



**Euroscepticism in Italy and  
Centre-Right and Right Wing Political Parties\***

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## **Euroscepticism in Italy and Centre-Right and Right Wing Political Parties**

### **ABSTRACT**

Recent unforeseen developments concerning the EU policy of the second Berlusconi government have pushed the issue of Euroscepticism in Italy into the limelight. This work examines party-based Euroscepticism by focusing on the three main parties of the centre-right coalition, namely, Forza Italia, the National Alliance and the Northern League during the period 1994-2002. The overall argument is that, despite the remarkable changes that the Italian political system underwent in the 1990s, the pro-European attitudes of Italian public opinion have remained strong, whereas Eurosceptic positions have surfaced amongst centre-right political parties. The caveat is that this trend has not been uniform. On the one hand, the Northern League's embracing of soft – and, increasingly, hard - Euroscepticism is an electoral strategy with very few roots in the ideological base of the party and with seemingly limited consensus amongst its supporters. On the other hand, the National Alliance's abandonment of its past soft Euroscepticism is part of a wider top-down 'rehabilitation' strategy, which tends to clash with the ideological platform of the party and is minimally shared by its supporters. Finally, Forza Italia's stance is very fluid because it is a large and composite party, its ideological platform is rather vague and, most importantly, the positions of its leaders on EU issues are still unclear. This work also argues that under the Berlusconi governments the bi-partisan approach that characterised Italy's EU policy from the mid-1970s to the early 1990s has come to an end, or, at least, it has been seriously questioned. It is concluded that a 'politicisation' of Italy's EU policy is under way.



## INTRODUCTION

Recent unforeseen developments concerning the EU policy of the Italian government have pushed the issue of Euroscepticism in Italy into the limelight. In the past any reference to 'Italian Euroscepticism' would have been regarded as an oxymoron, given that Italian elites, political parties and public opinion alike have traditionally been 'pro-European', meaning pro-EU and in favour of European integration. With the appointment of the second Berlusconi government in May 2001 - even though some signals had already emerged during the first Berlusconi government in 1994 - Eurosceptic attitudes, at times translated into policies, have appeared at the governmental level for the first time in post-war Italy.

This work sheds light on the evolution of Italy's EU policy and on the interaction between Italian domestic politics and EU policy-making by examining party-based Euroscepticism in Italy and focusing on the three main parties of the centre-right coalition currently in office. Taggart and Szczerbiak (2001) argue that in analysing Euroscepticism in both member states and candidate countries three components should be taken into account: (1) levels of public Euroscepticism; (2) party-based Euroscepticism; and (3) Eurosceptical policy outcomes. This study briefly mentions point 1 and elaborates points 2 and 3.

From a methodological point of view, this piece of research is informed by two sets of questions. Firstly, *when, how and why do parties of government move towards or away from Euroscepticism?* (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2001) Secondly, *when, how and why do Eurosceptic attitudes of parties of government result in Eurosceptic policies?*

The empirical part of this research focuses on Forza Italia, the National Alliance and the Northern League during the period 1994-2002. Three reasons explain this choice. To begin with, Euroscepticism in Italy has been surfacing on the centre-right of the political spectrum since the mid-1990s and, indeed, this is where the majority of criticisms of the EU are to be found in Italian politics. This assessment does not overlook the fact that on the left of the political spectrum the Communist Refoundation have also criticised the EU from time to time. This work, however, maintains that whereas there is a question mark over the Eurosceptic tendencies of the Communist Refoundation, these tendencies are clear amongst certain centre-right parties. The second reason why the centre-right parties are interesting case studies is that their attitudes and policies towards the EU have so far been an under-researched topic. Thirdly, this is a very topical issue given that the centre-right coalition is currently in power – it is the Italian government.

This work adopts the definition of Euroscepticism put forward by Taggart and Szczerbiak (2001) and distinguishes between 'hard' and 'soft' Euroscepticism. According to these authors, 'hard Euroscepticism is where there is a principled opposition to the EU and European integration and therefore can be seen in parties

who think that their countries should withdraw from membership, or whose policies towards the EU are tantamount to being opposed to the whole project of European integration as it is currently conceived'. 'Soft Euroscepticism is where there is not a principled objection to European integration or EU membership but where concerns on one (or a number) of policy areas leads to the expression of qualified opposition to the EU, or where there is a sense that 'national interest' is currently at odds with the EU trajectory'. Taggart and Szczerbiak identify these two forms of Euroscepticism as poles on a spectrum with some parties moving between them.<sup>1</sup>

The overall argument of this piece of research is that, despite the remarkable changes that the Italian political system underwent in the 1990s, the pro-European attitudes of Italian public opinion have remained strong, whereas Eurosceptic positions have surfaced amongst centre-right political parties. The caveat is that this trend has not been uniform. On the one hand, the Northern League's embracing of soft – and, increasingly, hard - Euroscepticism is purely an electoral strategy with very few roots in the ideological base of the party and with seemingly little consensus amongst its supporters. On the other hand, the National Alliance's abandonment of its past soft Euroscepticism is part of a broader top-down 'rehabilitation' strategy, which, however, tends to clash with the ideological platform of the party and is hardly shared by its supporters. Forza Italia's stance is very fluid because it is a large party, its electorate is composite and regionally distributed, the ideological platform is rather vague and, most importantly, the position of its leaders on EU issues is still unclear.

It is also argued that under the Berlusconi governments the bi-partisan approach that defined Italy's EU policy from the mid-1970s to the early 1990s has come to an end, or, at least, it has been seriously questioned. This emerging pattern bears some resemblance to what happened in the 1960s, when Italy's EU policy was not bipartisan since it was a bone of contention between the governing parties and the opposition party, the Italian Communist Party. At that time, two key foreign policy choices for Italy, namely NATO and EC membership, were 'shelters' that allowed the Italian governing class to concentrate on its domestic politics. Seen from this perspective, foreign policy issues in Italy were essentially symbolic and made reference to domestic issues (Vannicelli 1974). This work concludes that a 'politicisation' of Italy's EU policy is (again) under way.

This work is structured in the following way. Section 2 presents some data concerning Italian attitudes towards European integration. It also outlines the main changes that took place in the Italian political system over the 1990s as well as the electoral results in the same period. Sections 3, 4 and 5 cover the three main

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<sup>1</sup> The sources used for the empirical part of this research are: (i) electoral programmes, manifestos, press releases and speeches; (ii) British and Italian press coverage; (iii) a few semi-structured interviews with officials and politicians. Almost all the quotations from newspapers are either from the *Financial Times* or the *Economist*, albeit many of them were also reported by the Italian press. When parties' documents or Italian newspapers are quoted, they are my translation.

political parties chosen as case studies respectively. Section 6 analyses the material provided in Sections 3 to 5. Section 7 discusses the main features of the EU policy of the Berlusconi governments. Section 8 concludes.

## **BACKGROUND INFORMATION**

This section briefly discusses the evolution of Italian attitudes towards the EU. It also outlines the main changes that took place in the Italian political system in the 1990s and gives a very concise account of the electoral developments in this period. It is argued that Italian support for European integration has remained strong, despite the remarkable transformation of the domestic political environment.


The vast majority of Italian public opinion has generally supported the process of European integration over time, as shown in Figure 1 ‘Support for EU membership’ (1981-2001). These favourable attitudes have not shifted with the ‘deepening’ of European integration and Italy’s joining of EMU, as shown in Figure 2 ‘Support for or against the single currency’ (1995-2001). Finally, in a survey concerning the ‘Perception of European and national identity’ amongst EU citizens, 5% of the Italians sampled mentioned only their European identity (and not their national one), 69% referred to their national and European identities. Only 25% of the people in the sample mentioned their national identity only. In the EU 15 on average 41% of the people sampled referred to their national identity only (Eurobarometer 2001).

In the past, Italian mainstream political parties have mirrored the widespread support of their electorate for European integration. To be sure, this happened from the 1970s onwards, when the Italian Communist Party came closer to the government area and Italy’s EU policy became bi-partisan – up to a point.<sup>2</sup> In the earlier period, the Communist Party, mainly for ideological reasons, had displayed hostile attitudes towards the EEC and Italian membership of it (Vannicelli 1974). On the one hand, this shift suggests an interesting comparison with the process undergone by the National Alliance during the 1990s. On the other hand, it contrasts with the experience of the Northern League during the same period. Both these trends are discussed in the following sections.

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
<sup>2</sup> A few caveats are however needed. For example, in 1978 the Communist Party voted against Italy joining the European Monetary System. In 1992 the Reconstructed Communists and the Social Movement voted against the ratification of the Treaty on European Union.

**Fig 1: Italy - Support for Union membership (1981-2001)**



Source: Eurobarometer, Survey no. 56.2 (percentage "don't know" not shown).

**Fig 2: Italy - Support for the Single Currency (Euro)**



Sources: Eurobarometer, various issues

It is also noteworthy that during the 1990s the Italian political system underwent major transformations which culminated with the so-called 'end of the First Republic'. These changes concerned the electoral system; political parties and their 'elites'; and the party-system. In 1993 there was the reform of the Italian electoral system that became majoritarian 'first past the post', whereas it had previously been based on proportional representation. Under the new system, 25% of the seats in both chambers are still allocated on a proportional basis to parties that achieve the 4% threshold of valid list votes. Partly as a consequence of the change in the electoral system, partly because of other current factors, many of Italy's traditional parties such as Christian Democracy, the Socialist Party and the Liberal party disappeared during the first half of the 1990s. Others changed name, for instance the Communist Party became the party of the Democratic Left and the Social Movement became the National Alliance. Finally, new parties such as the Northern League<sup>3</sup> and Forza Italia were formed. This reshaping of the political landscape was coupled with a renewal of Italian political elites. For example, in 1994 56% of the senators and 66% of the deputies had no previous experience in parliament and amongst the governing centre-right parties 75% of the MPs reported no previous experience in parliament, national or regional politics. As for the party system, the 'old' system, which Sartori (1966) defined as 'polarised pluralism',<sup>4</sup> was transformed into a 'bipolar system' of centre-left and centre-right coalitions in which all parties have governing potential and compete for the median voter. Newell (2001) points out the disappearance of the old anti-system parties, of bilateral oppositions and of a large single party at the centre. Brand and Mackie (1996) observe the disappearance of purely ideological parties and of the ideological bases of the party system together with the end of the traditional sub-cultural segmentation. Finally, the long term Catholic tradition - in all its variants - apparently collapsed in 1992.

The 1994 general elections were won by the centre-right coalition. In the north of Italy the coalition was represented by the 'Freedom Alliance' (Polo della Liberta') that was composed of Forza Italia, Northern League, CCD (former Christian Democrats), Pannella. In the Mezzogiorno it was represented by the 'Good Governance Alliance' (Polo del Buon Governo) that was composed of Forza Italia, National Alliance and CCD. The Centre-right coalition had an outright majority of seats in the lower chamber, although not in the Senate (Leonardi and Nanetti 1996). Silvio Berlusconi, who was the leader of the main coalition party, became Prime Minister. The government was appointed after lengthy negotiations within the winning coalition and it was plagued by several internal conflicts. These culminated in the Lega's withdrawal from the coalition and the resignation of Berlusconi in autumn 1994. Brand and Mackie (1996) argue that the centre-right

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<sup>3</sup> Yet, as mentioned in Section 3, the first League was founded in 1984.

<sup>4</sup> This system was characterised by anti-system extremist parties (poles) at both ends of the political spectrum, whereby no party was able to win an overall majority and, hence, there was no alternative to the centrist government coalition because of the anti-system parties. It was a tri-polar format that hinged on a dominant governing centre pole and two excluded poles.

alliance was formed to win elections and not to govern because it had only a vague platform and there was no basic agreement on a programme of action .

The political parties that formed the first Berlusconi government returned to opposition in early 1995. They were defeated at the 1996 general elections that the National Alliance and Forza Italia fought together in the electoral coalition Freedom Alliance (Polo della Liberta'), whereas the Northern League did not have any electoral ally.

Finally, these parties were returned to power at the 2001 general elections. The elections were won by the centre-right coalition, the 'House of Freedom' (Casa delle Liberta'). Berlusconi became Prime Minister; the leader of the National Alliance, Gianfranco Fini, was appointed as Deputy Prime Minister; the leader of the Northern League, Umberto Bossi, was appointed as Minister for Federal Reforms; and the pro-European and highly experienced Renato Ruggiero was appointed as Foreign Minister. He resigned in June 2002.

**Table 1. General and European elections in Italy - % votes**

	<b>1994*</b> <b>General</b> <b>elections</b>	<b>1996*</b> <b>General</b> <b>elections</b>	<b>2001*</b> <b>General</b> <b>elections</b>	<b>1994</b> <b>European</b> <b>elections</b>
<b>Forza Italia</b>	21	20,6	29,4	30,6
<b>National Alliance</b>	13,5	15,7	12	12,5
<b>Northern League</b>	8,4	10	3,9	6,6
<b>Pannella</b>	3,5	1,9	2,2	2,1
<b>CCD CDU</b>	-	5,8	3,2	-
<b>Segni</b>	4,7	-	-	3,3
<b>Dini</b>	-	4,3	-	-
<b>Di Pietro</b>	-	-	3,9	-
<b>Popular Party</b>	11,1	6,8	-	10,0
<b>Margherita</b>	-	-	14,5	-
<b>Democratic left</b>	20,4	21,1	16,6	19,1
<b>Reconstructed</b> <b>Communists</b>	6	8,6	5	6,1
<b>Socialist Party</b>	2,2	0,4	1	1,8
<b>Green</b>	2,8	2,5	2,6	3,2
<b>Others</b>	6,4	2,3	6,7	4,7
<b>TOTAL</b>	100	100	100	100

\* Proportional vote, lower chamber

Source: Istituto Cattaneo, [www.cattaneo.org.it](http://www.cattaneo.org.it)

## FORZA ITALIA

This party was founded by the media-magnate Silvio Berlusconi in November 1993 to oppose the centre-left coalition. Berlusconi is the richest businessman in Italy and the company that he owns, Fininvest, had a very active role in the setting up of Forza Italia. He is also the owner of the main Italian TV network and, indeed, he has made effective use of the media, to the point where McCarthy (1996) defines Forza Italia as a 'virtual party', whereas Seisselberg 1996, quoted by Koff and Koff (2000) defined it as a 'media-mediated personality-party'. The congress that institutionalised the party took place only in April 1998 after the discussions that followed its electoral defeat in 1996 and its poor record in opposition (Koff and Koff 2000). The party has a pyramidal structure with networks of clubs that operate at its base. Forza Italia has often under-performed at the local level.

From the beginning of his political career Berlusconi has been able to depict himself as a self-made man (Koff and Koff 2000). As an industrialist, he has offered a different set of values by 'selling' 'anti-communism' and 'free market' ideas, often making explicit reference to Thatcher's policies (Koff and Koff 2000). Religion, family and the free market are important values for the voters of Forza Italia (Gray and Howard 1996). Furthermore, in 1994 and 2001 Forza Italia skilfully emphasised the job priority that ranks highly for a large part of the Italian electorate and predicted a 'new economic miracle' in Italy.

Bufacchi and Burgess (1998) stress the role played by electoral mobility in explaining the success of Forza Italia in particular in 1994, but also in 2001, when it attracted many Northern League votes. Forza Italia has been able to swing the more mobile sector of the electoral market in its favour. The electorate of Forza Italia is spread throughout Italy, however it is concentrated in the urban North and in Sicily (Gray and Howard 1996).

During the short-lived experience of the first Berlusconi government Forza Italia seemed to take a position midway between some rather rigid stances of the National Alliance on some EU issues and the pro-European attitudes of the Northern League. There were however some critical statements made by Antonio Martino, chief economist of Forza Italia, member of the Thatcher-inspired Bruges group (*Financial Times* 8 June 1994) and at that time Foreign Minister. Martino questioned the way in which the EMU project was built because in his view 'convergence was neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for monetary unification' (*Financial Times*, 28 November 1994; see also Martino 1997, 1995). He also believed in the possibility of re-negotiating the convergence criteria that the member states had to fulfil in order to join EMU.

Within the government there were different views on Martino's proposals and, indeed, from time to time the Prime Minister and the Cabinet distanced themselves from Martino's critical positions. Yet, he was their Foreign Minister. In addition,

Prime Minister Berlusconi also mentioned the possibility of renegotiating the TEU so that Italy would be able to join EMU, even if the convergence criteria were not fulfilled (*Sole 24 Ore*, 17 December 1994). Overall, the short-lived experience of the first Berlusconi government in 1994 was a 'dry-run' for the second Berlusconi government. For example, after the electoral victory of the centre-right coalition, Berlusconi pledged to 'raise his country's profile in the world', to have 'a more active role in Europe' and 'to state and reinforce Italy's role as a protagonist in the European Union' (*Financial Times*, 17 May 1994). Similar statements were to be repeated after the appointment of the second Berlusconi government in 2001.

Between 1996-98 the risk that Italy would be excluded from the first group of entrants to EMU was used by the centre-right opposition and by Forza Italia in particular as a means to discredit the centre-left government that had staked its prestige on Italy being in the first wave of countries joining EMU. This theme was prominent, for example, in the final stage of the campaign for the 1997 local elections (*Financial Times*, 25 April 1997). During its time in opposition, Forza Italia re-launched the idea of re-negotiating the TEU so that Italy would be able to join EMU even if it did not comply with the convergence criteria. Otherwise, little reference was made to European themes, except in the statute of Forza Italia, which was approved at its first congress in 1998 and which mentioned the European and Western vocation amongst the 'cultural pillars' of the party.<sup>5</sup> However, the document also stated that a change of route was needed in Europe and blamed the 'lefts in Europe' for the 'poor economic performance' in the old continent.

In the second Berlusconi government some rather critical statements on the introduction of the single currency made by senior figures of Forza Italia who also had important government positions, such as Finance Minister Giulio Tremonti and Defence Minister Antonio Martino, found wide echoes in the Italian and foreign press. Likewise, the Italian government decision not to participate in the pan-European programme to build the Airbus A400M military transport aircraft, a decision which is said to reflect the position of the Defence Minister, was seen as symbolic because the Airbus project is central to EU's defence ambitions (*Financial Times*, 26 October 2001). Overall, the position on EU matters of the party leader, Berlusconi, is still unclear. This is despite instances, such as his pressing the case of Parma as the Italian candidate to host the EU food agency during the Laeken European Council in December 2001, where his actions have been regarded as indicative of a more assertive stance.

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<sup>5</sup> [www.forzaitalia.it](http://www.forzaitalia.it) accessed on 30/12/01 at 10pm.

## THE NATIONAL ALLIANCE

The MSI-National Alliance was a right-conservative alliance formed in 1993 and led by the neo-fascist Italian Social Movement. The alliance was proposed by the then leader of the Social Movement, Gianfranco Fini, after the local election in 1993. However, when it was established in January 1994 only a few independent personalities joined (Tarchi 1996). In January 1995 the MSI was dissolved into the National Alliance which replaced it. The first congress that took place in Fiuggi in January 1995 sanctioned the fusion of the MSI apparatus with the nebula of the National Alliance clubs which had been active since July 1994. The extreme fringe of the MSI led by Rauti founded its own party called MSI – tricolour flame (Koff and Koff 2000). National Alliance is a ‘leadership party’ (Koff and Koff 2000).

The ideological base of the National Alliance has two main building blocks, namely nationalism and anti-left orientations. The creation of the National Alliance was not a sudden ideological shift (Ruzza and Schmidtke 1996). Instead, it was a strategic move that seized on the de-legitimisation of old parties and the fact that the MSI was untainted by corruption scandals as it had never been in power. It was a way of admitting new supporters without them having to come to terms with the old party (Ruzza and Schmidtke 1996). Whereas in the past this party had generally been described by the foreign press as neofascist, recently the language has changed and the party is often labelled as post-fascist.

Like the Italian Social Movement, the stronghold of the National Alliance is in the South of Italy where it has attracted former Christian Democrat votes. Its voters are predominantly low and middle class employees, many of them in the public sector.

The entry of the National Alliance into the first Berlusconi government in 1994 sanctioned the need to transform the party mainly because of the negative reaction of foreign press and foreign governments (Carioti 1996). On the one hand, the leader of the National Alliance, Gianfranco Fini, tried to reassure foreign observers. On the other, his polite tones often coincided with rigid stances on concrete questions, such as the dispute with Slovenia (Carioti 1996), whereby the hard position taken by the Italian government was heavily influenced by the pressure of National Alliance.

European themes hardly entered the political discourse of the National Alliance during its time in opposition. However, they were mentioned in the party statute approved at the 1995 conference in Fiuggi (the so-called ‘Fiuggi thesis’) which devoted a long section to ‘Europe’. The section opened with a reference to ‘Panneurope of Coudenhove Kalergi’ and to the ‘Europe des patries of de Gaulle’, which was defined as an ‘ideal approach to European integration’.<sup>6</sup> Yet, the document also mentioned Monnet and Schumann. Secondly, it called for the

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<sup>6</sup> [www.alleanza.nazionale.it](http://www.alleanza.nazionale.it) accessed on 29/12/01 at 10pm.

‘development of the EU beyond the purely economic and monetary dimension’ as well as the ‘strengthening of the European pillar vis-à-vis the US’. It advocated the extension of EU competencies in several common policies. At the Verona conference in February and March 1998, the final document called for the ‘strengthening of the EU by increasing the size of its budget’ and enhancing the scope of its budgetary policy. Surprisingly, it also proposed the ‘reduction of the weight of the national government by increasing the power of the European Parliament’.<sup>7</sup> However, the document criticised ‘measures labelled as market opening, but which jeopardise the homogeneity of national products’. A point that is worth making is that the tone used in all these documents called for a more assertive stance from the Italian government vis-à-vis the EU. At the Naples conference in February 2001 no reference was made to European themes in the final document.

In the second Berlusconi government, the National Alliance has so far adopted a low profile on EU issues. On the one hand, it has displayed an accommodating stance and conciliatory attitudes towards the EU. Fini, in particular, has done so. For example, on the issue of the A400, the Deputy Prime Minister commented that ‘Even if we might not need these planes, we cannot ignore the fact that this is the one pan-European military project that is actually up and running....If you even have unwarlike Luxembourg taking part in it, there's got to be a good reason for going ahead’ (*Financial Times*, 7 November 2001). Yet, for example, in September 2001 he floated the idea of a review of the eurozone's stability and growth pact (*Financial Times*, 12 September 2001). On the other hand, other senior figures in the party have argued in favour of a more assertive stance towards EU, as can be gathered by glancing at the party newspaper, the *Secolo d'Italia*. For example, the Minister for Telecommunications, Maurizio Gasparri, argued that ‘on one side there has to be a greater political and democratic legitimisation of the [EU] institutions; on the other side, there has to be a more balanced valuation of national interests’ (*Secolo d'Italia*, 20 December 2001).

## **THE NORTHERN LEAGUE**

The Northern League was initially a loose-knit federation of leagues from different northern regions (Koff and Koff 2000). The first league was established in 1984 and the Northern League was officially set up in 1991. Koff and Koff (2000) describe it as a ‘swing party’ and a ‘leadership party’ with ‘erratic behaviour’, which has kept it in the public eye, despite contradictory statements and outbursts.

The messages of the Northern League have appealed to a wide range of political forces in the north (Newell 2001). Taggart (quoted in Brand and Mackie 1996) argues that it is not a new party of the extreme right, but rather a neo-populist party outside the traditional left-right dimension. Diamanti (1996) points to the Northern League's ability to break with the traditional bases of political identity in

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<sup>7</sup> [www.alleanza.nazionale.it](http://www.alleanza.nazionale.it) accessed on 29/12/01 at 10pm.

Italy, namely religion and class. The Northern League has replaced them with other elements that result from unaddressed contradictions within the Italian state-society relation, such as the juxtaposition between the north and the south; the centre and the periphery; the public and the private (Diamanti 1996). Commentators often argue that the League is racist and xenophobic. Elements of success were the restricted and flexible ideological base, the widespread and flexible organisation, and the strong leadership.

The Leagues have traditionally appealed to the discontent of the middle class in the north after its alienation from the traditional parties. Its voters are mainly owners of small business and former Christian Democrats (Diamanti 1996).

In the first Berlusconi government in 1994 the Northern League declared itself strongly pro-European. In this period the Northern League did not display any Eurosceptic attitudes. On the contrary, one of its senior figures and MP Giancarlo Pagliarini argued that 'The political objective of Europe is fundamental for us...If we look back, the best laws put in place in Italy are the laws based on EU legislation' (*Financial Times*, 7 July 1994). A survey of the parliamentary activity of the Northern League between 1994 and 1996 as reported on its website supports this assessment. For example, the League presented a proposal to the Italian Parliament for the creation of a unified diplomatic service within the EU so as to rationalise personnel and funding. Furthermore, in 1993 the League had voted in favour of the ratification of the TEU and afterwards it maintained that Italy had to do its utmost to fulfil the convergence criteria in order to join EMU.<sup>8</sup> Of course, rhetoric has to be allowed for, especially in the case of a populist party such as the Northern League. Yet, these elements suggest that it was not fundamentally or ideologically Eurosceptic. It is also important to remember that for the federalist members of the Northern League, such as Pagliarini and Roberto Comini who in 1994 was Minister for EC Affairs, the support for European integration was also seen as a way to give more power to the regions. For example, in his speech delivered at the party's federal congress in Bologna in February 1994, Bossi argued that '[the treaty of] Maastricht re-allocates power at different levels and across the territory of each member state and gives new vitality to local autonomies'.<sup>9</sup> Likewise, in another speech delivered at the federal assembly in Turin in May 1995, Bossi referred to the principle of 'subsidiarity' in the TEU.<sup>10</sup>

During the first period in opposition after the government experience in 1994 the Northern League did not display any Eurosceptic attitudes. On the contrary, it was adamant that Italy should join EMU on time. One argument used by the League was that, although the north of Italy was ready to join EMU, the south was not and, therefore, the former would miss this historical opportunity because of the

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<sup>8</sup> *Sintesi di attività parlamentare 1994-1996* in <http://www.leganord.org/frames/links.htm> accessed on 30/12/01 at 11pm.

<sup>9</sup> [http://www.leganord.org/a\\_2\\_discorsi\\_4\\_5\\_6\\_94.htm](http://www.leganord.org/a_2_discorsi_4_5_6_94.htm) accessed on 28/3/02 at 10 pm.

<sup>10</sup> [http://www.leganord.org/a\\_2\\_discorsi\\_28\\_05\\_95.htm](http://www.leganord.org/a_2_discorsi_28_05_95.htm) accessed on 28/3/02 at 10pm.

backwardness of the latter. The *Economist* 8 November 1997 reported the following:

'Splitting Italy into two countries would be good for the north and good for the south,' says Giancarlo Pagliarini, the Northern League's economics spokesman. Padania would comfortably qualify for membership of EMU, which is what its firms want. Taxes could be cut, and tax revenues spent on the things Padania needs, rather than handed over to Rome. The rest of Italy-which can keep the name-could make itself more competitive by devaluing the lira, says Mr Pagliarini. The subsidies now being diverted from the north to the south would be gradually phased out, freeing the south from its dependence on hand-outs from Rome-a dependence that lies at the heart of the south's economic backwardness. In time, the south too might qualify for EMU.'

The Northern League was so keen for the north to join EMU that in 1996 its leader, Bossi, wrote a letter to the European Commission enquiring about the possibility for Padania to join EMU (*Il Sole 24 Ore*, 3 September 1996). Surely this was a propagandistic move which seems, nevertheless, to have been rooted in fundamentally pro-EU attitudes. Furthermore, as the following quote from the *Economist* (8 November 1997) suggests, the bulk of the Northern League electorate was (and is?) pro-EU and pro-EMU:

'Northerners vote for the League because they want to join EMU, pay less tax and lower social-security contributions, hand fewer subsidies to 'lazy southerners', and enjoy a measure of devolution-more government locally.....The main attraction of EMU is lower interest rates. Italian firms can borrow more cheaply abroad than at home, but they incur a significant exchange-rate risk that would disappear within EMU. Exporters' cash flows too would be less vulnerable to currency movements. And, many industrialists believe, membership of EMU would secure their access to major European markets. Massimo Cacciari, the mayor of Venice and a leading opponent of the League, thinks one reason for the slight slippage in the League's support this year is the growing probability that Italy will be in the first wave of EMU members.'

This quotation contributes to explaining the Northern League's shift towards Euroscepticism and, indeed, it is no coincidence that starting from 1998 when Italy officially qualified for EMU membership, there was a *crescendo* of criticism of the EU, as the subsequent section explains. Also, the EMU project was questioned and, for example, at the Northern League congress in Brescia in October 1998 Bossi criticised the fact that Italy's joining of EMU had been decided without a referendum.<sup>11</sup> From then on Bossi's criticisms of the EU increased and the most verbally virulent are reported in the following section. In a later speech Bossi was rather outspoken on the real motives underlying the Northern League's stance and

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<sup>11</sup> [http://www.leganord.org/a\\_2\\_discorsi\\_brescia98.htm](http://www.leganord.org/a_2_discorsi_brescia98.htm) accessed on 28/3/02 at 10pm. At present, neither the statute nor the congress reports of the Northern League are available on the web and my enquiries concerning this material were unsuccessful.

admitted that the joining of EMU had made the secession of Padania from the rest of Italy more difficult.<sup>12</sup> As explained above, if Italy had not joined EMU in the first wave, the League would most likely have deployed the argument that the South had to be blamed for this failure, which would have strengthened the League's secessionist campaign.

With increasing verbal virulence since 1998 the Northern League has displayed Eurosceptic attitudes, to the extent that the *Financial Times* (5 June 2001) wrote that 'this party is not Eurosceptic, it is Europhobic'. Along similar lines, Ruggiero commented in the national press that 'the Northern League is not only Eurosceptic, but also anti-European' (*Repubblica*, 3 January 2002). Bossi repeatedly attacked the EU as 'the Soviet Union of Europe' (*Financial Times*, 5 June 2001), 'a nest of freemasons and Communist bankers' (*Financial Times*, 7 July 2001) and went as far as accusing 'European technocrats and paedophiles' of seeking to impose their will on Italy if the left had won the elections (*Economist*, 12 May 2001). The Northern League and its Justice Minister Castelli have strongly objected to the common arrest warrant. Furthermore, Bossi argued 'Everybody has seen that the music has changed and that Italy is defending its own interests....We used to just go there and always say 'yes'. Now it's enough' (*Financial Times*, 20 December 2001).

## **THE EVOLUTION OF EUROSCEPTICISM IN ITALIAN CENTRE-RIGHT PARTIES**

To sum up, Forza Italia, the National Alliance and the Northern League came to power in April 1994 and returned to opposition in December 1994. They lost the 1996 general election and, finally, they returned to office in May 2001. The Northern League has expressed some soft Euroscepticism since 1998 and has moved towards hard Euroscepticism in the most recent period. However, during its first government experience in 1994 and the first period of its return to opposition in 1995, this party had not embraced Euroscepticism. In contrast, the National Alliance, which had held some Eurosceptic views in the past – to be precise, this was mainly the case of the Italian Social Movement - has mitigated these positions since its first government experience in 1994. As for Forza Italia, when Berlusconi was Prime Minister in 1994 some Eurosceptic views were put forward by a few senior figures within the party. Once back in opposition, Euroscepticism disappeared almost completely, perhaps because European themes were hardly present in Forza Italia's political discourse. Finally, Euroscepticism has re-emerged stronger than before in the second Berlusconi government in 2001.

The material provided in the previous sections suggests that the Northern League's move towards Euroscepticism was and is a strategy to 'reconstruct' its identity as a political subject, as it has done several times in the past (see Diamanti 1996). It is also an attempt to (re)construct its electoral base after the steady

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<sup>12</sup> [http://www.leganord.org/a\\_2\\_discorsi\\_congressoord\\_2002.htm](http://www.leganord.org/a_2_discorsi_congressoord_2002.htm) accessed on 28/3/02 at 10pm.

electoral decline since 1994 because of the rival attraction of Forza Italia. Euroscepticism is a way to differentiate this party from other mainstream political parties and the leader of the Northern League is a cunning political operator who does not miss opportunities to draw attention to himself and his party. After all, this is not an unexpected move for a populist party. Yet, this assessment does not imply that it is purely a short term strategy or tactic, since the Northern League may well decide to go down this route by consolidating its Euroscepticism. The material provided in this paper supports the view that Euroscepticism, in particular hard Euroscepticism, is not entrenched in the Northern League's ideological base - to the extent that it is possible to speak of an ideological base for this party. Indeed, until 1998 Euroscepticism, either hard or soft, was not displayed by the Northern League. Since 1998 the Northern League has taken on board soft Euroscepticism and is moving towards hard Euroscepticism. The party leader, Bossi, is at the forefront in this operation, although other party figures are less eager to do so. The main question for the future is whether its leaders will assess this strategy as politically (meaning electorally) convenient or not. Depending on the answer to this question, the League may try to swing Italian government policy in a more anti-EU direction, as was attempted with the European arrest warrant (*Financial Times*, 11 December 2001). Speculating a bit further on this, it seems to be questionable whether this strategy will pay off electorally, given the predominant views of the League's supporters.

In contrast, this research suggests that the National Alliance, largely because of its origins in the MSI, has an ideological base that could make it lean towards Euroscepticism. Yet, mainly because of the political strategy pursued by its leaders - Fini, first and foremost - this has not happened so far. On the contrary, the party has kept a low profile on EU issues, up to the point that its positions often come out as more moderate than those taken by the other two parties which are subjects of this study. However, the tone is different in the lower ranks of the National Alliance. The reason why the party has adopted such a low profile on this issue given the views of its supporters needs further elaboration. Arguably, the main reason behind this choice is that the absence of Eurosceptic discourses provides this party with a 'cloak of respectability', in particular in the eyes of foreign counterparts. In other words, it serves the purpose of presenting the National Alliance as a post-fascist party, rather than a neo-fascist one - it is mainly a marketing operation engineered by the party leaders. Here, the question is how far Fini will manage to move the party towards a centrist, or, for that matter, Gaullist position on European matters, as well as on other issues? This research supports the hypothesis that he might be planning a Gaullist landing for his party (see also Carioti 1996), which would result in a Gaullist approach to Europe. At the moment the party does not embrace either soft or hard Euroscepticism.

Out of these three case studies, Forza Italia is the most difficult to assess because it is a composite party and because Berlusconi's position is still unclear. On the one hand, there is the soft Euroscepticism of Martino and Tremonti, even though they would most likely dismiss this term and define it as 'Eurorealism'. On the other

hand, there are pro-European figures in the party. Furthermore, it is questionable whether under the present circumstances the electorate of Forza Italia would agree with a Eurosceptic line. At the moment, the party does not embrace either soft or hard Euroscepticism. Two questions lie ahead. Firstly, whether this party, or for that matter its leaders, are moving ahead of their political constituency and of Italian public opinion more generally? And, if this is the case, whether this will move the electorate towards Eurosceptic positions or not? Alternatively, the question is whether some Eurosceptic figures in the party are simply expressing or picking up trends of latent Euroscepticism in Italy.

## **MAIN FEATURES OF EU POLICY OF THE SECOND BERLUSCONI GOVERNMENT**

A few words are needed on certain features of the EU policy of the second Berlusconi government since they can help us to understand what sort of Euroscepticism is emerging in Italy. To begin with, for the first time in post-war Italy a major drift on EU policy has taken place within the government, as well as within governing parties. Within the government several political leaders advocate a tougher line vis-à-vis the EU and some of Berlusconi's actions reflect this. However, other political allies, first and foremost the Christian Democrat groups, are loyal to Italy's traditional pro-European policy and Berlusconi cannot ignore them. These advocacies do not split neatly according to party line, so they co-exist within different parties of the governing coalition. There is the impression that the Prime Minister does not have an EU line of his own and his views on Europe are far from clear. Berlusconi has never given a major speech or interview on this subject. As a result, the government has often spoken with many voices. One important difference between the first Berlusconi government and the second is that the number of (potentially) Eurosceptic ministers is much higher now. Whereas in 1994 Martino's point of view was isolated within the Cabinet, in the current government he is flanked, for example, by the influential Treasury Minister Tremonti, who 'has gradually let slip his deep-felt scepticism' (*Financial Times*, 4 January 2001). Ruggiero, who tried to head off the Eurosceptic tendencies of the government as well as to recompose its internal rifts, resigned in early January 2002. This begs the question of how these different views will be accommodated in the future and whether this can jeopardise government stability. After Ruggiero's resignation, the position was filled *ad interim* by the Prime Minister until November 2002, when Franco Frattini, a political figure close to Berlusconi in Forza Italia, was appointed as the new Foreign Minister.

Secondly, the Italian government has called for a more assertive stance on the world stage as well as within the EU and the argument of the 'defence of Italian national interests' has entered political discourse. Berlusconi professes himself to be an admirer of Margaret Thatcher, the former British Prime Minister, and is clearly tempted by the idea of standing up for Italy's interests in Europe. However, there has not yet been a clear definition of what the Italian 'national interest' is (i.e. *when* and *why* to 'say no' in Brussels) and how to defend it better (i.e. *how* to

'say no' in Brussels). So far, it would seem that the government has chosen to say 'no' on the wrong issues. For example, the location of the Food Agency or the A400 project are hardly vital decisions involving Italian national interests. Furthermore, it is questionable whether a more effective strategy could have been adopted to reach the preferred outcome. The overall impression is that in many instances there has been a last minute turn around in Italian negotiating positions and foreign counterparts have found it difficult to gather a clear understanding of the Italian government's stance.

Thirdly, within the Berlusconi government, some ministers, for example Martino and Berlusconi, profess heart-felt pro-Americanism and have repeatedly shown that they have more of an affinity with the US under the Bush administration than with the EU. They aim to strengthen this relationship, perhaps trying to build a 'special' transatlantic relationship with the US, a move that would be reminiscent of Thatcher's policy. Yet, this enthusiasm for the US is not shared by other members of the governing coalition, such as the Northern League and National Alliance.

Lastly, Berlusconi seems to see 'Europe' in terms of left and right camps (*Financial Times*, 16 October 2001). On the one hand, Berlusconi's overtures to Russia (*La Repubblica* 28 May 2002), which went as far as suggesting membership of the EU for Moscow, seem to run counter this interpretation. On the other hand he is sensitive to perceptions that he is not in the European mainstream and that, beyond Aznar, he has no natural partners (*Financial Times*, 10 October 2001). For example, he argued in favour of EU enlargement to eastern Europe noting that it will boost export markets and increase the number of EU governments led by the centre-right rather than the centre-left. The statute of Forza Italia, which is quoted in Section 3, supports this interpretation. One reason for the limited enthusiasm of the Berlusconi government for the introduction of the Euro coins was that EMU membership was regarded as a 'success' of the centre-left coalition. The 'intrusion' of partisan politics into Italy's EU policy is interesting because from the late 1970s this policy had been to a large extent bi-partisan. It would seem that the pendulum, say, policy and politics in Italy, are swinging back in that direction.

## CONCLUSIONS

This paper has argued that from the mid-1990s soft Euroscepticism – and in the case of the Northern League increasingly hard Euroscepticism - has emerged on the centre-right of the Italian political spectrum and that this phenomenon was accompanied by the abrupt end of bipartisan consensus concerning Italy's EU policy. For the three parties discussed here the changes in their stances on EU issues, either towards Euroscepticism - such as in the case of the Northern League - or, away from it - such as in the case of the National Alliance - are interpreted as strategic moves, rather than rooted in their ideological base. The situation is, however, fluid and the case of Forza Italia remains difficult to evaluate.

One important theme that comes through in this analysis and that deserves further elaboration is that in Italy (and elsewhere?), EU and foreign policy matters tend to be discussed through the prism of domestic politics. As far as EU policy is concerned, this trend strengthened in Italy when the bipartisan approach came to an end and examples include the way in which the 'national interest' has entered political discourse or the manoeuvring over EMU issues. In Italy there has been very little actual discussion about the overall trajectory of the European project and much of the critique of the EU seems to be an extension of domestic politics by other means. In the 1970s and 1980s any questioning of the EU had been ruled out in Italy by the widespread public and political party support for European integration, as well as by geopolitical factors. For all these reasons 'Europe was a taboo', as a leading politician remarked to me during an interview. After the watershed changes that unfolded in the international and European context as well as in the national environment in the 1990s, time would now be ripe for a wide-ranging debate about 'Europe'. Nonetheless, it seems unlikely that such a debate will be sparked off in Italy. On the contrary, it seems much more likely that Italy's EU policy will become more politicised than it has been in the past and that it will be a battleground for party politics. This work concludes that Euroscepticism is likely to take root in Italy in the future, with one important caveat. The Italian government, which will hold the EU presidency in the second half of 2003, for prestige reasons seem to be keen to achieve major results in the international scene and, in particular, to have the new EU treaty, the Constitutional Treaty, signed under the Italian presidency. This might well mitigate eurosceptic tendencies in Italy for the next twelve months or so.

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