**The Party Politics of Euroscepticism
in EU Member and Candidate States**

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Abstract:

This paper presents results of research into party-based Euroscepticism in twenty-five countries. After offering a conceptualisation of Euroscepticism and of two different forms of it, the paper maps the incidence of parties expressing Euroscepticism in EU member states and the candidate states of central and Eastern Europe. Using that data, comparisons are made between the member and candidate states as well as across the range of states. The research demonstrates that patterns of Euroscepticism in party systems of member and candidate states are remarkably similar and that support for Eurosceptical parties is an established component of European politics across Europe. The paper also demonstrates that there is a significant misfit between popular levels of Euroscepticism and support for parties expressing Euroscepticism which means that it is necessary to include parties in any evaluation of the impact of Euroscepticism on European integration.

The Party Politics of Euroscepticism in EU Member and Candidate States

1. Introduction[1]

The development of European integration has relied on a more or less compliant European population. For the most part this has been a safe assumption. European elites have been largely very supportive of European integration and they have been able to assume at least mass quiescence, if not support, on this issue for many years. But this assumption in a larger and more integrated European Union has become harder to sustain. In some member states Euroscepticism has become a visible and stable, albeit minority, seam running through public opinion. Across member states as a whole 13 per cent think that their country's membership of the EU is a bad thing according to the most recent Eurobarometer.

The impact of this public opposition is felt in different ways. It has normative implications for the democratic credentials of the European integration project when a significant and growing section of the EU populace does not buy into the European project. Direct, and less theoretical, effects can be seen when European populations have a direct input into the integration process or into the EU institutions. Referendums on treaties in member states have rejected significant moves forward. European Parliamentary elections have seen Eurosceptic MEPs elected. In indirect ways we can also see the impact of this Euroscepticism as member-states' governments in traditionally Europhilic states, take positions that allow them to distance themselves from

aspects of the European project while bringing them closer to Eurosceptic elements of public opinion. And, in some member states, the nature of domestic political competition has been significantly affected by the European issue.

Euroscepticism is not confined to member states. Many of the EU candidate states have thrown up Eurosceptic forces. 10 per cent of populations in the thirteen candidate states think that their county's membership of the EU would be a bad thing according to the first Applicant Countries Eurobarometer. The difficult process of negotiations over accession and the nature of domestic politics in many candidate states makes the EU a useful target for politicians seeking to make political hay. The impact of this is limited at present but the probability of a series of referendums over membership in candidate states makes the issue extremely salient.

Political parties are key gatekeepers in the process of political representation. They play a crucial role in the selection of key members of European institutions (most importantly the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament). They also play an indirect role in the selection of Commissioners. Parties play a vital role in referendums over European issues where they mobilise sentiment, agenda-set and structure the competition over the issue. Most importantly, political parties, although much-demeaned of late, still exercise the key role in determining the shape and content of politics at the domestic level. And as it becomes harder and harder to entirely disentangle the domestic and European levels of politics, this means that they determine the way 'Europe' plays out (or does not play out) as a political issue.

We argue in this paper that the role of political parties is a crucial component in this process of representing Euroscepticism and that the issue of European integration provides us with a powerful lens for illuminating new aspects of party competition of Europe. Simply put we argue that those interested in European integration need to understand party competition in member and candidate states and those interested in political parties need to understand the nature of the European issue. Marrying these two concerns means that we can begin to draw a picture of Euroscepticism and how it is manifested in party systems in party competition across Europe. And looking at both member-states and candidate states provides us with a contemporary pan-European picture and a glimpse into the future politics of the enlarged Union. This is the agenda of this paper and we provide an empirical basis for understanding the nature of pan-European party-based Euroscepticism.

The paper is divided up into seven sections. In the first section, we outline our definitions of types of Euroscepticism and distinguish between 'hard' and 'soft' Euroscepticism. In the second section, we present the results of research into which parties display what type of Euroscepticism in EU member states. In the third section we offer the results of the same research for the candidate states of central and Eastern Europe. In the fourth section we compare the differences between these two sets of data. Following on from that we put the data together in the fifth section to make some pan-European comparative points about party-based Euroscepticism. Section six sets out an agenda of research questions that flow from the earlier analysis while the final section brings together the overall threads of the argument in a conclusion.

To give some indication of our main conclusions here, we find that the broad patterns of party-based Euroscepticism are similar in both member states and the central and Eastern European

candidate states. We do, however, find that there are differences in the relative levels of support for the types of Euroscepticism and we further find that there is a significant misfit between the levels of public Euroscepticism and support for parties expressing Euroscepticism.

2. Hard and Soft Euroscepticism

In surveying the nature of Euroscepticism across member and candidate states we face some inevitable difficulties in defining what precisely this concept consists of. The first issue is that we are addressing Euroscepticism in the different contexts of membership and candidature. The second difficulty is a more familiar comparative issue in trying to find a definition of Euroscepticism that works in twenty-five national contexts. In order to address this issue we have offered a distinction between two types of Euroscepticism, what we term 'hard' and 'soft' Euroscepticism (Szczerbiak & Taggart, 2000). The original formulation used by one of the present authors in looking at Western Europe was comprehensive and included 'the idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration' (Taggart, 1998: 366). In extending this to central and Eastern Europe, we found that it was more useful to break this into two (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2001a, 2001b).

HARD EUROSCEPTICISM is where there is a principled opposition to the EU and European integration and therefore can be seen in parties who think that their counties should withdraw from membership, or whose policies towards the EU are tantamount to being opposed to the whole project of European integration as it is currently conceived.

There are two shorthand methods of assessing whether a party is 'hard Eurosceptic'. The first is if it is a single issue anti-EU party. We assume that a party would only mobilise solely against the EU if it were opposed to it on principle. The second method is to ask whether the opposition to the EU is framed in language that stresses that it is too capitalist/socialist/neo-liberal/bureaucratic, depending on ideological position (communist/conservative/socialist/populist), and calls for a fundamental re-casting of the terms on which their country is an EU member that is incompatible with the present trajectory of the European project. This is sometimes expressed as conditional support for EU membership but on conditions so unattainable that it is tantamount to being *de facto* opposed to EU membership.

SOFT EUROSCEPTICISM is where there is NOT a principled objection to European integration or EU membership but where concerns on one (or a number) of policy areas lead to the expression of qualified opposition to the EU, or where there is a sense that 'national interest' is currently at odds with the EU's trajectory.

Soft Euroscepticism can only meaningfully be said to exist where a party uses the rhetoric of contestation over the European issue as part of their political repertoire. The point of identifying 'soft Euroscepticism' is that it captures those positions that constitute real scepticism about the way European integration is currently developing. It is important to be aware of an assumption that we are making. We assume that the contemporary project of European integration is being pushed onward and that the status quo, in toto, is very rarely defended as the desired form of European integration. In other words we are suggesting that if someone supports the EU as it

currently exists and opposes *any* further integration, that they are effectively Eurosceptic because this is at odds with what is the dominant mode of integration that is on-going.

The contemporary debate about European integration and its future is largely focused around different ways in which the project can be extended. So, for example, the debate about the nature and prospects of the Euro, or the debate about the extension of the EU's foreign policy-making role and military capacity (most notably in the Rapid Reaction Force) are debates about the *extension* of European integration. The most obvious current debate about extension is that around the nature and timing of enlargement. Admittedly not all debates are about extending European integration. The debate about constitutionalism may include some proposals that would extend integration but it is not, in itself, about extension because the idea of constitutionalisation can mean, in its most limited sense, codifying the existing treaties and *acquis communitaire* into a constitution (see European University Institute, 2000). The debate (or lack of it) about the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is about the need for EU reform, and implicitly, about the need to rein in the costs and some of the effects of the existing policy. But most of the 'hot button' topics of EU debate are about where and how to extend European integration.

The usefulness of differentiating between hard and soft variants of Euroscepticism lies not only in nuancing the descriptive qualities of the concept but also because we strongly suspect that the different variants will have different qualities and this may inform our wider research agenda (see section 7 below). Of course, the distinction is an ideal type that will, in some cases, become blurred but it may be useful to identify the two forms as poles on a spectrum with some parties moving between them.

The way we have identified soft and hard Euroscepticism implicitly suggests a particular feature of Eurosceptical attitudes to Europe. This is that 'the European issue' is assessed by Eurosceptics in relation to an existing set of ideas or issues (whereas the same is not necessarily true for Europhiles). For hard Eurosceptics, the EU may be opposed because it embodies some previously identified 'enemy' (e.g. capitalism for communists, socialism for the right, bureaucracy for populists, supranationalism for nationalists or, neo-liberalism for socialists). For soft Eurosceptics, the EU is problematic when its development runs counter to interests, policies or issues that they support. The opposite may not necessarily be true, in that Christian democratic and liberal ideologies both support the idea of European integration as it is constitutive of 'European solidarity' or 'international co-operation'. In other words Europhiles may support European integration as a *good in itself* whereas opponents oppose it because it embodies other already existing demons.

Having established the characteristics of hard and soft Euroscepticism we present in the following section, in textual and summary tabular form, the results of our research into which parties can be characterised as taking either hard or soft Eurosceptic positions. We begin with the member-states and then move on to the candidate states of post-communist central and Eastern Europe. The data presented here has been gathered over an extensive period and has drawn on our own research into particular cases, countries and parties. We have also relied extensively on expert evaluations as to the position of certain parties (the sources are listed below the respective tables). We have not, in contrast to Ray (1999) and Gary Marks, David Scott, Marco

Steenbergen and Carole Wilson's replication (reported in Hooghe, Marks & Wilson, 2001) sought to quantify expert evaluations but have attempted to develop our own nominal categorisation on the basis of correspondence with them.

We should briefly state our rationale for using different types of data from that of Ray and others. The first reason is that we see our research as adding to the data there collected and therefore we do not see the two data sources as mutually exclusive. The second reason is that we are cautious about the quantification of qualitative judgements made by experts and therefore we are attempting to present the data in a different way as an alternative. The third reason is that we are aiming for comprehensiveness and the method we use is more sensitive to even the smallest parties being Eurosceptic. This last point is particularly important for an issue such as Euroscepticism that often occupies the peripheries of party systems.

It is important to clarify what our dependent variable is. Our dependent variable is essentially qualitative data on which parties take hard or soft Eurosceptical positions. (This data is presented, in summary form, in tables 1 and 3 below.) As an addendum to that we also use party vote share to give us some measure of party importance and, aggregating that in national cases, to give us some idea of the potential pool of voters in each country who could support a Eurosceptic agenda. The relevance of this is that this gives us some sort of guide to *potential Euroscepticism* in the respective party systems. We are not saying that the size of these parties vote is a measure of Euroscepticism as such. But we *are* suggesting that any realistic evaluation of levels of Euroscepticism in different respective political systems needs to take account of the number, size and importance of parties expressing Euroscepticism and that our research provides a neglected but vital piece of the puzzle. We further suggest that any account of the levels of Euroscepticism must take account of three components: (1) levels of public Euroscepticism; (2) party-based Euroscepticism; and (3) Eurosceptical policy outcomes. Only when there are citizens, parties and policies that are Eurosceptical will Euroscepticism become a realized force in European politics.

3. Party-Based Euroscepticism in EU Member States

Euroscepticism has become an established part of all EU member states' party systems (with the exception of Spain). It does however vary considerably in how and where it manifests itself in these different party systems. Summarising the position in all member-states table 1[2] offers a categorisation of the party positions and we have also placed in brackets after each party, the vote share of the parties in their latest national parliamentary elections.[3] The reason for this is to give some sort of indicator of importance or relevance. We can see that having a relatively large number of parties is not necessarily as important as having a large share of the vote that goes to parties that espouse Euroscepticism.

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[2] Table 1 represents a significant updating and amending of data first presented in Taggart (1998).
[3] Table 3 was originally presented in Taggart and Szczerbiak (2001a)

Table 1. Contemporary Political Parties with Hard and Soft Euroscepticism in EU Member States
(Parliamentary Election results from the most recent elections and year of election in brackets where applicable)

	Hard	Soft
Austria		• Freedom Party (26.9 - 1999)
Belgium	• Flemish Block (15.9 - 1999[4]) • National Front (2.4 - 1999[5])	
Denmark	• People's Movement against the EU (7.3 - 1999[6]) • June Movement (16.1 - 1999[7]) • Danish People's Party (5.8 - 1999) • Progress Party (0.7 - 1999) • Unity List[8]	• Socialist People's Party (7.1 - 1999)[9]
Finland	• Communist Party of Finland (0.8 - 1999)	• True Finns (1.0 - 1999) • Christian League (4.2 - 1999)
France	• Communist Party (9.98 -1997)[10] • Lutte Ouvrière (1.2 - 1997) • Revolutionary Communist League (0.2 - 1997) • National Front (Le Pen) (15.3 - 1997) • National Movement (Mégret)[11]	• Citizens Movement (Chevènement) (1.0 - 1997) • Movement for France (de Villiers) (2.7 - 1997)[12] • Rally for France and Independence of Europe (Pasqua)[13]
Germany	• Republicans (1.8 - 1998) • German People's Union (DVU) (1.2 -1998) • German National Democratic Party (0.3 - 1998)	• Party of Democratic Socialists (5.1 -1998) • Social Democratic Party (faction) • Free Democratic Party (national-liberal faction) • Christian Social Party (faction in state party organisation)
Greece	• Communist Party (5.53 - 2000)	• Democratic Social Movement (2.67- 2000) • Political Spring[14] • Synaspismos (faction)

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[4] As the party only contests elections in Flanders results are as percentage of vote in Flanders.

[5] As the party only contests elections in Wallonia results are as percentage of vote in Wallonia.

[6] Figures for 1999 European Parliamentary election as the party does not contest national elections.

[7] Figures for 1999 European Parliamentary election as the party does not contest national elections.

[8] Did not contest 1999 European Parliamentary elections.

[9] For reasons of comparability between the relative strength of the parties all the results for the Danish parties are for the 1999 European Parliamentary elections.

[10] All French results are for voting in the first round of the election and only for metropolitan France.

[11] Formed after national elections and therefore no voting figures available.

[12] Figures for LDI-MPF (Philippe de Villiers) + LDI-CNIP (Olivier d'Ormesson)

[13] Formed after national elections and therefore no voting figures available.

[14] Figure not found.

	Hard	**Soft**
Ireland		• Green Party (2.8 - 1997[15]) • Socialist Party (.5- 1997[16]) • Sinn Fein (2.6 - 1997)
Italy		• Northern League (4.5 - 1999[17])
Luxembourg		• Action Committee for Democracy and Pensioners Justice (11.3 - 1999) • The Left (2.7 - 1999)
Netherlands		• Green Party (7.3 - 1998) • Socialist Party (3.5 - 1998) • Reformed Political Federation (2.0 - 1998) • Political Reformed Party (1.8 - 1998) • Reformed Political League (1.3 - 1998)
Portugal		• Communist Party (9.02 - 1999[18]) • Greens
Spain		None
Sweden	• Green Party (4.45 - 1998) • Left Party (11.99 - 1998)	• Centre Party (5.1 -1998) • Social Democratic Party (faction)
United Kingdom	• UK Independence Party (1.48 - 2001) • Greens (.63 - 2001)	• Conservative Party (31.71 - 2001) • Democratic Unionist Party (.69 - 2001)
Average Party Vote Share	5.42	5.73[19]

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[15] All Irish results are for first preference votes.

[16] Estimated figure.

[17] Figures for 1999 European Parliamentary election as the party contested the most recent national elections as part of a coalition.

[18] Election figures include Greens who stood for elections in coalition with the Communist Party.

[19] For purposes of mean Portuguese Communists and Greens counted as two parties.

A brief look at the data in Table 1 demonstrates some obvious points. First, hard Euroscepticism is far less common in member states than soft Euroscepticism. Whereas eight member-states have no parties expressing hard Euroscepticism only two have no parties expressing soft Euroscepticism (with Spain having neither hard nor soft Eurosceptic parties). Secondly, there is still the relative absence of parties of government from this list and where the 'mainstream' parties are present in the table they tend to make an appearance in factional form (cf. Taggart, 1998). The exceptions to this come with the incorporation of new populist parties into government with the Freedom Party in Austria and the Northern League in Italy and with the Conservative Party in the UK which remains stubbornly exceptional to many of the wider trends we see here. Third, we can note that many of the parties have a low vote share. The average share of the vote for the parties (not factions) in this table is 5.66 per cent and there is little difference between the mean party votes for hard and soft Eurosceptic parties. We cannot say conclusively from the data presented here as to whether low support levels are a consequence of parties expressing Euroscepticism or if expressing Euroscepticism is a consequence of low vote shares. However, common sense would seem to suggest that the latter is far more likely to be true. This is because, for many of the more established parties in this category, their peripheral status pre-dates their Euroscepticism.

If we aggregate the vote share of the parties with hard and soft Eurosceptical positions, we can have some summary idea of the relative strength of these parties in different member states. Table 2 presents this data. We need to be extremely careful in how we interpret this data. The figures represent the potential electoral pool of voters who are either Eurosceptical or not put off voting for a party that is, among other things, Eurosceptical. Given the nature of many of the parties and the nature of the European issue, we need to be careful not to infer that the figures represent the size of a Eurosceptical electorate. Many of the parties are parties of protest (e.g. Green, New Populist or neo-fascist) and their position on Europe may be seen as secondary to other concerns. It seems unlikely that voters for such parties are voting on the basis of their European policies. The only exceptions here are the anti-EU parties in the UK and Denmark that are single-issue anti-EU parties. The secondary nature of the European issue and of voting in European Parliament elections also means that, more generally, it is hard to ascribe the support for even mainstream parties on the basis of their European positions. For example, even in the June 2001 UK parliamentary election, where the EU issue had a very high profile in terms of inter-party debate, it was still ranked very low by voters in terms of the priority that they gave it when deciding how to cast their votes. What the figures do give us is a guide to the relative strength of Eurosceptical parties within their respective party systems. The numerical data should be seen as subsidiary of the qualitative data which is our dependent variable.

Table 2. Cumulative Share of the Vote for Party Based Euroscepticism in Parliamentary Elections for lower Chamber by Country and Type of Euroscepticism for EU Member States

Country	Hard	Soft	Total
Spain	0	0	0
Italy	0	4.5	4.5
Ireland	0	5.9	5.9
Finland	.8	5.2	6.0
Greece	5.5	2.7	8.3
Germany	3.3	5.1	8.4
Portugal	0	9.0	9.0
Belgium	9.2[20]	0	9.2
Luxembourg	0	13.0	13.0
Netherlands	0	15.9	15.9
Sweden	16.4	5.1	21.5
Austria	0	26.9	26.9
France	26.7	3.7	30.4
UK	2.1	32.4	34.5
Denmark	29.9	7.1	37.0
Average	*5.62*	*9.1*	*15.37*

What Table 2 shows is that in member states parties espousing either soft or hard Euroscepticism do not command a majority of electoral support in any country. On the other hand, the average level demonstrates that this vote share is not insignificant and that party-based Euroscepticism appears to be an embedded part of member states party systems with only Spain having a total absence of either type of party.

4. Candidate States Description

Turning our attention from the member-states to the candidate states of central and Eastern Europe, we can begin to construct a pan-European understanding of how the European issue plays out through different party systems. Of course, the candidate states are interesting as putative member-states but they also provide us with the possibility of extending the range of our comparative understanding of the European issue and of party systems.

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[20] For national comparisons the figures of Wallonia and Flanders have been averaged.

Table 3. Contemporary Political Parties with Hard and Soft Euroscepticism in the Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe (Parliamentary Election results from the most recent elections and year of election in brackets where applicable)

	Hard	Soft
Bulgaria	None	None
Czech Republic	• Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (11.0 - 1998)	• Civic Democratic Party (27.7 – 1998) • Association for the Republic-Republican Party of Czechoslovakia (3.9 - 1998)
Estonia	• Estonian Christian People's Party (2.43 - 1999) • Estonian Future Party • Republican Party	• Centre Party (23.41 – 1999) • Estonian Rural People's Party (7.27 – 1999)
Hungary	• Hungarian Justice and Life Party (5.5 – 1998) • Hungarian Workers' Party (4.1 - 1998)	• FIDESZ/Hungarian Civic Party (28.2 – 1998) • FKGP Independent Party of Smallholders (13.8 – 1998)
Latvia		• Latvian Social Democratic Alliance (12.9 - 1998) • Conservative Union for Fatherland & Freedom (14.2 - 1998)
Lithuania		• The Centre Union of Lithuania (2.86 – 2000) • Lithuanian Peasants Party (4.08 – 2000)
Poland	• Self Defence (10.2 -2001) • League of Polish Families (7.87 - 2001)	• Law and Justice Party (9.5 - 2001) • Polish Peasant Party (8.98 – 2001) • Christian National Union (faction in Solidarity Electoral Action)
Romania		• Greater Romania Party (19.48 - 00)
Slovakia		• Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (27.0 -1998) • Slovak National Party (9.1 -1998) • Christian Democratic Movement (faction in Slovak Democratic Coalition)
Slovenia	• New Party (Drevensek & Reven)(0.59 - 2000)	• Slovenian National Party (4.38 - 2000)
Average Party Vote Share	5.96	13.55

Sources: Bulgaria - Deyan Kiuranov, (the Centre for Liberal Strategies), Elena Iankova (Cornell University); Czech Republic - Sean Hanley (Brunel University), Kieran Williams (SSEES/UCL); Petr Kopecky (University of Sheffield); Estonia - Evald Mikkel (University of Tartu); Hungary - Agnes Batory, (University of Cambridge); Latvia - Gunta Misane (Latvia Bureau of European Information); Lithuania - Ruta Buienevita (Sussex European Institute); Poland - Aleks Szczerbiak (Sussex European Institute); Romania - Sorin Ionita (Georgetown University), Slovakia - Karen Henderson, (University of Leicester)), Kieran Williams (SSEES/UCL); Slovenia - Alenka Krasovec (Ljubljana University).

[1] This party failed to be registered for the 1999 elections and so no vote share is shown
[2] This party has been formed since the 1999 elections and so no vote share is shown

Table 3[21] brings together the data in tabular form and clearly demonstrates that there exist significant manifestations of Euroscepticism in the candidate countries of central and Eastern Europe. Closer examination reveals that many of the parties are small (in terms of electoral support) but this should not obscure the fact that party-based Euroscepticism is becoming established as part of these party systems. The data of course hides lots of shades of opinion and can only serve as a guide to Euroscepticism in these countries but looking at the broad contours does allow us to make some general observations in comparison with the member states.

Table 4. Cumulative Share of the Vote for Party Based Euroscepticism in Parliamentary Elections for lower Chamber by Country and Type of Euroscepticism in CEE Candidate States

Country	Hard	Soft	Total
Bulgaria	0	0	0
Slovenia	0.59	4.38	4.97
Lithuania	0	6.94	6.94
Romania	0	19.48	19.48
Latvia	0	27.1	27.1
Estonia	2.43	30.68	33.11
Slovakia	0	36.1	36.1
Poland	18.07	18.48	36.6
Czech Republic	11.0	31.6	42.6
Hungary	9.6	42.0	51.6
Average	*4.2*	*21.7*	*25.9*

Bringing the results together, it is possible to look at the overall potential vote share for parties expressing hard or soft Euroscepticism and these are laid out in table 4 above. We could suggest that the combined vote shares for these parties represents the potential size of electoral constituencies for Euroscepticism in these countries. However, we are much more cautious than this and believe that the figures represent, more realistically, the size of the electoral constituencies not put off voting for a party by expressions of Euroscepticism. We need to bear in mind that there is only one party whose identity is *primarily* constructed in terms of Euroscepticism (Estonian Future Party) and that party has not yet been tested at the polls. Overall, we can see that the cumulative average electoral constituencies for parties expressing some sort of Euroscepticism in the candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe is by no means insignificant as it is 25.9 per cent across the ten states. The question this inevitably raises is how this compares with party-based Euroscepticism in EU member states, and this is the subject of the next section.

5. Comparing Between Member States and Candidate States

If we compare the member with the candidate states we can make some observations about how party-based Euroscepticism differs in these two contexts. Of course, the states differ because of their different status with respect to the EU, but we also need to keep in mind that they are different in other equally

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[21] Table 3 is a slightly amended version of a table originally presented in Taggart and Szczerbiak (2001a)

significant ways. The recently established party systems in central and Eastern Europe represent different histories but also different trajectories. The candidate states under examination are not only candidate states but also central and Eastern European states. But they are not only central and Eastern European post-communist states. They are also examples of new and different types of party systems that we can use to extend the range of party systems in representative polities.

Looking at the levels of support for Eurosceptic parties we can see that **there are higher overall levels of support for Eurosceptic parties in the Central and East European candidate states than in current member states** (25.9 per cent compared to 15.37 per cent for member states). We might account for this by noting that after a long period when most of these countries lost sovereignty during communist rule, a 'Europe of Nations' type of approach to the European project could find more potential outlets in the party systems of Central and Eastern Europe than in Western Europe. This kind of approach can easily (although need not necessarily) blur into soft Euroscepticism. This is partly reflected in the different character of the right in post-communist Eastern Europe, as discussed below Another factor that may account for this difference lies in the status of the states as EU candidates. The fact that these countries are engaged in accession negotiations creates additional incentives for some parties in the post-communist states (again, especially on the nationalist right) to adopt and articulate a 'national interest' kind of soft Euroscepticism.

However, this difference in levels of party-based Euroscepticism between the candidate and member states is largely accounted for by much higher levels of party-based soft Euroscepticism in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe. The second key difference, then, is that **there are higher levels of electoral support for soft Eurosceptic parties in the candidate states than in the member states**. As Tables 2 and 4, the mean share of the vote for parties that have used soft Eurosceptic rhetoric in candidate stages is 21.7% compared with 9.1% in member states.

The third difference lies in the relative importance of the parties that we are identifying. Using vote share as an indicator of the importance of individual parties, it is clear that **parties expressing soft Euroscepticism in central and Eastern Europe are more important to their party systems than parties expressing soft Euroscepticism in the member states.** Of course, both the higher levels of overall party-based Euroscepticism and soft party-based Euroscepticism in the candidate states disguise significant variations among them from lows of 0% such as Bulgaria to Hungary where over half of the population vote for parties that express some kind of Euroscepticism. Moreover, we need to be sensitive to the fact that the European issue has both low overall political salience and varying salience in different candidate states. For example, it appears to be much more salient in political discourse in Poland than in Hungary in spite of the much higher levels of party-based Euroscepticism in the latter and is very much a second-order issue in both countries (Batory 2001, Szczerbiak 2001). (The significance of the salience variable is discussed in greater detail below). However, what this does mean is that parties expressing Euroscepticism in the candidate states of central and Eastern Europe offer a more significant potential outlet for the expression of public Euroscepticism within the party system than they do in current member states. The potential for Euroscepticism to find expression within party systems appears to be particularly strong in certain candidate states such as Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia and Romania should public opinion in these countries take a significant turn against support for the EU. To those who portray the candidate states as essentially resource-poor bargainers in a game in which their only goal is accession, this should give pause for thought.

The fourth difference is that **levels of support for hard Eurosceptic parties in the central and Eastern Europe are derisory but are significant in some member states.** Simply looking at average aggregate levels of support for hard Eurosceptic parties in central and Eastern Europe the figure is only 4.2 per cent

while in member states it is 5.62 per cent. Why is this the case? Given the overwhelming consensus around 'return to Europe' type political discourses in the post-communist states, straightforward opposition to EU membership (hard Euroscepticism) is likely to find very little purchase in these party systems. Even East European nationalists (e.g. Meciar in Slovakia, Tudor in Romania or even more liberal-conservative nationalists like Klaus and Orban) are, therefore, inclined to try and accommodate their rhetoric to broadly pro-EU political discourses. This kind of over-arching 'political correctness' about the EU that creates an overwhelming necessity to pay, at the very least, lip service to the principle of supporting EU membership is not quite as ubiquitous in the party systems of the member states.

However, it is important to note that the average in member states is increased significantly by a few countries in which there are relatively high levels of support for hard Eurosceptic parties. High levels can be seen in Denmark, France and Sweden. We need to bear in mind that in the Danish case the figures are from the European Parliamentary elections rather than national elections and this may exaggerate this effect but it does not seem out of synch with the tenor of Danish European debate in recent years. In the French and Swedish cases, the high levels are due to the presence of the PCF in France and the Greens and the Left Party in Sweden. This throws up an interesting point, which is that, in both the French and Swedish cases, the current government has been reliant on these parties for support in the parliament. The governing French Socialists and the Swedish Social Democrats cannot be described as Eurosceptic (despite some Eurosceptic factions in the Swedish Social Democrats) and, therefore, have to rely on quiescence from hard Eurosceptic parties on the issue of Europe. We consider this important issue of how Eurosceptic parties downgrade or 'soften' their position on the EU issue when they move from government to opposition in more detail below.

The fifth key difference we can discern between the member and candidate states relates to the ideological position of the Eurosceptical parties. If we present a characterisation of the party family membership of all the parties we can see a clear trend. Tables 5 and 6 present a summary of the party families of all the parties and, in the final column, we have offered a shorthand categorisation of whether the parties are on the left or the right of the ideological spectrum (for liberal parties we have placed them as centre parties). This clearly demonstrates that **the parties taking Eurosceptical positions in central and Eastern European candidate states are predominantly on the right of the ideological spectrum whereas the Eurosceptical parties of the member states are more evenly spread across the left-right divide**.

Table 5. Party Families of Political Parties with Eurosceptic Positions in EU Member States

Country	Party	Party Family	
Austria	Freedom Party	New Populist	R
Belgium	Flemish Block	New Populist	R
	National Front	Neo-fascist	R
Denmark	People's Movement against the EU	Anti-EU	L
	June Movement	Anti-EU	L
	Socialist People's Party	New Politics	L
	Progress Party	New Populist	R
	Danish People's Party	New Populist	R
	Unity List	Extreme Left	L
Finland	Communist Party of Finland	Extreme Left	L
	True Finns	Nationalist	
	Christian League	Christian Democrat	R
France	Communist Party	Extreme Left	L
	Lutte Ouvrière	Extreme Left	L
	Revolutionary Communist League	Extreme Left	L
	National Front (Le Pen)	Extreme right	R
	National Mouvement (Mégret)	Extreme right	R
	Citizens Movement (Chevènement)	Anti-EU	L
	Movement for France (de Villiers)	Jacobin	R
	Rally for France and Indepedence of Europe (Pasqua)	Gaullist	R
Germany	Republicans	Neo-Fascist	R
	German People's Union	Neo-Fascist	R
	German National Democratic Party	Neo-Fascist	R
	Party of Democratic Socialists	Extreme Left	L
	Social Democratic Party (faction)	Social Democrat	L
	Free Democratic Party (faction)	Liberal	C
	Christian Social Party (faction)	Christian Democrat	R
Greece	Communist Party	Extreme Left	L
	Democratic Social Movement	Extreme Left	L
	Political Spring	Conservative	R
	SYNaspismos	Extreme Left	L
Ireland	Green Party	New Politics	L
	Socialist Party	Extreme Left	L
	Sinn Fein	Ethno-Regionalist	L

Italy	Northern League	New Populist	R
	National Alliance	Neo-Fascist	R
Luxembourg	Action Committee for Democracy and Pensioners Justice	New Populist	R
	The Left	Communist	L
Netherlands	Green Party	New Politics	L
	Socialist Party	Extreme Left	L
	Reformed Political Federation	Religious	R
	Political Reformed Party	Religious	R
	Reformed Political League	Religious	R
Portugal	Communist Party	Extreme Left	L
	Greens	New Politics	L
Sweden	Green Party	New Politics	L
	Left Party	Extreme Left	L
	Centre Party	Agrarian	R
	Social Democratic Party	Social Democrat	L
United Kingdom	UK Independence Party	Anti-EU Party	R
	Conservative Party	Conservative	R
	Democratic Unionist Party	Conservative	R
	Greens	New Politics	L

Table 6. Party Families of Political Parties with Eurosceptic Positions in the Candidate States of Central and Eastern Europe

Country	Party	Party Family	
Czech Republic	Republican Party of Czechoslovakia	Far right/nationalist/neo-fascist	R
	Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia	Communist	L
	Civic Democratic Party	Liberal/conservative	R
Estonia	Estonian Christian People's Party	Nationalist-Protestant	R
	Centre Party - (Paul - Are you sure this is right-wing?)	Populist	R
	Estonian Rural People's Party	Agrarian	R
	Estonian Future Party	Anti-EU	-
	Republican Party	Nationalist/conservative	R
Hungary	Hungarian Justice and Life Party	Far right/nationalist	R
	Hungarian Workers Party	Communist	L
	FIDESZ/Hungarian Civic Party	Conservative	R
	FKGP Independent Party of Smallholders	Agrarian/populist	R
Latvia	Latvian Social Democratic Alliance	Social Democratic	L
	Conservative Union for Fatherland & Freedom	Conservative	R
Lithuania	The Centre Union of Lithuania	Liberal	C
	Lithuanian Peasants Party	Agrarian	R
Poland	Self Defence (DNS) (Difficult to locate ideologically)	Agrarian-populist	R
	League of Polish Families	Nationalist-populist	R
	Law and Justice party	Conservative	R
	Christian National Union (faction in Solidarity Electoral Action)	Nationalist/conservative	R
	Polish Peasant Party	Agrarian	L
Romania	Greater Romania Party	Far-right/nationalist	R
Slovakia	Movement for a Democratic Slovakia	Nationalist/populist	R
	Slovak National Party	Far-right/nationalist	R
	Christian Democratic Movement	Christian democrat	R
Slovenia	New Party	Liberal/conservative	R
	Slovenian National Party	Far-right	R

Why is Euroscepticism in the candidate states more right wing than in member states? There seem to us to be two factors to take into account here. The first point is that one type of left-wing party adopting Euroscepticism in Western Europe does not exist in central and Eastern Europe. These are the new politics parties which are usually Green parties or new left parties which only exist as 'currents within parties rather than as parliamentary forces in their own right' (Lewis, 2000: 56). The second point is that there is comparatively very little support for far-left or orthodox communist parties in Central and Eastern Europe. Most former communist parties have (with varying degrees of conviction and comprehensiveness) transformed themselves into West European-style social democratic parties. Whether this transformation is a genuine one or not, adopting a pro-EU political discourse is an important part of their strategy for presenting themselves as 'reformed' social democratic parties and demonstrating their break from the Soviet era. The only significant exception here is the Czech Communist Party although, as Table 3 shows, the orthodox communist Hungarian Workers Party narrowly failed to achieve parliamentary representation in that country's 1998 parliamentary elections.

It is also important to consider the nature of the right in Western and Eastern Europe. What is clearly true is that right-wing parties are more ideologically eclectic in post-communist Europe and there is a stronger tendency for the right there to be more nationalistic than its Western counterparts. Even liberal-conservatives (e.g. Klaus and Orban) and Christian democrats (e.g. Slovak Christian Democrats) in Eastern Europe are much more inclined to use nationalist political discourses. This means that there is perhaps a more 'natural' affinity between the narratives and discourses of the Eastern European right and those of soft Euroscepticism.

What stands out, despite these comparative points is that **the patterns of party-based Euroscepticism are remarkably similar in both member states and the candidate states of central and Eastern Europe**. Although there is a difference in the scale of support for different types of parties there is an overall similarity in the predominance of soft Euroscepticism and in the patchy existence of hard Eurosceptical parties. We can say, therefore, that membership of the EU does not appear to fundamentally affect the patterning of party-based Euroscepticism in these states' party systems. To put this more concretely tables 1 and 3 do not look hugely dissimilar. This should not go unnoticed. It justifies our larger project of attempting to integrate the comparison of member and candidate states as well as, more broadly, points up the possibilities of comparisons of parties and party systems across Western and Eastern Europe. Capitalising on these possibilities the following section draws out the broader lessons about the European issue and party systems and the relationship between the two by aggregating the data from EU member states and candidate states of central and Eastern Europe.

6. Comparing Across All States

The existence of Euroscepticism in the party systems of member and candidate states tells us not only about the sceptics but it also, by implication, about the nature of support for European integration and about how the European issue plays in party systems. Putting our data together we can make some broad-brush statements that, therefore characterise the nature of Euroscepticism and the European issue across a wide range of states. Of course, we are aware that the breadth of the research sacrifices something of the depth that may also be needed and that is why we return to this issue in the section following on from this. But, qualifications notwithstanding, we make six general points about party-based Euroscepticism.

The first point is that party-based Euroscepticism exists in twenty-three of the twenty-five party systems that we examined. Only Spain and Bulgaria appear to have no party-based Euroscepticism. We can, therefore, say that **Euroscepticism is a near universal feature of the party systems of the member**

states and the candidate states of central and Eastern Europe. Further we can say that the aggregate levels of electoral support for these parties are not insignificant. The mean level of support across all twenty-five cases is 19.55 per cent and therefore constitutes almost one-fifth of the relevant electorates. This is illustrated in Table 7 below which aggregates the data from tables 2 and 4. There is, of course significant variation around that mean but at the lowest levels it can only be said to be negligible in Spain and Bulgaria. Euroscepticism can therefore be said to be a significant feature of the party systems of EU member states and the candidate states we have looked at.[22]

The second point is that **soft Euroscepticism is far more common in parties and has more potential electoral support than hard Euroscepticism**. Comparing tables 2 and 4 again we can see that in both groups the aggregate national electoral support for soft Eurosceptical parties is significantly higher than for hard Euroscepticism, which is frequently absent from party systems altogether. In table 7 we can see that the mean level of support for soft Eurosceptic parties is over twice that of hard Eurosceptic parties (with the means being 14.13 per cent and 5.42 per cent respectively).

Comparing the support for Eurosceptic political parties and popular levels of Euroscepticism, we find that there is a clear disjunction. Using Eurobarometer data to measure public levels of Euroscepticism, it becomes clear **that high levels of public Euroscepticism do not necessarily translate into high levels of support for parties expressing Euroscepticism and that high levels of support for such parties are not necessarily indicative of high levels of popular Euroscepticism**. The nature of the question being asked means that it is, in effect measuring hard Euroscepticism (if anything, it is underestimating it). In the case of the Eurobarometer poll the question asks whether the respondent thinks that their country's membership of the EU is 'a good thing' or 'a bad thing' and we use the figures for 'a bad thing'. Using the data from table 7, we can provide a new table (table 8 below) listing of the countries in order of their growing public Euroscepticism alongside the support for hard Eurosceptic parties.

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[22] We should also note that, although we have not presented the data for the other candidate states, it is clear that there is significant party-based Euroscepticism in the candidate state of Malta (Cini, 2001) in the form of the Labour Party but there is no apparent party-based Euroscepticism in Cyprus. We are unaware of what the situation is in the Turkish party system and would be grateful for any suggestions if readers have them.

Table 7. Cumulative Share of the Vote for Party Based Euroscepticism in Parliamentary Elections for lower Chamber by Country and Type of Euroscepticism and Levels of Public Euroscepticism for EU Member States and the Candidate States of Central and Eastern Europe

Country	Hard Euroscepticism (party)	Soft Euroscepticism (party)	Total Euroscepticism (party)	Public Euroscepticism
Spain	0	0	0	7
Bulgaria	*0*	*0*	*0*	*3*
Italy	0	4.5	4.5	7
Slovenia	*0.6*	*4.4*	*5.0*	*11*
Ireland	0	5.9	5.9	4
Finland	.8	5.2	6.0	23
Lithuania	*0*	*6.9*	*6.9*	*11*
Greece	5.5	2.7	8.2	10
Germany	3.3	5.1	8.4	11
Portugal	0	9.0	9.0	8
Belgium	9.2[23]	0	9.2	8
Luxembourg	0	13.0	13.0	3
Netherlands	0	15.9	15.9	9
Romania	*0*	*19.5*	*19.5*	*2*
Sweden	16.4	5.1	21.5	37
Austria	0	26.9	26.9	21
Latvia	*0*	*27.1*	*27.1*	*17*
France	26.7	3.7	30.4	12
Estonia	*2.4*	*30.7*	*33.1*	*14*
UK	2.1	32.4	34.5	24
Slovakia	*0*	*36.1*	*36.1*	*5*
Poland	*18.1*	*18.5*	*36.6*	*11*
Denmark	29.9	7.1	37.0	21
Czech Republic	*11.0*	*31.6*	*42.6*	*9*
Hungary	*9.6*	*42.0*	*51.6*	*7*
Country Average	***5.42***	***14.13***	***19.55***	***11.56***
Party Average	***5.46***	***8.52***	***7.50***	***NA***

Sources: Tables 1 & 3, European Commission (1999-2001).

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[23] For national comparisons the figures of Wallonia and Flanders have been averaged

Table 8. Cumulative Share of the Vote for Party Based Hard Euroscepticism in Parliamentary Elections for lower Chamber by Country and Levels of Public Euroscepticism for EU Member States and the Candidate States of Central and Eastern Europe

Country	Hard Euroscepticism (party)	Public Euroscepticism
Romania	*0*	*2*
Luxembourg	0	3
Bulgaria	*0*	*3*
Ireland	0	4
Slovakia	*0*	*5*
Spain	0	7
Italy	0	7
Portugal	0	8
Belgium	9.2[24]	8
Netherlands	0	9
Czech Republic	*11.0*	*9*
Greece	0	10
Germany	3.3	11
Poland	*18.1*	*11*
Slovenia	*0.6*	*11*
Lithuania	*0*	*11*
France	26.7	12
Hungary	9.6	14
Estonia	*2.4*	*14*
Latvia	*0*	*17*
Austria	0	21
Denmark	29.9	21
Finland	0.8	23
UK	2.1	24
Sweden	16.4	37
Average	*5.42*	*11.56*

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[24] For national comparisons the figures of Wallonia and Flanders have been averaged

Focusing on the levels of hard Euroscepticism (which is perhaps closest to what the public Euroscepticism figure measure) there is little relationship between party support and public Euroscepticism. Even if we look at support levels for soft Eurosceptic parties (which are more common), there is still a disjunction. Although these figures tell us little about the salience of the European issue in particular country cases, they do graphically illustrate that if we regard the soft and hard Eurosceptic parties as potential outlets for the expression of public Euroscepticism, there appears to be a significant misfit between popular Euroscepticism and party-based Euroscepticism.

The really striking thing about the misfit is that average levels of national popular Euroscepticism (11.56%) do not find expressions in European party systems (5.42%). Looking at countries such as Slovenia, Finland, Lithuania and Sweden we can see clear differences between popular Euroscepticism and support for (or even the presence of) such parties. In other cases the slack is clearly taken up by soft Eurosceptic parties (e.g. Latvia, Austria and the UK).

In other words we can draw two conclusions. Firstly, there must be a reason why high public hard Euroscepticism does not find expression in some party systems and the most plausible one is the *low level of salience* of the European issue. There are, therefore, no incentives for parties to harden their Eurosceptic stance and no disincentives for pro-EU parties to continue supporting the European project. Secondly, because of this dissonance (rooted in the low salience of the issue), levels of support for hard Eurosceptic (anti-EU) parties are no guide for how people will vote on European issues in referendums as witnessed in the referendums on Maastricht, the euro and Nice in Denmark, France and Ireland. This clearly has implications for the possible outcomes of the planned accession referendums in candidate states. In other words, parties matter. They mediate between public opinion and elite actions in representative systems but they do not do so mechanistically and our data clearly shows this in relation to the European issue.

The next point relates to the link between party ideology and party position on Europe. We need to be careful here not to factor ideology out of the equation altogether (see Szczerbiak & Taggart, 2000). While parties can make strategic choices about the position to take in competitive terms, they have to do so within ideological constraints. Clearly some parties (such as new populist and nationalist parties) have an ideological stance that makes them more inclined to embrace a Eurosceptic discourse than others (such as social democratic and Christian democratic parties). Added to this Euroscepticism (especially hard Euroscepticism) is more likely to be found on the extremes of politics and not among centrist parties. While some commentators have spent much effort in demonstrating the link between left-right position and stance on Europe (Hooghe, Marks & Wilson, 2001), the relationship is, at best, complicated and non-linear. What is undoubtedly true is that **being on the left or right is not a reliable guide to whether or not a party is Eurosceptical.**

In Taggart (1998) which looked only at Western European party systems, one of the starkest conclusions was about the absence of governing parties among the Eurosceptical parties identified (with the UK as the exception to this). Extending our reach to the candidate states of central and Eastern Europe, it became clear that the same story was not true of these states (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2001a). There are a number of parties that express soft Euroscepticism and have been or are in government. This is true of Klaus' Civic Democratic Party in the Czech Republic, FIDESZ and the Smallholders Party in Hungary, the Conservative Union for Fatherland and Freedom in Latvia, the Greater Romania Party in Romania, the Centre Party in Estonia, and, perhaps most notoriously, of Meciar's Movement for a Democratic Slovakia in Slovakia. Bringing the data from Western Europe up to date means being sensitive to the changes and we can see that the assessment that there are no Eurosceptic parties of government is no longer true. The

presence of factional conflict in the major parties of Germany and France and the participation of the Northern League in the Italian government means that soft Euroscepticism has come closer to the heart of European party systems. What does seem clear, across the full range of twenty-five states is that **hard Eurosceptical parties are not central to any current European governments**. Although we should note that in France the government does rely on PCF support and the Swedish Social Democratic government similarly relies on parliamentary support by the Greens and the Left Party. **Where governing parties are Eurosceptical they are almost invariably soft Eurosceptics**.

In looking at the relationship between governing and Euroscepticism, there are arguably two clear dynamics at work here. The first is that going into government or being 'coalitionable' (moving from the periphery to the centre of the party system) leads to a 'softening' or even abandonment of a party's Eurosceptic stance. Secondly, being on the periphery of a party system inclines a party towards being more Eurosceptic as a means of differentiating itself from the political mainstream. The two are distinct processes but have the same overall effect of lessening the expression of Euroscepticism at the heart of European party systems.

The final point we can make in this section is to use the data to imagine and an enlarged European Union. From our data we can garner some sort of sense of what the domestic politics of European integration might look like in a Union of twenty-five members. Looking at table 5, (which is laid out in ascending order of support for Eurosceptical parties) we can see that the candidate states are scattered evenly throughout the list and do not constitute a cluster at either end of this particular spectrum. What is clear is that the dominance of the Northern cluster of traditionally Eurosceptic EU member states (Denmark, Sweden and the UK) will be joined by a series of states with the potential to be as or more Eurosceptical as member states. The candidate states with high levels of support for Eurosceptical parties and high popular levels of Euroscepticism are Latvia, Estonia, Poland and the Czech Republic. Looking at figure 2 below, this is starkly illustrated (the high and low levels are simply above or below the means) and it is clear that Bulgaria (whose immediate prospects of accession seem remote) would be the only candidate state to have both low levels of popular and party-based Euroscepticism. All the other candidate states of central and Eastern Europe are in the quadrants with some sort of potential for Euroscepticism to be of importance in their domestic politics.

Figure 2. Levels of Party-Based Euroscepticism by Levels of Public Euroscepticism

	Low Levels of Public Euroscepticism	High Levels of Public Euroscepticism
Low Party-Based Euroscepticism	Spain *Bulgaria* Greece Ireland Germany Portugal Belgium Luxembourg Italy Netherlands	*Slovenia* Finland *Lithuania*
High Party-Based Euroscepticism	*Romania* France *Slovakia* *Hungary*	Sweden Austria *Latvia* *Estonia* United Kingdom Denmark *Czech Republic* *Poland*

7. Research Questions and an Agenda for the Comparative Study of Euroscepticism

There are clear patterns that we can discern as we look over the range of data presented in the previous sections of this paper. But we are also aware that there are both limitations to the data presented and also a series of questions which they raise but which cannot be answered with this sort of data alone. The data was gathered as a 'mapping exercise' in order to discern and inform the broad parameters of subsequent research. We therefore want to use this section to provide a broader research agenda for the study of Euroscepticism and to highlight what we think are some of the more important questions. The following is, therefore, highly speculative and we would welcome additional suggestions for such an agenda.

- Comparing Across the 'Wider' Europe

The first question we would raise is about the possibilities or limitations of comparing member states with candidate states and comparing West European systems with the post-communist systems in central and Eastern Europe. The question is whether the differences over the meaning of European integration, in the system-ness of party systems and the party-ness of parties, and in the meaning and understanding of left and right make pan-European comparisons fundamentally problematic for our consideration of Euroscepticism, or if not, how to deal with these issues of comparison. To put the question simply: *should we compare Euroscepticism across the range of member and candidate states and, if so, what factors do we need to be particularly sensitive to?*

Karen Henderson makes the argument that the context of political and economic transition means that the issue of EU membership is inextricably bound up with transition issues in the central and Eastern European states and therefore means something essentially different than in in the current member states

(Henderson, 2001). Even if this is true (and the existence of pro-reform, soft Eurosceptics such as Klaus and Orban mean that it is a questionable proposition), this does not, of course, rule out comparison but it means being sensitive to the different contexts. It is in this spirit that we here try to compare the two sets of states as groups.

- The Effects of Party Systems

It seems to us, from the data presented here, that party systems account for much of the reason for either the exaggeration or the minimisation of the European issue in different domestic settings. Cases such as France and Finland seem to point to very different opportunity structures with different sets of incentives and costs to the expression of Euroscepticism in their respective party systems. The question is: *what are the effects of differences in party system and how should we go about categorising party systems in ways that adequately capture the range of party system?* This is a question that relates to the state of the literature on European parties and party systems, and goes to the heart of whether the changes in Europe in the last decade of the twentieth century prove the enduring vitality or insufficiency of existing concepts, frameworks and categories.

- The Limits of Ideology

We have argued that the European issue is useful for taking strategic positions by parties but clearly ideological predisposition mean that this choice is not unlimited. At one pole, Lees (2001) analyses party positions as primarily strategic positions. At the other Brusis (2001) makes a differentiation between ideological forms of Euroscepticism. *How far can parties act strategically and how far does ideology constrain parties in taking either pro- or anti-European positions?* The question is also raised, therefore, whether some parties or kinds of parties find it easier to use the European issue strategically and how far different ideologies predispose parties towards support for integration or different types of Euroscepticism.

- The Effects of Peripherality

One of the driving questions behind our joint research has been about the issue of peripherality and how that relates to Euroscepticism. Although hard Eurosceptic parties are generally peripheral protest parties, our research has led us to moderate our conception of Euroscepticism per se as *fundamentally* a peripheral phenomenon. However, we are still interested in *when, why and how is Euroscepticism related to peripherality in party systems*.

- The Impact of Government Participation

Turning away from the peripheries of European party systems, there seem to be interesting questions to be asked about *when, why and how parties of government move towards or away from Euroscepticism*. Our data reveal parties that have changed their positions (say moving from hard Eurosceptic to softer Euroscepticism) as they come closer to involvement in government. *Does involvement in European government inevitably lead to a tempering of Euroscepticism or is it that parties must demonstrate their government potential by moderating any tendency they have towards Euroscepticism?* In this regard it may be instructive to look in particular at how the experience of government involvement has impacted on the Austrian Freedom Party, the French Communist Party, the Northern League in Italy, the Left Alliance and the Greens in Finland (who have moved away from Eurosceptic positions), PASOK in Greece, the Social Democrats in Sweden, the Civic Democratic Party in the Czech Republic, FIDESZ and the Smallholders Party in Hungary, the Conservative Union for Fatherland and Freedom in Latvia, the Greater Romania Party in Romania, the Centre Party in Estonia and the Slovak National Party and Meciar's Movement for a Democratic Slovakia in Slovakia and to attempt some paired comparisons of their experiences as they have moved into or out of government and on how this has affected their

positions on Europe. This could work with different types of parties where similar changes have occurred or in similar parties (e.g. Green parties) where they have taken very different positions under different conditions.

- The Effects of the Misfit Between Parties and Publics Over Europe

From a normative as well as analytical point of view it is worth asking *what are the effects of the differences in the expression of Euroscepticism by the European publics and its manifestation in European party systems?* In one sense, this is asking the time-honoured questions about when representative democracy should or should not produce institutions, policies or elites that are not strictly representative of public opinion and what effects this has. In the more specific sense of European integration, the charges of democratic deficit or citizen apathy make these questions particularly salient as the process of European integration has appeared to rely thus far on both a permissive consensus at the mass level and an almost monolithic pro-integration propensity among political elites. Our data is evidence that both aspects are changing.

- 'Interesting' and Neglected Cases

In terms of a research agenda we feel that it is important that any research project covers the full range. In the twenty-five cases we have examined there are a number of particularly interesting cases either because they seem to be indicative of unusual factors or simply because they are not well covered in terms of the literature. The work of Agnes Batory (2001) makes the case for Hungary as one such case - it has both relatively high levels of support for parties and politicians famed for their Euroscepticism and yet it has the absence of a real debate about Europe within the domestic context. Hungary seemed also to stand out as an exception on a series of other trends in central and Eastern Europe (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2001a, 2001b). Finland is perhaps the opposite. The work of Tapio Raunio (Raunio, 1999) demonstrates that Finland with high levels of popular Euroscepticism, a keen debate about Europe and many parties with strongly Eurosceptic activist bases, has very few parties that actually take Eurosceptic positions. The profusion of French Eurosceptic parties seems worthy of investigation as it is a country at the very heart of the European project. While there has been interesting work on Euroscepticism among some party elites (Alexandre, & Jardin, 1997), in general (Milner, 2000) and among the electorate (Evans, 2001), we would invite a focus on the relationship between the party system and the European issue. At the other extreme, Romania seems at the edges of accession and it would interesting to look at why, with such low public Euroscepticism, there seems to be opportunities within the party system for the expression of Eurosceptic sentiments - whereas in Bulgaria, for example, there is no evidence of party-based Euroscepticism.

- Comparative Questions and Possibilities

While the emphasis has been on case studies of particular countries, this is largely a reflection of the existing division of academic labour. We would also like to raise the possibility of *comparisons that go beyond national case studies*. This could mean the possibility of comparing paired cases of countries or parties. More than this, there are interesting comparisons that can be made between states and parties that did or will accede to the EU in different waves. Particularly interesting would be comparisons of countries from the 'Mediterranean' and 'Nordic' waves. It would be interesting to compare the dynamics of change within the party systems of some or all of the states involved in the most recent enlargement. This may offer clues as to what may occur in candidate states. The question might therefore be: *what are the effects of EU accession on the European issue in party systems of acceding states?* And the other comparisons that could be made, mindful of King, Keohane and Verba's (1994) exhortation to maximise your mileage from your cases, are between levels so that we might compare local party activists with national activists. There has already been work on this in some of the candidate states conducted under the ESRC 'One

Europe or Several?' Programme (Hughes, Sasse & Gordon, 2001) and the federal dimension has been suggested in the case of Germany (Lees, 2001) but there may well be other interesting comparisons at other sub-national party systems level.

- The Issue of Change

There are a number of key methodological issues that we feel need to be addressed. The data in this paper presents a snapshot and we strongly feel that the worth of the data is only fully realized if it is complemented by more detailed case studies. Those case studies already exist in some cases and we have already outlined where we feel there are particular 'gaps'. What we want to do here is to encourage the case studies to focus on change over time so that we can build up a particular sense of the dynamics of how the European issue works in party systems. Broader comparative studies such as ours have merits but we need to address the question of *how we can measure change in party positions and the way the European issue is manifested in party systems*. What we are making a claim for here is for diachronic comparative work to supplement the existing synchronic comparisons.

- Dependent Variable

The second methodological issue is how we measure 'levels' of party-based Euroscepticism and what the electoral support for Eurosceptic parties amounts to. To put it in another way, the question is*: what is the dependent variable?* We have been careful in the course of our work to avoid talking as if support levels for Eurosceptical parties are the same thing as levels of support for Euroscepticism. We are well aware that the European issue is often secondary, or of an even lower priority and therefore to ascribe voting intention as endorsement of the parties' Euroscepticism would be tenuous at best. But we have used vote share as some sort of indication of party importance and, in the absence of an alternative, we have aggregated party vote shares to give us some sort of sense of the potential pool of voters who either vote for parties in part because of their Euroscepticism or who are not put off voting for parties because of their Euroscepticism. We also argue that it provides a crude indication of the potential for shifts in the level of public Euroscepticism to find expression through the party system. For example, an increase in the levels and salience of public Euroscepticism is more likely to find expression in a party system where there are already parties that are using the issue to some extent as part of their political discourse and would find it easier to sharpen their rhetoric on this or to give it a higher profile. We simply wonder if there are alternative conceptualizations and operationalisations of the dependent variable of party-based Euroscepticism, and whether some of these might be measured quantitatively. We also wonder to what extent we could use such measurement to estimate potential future levels of party-based Euroscepticism.

- Opposition and Support for European Integration

Related to the issue of the dependent variable, we also want to raise the question: *what does the absence of party-based Euroscepticism mean?* Part of the very reason for the study of Euroscepticism is because of the historical elite consensus over Europe that has been in favour of European integration. Trying to discern the outline of the European issue and how it has (or has not) emerged in European politics has been particularly difficult because of this consensus. Focusing on Euroscepticism allows us to have a clearer picture of the perimeters of the pro-European consensus but it still leaves us with the question of knowing how to interpret the absence of party-based Euroscepticism. We are interested, obviously, in knowing about party-based Euroscepticism for its own sake but we would like to think that we could use it more widely to illuminate the particular political dynamics of the broader European issue.

- The Salience of Europe[25]

One way in which party systems differ is in the relative salience of the European issue. It is clear that there may be both variation in levels of support for parties expressing Euroscepticism *and* variation in the levels of importance attached to the European issue for voters in those party systems. We would suggest that there are three distinct types of salience. The first is the level of public salience whereby populations express Euroscepticism. The second dimension is the salience of Europe for party competition. The final dimension is the salience of the European issue in deciding elections. Indeed, one of the most striking features of the issue of European integration is how little salience it has among voters in any country. It is difficult to think of any parliamentary or presidential election were European integration has played a major role in determining its outcome. This is also true of the current Central and East European candidate states for whom the decision to join the EU is a foreign policy decision of historic proportions. The question is: *how do we measure the salience of the issue of European integration in different party and political systems, and how can we differentiate between types of salience?* This strikes us as both an important and a difficult question. Only when we know the overall salience of the European issue can we really interpret the importance of levels of support for parties expressing Euroscepticism. The issue of salience is an extremely important one. As noted above, low salience makes it impossible to 'read off' public attitudes towards European integration from the votes obtained from Eurosceptic (or pro-EU) parties as the dissonance between the vote for hard Eurosceptic parties and the levels of opposition to EU membership in most countries shows. Indeed, given that most citizens simply do not focus on the issue it makes it very difficult to predict the results of EU-related referenda from polling data, never mind votes obtained by pro or anti-EU parties.

The issue of salience does not only apply to the level of party systems. There is also the point about how different parties use the issue differently and this leads to the question about *how do we measure the salience of the European issue for particular parties and their voters?* Some parties use the parties as a 'second-order' issue to bolster their standing or position on other issues (e.g. France's National Front). Other parties, (e.g. Democratic Unionist Party in Northern Ireland), have the issue as a very minor part of their overall identity, while other parties (e.g. UK Conservatives and Danish People's Party) have made the issue central to their identity. Clearly this has some relationship to the overall salience of the European issue to the party system but there is variation in how much prominence is accorded to it by parties in the same party systems, and we need to be able to capture that in our research.

8. Conclusions

We have imagined an enlarged Europe Union. Using the fifteen existing member states and the ten candidate states of central and Eastern Europe, we have explored how far contestation about European integration, in the shape of Euroscepticism, has found expression in party systems. Through identifying which parties in the twenty-five party systems take Eurosceptical positions we have built up an overview of party-based Euroscepticism across a large swathe of contemporary Europe. This gives us a comprehensive picture of the types of parties and the levels of support for the parties that express Euroscepticism. We have looked at their electoral support and at their membership of party families. This has allowed us to both compare the member with the candidate states and to look across an imagined enlarged EU as we imagine the shape of domestic politics in a Union of twenty five states.

We have used the data gathered on both member and candidate states to make some analytical conclusions. In other words, as a result of the mapping exercise, we can describe some aspects of that

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[25] We are grateful to Agnes Batory for this point.

newly mapped territory. In comparing party-based Euroscepticism in the member states with it in the candidate states of central and Eastern Europe, we can offer the following conclusions about the differences between these two groups:

- There are higher overall levels of support for Eurosceptic parties in the central and Eastern European candidate states than in current member states.
- There are higher levels of electoral support for soft Eurosceptic parties in the candidate states of central and Eastern Europe than in the member states.
- Parties expressing soft Euroscepticism in central and Eastern European candidate states are more important to their party systems than parties expressing soft Euroscepticism in the member states.
- Levels of support for hard Eurosceptic parties in the central and Eastern Europe are derisory but are significant in some member states.
- Parties taking Eurosceptical positions in central and Eastern European candidate states are predominantly on the right of the ideological spectrum whereas the Eurosceptical parties of the member states are more evenly spread across the left-right divide.
- Patterns of party-based Euroscepticism are remarkably similar in both member states and the candidate states of central and Eastern Europe.

Looking at the twenty-five countries together we can also make some conclusions about party-based Euroscepticism that holds true across both sets of states:

- Euroscepticism is a near universal feature of the party systems of the member states and the candidate states of central and Eastern Europe.
- Soft Euroscepticism is far more common and parties that use soft Eurosceptic rhetoric have more potential electoral support than parties that use hard Eurosceptic rhetoric.
- High levels of public Euroscepticism do not necessarily translate into high levels of support for parties expressing hard Euroscepticism and high levels of support for such parties is not necessarily indicative of high levels of popular Euroscepticism.
- Being on the left or right is not a reliable guide to whether or not a party is Eurosceptical.
- Hard Eurosceptical parties are not central to any current European governments.
- Where governing parties are Eurosceptical they are almost invariably soft Eurosceptics.

Putting these together we would draw out three overall conclusions. The first is that Euroscepticism is part of the terrain of European party systems. It is by no means central to them in most cases but it is there across the spectrum and across Europe. The second conclusion is that parties matter: they do not directly represent public sentiment over Europe. We have demonstrated a clear misfit between levels of public Euroscepticism and levels of support for parties advocating hard Euroscepticism. And the third conclusion is that Europe matters, and matters in a similar way, whether the context is that of member states or candidate states. The 'European project', or the issue of European integration has a powerful and consistent resonance across Europe and this does not only apply to the existing member states.

The relevance of our findings lies not in how far we have measured 'levels' of party-based Euroscepticism. To that end we only offer qualitative data identifying which parties, and which types of parties, espouse which form of Euroscepticism. Looking at the data to see what levels of support these parties and groups of parties sustain does, however, give us a guide to the potential for the expression Euroscepticism in different political systems. We have suggested that it is one vital and neglected component, along with public opinion and party policy that is necessary if Euroscepticism is to become a political force in any particular country.

To complicate the issue further we also have argued that we need to be sensitive to different levels and types of salience if we really want to understand Euroscepticism. Although we are aware that the European issue is ubiquitous, there is something in its nature that means it has become second-order. This means that while no political party can afford to ignore it, it rarely seems to be a 'primal' or driving political issue for either parties of for voters. But we can see different levels of salience of the issue. We are aware that there are party systems where many parties express Euroscepticism but it is not a central issue in the competition between parties (e.g. Hungary and perhaps France) and systems where there is clear evidence of a substantial body of public opinion that is uneasy about the EU and yet relatively little party competition over the issue (e.g. Lithuania and Finland). We argue therefore that, for Euroscepticism to become a force, it would have to have (1) significant levels of public support, (2) parties expressing Euroscepticism, (3) salience as issue for voters meaning that they would be prepared to vote for Eurosceptic parties and (4) salience as a dimension of competition for the parties. This means that the existence of parties as receptacles for received public Euroscepticism matters, but it also means that the mere existence of party-based Euroscepticism is not enough, in itself, for us to see Euroscepticism as a force in those political systems.

The fact that we can discern trends across the party systems of Western and Central and Eastern Europe over the issue of Europe is evidence of the Europeanisation and the 'EU-isation' of European party systems. There has emerged a significant literature on Europeanisation of late.[26] The literature on Europeanisation has had two significant weaknesses to date. The first weakness is that it has primarily focused on policy-making and institutions and has neglected the politics aspect. The fault here lies partly with the literature on 'domestic' European politics that has been slow to integrate European integration into its focus, and partly with the EU studies literature that has traditionally been so dominated by the focus on policy and institutions and has appeared to be uncomfortable with the idea of politics. The second restriction of the Europeanisation literature has been its almost exclusive focus on 'Western-EU-Europe' and its neglect of other parts of Europe including significant numbers of EU candidate states. [27] Looking at the issue of Euroscepticism, it is clear that we can identify an example of Europeanisation that relates to politics and crosses the geographical divide. The Europeanisation of domestic party politics means that there is a new line of division. Europe has changed from being an issue of monolithic elite consensus to one where there are tangible lines of division - some of which map onto other types of divisions within party systems.

There is a consistent body of Eurosceptical Europeans. Although not a large proportion, Eurobarometer polls in recent years show that there has been a stable level of between 13 -14 per cent of EU citizens that feel that their country's membership of the EU is bad thing (European Commission, 1999-200). Turnout in European Parliament elections has declined consistently. In 1979 average turnout was 63.0 per cent but has dropped to a low of 49.4 in 1999.[28] This would appear to indicate something about the effectiveness of EU mechanisms of representation. The European Commission itself has rung the alarm bells arguing that 'many Europeans feel alienated from the Union's work' (European Commission, 2001: 7) and has called for reform of European institutions with its white paper on European Governance. The Irish voters have rejected the Nice Treaty at the recent referendum in 2001 and, in 2000, the Danish people similarly voted no when their politicians urged yes to joining the Euro. Public Euroscepticism has had an influence on the process of integration. If parties either downplay or exaggerate Euroscepticism this will mean that

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[26] The literature is voluminous but key contributions are Ladrech (1994), Radaelli (2000), Kohler-Koch & Eising (1999) Knill and Lehmkuhl (1999) and Cowles, Caporaso and Risse (2001)

[27] Notable exceptions to this tendency are Goetz (2000) and Grabbe (2001).

[28] Although Mark Franklin (2000) demonstrates that there are reasons for caution in taking European Parliament election turnout data at face value.

there is even more chance that it will influence events. If parties systematically under-represent the depth of public Euroscepticism then this may lead to some sort of backlash (perhaps as in Ireland over Nice). If politicians over-play public Euroscepticism they can still exert a powerful influence on European integration through domestic legislative processes, through representation in the European Parliament and through the selection processes for European Commissioners and other EU positions. Either way, the lack of fit between party-based hard Euroscepticism and public levels of Euroscepticism means that there is an increasing chance that domestic politics will play a role in the larger processes of European integration.

The process of European integration relies on the support of publics and party politicians for its continued existence. And much of that support, or lack of it, stems from what the EU is doing and looking like for ordinary citizens. However, our research shows that the fate of European integration at least partly depends on the structures of competition inherent in domestic party systems. In other words, the fate of European integration does not entirely depend on the nature of European integration. It depends, in part, on the processes of party politics at a domestic level that may operate with scant regard the issues of concern at the EU level. For the architects of integration this means accepting that some of the future is beyond their control. For scholars of EU politics, it means that we must keep one eye firmly fixed on domestic politics.

9. Postscript

Since this was written a couple of important papers have been published by Kopecky and Mudde that make a new contribution to the emerging debate on party-based Euroscepticism.[29] The Kopecky and Mudde papers are based, in a part, on a critique of our initial conceptualisation of hard and soft party-based Euroscepticism. Kopecky and Mudde propose a four-fold typology of parties as: Euroenthusiasts, Eurosceptics, Europragmatists and Eurorejects. These four types are based on a party's position in relation to two dimensions: support for or opposition to "the key ideas of European underlying the EU" (europhiles and europhobes); and support for or opposition to the way that the EU is at the moment or about the direction of its future development (EU optimists and pessimists). Kopecky and Mudde argue that although parties may change their position on the latter axis, they are very unlikely to do so on the former as this would involve a substantial re-orientation of their entire political ideology. On the basis of this, only parties that combine support for the general ideas of European integration but are pessimistic about the EU's current and/or future reflection of these ideas are categorised as Eurosceptic.

They then apply this framework to four post-communist candidate states: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. In doing so the only parties included in Table 3 that they class as Eurosceptic are the Polish Law and Justice Party, the Czech Civic Democratic Party and the Slovak Christian Democratic Movement (both of whom we categorise as soft Eurosceptic). They also include two parties that we do not classify as Eurosceptic: the Hungarian Christian Democratic Party (because we no longer consider them relevant) and Solidarity Electoral Action (because we believe that only a faction within rather than the whole grouping could be considered Eurosceptic). Three parties that we list as hard Eurosecptic (the League of Polish Families, Polish Self Defence, the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia and the Hungarian Justice and Life Party) and two that we list as soft Eurosceptic (the Association for the Republic-Republican Party of Czechoslovakia and the Slovak National Party) are categorised as Eurorejects (EU-pessimist and opposed to European integration), together with the non-parliamentary Slovak Workers Association that we, again, have not included. Two other parties that we list as Soft Eurosceptic (the Hungarian Smallholders Party and the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia) are

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[29] See: Kopecky and Mudde (2002). This is a substantially revised version of their earlier paper, Kopecky and Mudde (2001).

included in the rather curious Euro-pragmatist bracket (anti-European integration, but EU-optimist!) and two others (the Polish Peasant Party and Hungarian FIDESZ) are classed as Euro-enthusiasts.

There are a number of strengths to the Kopecky and Mudde framework. It contributes to the debate about causality of Euroscepticism by establishing a plausible link between ideology and the manifestation of particular kinds of positions on Europe. In doing so, it is clearly an important contribution to the developing literature on mapping party positions on the European issue. Perhaps its most important implication for our approach to conceptualising Euroscepticism is that it leads us to question whether we have stretched the concept of contestation too far in a way that has led us to categorise some parties as Eurosceptic when they are not. This may be particularly true in relation to parties in candidate states where criticisms of the EU are often couched in terms of their lack of the progress of, or the EU's mean-spirited approach towards, the accession negotiations or on other parties for being too 'soft' or ineffective in these negotiations. Hungarian FIDESZ and the Polish Peasant Party are clearly the most obvious potential anomalies here, although it also raises question marks over others such as the Polish Law and Justice Party. This leads us to consider redefining and narrowing our definition of a Eurosceptic party as one that uses contestatory rhetoric *about the European project itself* rather than simply some aspects of EU policy or approach. Hard Eurosceptic parties would, therefore, continue be those that de facto rejected their country being a member of the EU. Soft Euroscepticism would, however, only encompass parties that are supportive of EU membership in principle but contest the trajectory of the European project as it is currently expressed and developing within the EU or further extensions of EU competencies. It would exclude: those who simply criticise particular policies that they find objectionable (unless they involve the extension of EU competencies), the 'deal' that their country gets from the EU (or will get as a prospective member) or other parties for being insufficiently 'tough' in their dealings with Brussels (criticisms of their own government rather than the EU or the European project as such).[30]

However, in essence, the two approaches are really attempting to identify and examine somewhat different things. Kopecky and Mudde see Euroscepticism as a *party position on Europe*, defined in relation to other party positions. Euroscepticism is, thus, conceptualised as a relative point on a continuum or, more accurately, a box in a two-by-two diagram. Their approach to identifying a Eurosceptic party is, therefore, based on attempting to locate it within this typology of party positions on Europe. Our conceptualisation has approached party-based Euroscepticism is an actor-based phenomenon and we have viewed it as a specific *manifestation involving the use of the rhetoric or discourse of political contestation* of the European project as it is currently expressed through the EU. In other words, we are analysing it as an exogenous phenomenon rather than an iterative 'party position on Europe'. Within that we posit a distinction between hard Eurosceptic parties that reject EU membership per se (or do so in effect) and - therefore, (in our view) take their contestation to a qualitatively different level - and those that do not (Kopecky and Mudde do not really deal with this distinction explicitly). Consequently, we have deliberately avoided attempting to define parties that use Eurosceptic rhetoric as necessarily being more or less integrationist because of the problems that have dogged previous attempts to map party positions on Europe, particularly the fact that 'European integration' is not a one dimensional, unilinear process. It is, for example, possible to be in favour of the Euro but against developing common security and defence policies and vice versa. In other words, the two approaches are approaching party-based Euroscepticism as two different kinds of phenomenon. In our view, the Kopecky and Mudde approach is also a valid one but we see it as complementary to our approach that sees party-based Euroscepticism as a more actor-orientated phenomenon.

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[30] Although this does still leave the issue of whether to include parties that criticise the EU's current trajectory for being *insufficiently* integrationist.

However, there is still a major problem with the Kopecky and Mudde approach, which also has implications for our analysis of party-based Euroscepticism as an actor-oriented concept. That is that many parties are often reluctant to be explicit about their precise approach to European integration or to the current and future direction of the EU. Ironically, this is a much more likely to be a problem for parties in EU candidate states, which Kopecky and Mudde use as the basis for their empirical observations. This is because parties in candidate states tend to debate European issues almost exclusively through the prism of the accession negotiations. When they do set out their position on the general trajectory of the European integration process or the current (or future) development of the EU, they often do so in only the most general of terms (saying, for example, that they are in favour of a "Europe of Nations" or against a "federal super-state"). Few parties in post-communist Eastern Europe have elaborated their position on European integration in such detail as the Czech Civic Democratic Party on the basis of which Kopecky and Mudde are able to locate them fairly precisely as Eurosceptic within their typology.

This is also a problem in terms of our approach of identifying Euroscepticism by looking for evidence of political rhetoric that contests the European project as currently expressed through the EU. But it is an even more serious problem when attempting to determine a party's position on European integration and the current and future development of the EU because it involves engaging a large amount of guesswork as to what a party's actual position is. Two Polish parties serve as good illustrations of this. Firstly, the Polish Peasant Party which Kopecky and Mudde define as Euro-enthusiast because "they believe in both the ideas underlying European integration and in the EU (because of its support for farmers)."[31] However, it is not really possible to discern this on the basis of the statements that the Polish Peasant Party has made on European integration to date because it only really discusses the issue in the context of securing a good deal for Polish farmers in the enlargement negotiations. The party says nothing about either the underlying ideas of European integration nor the EU's current or future trajectory. Secondly, the Polish Law and Justice party which Kopecky and Mudde define as Eurosceptic. Again, the Law and Justice party have only defined their position on Europe in the most general of terms and almost exclusively in relation to the accession process rather than about the current or future shape of the EU project.[32]

There are also a number of issues of terminology and utility that arise from the Kopecky and Mudde schema. One obvious issue is that it goes against existing (popular) usage of the term by confining 'Euroscepticism' to a sub-set of what would generally be considered Eurosceptic in its popular sense. The second issue is that Kopecky and Mudde are only oriented towards the candidate states whereas we are anxious that any typology of Euroscepticism should be broadly applicable across the range of existing and future member states as well as to existing and future candidate states. It was to ensure the breadth of the

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[31] Kopecky and Mudde (2002)

[32] Another problem is that if one is attempting to develop a full-blown typology of party positions on Europe then they surely need to break down the Euro-enthusiast bloc. This currently lumps together those who are committed and uncritical supporters of the European project and those who are much more pragmatic and comfortable about criticising the EU as part of their rhetoric even if only for strategic or tactical reasons. Surely, a fully worked typology of party positions needs to capture the distinction between non-Eurosceptic parties that use tactical or strategic critiques of the EU or EU policies as part of their rhetoric and those that do not?

application of the typology that we originally suggested the continuum of soft and hard Euroscepticism. We felt that the wider the application of the typology the simpler it needed to be.

Clearly, this is an ongoing debate and we are not theologically committed to the Hard and Soft Euroscepticism labels that we consider very much as a work in progress. However, one clear implication of this is that we need to consider redefining a soft Eurosceptic stance more clearly, and perhaps, more narrowly.

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