Europe’s Immigration Dilemma

By Dr James Hampshire
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When Europe first became a continent with a net inflow of population in the years following the Second World War, immigration was a barely discussed, largely technocratic policy issue.

As guestworkers flowed into European labour markets and colonial immigrants arrived at the shores of former imperial powers, there were voices of opposition, but immigration was not, by and large, a matter of high politics. Fast forward sixty years and the situation could hardly be more different. Today, immigration is one of the most salient and controversial issues in national politics across Europe, and since the 1990s it has ascended to the top of the European Union’s agenda.

Migration management, as it is nowadays called, presents major logistical and technical challenges, but it is also a political conundrum. The basic problem is that whilst Europe needs certain kinds of immigrants and cannot avoid others, Europeans are not enamoured of immigration. Public opinion polls show again and again that European citizens are at best sceptical about immigration and its impact on European societies. Moreover, far right political parties have begun to capitalise on these sentiments and in several countries, have entered into government. In those countries where they have not gained power, the far right has often nevertheless influenced the rhetoric and policies of the mainstream parties that do form governments.

Anti-immigrant political mobilisation both feeds off and stokes controversy about the effect immigration has had on European economies and societies, and on the alleged failure of many immigrants to integrate into their host countries. Since 9/11, this has increasingly focused on concerns about the cultural integration of Europe’s Muslims, leading to controversial measures such as bans on burkas and the construction of Mosques, and a stream of commentary about Islam’s compatibility, or lack thereof, with European values. The recent comments by the former German central banker, Thilo Sarrazin, about German Muslims’ reluctance to integrate was only the latest intervention in this heated debate.

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Ranged against these forces pushing for a restriction of immigration are equally, if not more, powerful forces driving Europe towards openness. Firstly, as a wealthy region surrounded by middle and low income countries to its east and south, Europe faces an abundant supply of potential immigrants. Secondly, there is genuine demand for immigrants in many European countries, for both low-skill ‘3D’ jobs that Europeans are reluctant to do (jobs that are dirty, demeaning or dangerous) and high-skilled jobs such as doctors and IT professionals that too few of them are trained to do. Even if it was...

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able to, Europe could not afford to shut the door completely.

In addition to these supply and demand side drivers, governments face constraints on their ability to prevent immigration that they do not want, both logistical and legal. The ‘fight against illegal immigration’ as the Commission calls it, will always be a losing battle for a free movement area of 25 countries with 42,673 kilometres of sea and 7,778 kilometres of land borders. And as signatories to the Geneva Convention on Refugees, European countries must adhere to the principle of non-refoulement, even if in reality they do a lot to try to prevent people from actually reaching European shores and claiming asylum in the first place. Family migration is similarly constrained by international treaties and national constitutions. The upshot of these factors is that despite the loud voices of opposition, Europe is now the major immigrant-receiving region of the world, outstripping even North America.

Hence Europe’s immigration dilemma: how to manage a phenomenon that is to varying degrees both needed and unavoidable, but which is unpopular with voters and susceptible to populist mobilisation? This is no longer a dilemma faced solely in national capitals, but one increasingly tackled in Brussels as well. National governments began cooperating on migration as early as the 1980s: the most important outcomes of this period were the 1985 Schengen Agreement and the 1990 Dublin Convention, which are still the basis for the EU’s free movement area and asylum policy respectively. It was only with Title IV of the Treaty of Amsterdam that the EU acquired a legal competence to develop common migration policies. Since the coming into force of that Treaty in 1999, a European asylum and migration policy has begun to take shape; it remains very much a work in progress but considerable steps have been taken in just over a decade.

The emerging policy has four main elements: legal migration, asylum, the fight against illegal migration, and external relations. The most evolved areas are those directed at restricting ‘unwanted’ immigrants, namely the latter three elements which are intended to restrict entry of undocumented persons, prevent abuse of the asylum system, and facilitate the removal of illegal immigrants. Thus the EU has made significant advances in areas such as the common visa policy, the establishment of a European border agency, Frontex, and the conclusion of readmission agreements with third countries. As regards asylum, within the wider context of the Dublin system, which requires asylum-seekers to lodge their claim for protection in the first European country they enter, a number of directives have been agreed with the aim of harmonizing asylum procedures, qualifications, and reception conditions. There is some way to go before a common asylum policy becomes a reality – as evidenced by the persistent and often large differences in recognition rates of asylum-seekers between different member states – but further harmonization has been made a priority of the current Stockholm Programme in justice and home affairs.

By contrast, in those areas where the objective of policy is to facilitate or solicit ‘wanted’ immigrants, the EU has acquired far fewer powers. Unlike irregular migration and asylum, where member states share some broadly common objectives, the varying immigration histories and labour markets of the 27 member states makes a common legal migration policy hard to imagine. True, there have been developments here as well, such as the much-trumpeted ‘Blue Card’ for highly-skilled migrants and other legal migrant directives, but these are essentially procedural and do not transfer any competencies over member states’ control of numbers or national preferences. The decision on how many immigrants from outside of Europe to accept remains firmly a national prerogative, and given its political sensitivity it is highly unlikely that this core aspect of sovereignty will be relinquished at any point in the foreseeable future.

Will Europe’s immigration dilemma ease in coming years? It is hard to think so. The deep tensions that exist between the underlying drivers of immigration to Europe on the one hand and the politics of immigration on the other appear as intractable as ever. What does seem certain is that as the common European migration policy proceeds through its second decade, immigration will continue to be one of the most contentious areas of European policymaking.
Who we are...

euroscope is the newsletter of the Sussex European Institute (SEI). It reports to members and beyond about activities and research going on at the SEI and presents feature articles and reports by SEI staff, researchers, students and associates. The deadline for submissions for the Summer term issue is: 1st March 2011.

Editor: Kim Brayson (euroscope@sussex.ac.uk)

The SEI was founded in 1992 and is a Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence and a Marie Curie Research Training Site. It is the leading research and postgraduate training centre on contemporary European issues. SEI has a distinctive philosophy built on interdisciplinarity and a broad and inclusive approach to Europe. Its research is policy-relevant and at the academic cutting edge, and focuses on integrating the European and domestic levels of analysis. As well as delivering internationally renowned Masters, doctoral programmes and providing tailored programmes for practitioners, it acts as the hub of a large range of networks of academics, researchers and practitioners who teach, supervise and collaborate with us on research projects.

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Where to find euroscope!

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• the SEI website: http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/1-4-10-4.html
• via the official mailing list, contact: euroscope@sussex.ac.uk
• hard copies are available from LPS office
• via its new and dedicated facebook group called ‘euroscope’, where you can also join in discussions on the articles

Also feel free to contact us to comment on articles and research and we may publish your letters and thoughts.

Features Section: Migration

The Features section of this edition of euroscope has a special theme and presents articles discussing research currently being done at the SEI on Migration. In this edition, we feature articles on Migration from academics researching in different contexts and departments ranging from Geography to Political Science and more in between. This special edition is being published to coincide with a workshop on Migration being held at the SEI on the 8th of April 2011 being organised by Dr James Hampshire.
Let me open by congratulating Helen Wallace the founding Director of SEI and now Centennial Professor at the LSE who was made a Dame of the British Empire in the New Years Honours List.

For non-British readers do not worry that there is no British Empire just remember as Rodgers and Hammerstein put it “there is nothing like a dame!” It is a high honour and richly deserved by someone who has given great service to this University, to scholarship and interdisciplinary social science, to the quality of policy making in Europe and above all to the many students she has taught and supervised down the years.

I do not think that either of these outcomes are the most likely but the fact that sensible people can contemplate them is surely enough to say that we are in uncharted waters. A debt crisis and indeed a debt write down is not the end of the world for a currency. The problem for the euro is that it is the currency for a group of sovereign states and it does not have the institutions or the policy instruments to deal with the crisis: hence the muddling through from each inevitable stage of the crisis to the next is the order of the day.

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The euro is not unique in confronting the situation that a one size fits all monetary policy will result in wrong policy settings for some part of the monetary area. It is the fact that monetary policy was too loose for too long in Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal in particular that lies at the root of the crisis. These are the circum-

The day I joined SEI the euro came into being albeit for use in financial transactions only. We had to wait a further 3 years for notes and coins to make it palpable. As I enter my last year as Co-Director there are many, and not just fundamentalist eurosceptics who never wished the enterprise well, who wonder if the end of the Eurozone as we know it is now inevitable. At the extreme, they see a threat to the single market and the economic foundations of the EU, if the euro breaks up.

I have my own reasons to thank Helen. She recruited me to SEI in January 1999 from the Foreign Office where I was Chief Economist. I had never been an academic before and she and the selection Committee took a risk. I hope those who are still around still think it was a good idea!

Professor Jim Rollo
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stances for which Willem Buiter, when a member of the monetary policy committee of the Bank of England, said that God created fiscal policy. I will not say more since I am slated to give an RIP on this subject on the 8th February. Events move fast and by then we could have anything from a whole new euro area fiscal policy apparatus to a series of defaults and exits from the euro as countries try to recover competitiveness by currency devaluation.

More and more it looks to me that we may be condemned to repeat the mistakes of the 1930s because nation states choose to play competitive rather than cooperative games with their neighbours.

Looking at the wider world the view is not much better. The G20 that seemed to be the bright new Spring of global economic governance in London in April 2009 is now in disarray. Currency wars are underway and the US is winning in the sense that quantitative easing is driving up global prices for commodities. China and other emerging economies are facing real (China, as wage inflation cuts into its competitiveness) or nominal (Brazil as hot money inflows drive up the currency) appreciation.

The policy responses to this could lead either to a fall in growth rates in the economies that many see as the only sustainable engines for the global economy over the next few years and beyond or an attempt to engineer devaluations. In either case the next round of policy moves could be towards protectionism. More and more it looks to me that we may be condemned to repeat the mistakes of the 1930s because nation states choose to play competitive rather than cooperative games with their neighbours – and in a globalised world we are all each other’s neighbours.

Enough Gloom, the days are getting longer.

Senior Lecturer represents the SEI at EUSA Conference 2011 in Boston

On 3-5 March, Lucia Quaglia will participate in the European Union Studies Association biannual conference in Boston. The conference marks the 22th anniversary of EUSA. The aim of the conference is to promote the broadest possible exchange of theoretical approaches and disciplinary perspectives.

Dr Quaglia will be convening three panels:

- ‘The politics of financial regulation in the EU before and after the crisis’;
- Economic Governance in the EU before and after the crisis’;
- Roundtable on ‘European Economic Governance and Policies, Volume I and Volume II, Kenneth Dyson and Lucia Quaglia, OUP 2010’. (See full article on this book on page 30)
- She will also be presenting a paper on ‘The politics of ‘uploading’ and ‘downloading’ international financial regulation: the case of the EU’. 
The SEI Diary provides snippets on the many exciting and memorable activities connected to teaching, research and presenting on contemporary Europe that members of the SEI have been involved in during Spring 2010.

October:

‘The expert patient’. On the 6th of the month the first Sussex Salon Series debate took place at the Brighton Dome. It addressed the question as to what impact the ‘expert patient’, who has been born of the internet age, is having on medicine. Is lay knowledge and self diagnosis actually good for our health or medical science? These topics were discussed by an expert panel which included The Guardian’s Ed Halliwell (The Mindful Manifesto); Sally Smith QC (senior medical law barrister); Professor Gillian Bendelow (Health, Emotion and the Body); Dr Catherine Will (sociologist of science, technology and health); and Jo Bridgeman (Parental Responsibility, Young Children and Health Care Law).

Congratulations to Paul Webb! The Academy of Social Sciences conferred SEI-based Professor of Politics Paul Webb with the award of Academician. Prof Webb's research interests focus on representative democracy, particularly party and electoral politics. Jim Rollo, SEI Co-Director and Professor of European Economic Integration, and Michael Shackleton, a distinguished SEI Practitioner Fellow, also received this honour last year.

Lucia Quaglia and Kenneth Dyson’s book European Economic Governance and Policies Volume I: Commentary on Key Historical and Institutional Documents came out this month. See the more detailed article on page 30.

Professor Jörg Monar and Professor Malcolm Ross (University of Sussex) led off a SEI round table on “The changing distribution of power within the EU institutions after Lisbon”, held on the 12th of the month.

On the 22nd of October the SEI successfully hosted a Coalitions Conference which looked at how the current coalition government came into being and how the coalition has performed thus far. The conference brought together academics from a range of disciplines and Universities. The conference was organised by Dan Hough. For a more detailed report of the conference see the article on page 32 written by Dan.
November:

**Professor Alan Mayhew** was awarded the Bene Merito Distinction by the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs. This distinction was awarded in recognition of Professor Mayhew's efforts in strengthening Poland's position on the international arena. Professor Mayhew was an advisor to the Polish government from the beginning of the 1990's. In this capacity he assisted Poland's accession to the European Union. Congratulations Alan!


This autumn Professor Szczerbiak also published a chapter entitled 'Poland' in Juliet Lodge (ed), The 2009 Elections to the European Parliament, Palgrave Macmillan 2010.

How new is the 'new politics'?
The second in the Sussex Salon Series of debates took place at the Brighton Pavilion. It explored the question of whether, post expenses scandal and mid coalition, we have entered a 'new politics'? Or is it business as usual behind the spin?
The debate took place with the help of an expert panel comprising of: Caroline Lucas (Green MP, Brighton Pavilion); Liberal Democrat politician Mark Oaten (author of Coalition); Professor Paul Webb (*The Modern British Party System*); Dr Tim Bale (*The Conservative Party: From Thatcher to Cameron*); Dr Luke Martell (author of *New Labour*); and Dr Charlotte Skeet (legal expert: human rights, constitutionalism and gender). See the full article by Luke Martell on page 20.
Collectively, Dan Hough, Dan Keith and Charles Lees published an article in West European Politics entitled “Towards an analytical framework for party mergers—operationalising the cases of the German Left Party and the Dutch GroenLinks”.

On the 29th of the month Prof. Szczerbiak participated in a round table discussion on the 'Perception of Poland and Poles in Great Britain' at a seminar organised by the Polish Institute of Public Affairs (ISP) at the Polish Embassy in London. On the same day, Prof Szczerbiak was interviewed by BBC West Midlands on a report that was produced to coincide with the seminar.

Professor Aleks Szczerbiak gave a paper entitled “Political Parties in East and West: Convergence and Divergence' at the European Union Democracy Observatory (EUDO) Dissemination Conference in Brussels on 18-19 November.

Dan Hough gave a paper entitled “Norms, values and ‘doing the right thing’: the reform of parliamentary expenses in the UK” at a conference held at Royal Holloway on 17th of the month.

On the 26th of the month Tim Bale gave a paper at the “New Conservatism” conference held at the LSE.

December:

Dan Hough travelled to Keele University to give a paper entitled “Possibilities and Pipe dreams: The Myths and Realities of Left Parties in power”.

Volume II of Lucia Quaglia and Kenneth Dyson’s book, European Economic Governance and Policies Volume II: Commentary on Key Policy Documents, was published by OUP. See page 30 for the full article.

Congratulations to SEI-based doctoral researcher Marko Stojic who obtained one of the prestigious 2011 Universities Association for Contemporary European Studies (UACES) Scholarships. Marko is researching the positions adopted by political parties in Croatia and Serbia towards the EU and European integration. Marko will use the scholarship to help fund his fieldwork in Croatia and Brussels. Well done Marko!
Forthcoming Events:

SEI Workshop on European Migration and Policy Making

On Friday April the 8th, Dr James Hampshire is organising an SEI sponsored workshop on European Migration and Policy Making. The workshop will take place in the Sussex conference centre. Confirmed speakers include Andrew Geddes, Christina Boswell, Eiko Theilemann and Matthew Gibney. More speakers and a full programme to be announced!

All are welcome! Please await further details.

Wider Europe Conference at the European Parliament

On 3 and 4 February 2011, the SEI linked Wider Europe network will be holding its next conference entitled "Integrating the Wider Europe after the Lisbon Treaty" on the relations between the European Union and its eastern neighbours at the European Parliament in Brussels. President Buzek is our partner for this event and has agreed to open the conference. Participation is open to all and free although registration in advance is essential. To register, please send a short email to Illya Rozenbaum: illya.rozenbaum@wider-europe.org

SEI Research in Progress Seminars

SPRING TERM 2011
Tuesdays 16.00
Friston 119

18.01.11
Dr Dan Hough, Prof Alan Mayhew & Dr Kai Oppermann (SEI, University of Sussex)
SEI Policy round table on “Germany and EU: living with the costs of leadership”

25.01.11
Dr Peter Holmes (Economics & SEI, University of Sussex)
“Spreading the Single Market to trading partners: how successful has the EU been?”

01.02.11
John Fitzgibbon (SEI, University of Sussex)
“Euro sceptic Protest Movements: A comparative analysis of Ireland, the UK, Estonia and Denmark”

08.02.11
Prof Jim Rollo (SEI, University of Sussex)
“Options for the Eurozone consequent on the sovereign debt crisis on its periphery”

15.02.11
TBA

22.02.11
Alex MacKenzie (Uni Salford) & Ariadna Ripoll-Servent (SEI, University of Sussex)
“The battle over SWIFT: The European Parliament’s consent to international agreements”

01.03.11
TBA

08.03.11
Prof Shamit Saggar (SEI, University of Sussex)
Title TBA

Everyone is welcome to attend!
To be included in our mailing list for seminars, please contact Amanda Sims, email: polces.office@sussex.ac.uk
Migration

This Features section presents SEI research into Migration. There are a number of contributions on Migration, including the cover piece and there are also articles on EU external relations and EU citizenship. These contributions come from a variety of disciplines, highlighting the interdisciplinary approach encouraged by the SEI.

Gendering Remittances and Development in Albania

By Professor Russell King
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One of the joys—and pressures—of working as an academic is that sometimes invitations to tender arrive which, despite time constraints, offer good chances of success in raising research income.

This happened when I was approached by UN-INSTRAW (the United Nations Institute for Training and Research into the Advancement of Women) to tender for research on gendering migration and remittances in Albania. The sum was not huge—$55,000—but sufficient to appoint Julie Vullnetari, who was then just finishing her Sussex DPhil (on Albanian migration) as the Research Assistant on the project, responsible for the field data collection and first-drafting of the final report.

The idea was to focus on a ‘migration and remittance corridor’. We chose a cluster of villages in south-east Albania and the Greek city of Thessaloniki, linked by one of the few roads that cross the Greek–Albanian border. The main field task was to administer a detailed face-to-face questionnaire survey to a sample of 350 remittance-receivers in the villages and do follow-up in-depth interviews with some of them, and with a sample of remittance-senders in Thessaloniki.

Why the need to gender remittances? There is a big debate over the relationship between migration and development, conceptualised in various ways over the years. The traditional neoclassical view saw migration as a natural response to spatially uneven development and as ultimately self-correcting once enough people had migrated to create a new equilibrium position. Dependency theorists saw the relationship in exactly the opposite terms: migration from poor to rich countries was part and parcel of the very structure of the world’s uneven development, and self-perpetuating, as the ‘labour periphery’ could only survive by exporting workers. Recently an alternative view has gained currency (literally!): migration is seen as a route out of poverty and a means for development for the sending areas through the compensatory flow of remittances, used to sustain livelihoods and potentially as a source of development capital.

However, this lively debate on remittances is articulated purely in financial terms—how to maximise their quality and development im-
pact—and rarely in terms of their human, and particularly gender, dynamics. So the questions that need to be answered are as follows: Who sends remittances? Who receives them? And who decides how they are to be spent? Or, put more broadly: How does gender shape remittance processes amongst Albanian migrants and their family members, both abroad and in Albania? And how, in turn, do migration and the sending or receiving of remittances reshape gender relations amongst those affected?

**Albania, then, is an excellent test case to examine the gender–remittances nexus. The migration statistics are extraordinary: since 1990 the country has witnessed an outmigration of epic proportions**

In the gender and development literature there is an assumption that women are ‘better’ remitters than men; that is, they send more of their income, and are more reliable senders. It is also assumed that they are better ‘users’ of remittances, spending more for the benefit of the family than men, who ‘waste’ remittances on less altruistic outlets. The limited evidence available, from statistics and the small amount of empirical research, is however, highly contradictory. But we also came to realise that ‘Are women better remitters than men?’ is not the right question, particularly if, as in Albania, society is so patriarchal that women are hardly even allowed to remit.

Albania, then, is an excellent test case to examine the gender–remittances nexus. The migration statistics are extraordinary: since 1990 the country has witnessed an outmigration of epic proportions. Currently there are more than 1.4 million Albanians living abroad who have emigrated in the last twenty years, equal to 45 per cent of the country’s resident population of 3.2 million. Most of the emigration has been to Greece and Italy. Remittances, well over $1 billion per year, account for between 10 and 20 per cent of GDP (World Bank 2011).

What did our research find? The full story is in our forthcoming book (Vullnetari and King 2011) and summarised in an already-published online working paper (King and Vullnetari 2010). Results from the questionnaire (n=350) revealed that 99 per cent of remittance-receivers stated that their main remittance-sender was male. Hence, women were practically never seen as principal remittance-senders. According to traditional Albanian social and family norms, when a woman marries she becomes the ‘property’ of her husband and his wider family who, in a migratory situation, also lay claim to her remittances, channelling them under the ownership of the husband to his, not her, parents and family members. So, at first glance, men control the sending of remittances.

However, the in-depth interviews, both in Thessaloniki and in the villages, showed that some gender adjustment had taken place. Some women did send remittances independent of their husbands (to their own parents or sisters), but only under the guise of ‘presents’ or, to use a ubiquitous phrase, ‘just for a coffee’. Some ‘female’ remittances consisted of small amounts sent in secret, without the knowledge of husbands or in-laws. It is also worth noting that traditional Albanian rural society does not permit single young women to migrate on their own.

At the other end of the remittance corridor, receivers were of two main types. Female-headed households where the husband had emigrated, either seasonally or all year round. In the latter subtype, wives attained greater agency in administering the remittances and the household, but this ‘empowerment’ was often seen as a burden. In the former subtype, ‘seasonal’ husbands retained more control. The second main type of remittance-receivers were old men who received from their sons. In Albanian society it is the ‘duty’ of the sons (especially the youngest son) to support parents in their old age. Where the father had died and left a widow, sons remitted to them.

Whatever the situation, the patterns of migration and remittance transfer in Albania can only be understood through a gender lens. Such a perspective reveals both the hegemonic power of centuries-old patriarchal ways, and also the re-negotiations of gender relations that are possible through the ‘modernising’ experience of migration.
Governments across Europe are seeking to refresh their individual and collective strategies for taming Islamist-inspired terrorism. In Britain, this is the result of a change of government in spring 2010. A prominent backbench MP, Stephen Timms, was near fatally attacked by a lone, radicalised individual during that election campaign, reminding us of new tactics in the face of considerable success in disrupting larger terror networks. In Sweden in the first week in December 2010, another radicalised individual acting alone came close to carrying out a major “homespun” attack on weekend shoppers and diners.

These developments imply that a change in the source and nature of threats. But existing international terrorist conspiracies continue to drive the underlying engine of Islamist extremism.

Government strategies need to address both varieties, and in doing so, review on any on-going basis what allows men of violence first to recruit new members to their specific cause, and second to take comfort from many more in their communities to turn a blind eye to such violence.

**Tacit appetites for violence**

The biggest controversies over reappraisals of Government strategies have been in relation to preventing extremism and with it the tacit appetite for violence. Prevention rightly builds on protect themes because Governments cannot ignore that grassroots opinion in many Muslim communities contains grievances over foreign policy and what are seen as acts of impunity by Western nations. Security policy based strategies have resulted in a clamour for an approach that promises to shift away from dealing with terrorism “behind closed
doors and in secret”. But criticism has come from civil libertarians who have warned against policy itself being conducted in the shadows. The case for upgrading our protection of soft, high value targets has been a real priority for some time. Post Mumbai and pre-Olympics it is unanswerable.

Learning from muddle

New strategic thinking can learn from earlier muddle in two identifiable areas. Firstly, and most importantly, challenging specific communities to “shape up” in order to safeguard our shared values is going to be highly risky. It carries with it an unspoken inference that those that do not should be “shipped out”. It is an unnecessary risk. This is because the strategy fails to appreciate that such support is by definition an organic phenomenon. It grows from a society in which dissent is not ordinarily demonised. Furthermore, rightly or wrongly, backing for democracy and the rule of law is not present in significant pockets of Europe today. Exalting that extremists be challenged to show their backing for democracy is understandable but it will not help. And artificially engineering such backing in alienated communities is naive, possibly dangerous.

Secondly, there remains an under appreciation of how much the moral oxygen for extremism and violence lies at the very heart of the challenge. For policy-makers, taming terror requires an iterative and resilient mindset. Taming terrorism in not a one-way process. Stumbles permeate and should be expected. Smart policy that is in learning mode can help to ensure that two steps backwards might be limited to a single step. But no-one remotely doubts that progress forward has been made. Likewise with several dozen Islamist-inspired, Jihadi cells in Europe today. The new strategy to prevent repeated terrorism should spell out what beleaguered European Muslims might do to challenge themselves.

Government can help, but only at the margins. It cannot possibly provide a synthetic substitute for Muslims - kids and women especially - investing in safeguarding in their own public reputation. That reputation may not be deserved, and currently sees Muslims largely as dangerous extremists seeking a one-sided legal and moral carve-out from liberal democracy.

Government’s role

Finally, Government’s role is crucial and but can be exaggerated by the well-intentioned. Simply put, it should not be to challenge. Such a challenge, to be effective, must come from within communities themselves.

Countering terrorism, version 2.0, will need further fresh, critical thinking. The aim is, as before: to prevent extremism and terror.

The more effective levers held by Government are those that shape long term social inclusion. This means reshaping and sensitising policy on school attainment, skills and training, employment access, higher education, early intervention for families facing crisis, and so on. These are existing policy levers that, while they don’t impact on extremism directly, can have a significant impact on whether or how far communities remain isolated, inward facing and susceptible to grievance politics in the long run.

Countering terrorism, version 2.0, will need further fresh, critical thinking. The aim is, as before: to prevent extremism and terror. The best tools are, as before: to nudge European Muslims to act in a timely and proportionate way to manage and nurture their reputation as members of European democracies.

Shamit Saggar is SEI Professor of political science at the University of Sussex. His book, Pariah Politics: Understanding Western Radical Islamism and What Should be Done, is published this month in paperback by Oxford University Press. Available with 20% discount at: http://www.oup.com/uk/catalogue/?ci=9780199558131
Migration in the Euromediterranean Region: the Euromed Migration Project

By Dr Michael Collyer
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The Euromediterranean region is a fairly flimsy creation, more political than geographical. It has undergone some important changes since its first formal articulation at the regional conference that launched the Euromed (or Barcelona) process in November 1995.

At that time it described a grouping of the then 15 EU members with 12, ‘Southern Mediterranean partners’, including those with no Mediterranean coast (Syria and Jordan), but excluding some that did (Libya). This collective soon ran into difficulties. Following the Al Aqsa intifada of 2000, high level discussions between Israel and the Arab states virtually stopped. Even the celebrated ten year anniversary conference in Barcelona in 2005 failed to reignite much spark to the process.

In 2008, the Euromed process was transformed into the Union for the Mediterranean, under the French presidency. This was a result of a compromise between President Sarkozy’s initial plan for a politically separate ‘Mediterranean Union’ and other EU Member States who wanted to retain some control. The ‘UfM’ therefore includes all 27 Members of the EU and a slightly different collection of Southern States, as Malta and Cyprus have joined the EU but there are six new southern partners, with Libya as an observer. In contrast to the Barcelona process, the Union for the Mediterranean has official political structures, with a secretariat based in Barcelona and summits of heads of state every two years. Unfortunately, these summits are facing the same fate as the Barcelona process and have been derailed by the lack of progress in the Israel-Palestine peace process; the first heads of state summit, initially due to be held in Barcelona in 2010 was delayed and then cancelled.

While these high level summits have run aground, the Euromed process established a pattern of regular thematic meetings between lower level functionaries of the EU and partner states, which has continued. This has included one track focused on migration. The Euromed Migration project ran from 2004 to 2007 when the first Euromed Ministerial meeting on migration was held in Portugal. The Sussex Centre for Migration Research has been a partner in the second Euromed Migration project (www.euromed-migration.eu), which followed the Portugal meeting and runs until early 2011. There are nine partner countries in this project: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, Syria and Tunisia.

Sussex’s role has focused on a research project into migration legislation, institutions and policies in these nine countries. With a colleague, Ramy Aly in anthropology, I have coordinate a team of nine experts, one in each partner country, who have produced comparable country reports on the current state of migration legislation in their countries. This term we have made visits to most of these countries for discussions with the experts and supplementary research with policy makers and civil society figures on questions of migration in the region. We are writing this up into a report to be presented at the Euromed Migration II final meeting in Brussels in March 2011.

Sussex’s role has focused on a research project into migration legislation, institutions and policies in these nine countries. The disparity across the Euromed region is even more stark considering the migration experience of these partner countries. They divide quite
clearly into three distinct groups: the three Maghreb countries with large emigrant populations concentrated in Europe; Egypt and Palestine with significant emigrant populations mostly in the region or the Gulf states and Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and Israel which are all net immigration countries. This leads to very different migration legislation and varying interest and motivation in engaging with the EU on these questions.

Our report is structured according to the EU’s Global Approach on Migration, which falls into three sections: legal migration, illegal migration and migration and development. It identifies substantial gaps between objectives of the EU’s global approach and results across the region; for example, despite substantial pressure from the European Commission, and almost a decade of negotiations, Morocco has yet to sign a readmission agreement with the EU and has no intention of doing so. Yet it also finds evidence for growing convergence: new substantial pieces of legislation passed in the last few years in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and planned legislation in Jordan all look surprisingly similar and bear the imprint of EU discussions.

It is possible that, at least in the context of migration, the EU is may have some success at transforming the artificial geopolitical creation of the Union for the Mediterranean into a more substantial political reality.

**Access to EU negotiating directives: The latest step in the EP’s growing hold on EU external relations**

By Professor Jörg Monar
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When the EU negotiates agreements with third-countries its representatives conduct these under “negotiating directives” of the Council (also referred to as “negotiating mandate”).

These directives determine both the objectives aimed at and the margins of possible concessions to the negotiating partners in order to allow for overall compromises. The EU representatives (normally from the Commission) are tightly bound by these directives and have to seek approval from the Council for any potential deviation from the original mandate.

The conduct of international negotiations has traditionally been considered an exclusive prerogative of the executive branch of government. Because of this and also the consideration of secrecy of negotiation mandates as being crucial for denying third-countries any possible tactical negotiation advantages the Council had always refused to grant to the EP access to negotiating directives. It had left it largely to the Commission to inform the Parliament about the broad aims only of the negotiations to be pursued.

While most national parliaments accept the executive prerogative and secrecy rationale of international negotiation mandates, the EP has already in the past contested the Council’s upholding of this rationale regarding agreements negotiated wholly or partly under EU competence. Further to the strengthening of its powers in EU external relations by the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the Parliament went again on the attack against this bastion of Council primacy in EU external relations – and won substantial concessions.
On 9 July 2010 the Chairman of the EP Foreign Affairs Committee, Gabriele Albertini, sent a letter to EU High Representative/Vice-President of the Commission Catherine Ashton requesting access for EP rapporteurs to negotiating mandates. Referring to the new Article 218(10) TFEU according to which the EP “shall be immediately and fully informed at all stages” the Chairman held that “all stages” included the definition of the negotiating directives.

This time the Council gave in and the Working Party on General Affairs developed a procedure for granting MEPs access to negotiating directives which was endorsed by the COREPER on 1 December 2010: According to this procedure, requests for access have to be submitted by the President(s) of the relevant Committee(s) to the President of the Council. The Council will decide on those on a case by case basis, but “make every effort to respond positively”. Access will then be granted in a “secure room within the Council premises” and on the conditions that the document itself will remain “in the possession” of the Council and that no “direct reference to the detailed contents” will be made in any public meetings. As a positive initial gesture the Council decided to apply this procedure immediately to the negotiating directives for the new Framework Agreement between the EU and Libya – as previously requested by the Foreign Committee Chairman.

While the Council has reserved itself the possibility to deny access, it can be assumed that granting access upon request will become standard practice, for which the EU-Libya agreement already sets a precedent. The EP has thus acquired a power which most of its national counterparts never had. One may consider this as a case of overstepping the borderline between legislative
and executive powers. Yet the EP’s successful claim finds some justification in the fact that the political bond of overall trust and control which normally exists at the national level between a parliamentary majority and a government mandating and negotiating with third-countries, does not exist between the EP on the one hand and the Commission and the Council on the other. It is thus a reflection of the sui generis constitutional system of the EU with its complex legislative/executive divide.

In what respects will this actually matter? Committee Chairmen, rapporteurs and political group leaders will have a chance to ascertain better than ever before what is - and what is not - in a given EU negotiating mandate. As a result of this, they may be able to put more pressure on the Council to take into account EP positions right from the start of the negotiations. They will also be able to judge more critically to what extent the Commission as chief negotiator has given more or less weight to the different elements of its mandate, whereas in the past the Commission was often able to hide behind a Council mandate MEPs had never seen. It remains to be seen not only how the EP will be using its most recent gain in power in EU external relations, but also whether third-countries might not benefit from an occasional leaking out of EU objectives and compromise margins as a result of the new ‘democratic’ access to these formerly classified documents.

**A Constitutional Patriotism Perspective on European Constitutionalism and Citizenship**

By Robin MacDonald & Dr Yuri Borgmann-Prebil

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In 2009, Robin earned a Junior Research Bursary which enabled him to engage in an eight week research project on European Citizenship supervised by Yuri Borgmann-Prebil. The project feeds into Yuri’s research around European citizenship and specifically the theory of Constitutional Patriotism. This article is a précis of some of the findings.

Is there a European identity? How is it significantly different to those that emerge in the nation-state? Are values universal or only universally accepted within a normative context? This contribution argues that the concept of ‘constitutional patriotism’, the idea that political attachment ought to centre on norms, values and procedures rather than on a pre-political conception of a nation, can be utilised to understand core characteristics of European constitutionalism and citizenship. The context in which constitutional patriotism emerges is described and then applied to the European Union in both the political, legal and social spheres.

**Introduction and Genealogy**

The idea of constitutional patriotism can be traced back to immediate post-war West-Germany, in particular to Karl Jaspers who called for a new ‘collective responsibility’ - as opposed to ‘collective guilt’ - and argued that a negative past could form the foundation of a renewed form of social cohesion. He envisaged a project of continuously contested memory and, interestingly, associated a ‘working through the past’ with the formation of a new kind of cosmopolitanism and ‘universal membership’. This foreshadows the notion of constitutional patriotism as later coined by Dolf Sternberger, and then further developed by Jürgen Habermas. While Sternberger’s conception has strong republican underpinnings, conceived as devotion to
the rule of law and fundamental rights, and which connects with pre-national patriotism, his version of the notion was nevertheless still embedded in a, perhaps typically German, ‘consciousness of belonging to the state’.

Habermas’ appropriation of the concept departed from the focus on the state in accordance with his social theory and adopting Kohlberg’s psychological model of ‘post-conventional identities’, which aspired to adopt as impartial a point of view as possible, Habermas denied the possibility of any unproblematic reference to quasi-sacred objects, including the state.

The relativisation of identities leads to ‘de-centred’ identities and has repercussions at a social level. The legal system of the polity can no longer be justified by virtue of ‘sacred or quasi-sacred properties’ but only by virtue of rights and popular sovereignty, which by their very nature comprise a universalist core. Rights, although charged with universalist essence and aspiration, can only be redeemed within a particular context, or social reality, which in turn is transcended by the very normative content. This signifies the dialectics between universalism and particularism which imbues Habermas’ legal theory, as well as constitutional patriotism. This dichotomy also underpins this paper as it submits that European integration represents not only an ideal phenomenon for challenging the often unreflected acceptance of the nation state as the only viable particularisation of the constitutional state and citizenship, but, what is more, it also provides a more abstract, and also more ‘universalist’, forum for redeeming universal concepts and values in legal and political practice.

A European Constitutional Patriotism?

Recently, Jan-Werner Müller advocated the application of constitutional patriotism to the European Union. Müller’s appropriation and further development of the theory of constitutional patriotism envisages the concept as a broader one than a post-conventional identity. Constitutional patriots must adhere to fair terms of political cooperation, which facilitates robust debate and allows for reasonable disagreement. Constitutional Patriotism provides a common language, more specifically a mode of problematisation and contestation within a shared normative framework. This constitutional culture is not necessarily homogenous or harmonious, i.e. it is not an expression of an underlying national core identity. It rather only requires agreement on ‘constitutional essentials’, which can sustain or reconcile deep-seated conflict or provide for an agreement to disagree.

This aspect in particular renders Constitutional Patriotism amenable to not only supranational constitutionalism and the relationship between EU and member state legal systems in particular, but also to the promotion of political inclusiveness in increasingly multicultural societies and to the development of a plausible source of political cohesion in post conflict societies.

Constitutional Patriotism and the Single Market

The Court of Justice’s rule of reason jurisprudence also supports the case for a European Constitutional Patriotism. The rule of reason constitutes the key mechanism of the so called negative harmonisation or integration. It perhaps best be illustrated by reference to the landmark judgement in Cassis de Dijon, which concerned the mundane question of whether a French fruit liquor (‘Cassis de Dijon’), which was lawfully produced in France, could be barred from the German market on the grounds that it did not comply with a the German law, which prescribed that for a beverage to be sold in Germany as a fruit liquor would need to have an alcohol content higher than that of Cassis de Dijon. The essence of the Cassis judgement is the interplay of the principle of mutual recognition and the rule of reason. In the words of the Commission, this principle of mutual recognition entails that “… any product imported from another member state must in principle be admitted to the territory of the importing state if it has been lawfully produced […] and marketed in the territory of another”.

This interplay can be best construed and indeed explained in the light of a balancing of principles. Alexy’s notion of ‘optimisation requirements’ is most opportune in this regard. Optimisation requirements are norms that prescribe that some-
thing has to be realised as far as legally and factually possible. If two legal principles point in opposite directions, which is the case if their application results in contradicting solutions, then this means that one limits the legal possibilities of the other.

Crucially, according to Alexy, and in contrast to Ronald Dworkin’s rights theory, both rights and countervailing interests are construed as principles. Thus, the free movement rights and their derogation grounds are interpreted as optimisation requirements within the meaning of Alexy’s theory. Both have to be balanced against each other in the light of the principle of proportionality. This is so especially because a post-traditional society does not per se render all forms of convention and tradition illegitimate, but that it requires an at least partial reinterpretation, or refraction, of tradition in the light of universalist norms and procedures, which then results in either a reflective endorsement or rejection of national traditions. This is precisely what the rule of reason does. National rules reflective of national tradition and convention are not regarded as illegitimate per se. However, the rule of reason is commensurate with universalist norms and procedures, against which those national rules are assessed.

The European Commission’s ‘Europe for Citizens’ Programme

It is finally submitted that the Commission, through its ‘Europe for Citizens’ Programme, also forwards the case for European constitutional patriotism. It attempts to engage the (European) citizenry in a positive way by funding activities aimed at establishing and promoting further dialogue and integration. By providing the normative context the Commission brings together diverse communities who would otherwise have little interaction. The Programme enables grassroots organizations to foster cross border interaction, paving the way for a critical discussion. For example, Active Citizens for Europe brings people together from across Europe to promote a sense of “understanding” through town twinning. Twinning projects generally link two or more towns and/or cities through common ceremonies and festivities that can be celebratory, reflective or practical by combating a common problem. In one such project the communities of Giberville, France and Murlo, Italy collaborated in a number of ways to heighten awareness of their water shortages. These projects create a three-way dialogue, between the ‘twins’, whose shared past is the basis for critical discussion and between the twins as a collective and the European Commission who encourage a common yet critical sense of identity.

In another project, a number of coastal cities including; Jurmala, Latvia; Anadia, Portugal; Cabourg, France; Eskilstuna and Gävle, Sweden; Palanga, Lithuania; Pärnu Estonia and Terracina, Italy were concerned with their own protection and preservation due to erosion, global warming and environmental conservation. The towns organized a conference entitled, “Managing and Protecting the Coast” where experts, local citizens, politicians and other representatives were able to engage in a shared experience. Their individual efforts at protection were quite different and the exchange of ideas, information and resources exhibited may create new modes of attachment within a common constitutional culture. These projects may be perhaps the newest examples of an emerging constitutional patriotism in Europe. The structure is also noteworthy as they are not simply top-down or bottom-up exercises which yields a reflective process of critical and constructive discourse between (formerly) antagonistic forces.

Like the jurisprudential dimension of the Single Market project, the purpose of the Commission’s ‘Europe for Citizens’ Programme and its language are strongly evocative of the core characteristics of constitutional patriotism. These preliminary findings, it is argued, support the cause for more research into constitutional patriotism and further investigation as to its practical application as well as its potential development as a political and legal theory.
This section presents updates on the array of research on contemporary Europe that is currently being carried out at the SEI by faculty and doctoral students.

How New is the New Politics?

By Professor Luke Martell
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On November 3rd politicians, academics from SEI and LPS, and a public audience gathered at the Dome in Brighton to discuss the question ‘How new is the new politics?’ The background was the 2010 UK election, the novelty of a coalition government, and the forthcoming referendum on change to an Alternative Vote system. But will these events change British politics? And how new is this really?

The government is a coalition in name only. The junior supporting party has got little out of it. The most they won from the coalition deal was a referendum on a new voting system that falls far short of the proportional alternative they believe in. The Conservatives will campaign hard for a no vote.

Beyond this the Liberal Democrats’ main achievement has been to get bodies in government, rather than successes in ideology and policy. They made a rapid turn around on policies like student tuition fees, which they had been against but now propose doubling and using to replace public funding. They have employed a rhetoric of fairness. But it has been used to legitimate policies that hit certain groups the hardest, the poor and women for instance. David Cameron has allowed the Liberal Democrats to use a discourse of fairness to hide unfairness. Nick Clegg looked like an astute politician in the election campaign and coalition negotiations. Since then Cameron has looked cleverer, and Clegg the naïve one taken advantage of.

Politics since May 2010 have been old politics. They have involved traditional Conservative preferences. The Comprehensive Spending Review uses deficit reduction as a justification for implementing large-scale cuts to the public sector, especially welfare. The Conservatives say there is no alternative. But there is. The Labour Party favours cuts, but smaller and slower ones. Alternatives include increases in tax, for example on corporations and financial transactions, and the cancellation of Trident. The CSR does not address the basis of the crisis in short-term risk-taking by banks. Policies have been to cut spending to deal with effects, rather than regulate to tackle the root cause.

Think about higher education. The government propose big reductions in government funding of teaching, especially in subjects outside those with a narrow business rationale. Immigration, which provides vital funds for higher education and boosts economic growth, is also being reduced.

These cuts will be partly offset by increases in fees
paid by students. A reason given for this is that there is no money to pay for higher education. But the money is there. It is just to be paid by students rather than taxpayers.

The consequence is that public institutions will become increasingly privatised, funded by consumers instead of the state. Making judgements about what sort of education will provide for the public good will be replaced by education tailored to increasing income on the market. The balance of courses at universities is likely to change to one that favours courses with a narrowly economic justification at the expense of those geared to social need or the enhancement of culture.

The issue of inequality is highlighted further by the fact that the crisis was caused by self-interested decisions made by bankers but is being dealt with by special emphasis on cuts to welfare.

Another effect will be a division between universities charging higher fees and attracting middle class students, and others who charge lower fees attracting mainly working class students - reinforcement of a multi-tier class-based system. Or working class participation, such as it is, will drop and lower tier universities will close down with serious consequences for student places, staff jobs and the economies of local communities.

The issue of inequality is highlighted further by the fact that the crisis was caused by self-interested decisions made by bankers but is being dealt with by special emphasis on cuts to welfare.

The government does not have a democratic mandate for this radical restructuring. The Conservatives do not have a majority of seats and the Liberal Democrats are supporting them in policies that their own voters did not vote for.

Labour post-New Labour has not opposed these policies. In fact they initiated tuition fees and propose less cuts more slowly. New Labourites say new thinking is needed about the boundaries between the market and the state. But this is another way of talking about the market and privatisation taking over state functions.

The TUC responded to a Spending Review in October that would lead to 490,000 job losses in the public sector, on the government’s own figures, with a proposal for a demonstration – to be staged an astonishing 5 months later.

The Labour Party and trade unions have evacuated the space for anti-cuts politics. A hole for the politics of the public good – once at the basis of the labour movement - has been left.

In response to this failure of democracy, party politics and trade unions, people have filled the gap by taking to the streets – the politics of civil society rather than party or state. The public good has had to be defended by people organising outside politics. This is also not new politics. Social movements coming out of society to fill the space left by the failure of mainstream politics is age-old. The labour movement and the public sector came from these roots themselves.

Demonstrators are concerned about traditional issues such as equality and the social good. Higher education protests in the UK have not been the politics of self-interest. Many of the tens of thousands of students who have taken to the streets will not be hit by the changes in government policy. They will have graduated by the time these take effect. They were protesting for their staff, successor generations of students and for values they believed in.

What I have described is old politics – the public good versus the market, questions about the role and size of the state or private provision, issues of welfare, equality and social justice, and questions about functioning democracy, and the role of political parties or social movements. Radical restructuring of the state is being proposed. And the main divide in the debate is quite an old one – between left and right.
The Politics of Pledging EU Referendums

By Kai Oppermann
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Why do governments commit to referendums on European integration when they are not obliged to do so? This research question is at the heart of my Marie-Curie project at the Sussex European Institute which looks at the driving forces behind 28 discretionary cases of government pledges on EU referendums in 15 European countries.

The first objective of the project has been to develop a general typology of strategic reasons for governments to voluntarily pledge public consultations on European issues. Starting out from a broad two-level framework that expects governments to adapt to domestic and European level constraints, the suggested typology consists of two dimensions: the first is about the political level at which the strategic use of referendum pledges is targeted, and it distinguishes between domestic and European reasons for governments to commit to EU referendums; the second dimension attends to the strategic mode of governments when committing to referendums on European integration which can either be about avoiding political losses (the defensive mode) or about realising political gains (the offensive mode).

In combination, the two-dimensional typology yields four ideal types of strategic reasons for governments to pledge EU referendums: the depoliticising referendum pledge (domestic/defensive), which governments employ to defuse and evade the contestation of European policy in interparty and intraparty politics; the plebiscitary referendum pledge (domestic/offensive), which is a means of governments to mobilise public support and legitimacy and to encourage divisions within the opposition; the red-line referendum pledge (European/defensive), which is employed to entrench a government’s veto position in European negotiations; and the internationalist referendum pledge (European/offensive), by which governments seek to further European integration and their own integrationist agenda.

Exemplar cases for depoliticising referendum pledges include the 1972 accession referendum in Norway and the 2004 referendum pledge of the Blair government in Britain on the European Constitutional Treaty; the referendum pledges of French Presidents Mitterrand on the Maastricht Treaty and Chirac on the Constitutional Treaty serve to illustrate the plebiscitary type; an example of a red-line referendum pledge would be the 2004 commitment again of President Chirac to give the French people a vote on an eventual accession of Turkey to the EU; and Luxembourg’s 2005 referendum on the European Constitutional Treaty and the 1989 referendum on the Spinelli Report in Italy are instances of internationalist referendum pledges.

The second stage of the research project will be to apply this typology to the 28 EU referendum pledges under study. This will be based first on the findings of existing case studies; and second on an expert survey which has been conducted to complement the case study evidence and to gather comparable data on the rationale of governments when they commit to referendums on European issues. Starting out from the two-dimensional typology, the survey has asked country experts for their judgement on the significance of different reasons for EU referendum pledges that have occurred in their country. The survey has been sent out to 169 experts in 15 countries, and the response rate now stands at 54%. The results of the survey are currently being compiled and brought together with the case study data. The objective thus is to come to a comprehensive account of the politics of pledging referendums on European integration and to draw conclusions on observable patterns in the strategic use of EU referendum commitments.
Military Adaptation and the Afghan Insurgency

By Dr Sergio Catignani
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Dr. Sergio Catignani, SEI Associate, has recently begun a 12-month research project entitled, Military Adaptation and the Afghan Insurgency, funded by the Leverhulme Trust. The project will analyse to what extent the British and U.S. Armies have been able to adapt their doctrine, organisational structure, and operational methods, to the insurgency in Afghanistan (2001-2009).

The research objectives of the study will be: 1) to examine the nature and extent of adaptation British and U.S. Armies have undergone in order to operate effectively within the counter-insurgency (COIN) mission in Afghanistan; and 2) to assess to what extent the organisational culture of each army has either encouraged or impeded such adaptation to COIN warfare. Such research could not come at a more crucial time given the difficulties that these (and other Western) militaries have encountered in trying to adapt their conventional forces for COIN missions.

The research project will focus on the learning processes that may lead to doctrinal and training innovation within military organizations. Dr. Catignani will attempt to examine:

- how doctrine has been regarded and is regarded in the British Army/land forces;
- the way lessons are collected and processed in doctrine and training programmes;
- the way such lessons and particularly doctrine are diffused (e.g., through seminars, lectures, pre-deployment training);
- and, most importantly, what impact doctrinal and training changes have had and are having on units that have served/are serving in Afghanistan.

With particular reference to the impact that ‘new’ doctrine and training have had on organizational innovation, Dr. Catignani plans to carry out:

- participant observation of sessions in which doctrine and training in relation to COIN operations are carried out (with units undergoing pre-deployment preparation and with units returning from Afghanistan);
- carry out interviews with those involved in the doctrine, lessons learned and training processes relating to COIN operations and Afghanistan;
- explore feedback from members of combat brigades who have served in Afghanistan on the relevance of doctrine and training that they were provided prior to their deployment through interviews and anonymous surveys.

Dr. Catignani’s study aims to contribute to academic and policy debates regarding the role that militaries have in interventions where stability and reconstruction tasks and not just the use of military force are central to a mission’s success.
A New Visitor at the SEI

By Morten J. W. Hansen
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Morten J. W. Hansen is a Ph.D. student at the Department of History and Area Studies at Aarhus University, Denmark. He holds a combined MA in Public Administration and History from Roskilde University. His main interests are European and Nordic politics in a historical context.

In his Ph.D., he studies the career patterns of parliamentarians in European parliamentary assemblies, using Danish parliamentarians as a case study. The object is to examine which Danish parliamentarians choose to serve in European parliamentary assembly and if it is possible to construct a picture of a Danish ‘average European parliamentarian’.

The focus of the study is four of the European parliamentary assemblies, namely the European Parliament, the Nordic Council, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, and the Parliamentary Assembly of NATO.

During his stay at Sussex in the spring semester of 2011, Morten will be working on both quantitative research aspects through the construction of a database containing the Danish parliamentarians, as well as qualitative aspects using archival research. Combining these approaches he will try to give a fuller description of Danish parliamentarians in Europe, their careers, and the developments of these over time. As there seems to be a clear tendency among Danish members of these parliamentary assemblies to serve in one of these assemblies after another, one question of particular interest is whether the characteristics of Danish ‘European parliamentarians’ set them apart as a coherent group, differing from ‘average’ parliamentarians in the Danish parliament. As a result of this I became interested in movement across national borders and states’ policies to control it.

The SEI Welcomes New DPhil Student

By Satoko Horii
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In October 2010 I began my DPhil research at the SEI. My academic interests are in the EU policy on the EU common external border management and irregular migration.

Previously, I worked for the Embassy of Japan in Mexico from 2004 to 2006. This administrative and logistical work gave me an opportunity to involve myself in activities such as the negotiation on the Japan-Mexico agreement and the short-term deployment to Belize and Nicaragua. Most importantly, I was responsible for transportation. This required constant and close cooperation with the passport control officers and airline companies. As a result of this I became interested in movement across national borders and states’ policies to control it.

After returning to Japan, I pursued my interests by completing an MA in international and public administrations (my major focus was IR) at Hitotsubashi University. I concentrated specifically on the Mexico - US bilateral cooperation on irregular migration. I also worked as a research assistant at the University and completed internships at the United Nations University and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. I was then offered a scholarship from the Rotary Foundation and came to the UK to do an MSc in forced migration, where I shifted my focus onto Europe.
New EPERN Briefing Papers

The SEI-based European Parties Elections & Referendums Network (EPERN) produces an ongoing series of briefings on the impact of European integration on referendum and election campaigns. There are four new additions to the series. Key points from these are outlined below. EPERN papers are available free at: www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/1-4-2-8.html

ELECTION BRIEFING PAPER No. 58

“Europe and the Slovak Parliamentary Election of June 2010”

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Key Points:

- The centre-right won a surprise victory over the left-nationalist government of Robert Fico.
- Iveta Radičová became Slovakia’s first woman prime minister.
- The nationalist vote declined notably among both Slovaks and ethnic Hungarians.
- Mečiar’s Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, which had dominated Slovak politics in the 1990s, was eliminated from parliament.
- Voters used their ‘preferential votes’ to reorder the parties’ candidate lists and bring some unexpected deputies into parliament.
- Labour and the Red-Green coalition emerged as the main winners of the election. Labour improved its share of the vote compared to the 2005 election, and the coalition as a whole held its ground and lost only a single seat. However, Labour’s gains were offset by the decline in the vote for the Socialist Left, and a small reduction in support for the Centre party.
- On the right flank the Progress Party consolidated its lead. In 2005 it firmly replaced the Conservatives as the largest party on the right, and in 2009 it improved its vote marginally. However, the Conservatives recaptured about half of the support they had lost in 2005, and closed some of the gap to the Progress Party.
- The big loser was the Liberals, which campaigned for a centre-right coalition government without the Progress Party and lost a third of its support.
- The EU issue was completely absent from the campaign.

By Erica Consterdine
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I am a first year DPhil student at Sussex studying in the Migration Studies and Geography Department.

My undergraduate degree was in sociology which I completed in 2008. I specialized in the sociology of globalization which sparked my interest in migration and transnationalism. I then undertook an MA in migration studies at Sussex, where I became interested in the politics of immigration, and the processes and factors related to immigration policymaking. Last year I completed the MSc in Comparative and Cross Cultural Research Methods. While my research project is interdisciplinary, many of themes and theories come from political science, such as party politics, policy networks, and historical institutionalism. The title of my research is: Interests, Ideas, and Institutions: Explaining Immigration Policy Change in the UK, 1970-2010. I will be working under the supervision of Dr James Hampshire.
ELECTION BRIEFING PAPER No. 59

“Europe and the Swedish Election of September 19th 2010”

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Key Points:
- In the election of September 2010, Swedish voters produced a result that left approximately 94.3% of them somewhere between frustrated, embarrassed, aghast and bitterly disappointed.
- An incumbent centre-right government was re-elected for the very first time. But the four-party coalition lost its parliamentary majority.
- The left-of-centre opposition went collectively backwards.
- Some municipal and regional authorities were left with red faces after the close result exposed carelessness in their counting of the votes.
- For many Swedes, worst of all was that a far-right party made a long-anticipated breakthrough into parliament and secured a potentially influential strategic position there. The 5.7% who backed that party were the only really happy ones.

ELECTION BRIEFING No. 60

“Europe and the 2010 Parliamentary Election in Latvia”

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Key Points:
- The September 2010 election returned the serving centre-right coalition government of Prime Minister Valdis Dombrovskis with an increased majority.
- The election was framed by the harsh economic recession of 2008-2010 and continuing ethnic tensions. European issues were of no relevance.
- Five political party alliances were elected to parliament. The Unity Union, the National Alliance, and For a Good Latvia (which together won 49 of the 100 seats) look particularly likely to fragment over the four year term of parliament.
- Eventually, Dombrovskis formed a Unity Union and Green-Farmers Union government. Internal opposition led him to reject cooperation with both the pro-Russian Harmony Centre and the populist National Alliance.

ELECTION BRIEFING No. 61

“Europe and the Bulgarian Parliamentary Election in Bulgaria, 5th July 2009”

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Key Points:
- Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (CEDB) won a near full majority of 116 out of 240 seats, which is an almost identical result to that achieved by the central-liberal party of the former Bulgarian king Simeon II, National Movement Simeon II, at the 2001 parliamentary election.
- The election was conducted following the introduction of a new mixed electoral system where voters independently cast votes for candidates and parties.
- The election presented an opportunity for eight parties and coalitions to enter parliament which would have been the most diverse result since the first free elections in Bulgaria in 1990.
- Protest, anti-system and nationalist parties and coalitions (Attack, the Law, Order and Justice Party, LIDER and the New Time, Guards and Coalition for the Motherland) became prominent during the election campaign but only Attack and the Law, Order and Justice Party qualified for seats at the National Assembly.
New SEI Working Papers

SEI Working Papers in Contemporary European Studies present research results, accounts of work-in-progress and background information for those concerned with European issues. There is 1 new addition to the series. It can be downloaded free from: http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/1-4-10.html

SEI Working Paper No 118
“Deliberative Versus Parliamentary Democracy in the UK: An Experimental Study”
By Paul Webb, Tim Bale and Paul Taggart
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Abstract

This paper reports the results of new research funded by the Leverhulme Foundation, which employs experimental design to assess two hypotheses that are derived from the existing literature on popular alienation from politics and the potential for deliberative democracy to offer a solution to such alienation. The first hypothesis is that there are two quite different types of citizen who are ‘disaffected’ with or ‘disconnected from’ politics, but in distinctive ways: ‘Dissatisfied Democrats’ (middle class, educated, activist and articulate devotees of a vision of highly engaged citizens); and ‘Stealth Democrats’ (low socio-economic status, less educated, inactive, with little interest in politics, who are absorbed largely by private concerns). The second hypothesis is that deliberative-style participation would at best only be effective in respect of the former of these groups (the Dissatisfied Democrats), but would be counter-productive with respect to the latter (Stealth Democrats). The implications of the research findings into these issues should be important for the reforms that the political elites who attempt to respond to the problem of democratic disconnect devise.

The research design in this paper makes use of both qualitative and quantitative data based on a small sample of British citizens. Both offer broad confirmation of the first hypothesis: we can indeed distinguish two rather different types of critical citizens: measures of political interest, efficacy and trust generally reveal a notable distinction between those whom we had a priori designated as Dissatisfied and Stealth Democrats. Neither qualitative nor quantitative evidence, however, suggests grounds for accepting the second hypothesis. There is no obvious sign that those we defined as Stealth Democrats derived any less enjoyment from political deliberation than their Dissatisfied Democrat counterparts, nor that their sense of political efficacy or self-confidence suffered for the experience.

Research

- The tone of the election campaign of all parties, except Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria and National Movement Simeon II, was aggressive and often aimed at the actions and leadership of the ethically Turkish party, Movement for Rights and Freedoms, which mobilised the Turkish vote.
- The issue of vote buying was widespread especially among the Turkish and Roma minorities who bartered their votes for insignificant material incentives such as food, coal, free transportation and even religious rituals.
- A record number of arrested individuals applied to take part in the election campaign in a bid to take advantage of a loophole in the law which provides immunity to election candidates. The most famous of these were the Galevi brothers who have a notorious reputation of economic blackmail and criminality in the region of Dupnitsa.
- The turnout (60.5%) was influenced by the mobilisation of the ethnic vote, the proximity between the EP and parliamentary elections which led to a very long election campaign and the popularity of CEDB’s charismatic leader Boyko Borissov.
An Introduction to Common Law Cultures –
Research collaboration with the University of Paris V -
Paris Descartes

By Professor Susan Millns
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Within the context of the developing Erasmus teaching exchange between the Universities of Sussex and Paris V – Paris Descartes, Professor Susan Millns from the Sussex Law School has joined the group of contributors to a book being edited by Dr Anthony Chamboredon, the Director of the Common Law programme at Paris V – Paris Descartes.

The book, provisionally entitled ‘An Introduction to Common Law Cultures’ will assess the evolution of the original English common law tradition in the various countries and cultures where it has, and continues to, develop. This collection will be the first textbook published in France which presents the diversity of common law traditions from scholars writing about their own national and local jurisdictions. It will also be a unique volume in the Anglo-American literature on the subject.

The book builds upon the content of the common law seminars given by visiting professors who contribute to the Paris V Masters degree in the Common Law and Comparative Law. This Masters degree is a well established programme which aims to examine from a comparative perspective the particularities of the common law system.

Courses are taught in English throughout the academic year by a series of visiting professors from countries with common law systems (including the United States, Canada, South Africa, Australia, Ireland, Scotland and England/Wales). Courses are given on particular aspects of the legal systems concerned, such as common law methodology, torts, constitutional law, criminal law, contract, property law, company law, tax law, family law, plus the inevitable common law particularities of equity, trusts and restitution.

Each of the contributions to the book will com-
prise a clear technical summary of the law in a particular field within the context of a specific national jurisdiction. This will include a summary of the key conceptual features of the subject in the particular jurisdiction under examination, with special attention being paid to the conceptual and functional boundaries between the different legal areas (e.g., distinguishing trust from contract). Secondly, each chapter will, where appropriate, summarise the key historical influences on the development of the particular legal area in the home jurisdiction—with special reference to seminal ‘documentary’ developments (e.g., Coke’s Institutes, Blackstone’s Commentaries, The Judicature Acts).

Chapters will also identify the major points of distinction between the legal subject in the home jurisdiction and the same subject in other jurisdictions (e.g., the differences between ‘constructive trusts’ in different commonwealth jurisdictions). Equally, the chapters will attempt to identify socio-political, economic, and cultural factors which might explain why the particular area of law has been formed differently in different common law jurisdictions (e.g., the need to be sensitive to the recognition of indigenous peoples in Canada and Australia which is not a factor present in the UK). Finally, each chapter will take an analytical and comparative approach to stress the possible growing divergences of local or national specificities regarding the tradition of the common law in countries and cultures other than England/Wales.

The contribution made by Professor Millns to the course and to the collection will examine from a common law (particularly UK) standpoint the dynamic nature of European legal integration against a backdrop of economic, social, and political developments that have characterised the evolution of the European Union and the UK’s place within it over half a century. Concentrating on issues such as constitutionalism, supremacy, parliamentary sovereignty, the protection of fundamental rights, and the rights of workers, the contribution by Professor Millns aims to accentuate the particular aspects of the UK’s common law and constitutional structures that have been affected by Britain’s membership of the EU.

The volume will then conclude with a consideration of the claim that we are witnessing a globalisation of law but will seek to challenge this by demonstrating local resistance to unification. Indeed, it will be suggested that the example of the common law globalisation process reveals that it is bringing about more legal diversity than uniformisation.
Activities

European Economic Governance and Policies: A Study in Two Volumes.

By Kenneth Dyson and Dr Lucia Quaglia

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These two companion volumes result from a grant from the INTUNE project financed by the Sixth Framework Programme of the European Union (EU), Priority 7, Citizens and Governance in a Knowledge Based Society (CIT3-CT-2005-513421). Our INTUNE project was concerned with mapping and analysing the role of expert elites in Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in Europe. One of its ‘work packages’ was the collection of key primary documents as a means of tracing the evolution of policy debate about Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the changing content of its policy agendas and policy processes, as well as showing its salient features, characteristic dilemmas and recurring themes.

The two volumes published by OUP substantially extend this work, notably by selecting and editing ‘classic’ documents, grouping them into sections, and providing substantial analytical commentaries. They set out to identify the key issues and questions that the EMU project raises by bringing together, and offering commentary on, for the first time all the classic documents relevant to the process of constructing and developing European economic governance based on EMU, from the 1940s to the global financial crisis in 2008-9.

The volumes aim to make available a large and disparate collection of documents about European economic governance, based around EMU, in a convenient and accessible format for both scholars and students and for those concerned with the Euro Area and the EU as practitioners in markets and policies. Those who are new to the subject should benefit from easy access to basic texts and related commentaries and references. Those who are more familiar with EMU will have a key source of comprehensive and up-to-date references in terms of which current debates and policies are framed. The primary sources that are made available here would otherwise be costly to access and use. Their availability should also help to clarify and inform public debate about EMU and how the European economy is governed.

The project appears in two volumes because of different types of reader, though many will still wish to use both. Volume I covers both the history and the institutional arrangements of European macro-economic governance – centred on the ambition to achieve EMU, or more precisely (as it turned out) monetary union, accompanied and sustained by economic union. It should appeal particularly to general scholars and students of European integration and of European and international political economy. Volume II deals with the ambition to complete EMU. It is grouped thematically around policies, and focuses on the post-1998 period. Its appeal is more to those interested in the technicalities of political economy, as scholars and students and as practitioners. The key documents selected deal with a whole range
of global and European issues, including exchange-rate policy and foreign exchange operations, the euro as an international currency, external representation of the Euro Area, international and European financial stability, EU and Euro Area enlargement, fiscal policy coordination, macro-economic policy co-ordination, internal governance of the Eurosystem and the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), monetary policy strategy and operations of the Eurosystem and financial market infrastructure (like payment and settlement systems).

The two volumes are, however, similar in structure in that they offer commentaries at the beginning of each section with a view to situate documents in their political, economic and historical context as well as highlight underlying ideas and background. The distinctive contribution of both volumes to the scholarly literature on European macro-economic governance and policies is their interrogation of original documents rather than of the established academic literature, for instance journal articles. This intention is reflected in the ‘light’, selective referencing. Instead, by examining original documents, and by a close reading of them rather than as they have been mediated in the secondary literature, the volumes seek to uncover what expert and political elites meant when they wrote about European macro-economic governance and policies.

Interrogation of original documents is a central working method of professional historians. However, it is relatively neglected in much social science research, where there is a tendency to rely excessively on secondary sources for knowledge of documents. Original documents are rarely examined. These secondary sources in turn feed off each other. In the process errors and misunderstandings, once committed, are perpetuated and, at worst, reinforced. This effect is compounded when initial errors and misunderstandings serve

the purpose of legitimating a particular project that the author favours. Consequently, social science is in danger of working with stylised representations of European economic governance and policies, past and present. This observation – and the concern to which it gives rise – forms the background to, and justification for, the two companion volumes.

At the same time the books are more than a mere collection and editing of documents. They offer commentary and analysis that situate documents in their historical contexts and highlight underlying political and economic ideas, structural backgrounds and legacies. The editors operate from the premise that the documents cannot just 'speak for themselves' and that researchers and students of EMU, as well as policy practitioners, require more than just a 'reference file'. Hence substantial commentaries are provided.


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**Activities**

The project appears in two volumes because of different types of reader, though many will still wish to use both.
The SEI’s strength in providing a base for the academic analysis of party politics came to the fore on 22nd October 2010 when it hosted a one day conference on the UK’s (still relatively) new coalition government. Academics from the newly formed School of Law, Politics and Sociology (LPS), practitioners from London-based think tanks and the wider Westminster village plus other interested scholars came together to discuss how the UK’s coalition came into being and how it has performed in its first five months in office.

For most of the rest of Europe, coalition government is nothing to get too excited about. Parties oppose each other in the run up to election day, electors cast their ballots and the parties then craft together a new government based on the results. Only infrequently does one party win enough seats to govern alone, hence some sort of coalition is the norm. Sometimes the process of crafting such an alliance is simple and straightforward and within a few short weeks the new regime is in place. On other occasions this can take longer and be a decidedly fraught process (just ask the Dutch and Belgians); but, sooner or later, continental Europeans normally get there.

In spite of the fact that post-1999 both Scotland and Wales have had (not altogether bad) experiences with coalition government, the UK electorate still tends to view coalitions with scepticism. Politicians, no doubt with their own vested interests playing a role, are quick to talk about the instability of coalition politics and the need to preserve strong governments implementing clear manifesto-linked mandates. They are much more likely to point to the perils of Italian government (over 60 different governments in 60 years) whilst curiously neglecting the fact that the most successful country in post-1945 Europe (Germany) is also a state where coalition politics is very much the norm. In short, the 2010 election result – where no party achieved a majority of the seats in Westminster for the first time in 1974 – posed a set of challenges that both British voters and politicians were unused to dealing with.

The 22nd October event that the SEI hosted therefore couldn’t have come at a more opportune time. Participants had had time to digest the breathless process of forming the new government and, by mid-Autumn, could begin to put this apparently paradigm-changing event in both theoretical and comparative perspective. Tim Bale (Sussex) and Akash Paun (Institute for Government, London) set the ball rolling by analysing what the literature on coalition formation tells us should have happened (Bale) and how the government had organised itself in its first three months in office (Paun).

"The conference provided an excellent opportunity for participants to reflect on what one commentator called ‘the madcap month of May’"

Bale argued persuasively that despite the sense of ‘anything’s now possible’ that seemed to be everywhere in mid-May, in truth the creation of the Con-LibDem coalition was always the most likely option. The literature on coalition-formation said so and, most importantly, the maths did too; any-
Activities

thing other than Con-LibDem would have been all but unworkable, and there were – much to the surprise of many – actually more issues on which the parties could agree than first met the eye. Paun’s paper built on a report he published in the late summer (http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/pdfs/United_we_stand_coalition_government_UK.pdf) emphasising how the new government had a number of important governance issues to work through. One of these was the role of LibDem leader and Deputy PM Nick Clegg, whose office remained understaffed and under-resourced in dealing with the challenges of having to oversee every department in government whilst Paun also pointed out that the coalition agreement and much of the government’s broader set of objectives – formulated as they were with breath-taking speed in May – should be thoroughly reviewed after two years in office.

Participants had had time to digest the breathless process of forming the new government and, by mid-Autumn, could begin to put this apparently paradigm-changing event in both theoretical and comparative perspective.

The second panel saw papers from Rosanne Palmer (Cardiff) and Paul Cairney (Aberdeen) compare and contrast the experiences of Wales and Scotland with coalition government. Since devolution, both nations have had experience with parties sharing power, and although there were inevitably tensions neither country appeared to suffer directly as a result. Furthermore, and despite the fact that both speakers were quick to point out that the peculiarities of their respective cases ensured that lesson-drawing should always be done with caution, they did nonetheless both argue that government-by-coalition soon became a norm with which all parties could live. Processes are adapted, attitudes change and parties learn to work with one another.

Craig Lind (Sussex) and Marc Debus (Mannheim) rounded off the afternoon session with two quite contrasting papers. Lind outlined how the government’s coalition agreement sat rather uneasily with many of the principles that run deep through the UK constitution. Lind argued that the agreement was nothing more than a tool with which the coalition could drive its agenda forward; the notion that the government could be held legally accountable if it were to break some of the promises set down there was not sustainable. Debus, on the other hand, analysed who got what in terms of portfolios and why they did so. Debus’s intricate model indicated the LibDems had done poorly in terms of obtaining influential portfolios, but rather better in terms of getting ministers and junior ministers into potential gate-keeping positions.

The event was rounded off with a public lecture by Mark Oaten, the former Lib Dem Home Affairs Spokesman (2003-06). Oaten gave an entertaining tour de force on what the current government might learn from previous coalition governments in the UK, coming to the perhaps surprising (for a former high-ranking member of the Lib Dems!) conclusion that coalition governments had more potential downsides than upsides. Indeed, Oaten’s warning that although Nick Clegg had little choice but to opt for the Tories in May, it might well be something that the Lib Dems take a generation to politically recover from.

All in all the conference provided an excellent opportunity for participants to reflect on what one commentator called ‘the madcap month of May’ and the event once again proved that the SEI as an institution remains a real hub of research in to party politics. For those who’d like to read more, all of the papers will be published in the second issue of Political Quarterly in 2011.
Activities

European University Institute Workshop on Gender Justice and Institutions

By Dr Charlotte Skeet
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Dr Charlotte Skeet Sussex (LPS, Law), specialist research areas gender and constitutional change and human rights of women, and Professor Marie-Benedicte Dembour (LPS, Law), research specialisms in human rights and migration, have been invited to participate in an exploratory workshop to examine the creation of ‘gender just’ institutions.

The workshop is jointly organised by Professor Ruth Rubio-Marín from the European University Institute and Professor Louise Chappell from University of New South Wales, Australia. The workshop forms part of Professor Chappell’s forthcoming fellowship at EUI. It is intended to bring together feminist institutionalist political scientists and feminist legal scholars and in the first instance the focus will be on identifying relevant issues and research challenges and discussing which institutions should be of key concern.

The aim is to create a multi-disciplinary research agenda to examine how these institutions can be designed to operate in a ‘just’ manner in relation to gender. Other participants to the workshop include; Dr Fiona Mackay (University of Edinburgh’s Graduate School, Politics and International Relations) the Director of Femfin the Feminism and Institutionalism International Network; Professor Georgina Waylen (University of Sheffield) and Anne Marie Goetz formerly at IDS Sussex and now the Chief Advisor on Governance, Peace and Security at UNIFEM. The workshop takes place on the 21st of February 2011 at EUI in Florence.

Francois Duchene Travel Bursary for Doctoral Students

By Ezel Tabur
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With the aim of supporting doctoral students from any discipline conducting fieldwork research on issues of European integration in continental Europe, the Sussex European Institute (SEI) and the European Movement Sussex Branch offer a bursary of up to £1000 for expenses related to travel, accommodation and subsistence. Doctoral students can also apply for the bursary to contribute to a project in another European country related to their dissertation.

As one of the recipients in 2008, the bursary has made an enormous difference with respect to my fieldwork research conducted in Brussels and Berlin in 2009. An integral part of my doctoral research project is semi-structured interviews with officials from the EU institutions and representatives of member states who are actively involved in the decision making process concerning the European Neighbourhood Policy and the EU’s immigration policy. Given the considerable costs of travel and accommodation, the bursary has made my fieldwork trips financially viable.

If you are considering applying for the bursary, you need to submit a copy of your CV, a recommendation letter from your supervisor, a short description of your dissertation topic and a more detailed proposal regarding the planned fieldwork along with a budget to the SEI. The recipients are expected to present a report at a meeting of the European Movement Sussex Branch after they complete their fieldwork/research abroad with the bursary.
Activities

**Publish or perish... with Kai Oppermann**

*By Ariadna Ripoll-Servent*
*SEI Doctoral Student*
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On Wednesday 13th of October 2010, Kai Oppermann (Marie Curie visiting fellow) gave the opportunity to introduce research students to the world of publishing. The two-hour seminar was packed with useful information and tips on how to approach the – often daunting – business of publishing. The occasion was also a perfect forum in which to exchange experiences and anecdotes.

Kai offered a multi-level approach to publishing, looking first at how to select the focus of the potential article, then at how to select the journal, submit the draft and (hopefully) revise and resubmit. The first part of the seminar concentrated on how to dismember a dissertation to maximise the number of potential publications. There, it was proposed to spread out the dissertation in two or three contributions with different focuses. For instance, one piece could be dedicated to the theoretical framework – on its own or using case studies to make it easier to either develop or test its framework. Articles could also have a greater empirical focus. In that case, comparative case studies are usually easier to publish, while single case studies need to ensure that they present new data and some degree of generalisability. Finally, Kai underlined the importance of the – often overlooked – methods papers, testing the validity of different research methods.

The second part underlined the importance of preparation before submitting an article. Kai recommended circulating the draft paper before sending it to a journal, in order to receive feedback before the first review. Then, he concentrated on the selection of journals – one of the trickiest steps to getting published. It was recommended to start with more renowned journals and only go down if the paper was not accepted. In any case, the review of those journals would always provide a good source of feedback and help to improve a revised version of your contribution. However, he also warned that some journals have an informal rule, whereby they only publish more established academics. In order to unearth such a rule, it might be worth checking past issues of the journal to find any specific patterns in the authors’ profiles. This exercise could also be very useful to locate the journal and identify any particular theoretical or methodological preferences.

Kai proceeded to list different suggestions to make the process of submitting an article easier. He emphasised the importance of abstracts, since they place one’s contribution in the literature. In this sense, he also mentioned how important it is to write good literature reviews, since they locate classical and recent academic pieces that speak to your own research. In this sense, any article should pay special attention to emphasising its main argument and its contribution to the literature. Therefore, an explicit structure and methodology is very useful to clarify and enhance the focus of your research.

Finally, the seminar approached the next step if submission your submission was successful, namely revising and resubmitting. Often a disheartening process, Kai emphasised how important it is to make the revisions and try again. The trick is to listen to the reviewers and try to be fair with their comments but also be clear when the changes cannot be done. Balancing the request for changes with their feasibility is often an art in itself. Kai recommended to defend your choices when they conflicted too much with the reviews and to appeal to the editor in the face of contradictory observations. Finally, he stressed the importance of writing a cover letter highlighting all the changes made to the article (or the absence of changes) and justifying why it had been done in that particular way. Clearly, everything that can make an editor’s life easier will be more than welcome!
US Mid-Term Election Results: what are the implications for Europe?

By Professor John McCormick
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The 2010 US mid-term elections produced few surprises: the Republicans won a majority in the House of Representatives (everyone knew they would), their leaders declared the result a mandate for change (in spite of the fact that only one in three voters turned out), and President Obama made the inevitable admission of chastisement. So far, so predictable.

Less easy to ascertain is what the result will mean for Europe. There will be no immediate or obvious changes, if only because of President Obama’s well-known indifference towards Europe. It was only days after the election, after all, that he was wrapping up a two-hour US-EU summit in Lisbon with the observation that it “was not as exciting as other summits because we basically agree on everything”. Over the longer-term, though, we may find some interesting new dynamics emerging in the transatlantic relationship.

Firstly, in the time-honoured tradition of his predecessors, Obama will probably convert trouble at home into a new focus on foreign affairs, and he has a number of initiatives underway where the support of the Europeans is important, including Middle East peace, climate change, and Afghanistan. But Europe’s influence will continue to depend on how much Europeans are able to agree among themselves, and how well they make themselves heard. History does not offer much cause for hope in this regard, but there is a turn in the tide of international relations under way, driven by a combination of the diminished credibility of the United States (post-Iraq and post-global economic crisis) and of the fillip given to the economic clout of China, India, and Brazil by their weathering of the economic downturn.

Second, where the warnings about unsustainable American budgetary and trade policies long fell on deaf ears, they are now starting to gain new attention in the United States. Part of the explanation can be found in the resistance of the Tea Party movement to big government and large federal spending, but more telling has been the policy example provided by the Europeans.

Americans look in some awe at the manner in which the Cameron-Clegg coalition has imposed draconian spending cuts, and cannot help but note the adjustments also being made in Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain. And the unhappy recent tale of the euro is being seen by many as a wake-
up call to the Americans, who have so far largely shrugged off talk that the dollar could be in deep trouble.

The Republicans made all kinds of claims about the sources of America’s economic woes (except, of course, admitting their own role in creating the crisis), and made all kinds of promises about how their policies would prove superior to those of Obama. Inevitably, though, they will find that fixing the problems is far easier said than done, and that business as usual will not do.

There needs to be a fundamental reordering of the American economic house, and Europe may prove to be the best example to follow. The mid-term elections could end up meaning less for American influence in Europe than for European influence in the United States.

The EU and South East Europe: exploring the limits of Europeanisation and Multi-Level Governance

By Dr Charles Lees
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Two years ago I gave a paper at the SEI’s Research in Progress seminar in which I outlined a major research project I was working on with Andrew Taylor, Andrew Geddes, and Ian Bache, called ‘Multi-level governance in South East Europe: Institutional innovation and adaptation in Croatia, Greece, Macedonia, and Slovenia’ (ESRC response mode RES-062-23-0183).

The project is now complete and the end of project report was ranked as ‘outstanding’ by three anonymous assessors. More importantly, it also generated some really interesting findings about the impact of EU engagement in South East Europe and the limits of Europeanisation and Multi-Level Governance (MLG) in the context of persistent national traditions.

Andrew Taylor, Andrew Geddes and I present these findings in a new book called The European Union and South East Europe: The Dynamics of Europeanization and Multi-level Governance (Routledge, 2011 forthcoming). In the book we examine four states that represent different degrees of engagement with the EU; Greece (a long-standing member), Slovenia (a relatively new member), Croatia (a state approaching accession), and Macedonia (a state in the pre-accession process). The book compares changing modes of governance in three policy areas: cohesion, environment, and migration/border management, over the period since the signing of the Dayton accords in 1995. Across our four cases, we identify seven common features:

• First, despite different degrees of state capacity, all four states experienced few problems in developing appropriate legal frameworks to transpose the EU acquis.

• Second, in all four states policy-making is dominated by a single ministry that anchors a multi-level structure involving sub-national governments, NGOs and other ministries. Networks are both vertical and horizontal and have increased in complexity over time but – as would be expected - the degree of complexity varies across states and policy areas.

• Third, resource shortages and variable capacities and capabilities at different tiers of government constitute significant obstacles to implementation and enforcement. Technical expertise is often in short supply and concentrated at the centre. This limits any MLG effects.
Fourth, citizen/NGO participation is regarded as intrinsically good but our interviewees frequently questioned whether participation had substantive effects on policy. NGOs in the region are often small and lack the resources and capabilities to engage effectively, although some groups (notably business) enjoyed good access to policy makers. All-in-all, however, the desire to increase participation came second to the goal of EU membership and the need to ‘fast-track’ relevant legislation. Participation was particularly weak in migration/border management (a core state function) compared with cohesion or environmental policy.

Fifth, Europeanisation involves policy learning and such learning is a particular feature of the accession states. Slovenia (pre-2004) and currently Croatia and Macedonia were, as a result of accession, required to undertake rapid and extensive learning. As member states, however, Greece and Slovenia enjoy more opportunities to shape policy and, as a result, the learning curve in these states is flatter.

Sixth, EU engagement was identified by interviewees in all countries as crucial in shaping developments. Crucially, however, our evidence also exposes the limits of Europeanisation and confirms the importance of national traditions, institutional resistance, and bureaucratic game-playing; all of which skew the EU’s impact on domestic governance. To grasp the variety of these developments it is necessary to analyse policy sectors in the context of their historical development within individual states. In other words, engagement with the EU is not just a top-down or technocratic process and ‘national stories’ still matter.

Seventh, in a very real sense the EU’s engagement with South East Europe (and indeed the wider European integration project) is an exercise in challenging path dependence. Our findings show domestic elites respond to external incentives and engage in learning as a result of engagement with the EU. However, whilst our evidence points to substantial Europeanization effects it does not, and cannot, indicate the time period in which Europeanization will (or

Hostility and support of sub-state nationalist parties towards the EU

By Valeria Tarditi
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During the three years of my P.h.D in “Politics, Society and Culture” at the department of Sociology and Political Science-Università della Calabria (Italy), I have been carrying out research on sub-state nationalist parties.

The interest for this topic came from the awareness about the relevant role that sub-state nationalism actually covers in the politics of many western European democracies. Furthermore, sub-state nationalist parties are the most important representatives of minority communities’ self-determination claims. In recent years these parties have increased in terms of number and often have acquired relevant political positions, demonstrating the importance of the centre-periphery cleavage in modern politics.

Sub-state nationalist parties, especially since the 1980s, have redefined their constitutional goals,
including also the European dimension. For this reason, many scholars have classified them as one of the most Europeanized and pro-EU party families. In reality, the evidence and more recent research have shown how European positions of these parties are not so homogenous, and how some of them have changed, over time, their European visions, adopting also eurosceptic positions.

My research has tried to individuate the reasons that explain the heterogeneity of sub-nationalist parties' European visions and perspectives.

Although recently interesting research about this matter has been carried out, different aspects have remained scarcely investigated. Starting from these theoretical premises, my research has tried to individuate the reasons that explain the heterogeneity of sub-nationalist parties' European visions and perspectives, trying to contribute to the scientific debate. I decided to compare, through a qualitative study, the EU-positions of three sub-state nationalist parties: the Bloque Nacionalista Galego (BNG) in Galicia (Spain), the Lega Nord in North Italy and the Scottish National Party in Scotland (UK). The point of departure was the awareness of the difference amongst European views expressed by the three parties and their temporal variability.

First of all, my study has dealt with the general debate about sub-state nationalism, its origins and its main characteristics. In addition to this it has outlined the origins of sub-state nationalism and of centre-periphery cleavage in Galicia, in Northern Italy and in Scotland. It has then reconstructed the entire political evolution of the three parties, using a theoretical model based on the individuation of three party’s dimensions: identity, organization and strategy (Raniolo, 2006).

The second part of the research focused on the empirical study of the European policy of the BNG, the LN and the SNP. The three parties’ positions towards the EU have been described, through the use of primary sources, underlying the eventual changes that have characterized them. Finally the research evaluated the impact of different factors, linked to parties’ identity, organization and strategy and to the multilevel political contexts, on the definition and the changes of parties’ European visions. Through the comparison of the three case studies, the research has concluded that in order to explain the causes of the different interpretations of the EU, proposed by sub-state nationalist parties, it is necessary to analyze the internal political context and particularly the domestic “political opportunity structures”, more than the evolution of the European integration process and the European political opportunities.

Fundamental to my Ph.D study has been my research period at the SEI, where, with the supervision of Profs. Aleks Szczerbiak and Paul Taggart, I specified better my research object. I analyzed the Scottish case, collecting primary and secondary sources and carried out interviews with SNP MPs.

Fundamental to my P.h.D study has been my research period at the SEI, where, with the supervision of Profs. Aleks Szczerbiak and Paul Taggart, I specified better my research object. I analyzed the Scottish case, collecting primary and secondary sources and carried out interviews with SNP MPs. Equally important, has been my research period at the Departamento de Derecho y Teoría del Estado of the Universidad de Santiago de Compostela, where, with the supervision of Prof. Roberto Blanco Valdés, I had the opportunity to examine in detail the Galician case.
SLSA Conference Comes to Sussex!

SLSA Annual Conference 2011

The Sussex Law School at the University of Sussex is delighted to be hosting the Socio-Legal Studies Association (SLSA) Annual Conference 2011.

The conference, which will take place from 12-14 April 2011 in the University’s new Fulton Building, will bring together over 300 academics, practitioners, researchers and postgraduate students from all over the world to discuss a myriad of topics examining the impact of law upon society and the capacity of society to influence legal change.

The Socio-Legal Studies Association itself was formed in 1990 in the UK. It grew out of the Socio-Legal Group which for some years had provided an annual forum for socio-legal scholars to meet and disseminate their work. However, it was felt that there was a need for a more permanent organisational structure which would help to keep scholars in touch with each other, providing regular channels of communication and promoting and supporting the work of socio-legal academics.

The creation of an annual conference facilitates the meeting of socio-legal scholars and the promotion of their work nationally and internationally.

The conference is organised around a series of ‘streams’ and ‘themes’. The streams represent substantive areas of law and include a stream specifically on European Law, together with streams on International Criminal Law; Race, Religion and Human Rights; and Indigenous Rights and Minority Rights, to name but a few. The ‘themes’ are more cross-cutting and for 2011 will include topics such as ‘Challenging Ownership: Meanings of Space, Time and Identity’; ‘Auditors, Advocates and Experts – Monitoring, Negotiating and (Re)Creating Rights’ and ‘Criminalising Commerce’.

Expressions of interest both to participate in the conference and to help with the organisation are most welcome. Please contact the organising committee in the Law School (Susan Millns – s.millns@sussex.ac.uk and Jo Bridgeman – j.c.bridgeman@sussex.ac.uk) and see the conference website: http://www.sussex.ac.uk/law/newsandevents/slsa-conference

Editorial opportunity at euroscoope!

The euroscoope team are looking for a new Editor to join us.

euroscoope is the Newsletter/Journal produced on behalf of the SEI at the University of Sussex. We publish three times a year, one edition for each term of the academic year. Our aim is to raise awareness of research being done here at the Sussex European Institute and to encourage interdisciplinary work between departments.

If you are a DPhil student at the SEI and are interested in joining our team and gaining editorial experience which would be most valuable for your future career, please contact us at: euroscoope@sussex.ac.uk

We look forward to hearing from you!