

# EPERN

**European Parties Elections  
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## **ELECTION BRIEFING No.30**

### **THE SWEDISH PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION OF SEPTEMBER 2006<sup>1</sup>**

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#### **Key Points:**

- Despite strong economic growth, the Social Democrats suffered their worst election result since the 1920s and lost power. The long-serving prime minister and party leader, Göran Persson, immediately accepted the consequences of the result and announced his resignation from both posts.
- The centre-right parties had formed a pre-electoral coalition, the 'Alliance for Sweden', in 2004. This constituted the most extensive collaboration ever for the non-socialist parties.
- The Moderates, led by the new prime minister, Fredrik Reinfeldt, achieved their best electoral result since the 1920s and the biggest jump in support for any party in Swedish history.
- Issues over Europe and EU were virtually absent from the election campaign.

#### **Introduction**

Apart from perhaps the LDP in Japan, the Swedish Social Democrats are the most successful political party in the democratic world. For a period of over 70 years, between 1932 and 2006, the party was out of government for just over nine years. Moreover, they have not needed a coalition partner since the 1950s, when they collaborated with the Centre Party. In light of this Social Democratic record, the result of Sweden's election of 17 September 2006, then, must count as something of an electoral earthquake. Not only did the Social Democrats suffer their worst score ever in a democratic parliamentary election, the centre-right parties, which managed to present an unprecedentedly united pre-electoral government alternative, won a majority of the seats in the Riksdag. They were thus able to form the first government since 1981 that did not require additional parliamentary support from non-governing parties.

The long-serving Social Democratic leader and prime minister, Göran Persson, immediately announced his resignation. After a decade in charge of Sweden's largest party, Persson became the first Social Democratic leader ever to resign after an electoral defeat. He also became the first leader never to lead the Social Democrats to a score above 40 per cent, something it had failed to do just once

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<sup>1</sup> This report is based on a forthcoming article in *West European Politics*.

previously, in 1991. By contrast, the leading party of the centre-right coalition, the Moderates, led by the new prime minister, Fredrik Reinfeldt, achieved its best result since 1928 and the biggest jump in support between elections enjoyed by any party in Swedish history. Three weeks after the election, the 'Alliance for Sweden', comprising the Moderates, the Centre Party, the Liberal Party and the Christian Democrats, formed a coalition government.

Table 1. Elections to the Swedish Parliament, September 2006

	2006		2002	
	seats	votes %	seats	votes %
Left Party	22	5.9	30	8.4
Social Democrats	130	35.0	144	39.9
Greens	19	5.2	17	4.7
Centre Party	29	7.9	22	6.2
Liberals	28	7.5	48	13.4
Christian Democrats	24	6.6	33	9.2
Moderates	97	26.2	55	15.3
Sweden Democrats	0	2.9	0	1.4
turnout		82.0		80.1

Note: due to rounding and because minor parties that won less than 1 per cent have not been included, percentages do not add to 100.

Source: Election Authority website (val.se), accessed September 2006.

Above all, there was one puzzling feature of the Swedish election. Why did the Social Democrats lose in a period of strong economic growth? The conventional wisdom is that booming economies favour incumbent parties, while stagnant ones favour the opposition. But the theory fails to explain this particular case. Inflation in Sweden was negligible, the public finances would probably enjoy a surplus 2006 of 3 per cent, and the economy had grown in the second quarter of 2006 by a remarkable 5.1 per cent.

### **Background; Swedish Politics Since 2002**

After returning to power in 1994, a harsh period of austerity led to a poor election for the Social Democrats in 1998. The result in 2002 was much better. Yet, despite the improving macroeconomy, the following four years had not, in general, been happy ones for the party.

Much of the attention the last two years has been drawn to the aftermath of the tsunami in Asia just after Christmas 2004, in which hundreds of Swedish tourists were killed. The government's ponderous response to the disaster prompted an official inquiry, which reported nearly a year later. The inquiry

was unexpectedly fierce in its criticism, and, surprisingly to many commentators, criticised personally some of those it held responsible. Ultimately, the prime minister was criticised for failing to act on recommendations that a crisis-management unit be established in the chancery.

In fact, neither the tsunami, the inquiry nor the subsequent fallout ever caused a noticeable fall in the Social Democrats' support in opinion polls. Nor did a steady trickle of scandals within the labour movement (charity-owned property misappropriated, public subsidies fraudulently claimed by the party's youth wing). Nor did the foreign minister's resignation, in March 2006, over her actions during the Danish cartoons crisis. Nor, indeed, did recurring rows about the government's use of its wide-ranging powers of patronage, especially concerning top positions within state agencies and the civil service (rather than reflecting competence, such appointments often seemed to repay past political debts). Yet, together, all these stories may have added to voters' impression that the governing party had become just a little too comfortable with the trappings of office.

Primarily, however, the Social Democrats had problems with the increasingly apparent fact that Sweden's impressive economic growth had not brought many jobs. 'Open unemployment' had been brought down to 4 per cent in 2002, but had stayed stubbornly above that level since. The level was much higher in certain groups, such as the young and immigrants. Exactly how high unemployment was in Sweden became the subject of a rather bewildering debate. Different public agencies offered quite different figures, based on different counting methods, for even the narrow category of open unemployment. Under the OECD's broader definition, unemployment was about 8.5 per cent, a middling performance by European standards but poor by Swedish historical ones. And the picture was complicated further by disagreement about whether, and to what extent, puzzlingly high levels of incapacity could be understood as a form of hidden unemployment. There was, then, plenty of room for differing interpretations of the state of the Swedish labour market. Naturally enough, the Social Democrats presented the most optimistic view, while the opposition took the more pessimistic line. As we will see, the latter proved the more persuasive to voters.

### **The 'Government Question' and the Alliance for Sweden**

The five old parties that comprised the classic Swedish 'five-party system' could broadly be divided into two blocs: a 'socialist' bloc, containing the Social Democrats and Left Party; and a 'non-socialist' or 'bourgeois' bloc, containing the agrarian-based Centre Party, the Liberals and the conservative Moderates.<sup>2</sup> This bloc identity had at times become fuzzy, and the system was further complicated by the arrival of two new parties, the Greens and the Christian Democrats, in 1988 and 1991 respectively. But during the 2002-6 parliamentary term, the two blocs had acquired more coherence than ever before.

On the left, the Social Democrats had developed since 1998 a relationship with the Left and the Greens than was akin to, but fell short of, an executive coalition. It was based on two 'contracts', one signed at the beginning of each subsequent parliamentary term. These contracts secured a majority base in parliament for the Social Democratic minority government in return for a commitment that it would co-operate with the two 'support parties' in specific policy areas. The second contract also provided for the stationing of advisors from the Left and the Greens in selected ministries.

The contracts had worked rather well. Annual budget negotiations had often been fraught, but they had always concluded successfully. Yet the support parties had become increasingly discontented with the form of this semi-coalition, and the Greens' leaders declared that, if the 2006 election again gave the left bloc a majority, they would refuse to support a government in which they were not given cabinet seats.

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<sup>2</sup> Most of the parties have changed their names at some point in their histories. In this article, for the sake of simplicity, we use the modern English-language names that the parties themselves prefer. All other translations from Swedish are the responsibility of the authors.

This put the Social Democrats in a bind. In some ways, a coalition with the Greens, at least, might have been acceptable. The policy differences between the parties, such as on EU relations, had diminished or been allowed to drift away from the political agenda. But it was a different story with the Left Party. Since 2002 the Left had, interestingly enough, reverted to a more traditional radicalism. This made an alliance with the party unthinkable to the Social Democrats: what they would gain in firm parliamentary support would probably be more than offset by the votes lost through association with neo-communists. Yet the Left had blackmail potential. It threatened explicitly to block any two-party coalition that excluded it – that is, involving the Social Democrats and Greens only. This threat was enough to make a two-party deal just as unattractive to the Social Democrats as a three-party deal. For one thing, a two-party coalition would almost certainly still have fallen short of a parliamentary majority, which would have left it reliant on Left Party support in parliament anyway. And if co-operation with the Left could be awkward at the best of times, the prospect of relying on a rejected, humiliated Left to secure legislation was not an enticing one for the Social Democrats.

The governing party's choice, then, was to adopt its usual public electoral objective: to work for a Social Democratic government, and to reserve a free hand to assess the parliamentary situation after the election. The trouble was, developments among those centre-right parties had undermined this position.

The political significance of these developments is hard to overstate, and they amounted to the transformation of the opposition bloc. After a disastrous performance in 2002, the Moderates' elected Reinfeldt as their new leader in 2003. His strategy for the party had two components. The first was an ideological charge for the centre ground, with several sacred cows – big tax cuts, labour-market reform – cheerfully slaughtered on the way. He even began to call his party the 'new Moderates', with obvious echoes from comparable campaigns for the middle ground by parties in America and Britain. The second component of the strategy involved the Moderates' relationship with the other non-socialist parties. In fact, it was Maud Olofsson, the Centre leader, who in 2004 invited the other three party leaders to her home in northern Sweden to discuss co-operation. But the Moderates' openness to the idea was the key to its success. The four declared an 'Alliance for Sweden', and charged working groups with reaching common policy positions in six areas (growth, education, foreign policy, the welfare state, the labour market and justice). A year before the election, just when it looked as though the four parties' co-ordination might be fraying, their leaders reached common positions on the thorny issues of tax and social security.

Reinfeldt's strategy was, essentially, office-seeking in character. Through drastically softening their ideological profile and decisively anchoring themselves in an alliance with more centrist parties, the Moderates sought to persuade electors that a vote for them – or, almost as good, for another Alliance party – was a less risky enterprise than it had been in the past. It was less risky for two reasons. First, the Alliance clearly pledged to adjust the Swedish model, not to overturn it. Second, the fact that its platform had been thrashed out *before* the election made it improbable that the Moderates would be able to pull the other three parties in an uncomfortably radical direction in post-election negotiations.

It was this second factor – the predictability of the consequences of voting for an Alliance party – that so changed the dynamics of the contest between the blocs. Traditionally, the Social Democrats had emphasised this, the 'government question', as a reason to vote for them rather than for the eternally squabbling right-of-centre parties. Now, with the Social Democrats' future relationship with its support parties so uncertain, the respective blocs' qualities in this respect were reversed.

## **The Campaign**

By summer 2006, most surveys put the two blocs neck and neck. In June the Alliance parties agreed a common position on energy policy, which confirmed a major concession by the Centre – in effect, the end of the party's longstanding opposition to nuclear power. At the beginning of July, to some surprise, the four parties agreed to abolish a national property tax, which had become highly unpopular

among middle-class house-owners. In fact, the deal unravelled somewhat in the following days. But it coincided with a breakthrough for the Alliance in the polls. Later still, in August, came an agreement on family policy, in which the Liberals withdrew their previous opposition to a 'childcare benefit' that would increase the scope for parents to stay at home with small children, rather than leaving them at kindergarten. The Liberals were placated by a clever Moderate idea, an 'equality bonus', which would reward the better-paid working partner – presumably, but not necessarily, the father – for taking a larger share of parental leave.

The property-tax and family-policy agreements were significant achievements for the Christian Democrats, who had campaigned strongly on both issues. Indeed, a division of labour between the Alliance parties allowed each of them to emphasise their most intensely held preferences – and, moreover, it reduced the customary temptation to try to 'cannibalise' each other's support. The Liberals concentrated on education and law and order, and thus developed further the tougher, somewhat more populist profile that had won them votes in 2002. The Centre, meanwhile, shelved its politically hazardous proposals for reforming labour law, and focused instead on small-business interests.

The Moderates were still keen to confirm that their earlier radicalism had been jettisoned, and Reinfeldt raised eyebrows when he went so far as to promise to match and even surpass all Social Democratic promises of investment in healthcare. But, most importantly, his party led the pitch on what was unequivocally the Alliance's main issue: jobs. Indeed, the Moderates boldly branded themselves the 'new workers' party'. The joint Alliance manifesto, an almost unprecedented initiative in Swedish politics, was launched about a month before polling day. It was entitled (roughly translated) 'More people in work – more to share out'. There were several components to the Alliance's plan for achieving this aim. One was to cut taxes on domestic services, such as housework, which was supposed to bring a broad but illicit sector within the legal economy. (The issue touched nerves on the left, where some associate such services with class privilege.) More centrally, the Alliance also pledged to offer a substantial tax-rebate to those in work, and to cut unemployment benefit from its existing rate of 80 per cent of previous salary, albeit only after 200 days of unemployment.

The plan was vulnerable to attack. How, the parties of the left asked, would cutting benefits for the weakest in society create more jobs? The answer was that, by making those out of work relatively poorer compared to those in work, the unemployed would have reason to accept lower-paid jobs than would otherwise have been worth taking. But this was a tricky argument for the Alliance to make; advocating cheaper labour is not a recipe for success in a Swedish election campaign. The Moderates, especially, were often uncomfortable under fire on this basic question. Yet they always had an obvious retort: what was the left's jobs policy?

The Social Democratic manifesto, launched a few days before the Alliance's, was entitled (very roughly translated) 'Everyone on board', and it began, 'Work for everyone is the Social Democrats' most important objective.' But there was little else in it specifically on employment. Instead there were pledges to expand public dental care, to cut the maximum fees for childcare and to raise the ceiling on unemployment benefit. Otherwise, the document comprised aspirations rather than specific policy pledges. The manifesto's vagueness and caution caused some dismay among Social Democrats. The Left Party, meanwhile, had a very clear job-creation plan: the public sector should simply be expanded to employ 200,000 more people. But no Social Democrats took this costly idea seriously.

With the contest so close, the campaign's final weeks at first seemed surprisingly sedate. The numerous televised duels between the two prime ministerial candidates certainly became increasingly and unusually barbed, with Reinfeldt generally seen as holding his own against Persson's fearsome gladiatorial skills. But the parties' positions were stable, well-rehearsed and often repeated. At the end of August the under-secretary of state in the Prime Minister's Office resigned in another delayed reaction to the tsunami. But Swedes seemed by then largely inured to that particular saga.

Then, less than a fortnight before polling day, scandal broke. The Social Democrats announced that repeated intrusion into their intranet, which contained confidential details of the party's campaign

strategy, had been traced to the Liberals' central office. It quickly emerged that a leading figure in the Liberals' youth wing was behind the espionage. The Liberal party secretary, having denied all knowledge of the intrusion, then admitted that he had known about it since March. He resigned; other senior Liberals faced criminal charges. The party leader, Lars Leijonborg, was almost literally tottering. One political scientist went so far as to compare the incident with Watergate. Within a few days, however, media attention began to return to the main issues. Polls indicated that the Liberals' support had fallen but not collapsed, and that the parties of the left had not benefited from the scandal.

### **The Absence of the EU Issue**

Although decisions taken in the EU now impact upon national politics more than ever, Europe and the EU were virtually absent in the election campaign. None of the parliamentary parties seemed eager to debate EU-related questions; nor did the media do much to raise them. Traditionally, interest in these questions has been rather low, which also is confirmed by participation in elections to the European Parliament. Turnout for national parliamentary elections has not fallen under 80 per cent since the 1950s, whereas in European elections it is about 40 per cent.

The main reason for the scant interest in EU-related debate is the limited leverage it can yield the parties in terms of votes. None of the parties in the Riksdag has much to gain from raising the issue. Several of the parties are internally splintered over how to engage in the EU. This split is most apparent in the Social Democrats. Persson himself described the referendum in 2003 on whether to join Europe's monetary union as his greatest political failure. Ignoring the prime minister's advice, the electorate voted resoundingly No – as, embarrassingly, did a significant minority of the Social Democratic cabinet. Moreover, the support parties, the Left Party and the Greens, stubbornly held on to their demand that Sweden leave the EU. A more open debate of EU-related issues would probably have meant internal disagreement in the left bloc, which would not have served their interest in the election campaign.

Perhaps it is more surprising that the parties of the centre-right did not raise the issue more as a means to weaken the opposite bloc. However, there is still internal disagreement within these parties as well. Although, they were more internally unified in 2006 than during the campaign for the referendum in 2003, both the Christian Democrats and the Centre Party have a significant number of Eurosceptics among their members and supporters.

There was at least one party that was disfavoured by the absence of EU in the campaign. In the election to the European parliament in 2004, a newly formed soft-Eurosceptical party, the June List, ran for the first time. It surprised many by achieving 14.5 per cent and three seats, a tally surpassed only by the Social Democrats and the Moderates. However, in 2006 the party and its slogan, 'Yes to Europe – No to an EU state', did not get much attention during the campaign, and the party ended up with only 0.5 per cent of the vote.

### **Results and Voting Behaviour**

According to a Swedish Television exit poll,<sup>3</sup> the Moderates gained votes from all the other parties. In 2006 the Moderates became the most popular party among first-time voters (27 per cent) and 22-30-year-olds (26 per cent), surpassing the Social Democrats. While the Moderates still had mostly male voters, they became the second-largest party (after the Social Democrats) among women. Of course, all this constituted a personal triumph for their leader, Reinfeldt. Over three-quarters of Moderate voters ascribed to him great or fairly great significance in their party choice, easily the biggest proportion among the seven parties.

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<sup>3</sup> Valu 2006, accessed on Swedish Television's website (svt.se), September 2006.

The election's other big winner was the Centre Party. In 2002 Olofsson oversaw the party's first upswing in nine elections, and in 2006 it won further reward. This was a vindication of her taking the party into the internationalist, social-liberal territory partially vacated by the Liberals. But it probably owed at least as much to her own energetic leadership, an impression that the exit poll reinforces. The Christian Democrats lost votes compared to 2002. Yet the party did better than many had expected, and its leader, Göran Hägglund, managed to emerge from the shadow of his long-serving predecessor. Even the Liberals, despite their loss of nearly 6 per cent, were relieved not to have suffered even more from the hacking scandal, and could console themselves with the Alliance's victory.

For the Social Democrats, there was no consolation. They lost votes to all other parties except the Left. Their support declined in all the exit poll's categories, but especially noticeable were their losses among the over 65s (44 per cent to 33 per cent), the unemployed (46 per cent to 38 per cent) and, perhaps above all, immigrants (50 per cent to 37 per cent). One reason was the Alliance's foray into traditional Social Democratic territory through pushing jobs as its main issue. According to the exit poll, no issue was more urgent for the electorate in general, and only education was more important to Social Democratic voters. But another factor was the party leader. In 2002 over two-thirds of the Social Democrats' voters ascribed to Persson great or fairly great significance in their party choice. In 2006 that figure fell to just over half.

As for the Social Democrats' support parties, the Greens were happy to achieve their best score since their breakthrough election 18 years previously, even as the prospect of government disappeared. The Left was another party that had earlier feared an even worse result than it eventually achieved, but continuing internal turmoil seemed likely after it.

Turnout rose in comparison with 2002. That may have been due partly to the clear choice between the two blocs and the tightness of the contest. But it may also reflect the rise in support for parties that did not manage to win seats, which increased from 3.1 per cent in 2002 to 5.7 per cent in 2006.<sup>4</sup> A far-right party, the Sweden Democrats, which in 2002 took 1.4 per cent, increased its score to 2.9 per cent. The Sweden Democrats also quintupled their seats in municipal elections; they are now represented on nearly half of Sweden's local councils. In one southern municipality, they won nearly a quarter of the vote.<sup>5</sup> The public subsidies to which the Sweden Democrats became entitled after their success in 2006 could well make their next challenge for parliamentary seats – the threshold for representation is 4 per cent – even more potent.

Two final observations about voting behaviour and its consequences are worth making. First, the facility to vote for an individual candidate on a party's list became, intriguingly, less popular. In 1998, when preference voting was introduced, 29.9 per cent of voters used it. The figure fell to 26.0 per cent four years later, and to just 22.2 in 2006 (Election Authority 2006). Second, the representation of women in the Swedish parliament, already the highest in the developed world, improved further to 47 per cent (*Dagens Nyheter*, 22 September 2006).

### **Implications and Outlook for Swedish Politics**

After their party's defeat, some experienced and senior Social Democrats had little doubt where the lion's share of the blame lay. 'For me,' wrote a former finance minister, 'it is incomprehensible and a grave mistake that Social Democracy, of its own volition, without being forced to do so, abdicated from being the champion of work [*arbetslinjen*] and presented this trump card to its political opponents'.<sup>6</sup> This was indeed an extraordinary failure by the historic political representative of the labour movement, brilliantly exploited by the historic party of capital, the Moderates.

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<sup>4</sup> These included Feminist Initiative, with a former Left Party leader as its main figure. It won just 0.7 per cent.

<sup>5</sup> Municipal and county elections are held on the same day as the parliamentary election.

<sup>6</sup> Erik Åsbrink, 'Ett obegripligt och svårartat misstag av socialdemokratin', *Dagens Nyheter*, 6 September 2006.

How could the Social Democrats have allowed it to occur? The obvious culprit was the party leader. In his traditional May day speech, Persson had predicted that unemployment would not be a major issue in the campaign. This was obviously a colossal misjudgement. Its ramifications may have been amplified by the dominance that Persson had established in his party during his decade leading it. According to many observers, part of his 'presidential' approach to leadership had been to overlook heavyweight party figures when appointing to the cabinet, and the resulting vacuum at its summit might have left his party over-reliant on its leader's political instincts.

Yet this strategic error may also reflect a deeper ideological problem within Swedish Social Democracy. In another post-election critique, one of the party's MEPs speculated about the reasons for the party's neglect of the unemployment issue. 'It was as if those in the party leadership quite simply lacked ideas about how jobless growth should be addressed,' he wrote.<sup>7</sup> It is hard to escape this conclusion. When Persson belatedly took up the issue during the campaign, he had little more to say about job-creation than to argue that education and traditional labour-market measures would do the trick. In other words, he offered more of the same. There did not seem to be much else in the party's locker.

After Persson announced his resignation, a special party congress to elect a new leader was scheduled for March 2007, which provided for a long period of reflection about the party's future direction. With no obvious successor to Persson since the then foreign minister, Anna Lindh, died in 2003, the extent to which Social Democrats were ready for new thinking on labour-market questions was unclear.

Persson was also attacked for his approach to the Social Democrats' relations with other parties. Some, including the two critics cited above, deplored the contracts established with the Left and the Greens, which, it was alleged, had contributed to the governing party's failure to modernise its policies. Yet it was far from clear that, since the late 1990s, the centre-right parties had been interested in participating in any alternative, cross-bloc arrangement; and the formation of the Alliance had definitively ruled out that scenario. Nor would a genuine minority government, seeking to cobble together ad hoc legislative coalitions on individual pieces of legislation, have offered a stable basis for government.

When the Alliance announced its cabinet, meanwhile, commentators were surprised by the extent of the Moderates' dominance. Not only did Reinfeldt's party take half the 22 positions, its portfolios included those usually considered to be the most politically important, in addition to the prime minister's: foreign affairs, finance, defence, justice. Yet the three other parties – which had, after all, won fewer seats combined than the Moderates had – seemed content to concentrate on their 'favourite' policy areas: the Liberals took education, the Centre commerce and the Christian Democrats social affairs. Indeed, the Liberal leader suggested that he and the other two smaller parties' leaders had turned down the job of foreign minister, which went instead to Carl Bildt, a former Moderate prime minister.<sup>8</sup>

As for the Swedish party system, at the time of writing, the pattern of two opposing blocs now is perhaps stronger than ever. However, although it increasingly resembles a two-party system, further steps down that path are unlikely, at least under the current proportional electoral system. For one thing, there are the obstacles, discussed above, to an alliance of the left. For another, while unification of the Alliance parties was mooted both before and after the election, it is improbable that their moment of triumph in 2006 could be the progenitor of these old institutions' voluntarily abolishing themselves. Adversity and crisis are likelier catalysts for that sort of change. Moreover, while their Alliance leaders did appear to have established a genuine rapport, the pressures of office will

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<sup>7</sup> Jan Andersson, 'Perssons felaktiga strategi bakom partiets valförlust', *Dagens Nyheter*, 4 October 2006.

<sup>8</sup> The appointments of Bildt and other Moderate ministers were seen as an unexpectedly generous concession by Reinfeldt to his party's neo-liberal wing. Within days, however, four Moderate ministers were revealed as having earlier hired black-market domestic help or failed to pay their television licence fees. Two of them, both associated with the neo-liberal wing, resigned.



unavoidably put strain on their collaboration. The conditions that allowed them in 2004-6 to overcome their perennial collective-action problem, and to reconcile their parties' collective interest with their individual interests, are probably not permanent.

In short, after the 2006 election, the Swedish left had never looked so weak and the right had never looked so strong. But plenty could change before the next election, scheduled for 2010.

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*This is the latest in a series of election and referendum briefings produced by the European Parties Elections and Referendums Network (EPERN). Based in the Sussex European Institute, EPERN is an international network of scholars that was originally established as the Opposing Europe Research Network (OERN) in June 2000 to chart the divisions over Europe that exist within party systems. In August 2003 it was re-launched as EPERN to reflect a widening of its objectives to consider the broader impact of the European issue on the domestic politics of EU member and candidate states. The Network retains an independent stance on the issues under consideration. For more information and copies of all our publications visit our website at <http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/1-4-2.html>*