Love me, love me not... A typology of public euroscepticism

Catharina Sørensen,
Danish Institute for International Studies

cas@diis.dk
SEI Working Paper No 101
EPERN Working Paper No 19
The **Sussex European Institute** publishes Working Papers (ISSN 1350-4649) to make research results, accounts of work-in-progress and background information available to those concerned with contemporary European issues. The Institute does not express opinions of its own; the views expressed in this publication are the responsibility of the author.

The **Sussex European Institute**, founded in Autumn 1992, is a research and graduate teaching centre of the University of Sussex, specialising in studies of contemporary Europe, particularly in the social sciences and contemporary history. The SEI has a developing research programme which defines Europe broadly and seeks to draw on the contributions of a range of disciplines to the understanding of contemporary Europe. The SEI draws on the expertise of many faculty members from the University, as well as on those of its own staff and visiting fellows. In addition, the SEI provides one-year MA courses in Contemporary European Studies and European Politics and opportunities for MPhil and DPhil research degrees, as well as an MSc in Comparative and Cross-Cultural Research Methods (Contemporary European Studies).

The **European Parties Elections and Referendums Network** (EPERN) is a network of scholars researching the impact of European integration on parties, elections, referendums and public opinion. This working paper is one in a series of EPERN working papers produced with the Sussex European Institute Working Paper series. EPERN also produces briefing papers on elections and referendums. All publications are available at the EPERN web site:

http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/1-4-2.html

First published in January 2008
by the **Sussex European Institute**
University of Sussex, Falmer,
Brighton BN1 9RG
Tel: 01273 678578
Fax: 01273 678571
E-mail: sei@sussex.ac.uk

© Sussex European Institute

**Ordering Details**

The price of this Working Paper is £5.00 plus postage and packing. Orders should be sent to the Sussex European Institute, University of Sussex, Falmer, Brighton BN1 9RG. Cheques should be made payable to the University of Sussex. Please add £1.00 postage per copy in Europe and £2.00 per copy elsewhere. See page 22 for a list of other working papers published by Sussex European Institute. Alternatively, SEI Working Papers are available from our website at: www.sei.ac.uk.
Abstract

This paper demonstrates the multifaceted nature of public euroscepticism, which hitherto has been under researched. Through a theoretically - and empirically informed concept analysis, the relevance of four independent types of euroscepticism is confirmed, namely utilitarian, sovereignty-based, democratic and social euroscepticism. Applying this typology, the paper demonstrates pronounced differences in euroscepticism across member states and over time. A central argument is that euroscepticism assumes forms that are contradictory, and that this has consequences for the success of pan-European strategies and communication plans: What citizens want from the EU differs from member state to member state, and insensitivity to the various types of scepticism may result in counterproductive efforts.
Love me, love me not
A typology of public euroscepticism

Catharina Sørensen,
Danish Institute for International Studies

The European Commission stated in its Enlargement Report of November 2006 that ‘Democratic legitimacy also means a Europe which listens to the expectations of its citizens and addresses their concerns through adequate policies. For any of its policies, including enlargement, the EU has to win the support of its citizens’ (p. 23). This is a notable statement from a Union, which has lost five out of the eight public referenda on EU-issues that have been held during the present decade. Indeed, a seemingly growing euroscepticism has come to characterise the political climate of co-operation, with little clarity surrounding the questions of ‘why’, ‘when’, ‘how many’, and ‘for how long’ citizens are eurosceptical. With the aim of providing such clarity, this paper introduces a typology of euroscepticism that explains its multifaceted nature before analysing the dynamics of scepticism across EU member state over time.

Political efforts to accommodate citizens in the integration process have intensified in recent years, and have not least gained prominence following the rejection by French and Dutch voters of the EU’s Constitutional Treaty in 2005. For the first time in its history,

---

1 Correspondence address: cas@diis.dk. This SEI Working Paper is also published as EPERN Working Paper No 19. It builds on the findings of my PhD (Sørensen 2007). An earlier version of the paper was presented at the Euroscepticism conference at the Political Science Institute in Zagreb in 2007. I am grateful to two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on this working paper.

the European Union decided, in response, to call for a period of reflection in order to be able to decide on a way forward that is in line with the broad wishes of the public. The reflection period, however, has not made us wiser about the nature of euroscepticism, and it seems as if the EU’s heads of state or government are drawing the conclusion: Contrary to three years ago, the battle is now centred on avoiding the need to call referenda on the new Lisbon treaty. An unnerving feeling exists that perhaps there are as many reasons to be eurosceptic as there are no-votes at the ill-fated referenda of the current decade. This paper takes issue with this interpretation and attempts to demonstrate how careful conceptualisation can in effect reduce public euroscepticism to relatively few types. This endeavour is the task of the first part of the paper. In its second part, the developed typology is applied to the discussion of some of the consequences of multifaceted euroscepticism on the integration process.

Conceptualising euroscepticism

Deciphering a complex concept like euroscepticism involves three interdependent tasks (for instance Goertz 2005): defining the meaning ascribed to the semantic label (definition), deducing constitutive types from relevant literature (theory), and testing the validity and relevance of these through empirical analyses (data). Starting with the task of defining euroscepticism, we may note that the term euroscepticism consists of three components: euro, sceptic and ism. Each poses definitional challenges; indeed, it is not clear from most usages whether the term is taken to include scepticism towards the EU (or Europe?) as a whole, whether ‘sceptic’ means being ‘open to persuasion’, as Commissioner Peter Mandelson has suggested,3 or outright rejection, and to what extent euroscepticism—given its ‘ism’-ending—can be seen as an ideology in its own right (see Flood 2002; Flood and Usherwood 2005; Crum and Binnema 2006).4

4 Some languages permit the use of the word scepticism without the -ism ending, such as the Danish ‘euroskepsis’, which may be a more adequate term.
At this definitional level, the paper defines euroscepticism in a broad manner, as a sentiment of disapproval—reaching a certain degree and durability—directed towards the EU in its entirety or towards particular policy areas or developments. ‘Eurosceptic public opinion’ refers to citizens perceiving faults or shortcomings with regard to the EU-of-the-day, and thus not exclusively to citizens wishing the dissolution of the Union. In line with most studies on defining euroscepticism, it is important to recognise that it may assume a principled component as well as a contingent component. To apply the terms developed for party-based euroscepticism by Aleks Szczerbiak and Paul Taggart to public euroscepticism, hard euroscepticism is the principled rejection of co-operation—the continuation of the EU itself is contested—while soft euroscepticism is the contingent scepticism towards particular aspects within the co-operation (notably Szczerbiak and Taggart 2003).

It is the task of the second step of the conceptualisation to deduce and develop expectations as to the nature of various eurosceptic concerns. To this end, I have relied on existing studies into public EU-attitudes and the European integration process. These have increased in scope over recent years, but arguably remained scattered and contradictory. Euroscepticism, as Christopher Flood points out, has remained an elusive concept (Flood 2002: 2). We may think of the disagreements as to whether a favourable domestic economic climate in fact breeds EU–support (Andersen and Kaltenthaler 1996) or scepticism (Rohrschneider 2002); whether post-materialism is positively (Inglehart 1971) or negatively (Andersen and Reichert 1996) related to supportive EU attitudes; as well as in what sense socio-demographic variables, such as gender and age, are related to scepticism (Andersen and Reichert 1996, for instance, hold that these variables are not related to scepticism; Siune 1993 and de Vreese 2004 hold that they are). Thus, no coherent theory exists that details what euroscepticism is, or why, when and how it occurs and develops. Recently, a consequence of this shortcoming was the failure of the

---

5 This definition is in line with Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Mark’s brief conception that ‘Scepticism has come to mean “an attitude of doubt or a disposition of disbelief”. Euroscepticism refers simply to scepticism about some aspect of Europe or European integration’ (Hooghe and Marks forthcoming 2007: 2).
academic community to ‘predict the rise of euroscepticism’ (Hooghe and Marks forthcoming 2007).

This paper finds that a main reason behind the inadequacy of much existent research resides in the sheer number and diversity of conceptualisations of the dependent variable of euroscepticism (or at the other end of the continuum of EU attitudes, citizen support). This can be referred to as the ‘dependent variable problem.’ Its implications are significant and explain many of the shortcomings of existing approaches. Indeed, imprecise definitions of the dependent variable mean that most studies have inadvertently surveyed different phenomena altogether; a fact which to a considerable degree explains their sometimes contradictory findings. Conceptual disagreements, in other words, have hindered the accumulation of knowledge (see Sartori 1984; Weyland 2001): if we do not grasp the nature of the object of study, we are hardly ready or able to engage in explanatory, causal analysis.

At the second task of the conceptualisation, I have therefore reviewed existing literature with the aim of deducing a number of expectations not as to what may cause euroscepticism, but as to what is euroscepticism (see Sørensen 2007). At the third and final step in the conceptualisation, these theoretical expectations are concretised in such detail that empirical data can be brought in to test their validity and prevalence. I have relied on the European Commission’s public opinion polls, the Eurobarometer (published biannually since 1974), to identify four indicators of each expectation of euroscepticism. Statistical measures (gamma and alpha tests) are developed to test their coherence and independence. The idea is that the indicators standing in for one type should be strongly correlated internally, and that this correlation should be stronger than the correlation across the types.6

---

6 The list of indicators can be obtained from the author.
This overall endeavour has led me to establish that public euroscepticism can be boiled down to four broad ideal types:

- Euroscepticism can assume an economic character. This means that central to one’s evaluation of the Union is money-based calculations—whether or not one perceives of benefit from cooperation.
- Euroscepticism can be sovereignty-based. Citizens sharing this type of scepticism may experience the EU as an economically successful undertaking, but remain sceptical: what is decisive is that co-operation should not be experienced as a challenge to national sovereignty. Sovereignty-based eurosceptics, for instance, are thus likely to take issue with supranational elements of co-operation.
- A third type of euroscepticism does not predominantly take issue with economic calculations or sovereignty-based concerns, instead, scepticism centres on what is perceived to be inadequate structures of the existent political ‘set-up’—perhaps as the result of feelings that one’s voice is not being heard, or that the European Parliament does not have sufficient weight. It may be labelled democratic euroscepticism.
- Finally, a fourth type of scepticism is more political. Here, the EU is evaluated according to broadly the same cleavages that characterise national politics. In other words, if one is a socialist, one may be sceptical towards initiatives launched by a liberal Commission President, and reverse. Based on the existing literature, I expect that the dominant form of ‘political euroscepticism’ today is ‘social’, that is the critique that there is too little Social Europe. It is this variant of political euroscepticism that I focus on in this paper.

I illustrate the behaviour of the types of euroscepticism in three member states, namely Denmark, France and the United Kingdom. These are countries where we may reasonably expect some presence of euroscepticism, but still countries that have clearly

---

*The relationship between the types is one of family resemblance, meaning that the presence of one type alone is sufficient for there to be euroscepticism. There may be overlap between types – they are ideal types – but it goes for each type that internal coherence is strong, and stronger than inter-type coherence, and that inter-type coherence is not above a certain level (for details on the statistical tests employed to check intra-type and inter-type coherence, please see Sørensen 2007).*
had different approaches to the European integration process. The idea behind the typology of euroscepticism is, however, that it should be applicable to all member states, as well as to other levels of analysis than country populations. The below table presents a simplified result of contemporary euroscepticism in Denmark, France and the United Kingdom (relative to the EU-average).

Table 1. Overview of relative euroscepticism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relative euroscepticism?</th>
<th>Economic</th>
<th>Sovereignty</th>
<th>Democracy</th>
<th>Social</th>
<th>Intensity level (hard)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Low (Not significant with regard to social euroscepticism)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Yes/No means that all four indicators show euroscepticism/not euroscepticism; Mixed means that while one or two indicators show scepticism/not scepticism, the other are neutral (latest year polled).

An immediate conclusion is that euroscepticism varies from country to country. All the four types are prevalent in one of the three member states, but the picture is very different.

The Danish population is characterised by a strong sovereignty-based euroscepticism, combined with some degree of democratic euroscepticism. The French share a strong social euroscepticism, and to some extent an economic and a democratic euroscepticism. There is, however, no sovereignty-based euroscepticism in France. In the United Kingdom there is, as in the Danish case, a strong sovereignty-based euroscepticism, but here it is combined with some economic euroscepticism. We may note that the UK is not amongst the most eurosceptical member states when it comes to democratic and social euroscepticism.

The far right column of Table 1 denotes the intensity-level of public euroscepticism. It refers to the aforementioned distinction between hard and soft euroscepticism. I
determined this level in the same manner as I determined the prevalence of the types of scepticism, namely through the identification of four poll questions surveying dissatisfaction with EU-membership itself. Of the three case-countries, the UK shows a relatively strong hard euroscepticism, followed by the Danes. In France, the level of hard euroscepticism is low.

Below, a graph for each type of euroscepticism demonstrates the degree to which euroscepticism differs across member states, as well as some dynamics of scepticism over time.

I. Economic euroscepticism

Graph 1. The EU’s impact on specific economic areas (response: ‘bad effect’)

This indicator of economic euroscepticism surveyed citizen attitudes towards the EU’s impact on exports, industry, living standards and agriculture in 1983 as well as in 2005. It shows clear differences between member states: the EU’s impact on the very same area is experienced differently across countries. Generally, the Danes are not strongly eurosceptical, and scepticism towards the EU’s impact on all four areas has dropped over
time. In the United Kingdom, scepticism has also dropped on all four areas—albeit from a considerably higher point of departure. Scepticism-levels in 2005 are still higher than in Denmark, and relatively highest with regard to the EU’s impact on agriculture. This could reflect ‘traditional’ British antipathy towards the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy, which has been opposed as a policy predominantly favouring French needs.

Turning to French euroscepticism on this indicator, we may note that scepticism, curiously, is also relatively highest with regard to agriculture. France moreover goes against the Danish and British trend of decreasing euroscepticism—here scepticism rises (with up to 28 percentage points) in all four areas. The EU average mirrors the French increase in scepticism, albeit to a considerably lower degree. Thus, while scepticism-levels in France were largely similar to those in the EU as a whole, the French now differ considerably from the average in a sceptical direction. This curious development of decreasing Danish and British euroscepticism and increasing French scepticism, and on average in the EU, recurs on numerous indicators—including the Eurobarometer ‘classic’: feeling of benefit from the EU (another indicator of economic euroscepticism, omitted here for reasons of space). It could be mentioned that on this indicator, scepticism has between 1983 and 2005 increased in France from 21 percent to 40 percent, while it has decreased in Denmark and in the UK from, respectively, 31 percent to 15 percent, and 57 percent to 44 percent.

II. Sovereignty-based euroscepticism

We noted above that Danish economic euroscepticism has generally never been particularly high, and that it seems to have decreased over time. However, to conclude from this observation that Denmark is no longer particularly eurosceptical (and a safe ‘yes-voter’ at future EU-referenda) is not possible. What we can say is that it has hardly been due to economic reasons that a majority of Danes rejected the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and the third phase of EMU in 2000 (curiously, feelings of ‘no benefit’ from the EU reached an all-time low in precisely 1992). As the below graph shows, a main reason behind the Danish rejections may instead reside in sovereignty-based concerns.
This indicator surveys attitudes to an integrative step (a full-fledged EU government), which would arguably contribute to increasing supranational cooperation in the EU and potentially challenge national sovereignty. It was posed frequently by Eurobarometer until the mid-1990s (though not consistently: note gaps in between the years in the above graph), after which I have failed to spot it. The picture from the years illustrated above is uniform: the Danes are strongly against the idea, followed by the United Kingdom. There is no marked French scepticism, and even at its highest level, namely 24 percent, scepticism was forty percentage points lower than Danish scepticism. The levels appear largely stable. Other indicators of sovereignty-based euroscepticism show that Danish and British scepticism is relatively strong with regard to most supranational cooperation. An indicator from 2001 surveying attitudes to common decision-making in 17 policy areas, for instance, showed that in virtually all the areas (which ranged from cultural policy to protection of the environment), the Danes and the British were more reluctant towards joint decisions than the EU average, while the French were less reluctant.
III. Democratic euroscepticism

Turning to an indicator for democratic euroscepticism, a Eurobarometer poll question has since the mid-1990s surveyed attitudes to the general level of democracy in the Union.

Graph 3. Democratic euroscepticism

The Danes is the only case-population which has been distinguished from the EU average by a relatively strong democratic euroscepticism. The United Kingdom is the only case to have differed from the average in a less sceptical direction. Overall, we can note a somewhat decrease in scepticism-levels between 1993 and 2005 (of up to 14 percentage points). Another indicator of democratic euroscepticism, posed just prior to the referenda on the EU’s Constitutional Treaty, was more specific in that it asked citizens intending to vote ‘no’ if they were doing so because the Treaty was not perceived to be democratic enough. In 2004, 18 percent of the Danes would have done so, compared to nine percent on average in the EU, eight percent in the UK and six percent in France. It thus appears that the reasons for the subsequent French ‘no’ in 2005 have to be found elsewhere.
IV. Social euroscepticism

I argue that the perhaps main reason behind the French ‘no’ to the Constitutional Treaty is found in France’s high level of social euroscepticism—the fourth and final type of the conceptualisation. The below graphs from 2004 and 2005 show the percentage of citizens who would vote ‘no’ to the Constitution because it was perceived not to be ‘social enough’, or because it was seen as being ‘too liberal’.

Graph 4. Reasons for wanting to vote ‘no’ to the Constitutional Treaty

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Not enough social Europe and Too liberal 2004</th>
<th>Not enough social Europe and Too liberal 2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With 48 percent in France sharing this opinion in 2005, this was perhaps the most telling reason behind the French ‘no’. At five percent, it is hardly relevant to speak of British euroscepticism in this regard. The French ‘no’ has frequently been described as a protest vote in reaction to domestic recession and an unpopular president and prime minister at the time. However, other indicators of social euroscepticism show that this type of concern has been strong in France at least since the 1990s (the first decade Eurobarometer started inquiring about this type of concern). Although some degree of protest voting can hardly be dismissed from the 2005-vote, it is important to bear in mind
that social euroscepticism has been strong in France for a number of years (both in absolute terms and in comparison to the EU-average): the fear that integration may have negative effects on social welfare did not just arise in connection with the momentary socio-economic situation.

Consequences of multifaceted euroscepticism

Having established that public euroscepticism differs considerably across countries, it is timely to reflect on the potential consequences that the above dynamics have on the integration process. First of all, it is important to note that not only is euroscepticism multifaceted: it may also be counter productive. In other words, what one population wants from integration may be what another population fears will happen. This depends on the type(s) of scepticism characterising a country. A closer look at central EU-events or initiatives assist the demonstration of how the conceptualisation of euroscepticism outlined in this paper improves our understanding of citizens’ attitudes.

One example is Eastern Enlargement of 2004. It is well-known from various opinion polls that the French were rather sceptical towards this Enlargement, while the Danes were not and the British somewhere in between. A look back at Table 1 shows that this positioning of the three populations could have been predicted from their general euroscepticism situation. Indeed, if we think about what possible broad concerns the ‘average citizen’ could have had towards the Enlargement, one such concern could certainly have been economic. It was arguably not unknown to EU-citizens that in economic terms the ten new member states were all considerably poorer than the existing member states. In consequence, structural funds, for instance, had to be re-allocated in order to reach the now poorest member states. Most member states moreover faced an increased in their overall contribution to the EU-budget.\(^8\)

\(^8\) Eastern enlargement can certainly also be expected to make some citizens more content with the EU on economic grounds—indeed, a central argument behind enlargement was the benefits obtainable from a big single market. The focus of this paper, however, is exclusively on the possible characteristics of Eastern Enlargement that can be thought to make some citizens sceptic.
In addition, Eastern Enlargement could impact on social euroscepticism. Arguably, it was also a well-known fact to many citizens that the welfare systems and level of social protection of the new member states were less extensive than in most old member states. The image of the ‘Polish plumber’, which recurred as a scarecrow in the French referendum on the Constitutional Treaty illustrates such social concerns arising from the Enlargement. The impact of the Enlargement on democratic euroscepticism was arguably less easily detectable, while it could even be argued to have accommodated sovereignty-based concerns. Indeed, if Eastern Enlargement contributed to decreasing some euroscepticism, it may in particular have done so with regard to sovereignty-based euroscepticism. To citizens fearful of the EU’s impact on national sovereignty, widely enlarging the size of the Union may represent a welcome development—it is a classic example of the frequent dichotomy between deeper integration (including more policy areas) and wider integration (including more members).  

This picture of Eastern Enlargement being a challenging event in countries with economic and social euroscepticism (but no sovereignty-based euroscepticism) fits the euroscepticism situation of France—while the opposite is characteristic of the Danish case. The picture from the United Kingdom is more muddled, as the British on the one hand share no relative social euroscepticism and a strong sovereignty-based  

---

9 To some citizens and politicians, an important rationale for co-operation in the European Union may surely be the perception that co-operation in fact strengthens national sovereignty. Indeed, particularly with regard to France, it has been commonplace to state that European integration has been perceived as a means of strengthening French influence in Europe. To such ambitions, Eastern Enlargement may certainly breed fears about losing relative influence. In this sense, the 2004 enlargement could merely have been seen as the latest step in a general process lessening French influence in the EU, which may, in fact, have already started in connection with the EC’s first enlargement in 1973. The paper acknowledges that such concerns are inadequately captured by the present conceptualisation of sovereignty-based euroscepticism, which, as briefly noted above, is concerned with fears that supranational co-operation in the EU in itself is compromising national sovereignty (the above-mentioned French concerns about sovereignty are likely not to lie with supranational co-operation in itself—indeed, at least to the extent that the EU is seen as reflecting French values, supranationalism does not appear to be a contested issue in France. Therefore, a more refined causal analysis of reactions to Eastern Enlargement would do well in attempting to capture varying bases for support for supranational co-operation in the EU. Staying with the relation between sovereignty concerns and EU enlargement, it is noteworthy to consider claims that wider integration may in fact contribute to strengthening the European Commission (and thus supranational elements in the EU), as it is looked to for overview in the midst of a bigger, more dispersed Union (for instance EUobserver, 27th February 2007).
euroscepticism, but on the other hand also share a considerable economic euroscepticism. It thus appears that at least in this case knowledge of the euroscepticism situation of a population can assist predictions about its positioning towards central EU-developments.

Turning to examine how ideas to a way forth from the ratification crisis surrounding the Constitutional Treaty are likely to have been met in the member states, at least four such ideas were aired during the aforementioned period of reflection. One has been for a new ‘grand projet’ for the EU, which in its most specific version has been concretised in form of a ‘social protocol’, which should further a ‘Social Europe’. This hypothetical addition to the Treaty would indeed be likely to make the French more content; however, it is likely not to appease many sceptical opinions in Denmark and in the United Kingdom, where there is no marked social euroscepticism—and where such a protocol might rather contribute to increasing concerns that national social policy would come under pressure.

Another recurrent idea during the reflection period has been aired through the European Commission’s ‘Plan D’ (European Commission 2005), where ‘D’ stands for democracy, debate and dialogue. The focus of Plan D has been on improving the existing structures of the EU, with the explicit ambition to engage the public and ‘restore public confidence in the European Union’ (ibid: 3). Its motivation seems to be the interpretation of the French and the Dutch referenda results as largely protest-based: ‘What influenced the choice of “no” voters in both countries the most were the concerns about the country’s economic and social situation’.10 I will argue that Plan D’s relevance is in fact largely restricted to democratic euroscepticism. Indeed, to citizens critical of the EU’s ability to listen to their opinions and/or the set-up of its institutions, efforts by EU-politicians to appear more listening, as well as democratisation initiatives, may well reduce the prominence of this particular type of scepticism. However, more transparency and democracy are unlikely to reduce economic, sovereignty-based or social euroscepticism—and, could even contribute to the contrary (if, for example, the European Parliament as a result of democratisation strategies had its powers increased, this might

be welcomed by citizens sceptical on democratic grounds, but opposed by citizens who are sceptical on sovereignty-based grounds).

Third, there were widespread calls for **skipping the more symbolic references in the Constitutional Treaty** to, for instance, a European flag and anthem, as well as the very reference to a Constitution. These calls reflect the idea that scepticism towards the document centred on the fear that the EU was coming to resemble a state or a federation, or, in other words, sovereignty-based concerns. This can appear surprising given the finding that this type of concern is largely absent in one of the countries that in fact rejected the Constitutional Treaty. Indeed, sovereignty-based euroscepticism does not appear to be among the dominant reasons why the French rejected the document.

Finally, a prominent call during the reflection period has been for a ‘**Europe of Results**’. How is this project likely to be met in the member states? The idea to focus on the creation of day-to-day tangible results may, indeed, initially appeal, and has been advocated by for instance Commission President José Barroso, French coming President Nicolas Sarkozy and Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen. Indeed, Barroso’s strategy, which has been dubbed the ‘Elvis Presley strategy’, calls for ‘**A little less conversation, a little more action**’ (Financial Times: May 11, 2006). In Barroso’s words, ‘**The way to strengthen public confidence in Europe is through results**’.11 Not less forcefully, Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen argues that ‘**We need to show our citizens that the EU is first and foremost about creating results (...). Our citizens see the sense of common institutions and common policies if they deliver results**’.12

I shall certainly not argue against the likelihood that a Europe able to respond promptly and efficiently to citizen concerns would meet with diminishing scepticism-levels—at least with regard to the economic type of euroscepticism. However, an immediate question that poses itself is where one should focus in order to address the concerns of citizens and make the Union respond to their needs. Energy has been proclaimed an

---

11 European Commission 2006: IP/06/595, 10th May.
12 Prime Minister’s Office, Address by Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen at a Conference of Speakers of EU Parliaments in Copenhagen, 20th June 2006.
obvious focal area. However, a recent Eurobarometer poll showed that a majority of citizens were in fact in favour of retaining decision-making power with regard to this area at the national level. Moreover—not surprisingly in light of the above accounts—Eurobarometer surveys indicate that member state populations may want EU action in very diverse fields. In Germany in autumn 2005, for instance, 74 percent believed unemployment to be one of the two major issues of today. A mere eight percent shared that opinion in Ireland. 32 percent in Denmark mentioned terrorism. This figure was but one percent in Lithuania.

The main message from this paper may seem to be that aspirations for a united EU, enjoying the support of a majority of its citizens, are a chimera. This, however, would be a too hasty conclusion. What may be a chimera is restricted to the two surprisingly resistant ideas that one and the same message or campaign will (or should) appeal to all populations, and that euroscepticism is a pathology that can be done away with. These ideas, indeed, appear unrealistic in the absence of, say, a major external threat. Instead, campaigns seeking to win support for a particular treaty—or for that matter an entirely different type of co-operation in Europe—will have to focus on the particular euroscepticism situation of their target groups, and the awareness that some types of euroscepticism have existed as long as the EU itself, and are as unlikely to go away as it is unlikely that all citizens in a democratic country will back a particular government. Not all EU-policies are likely to enjoy popular backing in all the Union’s member states; however, this is not a pathology, but ‘merely’ an inherent feature of democracy.
References


Working Papers in Contemporary European Studies

1. Vesna Bojicic and David Dyker  
   Sanctions on Serbia: Sledgehammer or Scalpel  
   June 1993

2. Gunther Burghardt  
   The Future for a European Foreign and Security Policy  
   August 1993

3. Xiudian Dai, Alan Cawson, Peter Holmes  
   Competition, Collaboration & Public Policy: A Case Study of the European HDTV Strategy  
   February 1994

4. Colin Crouch  
   The Future of Unemployment in Western Europe? Reconciling Demands for Flexibility, Quality and Security  
   February 1994

5. John Edmonds  
   Industrial Relations - Will the European Community Change Everything?  
   February 1994

6. Olli Rehn  
   The European Community and the Challenge of a Wider Europe  
   July 1994

7. Ulrich Sedelmeier  
   The EU’s Association Policy towards Central Eastern Europe: Political and Economic Rationales in Conflict  
   October 1994

8. Mary Kaldor  
   Rethinking British Defence Policy and Its Economic Implications  
   February 1995

9. Alasdair Young  
   Ideas, Interests and Institutions: The Politics of Liberalisation in the EC’s Road Haulage Industry  
   December 1994

10. Keith Richardson  
    Competitiveness in Europe: Cooperation or Conflict?  
    December 1994

11. Mike Hobday  
    The Technological Competence of European Semiconductor Producers  
    June 1995

12. Graham Avery  
    The Commission’s Perspective on the Enlargement Negotiations  
    July 1995

13. Gerda Falkner  
    The Maastricht Protocol on Social Policy: Theory and Practice  
    September 1995

14. Vesna Bojicic, Mary Kaldor, Ivan Vejvoda  
    Post-War Reconstruction in the Balkans  
    November 1995

15. Alasdair Smith, Peter Holmes, Ulrich Sedelmeier, Edward Smith, Helen Wallace, Alasdair Young  
    The European Union and Central and Eastern Europe: Pre-Accession Strategies  
    March 1996
16. Helen Wallace
   *From an Island off the North-West Coast of Europe*
   March 1996

17. Indira Konjhodzic
   *Democratic Consolidation of the Political System in Finland, 1945-1970: Potential Model for the New States of Central and Eastern Europe?*
   June 1996

18. Antje Wiener and Vince Della Sala
   *Constitution Making and Citizenship Practice - Bridging the Democracy Gap in the EU?*
   December 1996

19. Helen Wallace and Alasdair Young
   *Balancing Public and Private Interests Under Duress*
   December 1996

20. S. Ran Kim
   *Evolution of Governance & the Growth Dynamics of the Korean Semiconductor Industry*
   April 1997

21. Tibor Navracsics
   *A Missing Debate?: Hungary and the European Union*
   June 1997

22. Peter Holmes with Jeremy Kempton
   *Study on the Economic and Industrial Aspects of Anti-Dumping Policy*
   September 1997

23. Helen Wallace
   *Coming to Terms with a Larger Europe: Options for Economic Integration*
   January 1998

24. Mike Hobday, Alan Cawson and S Ran Kim
   *The Pacific Asian Electronics Industries: Technology Governance and Implications for Europe*
   January 1998

25. Iain Begg
   *Structural Fund Reform in the Light of Enlargement*
   CENTRE ON EUROPEAN POLITICAL ECONOMY Working Paper No. 1

26. Mick Dunford and Adrian Smith
   *Trajectories of Change in Europe’s Regions: Cohesion, Divergence and Regional Performance*
   CENTRE ON EUROPEAN POLITICAL ECONOMY Working Paper No. 2

27. Ray Hudson
   *What Makes Economically Successful Regions in Europe Successful? Implications for Transferring Success from West to East*
   CENTRE ON EUROPEAN POLITICAL ECONOMY Working Paper No. 3

28. Adam Swain
   *Institutions and Regional Development: Evidence from Hungary and Ukraine*
   CENTRE ON EUROPEAN POLITICAL ECONOMY Working Paper No. 4

29. Alasdair Young
   *Interpretation and ‘Soft Integration’ in the Adaptation of the European Community’s Foreign Economic Policy*
   CENTRE ON EUROPEAN POLITICAL ECONOMY Working Paper No. 5

   October 1998
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Publication Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31.</td>
<td>Christopher Preston and Arkadiusz Michonski</td>
<td>Negotiating Regulatory Alignment in Central Europe: The Case of the Poland EU European Conformity Assessment Agreement</td>
<td>March 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32.</td>
<td>Jeremy Kempton, Peter Holmes, Cliff Stevenson</td>
<td>Globalisation of Anti-Dumping and the EU</td>
<td>September 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CENTRE ON EUROPEAN POLITICAL ECONOMY Working Paper No. 6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33.</td>
<td>Alan Mayhew</td>
<td>Financial and Budgetary Implications of the Accession of Central and East European Countries to the European Union.</td>
<td>March 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34.</td>
<td>Aleks Szczerbiak</td>
<td>Public Opinion and Eastward Enlargement - Explaining Declining Support for EU Membership in Poland</td>
<td>May 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35.</td>
<td>Keith Richardson</td>
<td>Big Business and the European Agenda</td>
<td>September 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36.</td>
<td>Aleks Szczerbiak and Paul Taggart</td>
<td>Opposing Europe: Party Systems and Opposition to the Union, the Euro and Europeanisation</td>
<td>October 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>OPPOSING EUROPE RESEARCH NETWORK Working Paper No. 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37.</td>
<td>Alasdair Young, Peter Holmes and Jim Rollo</td>
<td>The European Trade Agenda After Seattle</td>
<td>November 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38.</td>
<td>Sławomir Tokarski and Alan Mayhew</td>
<td>Impact Assessment and European Integration Policy</td>
<td>December 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39.</td>
<td>Alan Mayhew</td>
<td>Enlargement of the European Union: an Analysis of the Negotiations with the Central and Eastern European Candidate Countries</td>
<td>December 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41.</td>
<td>Joseph F. Francois and Machiel Rombout</td>
<td>Trade Effects From The Integration Of The Central And East European Countries Into The European Union</td>
<td>February 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42.</td>
<td>Peter Holmes and Alasdair Young</td>
<td>Emerging Regulatory Challenges to the EU's External Economic Relations</td>
<td>February 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44.</td>
<td>Witold Orłowski and Alan Mayhew</td>
<td>The Impact of EU Accession on Enterprise, Adaptation and Institutional Development in the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe</td>
<td>May 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Author(s)</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>Adam Lazowski</td>
<td>Adaptation of the Polish legal system to European Union law: Selected aspects</td>
<td>May 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak</td>
<td>Parties, Positions and Europe: Euroscepticism in the EU Candidate States of Central and Eastern Europe</td>
<td>May 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>Paul Webb and Justin Fisher</td>
<td>Professionalizing the Millbank Tendency: the Political Sociology of New Labour's Employees</td>
<td>May 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>Aleks Szczerbiak</td>
<td>Europe as a Re-aligning Issue in Polish Politics?: Evidence from the October 2000 Presidential Election</td>
<td>June 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>Agnes Batory</td>
<td>Hungarian Party Identities and the Question of European Integration</td>
<td>September 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Karen Henderson</td>
<td>Euroscepticism or Europhobia: Opposition attitudes to the EU in the Slovak Republic</td>
<td>September 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak</td>
<td>The Party Politics of Euroscepticism in EU Member and Candidate States</td>
<td>April 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>Alan Mayhew</td>
<td>The Negotiating Position of the European Union on Agriculture, the Structural Funds and the EU Budget.</td>
<td>April 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>Aleks Szczerbiak</td>
<td>After the Election, Nearing The Endgame: The Polish Euro-Debate in the Run Up To The 2003 EU Accession Referendum</td>
<td>May 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>Charlie Lees</td>
<td>'Dark Matter': institutional constraints and the failure of party-based Euroscepticism in Germany</td>
<td>June 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>Pinar Tanlak</td>
<td>Turkey EU Relations in the Post Helsinki phase and the EU harmonisation laws adopted by the Turkish Grand National Assembly in August 2002</td>
<td>October 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>Nick Sitter</td>
<td>Opposing Europe: Euro-Scepticism, Opposition and Party Competition</td>
<td>October 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Author(s)</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60.</td>
<td>Lucia Quaglia</td>
<td>Euroscepticism in Italy and centre Right and Right wing political parties</td>
<td>March 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>OPPOSING EUROPE RESEARCH NETWORK Working Paper No. 10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61.</td>
<td>Francesca Vassallo</td>
<td>Another Europeanisation Case: British Political Activism</td>
<td>March 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63.</td>
<td>Rasa Spokeviciute</td>
<td>The Impact of EU Membership of The Lithuanian Budget</td>
<td>March 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64.</td>
<td>Clive Church</td>
<td>The Contexts of Swiss Opposition to Europe</td>
<td>May 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>OPPOSING EUROPE RESEARCH NETWORK Working Paper No. 11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65.</td>
<td>Alan Mayhew</td>
<td>The Financial and Budgetary Impact of Enlargement and Accession</td>
<td>May 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68.</td>
<td>Professor Jim Rollo</td>
<td>Agriculture, the Structural Funds and the Budget After Enlargement</td>
<td>August 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>EUROPEAN PARTIES ELECTIONS AND REFERENDUMS NETWORK Working Paper No. 12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70.</td>
<td>Nicolo Conti</td>
<td>Party Attitudes to European Integration: A Longitudinal Analysis of the Italian Case</td>
<td>November 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>EUROPEAN PARTIES ELECTIONS AND REFERENDUMS NETWORK Working Paper No. 13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>EUROPEAN PARTIES ELECTIONS AND REFERENDUMS NETWORK Working Paper No. 14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Author(s)</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td>Juraj Buzalka</td>
<td>Is Rural Populism on the decline? Continuities and Changes in Twentieth Century Europe: The case of Slovakia</td>
<td>February 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74</td>
<td>Anna Slodka</td>
<td>Eco Labelling in the EU: Lessons for Poland</td>
<td>May 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>Pasquale Tridico</td>
<td>Institutional Change and Economic Performance in Transition Economics: The case of Poland</td>
<td>May 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76</td>
<td>Arkadiusz Domagala</td>
<td>Humanitarian Intervention: The Utopia of Just War? The NATO intervention in Kosovo and the restraints of Humanitarian Intervention</td>
<td>August 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77</td>
<td>Marisol Garcia, Antonio Cardesa Salzmann &amp; Marc Pradel</td>
<td>The European Employment Strategy: An Example of European Multi-level Governance</td>
<td>September 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79</td>
<td>Wojciech Lewandowski</td>
<td>The Influence of the War in Iraq on Transatlantic Relations</td>
<td>October 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>Susannah Verney</td>
<td>The End of Socialist Hegemony: Europe and the Greek Parliamentary Election of 7th March 2004</td>
<td>October 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81</td>
<td>Kenneth Chan</td>
<td>Central and Eastern Europe in the 2004 European Parliamentary Elections: A Not So European Event</td>
<td>November 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82</td>
<td>Lionel Marquis</td>
<td>The Priming of Referendum Votes on Swiss European Policy</td>
<td>December 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83</td>
<td>Lionel Marquis and Karin Gilland Lutz</td>
<td>Thinking About and Voting on Swiss Foreign Policy: Does Affective and Cognitive Involvement Play a Role?</td>
<td>December 2004</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
84. Nathaniel Copsey and Aleks Szczerbiak  
*The Future of Polish-Ukrainian Relations: Evidence from the June 2004 European Parliament Election Campaign in Poland*  
March 2005

85. Ece Ozlem Atikcan  
*Citizenship or Denizenship: The Treatment of Third Country Nationals in the European Union*  
May 2006

86. Aleks Szczerbiak  
*Social Poland Defeats ‘Liberal Poland’?: The September-October 2005 Polish Parliamentary and Presidential Elections*  
May 2006

87. Nathaniel Copsey  
*Echoes of the Past in Contemporary Politics: the case of Polish-Ukrainian Relations*  
October 2006

88. Lyukba Savkova  
*Spoilt for Choice, Yet Hard to Get: Voters and Parties at the Bulgarian 2005 Parliamentary Election*  
November 2006

89. Tim Bale and Paul Taggart  
*First Timers Yes, Virgins No: The Roles and Backgrounds of New Members of the European Parliament*  
November 2006

90. Lucia Quaglia  
*Setting the pace? Private financial interests and European financial market integration*  
November 2006

91. Tim Bale and Aleks Szczerbiak  
*Why is there no Christian Democracy in Poland (and why does this matter)?*  
December 2006

92. Edward Phelps  
*Young Adults and Electoral Turnout in Britain: Towards a Generational Model of Political Participation*  
December 2006

93. Alan Mayhew  
*A certain idea of Europe: Can European integration survive eastern enlargement?*  
April 2007

94. Seán Hanley, Aleks Szczerbiak, Tim Haughton and Brigid Fowler  
*Explaining the Success of Centre-Right Parties in Post-Communist East Central Europe: A Comparative Analysis*  
May 2007

95. Dan Hough and Michael Koß  
*Territory and Electoral Politics in Germany*  
May 2007

96. Lucia Quaglia  
*Committee Governance in the Financial Sector in the European Union*  
July 2007

97. Lucia Quaglia, Dan Hough and Alan Mayhew  
*You Can’t Always Get What You Want, But Do You Sometimes Get What You Need? The German Presidency of the EU in 2007*  
August 2007
98. Aleks Szczerbiak
Why do Poles love the EU and what do they love about it?: Polish attitudes towards European integration during the first three years of EU membership
November 2007

99. Francis McGowan
The Contrasting Fortunes of European Studies and EU Studies: Grounds for Reconciliation?
January 2008

100. Aleks Szczerbiak
The birth of a bi-polar party system or a referendum on a polarising government: The October 2007 Polish parliamentary election
January 2008

101. Catharina Sørensen
Love me, love me not… A typology of public euro scepticism
EUROPEAN PARTIES ELECTIONS AND REFERENDUMS NETWORK Working Paper No. 19
January 2008

All Working Papers are downloadable free of charge from the web - www.sei.ac.uk
Otherwise, each Working Paper is £5.00 (unless noted otherwise) plus £1.00 postage and packing per copy in Europe and £2.00 per copy elsewhere. Payment by credit card or cheque (payable to 'University of Sussex').