Department of Philosophy

photo of Anthony Booth

Dr Anthony Booth

Post:Lecturer in Philosophy (Philosophy)
Location:Arts A A033
Email:A.R.Booth@sussex.ac.uk
Personal homepage:home
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Biography

I am currently Lecturer in Philosophy. Previously, I've worked at the University of Durham, Queen's University Belfast, Utrecht University (NL) and the UNAM in Mexico City. I got my Ph.D. in 2006 at the University of Durham (supervisor: Robin Hendry; examiners: Jonathan Lowe  & Chris Hookway).

My current research interests are (roughly) the following:

The Ethics of Belief: How, if at all, are beliefs subject to normative appraisal? Should the ethics of belief give us prescriptive guidance as to what we should believe/how we should conduct our lives qua believers? Is the ethics of belief a subset of Ethics? Of Epistemology? Is Clifford’s Evidentialism (as opposed to James’ Pragmatism) true?

Epistemology: Fallibilism; Epistemic Permissibility; The Gettier Problem-problem; Epistemic Justification; Externalism vs. Internalism; Epistemic Normativity; the Basing Relation; Epistemic Conservatism; the Nature of Curiosity, Understanding; Knowledge-wh; Epistemic Luck; Epistemic Value.

Philosophy of Mind: The Nature of Belief, “Alief”, Suspended Judgement, wh-attitudes, Intention, Self-Deception; Doxastic Voluntarism; Degrees of Belief; Doxastic Compatibilism; the Phenomenology of Belief; Proprioception; Intuitions.

Ethics: Normativity, Reasons, Rationality; Parfit’s State-Given/Object-Given Reasons distinction; the All-Things-Considered/Pro Tanto Reasons, Oughts, and Duties distinction; “’Ought’Implies ‘Can’”; Blameworthiness, Blame, Responsibility, Obligation (and the relation between them); Rights; Permissibility; the Error-Theory.

Applied Philosophy: Freedom of Speech & Expression; Financial Ethics; Informed Consent. 

Wednesday 15.00 - 16.00

Thursday 15.00 - 16.00

Booth, Anthony (2012) Two reasons why epistemic reasons are not object-given reasons. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research . ISSN 1933-1592

Booth, Anthony Robert (2012) All things considered duties to believe. Synthese, 187 (2). pp. 509-517. ISSN 0039-7857

Booth, Anthony and Peels, Rik (2012) Epistemic justification, rights, and permissibility. Logos and Episteme: an International Journal of Epistemology, 3 (3). pp. 405-411. ISSN 2069-3052

Booth, Anthony Robert (2011) Epistemic ought is a commensurable ought. European Journal of Philosophy. ISSN 0966-8373

Booth, Anthony Robert (2011) The theory of epistemic justification and the theory of knowledge: a divorce. Erkenntnis, 75 (1). pp. 37-43. ISSN 0165-0106

Booth, Anthony Robert and Peels, Rik (2010) Why responsible belief is blameless belief. The Journal of Philosophy, 107 (5). pp. 257-256. ISSN 0022-362X

Booth, Anthony Robert (2009) Compatibilism and free belief. Philosophical Papers, 38 (1). pp. 1-12. ISSN 0556-8641

Booth, Anthony (2009) Motivating epistemic reasons for action. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 78. pp. 265-271. ISSN 0165-9227

Booth, Anthony Robert (2008) Deontology in ethics and epistemology. Metaphilosophy, 39 (4-5). pp. 530-545. ISSN 1126-1068

Booth, Anthony Robert (2008) A new argument for pragmatism? Philosophia, 36 (2). pp. 227-231. ISSN 0048-3893

Booth, Anthony Robert (2007) The two faces of evidentialism. Erkenntnis, 67 (3). pp. 401-417. ISSN 0165-0106

Booth, Anthony Robert and Rowbottom, Darrell, eds. Intuitions. Oxford University Press, Oxford.