Theorising Party-Based Euroscepticism: Problems of Definition, Measurement and Causality

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Abstract

This paper addresses and seeks to move forward the debate on two theoretical questions that have recurred in debates about party-based Euroscepticism: (i) how do we define and measure it and (ii) what causes it? It argues that analysts need to be careful to ensure that definitions of party-based Euroscepticism are not over-inclusive and should refer specifically to party attitudes towards European integration through the EU in principle and the EU’s current and future trajectory. The next stage in the process of theorising party-based Euroscepticism is to locate it within a broader typology of party positions on Europe that breaks down attitudes among pro-integrationist parties. However, the more complex and fine-grained the typology is, the more difficult it is to operationalise. It also argues that the debate on causality (as well as that on conceptualisation and definition) has been confused by the conflation of (i) Eurosceptic party positions and (ii) the use of Eurosceptic discourses in inter-party competition. These two phenomena need to be clearly distinguished for analytical purposes and have different causal mechanisms.
THEORISING PARTY-BASED EUROSECTICISM: PROBLEMS OF DEFINITION, MEASUREMENT AND CAUSALITY*

Why do political parties take the positions they do on particular issues, or use those issues in a given way as part of inter-party competition? In this paper we examine the way that parties have addressed the issue of European integration in order to try and contribute to a wider understanding of the dynamics of party politics. In doing this we aim to assess the relative degree of influence of ideas and ideologies, the role of individuals and leadership within parties, institutional constraints and opportunities offered by the context in which they operate, and role of the interests of parties, their constituent elements and electoral bases. We are focusing on the way in which parties take Eurosceptic positions on the project of European integration or problematise the issue as part of inter-party competition. This is an issue of low (if any) salience for many parties, but this makes the picture somewhat clearer as the issue is not, in the long sweep of history, an embedded issue which parties find themselves unable to change. In other words, the European issue is a very slippery one, amenable to very different interpretations and one that cannot necessarily be easily read off from other party positions. This makes it, potentially, a powerful illuminator of some key processes of party positioning.

Recent years have seen an upsurge in academic research on the subject of political party attitudes towards European integration¹ and specifically on the emergence of party-based Euroscepticism.² The formation of the Opposing Europe Research Network has provided an opportunity to bring together a range of scholars and practitioners interested in this important topic. This paper is based on one presented originally at the 8th Biannual International Conference of the European Union Studies Association conference, Nashville, 27-9 March, 2003. It originates from discussions held at two Opposing Europe Research Network seminars held at the LSE in July 2002 and December 2002. We are grateful for the input made by all the participants at these seminars and particularly to comments provided by Agnes Batory, Giacomo Benedetto, David Baker, Brigid Folwer, Sean Hanley, Tim Haughton, Karen Henderson, Petr Kopecky, Charles Lees, Francis McGowan and Nick Sitter. We are also grateful to the Economic and Social Research Council for funding these seminars. The authors of course take full responsibility for the views expressed in this paper, including any errors.


Network (OERN) three years ago was linked to this burgeoning interest in the impact of the EU on domestic politics and has provided much of the impetus for its development. This literature has produced some extremely valuable single country or party case studies as well as more comparative and theoretical contributions. Most of the theoretical controversies that have arisen within the various papers and seminars on this topic have focused on two linked issues. Firstly, how does one define and measure party-based Euroscepticism? Secondly, what is it that causes parties to adopt Eurosceptic positions and/or Eurosceptic discourses in party competition?

This paper, therefore, also seeks to address and move forward the debate on these two controversial theoretical issues. It surveys the current literature and attempts to draw conclusions in terms of where the debate has reached. The paper begins by examining the definitional controversies and, on the basis of the various approaches surveyed, attempts to draw some tentative conclusions about how party-based Euroscepticism should be conceptualised. Section two briefly considers some of the positions and discourses that have, in our view, been wrongly categorised as party-based Euroscepticism (by ourselves, among others!). Section three examines whether or not (and how) it is possible to ‘measure’ levels of party-based Euroscepticism and critically evaluates our own earlier attempts to try to do so. Finally, section four reflects on the academic debate on what causes party-based Euroscepticism. This has tended to be portrayed (wrongly, in our view) in dichotomous terms as an argument between those who give priority to ideological-programmatic impulses on the one hand and those who stress the imperatives of strategic-tactical positioning on the other. It should be stressed that this is very much a summary of research in progress and that the conclusions it reaches are tentative ones. It is primarily as a synthesis of, and our latest contribution to, an ongoing debate rather than the last word.

The paper argues that analysts must be careful to ensure that definitions of party-based Euroscepticism are not over-inclusive and should refer specifically to party attitudes towards European integration through the EU in principle and the EU’s current or future trajectory. The next stage in the theorising process is to locate party-based Euroscepticism within a broader typology of party positions on Europe that breaks down attitudes among pro-integrationist parties. However, the more complex and fine-grained the typology is the more difficult it is to operationalise. Finally, we argue that the debate on causality (as well as that on conceptualisation and definition) has been confused by the conflation of Eurosceptic party positions on the one hand and the use of Eurosceptic discourses in inter-party competition on the other. In our view, these two phenomena need to be clearly distinguished for analytical purposes and have different causal mechanisms.

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3 In August 2003 OERN was re-launched as the European Parties and Elections Research Network (EPERN) to reflect a broadening of its research agenda.
5 The focus of this paper is on how Euroscepticism manifests itself at the elite level, with political parties being the specific unit of analysis. It does not attempt to extrapolate these findings to the mass level in order to analyse the conceptualisation, measurement and causality of public Euroscepticism, nor makes any claims that the analytical framework set out here is transferable in this way. The authors disagree on whether or not it is possible to do so.
1. What is party-based Euroscepticism?

The term Euroscepticism has emerged relatively recently as a concept derived from journalistic discourse rather than political science. Euroscepticism tends to be used as a generic, catch-all term encapsulating a disparate bundle of attitudes opposed to European integration in general and opposition to the EU in particular. Consequently, political scientists who have attempted to borrow and adapt the term to analyse the impact of European integration on domestic politics and party systems have encountered a number of conceptual difficulties. This is particularly true when they have attempted to analyse the phenomenon of Euroscepticism in a comparative (and especially pan-European) way.

In recent years, several authors have attempted to define the term with greater precision, with specific reference to its manifestation in party politics. Our own working definition developed and refined over the last two-and-a-half years built on Taggart's initial observation that it was used as a term that "expresses the idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration." Subsequently, we attempted to break this concept down to distinguish between principled (Hard) opposition to European integration and contingent (Soft) opposition, with attitudes towards a country's membership of the EU being viewed as the ultimate litmus test of whether one fell into the first or second camp. Consequently, we arrived at the following definition of party-based Hard Euroscepticism as being: "where there is a principled opposition to the EU and European integration and therefore can be seen in parties who think that their countries should withdraw from membership, or whose policies towards the EU are tantamount to being opposed to the whole project of European integration as it is currently conceived." Party-based Soft Euroscepticism, on the other hand, was "where there is NOT a principled objection to European integration or EU membership but where concerns on one (or a number) of policy areas leads to the expression of qualified opposition to the EU, or where there is a sense that 'national interest' is currently at odds with the EU trajectory."

The Hard-Soft Euroscepticism dichotomy was designed as a (in the end, rather cumbersome) working definition for the specific purpose of conducting basic, comparative empirical research on manifestation of Euroscepticism in European party systems. Although it has been extensively applied (and critiqued) by other researchers, it is important to bear in mind that it was originally formulated very much...
as a work in progress with the explicit objective of stimulating further debate and we have never been theologically attached to it.

The most comprehensive alternative conceptualisation, based on a critique of our Hard-Soft distinction, emerged from Kopecky and Mudde. Kopecky and Mudde's critique of our working definition was based on two main strands of argument (both of which, incidentally, we agree with). Firstly, they argued explicitly that our definition of Soft party-based Euroscepticism was too inclusive and all encompassing or, as they put it, "defined (Euroscepticism) in such a broad manner that virtually every disagreement with any policy decision of the EU can be included." Secondly, and more implicitly, they argued that support for or opposition to EU membership was not the litmus test that we made it in our Hard-Soft dichotomy and, therefore, not the key distinction that should be drawn among critics of the European integration project.

Returning to Taggart's original 1998 conceptualisation, that placed greater emphasis on attitudes towards European integration per se rather than attitudes for or against EU membership, they argued for a two-stage distinction. Firstly, between: those parties that supported or opposed the principle of ceding sovereignty to supranational bodies (what they describe as the original ideas underlying the EU). Secondly, between those parties that supported or opposed the planned further extensions of EU sovereignty (what they call the EU's current or expected future trajectory). On the basis of these two dichotomies - party attitudes towards both European integration through the EU in principle and the EU’s current or future trajectory - they produced a four-fold typology of party positions on Europe as follows:

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<tr>
<th>Euroenthusiasts</th>
<th>Europramatists</th>
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<td>(pro-integration and trajectory)</td>
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<td>Eurosceptics</td>
<td>Eurejects</td>
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<td>(pro-integration, anti-trajectory)</td>
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In many ways, Kopecky and Mudde's critique and alternative conceptualisation is very well thought through and moves the debate on defining party-based Euroscepticism forward in a significant way. We accept that our definition of Soft party-based Euroscepticism may, indeed, have been too broad and included parties that were in essence pro-European integration. In particular, we find what we consider to be their most important argument to be a compelling one. That is, that the key variables in determining party attitudes should be: firstly, underlying support for or opposition to the European integration project as embodied in the EU (rather than a party's support for or opposition to their country's membership at any given time) and, secondly, attitudes towards further actual or planned extensions of EU competencies. In particular, we accept the weakness of using attitudes towards EU membership as the key definitional variable separating different party positions towards Europe.

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9 See: 'The Two Sides of Euroscepticism'. An earlier (slightly different) version of this paper appeared as 'Empty Words or Irreducible Core? Euroscepticism in East Central Europe,' Paper presented to the 97th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 30 August-2 September 2001, San Francisco.

10 See: 'The Two Sides of Euroscepticism.' p300.
This is partly because of our own and others empirical findings on this issue. This points to the fact that whether or not a party says that it is in favour of their country being a member of the EU is certainly important at particular moments such as accession referendums and potentially crucial in terms of the translation of broad party positions into specific policy outcomes. However, it also suggests that party attitudes towards EU membership may be a more conjunctural-opportunistic stance developed in response to short term tactical and medium-term strategic domestic considerations such as the 'deal' that their country is currently being offered or relating to positioning the party during a referendum campaign. For example, Fallend's account of party-based Euroscepticism in Austria describes how the Green Party came to terms with EU membership after their country voted Yes to accession without really changing their underlying attitudes towards the European integration project. Similarly, in her account of party-based Euroscepticism in Hungary Batory describes how two parties, the Justice and Life Party and Hungarian Workers' Party switched their positions on this issue with relative ease in response to short term tactical coalition considerations. In Poland the Polish Peasant Party determined its attitudes towards the June 2003 EU accession referendum on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis of the terms negotiated and whether or not the government introduced some specific items of legislation effecting farmers and rural areas. This suggests that a party's stance on its country's EU membership is not, in fact, such a caesura as described in our original Hard-Soft conceptualisation. On other occasions, it may also be simply a paper commitment in deference to a certain political correctness about attitudes towards EU membership that masks an underlying hostility to the principle of European integration through the EU. This could almost certainly explain the attitude of some parties in Central and Eastern Europe, such as the Slovak National Party, that claim to be pro-EU membership in principle but whose actions and underlying values suggest a fundamental hostility to the European integration. In other words, party attitudes towards EU membership do not necessarily tell us what that party's deeper position is on the broader underlying issue of European integration through the EU.

However, while agreeing with the broad thrust of their critique and overall argument, we also have a number of reservations about the Kopecky/Mudde classificatory schema. The first of these is a relatively less important terminological one, namely: that it departs from the existing common usage of the term Euroscepticism by confining it to a sub-set of what would generally be considered Eurosceptic attitudes. In the popular sense, the term Eurosceptic generally encompasses both principled and contingent opposition to the European integration project. (Indeed, many commentators often use the term even more broadly to refer to virtually any criticism of the EU, a criticism that we have been accused of in the past.) This is a point that we consider in greater detail in the next section. Kopecky and Mudde, on the other hand,

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refer to principled opponents of European integration either generically as ‘Europhobes’ or specifically if they (logically) combine this with criticism of the EU’s current/future trajectory (i.e. deepening) as ‘Eurorejects’. These terminological problems are highlighted when one considers that the UK Independence Party, for example, would not be categorised a Eurosceptic party according to this definition.

Secondly, we believe that Kopecky and Mudde’s Europragmatist category comprising parties that are opposed to European integration in principle but supportive of the further extensions of EU sovereignty and the deepening of integration project that the EU’s current trajectory envisages, is illogical. The placement of certain parties such as the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia and the Hungarian Independent Smallholders Party in this particular category simply reflects the fact that they have positions on Europe that make them extremely difficult to categorise. In our view, the fact that there will be certain parties that are difficult to fit neatly into any typology is something that we simply have to accept rather than inventing separate and illogical categories for them. Moreover, we cannot think of any parties in current EU member states that would fit into this category.

Thirdly, and most importantly, we believe that Kopecky and Mudde’s default Euroenthusiast category is too inclusive and does not really capture the full range of different approaches to the EU that are encompassed within it. In doing, it produces strange bedfellows (in the same way that we were rightly accused of doing in our Soft Eurosceptic category) placing the Polish Peasant Party and Hungarian Fidesz party in the same box as the Polish Civic Platform and Hungarian Alliance of Free Democrats. The problem is highlighted by the fact that in current member states this category would, presumably, include parties such as the German Christian Democrats, French Gaullists and Forza Italia, who clearly hold different views how they wish to see the European integration project develop. In other words, the Kopecky-Mudde classificatory does not capture the fact that just as opposition to the European integration project as embodied in the EU can be both principled and contingent so can support for it. Any classificatory schema that attempts to be comprehensive and offer a full-blown typology of party positions (as Kopecky and Mudde’s typology does) must capture and reflect different degrees of enthusiasm for the European integration project as well as opposition to it.

Logically, therefore, the next step in terms of building upon our and Kopecky and Mudde’s attempts to conceptualise party-based Euroscepticism (but one that goes beyond the scope of this paper) is to further break down the category of parties that are broadly supportive of both the European integration project in principle and the EU’s current trajectory. In other words, it is necessary to locate Eurosceptic party positions within a broader typology of party positions on Europe that reflect nuances among the (broadly conceived) Euro-enthusiast bloc of parties. Some commentators have already made some tentative attempts to try to do this. Conti and Verzichelli, for

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15 Some other academic commentators are more sympathetic to using the terminology in this way. Katz, for example, implies that a different term (such as Europhobia) may be appropriate for principled opposition to the European project given that “scepticism’ ordinarily refers to doubts or reservations rather than outright opposition.” See: R.S. Katz, ‘Euroscepticism in Parliament: A Comparative Analysis of the European and National Parliaments’, Paper prepared for the workshop on ‘Opposing Europe: Euroscepticism and Political Parties’, ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Turin, 22-27 March 2002. p2. See also: ‘Euroscepticism or Europhobia.’
example, have (without using this precise terminology) attempted to break down the pro-European integration camp into principled and contingent Euro-enthusiasts to mirror the principled and contingent opposition that is to be found among Eurosceptic parties.\(^{16}\) The most ambitious and comprehensive attempt to develop a classificatory schema that encompasses a range of party positions on Europe is Flood's (which, interestingly, deliberately avoids the term Euroscepticism).\(^{17}\) This comprises six categories (all carrying the prefix EU- rather than Euro-):

- **Rejectionist** - positions opposed to either (i) membership of the EU or (ii) participation in some particular institution or policy.
- **Revisionist** - positions in favour of a return to the state of affairs before some major treaty revision either (i) in relation to the entire configuration of the EU or (ii) in relation to one or more policy areas.
- **Minimalist** - positions accepting the status quo but resisting further integration either (i) of the entire structure or (ii) of some particular policy area(s).
- **Gradualist** - positions supporting further integration either (i) of the system as a whole or (ii) in some particular policy area(s), so long as the process is taken slowly and with great care.
- **Reformist** - positions of constructive engagement, emphasising the need to improve one or more existing institutions and/or practices.
- **Maximalist** - positions in favour of pushing forward with the existing processes as rapidly as is practicable towards higher levels of integration either (i) of the overall structure or (ii) in some particular policy areas. (all emphases in the original)

Apart from the epistemological problem that these categories are not necessarily mutually exclusive and some parties might comfortably be located in more than one of them, Flood's typology (together with Kopecky and Mudde's) draws our attention towards one of the generic problems of defining party positions on the European issue, including Eurosceptic ones. That is: that the more complex and fine-grain the typology, the more difficult it is to operationalise and categorise the parties. This is because parties rarely elaborate their policies on the key issues on European integration in such detail that we can properly categorise them. Put simply, both the Flood and the Kopecky-Mudde typologies require a lot of data in order to categorise broad underlying party positions with the degree of precision that is required to fully operationalise them and this kind of information is often not available. There are, of course, various strategies that researchers can adopt to circumvent this problem. For example, Baker et al have attempted to analyse the broad underlying positions of British parties (particularly the Conservatives) by referring to their broader political economy and this approach could be generalised to other parties and party systems.\(^{18}\)

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\(^{17}\) See: 'Euroscepticism.'

\(^{18}\) See, for example: D.Baker A. Gamble and D. Seawright, ‘Sovereign nations and global markets: modern British Conservatism and hyperglobalism,’ *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, Vol 4 No 3. October 2002. pp399-428. At an Opposing Europe Research Network seminar held at the LSE on July 31st 2002, Sean Hanley (Brunel University) has argued that another approach is to analyse a party's underlying cultural-historical orientation.
Ultimately, however, all of these approaches involve inferring party positions on Europe from statements on other policy areas or broader ideological positions and, therefore, involve a high degree of imprecision and second-guessing about what party positions really are.

Ironically, given that Kopecky and Mudde’s empirical focus is on four Central and East European EU candidate countries, this kind of data is actually is actually easier to obtain for parties in current member states. The latter are likely to have had more time to work out elaborate stances on various EU-related issues so that the researcher can discern the kind of EU that they are in favour or against with greater precision. In the candidate states, however, it is difficult to identify a party’s stance on either European integration through the EU in principle or on the EU’s current trajectory because most of them do not articulate them, or simply have not even considered them. Very few parties have elaborated their positions on the kind of EU they want to quite the extent of Vaclav Klaus' Civic Democratic Party, the paradigmatic case of a Eurosceptic party (pro-integration in principle, but anti-the EU’s current trajectory) according to Kopecky and Mudde.19 Henderson illustrates this point very well in a paper discussing the particular problems of researching party-based Euroscepticism in the context of the Central and East European candidate states when she argues that "it is likely that 'Europe' will be viewed through the prism of domestic politics even more strongly in post-communist states than in western Europe."20 In most cases, parties in candidate states have, indeed, tended to view EU integration almost exclusively through the prism of the accession negotiations and the kind of 'deal' that their country is likely to be offered. The kind of EU that they want to be members of (the kind of subjects being addressed by the Convention on the Future of Europe, for example) are issues of pure abstraction to them and therefore rarely addressed in any detail in party programmes, if at all. Moreover, given the predominant role that domestic politics plays in determining party positions on Europe, criticisms of the EU in candidate states are generally couched in terms of attacking the membership terms and conditions that are being offered by the EU and that country's government’s approach to the EU negotiations.21 Nevertheless, it is possible to overplay the differences between the candidate and member states. Many parties in the latter also view the European issue primarily through the lens of domestic politics and it is possible to exaggerate the extent to which they too have elaborated detailed policy positions on a broad range of EU-related issues. Lees’ analysis of party programmes in the October 2002 German Bundestag election highlights how little detail was accorded to this issue (and therefore, of the difficulties of identifying broad, underlying party positions) even in one of the EU founder states. This is in spite of the fact that most German parties have

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21 This is not the same as contesting the European integration project as such or the EU's current/future trajectory and, as Kopecky and Mudde argue, it is incorrect to classify such parties as Euroseptic. This point is discussed in more detail in the next section.
had several decades when they have been constantly forced to confront the issue of what kind of EU they want to see.\textsuperscript{22}

In the short term, therefore, we would argue that Kopecky and Mudde's classificatory schema should be modified so that it so that it focuses solely on party-based opposition to European integration, rather than attempting to locate their categories within a broader classificatory schema of party positions on Europe, and adopts the more popular usage of the term/convention of referring to Euroscepticism as both principled and contingent opponents of EU integration. While we think that the basic two-fold distinction based on the Kopecky and Mudde criteria is more workable than our original Hard-Soft formulation, we would re-formulate it as follows. Hard Euroscepticism (what Kopecky and Mudde term Eurorejectionism) might be defined as principled opposition to the project of European integration as embodied in the EU, in other words, based on the ceding or transfer of powers to supranational institution such as the EU. Soft Euroscepticism (what they term simply Euroscepticism) might be re-defined as when there is not a principled objection to the European integration project of transferring powers to a supranational body such as the EU, but there is opposition to the EU's current or future planned trajectory based on the \textit{further} extension of competencies that the EU is planning to make. This is a piece of short-term theorising and must, in our view, be only a first step in the larger project of developing a more comprehensive typology of party positions on Europe that offers a more nuanced approach to pro-integration as well as anti-integration stances.

\section{2. Opposing Europe or Problematising Europe? What party-based Euroscepticism is not}

As noted above, the term Euroscepticism has been used in an all-encompassing and over-inclusive way by a number of commentators, including by us. Finally, therefore, on this issue of definition it is worth discussing briefly a number of problem cases that those who have been researching this topic have had difficulties with when considering whether or not to include them in the definition of party-based Euroscepticism. The examples listed below are intended to be illustrative rather than exhaustive and there are, no doubt, other such difficult areas that can be added.

\textit{i. Criticising the EU for failing to reflect your country's national interests}

Does a party criticising the EU for failing to properly reflect its country's national interests in, for example, budget negotiations (in the case of member states) or accession negotiations (in the case of candidate states) count as Euroscepticism? We have been criticised for appearing to include this within our definition of party-based Euroscepticism ("a sense that national interest is at odds with the EU's current trajectory") and, therefore, of being over-inclusive. Clearly, it is possible at any given time for almost any party, however pro-European, to engage in this kind of rhetoric. On reflection, therefore, we believe that it was incorrect of us to include these kinds of critics of the EU within our definition of party-based Euroscepticism. In other words,

we now reject the idea that criticism of the EU for simply failing to reflect their country's national interests is sufficient for a party to be described as Eurosceptic.

\textit{ii. Criticising specific EU policies}

We also accept the criticism made by some commentators that our formulation of Soft party-based Euroscepticism as outlined above was in danger of including parties that only have concerns about what is going on in one or two EU policy areas. As noted above, Kopecky and Mudde have argued that "soft Euroscepticism is defined (by Taggart and Szczerbiak) in such a broad manner that virtually every disagreement with any policy decision of the EU can be included."\textsuperscript{23} Similarly, in a paper discussing party-based Euroscepticism in Belgium, Deschouwer and van Assche criticised us for including "concerns about what is going on in one or in a few policy areas"\textsuperscript{24} within our definition. In his discussion of party-based Euroscepticism in Finland, Raunio points out how parties can have individual policies that are against the EU’s current trajectory but nonetheless remain broadly in favour of it and therefore have a broad underlying party position that is not Eurosceptic. For example, the Finnish Social Democrats and Green League who opposed a common European defence policy but broadly support 'deepening' European integration in principle.\textsuperscript{25} Clearly if a party is broadly in favour of both European integration as embodied in the EU in principle and the EU’s general current trajectory but opposes one particular extension of sovereignty (to, say, include a common European defence policy) then that does not necessarily make it Eurosceptic. All of this, of course, begs a series of questions, an important one being: how many extensions of sovereignty must a party oppose before it can be categorised as Eurosceptic? In this respect, a certain amount of common sense has to be applied. There are no simple answers here and clearly further reflection on this point is necessary. The basic point is that opposing only one or two EU policy areas is clearly not sufficient to qualify a party as Eurosceptic.

A possible alternative answer is to focus on the quality of the policy being opposed rather than the quantity. We might want to ask what sorts of policies are being opposed and to differentiate between ‘core’ and ‘peripheral’ areas of policy concern for the EU. Clearly a party opposed to EMU is more likely to be categorised as Eurosceptic than a party opposed to say the Common Fisheries Policy. Again, there will be disagreement about what constitutes core policies but it is clear that picking away at marginal policy disagreements does not necessary constitute Euroscepticism.

A logical next step would, therefore, be to specify some areas of policy that are core parts of the European project as embodied in the EU or encapsulate its current/future trajectory, although we fully appreciate that this is open to dispute. An obvious example is EMU. The idea that one could support the EU’s current/future trajectory and yet be opposed to EMU seems deeply problematic to us. A second possible area might well be the European constitution agreed at the Convention on the Future of

\textsuperscript{23} See: 'The Two Sides of Euroscepticism’, p300.
Europe, when and if this ever becomes agreed as a new treaty. This is clearly speculative but we might find that reactions to the European constitution would constitute a core area that it would difficult to oppose while not against the EU’s current/future trajectory, and therefore being a Eurosceptic. The Common Foreign and Security Policy may, on the other hand, be an area where there is fundamental disagreement about the principle and practice but where support for the EU’s broad current/future trajectory is not jeopardised and, therefore, represents a non-core area.

The picture is further complicated by the fact that, arguably, the subjective lens through which they view the European project may well condition the positions that parties take on Europe. The European project as embodied in the EU can, in turn, be opposed (or, indeed, supported) on the grounds that it is, for example, a Christian democratic, social democratic, liberal or regionalist project. Similarly, it may well be that, to simplify a little, some parties view the European project as essentially a political project. In this case the EU is good in so far as it promotes internationalism, peace and security. Others may view the project as essentially economic. Seen through this lens, the EU is a way of either promoting prosperity, capitalism, socio-economic cohesion or all of these things. This may well yield different subjective evaluations of what constitute the core areas of EU policy. One solution to this may be to adopt the approach implicit in Kopecky and Mudde's model, whereby it is a general subjective pessimism about the EU’s current/future trajectory that determines classification as Eurosceptic rather than any objective stance that parties may adopt on particular policies or issues.

iii. Opposing EU enlargement

Although some observers appear to have interpreted it as such,\(^\text{26}\) we have never explicitly included opposition to EU enlargement as evidence of party-based Euroscepticism. In our view, opposition to 'widening' the EU contains no necessary assumptions about the current or future trajectory of the European project in terms of giving the EU further competencies or 'deepening' integration. Indeed, it can be argued that (in some Eurosceptic's view, at least) widening and deepening European integration may actually have conflicting logics so that opposition to enlargement can (logically, if not necessarily correctly) be equally well adopted by those who oppose as well as support or oppose 'deeper' European integration. As Baker et al point out in their survey of British Conservative MPs, the "strong support of some Eurosceptic Conservatives for widening the EU to well over 20 countries, carries with it the covert intent of diluting, weakening and eventually destroying the basis of the whole process of EU."\(^\text{27}\) In other words, Eurosceptic parties can support EU enlargement without necessarily supporting the EU’s current or future trajectory; indeed, they may see it as a way of undermining it!

iv. Criticising the EU for being insufficiently integrationist and/or undemocratic

Another problem area that has puzzled analysts is the issue of whether to categorise as Eurosceptic those parties that criticise the EU for being insufficiently integrationist? This is the kind of critique that is often levelled at the EU by 'New Politics' left parties such as the Greens and often combined with calls for the 'democratisation' of the EU.\(^{28}\) It is clearly difficult to consider parties that call for the transfer of more competencies to the EU-level as being opposed to the EU's current/future trajectory in terms of deepening integration and, therefore, incorrect to categorise them as Eurosceptic. As to whether or not parties that call for the 'democratisation' of the EU should be included in the Eurosceptic category, then it really depends on what precisely they are referring to as the means to achieve this objective. If they are calling, for example, for Treaty revisions to repatriate powers to national governments then this is clearly against the EU's current/future trajectory in terms of deepening integration and therefore indicative of a Eurosceptic stance. If, on the other hand, democratisation is synonymous with strengthening supranational institutions such as the European Parliament (as is often the case with 'New Politics' left critics of the EU), then this cannot be interpreted as opposed to the EU's current/future trajectory of deepening integration and, therefore, not Eurosceptic.

To sum up this part of the argument: we believe that commentators need to be careful to avoid the temptation of interpreting parties that problematise Europe, opposing whatever the EU happens to be doing at any given time (however vigorously), with party-based Euroscepticism. It is clearly perfectly possible for a party to problematise aspects of European integration without necessarily being a Eurosceptic party. To include these parties within definition of party-based Euroscepticism is, indeed, casting this net too widely. Some commentators have implicitly drawn our attention to a phenomenon that they refer to as ‘Euro-criticism’\(^{29}\): criticising the EU without being opposed to European integration through the EU. We shall return to this idea of parties engaging in Euro-criticism (or, perhaps, Euro-contestation), problematising Europe without being Eurosceptic, in our later discussion on causal mechanisms.

3. (How) Can party-based Euroscepticism be measured?

The question of definition is, of course, inextricably linked with issues of measurement and testing propositions about the levels of Euroscepticism within different party systems. Only when one knows who the Eurosceptic (and other) parties are can one begin to attempt to measure levels of party-based Euroscepticism. But even assuming that one can define party positions with any degree of precision in this way, is it possible to measure levels of Euroscepticism within party systems? In our previous papers, we included the party's share of the vote at the most recent parliamentary election, alongside the lists of parties that we considered to be Eurosceptic. We believe that this remains a valid exercise providing that one can

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\(^{28}\) Deschouwer and Van Assche draw our attention to this issue in their analysis of the Belgian Greens who voted against the Maastricht Treaty because it "they were in favour of more European integration." See: 'Why is there is no Euroscepticism in Belgium?' p5-6.

develop an operationalisable definition of a Eurosceptic party. Vote shares for parties can provide us with a crude but simple and clear indicator of the importance of these Eurosceptic parties within their national party systems although it does not give us a guide to levels of support for Euroscepticism.

However, we also went on to aggregate the vote share for Eurosceptic parties and, on this basis, attempt to compare levels of party-based Euroscepticism across Europe. We then tested a series of propositions on the link between levels of Euroscepticism in a party system and: public opposition to EU membership, the prospects of accession to the EU of candidate states, state longevity, levels of trust in the political regime, institutions and political actors, and type of party system in that country. However, commentators such as Deshouwer and Van Assche have questioned the extent to which electoral results can be used as an indicator of party-based Euroscepticism at the country level and, more broadly, whether party-based Euroscepticism is a phenomenon that can be measured in a hard and quantitative way.

We have become increasingly sympathetic to the arguments of these critics. While we still strongly believe that party-based Euroscepticism is a portable concept that can be compared across countries rather than just relatively within countries, we are now dubious of whether it is, in fact, possible to 'measure' levels of party-based Euroscepticism in this way. The reason for this is the varying (generally low) level of salience of the European issue in terms of: firstly, the extent to which parties use the issue in inter-party competition (discussed below); secondly, more generally how much it features in the public debate of political issues; and, thirdly, how much weight citizens attach to it when determining their voting behaviour. For example, a Eurosceptic party in one country may (hypothetically) obtain 40% of the vote in an election. However, the party may barely mention the issue in its programme and it may hardly feature either as an election campaign issue or in the rankings of issues that voters considered as important when determining how they vote. This is, arguably, much less significant than a party that obtains 10% of the vote in another country where the issue was much more salient in all or any of these dimensions. Consequently, we are now dubious of the value of 'measuring' levels of party-based Euroscepticism in this way and testing comparative and theoretical propositions on

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33 See: 'Why is there no Euroscepticism in Belgium?' p25.

34 Low salience of the European issue in party politics is also implicit in the argument developed in: P. Mair, 'The limited impact of Europe on national party systems'. West European Politics. Vol 23 No 4. 2000. pp27-51.
the basis of such data. To sum up: varying (generally low) levels of salience of the European issue make it virtually impossible to compare aggregate vote shares across countries as a means of 'measuring' levels of party-based Euroscepticism.

4. What causes party-based Euroscepticism?

The other major theoretical issue that has vexed analysts of party-based Euroscepticism is the question of causality. Here the causes identified in the literature can be broadly divided into those that privilege either ideological-programmatic or strategic-tactical party competition factors. For example, the approach adopted by Sitter sees party-based Euroscepticism very much as a question of strategic positioning, and closely linked to what he terms the 'politics of opposition.' Another sub-school of theorists point to the importance of incentives created by political institutions such as the electoral system, types of legislature or the spatial distribution of power within the polity. On the other hand, in an analysis that considers party positions on Europe more broadly, Marks et al view party positions in more ideological-programmatic terms. They argue that the main causes of why parties take Eurosceptic (or other) positions on Europe are to be found in the historical cleavages that Lipset and Rokkan argue gave rise to the main ideological party families: Christian democratic, liberal, social democratic and conservative. In later work, they expand this analysis to include the cleavages reflecting the 'New Politics' left and right. In other words, party positions on Europe (particularly when broken down to individual EU policies) can often be discerned from a party's more general ideological-programmatic dispositions that is, in turn, rooted in how it positions itself in terms of historical or contemporary cleavages. In their analysis, Kopecky and Mudde have attempted to account for the different circumstances in which strategy and ideology might determine party positions. Ideology, they argue, determines broad attitudes towards European integration in principle (which they argue is a relative constant) while strategy determines whether or not a party supports the EU's current trajectory.

In our own earlier writings, although we have often been identified as belonging to the strategic-tactical party competition camp, we have not taken such an unambiguous stance on this issue. We noted that certain party families have ideological pre-dispositions to take a Eurosceptic stance (nationalist parties, for example) or not to take one (social democratic and Christian democratic parties). However, we also

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37 See: ‘The past in the present’. Although they term this a “cleavage approach” we would argue that it should more accurately be described as a “party ideology approach.” We also have some more general reservations about their methodology which uses rankings based on experts surveys, ultimately a qualitative source of data, as the basis for a quantitative statistical analysis on which they base their conclusions.
noted that our empirical survey data of parties identified as Eurosceptic (according to our earlier definitions) found a pattern of strange ideological bedfellows and no linear relationship between Euroscepticism and left and right wing location on the political spectrum. We also found a marked tendency for Eurosceptic parties to be located on the peripheries or extremes of party politics. Generally, therefore, we identified this as an issue on which the evidence was inconclusive and requiring further research.

Having reflected on this, we feel that much of this debate has been cast in incorrect terms. Much of the confusion here stems from the conflation (not least by ourselves on occasions!) of 'Euroscepticism' as (i) a broad, underlying party position and (ii) whether or not (and how) parties use the European issue (in this case in a contestatory way) as an element of inter-party competition. As Sitter has presciently pointed out in a paper discussing party-based Euroscepticism in Norway, while “party positions have (apparently) remained relatively stable on the surface” since the 1972 EU accession referendum this is somewhat deceptive because “parties have a degree of freedom in translating issues (or even cleavages) into party politics.” In other words, the question of how a party determines its underlying position on the European issue is often different from how that issue has been accommodated into (in this case Norwegian) party politics.

We have come across several examples of when a party holds a broad underlying position that is Eurosceptic but does not choose to give it prominence in its discourse. One is the British Conservative Party, which, following its June 2001 parliamentary election defeat decided to play down (indeed, virtually eliminated) the emphasis that it gave to the EU issue. At the same time it retained its broad, underlying Soft Eurosceptic stance on the EU’s current/future trajectory; indeed, it elected one of the infamous 'Maastricht rebels' Ian Duncan-Smith, as its leader. Another example of this is the Belgian Vlaams Blok party. An analysis of its party programme would lead one to clearly categorise as a (Soft) Eurosceptic party but Euroscepticism plays virtually no role in its discourse. In her discussion of the Hungarian Justice and Life and Workers Parties, Batory points out how these parties have softened or sharpened their rhetoric on the European issue to suit their electoral strategy and coalition tactics. At the same time they have retained the same broad underlying position of ideological hostility to European integration though the EU. In our view, therefore, it is necessary for analytical purposes to clearly separate out these two phenomena: party position and whether or not (and how) a party chooses to use an issue in inter-party competition. This is an important distinction not just for the sake of conceptual and definitional clarity. We also believe that these two distinct phenomena have different causal mechanisms that explain whether or not - and, more importantly,

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40 This has also caused confusion in terms of conceptualisation. For example, while Kopecky and Mudde were attempting to develop a typology based on party positions much of what we were doing in our earlier surveys was attempting to find evidence of Euroscepticism as a contestatory political discourse.


42 Ibid. p9.


44 See: ‘Why is the no Euroscepticism in Belgium?’ pp22-23.

45 See: 'Euroscepticism in the Hungarian party system'.
under what circumstances – ideological-programmatic factors or strategic-tactical factors play a role in causing party-based Euroscepticism.\footnote{For this part of the analysis we draw heavily upon the ideas developed by Sitter in his various papers and set out most elaborately in a jointly authored paper with Batory on Euroscepticism among agrarian parties. See: N.Sitter and A. Batory. ‘Cleavages, Competition and Coalition Building: Agrarian Parties and the European Question in Eastern and Western Europe,’ in \textit{Opposing Europe}.}

In our view, broad, underlying party positions on the issue of European integration (including Eurosceptic ones) are determined by two factors: firstly, the party's wider ideological profile and values and, secondly, the perceived interests of its supporters. The relative importance of the first or second factor is determined by the type of party that we are talking about and whether it is primarily a more ideological, value-based goal seeking or a more pragmatic office-seeking party. A goal-seeking party with clear ideological and programmatic objectives will obviously privilege the former. A clientelistic, interest-based office-seeking party, on the other hand, will obviously privilege the latter and undertake a cruder economic cost-benefit analysis of how European integration is likely to benefit its supporters. In our view, these broad underlying positions are (generally) quite firmly rooted and, therefore, whatever rhetorical shifts parties may undertake, remain relatively fixed. This is particularly true if primarily ideology and values determine them because change would involve the party engaging in a potentially painful and costly ideological volte-face. For sure, parties do undertake ideological shifts that can change their underlying positions (although, admittedly, this is unusual). Indeed, contrary to what Kopecky and Mudde have argued, parties do change their position even on the principle of European integration through the EU: the British Labour Party and Greek PASOK in the 1980s and 1990s are obvious examples. The extent to which parties find it easy to shift their underlying position on Europe, therefore, depends on the extent to which they are primarily policy-seeking or office-seeking, with the latter obviously finding fundamental ideological shifts easier than the latter.

However, while ideology is a key component in determining broad underlying party positions on Europe, we also believe that there is no straightforward linear relationship between general party ideology and party position on Europe. In other words, it is not possible to 'read off' a party's position from whatever ideological family it belongs to. This is partly because, as noted above, some parties are primarily office rather goal-seeking and, therefore, ideology is a secondary factor in determining their party position. But there are two other reasons for this that Flood correctly draws our attention to.\footnote{See: ‘Euroscepticism’ pp7-11.} Firstly, because parties can interpret their ideologies flexibly and a broad ideological orientation can lead to a range of possible outcomes in terms of party position. Secondly, because the EU, and the 'European project' more generally, are themselves extremely malleable. There are many different 'Europes' embodied in the idea of EU and the project can be interpreted (and, therefore, supported or opposed) as a liberal, Christian democratic, social democratic, conservative or even (ethno-) regionalist one to suit one’s likes or dislikes.

Whether or not parties use the European issue as an element of inter-party competition and how much prominence they give to it, is, on the other hand, determined by a combination of (electoral) strategic and (coalition) tactical factors. A party's electoral strategy is, in turn, determined by a number of variables. The list that follows is
intended to be illustrative rather than exhaustive. Firstly, the views of the party's current supporters and potential target supporters (rather than voters as a whole) views on the issue of European integration and (critically) how much the salience they accord the issue. Secondly, whether it is a catch-all party that is attempting to attract a broad swathe of the electorate or a clientelic or fringe party with a more segmented electoral strategy. Thirdly, institutional factors such as the type of electoral system and, critically, whether or not it allows parties to survive and/or secure parliamentary representation by carving out a niche electorate for themselves or if it forces them to construct a somewhat broader electoral base. Other institutional factors that may be important here include: the format and dynamics of party system that the party operates in; the structure of the state in terms of the spatial distribution of power; and whether or not and how frequently that country uses referendums. Fourthly, how its discourse on the European issue and the prominence that it gives the issue fits in with its broader electoral appeal: a fringe protest party is clearly more likely to oppose the consensus view on Europe than one that seeks to locate itself within the political mainstream. Fifthly, the positions taken by its competitors and, sixthly, the imperatives of party unity and the strength of various intra-party factional positions will also affect party electoral strategy. A second set of variables determining the prominence that the party gives to the issue in party competition is coalition-tactical considerations. These include: the position of its potential coalition partners (both pre- and post-election); and, specifically, whether or not the party has to 'tone down' its rhetoric in order to secure a place in government (what Sitter refers to as the 'government-opposition dynamic')?

As noted above, some of these factors have been identified by other theorists of party-based Euroscepticism as factors causal of party position. However, we would argue that they cause parties to give prominence or not to the issue in inter-party competition rather than determining their broad, underlying positions on this issue.

We also believe that the same causal mechanisms that determine whether or not and how a party uses the European issue in party competition can also determine whether or not a party uses what we have termed above as the rhetoric of 'Euro-contestation'. This refers to those parties that problematise Europe: use rhetoric that is critical of the EU, while retaining a broad, underlying position that is supportive of EU integration in principle or even of the EU's current/future integrationist trajectory. In other words, electoral strategic or coalition-tactical reasons may cause parties that are supportive of the EU project to use rhetoric that is highly critical of the EU on occasions.

48 It is important to note here that there is no linear relationship between how overall levels of public Euroscepticism and whether or not and how a party uses the issue in competition. It is the level of support for or opposition to European integration and the salience of this issue among the party's supporters and/or the segment of the electorate that it is attempting to attract that is the key variable here.

49 See: 'Structuring Europe'; "Dark Matter"; and 'The Politics of Opposition and the European Question in Scandinavia'.

50 Cf 'The difficult task of opposing EU in Finland.' Here Raunio argues that it is government coalition tactics and a policy-making system that takes the sting out of the government-opposition dynamic that determine (and moderate) parties broad, underlying positions on the European issue in Finland. There are two possible (mutually incompatible) explanations for this. Firstly, he has not got it quite right and that party positions are actually determined by other factors, including the ones we identify above. Secondly, he is right and we need to re-think our nascent causal model (?) perhaps by stepping back developing a more dynamic model of how party ideology is determined and whether this includes the kind of the factors that Raunio identifies.
Conclusion

Definitions of party-based Euroscepticism have, therefore, become sharper since we set up our initial Hard-Soft conceptualisation. One of the conclusions of this is that analysts must be careful to ensure that definitions of party-based Euroscepticism are not over-inclusive and, as Kopecky and Mudde suggest, refer specifically to party attitudes towards: European integration through the EU in principle and the EU's current/future integrationist trajectory. At the same time, however, we believe that the term party-based Euroscepticism should also encompass principled opponents of European integration as embodied by the EU, as it does in the popular discourse on attitudes towards European integration. We also believe that the next logical step in terms of theorising party attitudes towards European integration involves locating party-based Euroscepticism within a broader typology that breaks down pro-integrationist parties. However, it is clear that the more complex and fine-grained such a typology is, the more difficult it is to operationalise because parties often do not go into sufficient detail when elaborating their European policies for firm conclusions to be drawn. We have also come to the conclusion that while vote share gives a crude indication of a party's significance within its party system, it is not possible to 'measure' levels of party-based Euroscepticism in a particular country (or, indeed, comparatively) by aggregating vote shares.

Finally, we believe that broad, underlying party positions on Europe need to be distinguished from whether (and how) parties use the issue in inter-party competition and that these two phenomena are driven by different causal mechanisms. A party's broad underlying position on Europe is determined by a blend of the party's ideology and what it perceives the interests of its members to be. The relative importance of the two causal factors depends on whether it is a more ideological, value-based, goal-oriented party or a more pragmatic, interest-based office-seeking party. Whether or not (and to what extent) a party uses the issue of Europe in party competition depends on the party's electoral strategy and coalition-formation and government participation tactics.

Moreover, we believe that this has broader implications for the analysis of why parties take the positions they do and why they give prominence to certain issues in inter-party competition, that goes beyond the scope of the study of party-based Euroscepticism. It other words, it potentially provides party scholars with the first stages of a broader framework for analysing how parties determine party positions and use issues in party competition. In this sense, we believe that the study of party-based Euroscepticism can actually make a much larger contribution not simply to the debate on the impact of European integration on domestic politics but also, indeed, on the study of party politics in general. The extent to which this framework is more broadly applicable and generalisable beyond this specific case depends, of course, on just how distinctive or typical we believe the European issue is.

Finally, and even more ambitiously, we believe that the implications of the study of Euroscepticism go beyond party politics to the way we understand the nature of politics more broadly. Euroscepticism is one manifestation of a lack of support for
political institutions and political elites and so our understanding of it helps to
demonstrate the way new issues are entangled, embedded and implicated in wider
political concerns. It is a potential bell-weather for understanding the tenor of politics
in a climate of sceptical or distrusting mass public sentiment. At the same time, the
European project is part of wider processes of global change involving a re-
constellation of the international institutional architecture as well as a growing
interaction of global and domestic issues and politics. Attitudes to European
integration, therefore, may well highlight issues of how domestic politics meshes with
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