


EUROPE AND THE CZECH PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS OF JUNE 2002

Seán Hanley

*Lecturer in Politics, Department of Politics,
American Studies and History, Brunel University
E-mail sean.hanley@brunel.ac.uk*



Key points:

- The Czech Social Democrats (CSSD) have won a decisive election victory over Václav Klaus's Civic Democratic Party (ODS).
- CSSD will form a coalition government with a narrow majority with the liberal/ Christian-democratic 'Coalition' grouping.
- The hard-line Czech communists (KSCM) polled their highest share of the vote since the fall of communism. All mainstream parties suffered a decline in support.
- EU entry was a significant issue for the centre-right, Eurosceptic Civic Democrats.
- All parties in the new government are Europhile. However, owing to Communist gains, the overall representation of Eurosceptic parties has increased.

Introduction

The Czech parliamentary elections of 14–15 June 2002 were the first since 1992 to produce a majority government: a coalition of the Czech Social Democratic Party (CSSD) and the liberal-Christian democrat 'Coalition' grouping will take over from the minority Social Democratic administration that has governed the Czech Republic since 1998. The new government will have 101 seats in the 200-member parliament. The formal written pact signed in 1998 by the governing Social Democrats and the opposition centre-right Civic Democratic Party (ODS) of former

TABLE 1: CZECH PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION RESULTS, 1998 AND 2002

	2002			1998		
	No. of votes	% of vote	No. of seats/200	No. of votes	% of vote	No. of seats/200
Civic Democratic Party (ODS)	1 166 464	24.47	58	1 665 550	27.74	63
Czech Social Democratic Party (CSSD)	1 439 797	30.20	70	1 928 660	32.32	74
Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM)	882 477	18.51	41	658 550	11.03	24
'Coalition' Freedom Union (US)	680 420	14.27	31			
Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party (KDU-CSL)			(8) (21)	513 596 537 013	8.60 9.00	19 20
Independents			(2)			

Czech Prime Minister Václav Klaus, guaranteeing the minority administration's survival (the so-called 'Opposition Agreement'), is therefore discontinued. As a consequence of provisions in the Opposition Agreement, the 2002 elections used a less proportional form of list-based proportional representation (PR) with a larger number of regional constituencies and a modified formula for representation favouring larger parties. The 5% hurdle required for parliamentary representation remained unchanged.¹ A dramatic fall in turnout (58% compared with 74% in 1998); a fall in support for all mainstream parties; and a very significant advance for the hard-line Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM) confirm high levels of popular dissatisfaction with the political drift and cartel-like behaviour of the two main parties, which characterized the period of the Opposition Agreement.

Although the right-wing Civic Democrats made EU accession and the defence of Czech national interests a key feature of their campaign, social and economic issues appear to have been more important for other parties and for most voters. However, the campaign saw the re-emergence of the issue of the Benes Decrees, which had expelled ethnic Germans from Czechoslovakia after the Second World War, and the linkage of this issue with EU entry.

The results

Despite a slight drop in support, the election result is a significant political achievement for the Czech Social Democrats (CSSD). CSSD has not only confirmed its status as the largest Czech party, but is also the first major incumbent centre-left party anywhere in post-

communist East and Central Europe to win successive elections. The result is also a personal triumph for Social Democrats' new leader, and incoming Prime Minister, Vladimír Spidla, who took over the party leadership from outgoing Prime Minister Milos Zeman in April 2001 (Zeman is retiring from politics).

Despite unexpected success in progressing Czech EU accession negotiations and implementing a number of important legal and constitutional reforms, such as the establishment of regional authorities and the privatization of state-owned banks, the 1998–2002 government largely failed to achieve the investment and improvement in public services stressed in CSSD's 1998 campaign. Nevertheless, CSSD's successful electoral performance in 2002 can be seen as a result of its decision to continue to campaign on these issues and its emergence as a credible party of government. More significantly, however, it seems a vindication of Vladimír Spidla's decision to rule out any further cooperation with Klaus's ODS, a point he made during the election campaign in an unexpectedly dramatic way in a face-to-face television debate with Klaus.² The Social Democratic campaign and programme, while positive about EU entry in general terms, largely ignored the issue.

For both the Civic Democratic Party and Václav Klaus personally the results are a major reverse. ODS suffered the most significant decline in its support in any parliamentary election since its foundation in 1991 and the continuation of a steady electoral decline since its peak performance in 1992. The results represent the failure of the party's political reorientation since losing office in a party funding scandal in 1997, which had seen it move away from a stress on free markets

towards a more nationalistic stance stressing the need to defend Czech national interests during EU accession (see below). The party's campaign and its ten key electoral themes devoted significant space to these issues, and, as well as familiar themes such as cutting taxes and slashing bureaucracy, also introduced a number of more conservative themes such as fighting crime and the need to restrict immigration.³ In other respects, the ODS campaign resembled that of 1998, centring heavily on Václav Klaus and directing strident, anti-communist and anti-socialist rhetoric against opponents on the centre-left.

However, the fact that Klaus had not only sustained a 'socialist' minority Social Democratic administration in office, but was willing to contemplate the possibility of further pragmatic cooperation with the Social Democrats as one of a number of post-election scenarios undermined the credibility of such a stance. During the course of the campaign, the party's Eurosceptic rhetoric and related discourse of 'national interests' was radicalized through its co-sponsoring with the Communists of a parliamentary resolution affirming that the Benes Decrees were a permanent and unalterable feature of Czech law and by Václav Klaus's subsequent declarations that his party would not support EU entry unless the Union guaranteed the status of the Decrees after Czech accession (see, for example, interviews in *Právo*, 26 May and *Hospodářské noviny*, 28 May).

Since the election Klaus and other ODS leaders have acknowledged their party's failure, opening up a period of recrimination and internal debate. Klaus and the party's current leadership have indicated that they will formally resign at the party's regular congress after local elections in November. Although it is not clear whether Klaus will seek re-election, or bow out as leader, he has hinted that he may retire, and the Czech press is already speculating about possible successors. The election result and the formation of the new government effectively rule out the possibility of Klaus becoming Czech president when Václav Havel's final term of office expires at the end of this year. As the president is indirectly elected by members of the two houses of the Czech parliament, Havel's successor is now likely to be a non-party figure with links to one of the two strongest parties in the new coalition.⁴

The election results are also a major setback for the Coalition grouping, which united the liberal Freedom Union and the Christian Democrats (KDU-CSL) in a joint electoral list. Formed as the Four Party Coalition (4K) with two smaller right-wing parties in July 1998 in reaction to the Opposition Agreement, until late 2001 the Coalition seemed poised to emerge as a significant third force in Czech politics. It enjoyed opinion poll ratings comparable to those of ODS and CSSD and won an overall majority in the Czech Senate in 2000.⁵

However, persistent conflicts between Coalition member parties over both personnel and programmatic issues, culminating in the departure of the small Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA) in early 2002, damaged its credibility as an effective political force.⁶

The 14% ultimately won by the Coalition not only fell short of the 17–18% forecast by pre-election polls, but was significantly less than its two member parties received when running separately in 1998. For the Christian Democrats the results were disappointing especially in their rural, Catholic, stronghold districts in South Moravia and East Bohemia. However, with 21 deputies the party's representation in parliament remains unchanged and, as a junior partner in the new coalition government, it will hold the key Foreign Affairs portfolio – Christian Democrat leader Cyril Svoboda takes over from Social Democrat Jan Kavan as Foreign Minister. For the Freedom Union, only formed as a breakaway from Klaus's ODS in early 1998, however, the results were disastrous. Several of the party's leading candidates failed to gain election and with eight deputies the party is technically unable to form a parliamentary faction and will need to affiliate two independent deputies elected on the Coalition list to do so.⁷

As a result of the election, splits are now opening up in both the Freedom Union and the broader Coalition grouping. Although, in contrast to 1998, the majority of the Freedom Union is now willing to work with the Social Democrats, Freedom Union chairwoman Hana Marvanová has resigned because of objections to fiscal provisions in the new government's programme. Among the Christian Democrats, many of whose supporters were unwilling to back Freedom Union candidates and used the system of individual preference voting to advance their party's candidates up the Coalition list, there is grassroots pressure to abandon an alliance whose main goal of challenging the Opposition Agreement has now been achieved.⁸ Neither the Coalition nor the Freedom Union, therefore, seems likely to survive in the long term.

Perhaps the biggest winner in the 2002 election was the hard-line Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM), whose 18.5% support and 41 deputies represent by far its best electoral performance since its foundation in 1990. The Communist election programme devoted minimal attention to European integration concentrating almost exclusively on social and economic issues. Although the party's share of the vote benefited from its ability to mobilize a well-motivated and loyal core electorate amid a record low turnout, the Communists also significantly increased their vote in absolute terms, gaining an extra 230,000 votes over their total in 1998. Exit poll evidence suggests that the additional support won by the party was drawn from groups of transition 'losers' who had

previously voted for the Social Democrats).¹⁰ In regional terms, KSCM succeeded not only in outpolling Klaus's ODS to take second place in four of the 14 regional constituencies, but also topped the poll in three administrative districts in West Bohemia and South Moravia, which are traditional Communist strongholds. Although KSCM demands for a role in government have predictably been rejected by the Social Democrats, the Communists seem likely to gain a number of chairs of parliamentary committees and one of the five deputy speakerships of the Czech parliament, which they were previously denied, and their political influence seems set to increase.

The issue of Europe

Euroscepticism on the right and left in Czech politics

In the Civic Democratic Party and the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia, the Czech Republic has Central Europe's largest and most well established Eurosceptic parties. Both have produced detailed critiques of European integration. ODS has consistently supported Czech accession to the EU. However, in the early to mid- 1990s ODS leader Václav Klaus developed a high-profile 'Thatcherite' neo-liberal critique of the EU, often conflated with wider criticisms of the European social model, which also included concerns about national identity, national sovereignty and the political and economic viability of the euro.¹¹ After losing office in 1997, however, ODS developed a more strident Euroscepticism, focusing more narrowly on the concept of the Czech national interest, which was more fully incorporated into the party programme, taken up by its wider leadership and disseminated to party activists at a series of ideological conferences. This position was most fully developed in the party's 2001 Manifesto of Czech Eurorealism drafted by a team headed by Foreign Affairs spokesman Jan Zahradil, on which those parts of its 2002 election programme dealing with European integration are based.¹² KSCM, given its self-identification as a radical, anti-capitalist, anti-system alternative, is unsurprisingly critical of current European integration. However, while it is vehemently hostile to Czech NATO membership, the party's position on the EU, established in a series of policy papers and position statements dating from the mid-1990s, is surprisingly vague and ambiguous.¹³

Despite their very different origins, ideologies and positions within Czech politics, the two parties' Eurosceptic critiques coincide in a number of respects.

These similarities (and differences) are summarized below:

1. ODS has consistently favoured Czech entry into the EU. KSCM has not been in favour of entering the EU in its existing form and seeks more advantageous conditions for Czech entry. It is officially reserving its decision for or against entry until the referendum campaign. Both parties argue that there has been a lack of open and critical debate in the Czech Republic concerning the EU and have strongly advocated a referendum concerning entry.
2. ODS sees the national state as a 'natural product' of human development, which should be preserved and privileged in relation to both sub-national and European institutions. KSCM, by contrast, views European integration and the decline of national sovereignty as inevitable. Its concerns centre on the *form* that this takes and its impact on the Czech Republic.
3. ODS is highly critical of the current EU, but strongly committed to integration with Western Europe and the West; it sees the Czech Republic as culturally and historically part of them. KSCM is dissatisfied with a Western geopolitical orientation, but recognizes that realistically there is little it can do to change this.
4. Both ODS and KSCM are critical of the existing EU on ideological grounds, seeing it as a leftover of the Cold War period. ODS sees it as an over-regulated, bureaucratic expression of postwar Christian Democratic and Social Democratic *dirigisme* in need of market liberalization. KSCM sees it as a capitalist-dominated political counterpart to NATO, whose 'social' elements should be expanded.
5. Both ODS and KSCM view the EU and the enlargement process as a largely zero-sum clash of conflicting, institutional national and socio-economic interests, which both see as mainly economic in character. Both regard the motives of West European political and economic actors in enlargement as essentially self-interested and are concerned that enlargement will take place to the socio-economic detriment of Czech and Central European citizens and businesses. ODS documents speak of a short-term 'liberalization shock', while KSCM foresees long-term structural unemployment and inequalities.
6. Both parties are concerned that enlargement and integration will serve the interests of Germany to the detriment of Czech national interests. ODS has increasingly identified Eurofederalism as a German-inspired project; KSCM refers to the strength of German capital. Both parties are concerned to defend the Benes Decrees (see below).
7. Both parties advocate maintaining national sovereignty and limiting the power of European institutions. ODS propounds a strongly intergovernmentalist model of integration and limiting the powers of the European

Commission, the European Parliament and Qualified Majority Voting (QMV). KSCM wishes to reduce Commission powers, but also wants to see the European Parliament strengthened. Both parties oppose steps towards tax harmonization and a European Army and wish to postpone Czech adoption of the euro.

8. Both parties advocate achieving more favourable conditions and guarantees for Czech EU entry. ODS has sought the upholding of the Benes Decrees. KSCM in its documents and pronouncements has appeared more concerned with social and economic guarantees, limiting the effect of the Single Market.

9. Both parties anticipate forming alliances within the EU to reform it along the lines they favour. ODS expects to work with (unspecified) parties and governments in the UK, Scandinavia, Spain and Portugal; KSCM with the 'European left' and the United European Left (GUE-NGL) group in the European Parliament.

10. Both parties have contemplated alternatives to Czech EU membership, analogous to the positions of Norway or Switzerland. The ODS *Manifesto of Czech Eurorealism* discusses a number of detailed non-membership scenarios in quite favourable terms. KSCM plans to work out such scenarios, but sees them as unrealistic contingencies.

The issue of Europe seems likely to be the subject of post-election divisions in both ODS and KSCM. The electoral failure of ODS's Eurosceptic campaign, the strongly pro-EU membership views of Czech right-wing voters and pressures to reincorporate the pro-EU Freedom Union in a reunited centre-right make it likely that the party's current policy will be challenged. In KSCM the (officially unresolved) question of the party's attitude to EU membership has already become an issue dividing pragmatists and conservatives. Conservatives have already fiercely criticized KSCM deputy chairmen Miroslav Ransdorf and Jirí Dolejs for favouring Czech EU accession. Dolejs has been quoted as saying that Czech EU entry is 'the only sensible option'.¹⁴ Grassroots KSCM supporters overwhelmingly oppose EU entry.

The Benes Decrees

The 'Benes Decrees' were a number of emergency decrees and laws passed by the Czechoslovak government during and after the Second World War, which, among other measures, ordered the removal of Czechoslovakia's 2.5-million-strong German population and its smaller Hungarian minority. The key 1945 decrees also stripped ethnic Germans and Hungarians of Czechoslovak citizenship and confiscated the bulk of their property. The official population 'transfer' (*odsun*) of Germans in 1945–6 was preceded by a number of often brutal locally initiated reprisals and deportations. As the *odsun* took place during the semi-

democratic 1945–8 interval preceding Communist rule, it was freely endorsed by both the Communists and non-Communist parties.

After 1989, some liberal intellectuals, including Václav Havel, and Czech Christian Democrats sought to promote a rethinking of Czech attitudes towards the *odsun*, which they viewed as an act of ethnic cleansing based on a principle of collective ethnic German guilt for Nazi crimes; however, most Czech politicians and members of the public were unwilling to do so. The consensus view was that it was a justified emergency measure bringing long-term stability, understandable in the context of the time, and that any compensation or apology would amount to 'revising the outcome of the Second World War' in favour of the aggressor.¹⁵ However, throughout the 1990s the Decrees were of secondary importance as a political issue, with only the Communists and, in particular, the far-right Republicans (represented in parliament between 1992 and 1998) mobilizing to oppose (supposed) German and Sudeten German claims.

In January 2002, the issue was reignited by comments made by Prime Minister Milos Zeman in an interview with the Austrian magazine *Fokus*, describing the Sudeten Germans as 'a fifth column' and 'traitors' with whom no reconciliation was possible. This was compounded by Zeman's apparent comments on a visit to Israel comparing Yasser Arafat to Hitler and seemingly suggesting that, given the Czechoslovak experience with the *odsun*, a population 'transfer' of Palestinians might be an appropriate solution to the Middle East crisis.¹⁶ The outraged reaction of Austrian and German politicians, including Gerhard Schröder, Edmund Stoiber and European Parliament deputies, as well as then Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, and the subsequent response by Czech politicians firmly linked the Benes Decrees issue with Czech accession to the EU.

The ODS programme paid considerable attention to the defence of the Decrees, presenting challenges to it as 'property and perhaps also territorial claims against the victims of past Nazi aggression' which could lead to 'the calling into question of Czech statehood'. As noted above, this position was then radicalized by Václav Klaus in his demand that the retention of the Decrees be legally guaranteed as part of Czech accession to the EU. The KSCM programme, by contrast, made no direct reference to the Decrees, although, given the party's consistent stance both before and after 1989, its position – often expressed in fairly crude anti-German terms by leaders and members on the campaign trail¹⁷ – was well known. The increasing mood of national self-assertion over the issue was exploited by both ODS and KSCM in April in their tabling of a parliamentary resolution asserting that the Decrees were an inalienable and unmodified feature of

Czech law.¹⁸ The resolution was passed unanimously by all 169 deputies present. However, the ODS–KSCM initiative effectively bounced other parties into backing the resolution for fear of appearing weak in defending national interests.¹⁹

Public opinion

Despite showing weaker levels of support for EU entry than in other Central and East European applicant states, surveys of Czech public opinion have always recorded clear majorities in favour. Nevertheless, there is evidence that the rise of Eurosceptic discourses and the re-emergence of the Benes Decrees as an element within them may have influenced both the election result and public attitudes towards EU accession. A public opinion poll commissioned in June 2002 by the news magazine *Respekt* indicates that, although, contrary to a previous poll, an overwhelming majority (69%) of Czechs voting in a referendum would support joining the EU, this would change to a narrow majority *against* entry if Czechs' right to work in EU states were restricted, and to a clear majority against if EU membership were made conditional on the abolition of the Benes Decrees.²⁰

Interestingly, in the election itself, there seem to have been higher levels of Communist support and/or gains in former Sudeten German areas, with marked differences sometimes observable even between different communes. In some cases ODS support also seems to have held up unexpectedly well in these areas.²¹ (Some leading Christian Democrats have attributed their party's weak performance to its perceived softness on the Benes Decrees issue. However, anecdotal evidence from Communist-supporting former Sudeten German areas suggests that other factors such as an effective KSCM presence in local government and a widespread sense of social and economic marginalization often overlay any concerns about the Decrees and possible German claims.²²

Conclusion and prospects

The establishment of a majority government for the first time since 1996 seems to mark a move away from a period of minority administrations sustained by left-right cooperation and the re-establishment of a clearer set of government–opposition relationships. However, this change may be more apparent than real. All parties in the new coalition *lost* support compared with their showing in 1998. The incoming Social Democratic-Christian Democratic-Freedom Union coalition has emerged less as a result of the election results than as a consequence of changes in party

strategy. Moreover, given the instability of the Freedom Union and the presence of two independent Coalition deputies, whose allegiances may prove unpredictable, the incoming government's majority of only two seats may rapidly erode. This would mean a return to the position of the 1998–2002 period, in which a minority centre-left administration had to negotiate on an ad hoc basis with opposition parties on left and right to ensure the passage of legislation.

In the longer term the poor performance of parties of the liberal and neo-liberal centre-right, ODS and the Freedom Union, is likely to herald a period of crisis, fragmentation and realignment for this once dominant bloc. The enhanced position of historically rooted parties committed to some form of social market, such as the Social Democrats, Christian Democrats and Communists, may mark an open reversion to the corporatist, state-centred Central European traditions characteristic of the Czech Lands.²³ The Communists' confirmation of their status as an apparently permanent feature of the Czech political landscape, combined with their continued unacceptability as a partner for other parties on the centre and left, promises to be a source of continued instability. The extent to which KSCM can be integrated into normal politics is therefore likely to be an important influence on future developments.

Some of the new dynamics in Czech politics are likely to show themselves in relation to European integration, and the referendum on EU accession likely to take place in 2003. All parties in the new government are strongly Europhile and rapid EU entry is a high priority for it. This implies a relatively smooth conclusion to the Czech Republic's accession negotiations. However, complications may arise in relation to a referendum on EU accession. Underlying Eurosceptic moods in public opinion and the presence of two powerful Eurosceptic parties might suggest the possibility of a lower than expected majority and/or an unconvincingly low turnout. In practice, however, the capacity of Eurosceptics to mobilize effectively may be limited, and the chances of a 'no' vote seem minimal. Despite the intriguing spectacle of recent parliamentary cooperation between the Communists and Klaus's Civic Democrats, for ideological reasons there is no real chance of a cross-party anti-EU campaign. Moreover, even the most hard-line right-wing Eurosceptics in ODS are likely to endorse entry, albeit with public reservations. Given the views of their grassroots membership, the Communists seem on balance likely to oppose entry. Nevertheless, both their ability to attract wider support and the enthusiasm of many of their leaders for all-out rejection of the EU must be doubted. The most unpredictable factor in the equation would seem to be the Benes Decrees, which have emerged as a focal point and symbol of Czech

anxieties about national identity and the Czech place in Europe. Although eager to decouple the issue from that of EU accession, new Prime Minister Spidla has made it clear that he holds conventional Czech views on the Decrees. He may therefore find that, as in the

2002 election campaign, the Benes Decrees could have a surprising ability to influence and mobilize public opinion and push moderate politicians into openly nationalistic positions they would prefer to avoid.

Endnotes

- ¹ The Social Democrats and ODS initially cooperated to pass a new electoral law introducing a form of PR with strong majoritarian effects. However, this was ruled to be an unconstitutional attempt to bypass the constitutional provision specifying that the lower house should be elected using a proportional system. A second compromise bill was then passed.
- ² TV Nova, *Sedmicka*, 9 June 2002.
- ³ The programme *Volební desatero ODS 2002*, can be found at www.ods2002.cz/ods2002/asp/texty.asp?CatID=8gSovakP&catP=5&textID=3.
- ⁴ Likely candidates include the former Justice Minister Otakar Motejl, who has links with the Social Democrats, and the current Speaker of the Czech Senate and former (1990-2) Czech Prime Minister, Petr Pithart, elected as a Christian Democrat, whose background as a dissident intellectual has much in common with that of Havel.
- ⁵ Elections to the Czech Senate are staggered, with one third of senators elected every two years. The Coalition performed well in both 1998 and 2000.
- ⁶ The fourth member of the Four Party Coalition, the Democratic Union (DEU) merged with the Freedom Union in 2001.
- ⁷ The actress Tatána Fiserová and the evangelical clergyman and former dissident Svatopluk Karásek, who were formally entered on the Coalition list as representing the Freedom Union and the Christian Democrats respectively.
- ⁸ *Lidové noviny*, 26 May 2002.
- ⁹ S lidmi pro lidi accessible at www.kscm.cz/show.php?leve_menu/aktuality/volby_2002/vp_2002.htm.
- ¹⁰ *Hospodářské noviny*, 17 June 2002.
- ¹¹ For an English language selection see V Klaus, *Renaissance: the Rebirth of Liberty in the Heart of Europe* Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 1997.
- ¹² *Manifest českého eurorealismu*, available online at www.ods.cz/docs/ik3_010421-manifest.doc.
- ¹³ This assessment is based on the party's 2002 election programme; the 1996 policy paper 'Za demokratickou Evropu' www.kscm.cz/show.php?leve_menu/dokumenty/manifest.htm; Central Committee resolution 'Informační kampan k problematice EU' of 31 March 2001 www.kscm.cz/show.php?leve_menu/tiskove_informace/leden_2002/greb_240102.htm; and 'Do Evropské unie jen s pevnými zárukami', by party chairman Miroslav Grebeníček, *Právo* 24 January 2002. www.kscm.cz/show.php?leve_menu/tiskove_informace/leden_2002/greb_240102.htm
- ¹⁴ *Respekt* no. 28, 8–14 July 2002.
- ¹⁵ See Jolyon Naegele, 'The Benes Decrees – How Did They Come to Be and What Do They Mandate?', www.rferl.org/nca/features/2002/03/01032002095607.asp.
- ¹⁶ *Ha'aretz*, 15 January 2002.
- ¹⁷ *Respekt* no. 24, 10–16 June 2002.
- ¹⁸ *Lidové noviny*, 25 April 2002.
- ¹⁹ *Respekt* no. 18, 29 April–5 May 2002.
- ²⁰ *Respekt* no. 24, 10–16 June 2002; on previous polls see *Respekt* no. 23, 3–9 June 2002.
- ²¹ *Respekt* no. 26, 24–30 June 2002.
- ²² *Respekt* no. 28, 8–14 July; *Mladá fronta Dnes*, 17 June, regional supplement for South Moravia.
- ²³ Such a trend has been publicly anticipated by ODS deputy chairman Jan Zahradil, who has predicted that his party is likely to be out of office for at least two parliamentary terms (eight years) (*Lidové noviny*, 18 June 2002).

Convened from the Sussex European Institute, the Opposing European Research Network is a group of academic researchers studying party politics within the European Union and candidate countries and seeking to understand in particular why Euroscepticism exists in some states and not in others. Like the Royal Institute of International Affairs, the Network itself retains an independent stance on the issues under consideration. The views presented are those of the authors.

For further details email p.a.taggart@sussex.ac.uk or
A.A.Szczerbiak@sussex.ac.uk
website:www.sussex.ac.uk/Units/SEI/oern/index.html



The Royal Institute of International Affairs is an independent body which promotes the rigorous study of international questions and does not express opinions of its own.

The opinions expressed in this publication are the responsibility of the author.

© Seán Hanley, 2002. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted by any other means without the prior permission of the copyright holder.



**THE ROYAL INSTITUTE OF
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS**

Chatham House 10 St James's Square London SW1Y 4LE
Tel 020 7957 5700 E-mail contact@riia.org
Fax 020 7957 5710 Website www.riia.org

Charity Registration Number: 208223
