



**Political Parties and Gender Balanced
Parliamentary Presence in Western
Europe: A two-step Fuzzy-set Qualitative
Comparative Analysis**

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ABSTRACT

The topic of this paper is the combinations of conditions that induce gender balanced parliamentary delegations from individual political parties. In this study, hypotheses about necessary and sufficient conditions are assessed in a two-step fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA). The analysis is based on data from 57 individual political parties in 11 West European democracies during the late 1980s, when several countries witnessed a surge in women's parliamentary presence.

The results indicate that none of the studied conditions was necessary or singularly sufficient for gender balanced parliamentary parties. The analysis also shows that egalitarian social structures combined with specific party-internal conditions in inducing gender balanced parliamentary delegations. It further demonstrates that for parties with localised candidate selection, either a long standing egalitarian social structure or the combination of leftist party policy and candidacy gender quotas was sufficient for achieving a gender balanced parliamentary delegation. This research also tells that egalitarian social structures formed a sufficient causal configuration together with electorally small parties, whereas large parties instead relied on their own leftist values and candidacy quotas.

Political Parties and Gender Balanced Parliamentary Presence in Western Europe

A Two-Step Fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis

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Women make up roughly half of the population of the world, and yet in most of today's democracies the same distribution does not apply to national parliaments. Gender equal presence in legislative assemblies is, as Phillips notes, related to official recognition of different social groups. Equal proportions of women and men in parliament also signify a chance of fair issue representation, granting both groups the opportunity to have their say. Finally, gender balanced parliamentary presence is a matter of changing biased power structures that rely on male dominated institutions (Phillips, 1995, p. 45.) Representative democracies in which legislative assemblies are characterised by diversity can thus be seen as a more successful mean of political representation than states with biased assemblies.

The proportion of women MPs differs both between individual political parties and between countries. Differences in the proportion of women parliamentarians (MPs) have been explained by two clusters of factors: country level conditions – institutional settings, cultural or socioeconomic conditions – and the inner life of political parties (Caul Kittilson, 2006; Caul, 1999; Dahlerup, 2006; Lovenduski & Norris, 1993; Matland & Montgomery, 2003; Norris, 2004.) Furthermore, several authors have suggested that some country level conditions may be framed as necessary or sufficient² for gender balanced representation and, in addition, that party-internal conditions may interact with party-external conditions in a number of ways in creating

1 The author wishes to thank Sabina Avdagic, Nicholas Aylott, Drude Dahlerup, Paul Webb and Joni Lovenduski for thoughtful comments on earlier versions of this paper. The authors is also grateful to Kenneth Janda, Richards S Katz and Peter Mair, and to three anonymous referees whose comments helped improving the paper. Responsibility for any remaining errors or shortcomings rests with me.

2 Necessary conditions are always present in successful cases, but may be also observed in unsuccessful cases. Sufficient conditions always cause the outcome when present, and are not observed in unsuccessful cases (Ragin, 2000, pp. 91-2.)

gender balance in parliament (Caul Kittilson, 2006, p. 37; Matland, 1993, p. 753; Norris, 2004, p. 208, 2006, p. 204) Still, few large-*N* assessments of such relationships using adequate techniques have been published (see, however, Krook, 2006, 2007).

Affiliating with a political party is often a prerequisite for becoming a parliamentarian. Consequently, exploring which party-internal conditions interact with which institutional and social conditions in creating equal proportions of women and men in parliament is key to understanding why some parties are pioneers of women's parliamentary representation.

The purpose of this study is to examine why some West European parties reached gender balanced parliamentary presence during the surge of women's representation during the 1980s, while others lagged behind. The study entails an empirical assessment of published ideas about which conditions are necessary and/or sufficient for women in politics, with the aim of presenting new knowledge about which combinations of conditions led to gender balance on the party level during the 1980s.

The empirical assessment is based on a two-step, fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (Schneider & Wagemann, 2006) that draws on data from 57 parties in 11 West European democracies during the late 1980s. The results show that party-internal conditions interact with both each other and with party-external conditions, creating several different ways to achieve gender balanced parliamentary delegations. The analysis also reveals parties are themselves able to even out gender bias in their parliamentary wing.

Methods and Case Selection

Qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) is a configurational method suitable for intermediate-*n* studies. Instead of conventional variables and additive reasoning, QCA is based on set theory, Boolean algebra and the idea that factors combine in causing outcomes. Assessment of the impact of single causal conditions on the outcome is carried out as part of the technique, so called analysis of necessary conditions. Still, focus remains on combinations of conditions that are jointly sufficient (Ragin, 1987, 2000.) The possibility to do cross-case assessments of necessity, sufficiency and

equifinality³ makes QCA a first-hand choice of method for this study.

In QCA, theoretical concepts that frame causal conditions are operationalised as sets, e.g., the set of parties with localised candidate selection. They may be crisp and allow only for full non-membership (0, e.g., not localised) or full membership (1, e.g., localised). They can also have different levels of membership ranging continuous or non-continuous from 0 to 1, so called fuzzy sets. The level of membership is determined by empirical data and calibration of each set, a process in which theory and substantive knowledge about the research field and cases are used for determining benchmarks, a standard of measurement for each concept. Such benchmarks provide outer boundaries of the set and tell of difference in kind, e.g., which type of candidate selection processes can be regarded as localised. Calibration also includes creating thresholds for differences within sets, e.g., to what extent the candidate selection process is localised (Schneider & Wagemann, 2007, pp. 180-3.) Much of the data used here lend themselves to such fine-grained analysis, which makes fuzzy-set QCA (fsQCA) useful for this study.

The main part of QCA is based on analysis of a truth table, in which all logically possible combinations of configurations of conditions are represented. The number of theoretically possible configurations increases exponentially with the number of conditions, while the social world is usually characterised by lack of variation. Discrepancy between empirical variation and logically possible variation may leave theoretical configurations without empirical cases, creating logical remainders, i.e., logically possible yet empirically unobserved cases. When the research problem has a clear two-level structure, as in this study, it may therefore be useful to reduce the theoretical complexity of multilevel interaction between conditions by conducting the analysis in two steps and hence avoiding drawing conclusions based on a large number of unobserved cases. In the first step, outcome enabling conditions from the context level are derived. Thereafter, integrated analysis of outcome enabling conditions and case level conditions is carried out. By dividing the analysis into two parts, the gap between empirical and theoretical variation can be narrowed, and the

3 Equifinality means that one single outcome can be achieved through more than one combinations of conditions (Ragin, 2008, p. 63.)

number of simplifying assumptions needed to produce a solution can be lowered⁴ (Schneider & Wagemann, 2006; Schneider, 2009, pp. 138-9.)

Individual political parties are commonly seen as the main vehicles and gatekeepers of political representation (see, e.g., Lawson, 1980.) Parties have their own internal life, and are usually able to choose who may represent the organisation in parliament: individual political parties are the main actors who may change the gender structure of their own parliamentary group. In this study, party-internal conditions thus comprise proximate, case-level conditions, whereas party-external conditions – state level institutional settings and social structures – form contextual conditions that may make it possible for parties to choose to strive for gender balanced parliamentary groups, so called outcome enabling conditions.⁵

Results from a qualitative comparative analysis are typically produced in three versions: complex, parsimonious and intermediate solutions. Whilst the complex version is based on empirically observed cases only and hence is appropriate for description of the studied cases, parsimonious solutions are derived using all logical remainders and may be used for broader generalisations. By contrast, in the intermediate solution only theoretically or empirically justifiable logical remainders are used. The intermediate solution can be preferred as a more theoretically and empirically informed middle way (Ragin, 2009, p. 111.)

QCA results are scrutinised with reference to consistency and coverage of the solutions, both of which range from 0 to 1. Consistency indicates how many of the studied cases displaying the causal condition or configuration have also reached the outcome, whereas coverage levels show the “empirical relevance” (Ragin, 2008, p. 45) of a relationship. A high consistency level, e.g., at least 0.90, is usually preferred in analysis of necessity whereas analysis of sufficiency can be based on a slightly lower level of consistency (Ragin, 2009 fn 7; Schneider & Wagemann, 2007, p. 213.)

4 In this study, the maximum number of simplifying assumptions is lowered by 83 per cent – 105 logically possible configurations – by splitting the 7 conditions into 3+4.

5 Whether a condition should be termed outcome enabling or sufficient depends largely on the research design. Since agency is assumed to rest with the individual party – as opposed to with factors outside of the individual organisation – all proximate conditions also rest with the party, whilst outcome enabling conditions are sought in the party environment.

The results presented in this study are strictly asymmetrical, providing explanations for successful outcomes only (Ragin, 2008, p. 110.) Negating the results does not provide explanations for the negative outcomes: the results cannot be read as if absence of the sufficient configurations caused non-balanced parties.

Case selection

During the late 80s, several European countries faced a period of sharp increase in the proportion of women parliamentarians (Christmas-Best & Kjaer, 2007, pp. 86-7.) Although many parties reached parity during this period, gender balance was not yet commonplace. None of the countries under study here had, for example, yet implemented constitutional or election law quotas (Quotaproject.org, 2006.) The selected countries were also among the states that headed the development of women's social and political rights, indicating that party-external conditions likely had an impact of the proportion of women MPs from each party. They are therefore well suited for evaluating collected knowledge about conditions that further women's parliamentary presence, using a new analytical technique to capture interaction between factors that have been pointed out as favourable for women's entry into politics.

The 57 selected cases come from 11 Western European democracies⁶ that were all high-income, industrialised countries with high levels of human development during the late 1980s (UNDP, 1990, pp. 185-8.) Outside of the group of advanced, industrial democracies, it should rightly be assumed that development is may not be a trivial necessary condition (cf Matland, 1998.) For the purpose of this study, however, the possibility to compare party-internal conditions in a contextual setting that lends itself well to cross-case comparison was prioritised. Only cases with more than 1 seat in the national parliament were selected. 56 per cent of the cases were 'successful' cases, i.e., parties with balanced proportions of male and female parliamentarians, whereas 44 per cent had not reached gender balance.

6 The selected cases were active in Austria 1990, Belgium 1987, Denmark 1988, Finland 1987, (West) Germany 1987, Ireland 1989, Italy 1987, the Netherlands 1989, Norway 1989, Sweden 1988, and the UK 1987. Due to aggregation of raw data, Belgian data are based on the number of women in both chambers over the number of seats in the lower chamber. Cases in which data were missing for one or several conditions were excluded from the analysis.

Gender and Party: A Theoretical Framework

This section deals with the theoretical framework. First, the outcome is defined, after which operationalisation of causal conditions is dealt with. Finally, hypotheses are presented. All continuous sets were calibrated with FSQCA 2.0. Cases and calibrated data can be found in Appendix.

Defining gender balance

Gender balance is a debated concept, not only because there are different opinions about the need for it in politics but also because it can be defined in slightly different ways. Kanter (1977, pp. 966-7) suggests that 'balance' should be interpreted as the 40-60 per cent range and thus stretch across the intuitive 50 per cent threshold. Using Kanter's definition, parties with 40 to 60 per cent parliamentarians of each sex qualify for full membership in the set of parties with gender balanced parliamentary groups. Full non-membership is defined as total absence of either of the sexes, whereas the cross-over point (0.50 membership) corresponds to a gap in the empirical data; the 20:80 distribution. Parties with 20 to 60 per cent women are thus defined as more in than out of the outcome set. Data for this fully continuous fuzzy set were collected from Katz and Mair (1992.)

Institutional conditions

Proportional electoral systems (PR) are often pointed out as favourable for women and minorities (Norris, 2004, p. 187.) Most of the West European countries have however chosen to apply some form of PR system, and still not all of them present gender balanced parliaments. This should, as has also been suggested elsewhere, prompt analysis of the details of electoral laws. In this study, two frequently used conditions were chosen: district magnitude and party list structure.

Party list structure is one of the most prominent differences between countries in the PR family, and a factor that can be directly related to party behaviour. With an open list system, voters can override the parties' decisions, whereas a closed list system renders intra-party candidate selection crucial for women's chances to enter parliament. When the electorate votes for a party rather than an individual candidate, decisions made inside party organisations will determine the proportion of women parliamentarians. As Matland (2005, pp. 104-6) points out, closed lists may however

have different impact in different contexts.

The set of parties in countries with closed party lists is a crisp set. Systems that do not allow voters to change party lists are coded 1, whilst systems that allow voters to alter party lists are assigned full non-membership of the set. The listless system applied in the UK was coded as a non-member of the set. Data were collected from World Bank Database of Political Institutions (Beck, Clarke, Groff, Keefer, & Walsh, 2001.)

The strict winner-takes-all logic of single-member constituencies is likely to delay women's entry into parliament, whereas multi-member districts are often pointed out as favourable for women or minorities. Larger districts may result in more parties in parliament and, consequently, more organisations through which newcomers can enter. Larger districts also make it more likely for individual parties to win more than one seat in each district, thereby increasing the possibilities for women to get elected even when they are not on top of the party list (Caul Kittilson, 2006, pp. 27, 124; Matland, 1998, pp. 112-3; Matland & Studlar, 1996; Norris, 2006, p. 205; Rule, 1987; Sainsbury, 1993, p. 267; Siaroff, 2000, pp. 205-6.)

The set of parties in countries with large district magnitude is a continuous fuzzy set based on effective district magnitude (Taagepera & Shugart, 1989, pp. 36-9.) Following the empirical distribution of the country data used, full membership was defined as 22.5 and the cross-over point was set to 16.5. An effective district magnitude of 6 denotes full non-membership of the set (Rule, 1987, pp. 484-6.)

Structural conditions

Progress in data collection methods has supplied researchers with a plethora of possible variables that may be related to the proportion of women in parliament. Because this study tests old knowledge with a new analytical technique, the chosen structural conditions were selected on the basis of, first, results from previous studies and, second, data availability.

Before dealing with operationalisation, a note on a condition that is not part of the framework is appropriate. Rule (1981, p. 67) argues that the year of introduction of women's suffrage is a useful indicator of egalitarian social structures. In all the studied

cases, women's suffrage was introduced during the first half of the 20th century (IPU, 2006), which reflects a low between-case variation. Introduction of women's suffrage was therefore excluded from the framework.

Scholars have also indicated egalitarian culture with reference to religion, using the dominant religion in a country as a proxy for cultural attitudes (Lane & Ersson, 2005, p. 182; Norris, 2004, pp. 206-7.) Women's success in politics in the secular Scandinavian countries and, in addition, the many different brands of Protestantism should lead us to question the usefulness of this proxy (see also Norris, 2004, p. 208.) Still, to achieve comparability with previous studies, focus here is on the proportion of the population that is member of a Protestant church. The set of parties in Protestant countries is a continuous fuzzy set based on data from the World Values Survey 1990 wave (WVS, 2009.) Thresholds are set at 100, 50 and 0 per cent, indicating the proportion of the population that claimed to belong to a Protestant religious denomination. The cross-over point thus marks if a majority of the population belongs to a Protestant church.

Gender equality in socioeconomic terms can also be achieved by women's entry into the public sphere, as in paid labour and higher education (Caul Kittilson, 2006, p. 36; Matland, 1998, pp. 113-6; Rule, 1987, pp. 481-2.)⁷ The set of parties in countries with gender equal labour force participation is a continuous fuzzy set and a short-term indicator of women's activity in public life. Data on women's share of civilian employment (OECD, 2008) during the outcome year and 9 preceding years are used in calculating an average, taking into account that there may be a time lag before women in paid labour decide to enter politics or before they are seen as self-evident participants in public decision-making. Drawing again on the works by Kanter (1977, pp. 966-7), full membership of the set is defined as 50 per cent women in civilian employment and 40 per cent as the cross-over value, whereas 30 per cent women (Dahlerup, 1988) in employment marks full non-membership of the set. Because employment is not as restricted as the political arena, thresholds can be set higher than for the outcome set. Furthermore, a slight majority of women in employment is likely

⁷ Siaroff points out a correlation between gender pay gap and women's parliamentary presence (Siaroff, 2000, p. 202.) Although the relationship is reasonable, the causal direction is less convincing: a small gender pay gap may well be the consequence, rather than the cause of equal proportions of women and men in parliament.

to be favourable for the pool of potential women politicians: variation above the 50 per cent limit is truncated to denote full membership of the set.

The set of parties in countries with gender equal participation in higher education is a continuous fuzzy set, based on data on the proportion of women graduating from university education during the early 1980s (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2001, p. 73; UNESCO, 1999.)⁸ Because university students are usually in their twenties, the data cover a small segment of the population – a segment that, as a group, can reasonably be assumed to be more strongly influenced by gender equality issues than the full range of generations accounted for in the set about labour. Therefore, thresholds were set higher: full membership at 50 per cent women in higher education and full non-membership at 40 per cent (Kanter, 1977, pp. 966-7.) 45 per cent women graduates marks the cross-over point. This set should thus be interpreted as more demanding; a set of countries with *very* balanced proportions of women and men in higher education.

Finally, egalitarian social structures in general and extensive welfare policies in particular are often referred to as facilitating factors for women seeking office (Caul 1997, cited in 1999, p. 81; Rule, 1981, p. 68; Siaroff, 2000, p 201.) Social democratic states are known for their commitment to equality, as manifested in encompassing welfare programmes facilitating for women and men to share roles in private and public life (Esping-Andersen, 2002, pp. 78-80.) Therefore, long-term influence from social democratic governments is used as a proxy for egalitarian public policies and social structures.

The set of parties in countries with a strong social-democratic tradition is a continuous fuzzy set. Based on data on the proportion of years with social democratic governments in each country between 1946 and the outcome election (Huber et al 1997), this set is a long-term indicator of an egalitarian social climate. Cut-off points were set at 100, 50 and 0 per cent of the post-war years lead by leftist governments, thresholds that compare well with the cases: countries traditionally seen as social

⁸ Female graduates from tertiary education: For the UK, data from 1983 and 1985, for Norway, only data from 1985 were available. Sweden: 1980 and 1988. German data refer to both “Absolventen” and “Promotionen”.

democratic countries are more in than out of the set, whereas other countries are more out than in.

Party-internal conditions

Party organisations offer a variety of possible explanations for party behaviour on issues of gender representation. In this framework, 4 conditions that allowed for cross-case comparison were selected. Before embarking on the operationalisation, a short note on other commonly used factors is appropriate.

Party institutionalisation constitutes a popular and debated concept in studies of party organisations and party systems (see, e.g., Randall & Svasand, 2002.) In studies of gender and party, it is referred to as the degree of bureaucratisation or formality with which intra-party candidate selection processes are carried out – processes that are rule-bound and formal are considered more institutionalised, whereas parties that allow personal political networks to guide the processes are labelled as less institutionalised (Guadagnini, 1993; Norris, 1993; cf Panebianco, 1988.) Assessing influence of personal networks in delicate intra-party procedures is likely a task for small-*n* research designs. In addition, internal changes, e.g., new party leadership, could provoke major changes in the degree of institutionalisation, which may render data obsolete almost overnight. Due to the lack of data suitable for comparison across all 57 cases, party institutionalisation is not part of this framework.

Scholars have also showed that women's presence in party leadership is related to the proportion of women MPs from a party. With women in party leadership, the issue of women's presence in parliament may become a natural part of party guidelines – formal or informal – and the mere presence of women in party leadership may encourage other women to seek office (Caul Kittilson, 2006, p. 37, 124.) However, Katz and Mair (1993, pp. 611-4; see also Van Biezen, 2000, pp. 403-6; Enyedi & Linek, 2008, pp. 269-71) point out that parliamentarians may be members of the party leadership.⁹ Without data on the extent of such double membership, explaining the

⁹ The cases under scrutiny here vary considerably in this respect: some parties had no restriction on the number of MPs in party leadership, whereas others had explicit limits ranging from no to several MPs. In one case, MPs were obliged to attend the meetings of the party executive (Katz & Mair, 1992.) The causal direction between women in party leadership and women in parliament is thus likely to vary significantly between parties and is best determined using single case or small-*n*

proportion of women MPs with the number of women in party leadership may be misleading.

The intra-party level of candidate selection has been pointed out as potentially decisive for women seeking elected office (Caul Kittilson, 2006, pp. 124-5; Matland & Montgomery, 2003, p. 34.) In some European parties, experience from local level political work can be a facilitating factor or even a prerequisite for candidacy in national elections (Sainsbury, 1993, pp. 276-9.) In addition, as long as women are comparatively more closely tied to family duties, the local level may be the level at which they can gain experience and build a political network. When parties allow local branches or even individual members much or all of the influence over candidate selection, women may benefit from their connections in local politics.

The set of parties with localised candidate selection is a four-level fuzzy set based on data from Bille's study of candidate selection rules (2001.) Full membership is assigned to parties that allowed sub-national party branches full control over candidate selection whilst also using membership ballots. Parties that used membership ballots but in which the national party could change the choice of the sub-national party are assigned 0.67 membership. Likewise, parties that did not use membership ballots but granted full control over candidate selection to sub-national party organs are also assigned 0.67 membership. The 0.33 level is used for parties that allowed control over candidate selection to sub-national organs but did not apply membership ballots and in which the national party could change the sub-national party's choice of candidates. Finally, full non-membership is assigned to parties in which the national party organ could exercise even more control over candidate selection.¹⁰

Affiliating with parliamentary large parties rather than with their smaller counterparts could be favourable for women seeking office, at least during an initial period (Matland, 1993, pp. 745, 753; 2006, p. 284.) The process is similar but not equal to how district size may influence the proportion of women MPs. In short, the larger the

studies.

¹⁰ The categories presented by Bille (2001: 367) are used in the following way: 1 membership: 5+6; 0.67 membership: 5 or 4+6; 0.33 membership: 4; Full non-membership: categories 1,2 and 3.

party delegation in parliament, the more likely it is that women candidates will be elected – even when they are not top candidates on party lists.

The set of large parties is a fully continuous fuzzy set. Using electoral data from Katz and Mair (1992), the set was inductively calibrated. Full membership is assigned to parties with 33 per cent of seats in parliament. 25 per cent denote the cross-over point, whereas the 0.00 level of membership is defined as 15 per cent. Due to the large number of multi-party systems, a somewhat low 24 per cent of cases are more in than out of the set. Analysis below shows that the low variation has not caused any results pointing to singular sufficiency of non-large parties, which would have been the effect of a too low variation. The set can thus be considered useful in this framework.

Party gender quotas are likely to transform gender biased parties into parties of equal representation and quotas constitute a factor that could explain why some parties headed the development of gender equal parliamentary presence. Dahlerup and Freidenvall (2008, p. 12) note that quotas are neither necessary nor sufficient for “a high level of female representation”, which should lead us to assume that quotas instead form part of one or several sufficient configurations of conditions. Few cases studied here had adopted candidacy quotas as part of their party statutes, yet 'soft quotas' or recommendations may have similar effects and are therefore taken into account. The set of parties with gender candidacy quotas is a crisp set. Parties with candidacy quotas are full members of the set, whereas parties without quotas are full non-members. Data were collected from Krook (2009, pp. 229-0.)

Finally, leftist and green ideologies are often referred to as favourable for women. Whilst some argue that commitment to gender equality has spread across the ideological landscape and, consequently, that leftism alone cannot account for all successful cases (see, e.g., Lovenduski, 1993, p. 13), others suggest that such contagion may not have been the case during the 1970s and 80s (Caul, 1999, p. 88.) Nevertheless, party ideology can be seen as one of several conditions that could interact with other conditions in inducing gender balanced parliamentary presence (Norris, 2006, p. 204.)

The set of parties with leftist party policy is a crisp set drawing on data from the 1984 and 1988 Chapel Hill Expert Surveys (Ray, 1999; Steenbergen & Marks, 2007.)

Parties classified as members of the socialist, radical left or green party families are assigned full membership of the set, whereas parties from other party families are full non-members of the set. Norwegian parties are assigned set membership using the same definition of 'left' as in the Comparative Parties Dataset (Swank, 2008.)

Hypotheses

Previous research has produced what can be read as hypotheses about necessary and sufficient conditions for gender balanced parliamentary representation, covering both contextual and party-internal conditions.

In two recent studies, Norris delineates the causal relationship between electoral laws and women's parliamentary presence. In her study from 2004, she concludes that proportional electoral systems are not singularly sufficient, but can “increase the diversity of legislative bodies” when combined with other facilitating factors (Norris, 2004, p. 208.) In a later study, she adds that “by itself the basic type of electoral system is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition to guarantee women’s representation”, and mentions party organisation, party ideology, candidacy quotas and district magnitude among what she terms “intervening conditions” (Norris, 2006, p. 204.) Norris further suggests (2004, pp. 207, table 8.8), that culture and institutional conditions may interact. Finally, Caul Kittilson has provided a clear-cut statement about an eventual causal link between cultural or social conditions and the proportion of women parliamentarians: “in most cases, social forces are necessary but not sufficient” (Caul Kittilson, 2006, p. 37.)¹¹

Drawing on the studies quoted above, we should expect laws closely related to PR systems to be present in successful cases as well as in less successful cases. Where specific party-internal factors and or egalitarian cultural conditions combine with factors that are closely associated with proportional electoral systems, we should also expect to find successful cases. In short, this leads to two broader expectations: For one, that contextual and party-internal conditions interact in inducing gender balanced parliamentary presence and also, that they do so in more than one way, i.e., that there

¹¹ Caul Kittilson's formulation of the relationship – “in most cases” – could be interpreted as a linguistic qualifier (Ragin, 2000, pp. 109-10), which means that her suggestion could be read in terms of “almost always” necessary. For the sake of clarity, it is however treated in less probabilistic terms here.

are several different paths to equal proportions of women and men in parliamentary delegations. The hypotheses formulated in relation to the conditions studied here read:

H1: *Closed party lists and large effective magnitude are neither necessary nor singularly sufficient for gender balanced representation.*

H2: *Egalitarian social structures are necessary for gender balanced representation.*

H3: *Localised candidate selection, high party magnitude, party candidacy quotas and leftist party policy are part of configurations of conditions that are sufficient for gender balanced representation.*

Configuring Gender and Party

Since all cases are drawn from 11 different countries, the empirical variation on country level is more restricted than the case level variation. Because of the small number of countries, the context models should be based on a strictly limited number of conditions. What is more, theory suggests that contextual explanations are formed of both cultural and institutional conditions, which in practice means that models for empirical testing should include conditions of both types. To cover combinations of institutional and cultural conditions without creating disproportionate number of logical remainders, 4 models with 3 conditions each were tested.¹² In turn, the party model is based on 4 conditions: party ideology, party magnitude, candidacy quotas and level of candidate selection. The combined model will, as is shown below, draw on 5 conditions. With 57 cases, models with 3 and 5 conditions are unlikely to cause over-determination (Marx, 2006, p. 19.)

¹² All models include the institutional conditions, closed lists and large district magnitude. Models were then created by addition of one structural condition as follows: Model A includes social democratic political heritage; Model B Protestantism; Model C education and labour joined by logical OR; in Model D education and labour were joined by logical AND. A summary table is provided in Appendix.

Necessary conditions

Using a high threshold for consistency, 0.90, analysis of all country and party level conditions showed that no condition was necessary or singularly sufficient for the outcome. It can thus be concluded that the analysis lends support to the hypothesis about electoral laws, whereas the hypothesis about egalitarian social conditions is not verified. Table 1 below reports results from analysis of necessary conditions for the outcome as well as for the negated outcome. The latter is interpreted as analysis of singular sufficiency.

Table 1. Analysis of necessary conditions

Outcome Condition	Balanced		Non-balanced	
	Consistency	Coverage	Consistency	Coverage
CLIST	0.619048	0.530833	0.646383	0.469167
clist	0.380952	0.560000	0.353617	0.440000
LDM	0.580175	0.668034	0.505549	0.492727
ldm	0.559443	0.572044	0.659395	0.570719
SOCDEM	0.662779	0.847205	0.406812	0.440166
socdem	0.562034	0.528158	0.858783	0.683105
PROT	0.684807	0.818745	0.353234	0.357475
prot	0.462585	0.457986	0.820896	0.687941
EDUC	0.784257	0.717333	0.530425	0.410667
educ	0.355685	0.472258	0.634902	0.713548
LABOUR	0.751539	0.807518	0.492155	0.447616
labour	0.485909	0.530598	0.788366	0.728688
LARGE	0.306122	0.546559	0.379258	0.573164
large	0.760933	0.591539	0.699962	0.460589
LEFTIST	0.429867	0.663500	0.257558	0.336500
leftist	0.570133	0.475676	0.742442	0.524324
LCS	0.720117	0.724340	0.549177	0.467579
lcs	0.470683	0.552261	0.676234	0.671608
QUOTA	0.345319	0.761429	0.127822	0.238571
quota	0.654681	0.470000	0.872178	0.530000

clist: closed list system. ldm: large district magnitude. socdem: social democratic heritage. Prot: Protestantism. educ: women graduates. labour: women in civilian employment. large: electorally large party. leftist: leftist/green party. lcs: localised candidate selection. quota: party gender quota applied. Upper-case letters denote presence, lower-case absence of condition.

Outcome enabling conditions

In two-step QCA, the first step is aimed at limiting the complexity of the research problem to correspond to the limited diversity of empirical circumstances. This is accomplished by deriving outcome enabling conditions using the most parsimonious solution (Schneider & Wagemann, 2006, pp. 761, 770; Schneider, 2009, p. 138.) In this study, where individual political parties constitute the primary actors behind change in parliamentary groups, conditions that pave the way for parties that seek to

accomplish such change are sought in the party environment, i.e., state level institutional settings and social structures. Because party behaviour ultimately depends on intra-party factors, conditions outside of the organisation are modelled as outcome enabling conditions instead of as sufficient conditions.

A model based on closed party lists, large district magnitude and social democratic heritage provided, compared to other tested models, the most encompassing and consistent solutions in both its complex and parsimonious versions and the model was chosen for inclusion in the two-step analysis.¹³ As shown in table 2 below, long-term influence from social democratic governance covers about two thirds of the total membership scores in the outcome set. This demonstrates that in the late 1980s in Western Europe, egalitarian values associated with long term influence from leftist governments were related to the willingness of individual parties to include an equal number of women and men in their parliamentary groups. We should expect social democratic welfare state arrangements to be a contributing factor, enabling women to participate in all parts of the public sphere.

Table 2. Outcome enabling conditions: Parsimonious solution

Path	Coverage		Consistency
	Raw	Unique	
SOCDEM	0.662779	0.662779	0.847205
Solution coverage:	0.662779		
Solution consistency:	0.847205		

Model: SOCDEM (Social democratic political heritage), CLIST (Closed lists), LDM (Large district magnitude). Upper case letters denote presence of condition. No selection of prime implicants needed. Frequency cut-off: 4. Consistency cut-off: 0.857542.

Egalitarian social structures provide a fertile ground for gender equality, an environment in which the occurrence of gender balanced parliamentary parties is more plausible. Social democratic political heritage is thus a useful, outcome-enabling condition that makes the occurrence of gender balanced parliamentary groups more probable. As shown by the bivariate sufficiency analysis in Table 1 above, social

¹³ Summary of results from others models is available in Appendix.

democratic heritage can however not be considered a singularly sufficient condition: by itself, the party-external environment does neither explain nor give a satisfactory account for the behaviour of individual parties. In order to reach an explanation that entails both context and case level factors, parties must be added to the model. The second part of the two-step approach thus relies on inclusion of proximate factors.

An integrated model of party and gender

The integrated model included all four party conditions – localised candidate selection, leftist party ideology, candidacy quotas and party magnitude – and social democratic heritage. While Schneider and Wagemann (2006, p. 771) recommend using the complex solution in the second step of two-step QCA to reach as detailed descriptions as possible, in this study the intermediate solution is used. Using the intermediate instead of the complex solution is underpinned by a broader set of knowledge and, in addition, is more appropriate for generalisation. Table 3 below reports results from the analysis.

The intermediate solution of the integrated model has high consistency and coverage levels, which indicates a solid result. In short, the four paths are well in line with previous research and lend strong support to the third hypothesis, confirming that all four party-internal conditions are part of configurations that are sufficient for gender balanced parliamentary representation.

Table 3. Integrated model: Intermediate solution

Path	Coverage		Consistency
	Raw	Unique	
large*SOCDEM+	0.527373	0.076126	0.872922
LCS*SOCDEM+	0.560091	0.066084	0.879004
QUOTA*LCS*LEFTIST+	0.193068	0.016521	0.990033
QUOTA*LEFTIST*LARGE	0.129576	0.052154	0.856531
Solution coverage:	0.730807		
Solution consistency:			0.859756

Model: SOCDEM (Social democratic political heritage), LARGE (High party magnitude), LEFTIST

(Leftist party ideology), LCS (Localised candidate selection), QUOTA (party candidate quotas). Chosen prime implicants: SOCDEM large leftist LCS, SOCDEM large LCS QUOTA and SOCDEM LEFTIST, SOCDEM LCS. Frequency cut-off: 1. Consistency cut-off: 0.841302. Simplifying assumptions: all conditions present. Upper-case letters denote presence, lower-case absence of condition. Logical AND marked by *, logical OR by +.

The first two paths include presence of the outcome enabling condition; long term influence from social democratic governments – and covers gender balanced parties in Austria, Denmark, Norway and Sweden. Both paths can be used to account for 16 successful cases each and do, as the unique coverage levels indicate, overlap with other paths: 13 of the gender balanced parties accounted for by the first path can also be described by the second path. Both paths have solid coverage and consistency levels, indicating that they must be considered central in explaining and describing why some West European parties reached gender balance already in the 1980s.

As showed by the first path, in the egalitarian social structures shaped by long term influence of social democratic governments, placing women high on party lists did not put smaller parties out of business. A society in which gender equality is accepted and endorsed as an important, common goal, women in politics is neither controversial nor does it create electoral risks for small or medium sized parties. Moreover, non-large parties may also be more sensitive to electoral competition, and therefore be keen to adapt to women's demands for political representation. When seen in the light of the fourth path, which is discussed separately below, this path could be interpreted in terms of contagion (cf Matland & Studlar, 1996): different cases from Austria, Denmark and Norway are covered by the first and fourth path, which makes it reasonable to infer that parties in these countries may have been influenced by the choices of their competitors.

In parties with localised candidate selection processes, women striving for political office were also successful, as demonstrated by the second path. Partly, this configuration can be explained by participatory values associated with localised candidate selection or, as Sainsbury points out drawing on the Swedish context (1993, p. 277), experience from local politics may form a prerequisite for candidacy at national level. An alternative explanation for why decentralised candidate selection proved more favourable for women may be women's comparatively larger responsibility for family duties: even in the social democratic countries, women have

taken the lion(ess)'s share of family responsibilities and therefore, it may have been easier for them to create their own personal political network at the local level than in national level politics – a process supported by an egalitarian social environment. Consequently, through parties with localised candidate selection in an egalitarian social environment, women were able to enter politics to almost the same extent as men did.

In contrast, the third and fourth paths do not rely upon social democratic heritage but instead demonstrate which configurations of party-internal conditions that are sufficient for gender balanced parliamentary groups. The third path covers 8 balanced parties in Austria, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden, whereas the fourth path is apt for describing 5 successful cases in Austria, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands and Norway. The third path overlaps with the first two; the fourth path only overlaps with the second and third paths. None of them cover any unsuccessful cases and as shown by the very high consistency level of the third path, presence of localised candidate selection and candidacy gender quotas in leftist parties was without doubt a configuration that led to high proportions women MPs during the studied time period.

The last two paths confirm what scholars of gender and party politics have argued elsewhere: leftist party policy and gender candidacy quotas are related – to each other and to higher proportions of women parliamentarians (Caul Kittilson, 2006, pp. 60, 125.) In addition, this study also shows that during the 1980s in Western Europe, political leftism and gender quotas combined with localised candidate selection or parliamentary large parties and induced gender balanced parliamentary groups. Drawing on both previous research and the above analysis, we may conclude that the opportunity for women to affiliate with leftist parties that apply quotas and also have localised candidate selection procedures, all of which have been shown to be beneficial for women seeking elected office – is a very powerful explanation for their success. Political leftism provided a commitment to gender equality, clearly expressed by the implementation of gender quotas, whilst local access to parties facilitated for women to pursue a political career. This configuration was in place outside the Scandinavian area, and makes it possible for us to better understand women's progress in continental European parties.

The fourth path resembles the third: it includes presence of both leftism and candidacy gender quotas. In addition, this configuration also rests upon electorally large parties. The combination of leftist party policy and quotas during the studied period has already been established, whereas party size is less studied. Matland (1993, pp. 745, 753) argues, however, that party size should be seen in relation to candidate selection procedures, and Sainsbury (1993, p. 267) shows that before the 1980s, Swedish women were more likely to enter parliament if their party won more than one seat in each constituency. We may thus infer that while leftist parties were more inclined to adopt gender quotas, their electoral fortune also affected women's chances of entering parliament: as the number of parliamentarians increases, so does the impact of gender balanced lists on women's chances to enter parliament.

Women's entry into the parliaments of Western European democracies during the late 1980s was made possible by several different combinations of factors. Some configurations included both party-internal and contextual conditions, while others relied on party-internal factors alone. The intermediate solution thus points in the same direction as the analysis of singular sufficiency: egalitarian social structures should not be read as singularly sufficient for gender balance on party level, but as an important part of the explanation for why certain parties succeeded while others did not.

Conclusions

This research confirms, first, that none of the studied institutional, structural or party-internal conditions were necessary or singularly sufficient for parties to become gender balanced. Second, it shows that specific combinations of conditions were sufficient for gender balanced parliamentary delegations in West European political parties during the increase of women MPs in the late 1980s.

The analysis points to four configurations of sufficient conditions: two include egalitarian social structures and party-internal conditions, whereas two other configurations are based on party-internal conditions only. For parties with localised candidate selection, either a long standing egalitarian social structure or the combination of leftist party policy and candidacy gender quotas was sufficient for achieving a gender balanced parliamentary delegation. This research also

demonstrates that egalitarian social structures formed a sufficient causal configuration together with electorally small parties, whereas large parties instead relied on their own leftist values and candidacy quotas.

We may conclude that parties can achieve gender balance by implementing gender quotas or using candidate selection strategies that are inclusive even on lower levels of the organisation – paths that have been followed by leftist parties. In addition, quotas seem to have played a powerful role in large leftist parties, confirming that party magnitude matters. Apart from motivated women themselves, individual political parties must therefore be considered the most important actors behind change in women's parliamentary presence.

The results presented in this paper are based on data from 57 individual political parties in 11 West European democracies during the late 1980s. The studied conditions are not necessarily generalisable to other context or time periods. Generalisations should therefore be restricted to Western European parties and kept within the time frame in which women's presence in national parliaments increased the most. Nevertheless, this research serves two important purposes for future studies of gender and party politics.

This study contributes with a novel empirical assessment of conventional knowledge, using a new analytical technique that provides detailed information about the combinations of factors that are sufficient for gender balanced parties. It shows that gender balanced parliamentary presence in national parliaments can be achieved in several different ways. It also demonstrates that women's paths to parliament are characterised by interaction between social structures and party-specific settings as well as between party-internal conditions alone.

What is more, the above analysis offers a springboard for future research about women in party politics, not least for studies that include cases outside of the West European context. Testing conventional knowledge about political representation and gender using new cases is crucial for the development of our understanding of how representative democracy can be turned more inclusive and representative. In addition, assessing the usefulness of the Western template in a different setting is

likely to strengthen the theoretical as well as empirical basis of the research field.

The next step in this research process should ideally draw on a new and wider set of cases, preferably including cases from other contexts. Furthermore, the research problem would benefit from symmetrical analysis, answering the question why some parties failed while other succeeded. Finally, studies of how changes in party organisation or social structures since the late 1980s have affected gender balance in parliament would provide a welcome addition to the field.

Appendix

Tables and outputs that are not presented here are available from the author on request.

Table A1. Outcome enabling conditions: Models A-D

Model	A	B	C	D
Consistency cut-off	0.857542	0.833333	0.835979	0.888350
Frequency cut-off	4	5	5	5
Complex solution				
Solution coverage	0.627470	0.577907	0.255912	0.530288
Solution consistency	0.871345	0.849928	0.835979	0.894047
Parsimonious solution				
Solution coverage	0.662779	0.602851	0.491740	0.584710
Solution consistency	0.847205	0.836781	0.833608	0.865708
Conditions in model	CLIST LDM SOCDEM	CLIST LDM PROT	CLIST LDM (EDUC OR LAB)	CLIST LDM (EDUC AND LAB)

No selection prime implicants required in model A. PI's included in other models:

Model B: clist LDM, LDM PROT

Model C: clist LDM, LDM EDUCOLAB

Model D: clist LDM, LDM EDUCALAB.

EDUCOLAB: Education OR Labour. EDUCALAB: Education AND Labour.

Table A2. Outcome enabling model A: Complex and intermediate solutions

Path	Coverage		Consistency
	Raw	Unique	
CLIST*SOCDEM+	0.425656	0.226757	0.847742
LDM*SOCDEM	0.400713	0.201814	0.890569
Solution coverage:	0.627470		
Solution consistency:			0.871345

Model: CLIST, LDM, SOCDEM. No selection of prime implicants required. Frequency cut-off: 4. Consistency cut-off: 0.857542. Simplifying assumptions in intermediate solution: SOCDEM and LDM present.

Table A3. Step two model: Complex and parsimonious solutions

Solutions and paths	Coverage		Consistency
	Raw	Unique	
Complex solution			
LARGE*LEFTIST*QUOTA+	0.129576	0.052154	0.856531
LEFTIST*LCS*QUOTA+	0.193068	0.016521	0.990033
SOCDEM*large*leftist*quota+	0.318108	0.050211	0.827296
SOCDEM*LARGE*LEFTIST*LCS+	0.108196	0.056689	0.951567
SOCDEM*large*leftist*LCS+	0.315517	-0.000000	0.848432
SOCDEM*large*LCS*QUOTA	0.155491	-0.000000	0.963855
Solution coverage:	0.667638		
Solution consistency:			0.868155
Parsimonious solution			
SOCDEM*large+	0.527373	0.059929	0.872922
LEFTIST*QUOTA+	0.285390	0.105604	0.881000
SOCDEM*LEFTIST+	0.263039	0.000000	0.953052
SOCDEM*LCS	0.560091	0.020732	0.879004
Solution coverage:	0.764820		
Solution consistency:			0.850198

Model: SOCDEM, LARGE, LEFTIST, QUOTA, LCS. Selected prime implicants: SOCDEM large leftist LCS, SOCDEM large LCS QUOTA and SOCDEM LEFTIST, SOCDEM LCS. Frequency cut-off: 1. Consistency cut-off: 0.841302.

Table A4. Cases and calibrated data.

Country Year	case	balanced	clist	ldm	soc- dem	prot	educ	labour	large	leftist	lcs	quota
Austria 1990	FPÖ	0.55	1	0.85	0.7	0.07	0	0.47	0.11	0	0.33	0
	SPÖ	0.55	1	0.85	0.7	0.07	0	0.47	1	1	0	1
	ÖVP	0.22	1	0.85	0.7	0.07	0	0.47	0.95	0	0.33	0
	Greens	0.99	1	0.85	0.7	0.07	0	0.47	0	1	0.67	1
Belgium 1987	CVP	0.53	1	0.22	0.23	0.05	0.51	0.29	0.2	0	0.33	0
	PVV	0.08	1	0.22	0.23	0.05	0.51	0.29	0.02	0	0.67	1
	VU	0.25	1	0.22	0.23	0.05	0.51	0.29	0.01	0	0.33	0
	AGA	0.38	1	0.22	0.23	0.05	0.51	0.29	0	1	0	0
West Germany 1987	CDU	0.17	1	0.14	0.23	0.4	0	0.46	0.98	0	0.67	0
	CDU	0.11	1	0.14	0.23	0.4	0	0.46	0.01	0	0.67	0
	FDP	0.26	1	0.14	0.23	0.4	0	0.46	0.01	0	0.67	0
	SPD	0.38	1	0.14	0.23	0.4	0	0.46	0.99	1	0.67	0
	Greens	1	1	0.14	0.23	0.4	0	0.46	0.01	1	0.67	1
Denmark 1988	SF	0.88	0	0.99	0.65	0.91	1	0.81	0.03	1	0.67	1
	SD	0.87	0	0.99	0.65	0.91	1	0.81	0.92	1	0.67	1
	RV	0.99	0	0.99	0.65	0.91	1	0.81	0	0	0.67	0
	KRF	0.68	0	0.99	0.65	0.91	1	0.81	0	0	0.33	0
	CD	0.98	0	0.99	0.65	0.91	1	0.81	0	0	1	0
	V	0.28	0	0.99	0.65	0.91	1	0.81	0.02	0	1	0
	KF	0.85	0	0.99	0.65	0.91	1	0.81	0.18	0	0.67	0
	FRP	0.97	0	0.99	0.65	0.91	1	0.81	0.01	0	0.33	0
Finland 1987	KESK	0.75	0	0.27	0.4	0.89	0.98	0.91	0.18	0	1	0
	KOK	0.96	0	0.27	0.4	0.89	0.98	0.91	0.64	0	1	0
	SDP	0.86	0	0.27	0.4	0.89	0.98	0.91	0.75	1	1	0
	VAS	0.84	0	0.27	0.4	0.89	0.98	0.91	0.01	1	1	0

	SFP	0.14	0	0.27	0.4	0.89	0.98	0.91	0	0	1	0
Ireland 1989	SFWP	0.05	0	0.03	0.08	0.05	0.66	0.07	0	1	0.33	0
	LAB	0.05	0	0.03	0.08	0.05	0.66	0.07	0.01	1	0.33	0
	FF	0.12	0	0.03	0.08	0.05	0.66	0.07	1	0	0	0
	FG	0.2	0	0.03	0.08	0.05	0.66	0.07	0.95	0	0	0
	PD	0.88	0	0.03	0.08	0.05	0.66	0.07	0	0	0	0

Table A4, cont.

Country Year	case	balanced	clist	ldm	soc- dem	prot	educ	labour	large	leftist	lcs	quota
Italy 1987	DP	0.68	1	0.85	0.08	0.05	0.25	0.1	0	1	0	0
	PCI	0.85	1	0.85	0.08	0.05	0.25	0.1	0.76	1	0.33	1
	PSI	0.1	1	0.85	0.08	0.05	0.25	0.1	0.05	1	0.33	0
	DC	0.09	1	0.85	0.08	0.05	0.25	0.1	0.99	0	0.33	0
	PRI	0.05	1	0.85	0.08	0.05	0.25	0.1	0	0	0.33	1
	PLI	0.05	1	0.85	0.08	0.05	0.25	0.1	0	0	0.33	0
	MSI	0.07	1	0.85	0.08	0.05	0.25	0.1	0	0	0	0
	PR	0.61	1	0.85	0.08	0.05	0.25	0.1	0	0	0	0
Netherl. 1989	PvDA	0.78	1	1	0.14	0.09	0.43	0.15	0.95	1	0.67	1
	CDA	0.26	1	1	0.14	0.09	0.43	0.15	0.98	0	0.67	0
	D'66	0.88	1	1	0.14	0.09	0.43	0.15	0.01	0	1	0
	VVD	0.43	1	1	0.14	0.09	0.43	0.15	0.04	0	0.33	0
Norway 1989	SV	0.96	1	0.08	0.83	0.9	1	0.74	0.01	1	0.67	1
	DNA	0.99	1	0.08	0.83	0.9	1	0.74	0.99	1	0.67	1
	SP	0.75	1	0.08	0.83	0.9	1	0.74	0	0	0.67	1
	KRF	0.78	1	0.08	0.83	0.9	1	0.74	0.01	0	0.67	0
	H	0.66	1	0.08	0.83	0.9	1	0.74	0.32	0	0.67	0
	FRP	0.09	1	0.08	0.83	0.9	1	0.74	0.03	0	0.67	0
Sweden 1988	V	0.94	1	0.22	0.89	0.83	0.99	0.88	0	1	1	1
	S	0.96	1	0.22	0.89	0.83	0.99	0.88	1	1	1	0
	C	0.94	1	0.22	0.89	0.83	0.99	0.88	0.02	0	0.67	0
	Fp	0.97	1	0.22	0.89	0.83	0.99	0.88	0.02	0	0.67	1
	M	0.75	1	0.22	0.89	0.83	0.99	0.88	0.14	0	0.67	0
UK 1987	CON	0.09	0	0.01	0.35	0.35	0.28	0.59	1	0	0.33	0
	LAB	0.16	0	0.01	0.35	0.35	0.28	0.59	0.98	1	0.33	0

Country Year	case	balanced	clist	ldm	soc- dem	prot	educ	labour	large	leftist	lcs	quota
	LIB	0.16	0	0.01	0.35	0.35	0.28	0.59	0	0	0.67	0

Sources:

Balanced: Katz and Mair (1992)

Clist: World Bank Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al., 2001)

ldm: Taagepera and Shugart (1989)

socdem: Comparative Welfare States dataset (Huber et al., 1997)

prot: World Values Survey 1990 wave ((WVS, 2009)

educ: UNESCO (1999) Statistisches Bundesamt (2001)

labour: OECD Annual labour force statistics (2008)

large: Katz and Mair (1992)

leftist: Chapel Hill Expert Surveys 1984 and 1988 (Ray, 1999; Steenbergen & Marks, 2007)

lcs: Bille (2001)

quota: Krook (2009)

NB. Raw data set is available from the author on request.

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