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With Europe's long-awaited enlargement to 25 Member States successfully completed, the autumn of 2004 is a time to take stock of the challenges that lie ahead for the Union. This edition of Euroscope focuses on two of the most pressing challenges: economic reform and the successful implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy.

During the past decade, European growth has lagged significantly behind that of the United States, reversing the gains of the post-war years, which saw Europe close the income gap with the United States. This latest trend should be the cause of greatest concern to us all. Some euro-optimists have attributed this lower economic growth to the more civilised European work ethic: Europeans prefer long lunches and plentiful holidays; given that Europe is one of the world's richest regions, why shouldn’t we work fewer hours for less pay and have more time to enjoy the fruits of our labour?

On inspection, this facile argument runs contrary to common sense; lower economic growth is not a ‘lifestyle option’. Lower economic growth means fewer jobs, and entrenches unemployment at an unacceptable 9 per cent in the Eurozone; lower economic growth means lower tax revenues and less money for the public services; it means second-class public health care and third-rate public education. The challenge of growth is not merely a trade-off between work and leisure. Robust economic growth is the true heart of social Europe: without growth our endeavours are doomed to failure.

Economic reform and the Lisbon process that accompanies it are the top of the agenda of the incoming Barosso Commission. In this edition of Euroscope, Alan Mayhew focuses on one element of this, assessing what Lisbon means for eight new Member States of Central Europe.

May 2004's enlargement has brought the eastern frontier of the European Union to Ukraine, the largest of our New Neighbours. Between 2004 and 2006 Sussex European Institute is organising a series of three annual conferences to examine the politics and economics of relations with our largest new neighbour, and the impact of European Neighbourhood Policy. A report of last June’s conference is on page 17. Wider Europe 2005 will take place at the College of Europe, one of our sister institutions, at the Warsaw campus in Poland. Anyone who would like to get involved in this should speak to Nat Copsey in EDB 110, telephone 8713.

Continuing on the theme of enlargement Elias Antoniou draws attention to South Eastern Europe and some of the thornier issues facing the EU regarding the entry of a divided Cyprus into the EU.

Euroscope has two new editors for 2004-05: Elias Antonioniou and Nat Copsey. We would like to thank our predecessors, Maria Cheiladaki-Liarokapi and Michèle Harrison for all their hard work.

Elias Antoniou & Nat Copsey, Co-Editors
This is the first academic year which SEI starts fully integrated into the School of Social Sciences and Cultural Studies, and the first in our relatively new home in the EDB building. The last year has been one of major change across the University, and this inevitably brought some challenges. Yet SEI has weathered these challenges well, thanks to the unflagging commitment of all members of staff and a very supportive attitude on the side of the School. As a result of its origins, purpose and community spirit SEI has developed an identity of its own which, at times, had to struggle with some aspects of the restructuring. We are grateful to the Dean of the School, Professor John Holmwood, and other colleagues from the School for having fully appreciated this, and having done their utmost to facilitate the transition. I am glad to say that this has now been successfully completed, with the full preservation of SEI’s identity and sense of purpose.

On behalf of all members of staff I would like to welcome our new students. We are very happy that again so many of you have chosen SEI for your studies on European issues and we are looking forward not only to teaching you but – in a sense – also to be taught by you; each of you brings your own knowledge, experience and cultural background. This means that also we as members of staff can learn something from you and that each of you has much to offer to the community which SEI has always been and which is an essential part of our success.

We are looking forward to spending the time you are going to be here with you as a ‘common study project’ based on a permanent dialogue and a joint exploration of key issues of the current and future development of Europe. Contemporary European Studies as a discipline deals with a field that is constantly developing and changing. This makes it an exciting area to work in – with a lot of opportunities to walk ‘off the beaten track’. Yet it means also some particular challenges in terms of adaptability and getting used to different perspectives. We have always been delighted – and indeed impressed – with how our student cohorts have managed these challenges and proved to be open-minded and, in a constructive sense, critical in our joint explorations of these developments. Everything suggests that all our newcomers will continue this tradition.

Without a doubt, this academic year will have its fair share of important developments in Europe which will again and again come up in our discussions (and in a fair number of essays and dissertations, I imagine):

Only with the new European Commission in office and the new European Parliament assembled will the newly enlarged EU fully start to function. Both new and old Member States still have to adjust, and the year will show to what extent a new culture of compromise (more necessary than ever) and new alliances between Member States will emerge. There are some pretty tough issues on which to test the post-enlargement decision-making capacity of the Union. The negotiations on the new 2006-2013 financial perspective which will decide not only how much the Union will be able to do, but also how much each Member State is going to pay in and receive, is certainly one of them. The question of the opening of accession negotiations with Turkey, which got through some rough waters just a few days ago, is certainly another.
Then there is the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. While one can certainly disagree on whether or not this treaty merits the denomination ‘constitution’, it certainly constitutes the biggest EU reform package since the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993. It has been the result of a unique treaty revision process (because of the European Convention) and was at some stage singularly close to failure (because of the weighting of votes in the Council). The text has now been agreed upon - and will keep legions of academics busy analysing all its provisions and likely implications - but it still faces the crucial test of ratification by the Member States. A successful ratification can in no way be taken for granted, especially as several governments either have had to or have chosen to embark on the adventure of holding a referendum on the issue of ratification. The history of the European integration process has shown that referenda are amongst the most unpredictable factors which can bear on the Union's destiny.

British policy developments are also going to be of high relevance in a European perspective throughout the year. In recent years, the UK has clearly been in the lead on some important initiatives in the EU context: the ESDP and EU justice and home affairs being key examples. But the British Government is also facing a number of major difficulties. The decision to hold a referendum on the EU Draft Treaty risks becoming a very divisive issue with incalculable consequences if the referendum were lost by the Government. In the negotiations on the next EU financial perspective the twenty year old British ‘rebate’ is likely to come under severe pressure. And last but not least, the fall-out from the British participation in the war in Iraq, which in terms of political costs and risks (not to speak about the human and financial) reminds one increasingly of the ill-fated 1956 Suez intervention, is likely to continue to have both internal and European ramifications.

In short: we will not be lacking in issues to explore and discuss!

Before I finish I would also like to use this opportunity to welcome Jo Amos as our new Departmental Co-ordinator. She comes with a lot of expertise and – in my impression – enthusiasm which has already from day one made her a much appreciated colleague. The re-arrangements of her office already show a new spirit at work – and a much welcome one.

Jörg Monar
Since the 10 new Member States of the Union together contribute 4.5 per cent of the GDP of the Union measured in current prices and exchange rates and only nine per cent at purchasing power parity, it might be asked if they are irrelevant for the success or failure of economic reform at the Union level. Naturally, the Lisbon Agenda is not irrelevant for their own development, although even if they manage to grow at twice the rate of the EU-15, in 10 years’ time they will still be contributing only a small proportion of the Union’s GDP. Nonetheless, the new Member States are more important for the future of economic reform in the Union than these simple statistics would suggest.

These countries have a weight in decision-making in the Union, which is considerably greater than either their relative GDP weight or indeed their population would suggest. While Lisbon concerns above all national policy, the new Member States will have an important say in every decision taken at the Union level. When Romania and Bulgaria join the Union they will have a clear blocking minority, which they may be tempted to use on certain Lisbon matters and perhaps on elements of the annual budget.

The experiences of the new Member States in negotiating accession will also lead them to pursue their own national interests in the same way that the EU-15 followed their own interests in the negotiations. The transitional period imposed on the free movement of labour by the majority of Member States, restrictions on the free movement of services, and the unequal treatment of farmers are all points which still rankle.

Both the experience of the accession negotiations and the rise of nationalistic economic policies in some key Member States makes it unlikely that they will agree to measures at the Union level which they regard as not in their own national interest.

The new Member States also represent a challenge and an opportunity for policy making in the EU-15 by providing alternative, low cost production locations within the internal market. In this way the older Member States could be encouraged to push forward with economic reforms; the penalty for not doing so will be to lose more production locations and the jobs which go with them. Unfortunately there are signs that the reaction of some Member States has been to move even faster towards protectionist policies.

What economic reform model do the new Member States need?

The capacity of the new Member States to undertake far-reaching economic reform is demonstrated by their transformation from centrally planned economies to market economies after 1989. Adjustment to the **acquis communautaire** prior to accession further tested their capacity to reform.

In spite of these remarkable achievements, the new Member States remain far poorer than even the poorest of EU-15. Closing this GDP per capita gap has been declared a key policy objective of their integration with the Union. In order to achieve sustained high growth rates these countries will have to favour many of the objectives of the Lisbon Agenda. Economic policies most conducive to rapid growth are those which aim at open markets in the Union, with strict adherence to the rules of competition and limitation of state aid, the development of entrepreneurship and business creation and measures on the employment market to ensure a larger active population. All of these are Lisbon goals.

Measured against the key Lisbon Agenda objectives today, the new Member States as a group score rather badly in comparison to the old EU countries. This is particularly the case for research and development spending, for innovation, labour market participation rates, labour productivity, the privatisation of remaining state enterprises, liberalisation in some key sectors and the sustainability of development.

In general the new Member States have a shortage of capital with an adequate supply of labour. The shortage of capital can be seen clearly both in the productive sector and in infrastructure. To enhance both the stock of capital and its quality, high rates of investment are required over a long period. Much of this capital will come from domestic savings but all the new Member States must attempt to attract as much foreign direct investment as possible. Investment by foreign companies will tend to improve management and production methods resulting in higher productivity.

Success in attracting FDI in the coming decade will depend on the new Member States being able to control costs, especially wage costs, as well as creating a business environment which is as stable and
dependable as that in the old EU. Low tax rates will also add to the attraction of these countries, as will an available skilled workforce.

At the same time, with some help from the EU Structural Funds, the infrastructure deficit of the new Member States will begin to be reduced. This itself will make these countries more attractive to productive investment.

Raising spending on high technology R & D to three per cent of GDP is not an immediate objective that most of the new Member States would find sensible to adopt, although they too in the longer term must aim for excellence in research and development. It is far more important to raise the general level of technological development in the economy by ensuring that modern production methods using modern equipment become generalised.

Already here we see a different emphasis from that in the Lisbon Agenda: that is, competing with the USA at the research frontier. Even where old and new Member States share the same objective, the policy necessary to meet these objectives may be totally different.

Finally, there are parts of the Lisbon agenda, which while being longer-term aims, cannot be part of the main development agenda of the new Member States today. This applies naturally to some of the sustainable development measures. This discussion should be qualified by the remark that there are wide variations between the new Member States.

Nevertheless, there are a sufficient number of specific characteristics which the new Member States have in common which suggest that they might be less willing to support all elements of the Lisbon Strategy, which, it should be remembered, was developed exclusively to serve the needs of the EU-15.

The scope of the Lisbon Agenda and decision-making

The aim of all the new members is, of course, the same as that of the richest countries in the Union – to become the most dynamic economies in the world. They would therefore be unlikely to question the overall aims of the Strategy. However, given their different position in progress towards this objective, they might well want to give different emphasis to certain parts of the strategy.

This may mean that the new Member States take a somewhat different view to the discussion on decision-making within Lisbon. There is a perception in many parts of the Union that the Lisbon Strategy is failing because the ‘open method of coordination’ has failed. Some of the larger Member States have been able to ignore Lisbon or even to adopt policies, which are anti-reform because the open method works only by persuasion. Many have suggested that the Lisbon Strategy needs to be enforced through the ‘Community method’.

The new Member State governments might welcome being able to blame reforms in the labour market on reinforced Lisbon decision-making. Overall however, given their different development priorities, the new Member States may turn out to be staunch defenders of the ‘open method’. They would not want to be forced into implementing policies which do not serve the overall objective of raising their growth rates and catching up the EU-15. Any move to make Lisbon objectives mandatory could therefore be seen as a danger to this objective, perhaps forcing the new Member States to waste resources on second-order problems.

Their potential opposition to changes in decision-making might of course be weakened if the scope of the Lisbon Agenda was to be limited to those objectives related to raising economic growth and competitiveness. The Lisbon Agenda as it now stands is the result of effective lobbying by the numerous interest groups in the Union, some of them not especially noted for their reform enthusiasm. As a result, it has moved away from the narrow economic reform agenda to a more broad-based and acceptable political reform programme, which indeed suits the needs of the EU-15.

Realistically it would be very difficult to achieve a new prioritisation of Lisbon objectives with a concentration on core economic reform. It is therefore likely that the new Member States will oppose any move from the ‘open method of coordination’ towards more compulsion.

Enlargement and economic nationalism in the Union

But the new Member States have another reason for objecting to any changes in decision-making on
economic reform. This is the rise of a new economic nationalism in key Member States of the Union – notably in Germany, Italy and France – a move which is clearly against the interests of the new members.

Economic reform in the core Eurozone economies is underway. This may be seen clearly today in Germany where the government is struggling to force through long overdue reforms against considerable opposition. However, at the Union level, this has translated into efforts to hold back development in other Member States, to give a certain breathing room to reformers at home.

This became obvious in the accession negotiations, where transition periods were forced through on the free movement of labour and the liberalisation of trade in services. It has become particularly clear in the three Governments’ concerted effort to defend their national champions against the Commission.

The latest moves have concerned attempts to impose company tax harmonisation ‘to avoid unfair competition in the internal market’. This aim has been clearly stated by the French and German Governments, most recently by the French Finance Minister. According to the Polish press, one of the German commissioners proposed to introduce a clause into the new draft General Regulation concerning the Structural Funds, which would have led to a country which had a company tax rate deemed unfairly low losing some of its Cohesion Fund grants.

While there are cases in the world of unfair tax competition, none of the new Member States would seem to be guilty. These proposals imply either a poor understanding of the basic economic reform issues or more probably they underline the fact that, faced with the enormous difficulty to reform tax systems in Germany and France, these countries are keen to ensure that the creation of attractive entrepreneurial environments in neighbouring countries is made more difficult.

The worry about enterprises relocating productive capacity to the new Member States, where costs are lower, is at its most extreme in Germany, where ‘delocalisation’ has become a major political issue. This is partly because of geography but also because Germany has a larger share of the economy still in manufacturing than most other Member States. Attempts by the German Government to protect highly paid employment in Germany are doomed to failure. The possibility of moving production to lower cost sites within the new Member States has probably led to employment being retained in the Union, which otherwise would have been relocated to low cost locations in Asia.

These protectionist policies clearly work against the interests of the new Member States and indeed of the Union as a whole. With such threats in the air, it is even more important for the new Member States not to agree to changes in decision-making procedures in the Lisbon Strategy.

Systemic weaknesses in economic reform in the new Member States

Although the new Member States have demonstrated their capacity to implement fundamental economic reforms, systemic weaknesses persist. These weaknesses put at risk the aim of accelerating economic growth and of implementing the Lisbon Agenda. They concern both the functioning of the economy and of state institutions. However, both problems are essentially institutional in nature.

In spite of the great increase in income and wealth inequalities over the last 15 years, social equality remains a stronger force in the new Member States than in many of the older ones. This is at the same time a social quality and an economic handicap. It often leads to an under-rewarding of vital skills in society, especially in the public sector, and reduces the incentives to innovation and upgrading of skills. It also encourages the more vital elements in society to emigrate to countries where skills are better rewarded. The low rewards to skilled professionals in the health system is a typical example.

At the same time there remains a tendency to regard the State as the ultimate guarantor of social welfare, even though it has been obvious for some time that the State is unable to fulfill this function. This contributes to low participation rates in the labour market and a bloated system of early-retirement and incapacity pensions. The cost to the State of these systems means that taxes on all incomes remain relatively high and the incentive to participate in the black economy is strong. The combination of low participation rates, high registered unemployment in some countries and low levels of productivity is a central challenge for reform policies in the new Member States.

The role of the State in the economy remains a problem in several of the new Member States in the form of a reticence to privatise certain ‘key’ industries or to remove state subsidies. Agriculture, heavy industry and banking are most frequently affected. Here, however, the new Member States hardly differ from certain of the old Member States; the reduction of subsidies to state owned ‘national champions’ is politically fraught,
since these are still perceived as national assets by the public.

These problems begin with unstable governments. As is known from French and Italian post-war experience, stability in government is essential if economic reforms are to be successful. Yet in several of the new Member States governments appear to be in continuous crisis and are forced to follow populist policies in order to retain power. New parties are still appearing with great frequency and meeting almost instant success, only to lose voters just as quickly. Even in Hungary, where all governments since 1989 have served the full term and where there is clearly a degree of political maturity and stability, the authority of Government to undertake economic reform seems to be severely contested. Rapid turnover of ministers in charge of important areas of reform such as health, education, finance and the economy testify to these difficulties.

Below the government, most of the new Member States have not completed reforms of the state administration, leading to problems in implementing reforms. There is a whole layer of highly qualified young officials in many ministries but they are held back by systems of seniority or by poor senior and middle management. What can be achieved has been demonstrated by the European Integration Offices (sometimes integrated into the Foreign Ministry, sometimes independent), which generally showed considerable efficiency and enterprise in preparing for accession. But the average age of staff in these offices was often around or even under 30!

Civil services are often extremely politicised, which again leads to inefficiency. In this aspect they are no different to several of the old Member States. However, where efficient staff are thinly spread, changes in senior positions at every election or even between elections becomes very costly as far as the implementation of economic reform is concerned.

Finally, of course, there is the question of pay. The pay of civil servants is not always poor but frequently so. In some countries it has become possible to break with the idea that all should receive the same (miserable) pay irrespective of qualifications and efficiency, but still the civil service can generally not pay young qualified officials adequately to stop them being poached by the private sector just when they become really productive for the state.

Weak government and civil services - at the national and regional level - often provide the space for corruption to flourish. The new Member States do not have a monopoly on corruption in the Union, which appears quite widespread in the EU-15 and in certain of the European Institutions. Nevertheless, the level of corruption in some of the new Member States and the proximity of certain business leaders or other interest groups to key politicians tends to increase the distrust of the population in politics. This in turn, reduces the effectiveness of economic reform measures, which do not have general acceptance amongst the population.

These weaknesses in the new Member States can all be explained by the traumatic transition to the market and democracy, which only started 15 years ago. Nevertheless they must be tackled urgently if economic reform and therefore economic growth are to be pursued vigorously.

The Lisbon Agenda, the Community Budget and the new Member States

The Sapir Report suggested that the Union should reorientate its limited budget to serve the objectives of economic reform. The Commission in its proposal for the Financial Framework 2007-2013 responded in a partial way to these suggestions by introducing a ‘Competitiveness’ heading. By 2013 this heading would absorb around 17 per cent of total commitment appropriations, equivalent to just over 0.2 per cent of Union GDP. Most of this finance would go towards increasing the Union’s research and development budget. The Commission regards this as a contribution to the Lisbon objective of raising spending on R&D to three per cent of GDP by 2010.

Although nothing can be excluded in the extremely complex negotiations which agreement on a new financial framework entails, it does not seem very likely that all the new Member States would support the proposed spending. R&D investments will almost certainly be targeted at the leading research institutions and companies, all of which are located in the old Member States, in western Europe.

Claims that the new Member States will gain through secondary effects of spending on R&D will probably not be very convincing, given that they have learnt through the negotiating process that national interests prevail in the Union. Any increase in the EU budget increases their gross transfers to Brussels and makes the task of reducing the government deficit that much more difficult. An additional encouragement to minimise gross budgetary payments to the EU budget is the fact that non-compliance with their ‘Convergence Programmes’ will lead to a suspension of access to the Cohesion Fund.
Conclusion

Enlargement has boosted the potential support for economic reform in the European Union. The principle objective of policy in the new Member States is to accelerate economic growth in order to close the income gap with the other Member States. Open markets in a liberal economic system are necessary to achieve this objective.

Opposition to certain aspects of such policies exists in the new Member States. This opposition often derives from rent seekers in the economy with powerful influence on the political establishment. Evidence suggests that these forces can delay economic reform but cannot stop it.

However, institutional reform is a prerequisite in most new Member States for the implementation of the economic reform agenda. Weak government, civil service and key institutions means that even when reform measures are decided at the legislative level, implementation in the country may be weak.

The new members are unlikely to support the new economic nationalism, which appears to be growing in the Union. They need high levels of investment, both domestic and foreign, which inevitably mean attracting companies in the EU-15 to move production from higher cost sites. This is good for the Union’s economy.

The core elements of the Lisbon economic reform agenda are likely to attract the support of the new Member States. However, at their current stage of development those parts of the Lisbon Programme which are not crucial to the economic growth and employment objectives may be considered counterproductive.

This fact makes it unlikely that all the new Member States would support a move away from the open method of coordination towards the Community method in decision-making in the Lisbon Process.

The experience of the new Member States in their dealings with the Union has shown them that national interests prevail in the policies of the EU-15, even if the rhetoric is all about Community solidarity. It is likely that they will therefore take decisions on the future financing of economic reform on the basis of their own national interest. This may well lead them to opposing the Commission’s proposal to develop Union financing of R&D.

Some thought should be given to developing funded policy elements which correspond to the current needs of the new Member States. Support for technology transfer and for the development of R&D capacity could be elements of such programmes. Support for higher education and for facilities which help highly talented individuals remain based in their home country is also necessary.

Finally, the whole climate of solidarity between old and new Member States could be improved if certain of the disappointments from the accession negotiations could be resolved. One key element would be the abolition of the transition period for free movement of workers after the first two years. It has already become clear from the experience of the United Kingdom that large movements of people are not to be expected. Yet in the minds of the citizens of the new Member States this is a key element of their perceived second class membership of the Union.

Alan Mayhew is Jean Monnet Professor of Contemporary European Studies at Sussex European Institute. He was previously responsible for relations with central and eastern Europe at the European Commission.

This is an abridged version. The full text appears in Economic Reform in Europe: priorities for the next five years, edited by Roger Liddle and Maria João Rodrigues, published this week by the London-based European think-tank, Policy Network.
UACES: University Association for Contemporary European Studies

UACES is the premier European Studies Association in Europe. Established in 1969 it now has 1,000 members worldwide. It is a highly active network of academics and other professionals who represent a diverse range of disciplines (politics, law, economics, international relations) and organisations (embassies, business, government, media). The UACES journal is JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, edited by Jim Rollo and William Paterson.

The aim of UACES is to provide a forum for members to exchange ideas and information on European affairs. Full details, including information on student membership, are found on www.uaces.org.

UACES annually offers an extensive range of conferences, workshops and study groups. The key event of the UACES calendar is the Annual and Research Conference. This is noted for its high quality speakers, and global delegates list. The 2005 Annual and Research Conference (5-7 September, Zagreb, Croatia), promises to be a huge success bringing together experts to exchange their ideas on the theme: ‘The EU: Past and Future Enlargements’.

Another highlight of the UACES calendar is the European Studies Research Students' Conference (15 November 2005, London, UK). This one day conference is aimed at research students in the field of European studies and caters for the needs of students at different stages in their research.

Anna Majewska, Marketing and Administrative Officer: info@uaces.org

UACES Student Forum

The UACES Student Forum is the student branch of UACES. It is an active network of research students specialising in all aspects of contemporary European studies. The aim of the Student Forum is to provide a voice for graduate students within UACES and to facilitate dialogue and the exchange of information between students at different institutions and in various countries. It brings together more than 500 postgraduate students specialising in European affairs from universities across Europe.

The UACES Student Forum facilitates dialogue between students through its website (www.uacesstudentforum.org) and its mailing list, the Euroresearch List. The UACES Student Forum also arranges conferences, supports Specialist Study Groups, and manages a research database of its members. Membership of the Student Forum is open to any research student interested in European Studies.

One of the most recent initiatives of the Student Forum and UACES is the launch of a new journal, the Journal of Contemporary European Research. This journal aims to encourage insightful debate and cutting-edge research on contemporary European affairs by publishing articles, comments and reviews on all aspects of the European integration process. The first edition will be published in May 2005, and submissions from PhD students and young scholars are especially welcomed.

For more details on the Journal of Contemporary European Research and the UACES Student Forum, visit our website www.uacesstudentforum.org.

Sara Hobolt, Chair of the UACES Student Forum
Myth meets reality on the island of Cyprus
Elias Antoniou

The issue

On 24th April 2004 the two communities of the divided island of Cyprus voted in parallel referenda on a settlement plan proposed by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan (known as the Annan Plan). The aims of the talks leading up to the fifth version of the proposed Plan had been to end the occupation by Turkish troops of 37% of Cyprus since the Turkish invasion of 1974 and to reunify the island along the model of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. The joint referenda on the Plan were seen as the last stage in over three decades worth of difficult negotiation and efforts by the UN to reunify Cyprus. These talks were given added urgency as they were viewed as the last chance to welcome a united Cyprus into the EU before the Republic of Cyprus (representing all of Cyprus but in control of only the un-occupied part of Cyprus) acceded to the EU in the historic EU enlargement on 1st May 2004.

The implications of the entry of a divided Cyprus into the EU are potentially serious when considered in terms of the impending Commission decision on Turkish membership. It is likely Cyprus will use its status as an EU member to further pursue Turkey through the political and legal institutions and raise difficult questions about the viability of the Turkish application, with the possibility, although unlikely, of a Cypriot and Greek veto of Turkish accession. Likewise, Turkey may press for the formal recognition of the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), a point that has already been mooted in EU circles as a reward for the Turkish Cypriot ‘yes’ vote to the Annan Plan. Whatever the final outcome, it is certain that the EU has taken up the mantle of the UN in dealing with the Cyprus issue and thereby imported a complicated issue and a source of continuing instability and tension into the EU. It also has implications for the EU if it is unable to broker an acceptable settlement to both sides without compromising the Copenhagen (membership) criteria and established EU law.

The breakthrough & breakdown of the settlement

The timing was last minute, the stakes were high and the outcome was uncertain, but optimism rose when at the eleventh hour, Turkey, under considerable international pressure, decided to amend its thirty-year intransigence over a Cyprus settlement and engage more positively in the negotiations. With Ankara now putting its weight behind the Annan Plan, success in the Turkish Cypriot referendum was assured, but by some dramatic twist of irony the Cypriot Government, who had made countless concessions in search of a workable solution to their thirty year long occupation and division, were unable to endorse the Plan as in the final analysis it did not meet even their minimal criteria and the requirements of international or EU law.

According to the principle agreed earlier in the negotiations to endow Mr. Annan with the authority to “fill in” the areas of disagreement the plan was presented directly to the people. Mr. Annan addressed them prior to the referendum as follows: “Let me be clear. The choice is not between this settlement plan and some other magic or mythical solution. In reality at this stage, this choice is between this settlement or no settlement. I am certain that my settlement plan offers the best and fairest chance of peace, prosperity and stability that is ever likely to be on offer.” (The Times, April 1 2004) What is certain is that these words do not exactly inspire confidence and there is an uncharacteristic absence of any reference to its being in accordance with international law or any UN resolutions which should be noted. The effect of such statements expressed in the language of an ultimatum or veiled threat as to the consequences of saying no left the Greek Cypriot people to do the unthinkable and vote a resounding “No” (75.8%) to this fifth Annan Plan.
Why did the Greek Cypriots vote ‘No’?

It is necessary to state that the Greek Cypriot people did not vote ‘no’ to the settlement of the Cyprus problem or to the inclusion of Turkish Cypriots in a united Cyprus. It is clear that they voted no to the specific provisions made in the final version of the Annan Plan because they deemed that it did not adequately address their long held grievances or even the most basic requirements of international law and human rights.

For thirty years Turkey has refused to engage in any meaningful way on Cyprus and has persistently blocked and scuppered efforts to find a fair and just solution outside the perceived Turkish national interest. It must be repeated that in this most recent round of negotiations Turkey only acted at the last minute to make the most minimal of gestures to support the Annan Plan and had no reason not to support the Annan Plan as it required no substantive concessions to be made by Turkey. The Financial Times (April 2 2004) reported that “[Turkey] secured almost all its interests on Cyprus without being forced to make critical concessions in the talks which Ankara has linked intimately to the fate of its own EU aspirations... the Hurriyet newspaper commented, this was “the first time in 30 years” that Turkey was not responsible for the breakdown of talks on the future of Cyprus.” The Cypriot government maintained a positive approach in all areas of the talks, making concessions all round, but eventually it was not able to concede on its minimum criteria, which can be summed up in three points:

i) Turkey should end the occupation of northern Cyprus and remove all Turkish military forces from the island;  
ii) An estimated 100,000 illegal Turkish settlers should be removed; and  
iii) All refugees should be able to return.

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has faced an immense task in persuading his domestic audience and particular hardliners within the armed forces that Turkey should remain on the path of Europeanisation and that a settlement in Cyprus has been vital to this but the preconditions set by Turkey’s National Council were that any solution be “based on the realities of the island” (Middle East International, 06 February 2004). Cypriot President Tassos Papadopoulos’ criticisms of the Plan are that “the Annan Plan does not abolish the de facto division, but on the contrary promotes the permanent division with restrictions on movement and settlement...” and “with the transformation of the divisive provisions of the Plan into the [EU’s] primary law, even the slightest hope for the solution to develop and improve in the future, has vanished”. (Declaration by the President of the Republic, Mr Tassos Papadopoulos regarding the referendum of the 24th April 2004, 07/04/04) This is why the Cypriot people could not approve the provisions of the fifth Annan Plan, because it was biased, unjust and ultimately illegal and fails to uphold any of the countless UN resolutions and EU rulings against Turkey’s behaviour domestically and in Cyprus that preceded it. The plan is characterised by the constructive uncertainty of certain provisions of the agreement, which the Cypriot government could not endorse and the people could not accept.

The consequences

Sadly, any consequences to date have been engineered by the EU, which has attempted to blame the Cypriot government for misleading it while rewarding Turkey with positive comments. External Relations Commissioner Chris Patten clearly failed to grasp the complexities of the situation and the legitimate reasons behind a no vote by the Greek Cypriots when he expressed his feeling on behalf of the EU that “I think we feel that we have, as it were, handed over the chocolate and they have refused to hand back the crisps” (The Times, April 26 2004). Such rhetoric is of course verging on the ridiculous to anyone with a basic knowledge of the history of Cyprus and the efforts the Republic of Cyprus in particular has made to transform itself from devastated and occupied state into an economically thriving, tolerant and secular liberal democracy that “has been rigorous in pursuing the implementation of the acquis communautaire” and which “has been, and remains, ahead of any other applicant state in its readiness for membership of the Union.” (Pauline Green [former MEP], Embracing Cyprus, p.55) The consequences of the no vote have been mixed among the relevant parties with Cyprus entering the EU under a cloud of criticism and negative portrayals by the EU and international media while Turkey’s position as an applicant state is certainly
strengthened. Various newspapers reported, “The Greek Cypriots have made the biggest mistake of their lives. But for [Turkish Prime Minister] Erdogan this is win-win situation” (“Poll is win for Turkey”, The Times, April 26 2004). The Financial Times (“Turkey emerges as talks winner” Friday April 2 2004) similarly reported “By emerging with most of the credit from the Cyprus negotiations, Turkey has boosted its credentials as a future [EU] member” while Cyprus is, again in the words of Chris Patten “an unwelcome addition to the family.” The consequence may be the opening of separate accession negotiations with the self proclaimed TRNC in the future, which may become more likely with Turkish accession ever more realistic.

The outlook

With the entry of a divided Cyprus into the EU and Turkish membership increasingly likely but by no means a forgone conclusion, there are implications for the future of security and stability in the Eastern Mediterranean and perhaps more crucially for the unity, functionality and democratic image of an enlarged Europe with a bearing on any vote on the Constitution for Europe.

The burden of the membership of a divided Cyprus into the EU and an improved image for Turkey presents a nightmare scenario for many EU governments and EU institutions. In one fell swoop the EU has imported one of the most intractable problems in South Eastern Europe and with the de-coupling of the resolution of Cyprus with Turkish membership, it has also one less reason not to open talks with Turkey, something that the EU is still deeply divided over. Günter Verheugen, the Commissioner for enlargement, only recently stated “From my point of view there are no further conditions which Turkey must fulfil” (BBC News, 23/09/04). This assessment of Turkey effectively writes off the Turkish invasion and occupation of Cyprus. Furthermore, the failure to win critical concessions from Turkey over Cyprus has to be considered as a failure on the part of the EU to exert its authority, and most crucially to uphold the founding principles of the EU and EU law; that of basic human rights, freedom of movement, territorial integrity, and the rule of law, and these cannot be casually brushed aside.

A firm lead must be taken by the EU, and in particular, the Council or the Commission must make a statement of principles in this matter to the effect that it cannot support the application of a state that has not yet fulfilled the most basic of the Copenhagen criteria and whose occupation of EU territory in Cyprus not only remains illegal and unacceptable but also prevents the application of the acquis communautaire and EU citizenship to the people of occupied Northern Cyprus. The EU is supposed to give a voice to weaker states through the fora of the EU institutions where laws and conventions abound and the importance of individual state power is theoretically diminished. But the recent failed attempt to settle the Cyprus issue implies that there is clearly a gap in approach and capability between the internal face of the EU and its external face, whereby when faced with an issue outside its immediate jurisdiction and influence or when its approach contradicts that of powerful external pressures it may abandon its principles and revert back to the norms of power politics and strategic interests. The latter is evident in the case of Cyprus where it seems the EU and particularly certain member states have pressed for a settlement based on pressure from Britain and the US to support Turkey for geo-political reasons undoubtedly linked to the present war on terror, and even an attempt by Britain to fulfil its Atlanticist agenda through the de-centralisation of the EU by including Turkey as a counter balance to the so called Europeanists.

The issue is now more sensitive and explosive than ever with the potential of destabilising the region and the recent Greek-Turkish rapprochement. A Cyprus isolated in the EU may exercise its veto in the Council (that may well be welcomed by some Council members as a means to block Turkish accession) and it will certainly pursue its legal case through the EU institutions and use popular pressure via the European Parliament. A firm legal case against Turkey by Cyprus could have the unintentional effect of further galvanising those numerous voices within the EU, both politicians and citizens that already have numerous other fears over Turkish membership that it is “just too big, too poor, too distant, and too Muslim” (BBC News, 23/09/04) and jeopardise any future vote on the Constitution. A positive engagement on the Cyprus issue would win Turkey many more friends among the Greeks and Cypriots who have championed Turkish membership as a means of reforming Turkey through Europeanisation and who notably do not raise Turkey’s ‘non-European credentials’ as a criterion for membership in the way that German Christian Democrats do for example.

In the event that the Commission decision on Turkey of December 17th 2004 does happen to be negative then an angry reaction by Turkey could ensue, further chilling relations in the Eastern Mediterra-
nean. For Turkey these scenarios could be interpreted as the realisation of its fears of exclusion from the Christian club or of a Greek mini-bloc acting against Turkish interests from within the EU and a further “slap in the face.”

The approach to the resolution of the Cyprus problem and the decision on Turkish membership is a matter of principles and legitimacy but it also has a bearing on the wider context, where the rhetoric of the EU points towards it positioning itself as an alternative to the US doctrine of unilaterality in the conduct of international relations by emphasising the importance and primacy of international law. This raises further difficult questions: What kind of regional / global actor is the EU aiming to be? Can the EU retain the authority and legitimacy from its citizens to fulfil these aims? And ultimately, does the EU possess the power and capability to do so?

What the EU does possess and has wielded effectively, is the lure of enlargement as an influential foreign policy tool. Based on the fulfilment of strict political, economic and social criteria the EU has demonstrated that it can transform whole nations, but crucially the application of these rules must be universal and no exceptions can be made if reforms are to have the desired effect both in the applicant countries and once they join the EU. In the case of Turkey, patience is perhaps one of the toughest criteria it is asked to fulfil, combined with wholehearted and unequivocal commitment. If there is a lesson that Turkey could take from the problematic Cyprus issue, it is that successive Cypriot governments, aware of the reluctance and sensitivities in the EU to deal with its particular political problem, made every effort to ensure that Cyprus completed all aspects of the domestic reforms required by the acquis communautaire and complied with all the Copenhagen criteria so that the EU found it impossible to justifiably exclude them. One would hope, that for the credibility and founding principles of the EU to be upheld, it must ensure reform in Turkey is accelerated and that Turkey continues steadfastly on the road to Europeanisation, with the absolute intention that when Turkey and the EU are both ready, Turkey becomes a full member of the EU. A positive Commission decision to open accession talks with Turkey is a powerful lure by which to convince Turkish domestic politics that reform is essential, but in the same vein, while being offered the carrot Turkey must not always be spared the stick if it does not make the necessary changes domestically and in its regional politics. Cyprus absolutely must remain at the top of the agenda for EU – Turkish relations in order that all sides can prove their commitment to EU principles and law.

The question now is how will the EU approach these problems? And can it engineer a workable outcome in terms of reuniting Cyprus and still satisfy its own criteria over Turkish membership?

What can be done next?

Turkey's actions in Cyprus must remain central to Turkey's aspirations for EU membership. The greatest breakthrough of the last negotiations were that Turkey began to become involved, albeit belatedly; its biggest downfall was that Turkey was not forced to answer any difficult questions. This involvement could be nurtured and continued in line with Turkey's accession negotiations to ensure justice is done in Cyprus. Hyperbole aside, the EU's treatment of the Cyprus issue at this juncture is nothing less than an examination of its core principles and approach to international relations. The EU espouses the ideological rhetoric of overcoming an international system characterised by anarchy and power politics through integration and adherence to international law. In international relations the EU emphasises economic power over military force, of international co-operation and multilateralism over unilateralism. The upholding of international law and of strict criteria for state behaviour domestically and externally is fundamental to this vision of the EU as a regional actor and as a legitimate authority. Moreover the right of the EU citizen to appeal directly to the EU and specifically to supranational bodies such as the ECHR is crucial to its legitimacy and to its image as a democratic entity, and therefore the credibility of these organisations must not be undermined. It must consider it is now dealing with the rights of Cypriot EU citizens and their legitimate grievances that have been pursued successfully through the European Parliament and upheld numerous times by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) against Turkey. Therefore it is essential to the credibility of the EU enlargement project and to the EU as a regional / global actor that it does not reduce a problem like Cyprus, where cases by Cypriot citizens have already been upheld in the ECHR, to a politico-strategic issue, and hence reverting back to the mode of realpolitik.
Conclusion

There is no magical or mythical solution to the Cyprus problem to paraphrase Kofi Annan. There are only hard choices and hard work, which the Republic of Cyprus should be recognised as having risen to time and again. That the Greek Cypriots voted for the ‘no solution’ is the real myth, this is not and never has been an option for the people of Cyprus. Their hope is for the reality of thirty years of Turkish military occupation to end, for the barriers to come down and for all Cypriots to be able to return to a secure home. Despite the setback of recent months, Cyprus will, undoubtedly, keep faith with the principles it has so readily accepted from the EU. Likewise, the EU must keep faith with its own founding principles and not seek easy solutions to difficult or seemingly intractable problems. Above all, it must ensure by every means possible that its principles are not undermined by those with an agenda to water down the EU as a means of controlling it or undermining its authority. In the words of President Papadopoulos “they tell us that a solution cannot be achieved if such painful compromises are not made and that a solution should be found somewhere in the middle. However, there are questions of principles and human rights where the middle solution is not the right answer.”

Elias Antoniou is a DPhil Student in Sussex European Institute and Co-Editor of Euroscope. You can contact him at E.Antoniou@sussex.ac.uk.

Submissions to Euroscope

You are welcomed and encouraged to send in short articles, book reviews, alumni news updates and more substantial articles to SEI and the Euroscope Journal. Please send your submission in electronic form to EUROSCOPE@SUSSEX.AC.UK as Word attachments. Pieces of up to 3,000 words will be considered. You can also send alumni news and events of interest to SEI. All submissions will be edited for language and length.

Deadline for submissions by the end of the previous term, so Autumn Term for the Spring Issue, Spring for the Summer issue, and September 1st for the Autumn Term issue.

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Sussex European Institute Wider Europe Seminar 2004

Sussex European Institute's Wider Europe Seminar, organised jointly by Professor Alan Mayhew, Jean Monnet Chair of European Studies, and Nathaniel Copsey, over 4-5 June 2004 was the first in a series of three events that bring together academics, diplomats, civil servants, and other stakeholders to discuss the European Union's New Neighbourhood Policy. The first seminar was generously co-sponsored by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the European Commission, and East Sussex County Council, and concentrated on relations with the Union's new eastern neighbours: Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova.

The seminar was opened by Professor Jim Rollo, Co-Director of SEI, and Councillor Daphne Bagshaw, Chairman of East Sussex County Council. They were followed by European Commissioner and former Polish Minister for European Integration, Danuta Hübner, speaking together with Kim Darroch, the British Prime Minister’s Special Advisor on Europe. Kim Darroch argued for a long term approach to the Action Plans for Europe's New Neighbours, adding together with Commissioner Hübner, that membership of the European Union should not be ruled out in the distant future for Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus.

Also included in the seminar’s impressive selection of speakers were: Professor Judy Batt, from the EU Institute for Strategic Studies, together with Pawel Swieboda from the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Nathaniel Copsey from Sussex European Institute, whose wide-ranging exposés covered the whole breadth of the relations between the EU's new member states and its new neighbours; Helen Campbell, from the Wider Europe Task Force at the European Commission, who spoke with Christophe Hillion from UCL on the implementation of the Action Plans for Ukraine and Moldova; Professor Alan Mayhew, who chaired the Round Table debate; Professor Jörg Monar, Co-Director of SEI, who spoke with Iwona Piórko, also from Sussex European Institute, on the Justice and Home Affairs aspects of the New Neighbourhood Policy; and, Ihor Prokopchuk, deputy Head of Mission at the Ukrainian Embassy in London, together with Dr Andrew Wilson, from SSEES, who spoke on the Ukrainian political and economic situation.

For abstracts of the conference papers and conference programmes for 2004 and 2005, please contact Nathaniel Copsey (details below), or keep a look out for our forthcoming collection of essays: Just Good Friends? Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and European Neighbourhood Policy, Sussex European Institute, autumn 2004.

Next year’s two-day seminar is forecast to take place at the College of Europe in Warsaw in spring 2005, and will be followed by the final seminar, expected to take place in Kyiv in 2006.

Planning for next year’s conference has already begun. Any students who would like to get involved in the organization of the 2005 or 2006 Wider Europe seminars, should contact Nathaniel Copsey in EDB 110, n.w.copsey@sussex.ac.uk or by telephone on + 44 1273 67 8713.
Europe to Victory – by Walter Johnson

The sun was shining and there was a clear blue sky - but make no mistake it was a cold day in February as we took to the field to compete in the University of Sussex Inter-Departmental 6 aside tournament. Our contingent consisted of (see inset: anti-clockwise from bottom) Cristi Georgescu (GK), Steffen Thejll-Møller (cpt.), Reçep Kotil, Razvan Maties, Andrei Popescu, Walter Johnson, Elias Antoniou and Emanuelle Massetti (not in picture).

Our first game saw us pitted against the Medical School. It was clear from the opening exchanges that we were man-for-man in far better physical condition than our opponents. We never looked back after our first goal and the result: SEI 1-0 Medical School.

Buoyed by our success in the opening fixture we went into the game against the Economics department full of confidence. These opponents passed the ball around with much more fluidity and their patient, probing build-up was impressive. Nevertheless, we were growing in confidence and our European defence strategy was proving formidable. For all their possession our opponents, in keeping with the bulk of economic theory, were only reduced to efforts from long range, as we collectively held off the Economists and scored twice: SEI 2-0 Economics.

We took an early enough lead against CDE with another Thejll-Møller strike but this team had also won their first two games and were no pushovers. The game was evenly matched throughout, and it came as no surprise midway through the second half when CDE applied their own version of ‘catch-up theory’ and equalised. Parity between the two sides was short-lived and the final score was: SEI 2-1 CDE.

We moved into our final group game with three wins under our belt. We dominated this game in every department and at times made our opponents seem as anonymous as George W. at the UN. A goal was coming all game long, and when it arrived it was simply magnificent because it was a team goal proving that European cooperation leads the field of international relations: SEI 1-0 IR & GPE.

The Final against group runners up CDE was a nervous affair as both teams failed to recapture the form that took them to the final and a failure to score eventually led to a penalty shoot-out. As fate would have it I was given the responsibility to take what was now the penultimate penalty. I placed the ball on the spot and didn’t take my eye off it. I took some deep breaths, waited for silence and let the wind drop before drawing the trigger. I curled the ball high towards the goal and out of the reach of a goalkeeper who remained dormant in the centre of the goal. The ball crashed against the crossbar and bounced down against the floor. For a split-second we all looked on in despair, but the ball bounced back up and into the net; we had won.

I turned towards my SEI colleagues and we all embraced each other in a scene of euphoria and jubilation almost reminiscent of the EU’s recent enlargement celebrations (and about as well received by a sceptical crowd!). A diverse team of individuals drawn from Britain, Turkey, Romania, Cyprus, Italy and Denmark displaying different styles and technique had achieved sporting victory under the banner of a united Europe.

Congratulations team SEI 2003-04 !!! University of Sussex Inter Departmental 6 a side Champions
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Head, European and International Unit, Home Office | TBC                                                                       |
| 19.10.04   | Dr Jocelyn Evans  
University of Salford | The Dynamics of Social Change in Radical Right-Wing Populist Party Support |
| 26.10.04   | Prof Alan Mayhew  
Prof Jorg Monar  
Prof Paul Taggart  
Dr Aleks Szczerbiak  
Sussex European Institute | SEI Roundtable on “A New Start for the European Union”  
[Ratification of constitutional treaty, new commission, new institutions ... ] |
| 02.11.04   | Christian Deubner | Closer Co-operation, [Necessary to Face/in the Face of] the Coming Challenges of European Integration |
| 09.11.04   | TBC | TBC |
| 16.11.04   | Adamantia Xyggi | TBC |
| 23.11.04   | Francesca Pissaridis | Small Businesses in the Balkans |
| 30.11.04   | Wyn Rees  
University of Nottingham | Transatlantic Relations |
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