessment of Diversities and Similarities in Sweden’s and Denmark’s EU policies |
| 25th June  | SEI Plenum      |
Ok ok, I admit it. First impressions would indicate that, as regards the spring term, I might, perhaps, not be the most appropriate person to write this piece. Indeed my SEI sporting appearances were limited to one, albeit hilarious, appearance on the badminton court ... (more of which later).

However, such is my dedication to the newly created post of SEI Sports Director that I have been sussing out some of the potential opposition for the upcoming summer term football season. I can thus report that even though SEI football was hardly a regular event in the spring term, we have little to fear from the International Relations post-grad team. That sorry mob will be no match for the superior fitness and skills of our multi-talented and multinational squad. I suspect that they will simply panic when faced with the elbow-led screaming and herding tactics of our female players. And I even think I managed to convince them that I myself am not actually that good – my long-hidden acting ability was back to the fore. So they clearly will get a shock when I unveil my Brazilianesque repertoire of moves. IDS will no doubt likewise taste the bitter pill of defeat at the hands of SEI.

But although success and glory are virtually guaranteed, we should still hit the ground running this term. We must ensure that football is restored to its rightful weekly slot; not least so that latecomers to the squad can lay their claim to a place in the first team.

So, back to that badminton game. On this occasion, a potentially all-conquering new doubles partnership was launched on an unsuspecting world. Although Ilias and myself actually lost our first match 3-1 to Petra (mainly) and Javier (partly), the potential is clearly there for global domination. My autumn term partner Ivan (whose thesis concerns human rights) now has a real fight on his hands to keep his place.

So here’s to long sunny days, sporting excellence and a few drinks to celebrate!
Friends of rational choice theory have been keen to adopt this approach on a variety of dilemmas, ranging from where individuals cast their votes (e.g. voting booths compared to postal votes) to coalition formation (e.g. mixed or mono-gender football teams). In choosing lines of behaviour, human beings are assumed to make rational calculations with respect to a utility and a preference hierarchy, comparing costs of alternatives in term of utilities foregone and, perhaps more importantly, which is the best way to maximise utility.

Following the arguments I laid out in ‘Are you absolutely sure China is a democracy?: Rational thinking re-examined’ I will in this article tackle the problems facing presenters at RIPs (Research in Progress Seminars). Since the scope of this article is limited, I will only concentrate on the time frame between 2:15 – 4:00 in an A71 context and will not include any rational undertakings occurring between 6 PM – 11PM in the context of the IDS bar.

Generally speaking, the RIP presenter faces two obstacles. Firstly, the audience spatial location and secondly, the so-called seminar attendant’s dilemma. The first case suggests that we will have a spatial cleavage of participants positioning themselves either in location A) close to the seminar door or B) at the far end of the seminar room. The most immediate problem here is that individuals constituting group A) might have a tendency to leave the presentation due to proximity to exit door and in the case of group B) they might subside to the phenomena known as the ‘sudden shoestring tying – syndrome’ in which the audience suddenly feels a strong urge to divert attention to their shoe-wear as soon the floor is open for questions.

In the second problem, the presenter must confront the issue of convincing the undecided participant that attending the RIP is two hours well spent. The obvious solution, which I have tried a number of times, is to come up with a controversial seminar title. Previously I have used headings such as ‘Save the last Walzer for me: Just solutions to slow-dancing dilemmas’ and ‘The key argument against Locke’s theory of liberty’ to great success.

Since the purpose of the speaker is to keep as many of the participants as humanly possible within the realms of A71 - in order to be invited back and possible to get a travel expense refund - I will suggest the following tactic. Since we are aware of that the audience is divided into two groups (Close to door-types and Far end of the room-types) we should ideally try and appeal to the median listener in order to maximise the number of listeners. However, since the use of force is strictly regulated we can not simply group everyone together in a location of our own choice but resort to an alternative solution. This means-to-an-end approach consists of re-organising the room so that we now have the speaker located in the middle with an even division of listeners on either side. Such a solution will safe-guard against both potential mishaps described above since it enables the speaker to quickly deal with ‘exiters’ and shoe-gazers without losing valuable seminar time.

Hope this helps,
Bob.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Sanctions on Serbia: Sledgehammer or Scalpel</td>
<td>Vesna Bojicic and David Dyker</td>
<td>June 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>The Future for a European Foreign and Security Policy</td>
<td>Gunther Burghard</td>
<td>August 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>The European Community and the Challenge of a Wider Europe</td>
<td>Olli Rehn</td>
<td>July 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>The EU's Association Policy towards Central Eastern Europe: Political and Economic Rationales in Conflict</td>
<td>Ulrich Sedelmeier</td>
<td>October 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Rethinking British Defence Policy and Its Economic Implications</td>
<td>Mary Kaldor</td>
<td>February 1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Competitiveness in Europe: Cooperation or Conflict?</td>
<td>Keith Richardson</td>
<td>December 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>The Technological Competence of European Semiconductor Producers</td>
<td>Mike Hobday</td>
<td>June 1995</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
15. Alasdair Smith, Peter Holmes, Ulrich Sedelmeier, Edward Smith, Helen Wallace, Alasdair Young
   The European Union and Central and Eastern Europe: Pre-Accession Strategies
   March 1996

16. Helen Wallace
   From an Island off the North-West Coast of Europe
   March 1996

17. Indira Konjhodzic
   Democratic Consolidation of the Political System in Finland, 1945-1970: Potential Model for the New States of Central and Eastern Europe?
   June 1996

18. Antje Wiener and Vince Della Sala
   Constitution Making and Citizenship Practice - Bridging the Democracy Gap in the EU?
   December 1996

19. Helen Wallace and Alasdair Young
   Balancing Public and Private Interests Under Duress
   December 1996

20. S. Ran Kim
   Evolution of Governance & the Growth Dynamics of the Korean Semiconductor Industry
   April 1997

21. Tibor Navracsics
   A Missing Debate?: Hungary and the European Union
   June 1997

22. Peter Holmes with Jeremy Kempton
   Study on the Economic and Industrial Aspects of Anti-Dumping Policy
   September 1997

23. Helen Wallace
   Coming to Terms with a Larger Europe: Options for Economic Integration
   January 1998

24. Mike Hobday, Alan Cawson and S Ran Kim
   The Pacific Asian Electronics Industries: Technology Governance and Implications for Europe
   January 1998

25. Iain Begg
   Structural Fund Reform in the Light of Enlargement
   Centre on European Political Economy Working Paper No. 1
   August 1998

26. Mick Dunford and Adrian Smith
   Trajectories of Change in Europe's Regions: Cohesion, Divergence and Regional Performance
   Centre on European Political Economy Working Paper No. 2
   August 1998

27. Ray Hudson
   What Makes Economically Successful Regions in Europe Successful? Implications for Transferring Success from West to East
   Centre on European Political Economy Working Paper No. 3
   August 1998

28. Adam Swain
   Institutions and Regional Development: Evidence from Hungary and Ukraine
   Centre on European Political Economy Working Paper No. 4
   August 1998
29. Alasdair Young  
   *Interpretation and 'Soft Integration' in the Adaptation of the European Community's Foreign Economic Policy*  
   Centre on European Political Economy Working Paper No. 5  
   October 1998

30. Rilka Dragneva  
   *Corporate Governance Through Privatisation: Does Design Matter?*  
   March 1999

31. Christopher Preston and Arkadiusz Michonski  
   *Negotiating Regulatory Alignment in Central Europe: The Case of the Poland EU European Conformity Assessment Agreement*  
   March 1999

32. Jeremy Kempton, Peter Holmes, Cliff Stevenson  
   *Globalisation of Anti-Dumping and the EU*  
   Centre on European Political Economy Working Paper No. 6  
   September 1999

33. Alan Mayhew  
   *Financial and Budgetary Implications of the Accession of Central and East European Countries to the European Union.*  
   March 2000

34. Aleks Szczerbiak  
   *Public Opinion and Eastward Enlargement - Explaining Declining Support for EU Membership in Poland*  
   May 2000

35. Keith Richardson  
   *Big Business and the European Agenda*  
   September 2000

36. Aleks Szczerbiak and Paul Taggart  
   *Opposing Europe: Party Systems and Opposition to the Union, the Euro and Europeanisation*  
   October 2000

37. Alasdair Young, Peter Holmes and Jim Rollo  
   *The European Trade Agenda After Seattle*  
   November 2000

38. Slawomir Tokarski and Alan Mayhew  
   *Impact Assessment and European Integration Policy*  
   December 2000

39. Alan Mayhew  
   *Enlargement of the European Union: an Analysis of the Negotiations with the Central and Eastern European Candidate Countries*  
   December 2000

40. Pierre Jacquet and Jean Pisani-Ferry  
   *Economic Policy Co-ordination in the Eurozone: What has been achieved? What should be done?*  
   January 2001

41. Joseph F. Francois and Machiel Rombout  
   *Trade Effects From The Integration Of The Central And East European Countries Into The European Union*  
   February 2001

42. Peter Holmes and Alasdair Young  
   *Emerging Regulatory Challenges to the EU's External Economic Relations*  
   February 2001
43. Michael Johnson
EU Enlargement and Commercial Policy: Enlargement and the Making of Commercial Policy
March 2001

44. Witold Orlowski and Alan Mayhew
The Impact of EU Accession on Enterprise, Adaptation and Institutional Development in the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe
May 2001

45. Adam Lazowski
Adaptation of the Polish legal system to European Union law: Selected aspects
May 2001

46. Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak
Parties, Positions and Europe: Euroscepticism in the EU Candidate States of Central and Eastern Europe
‘Opposing Europe Research Network’ Working Paper No. 2
May 2001

47. Paul Webb and Justin Fisher
Professionalizing the Millbank Tendency: the Political Sociology of New Labour's Employees
May 2001

48. Aleks Szczerbiak
Europe as a Re-aligning Issue in Polish Politics?: Evidence from the October 2000 Presidential Election
‘Opposing Europe Research Network’ Working Paper No. 3
June 2001

49. Agnes Batory
Hungarian Party Identities and the Question of European Integration
‘Opposing Europe Research Network’ Working Paper No. 4
September 2001

50. Karen Henderson
Euroscepticism or Europhobia: Opposition attitudes to the EU in the Slovak Republic
September 2001

51. Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak
The Party Politics of Euroscepticism in EU Member and Candidate States
April 2002

52. Alan Mayhew
The Negotiating Position of the European Union on Agriculture, the Structural Funds and the EU Budget.
April 2002

Each Working Paper is £5.00 (unless noted otherwise) plus £1.00 postage and packing per copy in Europe and £2.00 per copy elsewhere. Payment by credit card or cheque (payable to the University of Sussex).