

## Seminar series

Date: Wednesday 31 October

**Speaker**: Surendranath Jory (Sussex)

**Title:** A comparison of bidders of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) with

bidders of non-SOEs: Deal Structure Decisions and Wealth Effects

**Abstract:** Bidders are more likely to buy non-state/government-owned

corporations (non-SOEs) as opposed to SOEs in countries that rate favorably in economic freedom, government influence, law and order, access to sound money, freedom to trade and in the regulation of credit, labor and business. In countries that rate less favorably along these dimensions (i.e., less-free or repressed economies), bidders are more likely to bid for state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Unlike the case of bidders of non-SOEs, investors do not reward bidders of SOEs. This investor skepticism toward bidders of SOEs seems justified as their operating performance lag the performance of bidders of non-SOEs in

the long-run. Furthermore, mostly unfree and repressed target

countries adversely affect bidders' stock and operating performances.