Croatia's accession to the EU

By Prof Alan Mayhew
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Finally on June 30 2011 the EU member states agreed to close accession negotiations with Croatia. The accession treaty should be signed by the end of 2011 and Croatia's full accession to the EU is expected by July 1 2013, after ratification by Croatia and the member states.

This is a remarkable achievement for a country which was engulfed in war for most of the first half of the 1990s and then spent a good part of the next five years being 'cold shouldered' by the EU, which however, was beginning to create a new policy towards the western Balkans, based on Stability and Association Agreements. The EU made no secret of the fact that it regarded a change of government as an important ingredient for a warmer relationship with Croatia.

By mid 2013 Croatia will have been following its European integration strategy for around 15 years and for all that time the Sussex European Institute will have been closely associated with this integration process. Croatia began negotiations for a trade and cooperation agreement in the early 1990s but this was abandoned just before the initialling of the agreement as a result of the EU’s condemnation of certain actions taken by Croatian troops in Operation Storm. Croatia's European integration policy and the creation of its Office for European Integration began in 1997, remarkably under the last rather nationalist Government of the Franjo Tudjman Presidency. It is not clear whether that Government's interest in European integration was a tactical step in the light of the forthcoming election or was the result of far-sighted policy considerations.

The driving force behind these early steps towards European integration came from Deputy Prime Minister Mintas Hodak and above all from the leadership of the newly created Office for European Integration, the staff of which was considerably reinforced by returning exile Croatians from Canada. The Office produced Croatia’s first ‘Action Plan for European Integration’ in 1999, which in a very detailed way laid out the steps which were necessary for Croatia to adjust its policy to that of the EU. The government used this action plan to underline that its aim was to create a contractual relationship with the EU through the negotiation of a Stabilisation and Association agreement.

The pace of Croatia’s European integration accelerated after the 2000 general election, when the new government made it a centrepiece of its policy. Already by November of that year the negotiations for the SAA were opened during the Zagreb summit, which ‘reaffirmed the European perspective of the countries participating in the stabilisation and association process and their status as potential candidates for membership’. The SAA negotiations were swift (some believe too swift) and the agreement was signed in October 2001.

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Progress with the implementation of the SAA in Croatia was rapid and the government took the bold step of applying for membership of the Union in 2003, in spite of advice from many of the member states and from the European institutions that this would be a dangerous step. Croatia however, with several influential friends amongst member states, was given ‘candidate country’ status in 2004 and accession negotiations began in October 2005.

The actual negotiations lasted therefore around six years. This was only slightly longer than those between Poland and Hungary and the EU, in spite of the fact that there was stronger conditionality to be met by Croatia and of the problem of meeting the (unspoken) conditions of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.

Croatia suffered both from the perceived inadequacies of the preparation for membership of Romania and Bulgaria and from the longer term consequences of the Balkan wars. Romania and Bulgaria joined the Union in 2007 in spite of the fact that they were still mired in corruption and had taken inadequate measures to tackle serious crime. This coincided with a more negative approach to migration in some of the older EU countries, even when it concerned intra-EU migration. The result of these two factors was that conditionality became a much more significant part of the accession process than it had been for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe which joined the Union in 2004. Negotiating chapters could not be opened until ‘opening benchmarks’ had been achieved and could not be closed until the requirements of the EU had been met. There were several key areas of the economy which were highly protected in Croatia and where the application of the acquis communautaire would create serious economic and social problems (shipbuilding and steel).

ICTY requirements held up both the opening of negotiations and the negotiations themselves. The Netherlands and the United Kingdom were perhaps the most insistent member states on Croatia’s need to fulfil all the demands of ICTY. Some Croatian governments paid insufficient attention to these requirements but in the end they were all met. Croatia was lucky in three respects in this journey towards membership of the European Union. Firstly it is a small country with less than 5 million citizens. Its size was an advantage on the one hand because it does not require either major changes in EU policy or significant allocations of EU finance and on the other because it is not a source of major migrant flows to the old member states in the North. Secondly Croatia always had strong support from the German and Austrian governments and neutrality at worst from most of the others. It is significant that when the French government introduced a clause in the French constitution to make any future EU accession subject to a referendum, Croatia’s accession was exempted. Thirdly it managed to separate itself from the rest of the Western Balkans and promote itself as a well-governed ‘Habsburg’ Republic in the eyes of EU governments and citizens. Slovenia had succeeded in the same way a decade earlier. It is true that some EU member states are still worried that Croatia has not done enough in the areas of the judiciary and fundamental rights, and its commitments in these areas, as well as in the rest of the negotiated package, will be closely monitored by the European Commission and the member states.

SEI was involved from the very beginning of this process when Professor Marise Cremona (now head of the legal department in the European University Institute in Florence) together with the author of this article were invited to help the Croatian government establish its first Office for European Integration and develop its Action Plan. But more significantly, in 1999 the Croatian government decided to send young civil servants, and in some cases young graduates, to several EU university institutions, including Sussex. They studied European integration abroad for one year in return for signing contracts to work for the Croatian government for between three and five years after returning home. As a result SEI has now trained approaching 100 Croatian graduates, who have enriched our life at SEI and have supported in a significant way Croatia’s integration into the EU.

We welcome this year’s Croatian students to SEI and hope that they will enjoy their time with us, as their predecessors have done, and will return to support Croatia’s first steps as a full member of the Union.
Who we are...

euroscope is the newsletter of the Sussex European Institute (SEI). It reports to members and beyond about activities and research going on at the SEI and presents feature articles and reports by SEI staff, researchers, students and associates. The deadline for submissions for the Spring term issue is: 1st December 2011.

Co-Editors: Amy Busby & Anne Wesemann (euroscope@sussex.ac.uk)

The SEI was founded in 1992 and is a Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence and a Marie Curie Research Training Site. It is the leading research and postgraduate training centre on contemporary European issues. SEI has a distinctive philosophy built on interdisciplinarity and a broad and inclusive approach to Europe. Its research is policy-relevant and at the academic cutting edge, and focuses on integrating the European and domestic levels of analysis. As well as delivering internationally renowned Masters, doctoral programmes and providing tailored programmes for practitioners, it acts as the hub of a large range of networks of academics, researchers and practitioners who teach, supervise and collaborate with us on research projects.

Co-Directors: Prof Jim Rollo & Prof Aleks Szczerbiak
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Where to find euroscope!
euroscope is easily accessible in the following places:
• the SEI website: http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/1-4-10-4.html
• via the official mailing list, contact: euroscope@sussex.ac.uk
• hard copies are available from LPS office
• via its new and dedicated facebook group called ‘euroscope’, where you can also join in discussions on the articles

Also feel free to contact us to comment on articles and research and we may publish your letters and thoughts.

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Features Section: The Balkans

This issue of euroscope is a special edition presenting articles on the Balkans from a range of disciplines including political science and anthropology. You can find our special Features pieces on pages 13-20 and then a report on the Balkans Connections Conference held at Sussex on page 36. The Dispatches section also contains articles from our associates concerning the Balkans and surrounding areas.
Message from the Co-Director...

By Prof Aleks Szczerbiak
SEI Co-Director
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As a new academic year begins, I am delighted to extend warm greetings to all those about to commence postgraduate research and study at the SEI and say ‘welcome back’ to more long-standing members of the ‘SEI family’ both at Sussex and beyond. You can see from reports from previous Masters, and current doctoral, students that you are joining one of the most vibrant and exciting contemporary European studies postgraduate research and training centres.

Europe in crisis?

The new academic year begins with the EU facing a severe, some would argue existential, crisis. The storm centre for this is the turbulence in the Eurozone which was precipitated by, but has itself exacerbated, the global economic crisis that began four years ago. However, in many ways this has simply highlighted, and serves as the most dramatic example of, a broader crisis of the European integration project. What we need now more than ever is solid scholarly analysis of the causes and consequences of recent developments and events. In order to make sense of the key issues and challenges that face Europe today we need scholarship that can bring insights from a variety of disciplines and methodological approaches.

The EU crisis will, therefore, set the academic agenda for the coming year for those of us researching and studying contemporary Europe. For all the pervasive gloom, it also presents us, as scholars specialising in understanding the European project, with a range of intellectual challenges. As one of the foremost centres of inter-disciplinary scholarship on contemporary Europe, but also strongly committed making its research policy relevant, the SEI is extremely well placed to respond to these challenges and undertake such analysis. To start off the process this year, SEI is organising a round table on the EU crisis on October 12 which will include our internationally renowned scholars in European political and economic integration Professors Jorg Monar and Alan Mayhew. The round table is part of our weekly research-in-progress seminar series, full details of which can be found on page 12.

Links with the Balkans

The current period is a particularly daunting one for all those leading the European institutions. This includes the Polish government which currently holds the rotating presidency of the EU (and, as an aside, I would like to take this opportunity to give a shameless plug for my new book *Poland Within the European Union: New Awkward Partner or New Heart of Europe?* which was published this summer see page 21!) One of the priorities of the Polish EU presidency is promoting...
further EU enlargement and links with the ‘wider Europe’, particularly to the former communist states of Central and Eastern Europe and, among other things, it is hoping to preside over the signing of the EU's accession treaty with Croatia. It is, therefore, fitting that the theme of this issue of Euroscope is the Balkans. Reflecting SEI’s strong commitment to treat Europe ‘as a whole’ and engaging with the often ‘forgotten’ parts of the continent, over the years we have maintained a very strong intellectual interest in, and links with, this region in both our teaching and research. This has included a large number of students sponsored by the EU, national governments and NGOs participating in our MA and doctoral programmes drawn from nearly every Balkan state.

In addition to the lead article on Croatian accession by Alan Mayhew, who advised the Croatian government during its EU negotiations, this issue of Euroscope includes a number of pieces by both current and former SEI researchers and students. I am particularly pleased to see a large number of articles by SEI alumni who have gone on to use the skills and expertise that they have acquired here to serve their countries in a range of different capacities as both academics and practitioners. I am also very happy to welcome another cohort of students from this part of Europe as part of this year’s intake of new SEI postgraduate scholars.

Welcomes, farewells and congratulations

To conclude, a few words of welcome, farewell and congratulations. Firstly, welcome to Prof Sue Millns, who is Professor of Law in the Sussex Law School and is replacing Prof Jim Rollo as SEI Co-Director in October (although she will actually be on research leave until January 2012). You can find a profile of Sue on page 6 and a report of the SEI symposium that was organised in July to celebrate Jim’s career and professional achievements on page 42.

I would also like to welcome two new SEI colleagues. In September, Dr Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser joined as a two-year Marie Curie Inter-European Fellow. Cristobal joins SEI from the Social Science Research Centre in Berlin (WZB) and has come to work with SEI-based Professor of Politics Paul Taggart on a project on populism in Latin America and Europe. Cristobal will be presenting a paper on his research at an SEI seminar on 9 November. Welcome also to Dr Lee Savage who will be joining SEI in October as an ESRC post-doctoral research fellow working with me on a project on coalition formation and destruction in the new Europe. You can find articles by Cristobal and Lee about their research plans on pages 25-26. Welcome back also to Dr Sabina Avdagic who returns to SEI after a period of leave. You can read an updates on Sabina’s research on page 22.

Farewell to Dr Kai Oppermann who leaves us after a year at SEI to return to University of Cologne and who made a huge impact as a visiting Marie Curie Inter-European Fellow. Goobye also to Ellin Allern from Oslo University and Morton Hansen from Aarhus University who were SEI visiting researchers during the spring and summer terms. You can read pieces by Kai, Ellin and Morten on their research at SEI on pages 27-30. We shall miss them all and hope that they keep in touch!

Last but not least I’d like to say some congratulations to three of our doctoral students: Ed Maxfield who completed his DPhil thesis, Emma Sanderson who passed her viva successfully during the summer, and Ariadna Ripoll Servent who has been appointed to a two-year post-doctoral fellowship at the Institute for European Integration Research in the Austrian Academy of Sciences. Well done to all of you and good luck to those of you (including Ariadna) who have vivas in the autumn term!

Prof Aleks Szczerbiak
New SEI Co-Director takes post

By Professor Susan Millns
SEI Co-Director
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From October 2011 the Sussex European Institute will have a new Co-Director.

Susan Millns, who is Professor of Law in the Sussex Law School, will replace Professor Jim Rollo as Co-Director following Professor Rollo’s recent retirement. Professor Millns joined the University of Sussex in 2006 having lectured previously in the law schools at the University of Liverpool and the University of Kent. A graduate of the University of Kent, the Université de Paris I (Panthéon-Sorbonne) and the European University Institute in Florence, Professor Millns’ research and teaching interests lie in the areas of European and comparative public law, human rights and feminist legal theory.

Within the School of Law, Politics and Sociology Professor Millns currently teaches undergraduate and postgraduate courses in Law and Policy of the European Union, the Single Market and Theory and Practice of Human Rights. From 2012 she will also be responsible for a new MA module in socio-legal research methods. She has taught for many years as a visiting professor at the Université Lille 2 where she is responsible for courses in English law and legal system and English legal language.

Professor Millns has just completed a three year research project (called JURISTRAS) funded by the European Commission which involved a network of nine partner universities throughout the European Union and candidate countries. Bringing together an interdisciplinary team of lawyers and political and social scientists from the UK, Belgium, Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, Austria, Turkey, Germany and Greece, the aim of the project was to investigate the relationship between courts and politics, and the link between judicial review of human rights at the supranational level and domestic politics and policies aimed at the protection and promotion of fundamental rights. Professor Millns has co-edited a collection detailing the comparative findings of the project which has just been published as The Strasbourg Court, Democracy and the Human Rights of Individuals and Communities: Patterns of Litigation, State Implementation and Domestic Reform (eds. Susan Millns and Dia Anagnostou) (2010) 16/2 European Public Law Special Issue. Further findings relating specifically to implementation of the ECHR in the United Kingdom has been published as ‘Litigation, Rights Protection and Minorities in the United Kingdom’ (Susan Millns with Clare Saunders, Christopher Rootes and Gabriel Swain) in The European Court of Human Rights, Democracy and Minorities: An Inquiry into Litigation and Domestic Implementation in Nine Countries, ed. Dia Anagnostou (Leiden: Brill, 2010, 183-207).

Professor Millns is currently working on a new interdisciplinary project on ‘Rights, Legal Mobilization and Political Participation in Europe’ which has been funded by the European Science Foundation. A preliminary workshop was held in Athens, 8-10 October 2009 and was followed by a second meeting in Onati, Spain, in June 2011. Professor Millns will also use a period of study leave in autumn 2011 to finish researching and writing a new monograph on the principle of respect for human dignity in Europe. She is delighted to be joining SEI and is looking forward to pursuing further interdisciplinary collaboration in the field of European studies, law and politics.
The SEI Diary provides snippets on the many exciting and memorable activities connected to teaching, researching and presenting contemporary Europe that members of the SEI have been involved in during Summer 2011.

May: Research

5 May: Will the polls be right about AV?
Professor Tim Bale (Politics) gave his predictions to the Evening Standard.

10 May: SEI Roundtable
The SEI held a roundtable on ‘The Polish Presidency of the EU’ with Prof Alan Mayhew & Prof Aleks Szczerbiak (University of Sussex).

17 May: DPhil outline presentation:
Ilke Gurdal (University of Sussex) presented his research outline to SEI staff and students for feedback; entitled ‘The transformation of Political Islam in Turkey: From Anti-Westernism to Western political values’.

19 May: Conference in Kloster Banz
Dr James Hampshire gave a talk on ‘Irregular migration and security: border dilemmas’ at the Hans Seidel Foundation, the CSU’s party foundation, on 19 May.

24 May: RiP
Visiting researcher Morten Hansen (Aarhus University/ University of Sussex) presented his research entitled; ‘Danish Trans-national Political Elites: a prosopographical study of Danes in trans-national parliamentary assemblies’ to an SEI audience.

31 May: Immigration
Dr James Hampshire, (University of Sussex) presented a paper called; ‘Immigration and Problems of Liberal State Legitimacy’.

May: Presentations

The SEI’s Giuseppe Scotto did the following presentations this summer:
- ‘Meritocracy and legality: the discourse of ‘new’ Italian migration to London’, at: ‘Echi Oltremare: Italy, the Mediterranean...and Beyond’ Conference, June 18, Rome

June: Balkans Conference

2-3 June: Balkan Connections Conference, University of Sussex
This interdisciplinary conference brought together early career scholars from different disciplines who are currently undertaking research on ‘the Balkans’. It explored issues pertaining both to those countries ‘traditionally’ considered as ‘the Balkans’ and those historically and thematically connected to that region (e.g. Turkey, Cyprus, etc.) (see the full report on page 36).
07 June: AFSJ
Ariadna Ripoll-Servent, (University of Sussex) presented her DPhil research, ‘Shifting sands and changing minds: The role of the European Parliament in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’ to the SEI.

21 June: Populism
Stijn van Kessel, (University of Sussex) presented his DPhil research called; Paths to Populism: Explaining the Electoral Performance of Populist Parties in Europe’ to SEI colleagues.

22 June: Paper
Prof Aleks Szczerbiak gave a paper on ‘Democracy and Party Politics: East and West: Convergence and Divergence?’ at the Central and East European Language-Based Area Studies (CEELAS) dissemination conference at SSEES/UCL in London.

29 June: paper
Prof Aleks Szczerbiak gave a paper on ‘Poland’s Civic Platform: What is the secret of its success? And how long can it last?’ at the Central and East European Language-Based Area Studies (CEELAS) workshop on ‘Novelty and Endurance: Understanding Change and Stability in Central and East European Party Politics’ also at SSEES/UCL in London.

June: publication

June: presentations
SEI DPhil candidate Ezal Tabur has presented numerous papers this summer including:
- ‘The External Dimension of the EU’s Migration Policy towards the Eastern Neighbourhood’ at the UACES Annual Conference 2011, Robinson College, Cambridge, 5-7 September 2011
- ‘Does the EU’s institutional framework make a difference? Analysing the EU policy-making concerning the external dimension of the EU’s migration policy’ at the Migration Research in Progress: A Graduate Students Workshop, Sussex Centre for Migration Research, University of Sussex, 16-17 July 2011, Brighton
- ‘Convergence and divergence in the EU policy towards eastern neighbourhood: varied preferences on cross-border mobility’ at the ENP: Aims and Impact conference, University of Leicester, 18 June 2011

June: presentations
The SEI’s Dr Sabina Avdagic has been presenting at conferences across Europe this summer. Her papers include:

She has also published a book, co-edited with
July: Symposium

7 July: Symposium celebrates Prof Jim Rollo

30 current and former Sussex faculty and doctoral researchers came together for a one-day symposium to celebrate the academic career and professional achievements of Prof Jim Rollo, to mark his retirement after 12 years as Co-Director of the Sussex European Institute (SEI). Prof has been an SEI Co-Director and Professor of European Economic Integration at Sussex since 1999, having previously been Chief Economist at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. In 2009, he became an Academician of the Academy of Social Sciences.

The symposium was opened by Alasdair Smith, former Sussex Vice-Chancellor and currently a Research Professor in the Department of Economics, who played a key role in the formation and development of SEI in the 1990s. In his opening lecture, Prof Smith, who has been both a professional collaborator and personal friend of Prof Rollo’s since their undergraduate days at Glasgow University in the 1960, reflected on his colleague’s lifetime contribution to contemporary European studies at Sussex and beyond.

This was followed by a keynote address from Prof Rollo himself titled ‘The European Union: will its economic decline be relative or absolute?’ which provoked a lively discussion among participants. The rest of the symposium contained papers and contributions exploring the themes that have been a major focus of Prof Rollo’s work over the years, particularly the impact of globalisation on European trade and migration policy. Contributors included colleagues who have worked closely with him during his time at Sussex including: Prof Jorg Monar (who was SEI Co-Director with Prof Rollo in 2001-5), Dr Peter Holmes from the Department of Economics, and SEI Visiting Professorial Fellow Alan Mayhew (see page 41 for more).

8 July: EU Presidency Conference

The 'Conference on the Polish Presidency of the EU' was hosted by the Polish Embassy and organised by SEI, the Aston Centre for Europe and the Central and East European Language Based Area Studies (CEELBAS) network. (see page 42 for the report).

12 July: Murdoch Goes From Darling to Pariah in Watershed Moment

Professor Tim Bale (Politics) talks about the damage to the Conservative Party caused by the News of the World revelations over phone hacking in Bloomberg Businessweek.

17 July: UK police arrest Murdoch ally Rebekah Brooks

Professor Tim Bale (Politics) speculates on what will happen in the phone hacking scandal.
now that Rebekah Brooks has been arrested. Guardian 17.07.11

20 July: Cameron 'regrets' hiring scandal-hit tabloid editor
Professor Tim Bale (Politics) commented on David Cameron's admission of regret for appointing former NoW editor Andy Coulson on London South East, Vancouver Sun 18.07.11 and Reuters UK.

July: Balkans expertise
In July, Adrian Treacher was one of two external experts who joined the review panel at Brunel University to validate changes to credit weightings for politics and history courses and to provide feedback on a proposed new MSc in Politics.

Over the summer, a new journal for which he is head of the editorial board was launched. The first call for papers has gone out for the International Journal of Balkan Policy Research (www.balkanpolicyjournal.net), with the inaugural issue due out in September. The journal is being run out of Prishtina, Kosovo by SEI alumni Alejtin Berisha and Fisnik Korenica.

August: Publications and vivas

10 August: UK Riots
Dr Dan Hough (Politics) speculated on the causes of the UK riots on MDR Radio (Germany).

25 August: ECPR
Dr Sue Collard gave a paper at the ECPR conference in Reykjavik 25 - 27 August, entitled 'Participation in local elections by Non-National Citizens of the European Union: a Comparison of France and the UK', as part of a panel called 'Voting Rights Across Political Boundaries: non-citizen and non-resident franchise in the EU', chaired by Profs Jo Shaw (University of Edinburgh) & Rainer Baubock (EUI). (see page 42 for more on the SEI at ECPR).

The SEI’s Stijn Van Kessel presented on a panel called 'Analysing Party Competition with Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA)' with a paper called 'Paths to Populism: Explaining the Electoral Performance of Populist Parties in Europe'.

Also, the SEI's Dr James Hampshire co-chaired a panel (with Dennis Broeders, Erasmus University) on Europe's New Digital Borders, and co-authored a paper, entitled 'Dreaming of seamless borders: ICTs and the pre-emptive governance of mobility in Europe and the United States'.

August: Viva passed
Many congratulations to SEI doctoral student Emma Sanderson-Nash for passing her DPhil viva successfully at the end of August. Emma's thesis was on the subject of 'Obeying the iron law? Changes to the intra-party balance of power in the British Liberal Democrats since 1988'.

August: publication
In August the Polish Institute of Public Affairs (ISP) think tank published a discussion paper by Prof Aleks Szczerbiak on 'How will the EU presidency play out during Poland's autumn parliamentary election?'.

August: Book published
SEI Co-Director Prof Aleks Szczerbiak has published a new book titled 'Poland Within the European Union: New Awkward Partner or New Heart of Europe?'. The book examines the first five years of Polish EU membership (see page 22).

August: New SEI Working and EPERN Papers published
A number of new papers have been published
Activities

over the summer (see pages 33-35). The SEI-based European Parties Elections and Referendums Network (EPERN) has published two new working papers on: 'Sussex versus North Carolina: The Comparative Study of Party-Based Euroscepticism' by Cas Mudde (DePauw University); and 'The changing nature of Serbian political parties' attitudes towards Serbian EU membership' by Marko Stojic (SEI). To view these papers and others, see: http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/publications/seiworkingpapers.

The SEI-based EPERN has published three new election briefings on: The Irish General Election of 25th February 2011' by John FitzGibbon (SEI); 'Europe and the Finnish Parliamentary Elections of April 17, 2011' by Tapio Raunio (University of Tampere); and 'Europe and the Estonian Election of March 6 2011' by Mihkel Solvak (University of Tartu), which are available free at: (see: http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/research/europeanpartieselectionsreferendumsnetwork/epernelectionbriefings)

August: DPhil passed
Many congratulations to SEI doctoral student Ed Maxfield for passing his DPhil successfully in August. Ed's thesis was on the subject of 'Centre-Right failure in new democracies: the case of the Romanian Democratic Convention'.

August: SEI DPhil secures post-doctoral Fellowship
Congratulations to SEI doctoral researcher Ariadna Ripoll Servent who has been appointed to a two-year post-doctoral fellowship at the Institute for European Integration Research in the Austrian Academy of Sciences. The fellowship takes place in the framework of a research project on 'The role of supranational institutions in EU Justice and Home Affairs' led by Dr Florian Trauner.

September: New Co-Director
1-3 September: Conference paper
Dr Sue Collard gave a paper at the Annual Conference of the Association for the Study of Modern and Contemporary France (ASMCF) at the University of Stirling, called: 'Francois Mitterrand and the Parti Socialiste: an enduring legacy?'

15-16 September: paper
On September 15-16, Prof Aleks Szczerbiak attended a conference on 'Old Theory, New Cases: The Study of Party Politics in Central and Eastern Europe' at Södertörn University in Sweden where he presented a paper on 'Party politics in Eastern and Western Europe: convergence or divergence?' (Paul Taggart and Paul Webb also attended this conference.)

September: Teaching award
The Sussex Department of Politics and Contemporary European Studies, where many of the core faculty who teach on SEI's Masters programmes are based, has been awarded a Sussex team teaching prize in the 2011 University awards. The nomination was from the student body with a statement that emphasised the faculty's 'unfaltering passion for the subject (see page 47 for more).

September: New Co-Director
This autumn, the SEI will have a new Co-Director. Susan Millns, who is Professor of Law in the Sussex Law School, will replace Prof Jim Rollo as Co-Director alongside Prof Aleks Szczerbiak, following Prof Rollo’s recent retirement. Prof Millns joined the University of Sussex in 2006 having lectured previously in the law schools at the University of Liverpool and the University of Kent. Professor Millns’ research and teaching interests lie in the areas of European and comparative public law, human rights and feminist legal theory. (See Sue’s profile on page 6)
September: New Marie Curie Inter-European Fellow
In September, SEI welcomed Dr Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser as a 2-year Marie Curie Inter-European Fellow. Cristobal has come to work with SEI-based Professor of Politics Paul Taggart on a project on populism in Latin America and Europe.

5-7 September: EPQRN panels at UACES Annual conference
The SEI’s European Parliament Qualitative Research Network, (organized by Amy Busby and Ariadna Ripoll Servent) hosted 3 panels at the UACES Annual Conference, Cambridge. Submitted under the umbrella title “Inside the EU institutions”: exploring power and influence”, the panels were called; (1) “Beyond the new Treaties: re-defining working relationships between the EU institutions”, which explored the role of informality in shaping decision and policy-making processes, (2) “Opening the black-box: actors inside the institutions”, which investigated the role of specific groups of actors inside the institutions and (3) “Knowledge and expertise as a source of power” which concentrated on the role of experts and expertise. The panels were well attended and sparked many debates.

September: New ESRC student
Rebecca Partos satisfied her passion for politics by studying with top researchers while still an undergraduate during her summer holidays under a Sussex Junior Research Associate bursary - now she’s won funding to continue her studies as a political scientist. Rebecca has been awarded full funding by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) and the University for a four-year programme of research training and doctoral study on developments in Conservative immigration policy since 1945.

September: Masters students hand in!
This summer saw another batch of students hand in work for the SEI’s Masters courses, MACES and MAEP. For more information about the courses, see: http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/prospectivestudents. Daria, Tihana, Marica, Naida and Tomislav from MACES 2010/2011 sent their thanks to the SEI staff.

SEI Research in Progress
Seminars
AUTUMN TERM 2011
Wednesdays 14.00 - 15.50
Friston 113

12.10.11
SEI round table on ‘The EU in crisis’
Prof Alan Mayhew, Prof Jörg Monar
(University of Sussex)

26.10.11
Seven year itch? The European Left Party’s struggles to transform the EU
Dr Luke March (University of Edinburgh)

31.10.11
A new hegemony? Ten theses on Germany’s new European Policy
Prof Simon Bulmer (University of Sheffield)
(* Monday 14.00-16.00, Arts A71)

09.11.11
Bringing the right back in: Exploring the right in contemporary Latin America
Dr Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser (Social Science Research Centre Berlin (WZB)/ University of Sussex)

16.11.11
Relative Gains in the European Union
Dr Jonathan Golub (University of Reading)

23.11.11
Learning in EU Foreign Policy: The case of conflict prevention
Dr Christoph Meyer (King’s College London)

30.11.11
European Conservatism and the Limits of European Integration
Charles Crawford CMG (Former UK Ambassador)

Everyone is welcome to attend!
To be included in our mailing list for seminars, please contact Amanda Sims, email: pol-
ces.office@sussex.ac.uk

September: New Marie Curie Inter-European Fellow
In September, SEI welcomed Dr Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser as a 2-year Marie Curie Inter-European Fellow. Cristobal has come to work with SEI-based Professor of Politics Paul Taggart on a project on populism in Latin America and Europe.

5-7 September: EPQRN panels at UACES Annual conference
The SEI’s European Parliament Qualitative Research Network, (organized by Amy Busby and Ariadna Ripoll Servent) hosted 3 panels at the UACES Annual Conference, Cambridge. Submitted under the umbrella title “Inside the EU institutions”: exploring power and influence”, the panels were called; (1) “Beyond the new Treaties: re-defining working relationships between the EU institutions”, which explored the role of informality in shaping decision and policy-making processes, (2) “Opening the black-box: actors inside the institutions”, which investigated the role of specific groups of actors inside the institutions and (3) “Knowledge and expertise as a source of power” which concentrated on the role of experts and expertise. The panels were well attended and sparked many debates.

September: New ESRC student
Rebecca Partos satisfied her passion for politics by studying with top researchers while still an undergraduate during her summer holidays under a Sussex Junior Research Associate bursary - now she’s won funding to continue her studies as a political scientist. Rebecca has been awarded full funding by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) and the University for a four-year programme of research training and doctoral study on developments in Conservative immigration policy since 1945.

September: Masters students hand in!
This summer saw another batch of students hand in work for the SEI’s Masters courses, MACES and MAEP. For more information about the courses, see: http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/prospectivestudents. Daria, Tihana, Marica, Naida and Tomislav from MACES 2010/2011 sent their thanks to the SEI staff.
After lying in deep freeze during the cold war, the Balkans were once more ushered on the world scene in the 1990s. The images most commonly associated with the region in those years were those of violence, relying heavily on a small repertoire of negative stereotypes. The region had emerged as Europe's own land of Otherness, and, still under the influence of the Saidian paradigm, academia soon turned its attention to the long history of Western images of the Balkans. Maria Todorova’s *Imagining the Balkans* (1997) is the most influential work that came out that period, feeding a wider trend that saw the publication, among others, of Vesna Goldsworthy’s *Inventing Ruritania* (1998) and, more recently, Andrew Hammond’s *Debated Lands* (2007). It is within this context that I conceived the subject of my book *The British and the Balkans: Forming Images of Foreign Lands, 1900-1950*, which is out this September by Continuum. The book makes two main interventions.

First, it aims to bring back the human actors to the centre of the study of cross-cultural contacts. Who actually travelled to the Balkans and what relations were developed between the visitors and the locals? Who were those that ended up writing on the region, what was their relation to it, and what were their motives?

The first chapters of the book bring thus to the foreground a very rich and often complex relationship between the Balkans and a wide range of British visitors, from the war correspondents of the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 and the Macedonian front veterans of the First World War, to the travellers of the interwar years, and the secret agents parachuted in the Balkan mountains in the Second World War.

At the background, the book also explores the fascinating and ongoing power-game that took place back in Britain, regarding which private images would finally reach the public sphere. This question often turned into a classic power-knowledge struggle that involved experts, politicians, diplomats, academia and the media, as well as the Balkans’ own agents of influence.
The second half of the book takes a closer look at the images that were actually available to the British public, moving beyond the more oft cited literary sources, and challenging the linear reading of Balkan images as permanently negative or always concerned with violence. It is little acknowledged today that for long periods developments in the region were often viewed with positive interest or even with enthusiastic support, as was the case with the initial emergence of the small nation-state, the eviction of the Ottomans from Europe during the First Balkan War, the efforts in the 1930s for regional détente, or the resistance against the Germans and their allies during both World Wars.

The book thus takes the history of British-Balkan contacts out of the shadow of the violent 1990s, and historicises them in all their richness and contradictions.

Even more, the 2010s being a time when inter-European tensions and misunderstandings seem once more on the rise, it offers new insights into how cross-cultural contacts take place, how stereotypes get formed and how they can be overcome.

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A fistful of votes: 2011 elections and political polarization in Albania

By Gentian Elezi
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Twenty years after communism, Albania is still struggling for democratic consolidation. Establishing the rule of law and holding free and fair elections seem to be the hardest tasks.

Local elections held on May 8th of this year, confirmed these deficiencies. The electoral campaign was characterized by high political tensions and fears of destabilization of the country. Since the last political elections in 2009, Albania has been experiencing a political stalemate, due to the fact that the opposition did not recognize the election results (although it won 47% of the seats) and started a battle for transparency and a recount. This meant two years of impasse characterized by continuous boycott of institutions, a 20 days hunger strike of opposition MPs, several massive protests and the polarization of political environment.

Failing to reach an agreement, even with the mediation of several high rank EU officials, things precipitated when, during a violent protest organized by the opposition on January 2011, four protesters were shot dead by the Republican Guard in front of the Prime Minister’s Office.

The fact that the leader of the opposition, Mr. Edi Rama, decided to run for his fourth term as mayor of Tirana, the capital, helped in increasing the tension. Although elections were officially local, the opposition try to consider them political and appealed for an anti-government vote. Therefore, it was easy to predict that the battle for Tirana would be a tough one, with a strong political background rather than a local one. The leader of the opposition and head of the Socialist Party was running against the Minister of Interior, Mr. Lulzim Basha, who most probably will also be the successor of Prime Minister Berisha, as leader of the Democratic Party.

Although everything went smooth in the election day, the counting process became a source of tension. It took only two days to count votes all over the country, but the last ballot in Tirana was counted one week after elections.
And the worst was yet to come. The tension raised enormously when the counting for the last ballot box started. International partners and observers participated in this dramatic turn of events by following live at the counting centre. In the end, out of almost 250,000 votes in Tirana, Mr. Rama, the leader of the opposition had an advantage of 10 votes!

The governing party started a legal battle requesting the recount of some of votes considered irregular. The Electoral Commission decided in favor of the request and two months after the elections declared Mr. Lulzim Basha the winner, with few dozens of votes above his opponent. The opposition itself started other legal battles and appeals but with no result. The fact that the Commission is highly politicized (according to the law, members are designated by the main political parties, 4 + 3), contributed to undermining the legitimacy of the process by the opposition.

Similarly to political elections of 2009, a politicized administration managing the polls, lack of a culture of compromise and a highly polarized political environment, seem to be part of the same culture repeating in the Albanian democratization process. Failure to comply with the rules and frequent changes of them, have slowly delegitimized institutions and might leave the political game in Albania without trustworthy referees.

Serbia on its way to Europe:
The Serbian application for EU membership and its new Competition Law Reform

By Anne Wesemann
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The last four years might be seen as the most important ones in the Serbian aspiration to become a Member State of the European Union. Despite national economic and societal issues, its neighbours and the Serbia’s own political past have been difficult on the way to Europeanization.

This summer brought back in mind the tension between Serbia and Kosovo with the death of a Kosovo police officer during an assert control over borders in the northern, Serb-populated part of Kosovo. The EU’s acceptance of the new born Kosovo is too often felt as blackmail by Serbia. Bozidar Djelic, the country’s deputy prime minister for European integration, just announced in an interview on August 27th 2011 that the EU would try to lead the country into accepting for Serbia unacceptable solutions regarding the breakaway province of Kosovo. On the other hand the EU assists the former Yugoslavian republics to solve their issues concerning among others traveling and the Kosovo telecommunication and energy system. The EU president Herman van Rompuy visited Belgrade on September the 6th 2011 and promised five billion Euros spend by the EU to help the Western Balkans during their integration process.

However, the relationship to Kosovo is not the only issue. The process of integration also depends on other political demands of the EU. Over the last years Serbia denied knowledge about the residence of Goran Hadzic as one of the last war crime fugitives from the Balkan wars. Yet, the extradition of Hadzic, or better to say Serbia’s cooperation in that matter, was always a tension between the nation and the EU.
It was just this July that Hadzic was found and extradited to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in The Hague.

Despite these political tensions and on-going conflicts the economic status of this Balkan state brought other challenges for the European integration process. The common European market has its demands on the Member States. One main problem of Serbia was the lack of legislation on the competition processes. The installation of a functioning competition law was already a precondition for the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU. A first law of protection of competition (Zakon o zaštiti konkurencije) was passed in 2005. A reform had to follow soon after and the law or protection of competition now in force was passed in 2009.

It is no surprise that the Serbian competition law reads like a copy of the European competition law system. Regulations of mergers and cartels are to be found as well as EU equal definitions of the abuse of dominant position in the relevant market. Therefore, one can say that this step is made.

However, other problems are yet to be solved. Serbia’s labour market is still deteriorating and the privatisation of socially and state owned companies is going to slowly. These are factors, which are in combination with an ineffective administrative system, obstructing Serbia’s run to the EU. Vuk Jeremic as Minister of Foreign Affairs announced that Serbia has capacity as well as determination to beat all records for fastest EU accession. Knowing the problems the country still has to solve one might hope for Serbia’s long staying power.

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Transnational cooperation of Serbian political parties

By Marko Stojic
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Serbian political parties do not have a long history of cooperation with European transnational parties. Initial contacts between Serbian opposition parties and largest European party federations have been established in the 1990s, but the circumstances did not allow for the development of these relations.

After political changes in 2000, democratic parties that came to power began to cooperate intensively with European parties and expressed interest to join them, while the parties of a former regime remained in the international isolation.

The Democratic Party was the first Serbian party that secured international affiliation. It became a member of Socialist International (SI) in 2003, and obtained an associate member status of the Party of European Socialists (PES) in 2006. Although this party cooperated with centre right parties throughout the 1990s, the then party president Djindjic personally pushed for the strengthening of social-democratic values and joining the socialist transnational organisations.

This can be contributed to the fact that there was a need for this party to join one of the leading European party federations, and the PES was the only viable option, given that its main political rival, the Democratic Party of Serbia, had already been associated with the European People’s Party (EPP).
As a ruling, centre-right and conservative party that advocated Serbian membership in the EU, the Democratic Party of Serbia obtained an affiliated status in the EPP in 2004.

However, the party now maintains a minimum relation with this party federation. The main issue is the fact that this party argues that Serbia should remain outside the process of European integration until the EU recognises that Kosovo is a part of Serbia. As a consequence, the Democratic Party of Serbia has been under constant threat of suspension or exclusion from the EPP, since 2008. Another Serbian member of the EPP is the G17 plus. It became an affiliated member in 2005, despite the fact that this party does not share its conservative political profile, which indicates strategic rather than ideological reasons for transnational affiliations of Serbian parties.

The Liberal Democratic Party is a leading pro-European party that maintains close relations with liberal parties throughout Europe and the Balkans. It is a member of the European Liberal, Democrat and Reform Party (ELDR), the Liberal International as well as the LIBSEEN, a network of liberal parties from the South-eastern Europe.

Other relevant Serbian parties do not have official transnational relations. The Serbian Radical Party is a far-right, Eurosceptic party that has always been in unofficial isolation from the Western countries and the EU. This party resolutely rejects Serbian membership in the EU. It opposes transnational multilateral party cooperation and therefore is not a member of any of European party federations. The party has never expressed any intention to join them, which is in line with its negative attitudes towards the EU.

On the other side, the Socialist Party of Serbia, after adopting pro-European politics in 2008, expressed a strong intention to join the Socialist International and the Party of European Socialists. That is a key party goal even explicitly stated in a new programme. The SPS strives to become a leading pro-European left-wing party in Serbia, while a membership in these organizations would be the best proof of its full transformation. So far, the Socialists have not managed to fulfil this goal, given the reluctance of many parties to accept new rhetoric and politics of the party of former Serbian president Milosevic.

Finally, the Serbian Progressive Party is not a member of any of European party federations. As a new, centre-right party that was founded in 2008, its intention is to join the EPP. However, its potential European counterparts have expressed scepticism towards the party leaders, given that they had advocated the nationalistic and anti-European politics within the Serbian Radical Party for almost twenty years. As a consequence, the party has yet to prove its European orientation and to become a legitimate centre right party.

In summary, transnational cooperation plays a particularly significant role in a transformation of parties that adopted a pro-European position, after a long history of strong opposition to Serbian EU integration. Such parties are more susceptible to the impact of European party federations and are willing to harmonize positions with potential European partners.

They need to adapt to a new political environment, to legitimise in the eyes of the West and to get international recognition. Therefore, a key incentive for these parties to join European party federations is obtaining European credibility and legitimacy.
In the space of twenty years, Croatia has moved from being a constituent part of a Communist republic to an independent democratic state on the verge of EU membership.

Some of the other former parts of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia such as Slovenia moved further and faster ahead on the path to democracy than Croatia, whilst others still lag some way behind. So what can the case of Croatia tell us about how such democratic transitions have been brought about? What is the balance between domestic and international factors in describing democratic transitions? My research focuses on the conditions and mechanisms that determine the effectiveness of EU democracy promotion, and Croatia is one of my primary case studies.

Croatia is a key case for EU enlargement policy as the first country to be subject to the new, tougher conditionality introduced after the accession of Romania and Bulgaria, whose entry was widely seen as being rushed. This new approach had a two-fold logic. Firstly, tougher conditionality was important in order to get the country in question to deliver, and secondly it was important to allay the fears of member states that new members would be allowed to join who were not quite ready.

The EU has hoped to demonstrate that enlargement policy can still be successful, even in the ‘difficult cases’ of post-conflict states in the Western Balkans, through closer political monitoring, the introduction of country specific opening and closing benchmarks for negotiating chapters, a more direct link between political dialogue and the pace of the negotiations, as well as the new Chapter 23 on the judiciary and fundamental rights.

There has also been a different context for further entrants to the EU in which to operate, encapsulated in the oft-heard phrase ‘enlargement fatigue’. At the time of writing, in June 2011, Croatia has received the green light from the European Commission to wrap up the accession negotiations and to pave the way for Croatia’s entry to the EU in 2013. However, there is criticism that Croatia may not have done enough in terms of domestic reform, especially in the areas of the fight against corruption, to warrant the conclusion of its accession negotiations. Is the EU in danger of making the same mistake again of allowing a state to join that is not yet fully ready?

There is no doubt that Croatia has changed enormously in the last twenty years. The war from
1991-1995, most commonly referred to in Croatia as the ‘Homeland War’, led to huge loss of life, destruction of infrastructure and damage to the economy.

This period of conflict, which through its televised carnage and newly-termed ‘ethnic cleansing’ caused much hand-wringing in Europe, was finally brought to a close in November 1995 with the Dayton Peace Accord, which was brokered by the US. The inability of the EU to stop the conflict had profound consequences that are still playing out fifteen years later, most visibly in the creation of the European External Action Service.

Once the conflict was over, aid for reconstruction could begin to flow into Croatia, through instruments such as Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation (CARDS), and the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA). But Croatia in the late 1990s was described as a ‘defective democracy’, characterised by a concentration of presidential power, the obstruction of the opposition and expanded government control of society, especially the mass media.

Franjo Tuđman controlled a super-presidential, semi-authoritarian system that tolerated no opposition to his HDZ party. Throughout the 1990s, Freedom House rated Croatia as only ‘partly free’, with concerns about widespread corruption, a low level of media freedom and weak civil society.

This situation persisted throughout the decade with Tuđman and the HDZ seemingly resistant to international influence seeking to promote Croatian democracy. Croatia’s path towards EU membership only really started after Tuđman’s death in 1999 and the process of ‘de-Tuđmanisation’ that followed. Was it the so-called ‘passive leverage’ of the EU that put Croatia on a path to democracy, or was it a domestically led phenomenon?

Either way, in the last decade, Croatia began its journey towards EU membership. In February 2003, Croatia applied for EU membership, and in April the following year received a positive opinion from the European Commission on its application. In June 2004, the European Council confirmed Croatia as a candidate member, and in February 2005 a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) came into force. In October 2005, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) judged that Croatia was fully co-operating, and formal EU accession negotiations began at the same time. Six years later, Croatia stands poised to become the EU’s 28th member state.

In interviews I conducted recently in Brussels, senior officials in DG Enlargement in the European Commission conceded the clearly evident observation that EU enlargement has slowed down in recent years, and they also said that in order to show that enlargement as a policy still has legitimacy, there may be an inclination to look for good news and to look for successes. Many commentators hope that the success of the Croatia case will help to rejuvenate EU enlargement policy in the Western Balkans, especially in Bosnia, and that as the benefits of EU membership begin to be felt, citizens across the region will press their leaders to undertake the necessary domestic reforms.

But questions still remain to be examined about how much of the credit for Croatia’s progress towards democracy can be attributed to international influences such as the EU, and how much should go to domestic factors.
On-Going Research

This section presents updates on the array of research on contemporary Europe that is currently being carried out at the SEI by faculty and doctoral students.

Sussex launches Centre for the Study of Corruption

By Dr Dan Hough
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The summer of 2011 saw the launch of an exciting new venture at Sussex; a research centre dedicated to the analysis of, and developing antidotes to, corruption. The Sussex Centre for the Study of Corruption (SCSC) is based in the School of Law, Politics and Sociology under the leadership of PolCES and the SEI’s Dr. Dan Hough. Much like the SEI, the centre deliberately takes an interdisciplinary approach to analysing what corruption is, where and why it flourishes and also what (most importantly) can be done to counteract it.

The SCSC aims to be a world-leading centre of corruption analysis, working closely with organisations such as Transparency International in developing recommendations and proposals for combating corruption both in the United Kingdom and further afield. An integral part of the SCSC is the MA in Corruption and Governance (see http://www.sussex.ac.uk/polces/pgstudy/scsc/maincorruptionstudies for more details) which will accept its first cohort of students in 2012-13. This new MA programme is designed to develop students’ understanding of what corruption is, where it flourishes, why it proliferates and ultimately what can be done to counteract it. It will be of interest both for students with an interest in corruption more generally and for existing practitioners in the field. The programme will address challenging issues of how different disciplines define corruption and how this can lead to very different anti-corruption approaches. It introduces the analytical and theoretical tools that will allow students to analyse corruption across time, space and discipline and, importantly, aims to offer students practical experience – through placements in anti-corruption organisations – of tackling corruption in the real world.

The SCSC will be hosting a major three day conference on ‘The State of the Art’ in corruption research in September 2012. Academics, practitioners and commentators will come together to assess the effectiveness of anti-corruption efforts – in theory and in practice – thus far, before mapping out a future research agenda that institutions such as the SCSC will hope to follow.

Through 2011-12 the SCSC will continue to offer Sussex students the opportunity to interact with some of the most influential anti-corruption activists in the UK today. In January 2012 Dr Robert Barrington from Transparency International UK will, for example, becoming to speak to undergraduate students taking the third year special topic on ‘Political Corruption’. It is hoped that some Sussex students will also be able to visit TI's
headquarters in Berlin in March 2012. The SCSC is also building up links with other like-minded institutions abroad. Dan Hough is, for example, spending the Autumn term working with Professor He Jiahong in the Law School at Renmin University of China in Beijing. Renmin and Sussex already have strong institutional linkages, and it is hoped that this can continue between the SCSC and the anti-corruption scholars in the Renmin Law School.

For more on this, or any aspect of the SCSC or the MA programme, please email Dr. Dan Hough at d.t.hough@sussex.ac.uk.

By Prof Aleks Szczerbiak
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SEI Co-Director Prof Aleks Szczerbiak has published a new book titled 'Poland Within the European Union: New Awkward Partner or New Heart of Europe?'. The book examines the first five years of Polish EU membership.

The combination of Poland's potential power as a major, and possibly controversial, player in both the region and Europe as a whole, and the apparent salience of Euroscepticism in domestic electoral politics at the core of the Polish government and party system presented the possibility that Poland would be a 'new awkward partner' in Europe.

However, although Poles may have voted for EU-critical parties in large numbers no 'Eurosceptic backlash' has emerged. In fact, far from being a 'new awkward partner', Poland has tried to portray itself as the 'new heart of Europe' and it certainly came to be increasingly perceived as such in Brussels and by its European allies.

The book focuses on two linked questions. Firstly, what impact has Poland had upon the EU as a new member state? Secondly, how has becoming an EU member impacted upon public attitudes towards the EU and Polish domestic politics, particularly on its party and electoral politics?

Prof Szczerbiak provides the first detailed empirical case study of the impact of Poland's EU membership on its politics and of Poland's impact on the EU. The book also makes broader theoretical contributions to our understanding of EU relations with its member states.

As a result of the above, this book will be of interest to students and scholars of European Politics, political science and European integration. For more information, see: <http://www.routledge.com/books/details/9780415380737>.

The book was launched on 26 September 2011 at The Embassy of the Republic of Poland in London, with The Ambassador of the Republic of Poland, Her Excellency Ms Barbara Tuge–Erecińska, where Prof Szczerbiak delivered a guest lecture.
Employment protection across countries

By Dr Sabina Avdagic
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During 2010/11 I was away in Germany on a 10-month fellowship funded jointly by the German Academic Exchange (DAAD) and the Hanse-Wissenschaftskolleg / Hanse Institute for Advanced Study (HWK). The arrangement included a research fellowship at the HWK and a visiting professorship at the University of Bremen’s International Graduate School of Social Sciences (BIGSSS). During this time I have been working on three papers that draw on new data collected in the course of my ESRC project on the causes and consequences of employment protection reforms. Two of these papers are currently under review, while the third one is in the final stages of analysis.

The first paper examines why some governments adopt costly reforms that bring about far-reaching liberalization of the labour market, while others opt only for marginal adjustments or even further regulation of employment protection. The paper presents a model that explains the likelihood of different types of reform as an effect of different constellations of government partisanship and veto players, and tests this model on data for 24 EU countries during 1990-2007. Combining the ‘blame avoidance’ and ‘veto players’ logics of politics, the paper shows that liberalization is likely to be undertaken either by left parties in contexts with a high degree of power sharing, or by right parties facing few veto players. Regulatory reforms, on the other hand, are most likely in contexts where left governments enjoy strong power concentration, but marginal regulation may be also adopted under external pressure by right governments facing many veto players.

The second paper, on which I have been working jointly with Paola Salardi, who was a research assistant on my ESRC project, re-assesses empirical support for the conventional view that labor market rigidities are responsible for high unemployment and that wide-ranging institutional deregulation is an appropriate policy response. Rather than focusing exclusively on the standard group of advanced OECD economies, the analysis also includes new data for the 10 EU member states from Central and Eastern Europe. Focusing on 1980-2007 and paying special attention to the robustness of estimation results, we found that support for the deregulatory view is remarkably thin. The sensitivity analysis demonstrates that in most cases the adverse effects of institutions diminish or disappear entirely with small changes in the sample or the use of alternative estimators and specifications. We also found that the impact of institutions is particularly weak in new market economies, where labor market institutions are already fairly liberal, and unemployment seems to be related primarily to macroeconomic factors. On the whole, our findings challenge the policy orthodoxy espoused by the OECD and IMF that comprehensive labor market deregulation is necessary to reduce unemployment.

Finally, the third paper, which I am co-authoring with Luna Bellani, a research fellow on my project, examines the impact of labour market institutions on earnings and income inequality in the EU and OECD countries. Focusing in particular on the impact of different components of employment protection legislation, we examine whether labour market institutions reduce inequality and whether there may be a trade-off between employment and inequality, as commonly argued. I am currently organizing a workshop, which is to be held at Sussex in early December, where the findings of these papers will be discussed.

In addition, I have been also proofing an edited book on which I have been working with Martin Rhodes (University of Denver) and Jelle Visser (University of Amsterdam) for a couple of years within a larger project financed by the European Commissions’ Sixth Framework Programme. The book, entitled Social Pacts in Europe: Emergence, Evolution and Institutionalization, was published by Oxford University Press in May this year.
Precipitated by the alleged “politicisation” of the Human Rights Commission, the United Nations human rights system has been subjected to radical reform since 2005.

Within the reconfigured Human Rights Council, a new mechanism, Universal Periodic Review (UPR) was launched in 2006; it completes its first cycle this October. UPR is a state-driven scrutiny of the human rights “situation” of each of the United Nations’ 192 member states. In the UPR, the community of member states is charged to carry out reviews in “an objective, transparent, non-selective, constructive, non-confrontational and non-politicised manner”. But how does it actually work in practice and what are its effects?

Since November of last year, funded by a British Academy Research Development Award (BARDA), my colleague, Sussex Research Fellow Dr. Julie Billaud and I, have been conducting fieldwork on UPR at the United Nations in Geneva. Through ethnographic methods of participation-observation, interviews, analysis of documents and of document-creating processes, we have been exploring the social practices and contested meanings of UPR.

The project builds on an anthropology of human rights that considers the complex and contradictory ways that human rights unfold “in practice”, both in diverse localities across the world and in international institutions. It also draws on a second interdisciplinary area of work that has been critically examining what the anthropologist Marilyn Strathern calls “audit culture”: the global trend toward increased auditing of public institutions as a mechanism of “good governance”. Finally, it arises out of my investigations into the everyday bureaucratic practices by the Minorities Section of the League of Nations Secretariat as they dealt with petitions and claims for Macedonia in the 1920s. Notwithstanding the dominant discourse of League failure and of the United Nations as a fresh start, I was intrigued by institutional continuities in the monitoring of rights and protections yet, also, historical transformations, as evident in the distinctively managerialist logic and language of the new mechanism.

Heuristically, I conceive the half-day review, known technically as the UPR Working Group, UPR’s most visible element, available by simultaneous webcast and in an online archive, as a “public audit ritual”. Conducted in the magnificent Salle XXI, La Salle des Droits de l’Homme et de l’Alliance des Civilisations in the Palais des Nations, this ritual is composed of a multiplicity of performances, some occurring on the podium, others staged from the floor.

The public ritual continues in the 30-minute “adoption of the report” 48 hours later, and finally, three to four months later, in the one-hour slot under Item 6 at the Human Rights Council Plenary. Yet we are investigating what happens “backstage” in the form of preparations for the review, as well as what follows from it. Outside of “The Room”, NGOs sponsor parallel events over the long lunch break. Ravenous diplomats, NGO staffers and journalists jostle amiably for the free sandwich rolls and coffee provided before the event. Alternatively, they meet, greet and lobby in the airy Serpentine Bar looking out over Lac Leman.

UPR is a collective production. Whereas the ways that each collective actor may participate in UPR is formally differentiated and highly circumscribed,
Research

attempts to influence others, as well as bureaucratic practices of compilation and cut-and-paste, raise intriguing questions around “who is speaking?”

Although only state delegations can take the floor during the UPR Working Group “Interactive Dialogue”, their intricately composed statements, hurriedly delivered before the 2-minute guillotine, are normally the product of intense negotiations within each state, with other states and with NGOs, who have often researched and authored the “recommendations” that states offer. Indeed, the mechanism relies on a “civil society” actively engaging in consultations with their government as the “National Report” is being prepared, as well as lobbying other states and submitting NGO reports. Secretariat staff have the politically delicate task of drawing together these NGO contributions into a “Stakeholders’ Report”; they also extract the judgments of independent experts from the reports of treaty-bodies and special procedures and recycle them into a “Compilation of UN Information”, the third of the three key reports that underpin the review. In our research, we have been asking: through what encounters, using what technologies and resources, in relation to what data, identities and relationships and in what sites do the various actors ascertain facts, negotiate the meanings of human rights and their violation, formulate interventions and create outcomes to produce UPR?

Even for two experienced anthropologists, gaining “access” to this ostensibly “public” event has been a challenge. As acknowledged in its own documentation, the Human Rights Council has not yet established procedures to facilitate the efforts of scholars who want to study how it works. Several requests for permission disappeared into the black hole of a generic OHCHR email address before we were connected with someone vaguely relevant. Eventually, we acquired the precious, though time-limited, badge giving us entry into Salle XXI through personal contacts with an ECOSOC-accredited Geneva-based NGO, who graciously negotiated our entry under their aegis, exactly as they do for members of non-accredited NGOs.

We found seats in the back, in the two long rows allocated to all and sundry non-state bodies, from UNHCR, UNDP and the EU to a hodgepodge of NGOs. We followed a number of reviews, and in the interstices, chatted with those sitting near us. Alongside other regular followers of UPR proceedings, we met many who had travelled from afar and were seeing UPR for the first time; often they were local civil society activists, observing the UPR session predating that of their country, in order to learn how it worked so that they could return home and influence the process. Sometimes—just like NGO activists—we discreetly approached diplomats at their desks, slipping them our business cards and asking for interviews. Although we have learned how frantically busy most diplomats are, some of these contacts have developed into friendships, giving us insights into backroom horse-trading as well as diplomatic dilemmas.

From March until June, Julie worked as an intern in a hopelessly understaffed office of the Secretariat responsible for compiling the UPR Stakeholders’ reports. Allocated on her very first day final responsibility for specific country’s Stakeholders report, she learned the combination of mind-numbing fastidiousness and quiet diplomatic savvy that characterises the Secretariat’s work. Having glimpsed these various contexts, we hope to construct an illuminating account of the social, cultural and political dimensions of human rights monitoring as an international practice.
Who governs?: government formation and duration in Central and Eastern Europe

Lee Savage is joining the SEI for one year as an ESRC Postdoctoral Fellow in the autumn term. Following the award of his PhD from the University of Essex in 2008, Lee worked in policy development on behalf of the government and third sector organisations. The focus of the fellowship research is government formation and duration in Central and Eastern Europe though his wider interests are party behaviour and party systems in Eastern Europe. Lee will be mentored by Professor Aleks Szczerbiak for the duration of the fellowship.

Who governs? It is perhaps one of the most important questions that can be asked in political science and one that seems to yield obvious answers – the party that wins the election. But in most parliamentary democracies there is not a direct link between vote share and participation in government. Where proportional electoral systems predominate, it is rare for a single party to accrue a majority of seats in the legislature and therefore coalition governments which do hold a majority are the norm. How these coalitions arise in Central and Eastern Europe is the focus of my research.

The Central and East European region provides fertile territory for the analysis of government formation. The standard approaches in this field of study have been developed and tested in areas where democratic politics has been established for some time and where party systems are more or less stable. Democratic institutions are relatively new in Central and Eastern Europe and in contrast to Western Europe, party systems are often seen as unstable. This raises questions of how coalition politics functions under such conditions, in particular, if party systems are unstable to what degree can future-oriented parties build political alliances?

A number of models of government formation will be assessed during the course of the research from traditional approaches such as the size principle to the more recently-developed Portfolio Allocation model. The research will also consider government formation from another perspective, moving from government composition as the unit of analysis to individual political parties to answer the question: which parties become members of the government? Finally, government duration will be examined as a natural progression from investigation into government formation.

During the next year I will publish a number of papers detailing the results of my research together with producing a monograph for publication in late 2012. I will also extend the expert survey on party policy position in Central and Eastern Europe that I collected for my PhD. This is a valuable resource that has uses beyond my own research and therefore I will be setting up a website to deposit the data freely available online to other researchers.

I am looking forward to returning to academia following my time in the policy world and I greatly appreciate the opportunity afforded to me by both the SEI and ESRC. I also look forward to discussing my work with colleagues and students throughout the year.
Populism in Europe and Latin America: A Cross-Regional Perspective

By Dr Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser
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Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser is a Marie-Curie Fellow in residence at the University of Sussex for two years between September 2011 and August 2013. He holds a PhD from the Humboldt-University of Berlin (2009) and is currently post-doctoral fellow at the Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB). His main research interests include populism, democracy, and Latin American politics. He has published in Democratization, the Latin American Research Review and the Kellogg Institute Working Papers, among others. In 2012 his co-edited volume (with Cas Mudde), Populism in Europe and the Americas: Threat or Corrective to Democracy?, will be published by Cambridge University Press. At the moment, he is working (with Juan Pablo Luna) on a research project on the right and democracy in contemporary Latin America.

In the last two decades, populism has been gaining strength in Europe and Latin America. Although the topic has received much scholarly attention, there are no cross-regional studies on this subject. My project seeks to fill this research gap by achieving three main objectives. First, I will develop a conceptual approach which is useful for undertaking cross-regional research. Second, I seek to determine which factors foster and hinder the (re)emergence of populism in Europe and Latin America. Third, I aim to show that and elucidate why populism takes a different form in each of these regions: while European populism seeks to exclude certain groups (e.g. immigrants) from society, Latin American populism intends to include certain groups (e.g. the poor) to the polity.

The innovative potential of this research project lies in at least two factors. On the one hand, by undertaking a cross-regional study it is possible to disentangle features that in different regional contexts tend to appear together with populism but are not necessarily intrinsic to it (e.g. xenophobia in Europe and clientelism in Latin America). On the other hand, the cross-regional comparison will contribute to gain new insights into the ambivalent relationship between populism and democracy, particularly in terms of the impact that the former might have on the latter. Accordingly, it is important to mention that the subject of this research, as well as the knowledge that it intends to generate, goes far beyond the “ivory tower” of academia. Indeed, populism is a contemporary phenomenon that affects the day-to-day functioning of democracy worldwide. Thus the project will contribute to the understanding of a topic that not only is significant for the scholarly community, but also for governments, civil society and public opinion.

“populism is a contemporary phenomenon that affects the day-to-day functioning of democracy worldwide.”

While in Sussex I plan to write a monograph on populism in Europe and Latin America. Moreover, I intend to teach a course on Latin American politics and also present different parts of my project at the SEI. Professor Paul Taggart will act as the scientist-in-charge of the project. I greatly appreciate the opportunity to discuss my work with colleagues and students at the SEI and I very much look forward to advancing the project.
After the defeat of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE) in the French and Dutch referendums, governments across Europe had little appetite for popular votes on the Treaty of Lisbon. Indeed, ratification of the treaty followed the parliamentary route in 26 of the 27 EU member states – the one exception being Ireland, where a referendum was mandated by the constitution. The interesting puzzle, here, is less why governments would not have wanted to be drawn into further referendums on the reform treaty. In fact, this is rather straightforward after the No-votes on the TCE reminded them of the political risks of the referendum strategy. The question in need of exploration, in contrast, is how it was possible for governments to get away with not having popular votes on Lisbon domestically. This is all the more remarkable for those nine member states – apart from Ireland – which were at some point committed to or had already held popular votes on the TCE: the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. After all, the referendum commitments on the TCE make for powerful precedents which should have reinforced domestic referendum demands on Lisbon. While the attempts of governments to get around popular votes on the treaty were certainly helped by country-specific changes in the domestic political contexts of ratification during the ‘period of reflection’, it will be argued that the European-level collusion between member state governments was crucial for these attempts to succeed.

The European negotiations on the reform treaty started out from the premise that settling the issue quickly was a priority. With this objective in mind, the general consensus among EU governments was to make sure that there would be no national referendums on the treaty beyond Ireland. In consequence, there was a broad willingness among European-level negotiators to assist individual governments in avoiding referendums and to grant them a number of negotiation ‘victories’ which they could employ for this purpose. Indeed, in the judgement of Valerie Giscard d’Estaing, the main rationale for the changes to the Lisbon Treaty as compared to the TCE was precisely to prevent further popular votes.

At the heart of European-level support for governments hoping to evade popular votes on Lisbon was the German council presidency during the first half of 2007, which was tasked with producing a mandate for an intergovernmental conference (IGC) on treaty reform under the Portuguese presidency. To this purpose, the German presidency engaged in intensive bilateral consultations which focused specifically on the concerns of governments who battled to get around referendum commitments on the TCE. At the top of its priorities stood the concerns of the French and Dutch governments that they would have no choice but to call a referendum on Lisbon – and little chance of winning it – unless the new treaty took a decidedly non-constitutional form. From the outset, the German presidency was ready to accommodate that position and played an active role in de-constitutionalising both the process of treaty reform and the content and language of the new treaty. In the domestic arena, in turn, the express de-constitutionalisation of the treaty proved to be one of the most powerful argumentative resources of governments in resisting calls for popular votes. Just as the constitutional aspirations of the TCE signified a qualitative leap in European integration which went beyond the realm of ‘normal’ politics and thus required the extra legitimacy provided by popular votes, the rejection of these aspirations in Lisbon was to symbolise the re-normalisation of European treaty reform and to allow for the return to the practice...
of parliamentary ratification. On a more specific level, the German presidency and other member state governments went out of their way to accommodate the negotiation priorities of governments who were expected to find it most difficult to resist domestic pressures towards a referendum. Thus, it was the governments of Denmark, the Netherlands, France and the United Kingdom who benefited most from the common desire of EU governments to forestall national referendums and who therefore did particularly well in the negotiations.

Finally, the prospects of EU-level efforts at avoiding referendums were strongly interdependent. On the one hand, the example of countries not having referendums on the treaty strengthened the hands of governments in other countries to avoid referendums as well. As a case in point, such examples were routinely invoked by Brown: 

*Is it not remarkable that only one government – Ireland – who are constitutionally obliged to do so, think that the issues [involved in the Treaty of Lisbon] justify a referendum now?*

On the other hand, government decisions to grant referendums on the reform treaty were expected to bolster domestic referendum demands in other member states. Most notably, the wish to avoid such knock-on effects was a major reason for the Portuguese government to decide against a referendum on Lisbon. Given that such a referendum would have been easily won in Portugal, the government for a time toyed with the idea of extending its referendum commitment on the TCE to the Lisbon Treaty. In consequence, it came under explicit pressure from, among others, the French, UK and German governments not to endorse a referendum. Eventually, the Portuguese government did indeed opt for parliamentary ratification of the treaty because, in the words of Prime Minister José Sócrates,

*[a] referendum in Portugal would jeopardise, without any reason to do so, the full legitimacy of the ratification by national parliaments that is taking place in all the other European countries.*

Along these lines, the concerted efforts of EU governments at avoiding referendums on Lisbon are a prime example for the strategy of ‘chief of government collusion’ in two-level games. In the Lisbon negotiations, governments have collaborated to strengthen their cases against referendums and to reassert control over the institutional rules of domestic ratification. Thus, the Lisbon Treaty shows that governments may indeed succeed in reversing the trend towards ever more referendums on European integration. It also suggests, however, that this was only possible because of their resolve to act in collusion. Given the temptations for governments to commit to EU referendums for domestic or European reasons, however, such a unity of purpose should not be taken for granted.

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**Researching party-interest group relations**

Dr Elin Haugsgjerd Allern, SEI Visiting Postdoctoral Research Fellow 2011 e.h.allern@stv.uio.no

During the spring of 2011, I had the privilege of serving as a visiting scholar at the University of Sussex. When I was granted a postdoctoral fellowship at the University of Oslo in 2008, I soon decided that I would try to go abroad during my post-doc period to work in a different academic environment for a while – like I did as a Norwegian doctoral fellow, visiting the Johns Hopkins University, Maryland, in the early 2000s. As a specialist on political parties, the Department of Politics and Contemporary European Studies/SEI at the US was an obvious ‘destination’ to consider in Europe, and the impression of a strong and friendly research community was clearly confirmed while I was in Sussex. The welcome was warm – including, for the record, the best April weather ever recorded!
My spring visit also served a more specific academic purpose: to work with SEI Professor Tim Bale on a research plan related to the relationship between political parties and civil society organisations. In 2008, we ran an ECPR workshop together on this topic that led to a special issue in Party Politics (to be published in early 2012). During the spring of 2011, we extended this work into a cross-national project idea on the relationship between parties and interest groups. The main topic of this comparative research project will be the (changing) nature of party-interest group relationships and the factors that shape them in contemporary democratic politics. We are also interested in the actual political significance of party-group links. During the autumn of 2011, we will submit an application for a grant that will allow us to establish a network of party/interest group scholars across Europe and beyond, and to develop a full-blown research proposal consisting of several ‘waves’.

I arrived in Sussex with my family when the spring break was about to start, so I was not able to get involved in any student-related activities during my stay from mid-March to mid-May. However, this gave me ample time to work on on-going projects in addition to the research proposal. Above all, I finished and presented a co-authored paper draft on ‘parties as multi-level organizations in a unitary state’. I am grateful for the useful questions that were brought up during the reading group meeting, and a revised version of the paper will soon be resubmitted to an international journal. I also contributed to a co-authored paper comparing political appointments to the state administration in three Nordic countries that was presented at the ECPR General Conference in Reykjavik in August this summer. Hopefully, the forthcoming party-interest group-project will bring me back to Sussex in the not too distant future!

By Morten Hansen
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The practical implementation of parliamentary institutions beyond the nation state is a feature of post-World War II Europe. While previous supranational parliamentary institutions did exist to a limited extent before this time (the Inter-parliamentary Union since 1888 and the Empire/Commonwealth Parliamentary Association since 1911/1948), none of these preceding organisations are coupled with a formal advisory position vis-à-vis a transnational intergovernmental organisation as is the case with most post-war European assemblies.

So far, scholarship has tended to focus mostly on one example of these European transnational parliamentary assemblies (TPAs), the European Parliament (EP), particularly its development since the introduction of direct elections in 1979.

However, the European Parliament did not suddenly leap into existence fully formed in its post-1979 guise, but rather began as one among many similar TPAs in the 1940s and ‘50s, created in an immediate post-WWII context and shaped by the emerging Cold War environment.

Thus, studying the period 1949-1989 offers the advantage of following a series of TPAs from their inception until the end of the Cold War, which spawned a ‘second generation’ of European TPAs in the early 1990s.

As organisations are shaped by their personnel and, conversely, changes in personnel might reveal developments within an organisation, the actual persons making up these TPAs, their backgrounds and careers, are worth studying to reveal what types of parliamentarian chose to or were sent to serve in these institutions and what career opportunities such service might entail. The historical/sociological method of prosopography focuses the attention on the parliamentarians as both individu-
als and as parts of a group, and especially on their personal backgrounds in conjunction with their political careers.

As a small state with a multi-party parliamentary setup that potentially allows considerable parliamentary control over foreign policy, this makes Denmark well-suited as a case study, and its membership of most TPAs in Cold War Europe provides the opportunity to compare developments in the composition of different TPAs over time.

Preliminary analysis points towards the initial dominance of a very small group of committed Danish ‘internationalists’ comprising the ‘founding generation’ of members in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE). This 1949 delegation consisting of 4 members and 4 substitutes, collectively occupied both membership and substitute positions in PACE almost constantly until the late 1950s, only one, Thorkil Kristensen, leaving permanently in 1951 to become Finance Minister in Denmark, then the first General Secretary of the OEEC (now OECD) 1960-67. Kristensen aside, none spent less than 4½ years in PACE and half more than a decade, all having conspicuous subsequent international careers as members of Danish UN and Nordic Council delegations, and international NGOs, most achieving prominent positions (chairmanship, head of delegation etc.).

These ‘founders’ had in common their considerable prior international experience. Kristensen aside (having only been involved in foreign policy as an MP and minister since 1946), all the delegates could draw on experience from service in multilateral organisations during the inter-war period, and/or wartime international experience and contacts from time spent in the Danish resistance.

Interests, Ideas and Institutions: Explaining Immigration Policy Change in the UK, 1970-

By Erica Consterdine
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Since last writing for Euroscope I’m delighted to say that I have officially switched to the Politics Department and acquired a new supervisor, Tim Bale, who I’m very excited to be working with. In terms of my DPhil I’ve been focused on conducting my fieldwork, which begun in the spring term with the collection and analysis of grey literature, and analysis of Hansard debates. This data, combined with data from my elite interviews, led me to some insights about how foreign policy has shaped recent economic immigration policy in the UK.

I presented this research at the Migration Graduate Conference at Sussex in July, with the title ‘Fusing Policy, Shifting Paradigms: UK Immigration Policy and the A8 Case’. I co-organized this two day event, which brought together young scholars working in the field of migration from across Europe, which also included many DPhil students at the SEI. I then conducted archival research in the National Archives in Kew throughout July. This produced some really interesting evidence, such as how EU relations shaped immigration policy in the 1970s, and why the 1981 British Nationality Act was constructed.

This research showed both marked differences with the political rhetoric of immigration in the 1970s, and parallels with current immigration policy, such as inflated concerns over irregular immigration, and references to policy ideas which have informed current policy such as a discussion on a possible points-based system.

Since June I have been conducting elite interviews (mostly in London) with various individuals from the policy community of UK economic immigration policy. These have included policy officers from NGOs such as the Joint Council for Welfare
of Immigrants (JCWI) and the Refugee Council, migration specialists at think tanks such as the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR), policy advisers including members of the Migratory Advisory Committee (MAC), policy analysts from departments such as the Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit and the Cabinet Office, and union representatives from the TUC and Unison.

These interviews have highlighted the contrasting institutional positions on economic immigration policy, and have so far shown, perhaps unsurprisingly, that the source of policy change is contested according to different institutions and political elites. The data has also led to some insights about the role of departmental culture and changing policymaking practices within government generating immigration policy change, and the role of organized interests and evidence in immigration policy making. I’m hoping to develop these insights into chapters for my thesis.

“This research showed both marked differences with the political rhetoric of immigration in the 1970s, and parallels with current immigration policy”

I have more interviews planned to be conducted throughout the year with other policymakers, economists and representatives from employers and employer associations. I also plan to conduct more archival research at the Labour History Archive in Manchester, and the Modern Records Centre at the University of Warwick.

Ilke Gurdal
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I started my research in October 2010 at the SEI. My research is on the transformation of political Islam in Turkey from an anti-westernist position to pro-western policies. My undergraduate degree is in Political Science & Public Administration at Eastern Mediterranean University in Cyprus. During my undergraduate I have developed an interest in international and local politics by being politically active as well as taking a special interest in European politics. By developing an interest in European politics I then went on to do an MA in Contemporary European studies at University of Sussex. This enabled me to develop further knowledge of the European Union and other aspects of European politics.

After finishing my MA, it didn’t take long for me to get back into the academic world. A year after completing my masters I started a DPhil degree at SEI. My interest in the Middle East and Turkey as a country inspired me to do research on political Islam in Turkey. My research looks to explore the transformation of political Islam in Turkey since its foundation in the 1970s. I will look at the changing dynamics of this ideology and what factors have inspired these changes. My primary focus is to study the Justice and Development Party (JDP) led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan of their differences with the previous Islamist parties in terms of policy-making, foreign policy, economic approach and social bases of the party. JDP claims to differ from the previous Islamist parties in their understanding of democracy, law, human rights and foreign policy and I will try to define how it does so.

“My research looks to explore the transformation of political Islam in Turkey since its foundation in the 1970s”.

I will be working with Prof Shamit Sagar and Dr Adrian Treacher who have been very helpful in guiding me throughout the start of my research.
After interviewing a number of Serbian politicians in Belgrade earlier this year, I conducted a second phase of my fieldwork in Zagreb and Brussels over the summer. The main purpose of these research trips, which have been financed by the UACES and the Francois Duchene Travel Bursaries, was to gather data on the attitudes of Croatian parties towards the EU as well as on cooperation of Serbian and Croatian parties with European transnational party federations.

I carried out 18 interviews with leading Croatian politicians, including the president of the Croatian Party of Rights, a key far-right and Eurosceptic party in the country, as well as international secretaries and spokespersons of all the relevant, parliamentary parties. I also spoke with a number of MP’s, members of the Joint EU-Croatia Parliamentary Committee and the National Committee for monitoring the Croatian EU accession, as well as two political advisers of the Croatian President. This fieldwork was specifically aimed at collecting data that is not available in written sources, such as the interviewees’ interpretation of parties’ stances and their personal attitudes towards the EU, with an emphasis on the political and economic requirements for EU membership.

In Brussels, I interviewed a number of MEP’s, including the European Parliament rapporteur for Serbia, members of the EP’s delegations for Serbia and Croatia, and a head of the Serbian Unit of the Commission’s DG Enlargement. I also spoke with representatives of the European People’s Party, the Party of European Socialist and the European Liberal, Democrat and Reform Party that are in charge of cooperation with Balkan parties. The interviewees were asked to evaluate cooperation of Serbian and Croatian parties with EU institutions and European parties, as well as to assess their policies regarding the EU.

Both research trips have been primarily marked by the fact that in early summer Croatia was in the final stage of accession negotiations. As a consequence, everybody was eagerly awaiting the decision on the conclusion of negotiations and a date of accession to the EU. This overall feeling has significantly contributed to my field research, given that EU accession was the topic of absolute priority for all political parties. As a result, the individuals I talk to were very helpful and willing to answer all my questions and therefore it was possible to observe fully elaborated and nuanced stances of Croatian political parties on this issue.

The good timing of my fieldwork has particularly enabled me to detect a fair degree of dissatisfaction among a few Croatian Eurosceptic politicians with the terms of accession that had been revealed to a wider public for the first time during my research trip.

Croatian politicians I interviewed expressed mixed feelings regarding their country’s EU accession. Those from the ruling coalition were happy since a very difficult process was finally coming to an end, and were pleased with the fact that Croatia returns to its natural and well-deserved position in Europe, where it had belonged for centuries. Those from the Eurosceptic opposition expressed strong dissatisfaction with how the EU was treating the country during the negotiations, while the pro-European opposition argued that the process was too long due to incompetency and lack of genuine pro-European orientation of the government.
SEI Working Paper: No 119
“German foreign policy and leadership of the EU – ‘You can’t always get what you want … but you sometimes get what you need’”
By Prof Alan Mayhew, Dr Kai Oppermann, Dr Dan Hough
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Abstract
Germany is still in many ways a reluctant leader, even if its economic strength and its increasingly distinctive sets of political interests dictate that, in many areas at least, lead it must. Furthermore, it is not just in Germany’s interests to do so, other states in the EU now expect Germany to act decisively not just in times of crisis but also in setting future agendas. Whilst it is self-evidently no longer the case that France and Germany can independently set the pace and tone of European integration, and more voices and interests vie to be heard, it is still to Germany that many states instinctively look when trying to solve many of their EU-related problems.

The reflexive pro-Europeanism of pre-unification Germany has however given way to a more selective and ambiguous approach to European integration. At a time when German leadership in the EU is arguably more in demand than ever, in particular in the current Euro crisis, the willingness and ability of German governments to provide such leadership can subsequently no longer be taken for granted.

The first part of this working paper begins by sketching out the major changes in German European policy, putting them into the broader context of whether German foreign policy in general has ‘normalised’. It then analyses the main drivers of these changes: first, a shift in the international and European-level opportunity structures of German policy towards European integration; and second, a tightening of the political constraints and a reappraisal of the standards of appropriateness in the making of German European policy at the domestic level. It then moves on to analysing Germany’s recent behaviour in dealing with the Eurozone crisis before concluding with some speculations on the implications that all of the above have for Germany’s European Policy in the future.

The second part of the working paper investigates the economic background to German leadership of the EU. In particular, it argues that Germany’s swift recovery from the global financial crisis has once more demonstrated that the country is the major economic power in Europe. Given its economic strength, leadership in rescuing the Eurozone has been forced upon a reluctant Germany.

SEI Working Paper: No 120
“The non-European roots of the concept of populism”
By Tim Houwen
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Abstract
This paper analyzes the conceptual history of the term ‘populism’. It examines the way in which the concept of populism emerges, takes different theoretical and normative connotations, and has been linked to other concepts (e.g. ‘democracy’,...
‘the people’, ‘popular’). The concept of ‘populism’ is rooted in the development of a so-called asymmetric counter-concept, namely ‘the people’ versus ‘the elite’. While the people is seen as positive, the elite is seen as negative. The logic between good and bad is inverted by opponents of populists, which identify ‘the populists’ with ‘false democrats’. The paper analyzes the historical transfer of these specific pairs of concepts and studies to what extent these concepts have changed their nature in the course of time. Since politics is linguistically constituted, it is argued that shifts in meaning of the concept of populism do not only stem from the semantic variability of the concept, but also from political struggles to define the word. A conceptual conflict about ‘populism’ could, therefore, express a political conflict about preferred political action and practice.


By Cas Mudde
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Abstract
Since the late 1990s a true cottage industry of ‘Euroscepticism studies’ has emerged, which has given way to hundreds of publications in increasingly prominent journals. This working paper looks at two of the most important ‘schools’ of Euroscepticism studies: Sussex and North Carolina. The two differ in many ways – e.g. definition, data and methods, scope – but account for much of the academic output on the topic. I first shortly describe the major publications of the two schools, before comparing and contrasting them on the basis of some key dimensions (definition, data, scope, explanations). The paper then discusses the crucial ‘so what question,’ by focusing on the Achilles heel of Euroscepticism studies: salience. Finally, I propose ways in which the two schools can be better integrated and suggest some avenues of research for the post-crisis period.


“The changing nature of Serbian political parties’ attitudes towards Serbian EU membership”
By Marko Stojic
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Abstract
Serbian political parties express a full range of attitudes towards Serbian integration into the EU, which spans from a strong support to an outright opposition to it. The aim of this working paper is to locate such diverse stances of relevant, parliamentary political parties on Serbian membership of the EU, as well as to depict changes of party attitudes over the last decade. Party positions are therefore mapped by using a clear-cut, ordinal axis of dynamic party stances, which is a framework currently well suited to EU candidate and potential candidate states in the Western Balkans. The paper identifies that Serbian parties do not have elaborated stances on ‘the substance of the European integration project’, although they express fully developed attitudes towards Serbian membership of the EU, which has been a single most important political issue since the last parliamentary election in 2008. It also argues that domestic political debate on the EU is still abstract and that the EU is almost exclusively perceived through its policy towards the former Yugoslavia over the last two decades. The paper thus concludes that Serbian parties’ stances on the EU are multifaceted and dynamic categories that are directly related to the legacy of the post-Yugoslav conflicts, particularly the issues of the status of Kosovo, as well as the role of the EU and its key member states in that respect.
"When life gives you lemons make lemon-ade’ Party organisation and the adaptation of West European Communist Parties"

Dr Daniel Keith, University of Sussex
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Abstract

This paper examines the development of Western European Communist parties (WECPs) and their post-Communist successor parties.

These parties had always adapted in surprising ways as they struggled in political systems that they sought to overthrow. Following the collapse of Communism in 1989 in central and Eastern Europe (CEE) they continued to amaze. Some reformed themselves dramatically, sacrificing or transforming their policies in search of office and votes. Others resisted compromising their orthodox Marxism-Leninism but remained significant players in their party systems.

This study analyses the reasons behind the divergent trajectories of five WECPs and their post-Communist successor parties in the Netherlands, Sweden, Ireland and Portugal. It does this by importing and refining an analytical framework developed to explain the diverse adaptation of Communist parties in CEE.

This article points to the lessons that scholars of western European party change can learn from importing theories from CEE. It also identifies the strengths and weaknesses of using such theories to build a comparative understanding of WECPs’ adaptation.

EPERN BRIEFING PAPER:

No. 62
“Europe and the Finnish Parliamentary Elections of April 7 2011”

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Key points

- The elections were nothing short of extraordinary, producing major changes to the national party system and attracting considerable international media attention.
- For the first time since Finland joined the EU, European matters featured strongly in
Research

the elections, with the problems facing the Eurozone and the role of Finland in the bail-out measures becoming arguably the main topic of the debates.

- The Eurosceptical True Finns won 19.1% of the votes, a staggering increase of 15% from the 2007 elections and the largest ever increase in support achieved by a single party in Eduskunta elections.
- All other Eduskunta parties lost votes, with the Centre Party ending with 15.8% of the votes and the biggest ever loss suffered by a party in the elections.
- Despite the rise of the True Finns, the election is unlikely to result in any major changes in national integration policy.

EPERN BRIEFING PAPER:
No. 63

“Europe and the Estonian Election of March 6 2011”

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Key points

- The 2011 national elections in Estonia produced a more coherent party space with only four parties represented in parliament.
- The centre-right governing coalition gained in votes and commanded a comfortable majority in the new parliament.
- The Social Democrats almost doubled their seat share.
- The biggest opposition party, the Centre Party, lost votes for the first time in its history, partly due to a funding scandal involving the party leader.

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“The Irish General Election of 25th February 2011”

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Key points

- The election provided the effective electoral wipeout of ruling government parties with the historically dominant Fianna Fáil (ALDE) reduced to third party status and complete parliamentary destruction of junior coalition party the Greens.
- Main successful parties were centre-right Fine Gael (EPP) and centre-left Labour Party (PES). Also there were important gains for Sinn Féin (GUE/NGL) and there was the re-emergence of hard left minority parties.
- The resulting coalition of the two largest parties Fine Gael and Labour results, created the largest government majority in the history of the state.
- Immediate challenges for new government were the ending of banking crisis, renegotiation of EU-IMF financial aid package, government deficit, high unemployment, and the restoration of public trust in political process.
- Europe was an important issue in the election but in the specific context of the renegotiation of the EU-IMF bailout package and its implication for Ireland’s relationship with Europe.
Balkans Connections Conference

success at Sussex

By Vesselina Ratcheva
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Four years ago Christos and I, both of us Prof. Jane Cowan’s supervisees, were sitting on the old couch in the corner of a café at Sussex talking about the need of a Balkan forum at Sussex – something likely to happen in an interdisciplinary environment.

As time passed a new generation of doctoral researchers who studied the region arrived. The necessity seemed even more acute. Critical mass grew. Andrea Szkil, a young genocide scholar, pushed by the logistical problems of research in Africa, joined the group of people in the School of Global Studies with Eastern European regional affiliations. As it happens, the topic of a Balkan forum re-appeared autumn 2010. With Deniz Duru’s entrepreneurial spirit, and direct approach to about funding, the ‘Balkan connections’ conference was born.

Thus, the start of June 2011 saw a group of Balkan scholars sit and discuss questions relevant to the region at the Global Studies Resource Centre. It is a precedent within the UK academic arena that such an event would have happened in a place which has no formal Eastern European and Slavonic Research Centre. The event was overseen by Dr. Eugene Michail from the History Department who introduced it by reflecting on the complicated positionality of the region, the need to develop comparative histories and to extend Maria Todorova’s and Eric Wolff’s legacies of exploring how this paradoxical region has been imagined over the years. On a more pragmatic note, he also reminded us that funding for projects to do with the Balkans remains relatively accessible and encouraged us to consider applying. The first day then saw a set of papers which reflected on the Balkans’ Ottoman heritage – both in the context of mappings, impressions and images, and in the context of international relations theory.

From across the road (Brighton University) Andrew Hammond’s student Ana Snowley, presented a paper which addressed the shifting representations of foreign travellers to Montenegro in the 19th century, musings which presented different interpretations of L’orient de l’ Europe. Meanwhile down from Birmingham’s criminology department, political science graduate Dr. Katerina Gachevskaya proposed that there are elements of invention in the image of increased criminality in the Balkans in the post-socialist period while her friend Andy Anderson presented a newly discovered Map of the Vilayet of the Danube 1869.
Two Sussex IR students Kerem Nisancioglu and Clemens Hoffmann, explored the international setting of the dissolution of the Ottoman empire debating whether it led to the creation of ‘a modern international system’ in Southeastern Europe. Meanwhile Vesselina Ratcheva pointed to the heritage of affect in the newly ‘liberated’ populations of the said empire, a narration of a violent past and distrust of Turkish neighbours as could be seen in debates regarding a negative stance on Turkey’s EU bid. As the day drew to a close we retreated appropriately to the restaurant ‘Ottoman cuisine’ invigorated by Prof. Russell King’s reflexions on a long career studying Albanian migrations.

The next day we started addressing the really tough and rather emotive issues in the contemporary Balkan arena: the post-Yugoslav, post-genocide context, with a reflexion on the possibility for recovery from such violent and divisive histories. The topic was addressed by papers which tried to deal with the aftermath in terms of community relations, as well as, more intimately the dramas of families who have lived through these events: confronting the ongoing process of trying to identify the victims of genocide as well as to understand how memories will be passed onto the young children who hold the future of the region. Thus, Andrea Szkil presented her post-fieldwork analysis on the process followed in genocide victim identification morgues in Bosnia and Herzegovina, while Marika Djolai (studying at IDS) and Kalina Yordanova (a young scholar from UCL who had worked as a psycho-therapist with trafficked women in Bulgaria) presented their pre-fieldwork project proposals.

This challenging beginning was followed by papers which spoke to the ongoing status of minorities in the Balkans, this time ones left by the older conflict, Ottoman partition, touched upon the day before. Ali Huseyinoglu and Sebahattin Abdurrahman both analysed the present situation of the Turkish minority in Greece, while Deniz Duru presented delightful and encouraging examples of co-existence between ethnic and religious groups on the Princes Islands of Turkey. A welcome sojourn in the rather young face of the day’s participants was given by Prof. Jane Cowan description of her own journey in scholarship across the region, one which paradoxically ended among the international governing community in Geneva.

That, of course may be less paradoxical if we consider the region’s EU ambitions, with Croatia set to join in 2018 and Serbia encouraging the international community to recognize its efforts in cleaning up its war criminals in exchange for candidate membership. We culminated the event with a discussion of the realities of various actors who contribute to building up the potential stored in the Balkans: NGOs and political parties. Piotr Goldstein from the University of Manchester gave a humorous but insightful analysis of the characteristics of NGO activists in Mostar and Novi Sad. Recent IDS graduate Emina Demiri bemoaned the system of minority protected in Croatia pointing out some its blind spots, an obvious hopeful contributor to changing the problematic status quo. The SEI’s own Marco Stojic finally presented different party attitudes towards the EU in Serbia – a political analysis which is even more pertinent given recent debates enlivened by Angela Merkel’s recent visit to Serbia.

Judging by our final dinner, most people left with questions and insights buzzing in their head. For me, the key one emerged as the rather unexpected realization of the differences wrought in the region by the Yugoslav conflict. One set of countries have spent the past years chasing war criminals and their populations have been trying to deal with the all too recent violence, another worked towards EU integration and built up their economies.

We do a news review of the region which can be seen and contributed to at http://www.delicious.com/tag/balkanconnections or on our facebook page ‘Balkan connections’.
The Sussex Law School at the University of Sussex was delighted to host the 21st Socio-Legal Studies Association (SLSA) Annual Conference, 12-14 April 2011.

The conference, organised by Professor Susan Millns, Jo Bridgeman and a team of colleagues from the Sussex Law School, took place in the Fulton Building and was attended by over 350 delegates. These included academics, practitioners, researchers and postgraduate students who came from all over Europe, indeed all over the world, to discuss a myriad of topics that examined the impact of law upon society and the capacity of society to influence legal change. There was a fantastic range of papers given by delegates from a truly international field.

The Socio-Legal Studies Association itself was formed in 1990 in the UK. It grew out of the Socio-Legal Group which for some years had provided an annual forum for socio-legal scholars to meet and disseminate their work. However, it was felt that there was a need for a more permanent organisational structure which would help to keep scholars in touch with each other, providing regular channels of communication and promoting and supporting the work of socio-legal academics. The creation of an annual conference facilitates the meeting of socio-legal scholars and the promotion of their work nationally and internationally.

SLSA conferences are organised around a series of ‘streams’ and ‘themes’. The ‘streams’ represent substantive areas of law and this year included streams on: European Law; International Criminal Law; Race, Religion and Human Rights; and Indigenous Rights and Minority Rights, to name but a few. The European Law panel was sponsored by Oxford University Press and included contributions on ‘Healthcare and the Lisbon Agenda’; ‘EU Penal Policy in the post-Lisbon Era’; ‘Extraordinary Extradition: A Study of the European Arrest Warrant’; ‘Public Sector Compliance with EU Procurement Regulation’; ‘European Agencies’ Accountability’; ‘Free Movement of Students’; and ‘EU Citizenship and Family Reunion’.

The ‘themes’ are cross-cutting and for 2011 included topics such as: ‘Challenging Ownership: Meanings of Space, Time and Identity’; ‘Auditors, Advocates and Experts – Monitoring, Negotiating and (Re)Creating Rights’ and ‘Criminalising Commerce’.

We were honoured to be able to present our plenary session by Justice Edwin Cameron, of the Constitutional Court of South Africa chaired by Simon Fanshawe, who spoke about ‘Diversity as a Constitutional Value’. This event was followed by a drinks reception at the Brighton Museum which was sponsored by Westgate Chambers. Edwin Cameron was appointed a Justice of the Constitutional Court of South Africa, South Africa’s highest court, from 1 January 2009. Before that, he was a judge in the Supreme Court of Appeal for eight years, and a High Court judge for six. He was educated at Pretoria Boys’ High School and Stellenbosch University. There he won a Rhodes Scholarship to Oxford, where he gained the top academic awards in law. He joined the Johannesburg Bar in 1983, and from 1986 practised as a human rights lawyer from the University of the Witwatersrand’s Centre for Applied Legal Studies, where he was awarded a personal professorship in law. His practice included labour and employment law, defence of ANC fighters charged with treason, conscientious and religious objection, land tenure and forced removals, and gay and lesbian equality. In 1994, President Mandela appoint-
ed him an acting judge and then a permanent judge of the High Court from 1995. Justice Cameron has received many awards, among them Honorary Fellowships of Keble College, Oxford and of the Society for Advanced Legal Studies, London; the Nelson Mandela Award for Health and Human Rights (2000); Stellenbosch University’s Alumnus Award (2000), Transnet’s HIV/AIDS Champions Award and the San Francisco AIDS Foundation’s Excellence in Leadership Award (2003).

In 2002 the Bar of England and Wales honoured him with a special award for his “contribution to international jurisprudence and the protection of human rights”. His memoir, Witness to AIDS, was awarded South Africa’s most prestigious literary award for non-fiction, the Sunday Times/Alan Paton prize (2006). In 2009, he was installed as an honorary Bencher of the Middle Temple. He holds honorary doctorates from King’s College London and the University of the Witwatersrand.

By Theodore Konstadinides
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This article is based on a paper Konstadinides presented at a Sussex Law School Seminar in February 2011.

The lineage of the ECJ’s citizenship case law demonstrates that the European Union (EU) possesses sufficient competence to adjudicate upon the lawfulness of national requirements each time Member States create hindrances to the free movement of EU citizens. Indeed the provisions on EU citizenship now, more than ever, impose upon the Member States an invasive level of judicial review, extending beyond the traditional rights of equal treatment and residence of migrant EU citizens. The ECJ has established that the exercise of the fundamental freedom of cross-border movement by a Member State national is sufficient in itself to raise an issue within the scope of the Treaty. Hence, although EU citizenship is not intended to extend the scope ratione materiae of the Treaty to internal situations, once the right of free movement and residence of EU citizens is triggered it almost becomes irrelevant under the material scope of the protection provided by Article 21 TFEU and Directive 2004/38 whether a case involves a question of EU law per se.

In Metock (Case C-127/08), the ECJ established that since the exercise of the rights inherent in Article 21 TFEU is interconnected with an EU citizen’s ability to lead a normal family life in the host Member State, any obstruction by a Member State to the right of a third country national, family member of an EU citizen, to accompany that EU
citizen would discourage the latter from exercising his/her rights of entry and residence in that Member State under the Treaty. On the reverse, in Ibrahim (Cases C-310/08), a case concerning minor children of third country nationals born in a Member State, Metock was taken a step further. There it was held that a refusal by the British authorities to grant a right of residence to a third country national (married but separated from her EU citizen spouse) with dependent minor children in the UK, where those children were nationals and residents, and also a refusal to grant that third country national a work permit, deprived her dependent children of the genuine enjoyment of their EU citizenship rights.

Most recently, in Ruiz Zambrano (Case C-34/09) the ECJ held that a refusal by a Member State to grant resident rights to a third country national with dependent minor children born in Belgium, where those children are both nationals and residents, and also a refusal to grant such a person a work permit, affects the children’s rights stemming from their status as EU citizens. Given that Mr Ruiz Zambrano and his wife are both Columbian nationals, the paradox in this case is that the ECJ held in favour of primary carers of EU citizens irrespective of the existence of marital bond (past or present) with an EU citizen (as in Ibrahim). What is most controversial is that the ECJ has chosen to bypass the cross-border movement requirement that triggers the application of EU law. In Zambrano there is neither an element of cross-border movement of the EU spouse prior to his marriage with a third country national (as in Metock and Ibrahim) nor any cross-border movement of the dependant EU citizen (as in Chen - Case C-200/02). The whole case took place in Belgium and as such it could have been considered as an internal situation. Any rights upheld in favour of the EU citizen were directly conferred from the status of EU citizenship inherent in Article 20 TFEU and not from its functional requirements under Article 21 TFEU. The Zambrano decision, therefore, paints a very grey picture and, no doubt, it will generate heated academic commentary.

If any general rule can be put down on paper vis-à-vis the scope of EU citizenship, this is that when Member States apply their domestic laws to a case at hand, which has an element of EU law, they are obliged to do so taking into account the general principles of EU law, such as the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty and the duty of sincere cooperation and proportionality as general principles of EU law. For instance, in Rottmann (Case C-135/08) the ECJ confirmed that even naturalisation rules in the Member States are not immune from EU law. It held that a decision of a Member State to withdraw the nationality of an EU citizen acquired by deception must observe the general principles of EU law. This is the case even when such a decision has occurred years after free movement has been exercised. Although the principle of sincere cooperation enshrined in Article 4(3) TEU and the pre-emptive effect of Treaty provisions has allowed the ECJ to legitimately assert its degree of intervention in areas dominated by national competence, the present author has argued that the ECJ’s assessment of proportionality has not always been elegant in detail or guidance and therefore has constituted the weak spot of its citizenship jurisprudence (See Konstadinides, T. ‘La Fraternité Européenne? The Extent of National Competence to Condition the Acquisition and Loss of Nationality from the perspective of EU Citizenship’ (2010) 35 European Law Review 401-414).

What lies behind this jurisprudential conundrum? A constitutional justification in asserting the separation of the freedom of movement for citizens from its functional and instrumental elements at the expense of national welfare systems or rather an aversion of injustice targeting national legislation, which places EU citizens of all ages and backgrounds and their families at a disadvantage regardless of when and whether or not they have exercised their freedom to move and reside freely within the Union? I would certainly argue the latter, at least until the ECJ pulls the break in an act of self-restraint and interprets both the Treaty’s provisions on citizenship and Directive 2004/38 literally.
Symposium celebrates SEI professor’s achievements

By Prof Aleks Szczerbiak
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30 current and former Sussex faculty and doctoral researchers came together for a one-day symposium to celebrate the academic career and professional achievements of Prof Jim Rollo, to mark his retirement after 12 years as Co-Director of the Sussex European Institute (SEI).

Prof Rollo has been an SEI Co-Director and Professor of European Economic Integration at Sussex since 1999, having previously been Chief Economist at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. In 2009, he became an Academician of the Academy of Social Sciences.

The symposium was opened by Alasdair Smith, former Sussex Vice-Chancellor and currently a Research Professor in the Department of Economics, who played a key role in the formation and development of SEI in the 1990s. In his opening lecture, Prof Smith, who has been both a professional collaborator and personal friend of Prof Rollo’s since their undergraduate days at Glasgow University in the 1960, reflected on his colleague’s lifetime contribution to contemporary European studies at Sussex and beyond.

This was followed by a keynote address from Prof Rollo himself titled ‘The European Union: will its economic decline be relative or absolute?’ which provoked a lively discussion among participants. The rest of the symposium contained papers and contributions exploring the themes that have been a major focus of Prof Rollo’s work over the years, particularly the impact of globalisation on European trade and migration policy. Contributors included colleagues who have worked closely with him during his time at Sussex including: Prof Jorg Monar (who was SEI Co-Director with Prof Rollo in 2001-5), Dr Peter Holmes from the Department of Economics, and SEI Visiting Professorial Fellow Alan Mayhew. The symposium was rounded off by a closing address from Prof Dame Helen Wallace, founder and Director of SEI between 1992-2001, and currently a Sussex Visiting Professorial Fellow. Prof Wallace reflected on her experience of working with Prof Rollo at SEI, and previously at the Foreign Office and the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London. She also introduced a wide ranging debate on the current state of the EU and future prospects for European integration.

Summing up the day, Prof Aleks Szczerbiak, who has worked with Prof Rollo as SEI Co-Director for the last five years, said: ‘Given his distinguished career as both an academic and practitioner, Jim embodies the SEI’s mission of producing research that is both at the scholarly cutting edge and policy relevant. During the last 12 years, Jim has played a huge role in helping to develop SEI as one of the foremost centres of postgraduate training and inter-disciplinary research on contemporary Europe, which was recognised in our outstanding result in the most recent Research Assessment Exercise. He has been a huge intellectual presence at Sussex and I am one of very many current and former Sussex faculty and students who owe Jim a huge debt for gratitude for our academic and professional development.’
The Polish Presidency of the EU conference

On 8th July, ‘The Polish Presidency of the European Union: Politics and Policy Priorities’ conference was held to mark Poland’s rotating Presidency of the EU. The conference was hosted by the UK Polish Embassy in London and organised by SEI, the Aston Centre for Europe and the Central and East European Language-Based Area Studies (CEELAS) and the European Commission Representation in London and UCL.

The event began with a panel on the political context of the Presidency, before looking at two policy priorities: Economics and the Budget (notably the negotiations on the next multi-annual financial framework) and the Eastern Partnership. Keynote speakers included the Chair of the Economic Advisory Council to the Polish Cabinet and former Polish Prime Minister Jan Krzysztof Bielecki, as well as Paweł Samecki of the National Bank of Poland and the Polish Ambassador.

At this event, the SEI’s Prof Aleks Szczerbiak then participated in the final roundtable on the Polish EU presidency and gave a paper ‘The Polish EU presidency and autumn parliamentary elections’.

SEI goes to the 6th ECPR general conference Reykjavik, 24-27 August

By Dr Sue Collard
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When I was invited by Jo Shaw and Rainer Bauböck to submit a proposal for their panel on Voting Rights Across Political Boundaries, two thoughts immediately sprang to mind: the first was that this would be a great opportunity to present the next stage of my ongoing project on the participation of Non-National European Citizens (NNEUCs) in local elections, in the wider framework of the broader, more theoretical questions relating to voting rights in Europe raised by the other members of the panel; the second was that it was a fantastic chance to visit Iceland, the tiny country that has recently brought the world to its feet both through the collapse of its banking system and as a result of its erupting volcanoes. It was therefore both as an academic and as a tourist that I set off for the ECPR conference in Reykjavik, and I suspect that for 99% of participants this was also true! Indeed, the conference organisers had clearly anticipated this by offering in advance a wide range of trips and activities designed to take us away from our panels and out to the volcanoes, glaciers, waterfalls and lakes that are such a unique feature of the dramatic Icelandic landscape. Judging from discussions with other participants, it seems we all managed to combine academic engagement with tourist activity, and the formula was obviously really successful.

With a staggering 2300 participants (or so we were told) it was the biggest conference ever hosted in Iceland to date, and in recognition of the importance of this event to the political authorities there, we were treated to a plenary lecture on the first evening from the President of Iceland (known simply, according to Icelandic tradition of only using first names) as ‘Olafur’, Grims-son (son of Grim). Olafur was ideally placed to give this lecture, not only because he has been the elected President of Iceland since 1996 (and is the longest serving left-wing president), but also because he was the first Icelander to gain a doctorate in political science (from the University of Manchester), after which he joined the faculty at
the country’s only university (the total population is only about 319,000, two thirds of which lives in the Reykjavik area), and went on to combine professorial achievements with political activism. Olafur gave a fascinating and informative lecture which was very warmly received, in which he used the collapse of the Icelandic financial system to revisit the relationship between politics and economics, speaking of a ‘fundamental shift of the tectonic plates of politics and economics, in the role of the state and the market’, but also emphasising the importance of information technology and the new social media in empowering individuals to challenge established institutions as never before, in the interests of greater democracy. The lecture can be accessed at http://www.forseti.is/media/PDF/2011_08_25_ECPRraeda.pdf

Olafur’s lecture and following reception took place in the brand new glass conference and concert hall known as ‘Harpa’, which was commissioned in the days before the banks collapsed, but nevertheless completed with the help of some ingenious government financing, as part of Iceland’s strategy to put itself back on the global map and showcase its ‘renewed dynamism’: attracting conferences such as ECPR not only enhances the country’s reputation, but is also an important way of bringing income into the country, and the development of its tourist industry is clearly an essential element in this. So all those of us who went either whale watching, snowmobiling on the glaciers, hiking round the volcanoes, horse riding across the ‘lavascape’ (Icelandic horses are unique in having a fifth gait), relaxing in the Blue Lagoon, or taking one of the day trips to the waterfalls, geysers and national parks, were all in our little ways contributing to putting Iceland back on its feet again.

As for the conference itself, with 632 panels, there were 37 running in parallel during each of the sessions, so choosing which ones to attend was a time-consuming process, and the 200 page glossy programme brochure was the indispensable guide in this exercise. Those I chose were all well attended with excellent presentations and stimulating discussions, though I heard of others that were less successful. My own panel took place in what I had feared was the worst slot, in the very last session late on Saturday afternoon, but we had a surprisingly healthy turn out of about 25, with some interesting comments and questions, and I felt the papers all worked very well together.

I was by no means the only representative from SEI: my colleague James Hampshire co-chaired a panel (with Dennis Broeders, Erasmus University) on ‘Europe’s New Digital Borders’, and co-authored a paper, entitled ‘Dreaming of seamless borders: ICTs and the pre-emptive governance of mobility in Europe and the United States’.

Three of our research students gave papers: Monika Bil’s paper in the panel on Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Central European Countries, was called ‘Constructing State Supported Party Democracy? The Case of Post-1989 Poland’, Stijn Van Kessel spoke in the panel on Analysing Party Competition with Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) on ‘Paths to Populism: Explaining the Electoral Performance of Populist Parties in Europe’, and John Fitzgibbon’s paper in the panel on The Role of Political Parties and Elites in Convening EU Referendums was on ‘Political Parties and EU Referendums in Denmark and Ireland: A Toxic Mix?’.

SEI Research Fellow Kai Oppermann also contributed a paper to this panel, on ‘The Politics of Pledging EU Referendums. A Typology of Reasons for Governments to Commit to Referendums on European Integration’, and he was also the co-chair of the section on "Analyzing Foreign Policy", which consisted of 8 panels. The panels were on various theoretical issues in foreign policy analysis and the comparative analysis of the foreign policies of European states.
Activities

ASUAA keeps moving forward

By Gerond Kamberi
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Since its establishment in February 2008, ASUAA (Albania Sussex University Alumni Association) has increased its membership ranks by inviting all the Albanian students who have completed the SEI’s MAEP or MAECS courses during the last three academic years (07-08, 08-09, 09-10) to join the association. Although a voluntary based association, ASUAA seeks to meet the needs of graduates by providing social and intellectual opportunities throughout the year as well as ways to remain in touch with the SEI. It’s periodical Social Hour meetings remain an excellent opportunity to bring together alumni throughout the country. Some of our alumni who work as lecturers at different public and non-public universities, have been part of workshops that provide students with career and practical advice for attending postgraduate studies at the SEI, as well as other activities which offer networking to provide students with a fulfilling “SEI experience”.

While the ASUAA membership is growing, there are initiatives to put together an Annual Calendar of Events which would increase its visibility and commitment of members. As a first step, we designed a blog called Eurosceptophobia (Eurosceptic +Europhorics) - which means an on-line portal where alumni can debate pro and con issues about the EU integration process. Another idea is establishing an ASUAA Guest Lecturer Fund which would bring an SEI professor to deliver a lecture on EU policies, trends or institutions at least once a year. Meantime, three ASUAA members (MAEP Doriana Hyseni, MAEP Geron Kamberi and MAECS Mariola Qesaraku) have recently submitted an application to the framework of OSI/Network Alumni Scholarship Programme (2011) to write a series of policy papers titled: How far is Albania from Madrid, which refer to the fulfilment of the Madrid administrative criteria for Albania’s future EU membership. These would be followed by a set of workshops where all alumni would be invited to share their feedback on such an important issue for the further European perspective of Albania.

ASUAA is also looking to establish a searchable database of MA theses, enabling the Albanian students interested in EU studies to access this extensive database which would contain not only valuable information but even a helpful model of how to write a thesis based upon strict academic criteria. Despite fundraising difficulties, we are convinced that keeping a strong and vibrant ASUAA will enable not only a connection for its members, but a way to enhance the shared value of the SEI.

ASUAA keeps moving forward

Life post-MACES in Albania

By Dorarta Hyseni
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Before I enrolled in MACES 2009, I worked in the Albanian civil society for nearly 3 years. With a liberal arts degree in business, by the end of this period, I had ‘self-learned’ a lot about political science and NGO jargon, Albanian politics and the EU integration and enlargement processes. I was ready for an academic experience that saw the EU in similarly inter-disciplinary terms and that al-
Activities

lowed me to see the bigger picture at some distance. Something that would support my career and maybe help me narrow down my interests. Fortunately, SEI promised just that. And a scheme combining the FCO Chevening Award with an Open Society scholarship made the experience possible. It came with a heavy-sounding and somewhat cliché tag of ‘contributing to the country’s democratisation and EU integration’, but I could at the time conveniently leave that to the future.

In autumn 2010, I had learned a lot, discovered new interests, made lasting personal and professional connections, and thoroughly enjoyed my time in Brighton and the UK. In November 2010, I came back to Tirana. Nothing had really changed. EU integration was still the buzzword, which for good or bad, muffled just about everything else. Only the personal questions had become more difficult. What do I really want to do next? Am I more capable now? How do I contribute to ‘leadership’ in the way my schemes imagined?

Fortunately, life is what happens in the meanwhile. Catching up with my former colleagues at the Albanian Institute for International Studies, I somehow became automatically re-involved in their projects, ranging from academic conferences on democratisation and the EU, to opinion polls on the then upcoming local elections. A few months later, Open Society Foundation Albania (OSFA), who had supported my studies, invited me to join their Democratisation and EU Integration Programme as an external expert. It started with a project seeking to monitor the implementation of the government’s Anti-Corruption Strategy in 2010. A few months later, following Albania’s application for EU membership and the EU Avis of 12 key Recommendations, OSFA launched another monitoring project – this time of the Action Plan that the Government of Albania designed in response to the Avis. I got involved in teams monitoring recommendations ranging from the need to appoint the new ombudsman, to public administration reform, and anti-corruption efforts. The monitoring report is in its final stages and will come out in October, before the EU Progress Report.

In June, I was hired by the Westminster Foundation for Democracy to manage a project funded by the FCO which seeks to support the Parliament of Albania. The Westminster Foundation for Democracy is a British independent public body supported by the FCO to achieve sustainable political change in emerging democracies throughout the world. In the case of Albania, WFD seeks to leverage its unique links with UK political parties to facilitate political dialogue in the Parliament and support the EU integration agenda. The project objectives are very ambitious given the on-going political deadlock in the country. However, WFD seeks to take advantage of the opposition’s return to Parliament to engage the respective UK and Albanian political parties in bilateral as well as cross-party work, featuring visits of UK MPs and experienced Commons Clerks. The project seeks to culminate with the facilitation of a negotiation on a consensual parliamentary reform agenda. While still early to point to successes, the project has so far received the support of the Speaker of the Albanian Parliament and the political whips. With the quickly changing political climate, to achieve outcomes, such projects have to be flexible. I consider the ability to do this one of the biggest advantages of WFD. Bilateral party work with the UK Labour and Conservative Party is ongoing. With high expectations, we curiously look forward to the outcomes and the way they will shape the rest of the project.

It is hard to believe it has been nearly a year since I submitted my thesis. Now, I ask myself whether I have answers to those questions I always ask when I return to Albania; part of me thinks I never will. The other part makes me deeply appreciative of what I have learned and who I have met at Sussex. It makes me realise that my learning, achievements and contributions don’t have to change the world for me to have the courage to share them with others. Study experiences, especially when abroad, give one the motivation and navigation skills to ask for more. That is partly manifested in one’s career and contributions - what happens when we go to work and enjoy what we do. The other part, is that craving to keep on eye on academic opportunities to go a step further – and come back with more skills, friends, and motivation. And I am thankful to the Sussex experience for both!
Student report: MACES at the SEI

By Visar Gjakova  
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Being able to study in the University of Sussex, was a really unique and life remembering opportunity for me. Furthermore, from my personal perspective, doing a Masters in Contemporary European Studies was making the whole experience even more attractive, especially having in mind that the course is run under the umbrella of highly respectable Sussex European Institute. Just a few days ago, a friend of mine asked me what does the “Contemporary European Studies” mean? Although the title of the course might look little ambiguous in the beginning, in reality it means a lot and it offers a lot!

It was not easy to push forward the European project from the remnants of the World War II. It took much courage decisions of leaders with vision to follow a path full of uncertainties to build what we see today as the European Union (EU). Studying EU institutions and policies today would not be complete without referring to its past from the very outset. This is exactly what the MACES first term does. It gives a clear overview from the historical context of the evolution and consolidation of the European project, with special emphasis of the West/East relations, making the overall process far-reaching.

Same as the second part of the European project which was seriously boosted after the fall of the “iron curtain”, the second term of the MACES boosts to the next level by offering variety of specialised topics, mostly looking to specific institutions or policies of EU, or other related issues. Personally I was very much attracted (among other two courses) in selecting the “Eastern Europe in transition” course! What triggered me was the fact that most of Eastern Europe countries have successfully concluded their transition process and managed to become full members of the EU. Coming from the country that is still undergoing a transition process I was very much interested to learn from the Eastern experience and practices. Their lesson learns are essential guidance for any country undergoing the same trail as they did.

In fact, the course did not disappoint me! What Eastern experience shows us is that without comprehensive substantial reforms, the process of transition and consolidation of democracy would not be completed and by that EU integration unreachable. However, each country had its own path to follow, in accordance with its own specific circumstances. Kosovo is the newest independent state of Europe and currently is undergoing a process of consolidation of its independency in parallel to the process of European integration. Taking in to account its ethnic fragmentation and violent past, Kosovo is building its statehood through a unique process of accommodation of its ethnic divergences in accordance with a model that comparative political science refers to as consociationalism. It was the Professors Szerbiak’s class of “Eastern Europe in transition” that introduced to me for the first time the consociational term and theory, but not its form and substance in practice! The model was very familiar to me, since I witnessed its practical applicability in Kosovo without being aware on its consociational spirit. Consociationalism as a political theory was developed by a prominent Dutch scholar named Arend Lijphart. According to him democracy and stability are possible also in countries with societal fragmentation and deep cleavages as far as fragmentation is accommodated in accordance with four consociational principles: grand coalition, segmented autonomy; proportionality and mutual veto.

After class discussion with Professor Szerbiak, on the prospects of democracy and stability in the fragmented societies, I decided to focus my dissertation exactly in this area, consociationalism. I would use Kosovo as a case study and see the viability of consociationalism in ensuring stable and democratic perspective, even in countries with ethnic fragmentation, dominant majority population and violent past of inter-ethnic relations. Bringing theory close to an empirical reality
is very challenging for me, especially since the subject is linked with the future prospects of my country! I was interested to learn more on consociational theory, analyse its strengths and weaknesses and applied the context of my country.

The whole constitutional set up of Kosovo is based on the four defining elements of consociationalism. When Kosovo declared its independence on 17 February 2008, it decided to build its statehood by power sharing with all non-majority communities, despite the fact that it has a dominant Kosovo Albanian majority (90%). Consociational model and its features would enable internal cohesion by ensuring the balance of power and build trust between fragmented groups in order to reach political stability, an essential precondition for the countries’ democratic perspective. This is a very challenging process, which requires time, patience and commitment of government institutions in order to get necessary support from the all citizens in building the common future. At present Kosovo is divided and does not control its northern part. Despite extensive accommodation opportunities, the Kosovo Serb community in the north is refusing to integrate in the Kosovo system, in compare to their compatriots in other parts of Kosovo who do participate in Kosovo institutions. This stance creates an extra burden for the process and directly exercises its influence in other parts.

At this time is too early to assess the success or failure of consociational model in Kosovo, however Kosovo institutions are committed in its full implementation, in order to guarantee the rights for all citizens, regardless their ethnicities. Once known as turbulent part of Europe, today Balkans is committed to its EU integration agenda and Kosovo is not an exception. Sooner it’s able to accommodate its ethnic divergence and ensure political stability, faster it can orient its time and resources in the demanding process of accession in to the EU.

Since 1999, I was working as policy officer for the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe and International Civilian Office/EU Special Representative in Kosovo, directly engaged in several important projects in building Kosovo capacities for stability and welfare of all its citizens. I sincerely intend to re-engage in assisting my country in overcoming its numerous challenges ahead. My professional background and recent academic knowledge I got in the Sussex University, give me confidence in my future activities.

SEI faculty awarded teaching prize

The Sussex Department of Politics and Contemporary European Studies, where many of the core faculty who teach on SEI’s Masters programmes are based, has been awarded a Sussex team teaching prize in the 2011 University awards.

The nomination was from the student body with a statement that emphasised the faculty’s 'unfaltering passion for the subject. This enthusiasm makes such a difference to students' engagement. The humour and energy with which faculty deliver lectures and organise seminars, encourages students to engage with the material, and obtain a much higher level of satisfaction and enjoyment from their studies'. The award is to be given at the University’s Teaching and Learning Conference in September. This is the fifth teaching award for the Department which already has four national prize-winning members. In recent years, SEI-based faculty members Prof Paul Taggart, Prof Aleks Szczerbiak, Dr Dan Hough and Prof Tim Bale have all been awarded the Political Studies Association (PSA) annual prize for outstanding teaching in political science. Prof Taggart, who is also Head of the Politics and Contemporary European Studies Department, commented that the University award ‘reflected a longstanding culture of commitment to teaching in the Department’.
Preparations are currently under way for a new edition, the 5th, of *Developments in Central and East European Politics*, published since 1993 by Palgrave Macmillan. For this reason, I am again mulling over the state of political parties in the region (the focus of the chapter I am revising) and trying to pin down which particular trends, if any, should currently be highlighted. One obvious point is that two decades or more have now passed since democratic party development began in the region – although progress in the twenty or so countries that make it up has been quite varied. There is rather little point in dwelling on party origins and the context of their emergence where democracy has been established. All that is now a long time in the past and most probably of minor importance to the reader of the next edition of the book. Equally, the early focus on how successful the process of democratic party development was proving to be, with most countries moving more successfully towards stable patterns of party politics and effective electoral competition than others, is also no longer so convincing. It had become apparent at quite an early stage, for example, that relatively stable party systems were developing in Hungary and the Czech Republic and that a fairly effective bipartisan model of party competition was emerging in those countries. The consolidation of relatively institutionalised party politics in this sense fitted neatly with the image of successful new democracies now well established within the European Union. After the 2010 elections, however, this trajectory was not so obvious. The Hungarian Socialist Party suffered an electoral collapsed as Fidesz won an overwhelming victory, accompanied by the significant gains on the extreme right made by Jobbik. Rather similar developments took place in the Czech Republic as the Civic Democrats and Social Democrats for once failed to capture 50 percent of the vote between them.
Various explanations may be offered for this: a move away from principles of party government in parallel with developments in the West (see Mair 2008 on this), exhaustion of the possibilities embodied in some genetic model of party development (sketched out by van Biezen 2005), the more convincing arrival of the ‘populist backlash’ long anticipated by contributors to the *Journal of Democracy*, political disfunctionalities of the new global openness and backwash from the economic crash of 2008, the running down of the Europeanisation motor – and all or any of these in combination. What is clear is that assumptions of relatively linear party development, even in countries well integrated within the European Union, no longer have any credibility.

**ICJ’s Opinion on the Legality of Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence**

*By Fisnik Korenica  
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Kosovo has a distinct recent history. Many regarded its claim for secession and self-determination as a quest from an entity without a colonial past. Following the international humanitarian intervention, Kosovo was administered internationally beginning in 1999, and, from that point forward, a gradual process of transferring responsibilities from the United Nations (U.N.) mission to Kosovo’s institutions established Kosovo’s basic domestic structures. Having gone through an international process of status settlement—under the guidance of the United Nations Special Envoy for Kosovo—this international guidance proposed that Kosovo declare independence under certain international supervision. Despite the U.N. Security Council’s failure to adopt the plan that embodied this international guidance—the Ahtisaari Settlement Proposal, it was ultimately accepted unilaterally by those states supporting Kosovo’s secession from Serbia. As such, Kosovo’s representatives proclaimed Kosovo an independent state on February 17, 2008, issuing a Declaration of Independence that later fell under the scrutiny of the International Court of Justice.

Sponsored by Serbia, the United Nations General Assembly authorized asking the ICJ to provide an opinion whether Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence (KDU) was legal under international law. Per this request, the ICJ considered the question of legality on three grounds: first, whether general international law prohibited the KDU; second, whether the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244—that had governed Kosovo since 1999—prohibited the KDU; and, third, whether the regulations of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)—in particular the Constitutional Framework for Kosovo—prohibited the KDU. The Court chose to interpret the question narrowly, implying to observers that it did not want to address the ‘political’ side of the problem.

In the first case, the Court refused to engage the norm of self-determination when assessing the legality of the KDU, declining to address arguments that external self-determination does not apply in circumstances outside military occupation and decolonization. As such, the Court refused to render a decision on whether the KDU constituted, in fact, a product of a broader right to self-determination and whether one should contextualize the KDU as an instance of external self-determination. The Court also refused to consider the option of qualifying the KDU as a matter of remedial self-determination, as argued by countries supporting Kosovo’s independence. As a result, the Court refused to issue an opinion on whether the KDU should be considered an act deriving from the concept of self-determination, which could have been enlightened by the argu-
ment that Kosovo represents a ‘unique combination of factors’ granting it the right to self-determination.

To sharpen the question posed to it, the Court clarified that it had not been asked whether the result produced by the KDU was legal under international law, thereby putting aside an analysis of whether the effects of such a Declaration of Independence were valid. The Court, therefore, dealt strictly with the issue of whether international law prohibited the KDU as a declaration of independence. Given this, following Lotus model, the Court ruled that the KDU did not violate any applicable norm of general international law, nor Resolution 1244 of the Security Council, nor the Constitutional Framework for Kosovo adopted by UNMIK. All told, the Court’s Opinion argued that the KDU—including its effects—did not violate any applicable prohibitive rule, and, thus, was not prohibited under international law. The approach used in the Advisory Opinion for Kosovo, modelled after the Lotus case—from which derives the principle that what is not prohibited is permitted, leaves the impression that the Court has granted legal status to the KDU.

The General Assembly of the United Nations later welcomed the Opinion of the ICJ and asked the involved parties (Kosovo and Serbia) to continue negotiating under the guidance of the European Union. As a result, the Opinion of the ICJ left those optimistic spectators uninformed about whether the KDU—and generally the question of secession of Kosovo—was legal under international law. In our view, because of the ICJ’s desire to avoid political controversies that could either undermine its legitimacy or decrease its credibility, the ICJ could not have gone any further in its opinion. The Court, therefore, proved only that it follows a consensual approach to international law, not troubling waters in such cases where factual situations cannot be much challenged.

Post-conflict transition and Euroscepticism in the Western Balkans after 2000

By Andrea Ćović
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At a time of an ever-greater self-absorption of the EU, particularly since the Eurozone as one of its most successful ventures is desperately gasping for air, the closing of membership negotiations with Croatia this past June comes as a confirmation that the other thus far most praised EU policy—enlargement—still timidly continues.

Having for the past three and a half years worked precisely on Croatia’s EU accession talks at its Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration, I witnessed from within the transformative power of EU conditionality—and not (merely) of the acquis alignment, but in particular that of the less tangible political criteria. The immediacy of this experience made me realize in practice what great “carrot-and-stick” potential still lies in the Thessaloniki Agenda as one of the most powerful external tools the EU has at its disposal.

Beyond any doubt, when it comes to reform and stabilization, the highest international motivator in this part of the world—which the rest of Europe calls the Western Balkans, but many of the pertinent countries themselves prefer the less historically less overburdened “Southeast Europe”—is the prospect of joining the Union.

However, notwithstanding the generator-of-change importance of elite processes and the hold EU membership has for their protagonists, I have
decided to focus the scope of my PhD dissertation on the dissection of nuances of how actual, flesh-and-blood citizens in this region look at the EU. My hypothesis is that the perceived role which the EU played in this warring part of Europe during the post-communist conflict period, in combination with nationalism fuelled particularly by domestic political elites, are those two decisive elements that planted the seeds of post-2000 euroscepticism in most of the Western Balkans.

More specifically, I will be looking into eurosceptic attitudes of citizens of the following countries: Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as Montenegro and Kosovo. I chose precisely these five because of their shared legacy of conflict and violence at the break-up of Yugoslavia and beyond. I will work on proving that the levels of negative popular opinion found in the countries I am to scrutinize for euroscepticism are not necessarily connected to pragmatic rebuttals of Europe, but directly to the post-conflict heirloom, or to the war the facettes of which the international community greatly shaped for many—if not for all—who live in this region.

This legacy includes both issues related to EU conditioning of pre-candidacy (in the case of Croatia, pre-membership) stabilization, as well as the subjective attitudes deeply rooted in citizens’ towards their realities of conflict, much aided by those domestic voices echoed most potently in public discourse—the politicians via the media. In addition, the independent variables related to pragmatism and, for example economic conditions will be those furthest removed from my examination. Also, at this stage of my analysis, I have not come to appreciate the issue of how well informed citizens are on EU matters as particularly relevant in shaping public opinion in this region. My work will thus be a focused study of several cases, with Croatia and Serbia at the centre of my thesis as those two forces which most shaped the dynamics of divergence in this part of geographical Europe. In Croatia, political elites jumped all the hurdles and membership is just a glance away, but a lot of the toughest to handle about EU conditionality had to do with the realities of the post-war period. Similar is the case with Serbia, which has in 2011 extradited the last remaining ICTY suspects and, as speculated, is now on the brink of obtaining candidacy status. Nevertheless, given the results of various opinion polls, support has been continuously low in Croatia—regardless of the close proximity of actual membership; Serbia follows in the lower spectrum, along with Montenegro. Moreover, the proximity of EU membership as an independent variable may indeed show as proof that post-war legacy overrides it by far as a contributing factor regarding the EU’s image in the public eye.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, support of the EU is significantly higher, and rising, whereas the internationally-sponsored Kosovo has always been overwhelmingly affirmative of membership even if in every possible sense farthest removed away from it. Bosnia and Herzegovina, a country created through the Dayton Agreement in the form it exists now, also in a state of a near-protectorate, will—I expect—along with Kosovo, come to show that its different relationship with the international community—and thus with the EU—especially in state-formation, is something that likely exerts significant influence on the overall public stances towards the EU. Furthermore, I am excluding Macedonia and Albania from my study, although they are clearly also countries of the Western Balkans. Notwithstanding the relevance of looking at them in their diachronically different status towards the EU and drawing many relevant conclusions from it, conflict—in its form as the defining factor of statehood, as well as the essential element for my study—is missing.

In preparing my dissertation, I am to use relevant public opinion surveys and analyze their qualitative and quantitative results; a key tool will be content and discourse analysis of the media presence of politicians and other factors relevant for shaping and shifting public opinion. Furthermore, I have already undertaken steps to get interviews with relevant stakeholders in all the countries I am to investigate. As regards the theoretical framework to be studied, I will engage in authors who dissected public stances towards the EU in Western Europe, as well as in the works of those scholars tackling transitology and issues specific for Eastern European countries. Given the fact that there are no coherent academic studies related to public
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The Counterintuitive Dynamics of the EU-Ukraine Relationship

By Jonathan Hibberd
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Trying to understand the intricacies of Ukrainian politics has been likened to peeling an onion-beneath each layer of explanation there is sure to be another. The more high profile news recently has certainly been bad for supporters of democracy in the country, most notably with the Yushchenko trial, but also with general reversals in areas such as parliamentary democracy, education and judicial independence. Yet paradoxically Ukraine and the EU are moving very rapidly towards finalising the details of an Association Agreement which will contain an agreement for the establishment of a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, potentially moving the country towards something similar to European Economic Area status. This is to the disappointment of Russia, which had been hoping to integrate Ukraine into its Customs Union with Belarus and Kazakhstan. So why, when Ukraine seems to be lurching towards Russia, is the country now making constructive headway with the EU?

March 2010 saw the coming to power of the pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovych, but what does ‘pro-Russian’ really mean? There was a swift settlement to the issue of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, which was given leave to remain in the Crimean port of Sevastopol on a 40 year lease in exchange for cheaper gas. There was a swing towards the Russian language from the concerted promotion of Ukrainian by Yushchenko. In particular, the appointment of Dmitry Tabachnyk, a fervent pro-Russian, as Education Minister, has resulted in a realignment back towards the Russian education system from the European one and the introduction of school history textbooks harmonised with those in use in Russia, which omit the Orange Revolution and downplay ideas that the Holodomor (the artificial famine which killed between 5 and 9 million Ukrainian peasants in the years 1932-33) was a genocide against the Ukrainian people.

However, the label ‘pro-Russian’ can be misleading. Yanukovych’s party, the Party of Regions, gets the vast bulk of its financial support from the oligarchs of Eastern Ukraine, and variously contains powerful regional clans, the so-called ‘Donetsk clan’, ‘Dnipropetrovsk clan’ etc. who enjoy a high position of privilege in the country. Were they to open up to political re-integration with the Russian Federation, the experience of the Russian oligarchs since Putin came to power is a cautionary tale, with Berezovsky in exile and Khodorkovsky behind bars for the foreseeable future.

Russian tendencies nonetheless have been replicated. The Verkhovna Rada now appears to be a ‘rubber stamp’ parliament. As in the Russian Duma, when a vote is taken a handful of so-called ‘piano-payer’ deputies spring into action pressing the voting buttons of often absent colleagues. Then there is the Constitutional Court, now
stuffed with judges loyal to the President, which approved deputies elected under a closed list system crossing from the opposition to the government for supposed financial inducements. This is the equivalent of your vote growing legs and walking away from you. It also contradicts an earlier ruling from the very same court which had forbidden the practice.

Then we have what certainly appear to be ‘show trials’ of opposition figures, most notably the former Prime Minister and narrowly defeated presidential candidate Yulia Tymoshenko, who has already been spending some time behind bars for contempt of court. There is now a growing tide of criticism of her detention, from Freedom House and the European Parliament to individuals including such figures as Václav Havel and even Desmond Tutu! And on a micro level, the undermining of the country’s only two real liberal universities, the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, where I teach, and the Ukrainian Catholic University in Lviv, Western Ukraine, seems a clear attempt to limit the growth of civil society in Ukraine. For the coming academic year the number of state-funded places on many of our programmes has been cut, in some cases by as much as 50%. Many of the cuts are to disciplines just such as political science, which are already underdeveloped in the country, where political discourse is typically littered with flawed reasoning and false comparisons.

So, with the apparent meltdown in democracy in Ukraine, shouldn’t the EU be applying conditionality by holding up progress on the DCFTA? Iryna Solonenko of the International Renaissance Foundation in Kiev doesn’t think so, believing that delaying the agreement beyond 2011 would be ‘too dangerous’, with parliamentary elections in Ukraine and a presidential election in 2012 to come. “The relationship between Russia and Ukraine is not transparent.” In a sense, the election of Yanukovych has concentrated minds in Brussels, in contrast to the Yushchenko regime which could at least be relied upon not to burn any serious bridges with the EU.

However, the above mentioned actions of the Yanukovych administration are testing the patience of western partners and observers to their limits. Now Poland, Ukraine’s biggest supporter within the EU, is making noises about possibly vetoing or delaying Ukraine’s progress towards the DCFTA. One line of thinking is that if Ukraine is locked into a trade agreement with the EU, the EU will gain better leverage on democracy and human rights, but in the worst case scenario, the EU could be locked into a relationship with an increasingly oppressive regime.

There is a wider geopolitical dimension to this too. Some commentators, including Edward Lucas and Andreas Umland (a colleague of mine at the Academy) have suggested that turning Ukraine into a democratic success story might prove to be a far more effective tool in the EU’s dealings with Russia than the current bilateral relationship between Brussels and Moscow, which is consistently undermined by Russia’s close bilateral relationships with several EU member states. Recognition that eastern neighbourhood states such as Belarus, Ukraine and Georgia act as a kind of ‘collective Tito’ between Russia and the west helps to account both for their behaviour and others’ behaviour towards them, so to understand the behaviour of the various actors in these cases, it will always be necessary to keep peeling the onion.

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**Eurozone leaders cannot ignore the populist warning lights flashing across Europe**

*By Stephen Booth*

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Events in the European Union have moved rapidly since the world was first put on economic alert in late 2008. The consequences are certain to be far reaching but are also unlikely to become clear for several years or even a decade from now. The only thing that is evident is that the process of European integration is being tested to its political limits. The financial crisis has exposed the inherent weaknesses of the eurozone – a club whose mem-
The eurozone – a club whose members have been driven apart rather than bound together by its one-size-fits-all monetary policies. Financial markets have grown intolerant of European leaders’ failure to recognise the fundamental problems, never mind find the solutions to them. Europe’s hesitant politicians now risk having the choice between full fiscal union or splitting up the eurozone thrust upon them.

The EU has become a live issue in domestic politics. Nowhere is this more so than in Finland where the anti-euro True Finns have topped post-election opinion polls and now exert their influence over the Finnish government from the sidelines. This, in turn, has made life increasingly difficult for eurozone leaders trying to agree the details of unpopular bailouts. Germany, traditionally the EU’s paymaster, has been accused of lacking leadership but Chancellor Angela Merkel’s coalition government is constrained by an increasingly vocal minority of MPs wary of being sucked into a ‘transfer union’, and the fear of upsetting judges at the Federal Constitutional Court.

On the other side of the coin, the protests against EU-backed austerity measures on the streets of Athens are another example of how Europe has permeated national politics, pitting creditor and debtor countries against one another. The sight of the EU flag’s 12 peaceful stars distorted by Greek protesters into a golden swastika should have served as an unpleasant but powerful reminder of how emotions can run to extremes in desperate circumstances. This is no longer about lost referendums on obscure new treaties but the realisation that this crisis may hit taxpayers’ in their pockets or result in years of painful austerity, depending which side of the fence one might find themselves on. Unsurprisingly, the European elite perceives the rise of populist parties hostile to the eurozone at all costs, with many of them using opposition to the bailouts to their electoral advantage. Indeed, the existence of these parties is not a threat in and of itself but rather a forewarning to a situation in which the politics of the eurozone could well become explosive.

Juppé’s polemic, and the mindset that gave birth to it, only makes such a scenario more rather than less likely.

Shutting down or ignoring peaceful means of registering legitimate protest is the surest way to push people to the extremes. It should however be noted that the populist parties that we can now see around Europe are more diverse in their make-up and origins than is often understood, for example, by the media. But a simple fact remains: if voters’ message is ignored, what options do they have left to register their opposition to and fears about the eurozone elite’s consensus? Otmar Issing, former European Central Bank board member and architect of the euro, recently made the point in the Financial Times that, “Any attempt to ‘save’ monetary union via agreements which transfer sovereignty to a European level, where violations of fundamental treaties have become a regular event, lacks any logic. In the end it will only further alienate the people from Europe itself.”

He concluded, “This type of political union would not survive. Its collapse would be brought by resistance from the people. In the past cries of ‘no taxation without representation’ have brought war.”
This time the consequence would be to threaten the collapse of the most successful project of economic integration in the history of mankind.”

However, talk of the eurozone crisis bringing down the entire EU with it is not only premature at this stage but, putting it in these terms, on either side of the debate, also risks upping the stakes so far as to make these arguments self-fulfilling. Nevertheless, with the fiscal union versus dismantling of the eurozone choice on the horizon (however distant), the politics of this issue are only going to get more fraught unless politicians start addressing the genuine concerns of their citizens.

It is clear that there is no easy way out of the situation that the eurozone finds itself in but this is no excuse for failing to debate the issues with voters or consider solutions that may be more painful in the short term. There is certainly no reason to think that people’s concerns about the centralisation of power in Brussels and Frankfurt are going to be allayed by more of the same, especially if it is done without an explicit democratic mandate.

Stephen Booth writes here in a personal capacity.

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- Comparative Politics - particularly the comparative study of political parties, public policy, political corruption and comparative European politics.
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Potential applicants should send a CV and research proposal to Professor Aleks Szczerbiak (a.a.szczerbiak@sussex.ac.uk).

Next edition of euroscopec Human Rights in Europe

The next issue of euroscopec will be a Special Issue on Human Rights in Europe. If you would like to contribute a piece to the Features section, or write about your research or a relevant event, then please contact the editors and submit your article by the 1st December: email the team at: euroscopec@sussex.ac.uk.