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We ◆ Face ◆ Forward

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Welcome to the fifth edition of the Sussex Undergraduate Politics Journal. This journal is a joint collaboration between the University of Sussex Politics Society and the Politics Department. It seeks to celebrate excellence across all three year groups, presenting the work of Sussex undergraduate students from Politics and affiliated disciplines. We hope you enjoy reading this selection of essays and that this journal may continue in the future to showcase the talent of those whose work *shines bright like a diamond.*

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What Factors Contributed to the Rise of the Solidarity Movement in Poland?

(Written for Political Change: Eastern Europe [L2017], 3rd Year, Winter 2015)

Adam Ahmet

Introduction

This essay posits the argument that the factors which led to the rise of the Solidarity trade union in 1980 were ultimately unique to the Polish case.

The focus here falls on the mid-term factors: thematic occurrences taking place between 1945 and the 1980 Gdansk negotiations. These will provide a bridge between the existing literature on the episodic and long-term causes of the rise of the Polish mass opposition.

Thus, the discussion will concern: the economic crisis of the 1970s and how the opposition's pretext was establish; the cross-class cooperation between blue-collar workers and intellectuals, specifically in how this was significant in expanding the movement; and the role of the Catholic Church as an extra-political benefactor of Solidarity. Throughout the analysis, consideration will be given to how the relevant episodic factors and long-term developments led to the establishment of Solidarity. Importantly, this will be located in the context of Eastern European communism in order to ascertain why the articulation of mass opposition was exclusive to Poland.

Whilst this essay acknowledges the importance of historical antecedents in explaining the wider story of Polish opposition, these will not be discussed here[1]. Likewise, attention will not be focused on detailing episodic events or the proceedings Gdansk negotiations in 1980[2]. Similarly, whilst the strategies and tactics of the opposition will be briefly mentioned where relevant, they will not be the onus of this discussion[3]. However, the impact of these factors on the Polish case is respectively appreciated.

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[1] Poland has exhibited a long history of anti-Russian sentiment. Whilst numerous conflicts precede this, the importance of the history of the Partitions (1795-1918) is widely attested to the cultural-political resentment of Russia in Poland. This had ramifications for how communism was adopted and, conversely, perceived in Poland. Likewise this had far reaching consequences for the regime's (lack of) legitimacy. For a detailed discussions, see: (Davies, 2001; Pipes; 2011)

[2] Events during and around the time of the Gdansk negotiations, such the sacking of Ania Walentinowicz and the negotiating tactics of the opposition leaders, are pivotal in explaining why the specific push for a 'free trade union' was successful. There is a lively discussion in the literature regarding the episodic factors of 1980, as well as a wealth of primary evidence. See: (Robinson, 1980; Modzelewski, 1982; Mason, 1989; Bloom, 2006)

[3] The opposition movement developed a decentralised organisation structure following the Gdansk strikes in 1976. Whilst this came as a response to the increasing clampdown by the authorities on isolated strikes, it also contributed to the opposition movement becoming embedded in local communities. This is arguably one of the factors that enabled Solidarity to survive in exile during the years of martial law following the Gdansk negotiation. See: (Bielasiak and Hick, 1990; Kennedy; 1991)

Political and economic crisis

The economic crisis of the 1970s was instrumental in establishing the political conditions which led to the rise of Solidarity. Whilst there were some external influences, the crisis was largely exacerbated by the poor economic management by the **PZPR** (Polish United Worker's Party / *Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza*) and the political incompetence of its leader, Edward Gierek[4]. Subsequently, the events of the 1970s can be seen as providing a then-developing Solidarity movement with the necessary pretext to assert its challenge.

It is unlikely that, without the drastic economic decline Poland experienced in the 1970s, that Solidarity would have formed (Bahro, 1978; Drewnowski, 1982; Kennedy, 1991). In an attempt to finance Gierek's consumerist reforms of the Polish economy, Poland had become heavily reliant on loans and technological imports from Western governments (Nutti, 1981: 104-105). Whilst this meant that Poles initially saw improvements in their living standards, the fallout from the oil crisis in 1973 meant that Poland became saddled with $27 billion in foreign debt (*ibid,* Farrell, 1981: 302*)*. Consequently, this led to an economic crisis wherein access to basic commodities and quality of living were severely affected (Ost, 1990). The abrupt introduction of food price increases, averaging at approximately 60%, sparked a series of strikes and violent protests in Warsaw and Radom in 1976 (Raina, 1977: 231). Gierek subsequently withdrew the price increases, but in doing so granted a now-energised Solidarity movement increased political momentum (Laba, 1991: 93). Solidarity's gains were demonstrated when the attempt to reintroduce the price increases in July 1980 was met with larger, more organised strikes and ultimately resulted in Solidarity being invited to negotiations with the PZPR.

Aside from fuelling popular discontent, the economic developments fortified the blue-collar willingness to protest by inflicting massive political damage to the regime. Gierek's aim to deliver a new 'social contract', by guaranteeing improving living standards and access to basic goods, meant that he mortgaged his political capital on being able to deliver his economic reforms (Butterfield and Weigle, 1992: 10; Pravda, 1982: 172). This meant that, despite the oil crisis having global economic ramifications beyond Poland, "Poles actually held government, rather than economic circumstances, responsible for economic performance" (Pravda, 1982: 173). It subsequently provided the opposition a clear adversary (the regime) to rally against. However, it is important to remember that all states in the Eastern Bloc were also experiencing economic decline throughout the 1970s, with all respective regimes pursuing failing attempts to establish the 'social contract' (Butterfield and Weigle, 1992). But Poland's economic fluctuations were more severe than any of those also experienced by Soviet-type economies at the time (Drewnowski, 1982; Staniszkis, 1984a: 248-77). With his economic strategies hinging

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[4] Pravda's essay coins the term "pre-mature consumerism". This is inferential of the imbalances of Gierek's spending plans in relation to volume of Western loans being used to funds. This, in conjunction with Gierek's handling of the 1976 food price increases, gave Gierek a reputation for being of one of Eastern Europe's most incompetent leaders. See: (Pravda, 1982: 167)

on being able to successfully pay off the Western loans, which was arguably impossible, Gierek paid a higher political price than this counterparts in the region.

Ultimately, the economic crisis of the 1970s underscored the regime's political incompetence and inability to deliver on the new 'social contract'. Thus, this provided Solidarity with a compelling case to mount a challenge to the regime.

Cross-class fertilisation: cooperation between the workers and intellectuals

This necessarily leads to consideration as to how the opposition was able to mobilise on this political momentum. Whilst the origins of the oppositional movements were predominantly working-class, what ultimately became Solidarity was a strategic alliance of white-collar workers and intellectuals (Laba, 1991: 170; Bloom, 2006: 40). The participation of the various cross-sections of society proved to be a defining feature of socialist Poland and this essay argues that Solidarity would not have been able to organise itself without this broad support base.

The bloody outcome of the student protests at Warsaw University in 1968 affirmed that it was in the interest of the intelligentsia to participate in the oppositional movement (Bloom, 2006: 12). However, episodic factors meant that intellectuals were sceptical of actively engaging with the working class opposition until the tragic and prolonged aftermath of strikes in Szczecin (1970) and Gdnask (1976) (Garton Ash, 1991; Karabel, 1993: 30). The setbacks of these events confirmed both the need for the opposition to institutionalise its gains in order to achieve progress and that this had to be accomplished via cross-class cooperation (Laba, 1991: 100). Although many Polish strikes throughout the 1970s were predominantly led by blue-collar workers, the involvement of the intellectual movement led to important productive outcomes. The intellectuals' creative contributions, particularly through the establishment of *Komitet Obrony Robotników* (the Worker's Defence Committee) (KOR), enabled the more effective organisation of protesting workers and eventually inspired the build-up to a consistent focus on demands for a free, self-governing union in the Gdansk negotiations (*ibid*; Bernhard, 1993: 65). This also stimulated self-reflection about what the ideas of opposition was and about the nature of socialism itself[5]. In particular, this was important because the united interests of different social cleavages meant that a "free trade union" would ultimately be able to uptake a wide(r) variety of social-political issues (Goodwyn, 1991; Laba, 1991: 179).

Whilst it is clear, particularly with historical hindsight, that the proposed 'free trade union' was going to be used to forward issues beyond worker's rights, it also avertedly presented the first serious challenge to the PZPR's monopoly on political life (Ost, 1990: 70; Laba, 1991). The

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[5] Leszek Kołakowski's essay: "Thesis on Hope and Hopelessness" is a seminal text from the intellectual opposition movement. Among his focuses was how regimes were able to manipulate cultural collective memory and how the ideology structure of socialism was very inflexible. Importantly, he encouraged the idea that reformist politics was an active form of opposition. See: (Kołakowski, 1971)

sheer size of the opposition, approximately 9 million before the Gdansk negotiations, gave it a massive stake in social and political life and provided for the establishment of an alternative public sphere (*ibid*). Additionally, the perception of cooperation across the masses of Polish society served as a "catalyst for moral regeneration", which both instilled a strong sense of optimism amongst the opposition and negated the influence of the regime (Bloom, 2006: 57). It is important to highlight at this point that the effective disappearance of social cleavages was unique to the Polish case and not seen elsewhere in the region during this period. Although it is important to acknowledge the existence of dispersed intellectual oppositional movements throughout the Eastern Bloc, they were never able to effectively coordinate dialogue or protest with the working-classes in the way the Polish example demonstrates (Kemp-Welch, 1983). The inability of different social groups to work together was arguably a contributory factor to the relative stability of post-war Eastern Europe (ibid: 12).

Fundamentally, we learn that the cross-fertilisation of workers and intellectuals in Poland was vital to the development of the organisational-political credentials of the opposition movement and aid in explaining why mass opposition was articulated in Poland before anywhere else in the Socialist Bloc.

The role of the Catholic Church

Whilst Solidarity was ultimately able to bring different societal factions together, the Catholic Church provided the opposition movement, and indeed Poles more broadly, with a sense of cultural self-identification[6]. From its unique cultural-political position in Polish society, the Church "asserted a collective identity antithetical to that provided by the state" (Osa, 1997: 356). It ultimately provided the organisational and political lubrication which transformed the political role of the opposition into one of cultural emancipation (*ibid*; Kwitny, 1997).

In the years preceding the Gdansk negotiations, the Church frequently expressed support for the opposition movement. It exhibited sympathies to the "just and legitimate" struggle for human rights and basic living conditions, even going so far as to challenge state censorship and demanding church-goers free access to media (Cardinal Stefano Wyszynski, *ct.* in: Celt, 1980: 134; de Weydenthal, 1980: 229). Furthermore, the Church commonly opened its doors to provide safe(r) meeting places for the underground movement and aided in the preparation of a skeletal, regional oppositional structure (Bloom, 2006: 33). Arguably, this was a factor indirectly responsible for the increased effectiveness of strikes and protests leading up the Gdansk negotiations.

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[6] Catholicism is widely attributed as a central tenant on the Polish national identity. Whilst its roots stem back to the foundation of Piast Poland in 966, its cultural role particularly throughout the partitions codified spirituality as integral part of the 'Polish' identity. For a historical account see: (Davies, 2001: 295)

Above all, the election of Karol Wojtyła as Pope John Paul II in 1978 was the seminal moment wherein mass opposition in Poland was galvanised (Starski, 1982: 55). The assumption of the Papacy by a Pole "gave the Church a new stature within the country and weakened the government's ability to act against it" (Bloom, 2013: p.136). Wojtyła's inaugural Papal visit to Warsaw in September 1979, which attracted an estimated 3 million people, crystallised the new political reality wherein the Pope "personified the hopes and aspirations of the nation" (Szczypoirski, 1982: 112-113; Bernstein and Politi, 1996). Aside from being completely blindsided by the situation, the PZPR found itself effectively isolated from the life of the country and unable to sabotage the opposition's momentum.

Consideration of the historical role of the Catholic Church in the Polish national identity is important to understand why it engaged with the opposition, and eventually Solidarity. The Church saw its role in the story of Polish communism as that of an emancipatory actor (de Weydenthal, 1980: 229). Its "specific religious and moral mission", which has been a characteristic of the Church's activity throughout Polish history, helped to fortify the previously mentioned alternative public sphere which arose from cross-class cooperation (*ibid*: 231; Davies, 2001: 295, 365). Therefore, its support confirmed that the opposition was culturally and politically a 'Polish' movement. This speaks of something that is absolutely unique to Poland and has no analogy with any other European state (Davies, 2001). Again, it aids in explaining why the PZPR, and indeed the Communist Bloc as a whole, was completely unprepared for the mass mobilising effect that Pope John Paul II and the successful creation of an alternative public sphere in Poland. It may be difficult to assert exactly what would have become of the Solidarity movement had the role of the Church been different, but it is certain that the inspirational effect it had on the opposition was extremely significant.

Conclusion

Without the economic crisis of the 1970s, triggered by the 1973 oil crisis and Poland's reliance on Western loans, it is unlikely that the opposition would have been spurred to mobilise. Whilst economic recession as not an occurrence exclusive to Poland, the volatility of the Polish economy meant that the working classes were particularly badly affected. Compounded by the political and economic mismanagement on the part of the regime, exhibited most starkly by the numerous attempts to increase food prices and fortified the worker's willingness to strike and to protest. Ultimately, Gierek's lost political capital from being unable to deliver the promised 'social contract' was instrumental in providing the opposition with a compelling pretext to mobilise against the regime.

Whilst this was to be an opposition movement led predominantly by blue-collar workers, their cooperation with the intellectual classes enabled the opposition to take on a broader range of social-political issues. The intellectuals helped the opposition organise more effectively and

encouraged learning from the mistakes of the failed strikes in Szczecin (1970) and Gdansk (1976). Although intellectual opposition was elsewhere in the Eastern Bloc, the extent of class cross-fertilisation was something not seen outside of the Polish case during this period. Thus, it aids in illuminating why the demands for a 'free trade union', made in the Gdansk negotiations, were pushing a much broader political agenda and why mass opposition developed exclusively in Poland.

Conversely, the role of the Catholic Church particularly special factor in the Polish story. The historical-cultural position of the Church in Polish meant that its endorsement of the underground movement, through accommodating safe meeting places to publicly critiquing the regime, provided the opposition with cultural self-identification. Karol Wojtyła's ascendency to the Papacy galvanised the opposition and underscored the regime's social and political isolation from public. Importantly, an alternative public sphere, which was developed through the broad societal reach of the opposition, was culturally validated by the Church and confirmed the opposition to communism was fundamentally 'Polish'.

Conclusively, we can comment that whilst Polish was in a similar political-economic situation to its regional counterparts in the 1970s, the mid-term factors which contributed to the rise of the Solidarity movement in Poland exhibited numerous conditions which were unique to the Polish case. Ultimately, these can help us understand why Solidarity and mass opposition to communism was articulated in Poland before anywhere else in Eastern Europe.

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Discuss and Evaluate Hayek's Critique of Socialism as Presented in 'The Road to Serfdom'.

(Written for Death of Socialism [L2137], 3rd Year, Winter 2015)

Riccardo Bartoli

Introduction

The essay focuses on Hayek's criticism of socialism as outlined in 'The Road to Serfdom'. Here the author claims that this ideology is inherently totalitarian and anti-democratic. Instead of engendering a society in which individuals are free and emancipated, socialism leads to the suppression of individualism for the 'good' of the community. I shall however argue that such a position is outdated as it refers exclusively to a particular strand of socialism, namely communism. A significant number of socialists now subscribe to more democratic and liberal forms of socialism. Among those, social democracy is one of the most successful and widespread.

The aim of the essay is to show why social democracy is immune from Hayek's critique, which is exclusively concerned with central planning. It does that by, first, arguing that since socialism has changed its perspective upon parliamentary discussion it cannot be described as anti-democratic. Second, it will be demonstrated that socialism is not inherently totalitarian given its support for the mixed economy. The discussion will ultimately lead to a critical evaluation of Hayek's conception of freedom.

'The Road to Serfdom' assessed

According to Hayek, socialism is inherently totalitarian and anti-democratic. The purpose of this section is to disprove such an argument by focusing on the developments of socialism following the publication of Hayek's work.

Socialism and Democracy

Hayek devotes an entire chapter to the relationship between socialism and democracy. What characterises collectivist systems is the fact that the resources of society are deliberately organised to realise a specific social end (Hayek, 1944, pp.59). The problem with the notion of 'social end' lies is its vagueness, says Hayek (1944, pp.60). As a matter of fact, individuals act with different ends in mind and according to different systems of values. It follows that conceiving a single order where human differences are denied is both absurd and dehumanising. The common good of collectivist systems is indeed chosen arbitrarily by that

group of people that manage to seize power (1944, pp.115-16). Socialists, however, hold the opposite belief. Agreed social ends, as well as agreed means to achieve those ends, and universally shared sets of values, do exist. As a consequence, parliaments are often seen as mere 'talking shops' where agreement is seldom reached (1944, pp.65). If people share the same ends, then how is it possible that their representatives often fail to see them and legislate accordingly? It is for this reason that central planning is desirable as the fastest route to the good of the community (1944, pp.70). Hayek argues, however, that this is a superficial conception of parliamentary discussion. The way parliaments work demonstrates not that they are useless but that a pluralism of ideas and opinions exists (1944, pp.67). Yet pluralism is incompatible with the adherence to a common goal. According to this logic, therefore, socialism is inherently ant-democratic.

The above-mentioned argument, however, ignores a fundamental development within socialism. A common trait of social democracy is that it has accepted parliamentary democracy and does not see any longer parliaments as mere 'talking shops'. Such a decision has been the product of a long-lasting debate where the attitude towards political participation was, at the beginning, highly ambivalent (Przeworsky, 1985, pp.7-12). In the end, however, the desire for democratic reforms has prevailed over that of immediate violent revolution: socialism has become democratic in the sense that it has accepted the rules and the logic underlying democratic participation (1985, pp.29-31). Defeat in parliamentary elections signifies that the majority of the people do not subscribe to the socialist political programme. On the other hand, being elected means being empowered by citizens to deliver a certain manifesto, which is based on a variety of goals rather than on a single social end. The manifesto of the Italian Democratic Party (PD) is instructive in this sense. Here a whole range of objectives are pursued including a universal and indiscriminate access to knowledge, the eradication of social inequalities, stronger democratic participation, equality of opportunity etc. (Partito Democratico, 2008). Hence the common good does not correspond to a single project. Rather it stands for an array of proposals whose priority differ from one individual to another. This, however, does not apply to Marx and Engel's Communist Manifesto: 'The theory of the Communists may be summed up in the single sentence: abolition of private property' (1998, pp.52). Here the unquestioned attachment to a single goal, namely the abolition of bourgeois property, falls short of that pluralism that social democracy now highly values. It follows that the idea of a common good is compatible with the valorization of pluralism only with reference to the democratic strand of socialism. Hence socialism is not necessarily anti-democratic.

Socialism and Totalitarianism

Hayek's argument concerning the totalitarian nature of socialism will now be considered (1944, pp.91-104). In his view planning is the planning of the economy. But the economy is not just a

sector among others. Rather, it represents a fundamental aspect of individuals' lives because economic ends and individuals' life goals often coincide. Within this perspective, money becomes 'one of the greatest instruments of freedom' as it gives individuals the opportunity to choose and strive for their non-economic goals (1944, pp.93). But under socialism citizens would have their economic ends chosen beforehand by a group of planners (1944, pp.94). The freedom of choice as consumers and workers would be crucially affected and constrained too. It follows that planning does not merely affect marginal parts of our lives but a considerable portion of it. As a result socialism leads to totalitarianism, i.e. a society in which a group of planners with absolute powers controls all aspects of society (Hayek, 1944, pp.95).

Although Hayek's work does indeed indicate the vices associated with central planning, his criticism is not applicable to contemporary socialism. As a matter of fact, democratic socialists have long abandoned the idea of complete central planning by substituting it with that of the 'mixed economy'. This is a system which is partly run by the government and partly 'run' by the free-market (Ikeda, 1997, pp.35-41). Individuals are left free to exchange goods in a market that works according to a determinate set of rules; while government is supposed to intervene in order to correct the shortcomings of the free-market. This means that although the government is the major economic agent, the most fundamental liberties and rights are granted to citizens. A mixed economy is thus envisaged in order to avoid the evils that burden the two extremes: capitalism fostering exploitation and inequalities, planning leading to totalitarianism and inefficiency (1997, pp.38). Hence, if socialism is not merely about planning, then it looks as if social democracy is immune from Hayek's critique.

Hayek, however, would deny the power of this argument on the grounds that the mixed economy is another expression used to indicate 'interventionism' (Burton, 1984, pp.94). Having said that, Hayek is not against interventionism itself but against the idea that there is a stable middle way between central planning and laissez-faire regime. 'The road to serfdom' is a warning for those who advocate the expansion of state intervention: the path from interventionism to totalitarianism is accessible and rather short (Gissurrarson, 1984, pp.5). There are two reasons for this: first, the planner cannot halt the process of intervention as he likes. Second, economic phenomena are strictly interdependent. Thus, interventionism may transform the liberal state, i.e. that 'utilitarian machinery' that helps citizens actualising their freedom, into a 'moral institution', whose directives extend to the whole of society (Hayek, pp.77, 80). Hence, the problem with interventionism is that it may lead to more and more intervention and consequently to a reduction of citizens' freedom.

Against this, however, it can be argued that there is no correlation between loss of freedom and growth in state intervention. As researches suggest, although government use of the GDP through public expenditure has increased since the 1920s, such trend has not been accompanied by a substantial loss of individual and economic freedom, as Hayek instead suggests (Meadowcroft, Alves, 2014, pp.849-851). For instance, in the UK the proportion of

the GDP used for public expenditure has increased from 26.2 in 1920 to 51.0 in 2010. However, the Freedom of House ratings and the Economic Freedom Scores show that the UK has still the highest score in terms of civil liberties and political rights. Moreover, the degree of economic freedom has actually increased in the past 40 years, from 5.9 to 7.7 points (2014, pp.849-851). The failure to see this is mostly due to Hayek's narrow conception of freedom, namely freedom as absence of external impediments. If freedom is only conceived in its negative acceptation, i.e. as constituting a sphere immune from state control, then any growth of state control over the economy results in the loss of individual liberty (Meadowcroft, Alves, 2014, pp.857-8).

Socialist Freedom

Hayek, however, does not consider this objection because of his misunderstanding of socialist freedom and his wrong belief that 'limited' freedom has already concretised.

He claims that socialists are right in pointing out that individuals cannot be free if they are not granted the resources necessary to actualise the freedom that law confers to us in the form of rights (Hayek, 1944, pp.124). The issue, for him, is that this sort of 'limited' economic security has already been achieved in most of the advanced countries, like the UK (1944, pp.125). Conversely, what socialists aim at is 'absolute economic security'. This refers to the idea that a certain standard of life, which is immune from the 'common hazards of life', such as an abrupt loss of income, ought to be granted to all (1944, pp.125). Hayek, however, points to the problematic nature of absolute security, namely that that it can be achieved only as a result of the alienation of a whole range of liberties and rights in favour of a central authority (1944, pp.135). The choice of occupation, for instance, would be constrained by the planner in order to maximise economic efficiency. But this is not desirable if freedom is valued as the highest end.

It is illegitimate, however, to associate the socialist notion of freedom to 'absolute economic security'. What socialists mean by the word 'freedom' is, indeed, what Hayek calls 'limited economic security'. This refers to the idea that the most disadvantaged groups within society ought to be secured from the constant threat of sinking into a 'cattle-like existence' characterised by misery and alienation (Marx, Engels, 2011, pp.12). Furthermore, Hayek overlooks the fact that Western countries have reached a certain degree of well-being even at the expenses of Third World countries. The possibility of buying a pair of jeans for less than ten pound parallels the insecurity felt by a group of workers within a warehouse in Bangladesh (Rustin, 2014). The availability on the market of affordable long-lasting batteries for our electronic devices are the effect of continuous violations of human rights taking place in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Moran, 2014). Hence, what Hayek failed to recognise is that socialist freedom is not the whimsical research of a consistent level of well-being. Rather it reflects the worry that, at

present, negative freedom cannot be actualised by a consistent part of the earth population and thus need to be integrated with socialist freedom.

Conclusion

The essay have thus attempted to demonstrate how 'The Road to Serfdom' is a work that loses its critical appeal as soon as recent developments within socialism are considered. Social democracy is not anti-democratic as it has accepted parliamentary discussion and, along with it, the idea of pluralism. Moreover, its support for the mixed economy avoids the problematic link between central planning and totalitarianism. Hayek, however, rejects the mixed economy on the basis of a certain conception of freedom, namely negative freedom, and a wrong view of socialist freedom. As shown, such rejection is unjustified because, first, negative freedom is too narrow and ought to be integrated with socialist freedom. Second, the latter corresponds not to absolute but to limited economic security.

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To What Extent Does Rousseau's General Will allow for the Recognition of Minority Interests?

(Written for Modern Political Thought [L2031], 2nd Year, Winter 2015)

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Rousseau's Social Contract is an attempt to justify the existence of a state, by proving that citizens can be free whilst obeying its laws, if only the laws are created out of a General Will. This equal and justifiable General Will was written about in a book published over 200 years ago, and made for small, homogenous city states,[7] by a man who thought that women should be kept from voting,[8] as they instead ought to focus on becoming loving spouses. It's safe to say that today's notion of equal societies are quite different from the civil society Rousseau imagined. However, that does not necessarily mean that his concepts cannot be transposed onto more diverse societies than what was envisioned by him. I will argue that the General Will does allow for the recognition of minority interests in diverse societies to a certain extent, as its justification rests upon finding a common value; a value shared by *all* citizens. However, Rousseau doesn't allow us to find a clear response to this question, as his General Will is to be ruled by a proportional majority vote, which could potentially be used to exclude the interests of minorities. An interesting paradox lies at the heart of this question, as the General Will is justified by a majority, but cannot justly function by excluding a minority.

Rousseau's General Will is his attempt to show that human beings can be free when obeying a state ruled by a General Will. This is possible as the General Will allows citizens to decide for themselves what laws they would like their society to follow; citizens are free, able to do what one wants, and to not be forced to do something one does not want,[9] when they live under self-prescribed laws.[10] In Rousseau's Civil Society, citizens are free through being the sovereign of the state, as this co-joins the interests of the citizens with that of the sovereign.[11] When making the citizens sovereign, you make them both the rulers and the ruled; able to choose their own laws and in this be free. He argues that, in order to make sure that all citizens are equally free, citizens should use their sovereign power to find and vote upon the General Will. The General

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[7] Jones, W.T., (1987) 'Rousseau's General Will and the Problem of Consent', *Journal of the History of Philosophy,* 25(1) p.113

[8] Coole, D., (1993) *Women in Political Theory,* Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf, p.81

[9] Hoffman, S. (2010) 'The Social Contract, or the mirage of the general will' in McDonald, C. and Hoffman, S. (eds.) *Rousseau and Freedom,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.114-115

[10] Trachtenberg, Z.M., (1993) *Making Citizens, Rousseau's Political Theory of Culture,* London: Routledge p. 29

[11] Rousseau, J.J., *The Social Contract,* Book I, 7. The Sovereign

Will is general in two senses; firstly, it consists of the common interest of the people, and secondly, applies equally on all citizens, so that each, when voting, submits themselves to the same rules in the same way that they submit it on all others.[12] However, the General Will is not just a sum of all individuals' wills taken together and voted upon, but rather, the core of common interests shared by all citizens.[13] The General Will is decided in an assembly by '...each man (sic), in giving his vote, states his opinion on that point, and the general will is found by counting votes'.[14] By letting the citizens vote individually in this way and listen to each other's opinion, the general interest will, according to Rousseau, assert itself.[15] The purpose of the General Will isn't to find what's objectively right, per se, but to find out what the majority of the community considers to be correct for their society.[16] So, when voting on the General will, the members collectively decide, by discussion and majority vote, whether a proposal is in keeping with the General Will, whether it is a perspective they all share.[17] Not to find a truth known by all, but a value shared by all.

This shared value and General Will is, according to Rousseau, to be discovered and decided by discussions and proportional majority voting,[18] which intrinsically makes the General Will biased towards the status quo and against minority interests. Proportional majority rule works so that the majority required for passing a law, or to decide the General Will, is in proportion with the importance of the motion discussed,[19] and in this sense legitimised by the General Will.[20] This, to make sure of a stable society, where motions in line with the traditions of society are easy to pass, and motions contrasting traditions need a strong support to be implemented; it makes sure that any drastic change implemented is strongly supported by the General Will.[21] This inevitably makes the General Will biased towards the status quo and against change, which makes it hard for unpopular or untraditional interests to gain recognition in a vote on the

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[12] Coole, D., (1993) *Women in Political Theory,* Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf p.80

[13] Ripstein, A., (1992) 'The General Will', *History of Philosophy Quarterly,* 9(1) p.55

[14] Rousseau, J.J., *The Social Contract,* Book IV, 2. Voting

[15] Bosanquet, B., (1894) 'The Reality of the General Will', *International Journal of Ethics,* 4(3), p.309

[16] Rousseau, J.J., *The Social Contract,* Book IV, 2. Voting

[17] Ripstein, A., (1992) 'The General Will', *History of Philosophy Quarterly,* 9(1) p.58

[18] Rousseau, J.J., *The Social Contract,* Book IV, 2. Voting

[19] Weirich, P., (1986) 'Rousseau on Proportional Majority Rule', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,* 47(1) p.111

[20] Dahl, R.A., (1989) *Democracy and its critics,* London: Yale University Press p.135

[21] Weirich, P., (1986) 'Rousseau on Proportional Majority Rule', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,* 47(1) p.114

General Will. If the interest of a minority of citizens is more progressive or considered foreign in comparison to society overall, then the proportional majority will work against them, partly, as their interest is not part of the status quo, and partly as they, in their role as a minority, lack the majority vote needed to implement change.

This structure which favours majorities and traditions can seem unjust, as the General Will in a proportional majority voting imposes the opinion of the majority on all citizens, and gives little room for recognition of the interests of minorities. However, Rousseau did not think that this was unjust. He famously proclaims that a minority, when voted down, can be forced to follow a General Will which they didn't vote for, and in this be 'forced to be free'.[22] This apparent paradox is possible, as a vote on the General Will isn't about what's objectively right, but what the citizens thinks is subjectively correct for their society. The General Will is justified by having a majority of the population sharing a perspective and agreeing that it is in agreement with their idea of a General Will. So, in a vote on the General Will, a minority that disagrees is simply mistaken about what the community thinks to be correct.[23] A minority view can, because of this, justly be overlooked as it is not shared by the overall society; a minority view of the General Will can never be the General Will. Indeed, as Jones puts it, the social contract upon which the General Will is founded, was never made to guarantee the inclusion of minority views, but rather a moral justification for their exclusion.[24] The General Will cannot constitutionally be illegitimised because of the existence of a minority with a contrasting opinion, as a minority in a voting on the General Will is, constitutionally, misguided about what the General Will ought to be.

However, this does not mean that the majority can unconditionally overrule or exclude minority interests. This, as a General Will which does not take into account the interests of minorities cannot truly be a General Will, but is rather a Corporate Will. Rousseau makes a distinction between the General Will, a will which has been agreed upon by a majority of all citizens, and a Corporate Will, agreed upon by some citizens.[25] This is an important distinction to make, as Rousseau's conception of the citizens of a state being the sovereign relies upon each citizen being an 'indivisible part of the whole'.[26] Rousseau's justification of the General Will relies upon the notion that each citizen is not forced to be a subject to someone else's will,

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[22] Rousseau, J.J., *The Social Contract*, Book I, 8. The Civil State

[23] Ripstein, A., (1992) 'The General Will', *History of Philosophy Quarterly*, 9(1) p.58

[24] Jones, W.T., (1987) 'Rousseau's General Will and the Problem of Consent', *Journal of the History of Philosophy,* 25(1) p.129

[25] Rousseau, J.J., *The Social Contract*, Book III, 2. The Constituent Principle in the various forms of government

[26] Rousseau, J.J., *The Social Contract*, Book II, 1. That Sovereignty is Inalienable

but to a will which they all equally can affect and decide upon.[27] In order for this to work, each citizen must have an equal chance to put forward what they think the General Will should be, to persuade others of their view, and then together vote towards an agreement. Rousseauian voting 'combines elements of creating the general will and discovering it',[28] which means that each citizen has a right to be a part in the making of the General Will, to discuss, listen and vote. Because of this outline, unpopular, untraditional or minority opinions have a chance to become popular, if they are argued for well enough for a majority to be persuaded. The minority vote can justly be overlooked after a vote on the General Will has been passed, but only if they've first been given an equal chance to influence what the General Will should be in the first place.

An unjust way to exclude minority interests from the General Will occurs when minority interests or unpopular opinions are excluded from what *the general* of a society is considered to be, and in this given an unequal chance to affect the outcome of the vote.[29] In such a situation, minority interests becomes a threat to what is perceived as the General Will, as it contrasts with the majority, or Corporate, will, rather than being seen as an intrinsic part of the General Will.[30] Such a situation is brought up by David Miller, as he discusses how the arrival of immigrants, which are 'likely to arrive as bearers of cultural values distinct from those of the receiving community', creates a dilemma in how these are to be integrated into the 'existing national culture',[31] or the existing 'General Will' of a society. However, I argue that this conception of a General Will is faulty. When the interest of a minority group of citizens are perceived as foreign, rather than part of *the general* alongside all other citizens, the General Will becomes a Corporate Will. If the justification of the General Will comes from it equally being dependent on all and applying to all,[26] then the Corporate Will cannot be justified. This makes it unconstitutional to the General Will to unconditionally exclude minority interests from the General Will, to not consider them as an equal part of *the general*, as it is required that all interests, even those perceived as foreign, have equal opportunity to be listened to and taken into account. Their interests aren't foreign to the General Will; the General Will isn't general without them. So, even though the proportional majority system does favour traditions over minority interests, the General Will exerted properly does allow for some recognition of minority interests as it depends upon the integration of all interests into *the general* to become legitimate.

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[27] MacAdam, J.I., (1972) 'The Discourse on Inequality and The Social Contract', *Philosophy*, 47(182) p.317

[28] Ripstein, A., (1992) 'The General Will', *History of Philosophy Quarterly*, 9(1) p.57

[29] Motchanova, A., (2011) 'The General Will and Immigration', *Journal of Social Philosophy*, 42(2) pp.136-137

[30] Motchanova, A., (2011) 'The General Will and Immigration', *Journal of Social Philosophy*, 42(2) pp.133-134

[31] Miller, D., (2008) 'Immigrants, Nations, and Citizenship', *The Journal of Political Philosophy*, 16(4) p.375

To conclude, to which extent exactly minority interests are recognised under the General Will is not easy to answer, but it has here been argued that the General Will does allow for the recognition of minority interests to some extent. The General Will is to be decided upon by a majority vote, which does makes it intrinsically biased against minority or untraditional interests. However, the General Will is not entirely excluding of minority interests as it could not be properly justified without their involvement. For example, citizens with minority interests can use the General Will to have their interests recognised by persuading other citizens of the value of their perspective, and in this potentially acquire a majority support for their cause. Furthermore, they can, if they feel like their interests are unconditionally excluded, argue that the excluding General Will is in fact an unjustifiable Corporate Will. Minority interests will intrinsically be disadvantaged by a General Will as they, because of how the proportional majority rule works against them, can justly be overlooked after a vote has been held if they have not managed to persuade a majority to agree with them. Minority interests are, as such, more probable to be overlooked than traditional majority interests are. The General Will does not give equal weight to majority and minority opinions, only an equal chance to argue for their case and persuade others to vote with them, and measures to make sure that they could not justifiably be unconditionally excluded. Rousseau did imagine states as small and homogenous, but that does not mean that bigger and more diverse states cannot find a General Will.

Indeed, the necessity to make sure that all citizens become a part of the general grows with its adversity, if it is to be ruled by a General, and not a Corporate, Will.

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A Critical Evaluation of Art, Politics and Power in the GDR

(Written for Politics of Governance: Germany [L2039], 2nd Year, Summer 2015)

Sol Hallam

The art of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) is often times forgotten in the art world. Initially after German reunification, GDR artwork was swept under the carpet so to speak, being seen as too ideologically driven to be considered art (Schulz, 2012). Under the GDR art was seen as supremely important in the development of Socialism. It was for this reason that the art of the GDR was so heavily censored; criticism of the GDR, Communism, or the Soviet Union were not to be permitted. Support for capitalism, fascism or violence against the state were prohibited. While there was no official programme of censorship in the GDR, any published work went through several stages of filtration to ensure it was appropriate. Despite these conditions, artists still found a means of expressing discontent with the system. This fact alone tells us about the state of the GDR. That even by the mechanism through which Socialist ideas were meant to be dispersed, there was dissenting voices, attempting to bring about change to the state. As the optimism of establishing a Socialist state corroded away, so too did artwork criticising the state increase. It would be an exaggeration to say that artwork in the GDR brought down the Berlin Wall. But just as the artwork demonstrates to us now that dissent was rife in East Germany, so too did it express to people trapped in the GDR that dissent was possible and that things were beginning to change.

What constitutes art is the topic of a myriad of books and essays, however for the purposes of this essay we will use the GDR's own definition. This is because, firstly, there are limited examples of certain forms of art not recognised by the GDR, and, secondly, as that art which is both state commissioned and acts as state criticism best demonstrates the extent of the discontent within the GDR. The GDR did not consider, anything that was not proper formal art; this disallowed all abstract art, internal monologue, nonsense, anything deemed avant-garde, and free verse poetry. However, it did allow for most conventional mediums; visual forms of art, paintings, literature, film and theatre (Holzweissig, 1997).

The essay will deal with the aforementioned permitted art forms in turn, highlighting the prevalence of censorship and in each case demonstrating how, despite acknowledgement by the SED of the threats of the arts, the medium still managed political criticism.

Fine Art

The largest contingent of art from the GDR comes from what was termed Socialist Realism. Paintings from 1945 onwards tend to be placed under this stylistic category. Socialist Realism was a play on the art and literary style of Social Realism which attempts to depict contemporary life realistically and often to make political comment. Socialist Realism was a GDR and soviet art style encouraged and commissioned by the state depicting life under Socialism with the purpose of highlighting Socialist values and idolising the common worker.

Socialist Realism in the GDR was often placed on posters or presented as murals on the sides of buildings so as to give it maximum visibility ensuring its message was seen by as many people as possible. A wall in Dresden exemplifies the art style (fig. 1) with its preference for red, the colour of socialism and power, as well as using the worker to demonstrate their importance to the socialist effort. The art style was also commissioned to express more specific socialist ideas - one mural expressing the Marxist view of the press to the public (fig. 2). In this way Socialist Realism was used as propaganda for the GDR. Here the art of the GDR looks wholly interested in supporting the state, as opposed to expressing any dissatisfaction or opposition to the regime and this perception of such art continued after reunification also. The majority of art from early on in the GDR's existence shares a resemblance with this work.

Given the nature of Socialist Realism as supported by the state, after the breakup of the Soviet Union, this art style was quick to be forgotten. Worse than this the artists themselves were shunned, being seen as supportive of the old system rather than seeking to overthrow it. Closer inspection of some the art of this period from within the GDR, tell a different story. 20 years on, a re-examination of Socialist Realist paintings demonstrate not work which glorifies communism or highlights the class struggle, but art which captures the melancholy of a failed socialist utopia. At a new art exhibition in Weimar, two paintings from the GDR are being put on display with the intention of breaking the primarily Western perception of the art as following an aesthetic and ideology of conformism (Knöfel, 2012). The first painting (fig. 3), by Bernhard Kretzschmar, depicts a city, largely green, with factories billowing triumphantly in the background was made in 1955, and is an exemplar of what is traditionally thought of as Socialist Realism. The second painting (fig. 4) by Konrad Mattheuer, with its large expansive brown desert of nothingness and solemn faces of the workers, is meant to present a "destroyed landscape" (ibid). The second painting comes in 1974, 20 years after the first. The exhibition intended for them to be viewed together, as two landscapes that demonstrate the changing attitudes within the GDR. What started off with hope of creating a functioning socialist society, became this destitute barren land, where the faces of workers have to be covered with masks or painted on in order to be express joy about the situation that surrounds them.

Socialist Realist art of the GDR often also took inspiration from Greek mythological stories and imagery. This was one of the few areas which was acceptable to the state, but also left room for

state criticism (Hompes, 2012). A popular figure allowed in German Socialist Realism was Icarus. Symbolism of flight at a time when the Soviet Union was seeking to put a man into space and the progressive optimism of the Socialist project are presumably what made Icarus a popular symbol in the GDR. However, an alternate reading whereby artists where aware of the full story of Icarus' failed flight puts the symbolism in a different light. In the Roland Berger's print of Icarus confined to a chair (fig. 5), much like Socialism in the GDR, limited, with the wings to take flight, but none of the momentum and dynamism necessary. In sharp contrast, a painting by Mattheuer titled Icarus Rises (fig. 6) created nearly 10 years later, at a time when protests in Leipzig were taking place and the fall of the Soviet Union had become a waiting game. The irony of an image of Icarus finally taking flight at the dawn of Socialism's demise, was no doubt lost on the Verbund der Bildenden Künste der DDR, the council that commissioned visual artists to work for the state.

While the role that fine art played in sowing the seeds of revolution must not be overstated, the bold means of expressing criticism of socialism and GDR authority demonstrates the nature of life in the GDR. The political messages in their work are a by-product of the state's own view of the purpose of art as serving political ends. In the art of the GDR, we see the intricate link between art and politics in the GDR.

Literature

Another source of artistic political expression in the GDR came in the form of state-printed and published novels. Initially, there were many authors that believed in writing in support of the Socialist cause (Emmerich, 1999, p. 56), however as time went on and the socialist ideal became ever further from reality, so too did the authors begin to express dissent by utilising hidden messages, understated satire, and metaphor. Literary critics agree (Ó Dochartaigh, 2005) that "most good writers [in the GDR] looked for ways to challenge the dominant ideology of the era." As the state recognised the potential of the literary art form to express political messages to the people, early GDR literature was dominated by anti-fascist writing. However as the GDR became settled as an independent state and tensions with West Germany began to ease, the censorship of art and in particular literature began to relax. Literature began subtly to approach topics of authoritarianism and state control. Finding ways of expressing criticism through literature was spurred on by Erich Honecker's declaration at the 8th Party Congress in 1971 that "if we take our stance on the firm socialist position, then in my judgement there can be no taboos in the field of art and literature. That goes for both issues of how the content is handled and for issues of style — in short any issues relating to what we call artistic mastery" (Hoffer, 2012, pp. 109-110). This quotation highlighted what was hoped to be a reformation to the heavily restrictive formal limitations of Socialist Realism. And it was

because of the unique ability to language to express a dichotomy of meaning that resulted in its sustaining high readership levels within the GDR (Herminghouse, 1994, p. 87)

The 1970s saw moderate liberalisation of GDR due to declining pressure with West, this saw the introduction of more contentious literary criticism of the GDR. Plenzdorf's Die neuen Leiden des jungen W. [The New Sufferings of Young W.] (1972) saw the suggested suicide of the characters main protagonist, in despair at the futility of his situation. Suicide however was not allowed in the GDR and neither was it allowed to be written about, so the suicide had to remain implied. Volker Braun's Unvollendete Geschichte [Unfinished History] (1977) was based in a made up land in which an authoritarian state, suspicious of everyone, arrests and punishes its citizens on illegitimate, nonsensical grounds. Despite this state criticism being published, much literature from the 1970s was banned, and their authors excommunicated in some cases.

Literature excited people not only because of the subversive metaphors of works like Plenzdorf and Braun, but literature is spoken of nostalgically by East Germans, because of it's being one of the only written mediums by which people could access a more truthful account of what was going on in the GDR. The news media was far more heavily edited by the state, than the literary art form could be and it became a means of communicating challenges to the system and desires for social change. Authors would be participate in public meetings to discuss the themes of their work (Wolf, 1990), creating a kind of faux or replacement journalism ("ersatzjournalism" - Herminghous, 1994, p. 87) Literature thereby took the role of the press in holding the government system to account even if only in the minds and discussions of those that analysed such writings.

Literature therefore played a vital role in disseminating counter propaganda and built a class of people that shared in their dissatisfaction with the state, delighting in the expressive capacities of language and literature.

Theatre

In the final decade of the GDRs existence, Gorbachev introduced Glasnost - a policy of encouraging greater transparency and openness of the Russian government and their satellite states' governments. While Glasnost was not widely accepted by the SED, the world of theatre undoubtedly felt its effects (Schememann, 1987). The word Glasnost literally translates to 'publicity'. Appropriately, in East Germany it was bad publicity in the form of state criticism, thinly veiled as satire that began to spread across the country. Satirical jokes about the GDR and communism had up until very recently been an area that were reserved only to be shared amongst close friends in the privacy of one's own home, and never expressed through art that was approved by the state. And even then, making your views public might be costly with 179,000 unofficial collaborators working for the Stasi (Enbergs, 1993, p. 55). One joke in a

performance in Leipzig in 1987, belittled Communist Party secretaries, with a character intended to be a GDR bureaucrat demanding an answer to the question of what the purpose of a sunset was towards creating a socialist society, questioning the suns ideology by pointing out that at sunset "the West stays light, but can see it getting darker in the East" (Schememann, 1987). Perhaps a joke for a certain time and place, but given the previous 40 year scarcity of such jokes, the change would not doubt have been refreshing to hear. It is often argued that Glasnost, along with its sister policy of governmental restructuring Perestroika, was key in bringing down the Berlin wall. Is Glasnost therefore to be considered yet another error in an era of mistakes for the USSR? Under a communist regime that had censored what people were allowed to say for so long, it was by no accident that Glasnost allowed for greater political expression in theatre. Bad publicity of the state was the intention, because in allowing for the expression of dissent through satire and comedy, the appetite for revolution, for unification, for other freedoms, it was thought, could be quelled. This turned out not to be the case, and the art form of comedic theatre played a small role in demonstrating to the East German people that the tides of change were coming. Satirical theatre of the late 1980s demonstrated that opposition to the GDR was increasing, for the first time in public, state criticism was allowed.

Mail Art

Although not technically "fine" art, postal art of the 20th century was equally one of very few mediums by which dissenting voices could criticise the state[32]. Mail art was a phenomenon that developed in soviet satellite states as a means of people communicating with one another without their messages being overtly obvious to any state postal surveillance employees (Szombathy, 2005). Mail art as a phenomenon began with intellectuals and members of the intelligentsia trying to evade surveillance, but soon became adopted by both East German and Western artists and everyday people as a means of expression. Mail art in the GDR, allowed artists to utilise banned forms as a means of expression. This actions can be seen as politically by its very nature as dissent, however, equally the versatility of form that the medium brought was used to express discontent with the state and to spread those ideas. A major theme revolved around artistic freedom in a medium that would unlikely be shared with a high volume of people. For example, a postcard by Robert Rehfeldt made in 1975 (fig. 5), expresses a far more observably risqué message than any art commissioned by the state. While still maintaining socialist principles ("L'art anti-bourgeois"), it still makes criticism of the GDR's suppressive art policy, with the tag line "everyone is artist". By 1975, the GDR was using collage and collaboration through mail art to organise gatherings, publicise underground art shows, and

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[32] While mail art may not technically have fallen into a GDR classification of art, I include it because firstly, the SED banned the medium, making it a censored art form, and secondly, because the medium's very existence demonstrates dissent against a system that attempted to control ideas For these reasons, mail art possesses the criteria to be considered in an essay on art, power, and the GDR.

to communicate with East Germany, acting as an early form of social networking (Kemp-Welch, 2012, pp. 3-13). This element of mail art created a kind of public life that was missing from many soviet controlled states. Politically, the development of an underground postal network of art, demonstrates that the mail art was more than just a formal development in the art world, its importance is equally in the social element of this phenomenon. It brought people together, in opposition to the bureaucratic control of the GDR, in a way that was not publicly possible by any other art form or means of communication.

In mail art, the people of East Germany found a kind of public life, a meeting place and network by which to express and be informed about political messages other than what the state was trying to disseminate.

Film

GDR film was well maintained as an art form which furthered the goals of socialism, but the young generation of film makers in the 1980s grew up with far more access to Western media, and their film was far more critical of the system than the state had been used to. Initially film was one art form which managed to escape was heavily censored with 11 movies being censored in the 1960s alone. After this the SED found less direct methods of limiting the production of films that criticised the state, through a mixture of withdrawal of funding, cultural criticism, and revision. Similarly to literature, paintings, and theatre, films required approval by the state. The difference came from the fact that films would often cost a large amounts of money and thus the state had a greater stake in the film and a greater say in the script. Any movie that did not clearly further the aims of Socialism by educating the public about its benefits or technicalities was criticised in the media (McGee, 2003, pp. 445-446). Because of this fact very few films criticising the state made it to production. Those that did were all banned and not shown publicly until after unification. Banned films include Frank Beyer's Trace of Stones and Frank Vogel's Denk bloß nicht, ich heule, with their being 11 films banned in the GDR in total. All were banned on some political grounds or another, ranging from the film company responsible for all state-funded film, DEFA, not liking the fact that the workers are not committed hard workers in Trace of Stones (not in keeping with Socialist values) to banning them on the grounds that they depict young people being suppressed by the system. One director that managed to evade censorship, despite making films with the intention of criticising the GDR was Rainer Simon. He managed to create films that could be interpreted as critical by those looking for criticism by making films in which he documented real life situations, but purposefully blanked out any form of confrontation, thereby highlighting it. He also adopted the use of other forms of disobeying authority figures as metaphors for dissenting against the state, which proved his most successful films (Reinhardt, 2009). The production of film slowed towards the end of the GDR's life. Some attribute this to a lack of money to make

films, but others have cited the radicalisation of the young generation of film makers in the 1980s as the reason for fewer films being created (McGee, 2003, pp. 448-450). In either case, the drought in GDR films would have been noticed by East Germans as further evidence of that all was not well in the soon to collapse system.

Conclusion

Art in the GDR was defined by politics. Whether that be state commissioned art disseminating the ideas of Socialism, attempts at expressing political discontent with the regime, or by government censorship. At different points in the history of the state, the degree to which artists were constrained varied, with the 1970s representing a lax in literary censorship, while the closer the spectre of soviet collapse became the greater the degree to which state criticism was expressed publicly through both the postal service and the theatre. But just because this unique art period can be defined by politics, says nothing of its impact on the East German political situation. For this we look to a conception of art developed separately in West Germany by artist Joseph Beuys. While Germany remained separated Beuys created what he called Social Art, or Social Sculpture, which was meant to highlight art's potential to transform society. That artwork should be thought of as inextricably linked to the society in which it exists, both art and society acting on and reacting to each other. This is a conception that the SED understood, the need to make art expressive of the ideas of an ideal society in order to influence it. However, ultimately, it was impossible to prevent the socially pervasive desire for change that lead to the fall of the Berlin Wall and this social pressure is represented in the art we see in the GDR. The fall of the Berlin Wall representing the end of this unique art and the culmination of its political endeavour.

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APPENDIX

Figure 1

Figure 2

Figure 3

Figure 4

Figure 5

Figure 6

Figure 7

Figure 8

Why Did Jospin's Government Introduce a Law on Parity, and did it End French Universalism?

(Written for Politics of Governance: France [L2049], 2nd Year, Summer 2015)

Isabel Jennings

The introduction of the gender parity laws marked a controversial turning point in French politics. Whilst the parity laws might seem like a logical solution to the problem of under-representation, they had been a hard fought win for those campaigning for gender parity. This is predominantly because of the hindrance of Republican ideals of universalism. Universalism is a concept whereby everyone is seen equally before the law; which is assumed to result in legislative equality. In France this translates as a rejection to categorise voters; as it might discriminate them above, or below, other cleavages. However, the realities of universalism tend to put women on the back-foot due to institutional prejudices such as incumbency – of often male incumbents - and outdated assumptions of male superiority within the system. This therefore presents an interesting challenge to the Universalist framework of the fifth republic; especially considering that women form 50% of the population. In order to explore why the parity laws were introduced and their effect on universalism this essay shall focus on: who introduced them and why; whether they were necessary for French politics; and whether or not they actually contravene universalism, or if it simply renegotiates its boundaries.

Lionel Jospin's government introduced the parity laws in 2000. These laws are effectively gender quotas stating that there should be a 50% representation of men and women in party candidacy in elections. The 50% threshold is chosen due to the natural divide of the population. Emphasis on universalism means that the parity laws are discussed in French political discourse as being gender neutral. However, for the purpose of this essay the terms 'parity' and 'quotas' will be used interchangeably as borrowed from Murray (2012).

Indeed Jospin's government was not the first to try and introduce parity laws into French politics. In 1982 the Socialist majority National Assembly passed a bill requiring a maximum of 75% (of either sex) to be put forward in party lists; Murray (2012, pg. 346) states this was effectively a 25% parity quota. However, the Constitutional Council later ruled that the laws were not compatible with France's Declaration of the Right of Man, which emphasises the rejection of "any division of voters and candidates into categories" (Mossuz-Lavau 1998, cited in Murray 2012 pg. 364). The Constitutional Council effectively declined the advancement of real equality to protect the formal equality enshrined in the Declaration of the Right of Man (Sineau, 2000, pg.40). Moreover, the interpretation of the Declaration of the Right of Man was anachronistic (Murray, 2012, pg. 364). The clause under which the Constitutional Council rejected the parity laws was written before women had been granted legal citizenship (suffrage)

in 1944; this therefore means that it is not adapted to any contemporary issues that might occur regarding male and female equality. Mossuz-Lavau (1998, cited in Murray 2012, pg. 364), speculates that those in the National Assembly anticipated the Constitutional Council would not endorse the law; which therefore led to a wider support within the National Assembly, as support for the bill was seen as beneficial for personal reputation. In light of this rejection, some scholars argue that parity could have been introduced, without constitutional amendments, on part of the preamble of the constitution in 1946 (which was later incorporated into the constitution in 1958) which reads "The law guarantees women, in all domains, rights equal to that of men" (Sineau, 2000, pg.41). Furthermore, some authors argue that the rejection of the 1982 parity attempts marks a failure of the Constitutional Council and highlights that "legislation does not respond to the legal norms contained in the constitution" (Sineau, 2000, pg.40). Gisèle Halimi (cited in Sineau, 2000, pg. 41), the founder of the group *Choiser-La Cause des Femmes,* stated in *Le Monde Diplomatique* in 1994, that the state had an obligation to move from formal equality to real rights.

In an attempt to reignite the parity debate in France during the 1990s, advocates reframed what parity meant in relation to the republic. Lépinard (2007, pg. 375) identifies the publication of Gaspard, Servan-Schreiber, and Le Gall's pro-parity text '*Au pouvoir citoyennes! Liberté, égalité, parité'* as signalling the start of the vivid parity debates which resulted in the adoption of parity in 2000. *Au pouvoir citoyennes!* defined a new, feminist, agenda pressuring the state for equality of "political participation and access to political power and institutions" something which had not previously been endorsed by the second-wave feminists (Lépinard, 2007, pg. 376). Additionally, the play on French Republican ideals of *Liberté, egalité, fraternité* showed to both endorse, and subvert, the ideals of the republican doctrine in light of equal representation; allowing for parity to be seen as enhancing the Republic's legitimacy (Lépinard, 2007, pg. 376). Thus, parity was framed within the Republican doctrines of universalism, advocates of French parity identified the differences between the sexes as being different from those between other minorities and ethnicities; as sex difference is a fact throughout human history and a biological necessity in order to reproduce, which therefore frames it as a universal fact (Lépinard, 2007, pg. 391). Furthermore, Rodriguez and Rubio-Marin (2008, pg. 303), state that differences in the social experiences, and biology, of the genders assumes gender based interests. These might not affect all women equally but they affect women more than they do men and therefore women can be seen as having a collective group identity – which also adheres to the framework of universalism (Ruiz and Rubio-Marin, 2008, pg. 303). Despite this, similar debates surrounding the impact on universalism were still as prevalent as they were in 1982. For instance, views such as Universalist Jacques Julliard (cited in Sineau, 2000, pg. 39), who believed that parity would not only put women into the position of "perpetual assistance" which would mark "real inferiority", but also allow for further categorisation which would undermine republican universalism. In spite of Julliard's speculation, there was little debate in the 1990s surrounding the need for representing race or ethnicity, the French Feminist

movement was dramatically socially homogenous with only white, middle class, women being represented (Lépinard, 2007, pg. 385). In fact, the first criticisms of the French feminist bias towards white, colonial, women, have come as late as 2001 from the radical lesbian group *Groupe du 6 Novembre* (ibid, pg. 385). Although this may cause disagreements about the legitimacy of feminist groups, the predominantly white, middle class, nature of the campaign in combination with the aforementioned framing of parity within the republican framework, meant that minority groups could not claim representation through parity as Julliard worried (Lépinard, 2007, pg. 392).

In addition to these domestic pressures, the European Union also intensified its campaign for gender parity, focusing primarily on achieving gender parity at member state level (MacRae, 2012, pg. 308). In France this pressure took several different forms. Although it is important to realise that whilst the European Union was encouraging parity rhetoric on its member states, it was not pushing for EU institutions to adopt the same level of gender parity. In fact, in 1996 the European Council made a statement recommending that women, and girls, be encouraged to participate in education and training activities so that they can participate as fully as men in society (MacRae, 2012, pg. 309). Unmistakeably, this assumes that women should aspire to be more like men in order to participate in state activities, which therefore fails to realise that "duality of humanity requires an acceptance of difference without any attempt to make one more like the other" (ibid, pg. 309). Despite this contradictory interpretation of gender balance the campaign led by the European Women's Lobby (EWL) in 1994 stimulated debates across the EU regarding the representation of women at international, national and sub-national levels (MacRae, 2012, pg. 302). The international pressures, and soft laws, of the EU aligned French feminists with the parity movement as early as 1990 (Lépinard, 2007, pg. 387). French feminists such as Gaspard and Vienott, who were parity experts at the European Union level, were instrumental in driving initial demands for gender quotas among feminist groups in France (Lépinard, 2007, pg. 387). This resulted in the creation of NGOs (such as *Demain la parité, Choiser - La cause des femme* and *Elles Aussi*) which provided the initial framework for the *women for parity* campaign (ibid, 2007, pg. 387). Although these are domestic pressure groups, they raised funds from the European Union in order to lobby the National Assembly (ibid, 2007, pg. 387). Further attempts of the EU, such as Action Programmes (AP), conducted to analyse gender equality, encouraged the participation of women in decision making processes (MacRae, 2012, pg. 308). In spite of EU pressures the influence on parity adoption in France can be described as negligible. This can be deduced from the failure of the French state to put forward a female candidate for consideration by the College of Commissioners to a new commission created in 1999 (MacRae, 2012, pg. 310). This signalled a lack of political will, on behalf of the state, to enact real change to women's representation in spite of the government's commitment to national parity goals.

In the late 1990s it was the parties of the left which aided putting parity onto the political agenda. Following his presidential election defeat in 1995, Lionel Jospin and the Socialist party made significant pledges to support the implementation of parity. For example in 1996, at the National Convention on Democracy, the Socialist party adopted the text "Players in Democracy" in order to show their solidarity for change (Sineau, 2000, pg. 47). Furthermore, Jospin made "renovation and feminisation of the political arena" the central theme of his election campaign in 1997, advocating that he strongly believed in the implementation of parity for men and women (Sineau, 2000, pg.47). To show implicit support, the socialist party adopted a 30% parity quota within their party, of which 17% got elected in the 1997 legislative election (ibid, pg.47). In solidarity with the socialist party other parties of the left, as well as the Greens, also supported a constitutional amendment introducing parity (Haase-Dubose, 2000, pg. 3857). The 1997 election resulted in 63 women (42 of which were from the socialist party) being part of the socialist led, left-wing coalition, in the National Assembly (Haase-Dubose, 2000, pg. 3857). Whilst this translated as only 10.9% of the National Assembly being women, it showed strong alliances between the parties of the left on parity; and gave the right-wing parties little place to hide (Haase-Dubose, 2000, pg. 3857). Historically right-wing parties in France tended to do little to address political rights of women. For example the Ministry for Women's Rights, which was created following Mitterand's election win in 1981, was not maintained under Chirac's government between 1986-88 (Murray, 2008, pg. 476). In wake of this right-wing tendency, Alain Juppé, Jacques Chirac's Prime Minister until 1997, failed to re-instate the role of Women's Minister despite having 12 women in his cabinet (Murray, 2008, pg. 476). Furthermore, at the first re-shuffle of his cabinet, Juppé removed 8 of the 12 women (nicknamed *Juppettes* in a patronising spin on the French term 'short skirts') in the cabinet; this scandal had a lingering effect on the integrity of the RPR (Murray, 2012, pg. 350). This occurred in spite of Juppé's formal declaration of being in favour of parity (Sineau, 2000, pg. 47). Nonetheless, although not committing to a constitutional reform, Chirac did come through on his promise to set up an *Observatoire de la Parité*, though this was given little resources to function in the hope that it would stand as merely symbolic (Murray, 2008, pg. 472). Following the Socialist, left-wing, win in the legislative elections, Jacques Chirac's casual commitment to parity became binding as his Prime Minister Jospin reaffirmed his commitment to parity in June 1997 (Haase-Dubose, 2000, pg. 3857). Chirac was forced to make a statement advocating parity – "If nothing can be done without resorting to a constitutional encouragement, I must say that I will get used to the idea" (Haase-Dubose, 2000, pg. 3857). As Murray (2012, pg. 351) concludes, a casual commitment to parity ended up becoming a political reality due to a unique series of events resulting in the cohabitation between left and right.

Although the constitutional amendment in 1997, and the following parity laws of 2000, was a breakthrough for French feminists, it is still a prevalent debate within French political discourse. One of the key debates, between Universalists and advocates of parity, is the phrasing of the law. Surprisingly the phrase 'parity' is not used within the 1997 Constitutional

Amendment due to disagreements' surrounding the compatibility of the wording and universalism (Murray, 2012, pg. 353). If the clause was seen to favour women over men, it would not be deemed compatible with universalism, and would therefore nullify the Universalist state commitments. As Opello (2006 cited in Murray 2012 pg. 353) explains, the final wording – "The law favours equal access of men and women to political office" - was significantly watered down to try and enhance the gender-neutral stance; with 'equal access' replacing 'parity' and 'favours' replacing guarantee. This step suggests that universalism is not threatened by the introduction of the parity laws. The inherent neutralism of a 50% divide in gender in fact makes the state and its institutions more representative and democratic (see Scott, 2005; Ruiz and Rubio-Marin, 2008). This is primarily because legitimacy can hardly be assumed when half of humanity have been failed to be given the chance to represent, or to be represented (Suk, 2012, pg.455). This assumption is based upon the concept of *gender essentialism* that men cannot represent women, and therefore a truly democratic state is one which ensures a parity based democracy (Scott 2005 cited in Suk 2012, pg. 455). Enhanced legitimacy, in combination with aligning parity to the standards of universalism, provides an enticing motive for policy-makers. Although the legitimacy of this *'gendered parity democracy'* can be questioned when it comes to the application of the law. Loop-holes throughout the law allow parties to by-pass the equal parity representation laws. Despite a long campaign for parity, the incentives of the policy-makers who phrased the laws could be misleading. The introduction of the so-called parity laws are good – especially considering their popularity – but their implementation may make them less effective than advocates might like.

Despite the controversial implementation methods of parity, the introduction of the parity laws showed a shift in interpretation of the relationship between universalism and equality. Whilst previous emphasis had been on equality of opportunity, it had now modified towards equality of outcome. Resulting in a guarantee of political representation opposed to mere facilitation (ibid, pg. 345). Equality of outcome is undoubtedly more important to equal representation in France than that of opportunity. This is particularly because of the strong rate of incumbency within French politics and the subsequent disproportionality within the political institutions' at all levels. This change, from opportunity to outcome, is in line with the research of Dahlerup and Freidenvall surrounding the incremental and fast-track approaches to change.

The Incremental track is (often) described by Dahlerup and Freidenvall (2006) as the gradual 'Scandinavian' route to equal representation in politics. This gradual increase is meant to be due to greater access to political resources as society develops (Dahlerup and Freidenvall, 2006, pg. 30). Furthermore, it rejects the notion of positively discriminating groups over others, instead focusing on the (pre-parity) French emphasis on equality of opportunity (ibid, pg. 30). In contrast, the Fast Track approach calls for immediate action regarding representation. The introduction of parity gender quotas are a powerful tool in speeding up the process of equal representation; especially considering their direct impact on parties, who are seen as the key

vessel for change within institutions (ibid, pg. 30). Additionally, Murray (2012, pg. 354) likens the Fast Track approach to that of a top-down approach, which could account for the lack of change following their introduction. A commitment to both top-down and bottom-up approaches would achieve parity quicker.

One of the key questions regarding why the parity laws were implemented, rests on whether the incremental track was inevitable within the French political system. Murray (2012, pg. 347) states that the rate of representation, in comparison with neighbouring European countries, suggests that the incremental track was not enough to achieve anything other than marginal results. This was reiterated in the 1986 National Assembly elections where only 5.9% of seats were occupied by women (Murray, 2012, pg. 347). Considering Proportional Representation (PR) was used in these elections, which is associated with favouring female candidates, the future of fair representation without parity seemed bleak (ibid, pg. 347).

Within the literature there seems to be some disagreement about the incentives of, dominantly male institutions, introducing gender quotas at a micro-level. On the one hand, Fréchette, Maniquet and Morelli (FMM) (2008) state that due to the phenomenon of 'male advantage' it is in the best interests of male dominated institutions to introduce parity policies. Statistically, FMM argue, men are likely to receive a score 1-2% higher when running against a women opposed to another man (Fréchette, Maniquet and Morelli, 2008, pg. 898). Moreover, when two female candidates run against each other it equals that of two male rivals, and the disadvantage of a man vs. women benefits the male as much as it disadvantage's the female (ibid, pg. 897). This therefore assumes that those within the senate voted for parity because of the dominance of male incumbents in the system; this would therefore lead to fewer woman entering politics than might originally be expected. FMM attribute 'male advantage' to *voter-bias* opposed to *party-bias*; openly rejecting the hypothesis that parties place women in less winnable seats.

By Contrast Murray, Krook and Opello (MKO) (2012) dismiss this so-called 'male advantage' theory, stating that FMM's application is not compatible with French politics. Whilst this is a compelling argument, MKO state that FMM's application of this 'male advantage' has no place within the French system, accepting instead that 'male advantage' is due to the dominance of *party biases* rather than *electorate bias* (Murray, Krook, Opello, 2012, pg. 535). This is because male *voting-bias* would conclude that parties would try and remove all female candidates from the party-lists. If they did not, then they would provide opposition parties with a more favourable chance of winning seats. However, as this has not benefitted parties, they can conclude that male voter-bias is not a relative incentive for parity (Murray, Krook and Opello, 2012, pg. 533). Additionally, MKO argue that overlooking the importance of *alternance* deems FMM's argument invalid. This is because the swinging natures of French districts' are not taken into account in statistics about incumbency. Considering that 2007 was the first election since 1978 to not replace the incumbent government, this is a crucial factor to omit (Murray, Krook

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and Opello, 2012, pg. 532). The omission of *alterance* from FMM's research misrepresents the incumbency statistics whilst also overlooking the importance of swings in both 'safe' and 'marginal' districts respectively (ibid, pg. 352). In conjunction with this, at a macro-level, MKO highlight three different incentives that male dominated institutions might have for pushing parity: these are electoral, ideological and strategic (ibid, pg. 529). With regard to the political climate of 1997 these reasons seem more appropriate. Jacques Chirac's RPR party (which in 2000 merged into the UMP) was struggling with credibility (due to minimal progress by the *Observatoire de la Parité* and the Juppette scandal) and therefore saw the introduction of gender quotas as an electoral and strategic incentive. By contrast Lionel Jospin, of the socialist party, firmly believed in parity as an ideological framework, having introduced quotas within the Socialist party. This interpretation of incentives puts less pressure upon the electorate and adequately shadows recent literature.

In conclusion, the introduction of the parity laws under Jospin's government was a landmark decision for the relationship between French politics and universalism. Although some argue that the incremental track would have been sufficient, both MKO and FMM highlight that, ingrained biases against women deemed the introduction of parity necessary. Careful wording of the constitutional amendment, and the following parity clause, protects French universalism, especially considering the arguments from advocates of parity stating that *sex* and *gender* are the only categories to stem all social cleavages. Without the parity laws the legitimacy of the French republic could be called into question. The reality is that human populations are 'sexed populations', and therefore this universal, gender categorised, population should be considered within French universalist thought. The only way that parity could cause the end of French universalism is through policy creep regarding the representation of minorities; and this has not been given any time within political debate. Either way, parity has allowed France to renegotiate the outdated rules of universalism. This should only be seen as the end of universalism if universalism is a rigid concept and incompatible with the ability to evolve as new problems arise. As with all stagnant concepts, those that cannot evolve die out and pave the way for new ones.

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What Key Factors have led to the Fragmentation of the Party System in India, and with what effect?

(Written for Political Change: India [L2095], 3rd Year, Winter 2015)

Emerick Lovasz

India's political system in the two decades that followed independence in 1947 was marked by the dominance of the Indian National Congress (hereafter 'INC' or 'Congress') and referred to as the 'Congress System'. The INC had taken a leading role in the independence movement against the British, and thereafter consolidated its authority by becoming the predominant party in Indian politics. Its nature as a consociational party that accommodated various social and political groups led to its categorization as an 'umbrella party' and allowed it to obtain a comfortable majority both in the National Parliament and State Assemblies. In addition, until 1964 the Congress was led by Nehru, a charismatic leader whose integrity was highly recognised by the electorate. As of the 1967 general election, however, this role slowly began to fade and gave birth to a new form of party politics. Indeed, in the decades following 1967 the epoch of 'one party dominance' was slowly replaced by growing party fragmentation that gradually redefined India's political system. In order to provide a clear analysis of the major changes that went on in Indian politics along with their consequent impacts on the country, the paper will be divided into two parts. The first will concentrate on key factors that caused the fragmentation of the party system. Although there is an array of elements that came into play during this period, the essay will focus on three of them: The internal demise of the INC under the leadership of Indira Ghandi, the delinking of national and state elections in 1971 causing the rise of regional parties and the politicization of caste and religion. Having established the reasons for the party fragmentation, the second part will assess significant effects of the fragmented party system on the formation of coalition governments and on government policies. It will discuss how the rise of coalitions has impacted the role of regional parties and the making of policy. Before concluding, the paper will also include an outlook on the future of the Indian party system.

Part I: Key Factors causing Party Fragmentation in India

Before examining the specific reasons which led to the decline of Congress in the period following 1967, it is important to take a look at the party's electoral results during this period as they show the trend of declining electoral support of the INC and the search of the majority of the people of India for political alternatives. An analysis of national elections ranging from independence to the late 1990s demonstrates that Congress went through approximately 3

phases. The first was the period preceding 1967 in which the party dominated the political system with 45% of votes in 1952 and similar results were achieved throughout the period to 1967. During that time the INC had always an absolute majority in Parliament. As explained above, this period was marked by strong charismatic leadership and internal cohesion. The second phase was the period from 1967 to 1977, in which Congress's position as dominant party began to waver. This period was marked by the split of Indira Ghandi from the official party in 1969 and the subsequent formation of 'Congress R.'[1] (Which hereafter will be referred to as 'Congress'.) Although obtaining strong support in 1971, Indira's political actions, and in particular the emergency state imposed by her in 1975, had a negative impact on the party's credibility and led to a considerable defeat in 1977 in which the party obtained only 34.5% of the votes and 154 seats in Parliament implying a loss of its absolute majority. This decade can be considered as the first major downfall of the Congress. The last period following 1977 marks the further gradual decline of the party until the end of its dominance in 1989. Apart from the isolated case of 1984 in which Congress obtained high results (48.1%) due to sympathy votes resulting from the assassination of Indira Ghandi, the elections that followed show a shrinking electoral support for the INC of 20-30% that did not enable the party to form a single party government (In 1996, 2004 and 2014 it did not even obtain sufficient electoral support to form a coalition government.) [2]

In his article *Contested Meanings: India's National Identity, Hindu Nationalism, and the Politics of Anxiety,* Ashutosh Varshney provides a clear and short summary of the internal problems faced by the INC that can be considered as the first factor leading to a fragmentation of the party system: "The organizational decay of the Congress party coincides with Indira Ghandi's rise to unquestioned power by the early 1970s. (...) She used her charisma to make the party utterly dependent on her, suspending intraparty democracy and debate, and weakening the organization as a result."[3] This statement captures several important points that merit elaborations. (Although Indira's son, Rajiv Ghandi also had an important role in the Congress decline, the arguments that follow will essentially focus on Indira.)

The first relates to the 'organization' of the party, more specifically in regard to its distribution of power. James Manor discusses this point by emphasizing the over centralization of power within the hands of Indira and her 'inner circle'. In contrast to the open system prevailing during the Nehruvian era in which the decision making process was divided between people of influence at different levels, Indira concentrated this power within her own hands.[4] By circumventing the principle of fair representation and replacing elections with political

[1] Singh, M. P and A. Mishra. (2004). Coalition Politics in India: Problems and Prospects. New Delhi, Manohar. p°45
[2] Hasan, Z. (2002). Parties and Party Politics in India, New Delhi: Oxford University Press. P°478
[3] Varshney, A. (1993) 'Contested meanings: India's national identity, Hindu nationalism, and the politics of anxiety', Daedalus, 122, pp. 227–261. doi: 10.2307/20027190. P°243
[4] Manor, J. (1981) 'Party decay and political crisis in India', The Washington Quarterly, 4(3). doi: 10.1080/01636608109451789. P°28

appointment, the power of decision making became increasingly concentrated at the top, in a pyramid like system. In addition, the gradual replacement of political managers that presented a threat to her rule with close loyalists allowed her to keep a "number of portfolios in her own hands"[5] and constituted an essential part of the concept of Executive dominance.[6] One of the most important consequences of this 'personal rule' was that it disrupted the flow of 'objective' information within the party. A clear example of this was the party's defeat in 1977. Without a transactional flow of information between the state and national level, Indira was led to believe by her party loyalists not daring to provide an objective 'picture' that her support was much stronger than in reality. The obedience and subservience of these party loyalists thus blinded Indira and constituted one of the major reasons for its demise. Another reason for the INC's internal decline is the fact that under the leadership of Mrs Ghandi and thereafter her son Sanjay "Party matters received low priority."[7] In this context, the factionalism that had been one Congress's key strengths since the beginning of the party, was neglected under the new Congress. Thus, the ability of Congress to not only incorporate but also mediate between different social and political perspectives which allowed for a system in which external parties would rather directly negotiate with a faction of Congress rather than build an alliance with another party, was no longer applied. (Argument presented by Morris Jones.)[8] The lack of inter-party communication and organizational structure generated a wide range of disputes between castes, patron-client networks and members of different party positions leading to a weakening of the functioning of the party.[9] Manor discusses an example in which the chief minister of Andhra Pradesh attempted to remedy the resulting growing "pressure of his followers for ministerial posts"[10] and to better take into account different party positions, by enlarging his cabinet. This proved, however, to be unsuccessful because individual interests and strive for personal advantage transcended the good of the party. The last point to be raised related to the organisational decay of the Congress can be considered as a corollary to the previous points. As the party's focus strayed away from maintaining cohesion, it became increasingly difficult to adapt to the growing politicization of issues raised at all levels and by different interest groups. Adam Ziegfield explains that the inability to respond and accommodate the rise of interest groups led to the marginalization of the party across certain

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[5]Manor, J. (1981) 'Party decay and political crisis in India', The Washington Quarterly, 4(3). doi: 10.1080/01636608109451789. P°31

[6] Hart, H. C. (ed.) (1977) Indira Gandhi's India: A political system reappraised. Boulder, CO: Westview Press Inc., U. P°80

[7]Rudolph, L. I. and Rudolph, S. H. H. (1987) In pursuit of Lakshmi: The political economy of the Indian state. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. P°136

[8] Morris Jones, W. H. (1966). "Dominance and Dissent: Their Inter-Relations in the Indian Party System", Government and Opposition, Vol. 1. No. 4. P°456

[9]Manor, J. (1981) 'Party decay and political crisis in India', The Washington Quarterly, 4(3). doi: 10.1080/01636608109451789. P°36

[10] ibid

states.[11] This was particularly the case for groups such as backward castes and peasantry which had previously constituted a vital source of support for the party. The lack of adaptability was exemplified during Indira's quasi 'issue-less' campaign in 1981 in which she rather put emphasis on a 'government that works.'[12]

Mention must be made that although the arguments presented above are supported by a large number of authors such as Vrashney and Manor, there are also scholars such as Kothari that do not "attribute the deterioration of politics to the reign of Indira Ghandi or the Congress party."[13] Kothari claims that there were much wider structural factors that came into play during this period causing party fragmentation. He characterizes this as a natural phase and a product of democracy rather than the consequence of particular events. Without being able to discuss in depth these arguments within the scope of this brief paper, wide structural factors such as an increasing process of establishing a more pluralistic and open democratic society can indeed be considered as having contributed to the development of more parties.

The second important factor that promoted party fragmentation in India was the decoupling of national and state elections by Indira Ghandi in 1971. The separation of these elections gradually allowed regional parties to gain importance both at a national and state level. Although its effects were not immediate and Congress won the 1971 election, it did have long term consequences on the party system. In his article on party system change, Adam Ziegfeld provides a graph that demonstrates the gradual increase of regional party votes over time. Although the intent of this graph is to show the tremendous increase in votes for these parties after 1989, it also brings attention to the fact that this process started in 1971, the year in which regional parties already obtained a much higher share of vote than before.[14] One of the main explanations for this relates to the fact that the split freed state from national elections and allowed smaller regional parties to raise local issues and gain prominence.[15] Delinking meant "smaller agendas and less crowded bargaining tables" which gave smaller parties more chances to appeal to the electorate and ultimately negatively impact Congress's dominance. In some states such as Tamil Nadu this translated in a negotiation between the dominant regional party and Congress in which the latter would renounce the legislative assembly in exchange for a portion of the former's parliamentary seats. [16]Although these strategies were not 'common', they are good examples that demonstrate the necessity for Congress to make concessions. Another

[11] Ziegfeld, A. (2012) 'Coalition government and party system change: Explaining the rise of regional political parties in India', Comparative Politics, 45(1). doi: 10.5129/001041512802822905. P°75

[12] Manor, J. (1981) 'Party decay and political crisis in India', The Washington Quarterly, 4(3). doi: 10.1080/01636608109451789. P°36

[13] Bose, A. (2009). "Hindutva and the Politicization of Religious Identity in India." Journal of Peace, Conflict and Development, Issue 13, February 2009. P°5

[14] Ziegfeld, A. (2012) 'Coalition government and party system change: Explaining the rise of regional political parties in India', Comparative Politics, 45(1). doi: 10.5129/001041512802822905. P°73

[15] Diwakar, Rekha. (2015). Evolution of the Indian Party System II since 1990s (Power Point slide). Retrieved from: https://studydirect.sussex.ac.uk/course/view.php?id=24219&topic=5

[16] R, B., Paul (1992) The politics of India since independence. New Delhi: Foundation Books. P°126

explanation that ties in with this point is that by decoupling elections, parties were able to form pre and post electoral alliances and coalitions at national level without putting their state interests in danger. In other words, parties were able to make more concession at a national level in order to form alliances against Congress because they could continue to uphold their political positions at state level and thus ensure their underlying support base in state elections. This was epitomized both during the 1977 election with the rise of the Janata party and in 1989 with the appearance of the National Front.

The last factor to be discussed is the politicization of religion and caste. There are various theories that explain the politicization of religion. Instead of looking at them as competing, this paper will consider them as complimentary. As explained by Kothari and Varshney, religion originally became a salient issue to the end of the Congress system and the Nehru era.

The important structural political transformations that took place in India in the process of the Congress' decline led to a change in attitude and engagement towards politics. A certain disillusion with the politics that had become a numbers game based on gaining power through coalitions rather than ideology created a vacuum which opened up the Indian political system and became the stepping stone for the rise of power of a party such as the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)[17] reflecting Hindu nationalist positions. As noted by Shaila Seshia "Through their program of Hindu nationalism, the party aspired to (...) build a broadly defined Hindu vote bank by filling a perceived leadership vacuum among the Hindu population."[18] Anuja Bose adds to Vrashney and Kothari's accounts by explaining that the reason for which the BJP was able to harness the support of Hindus was due to India's longstanding secularism. She explains that the state's ability to appease minorities and occasionally 'give in' to their personal laws (such as in the Shah Bano case) was received with discontent from the Hindu majority which perceived it as discrimination. The feeling of disenfranchisement that resulted was used by the BJP which insisted that by giving in to the demands of certain groups, the government was threatening the integrity of secularism and common citizenship. This criticism was also directed towards the Congress party which the BJP considered as purposely "debasing the ideology"[19] of state centrism in order to win votes.[20] The party used the 'insecurity' and instability in politics to define religion as a political factor and use it as a tool to establish itself as a viable contender in politics. This strategy was, however, mainly employed as of the second half of the 1980s, as prior to this, the party had adopted a more moderate stance on secularism in order to expand its support base.

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[17]Bose, A. (2009). "Hindutva and the Politicization of Religious Identity in India." Journal of Peace, Conflict and Development, Issue 13, February 2009. P°3

[18] Seshia, S. (1998) 'Divide and rule in Indian party politics: The rise of the Bharatiya Janata party', Asian Survey, 38(11). doi: 10.1525/as.1998.38.11.01p0406o. P°1039

[19]ibid

[20] ibid

Although caste has always been an important issue in Indian society, its politicization only emerged as of the 1980s with the establishment of the Mandal Commission by the government. The goal of this policy was to extend the notion of positive discrimination for lower castes (comprising Other Backward Castes, Scheduled Castes and Tribes) by increasing their quotas of government jobs and public universities from 27% to 49.5%.[21] This change had a fundamental impact on both lower and upper castes. Indeed, by expanding the rights of lower castes, the upper castes that had previously enjoyed the security and status of their position in society felt threatened. This was particularly true for the upper caste of Hindus that turned towards the BJP's communalist discourse in search of representation. But the effects of politicization were also seen in the emergence of parties such as the BSP that advocated for lower caste rights. The BSP's goal was to reverse the longstanding tradition in India that benefited the minority upper castes and raise awareness as to the size and power of lower castes. By using strong ideological messages such as "the highest number has to be represented" the party emphasized the power of the masses and the necessity to overthrow the minority rule.[22]

Part II: Effects of Party Fragmentation

Having discussed the major causes that led to party fragmentation, the following section of the essay will look at the implication that the appearance of coalition government had on Indian politics. Coalition governments became the 'norm' as of the end of Congress dominance in 1989. This section will argue that they had 2 major impacts on Indian politics: The first concerns the role of regional parties and the second concerns decision making and the implementation of policies. Although fragmentation had many other consequences that will not be covered due to the quantitative limitation of this paper, the reason for which these two points will be discussed is because they are still extremely relevant to Indian politics today. Before concluding, the essay will provide a brief outlook on the future of Indian politics and the possible shift towards a 'BJP system.'

There are a number of ways in which the rise of coalition governments have impacted regional parties. (Hereafter the term 'smaller parties' will be used as a synonym to that of regional parties.) Adam Ziegfield approaches some of these effects in his article on coalition governments. Instead of focusing on his argument that the rise of regional parties was a consequence of coalition governments and not the other way around, this paper will use his arguments to explain how the change in the political system of decoupling national from state elections impacted smaller parties.

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[21]Maheshwari, S. (1991) The Mandal commission and Mandalisation: A critique. New Delhi: Concept Publishing Co. P°134

[22] Jaffrelot, C. (2011) Religion, caste, and politics in India (Columbia/Hurst). New York: Columbia University Press. P°537

The first and most basic consequence of coalition parties was the increase in importance of regional parties. Indeed the vote shares for these parties at a regional level, skyrocketed from about 20% in 1989 to just under 50% in 2000[23] with the result that as of 1989 only coalition governments were possible. In a system where a single party majority government is the norm, there is little to no incentive for smaller parties to engage in trade-offs, firstly because big parties do not need their support and secondly because smaller parties know that they would not benefit from this. However, in a system in which coalitions are required in order to obtain majorities to form a government, the relationship between regional parties and their larger adversaries is much different. Due to their position as necessary coalition partners for bigger parties, smaller parties can obtain more concessions from the bigger parties that are required to engage in trade-offs in order to ensure their access to power.

Furthermore, in many cases these trade-offs are more advantageous to smaller parties than they are to larger ones.[24] For example, as regards cabinet representation, Diwakar demonstrated that in 2009 smaller parties such as the NCP, TC and DMK managed to negotiate more portfolios in proportion to their share of seats than the main party. [25] Ziegfield showed that a clear transition between the period from 1952-1989 in which only 3 parties held ministerial berths to that of 1989-2010 in which this number increased to 33.[26]

Furthermore, during one-party dominance, the only states that received financial aid from the central government were those controlled by the party in power, whilst in coalitions these economic benefits were expanded to more states due to the multiplicity of parties in power.[27] Although this support was not always proportional and advantaged some states more than others, it allowed them to cater for the needs of their particular regions. This matter has become increasingly salient over the last decades in which 'pork barrel politics' have become vital for parties to stay in power.

The second factor that needs to be taken into consideration in the discussion on the impacts of party fragmentation and coalition governments is how this political constellation has impacted decision making and implementation. Due to the highly debated nature of this subject, there are an array of opinions on whether coalitions have positively or negatively impacted the making of policy. One of the traditional perspectives discussed by authors such as Sridharan puts forward the idea that due to their inclusive nature, coalitions promote inter-party

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[23] Ziegfeld, A. (2012) 'Coalition government and party system change: Explaining the rise of regional political parties in India', Comparative Politics, 45(1). doi: 10.5129/001041512802822905. P°73

[24]Jacob, K. S. (2011) On political space and coalitions. Available at: http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/on-political-space-and-coalitions/article1568492.ece (Accessed: 1st December 2015).

[25] Diwakar, Rekha. (2015). Evolution of the Indian Party System II since 1990s (Power Point slide). Retrieved from: https://studydirect.sussex.ac.uk/course/view.php?id=24219&topic=5

[26] Ziegfeld, A. (2012) 'Coalition government and party system change: Explaining the rise of regional political parties in India', Comparative Politics, 45(1). doi: 10.5129/001041512802822905. P°77

[27] Ziegfeld, A. (2012) 'Coalition government and party system change: Explaining the rise of regional political parties in India', Comparative Politics, 45(1). doi: 10.5129/001041512802822905. P°77

negotiation and compromises that prevent taking extreme decision. The example he uses is that of the BJP after the 1998 general election in which the party retreated considerably on its hardline 'Hindutva' discourse in order to allow "most of its pre- and post- election coalition partners to be able to join it in government."[28] Furthermore, he argues that due to India's diversity, the coalitions that are formed comprise a wide range of geographic and social groups that need to be satisfied, forcing parties to operate in a more consensual manner. In other words, in order to please their constituents, take decisions and implement them, and stay in power, parties need to cooperate. Sridharan wrote this article providing a more positive outlook on coalitions in 2000 and was therefore, not in the position to take into account the most recent developments .The reality in India, at least over the last decade and a half, provides more negative impacts of party politics with coalitions i.e. the notion of 'policy paralysis' has become an increasingly salient issue. The whole debate surrounding this phenomenon stems from the fact that coalition governments have been unable to cooperate to make decisions and therefore fail to implement policies. Author Prem Shankar Jha recounts an example in 2000 when the NDA (National Democratic Alliance) cabinet "shot down" two important recommendations from the Finance Minister that sought to promote economic development.[29] This is just one of the countless examples in which disagreements in government have hindered the introduction of new policies and their execution. This reality has taken particular significance over the last 15 years in which the difficulty of overcoming specific party and sometimes even individual interests has severely impacted India's economic growth rate. Prime Minister Modi himself raised the issue by stating: 'Indian economy is suffering from policy paralysis and lack of optimism.'

However, although coalition governments have been widely considered as the most important causal factor in explaining policy paralysis, there are other explanations as well. For instant private businesses in India are influencing party politics through different channels working within parties and as external pressures. In this context business has for example very high interest to hinder policies that would 'invite' external capital. Whilst big industries benefit from their often monopolistic position in the market, smaller businesses have used the "infant industry" argument in order to avoid opening to trade and investments from other countries.[30]

As a corollary to the points discussed throughout the paper, the final question that needs to be dealt with is: what is in store for the future of Indian party politics in light of the latest national elections? The Indian political system started as a one party dominant system as of 1947 under the INC and gradually merged towards coalition governments as of 1989 as no party was in the position to obtain the absolute majority in parliament anymore. However, the most recent

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[28]Singh, M. P and A. Mishra. (2004). Coalition Politics in India: Problems and Prospects. New Delhi, Manohar. p°65
[29]Ibid P°228
[30]Palit, A. (2012) 'Economic reforms in India: Perpetuating policy paralyses, SSRN Electronic Journal. doi: 10.2139/ssrn.2031234. P°9

election in 2014 has given rise to the possibility of a whole new system. Indeed, by winning within the framework of the National Democratic Alliance coalition, a total of 282 out of 543 seats in parliament and the first outright majority since 1984, the BJP's electoral success has been characterised by some academics as the rise of a 'BJP system'.[31] After obtaining only 2 seats in 1984 to over 160 in 1996 and finally 282 in 2014, the BJP has witnessed a remarkable ascendancy that has started a debate on whether it will become the new political dominant and system defining party. Although predictions have to be treated prudently, as for example in 2014, the party only obtained 31.3% of the electoral votes but still obtained parliamentary majority due to the 'first past the post' electoral system. It is not expected that the BJP's electoral prominence in 2014 was a one-off success although at this stage it is impossible to provide a definitive answer to whether India will become a BJP system. The performance of the BJP led government and future election results will have to show whether the BJP will be in the position to confirm its ability to continue to obtain a parliamentary majority and enlarge its electoral basis and thereby becoming a longer lasting new political dominant and system defining party within the context of an overall fragmented political party system.

Conclusion

The paper explored the reasons for party fragmentation in India as of 1967 and their subsequent effects on politics in India. The first part provided 3 key factors that explain why India's political system became fragmented. The first, discussed the role of Indira Ghandi in the decline of the Congress Party. The centralization of power at the top and the lack of communication within the party made it very difficult for the INC to manage internal disputes and adapt to its electorate. The weakening of the dominance of Congress was then further promoted by the decoupling of elections in 1971. Dividing state and national elections allowed regional parties to expand their electorate by raising local issues of direct concern to the electorate and thus gaining prominence. Finally, the trend that politics had become more a numbers game on gaining power through coalitions rather than addressing issues of substance created a vacuum in politics which allowed parties such as the BJP and the BSP to establish themselves as viable contenders by taking strong positions on religion and caste. It was also mentioned that these factors can be seen in the context of the 'natural' developments of a country becoming increasingly democratic and pluralistic.

After having established these causal factors, the essay then showed that party fragmentation led to coalition governments that functioned partly well by taking into consideration a broad spectrum of interests and issues raised by the different coalition parties at national and regional level. In this context in particular regional parties often obtained more representation and

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[31] Priya Chacko & Peter Mayer (2014) The Modi lahar (wave) in the 2014 Indian national election: A critical realignment? Australian Journal of Political Science, 49:3. P°518

concessions. However, the last 15 years have witnessed a certain "policy paralysis" due to coalition governments' inability to cooperate and implement decisions that has now been an important factor of one party taking most of the seats in Parliament. Whether this will lead to a one party dominant system again remains to be seen as it is not clear whether the BJP will be in the position to widen its electorate to the same extend as the INC did before and after independence and whether its political performance will provide for real social-economic progress and address the needs and ambitions of a broad spectrum of the Indian society.

In addition, if the outlined 'progressive' implications of the party fragmentation caused by the national and state elections will be strengthened, and a further democratization with all of its facets will take place, the reintroduction of a lasting system with one dominant party representing a wide scope of specific positions and interests of a socially, culturally and economically diversified country such as India with a population exceeding 1 billion may not take place.

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In the World of New Public Management, how can the Public best hold Public Service Providers to Account?

Lillian Lovatt

Over the last thirty years, the provision of public services in the United Kingdom has changed substantially, as service providers – local and central government – have adopted a style of provision known as New Public Management. New public management is marked by adopting practices from the private sector to create a more efficient public sector, including management for performance, measured performance outcomes, and competition in public services. This arose out of public sector shake-ups that have been occurring since the 1980s intended to create "a government that works better and costs less" (cited in Hood and Dixon, 2015, p.255). NPM challenges the traditional notion of the welfare state and that of the citizen: they become a market-based delivery system, and the citizen is seen as a customer (Christensen and Lægreid, 2002, p.269). This essay aims to assess from a theoretical perspective how well the public can hold public service providers to account in the presence of widespread new public management practices, such as targets, the creation of executive agencies, privatisation, and outsourcing.

Responsibility is a key part of accountability: if services are no longer implemented by public service providers, then it is easy to for them to absolve some or all responsibility for services, and subsequently accountability.

The ability of the public to make this decision with enough information is an element of 'best' holding public service providers to account. To do this, at least accurately, requires a considerable amount of transparency. One of the benefits of new public management is the ability to gather data and resources about the actions of local councils and the implementation of policy, or provision of public services and goods. This transparency is integral to holding public service providers to account, but I argue that narrow perimeters for measurement impair transparency.

Assessing performance target systems, and the decline of governmental responsibility due to outsourcing and privatisation, I argue that New Public Management (NPM henceforth) has impaired the working reality of accountability.

Concepts of Accountability

Sir Robin Butler (cited in Barberis, 1998, p.452) makes the distinction between accountability as 'providing an answer', and of responsibility being 'liability'. In the context of ministerial and civil service responsibility and accountability this is a useful distinction, but when looking at public service providers as a whole, over the last thirty or so years, and from the perspectives of answering to the public, I feel it is necessary to amalgamate the two terms, and look at NPM through the public choice approach. Accountability, for the purposes of this essays assessment at least, means public service providers holding responsibility for their actions, the public having tools to see this process happening, and being able to make a choice over which public service providers they want to elect. Barberis (1998, p.451) outlines how ministerial accountability to the public via parliament plays a large role in governmental accountability, while civil servants are accountable internally only, to maintain impartiality. This understanding of the public holding those who provide services to them accountable in elections (both general and local) is the fundamental way in which I will assess accountability in this essay.

Christensen and Lægreid (2002, p.271) also distinguish between political responsibility and managerial accountability, with the former about those with "delegated authority being answerable for their actions to the people" (ibid.), with the aim of being systematically responsive to popular opinion. In contrast, the concept of managerial accountability is more oriented toward neutral book-keeping and efficiency. NPM focuses on strengthening managerial accountability, which I argue increases the level of accountability of public service providers to the public, but NPM absolves political responsibility through outsourcing and privatisation.

Targets and Performance Indicators

There has been a move towards more "explicit and measurable…standards of performance" in the public sector (Hood, 1995, p.97), which is an integral part of private sector techniques being applied to the public as a means toward efficiency. Pollit (2013, p.354) highlights the 'alternative logics' of performance targets other than the instrumental rationality of achieving the targets: symbolic use of information occurs where performance information is gathered almost solely to appear accountable. According to March, "the possession and exhibition of information symbolizes (and demonstrates) the ability and legitimacy of decision makers" (March, 1994: 226 cited in Pollit, 2013, p.354). This contributes to the 'performance paradox' where there is a gap between appearance and reality.

Concerning managerial accountability, the ability of the public to observe council's targets and achievements is a good way to assist the public's ability to hold councils and governments to account. Brignall and Modell (2000, p.282) highlight that the need for accountability to tax-payers has kept the focus of organisational performance measurement mainly on financial

information, despite calls from academics like Mayston and Pollitt (1985, 1986) to widen measurement to include non-financials. Performance based indicators are a way for this element of NPM practice to be transparent. However, academic calls to widen performance indices to include more than financial impacts are an important criticism of new public management, as other costs or changes in service quality are not quantified or measured (Dunleavy and Hood, 1994 p.12); accounting frameworks measuring only financial impacts of policy implementation create a culture in which only financial impacts are valued, and future efforts become solely cost oriented. This ignores the impact of service implementation on users and others. If services are cheaper but quality and impact has declined, but that is unclear or even ignored in reports and publically available publications then this does not provide a complete picture for which the tax-payer can make informed decisions regarding electoral choices to the detriment of accountability.

An additional barrier to the utilisation of performance targets as a means of transparency is the interpretation of this data by the electorate – evidence would need to be published by an independent body in order to remain impartial, and the public would need the will to seek this information out as an aide to voting preference. There is little evidence that even if this happened it would affect electoral choices. Hood and Dixon (2010, p.281-298) argue that the performance target system in the health and education services did not have an impact (they use the term 'political payoff') on the electoral decisions of the public in the New Labour years.

Outsourcing and Privatisation

A key change over the last few decades has been the increase in outsourcing, and privatisation of public services. This shift towards greater competition both between public sector organisations and between public sector organisations and the private sector is a market characteristic of NPM (Hood, 1995, p.97).

This has made it increasingly difficult to hold public service providers accountable for the services that they provide. Dunleavy and Hood (1994, p.12) highlight the idea of 'management avoidance' of senior public servants externalising responsibility and blame, unless incentives are carefully set up.

The changes that new public management have made in recent years has meant that the purchasers of public services have become a new, influential actor (Brignall and Modell 2000, p282), and shows the need for transparency for accountability to happen in this process.

Fragmenting public service provision through outsourcing and privatisation has the potential to greatly diminish public accountability, as private companies, whether as new market competitors or as outsourced provider are ultimately accountable to shareholders, and do not

have any motive other than to maximise profits. Once a service has been privatised there is no longer any ability to allow the public to hold government accountable.

In newly privatised sectors there are also issues around true competitive: in areas where there are barriers to the market like high start-up costs or natural monopoly it is unlikely there will be more than one or two companies who offer proposals to the government.

There is also an issue regarding contract awarding or selling to companies in newly privatised or outsourced services creates unfair advantages, as the experience and expertise a company would gain through being awarded the first private contracts has the potential to create a monopoly within the sector. These post privatisation issues, especially when privatisation of services was not publically consulted on, can leave the public feeling like the movement of provision into the private sector was not value for money or in their best interest.

Common arguments in New Public Management practices for the privatisation and outsourcing of services are the supposed economic benefits of marketization: it will cost less for the public if private companies either compete in a market for the opportunity to provide the service on behalf of government, or compete in a market to get customers. Hood and Dixon's new (2015) study has shown that the implementation of privatisation and outsourcing hasn't improved running costs of implementing public policy / providing public services: the costs of civil departments rose by about two-fifths over the last thirty years (Hood and Dixon, 2015, p.266). Complaints about maladministration to ombudsmen increased, as did judicial challenges, Hood and Dixon suggest New Public Management has issues of both "consistency and fairness".

This is detrimental to accountability, as the public were promised cheaper and better services, but have received more expensive services that are no longer directly accountable to the public, and whose profits are not reinvested into services.

Conclusions

In conclusion, Considine (2002, p37) argues that as service delivery systems change, we must expect accountability to change alongside it – this change could take the form of 'evolution, adaption', or even 'crisis' before the right methods of holding public service providers accountable become realised. In vertically accountable systems like the UK, Considine (ibid.) suggests ombudsmen and parliamentary committees' roles could be strengthened to achieve greater accountability under New Public Management. I would argue that New Public Management practice in the UK has created a public sector where efficiency and value for money have become an end in themselves, as opposed to a means to achieve an end – that end being better service provision for the public. Public accountability is not a key feature of NPM, and although measuring performance outcomes can be useful in evaluating public service

providers, the limited nature of the performance indicators (normally value for money or cost) means they do not show the whole story in public service provision and are not as useful in creating accountability as they could be. Additionally the widespread privatisation and outsourcing of services removes the onus of responsibility from elected officials to shareholder conscious, profit oriented private companies who choose contracts based on their ability to make money, not to provide vital services due to social responsibility.

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How Has US Language Policy Adapted to the Changing Needs of US Society?

(Written for Politics of Language [Q1200E], 2nd Year, Winter 2014)

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In the ongoing campaigns leading up to the 2016 United States Presidential Election, language policy has been mentioned several times by various candidates in both political parties. Sarah Palin notably said that immigrants should 'Speak American' and Jeb Bush has been praised for addressing audiences in Spanish (Lopez & Gonzalez-Barrera, 2013), however, despite this clear awareness of the importance of language, the United States does not have, and has never had, a national language policy. This paper will discuss the importance of language to the US, as well as how the country has adapted to different language issues in history, discussing firstly the issues created by the founding of the country, then around the merits of bilingualism, and finally analysing some of the unique features of American language policy. This paper will demonstrate how language policy in the US has been a result of strategic interests as defined by the US' place in global politics.

The United States has been historically characterised as the perfect republic, with settlers leaving behind the 'prejudices of the Old World' (Crèvecœur, 1782, p. 54). Indeed immigration is one of the defining characteristics of the nation as a 'melting pot' (Samovar, et al., 2011, p. 27), particularly because of the wide range of cultures and ethnicities, both native and foreign that comprise the population. Considering these diverse range of peoples, it is unusual that the US is one of the least multilingual places in the world, with few people speaking languages other than English outside of immigrant concentrations in large cities (Grimes, 2000).

The language policies of the US are inextricably linked with the history of the US; therefore it is necessary to discuss the different language groups in the United States before discussing how language policy has been used. Following the success of the War of Independence from Britain in 1783 the Continental Congress saw the necessity of promoting the Revolutionary cause to the various groups of Swedes, Germans and Dutch colonists in the Thirteen Colonies, however the Congress rejected English, German, Dutch, French and even Hebrew as the 'official' language of state, arguing that they had no business deciding what people spoke. The language policy of the early American state therefore was not to have a policy, with the government relying mainly on private efforts such as Webster's dictionary to regulate language use (Ferguson, et al., 1981). English in this case was regarded mainly as a practical instrument, rather than as a unifier (Crawford, 1992).

While the Thirteen Colonies were ethnically homogenous, with most immigrants being English, Irish or Scottish, and therefore speaking English, there were other groups present, such as the Pennsylvanian Germans, however even within these groups there was the common Germanic heritage that in modern times has seemingly transformed into an automatic assumption of political loyalty to the United States (Crawford, 1992). The small Germans, Dutch and Scandinavian populations of the Colonies were absorbed within a few generations, meaning no language policy had to be formulated to 'deal' with them, however following the US' interactions with the colonies of other European countries the need to assimilate these populations was made apparent to prevent divided loyalties. In 1780 John Adams proposed a creation of an American Language Academy to regulate the language used in the newly formed US (Crawford, 1992), though ultimately unsuccessful this proposal does give insight into the ideas of the American elite at the time, attempting to use language to maintain and protect their state.

English, or at least American English was seen as the language of America, however English has never been enshrined as an official language. Official languages are generally used to bind countries with diverse populations together; as the United States can be argued to have one of the most diverse populations in the world it is surprising that no language or policy has ever been made official over the whole of the American state. It is also interesting that there has been a relative lack of foreign influence on American culture from immigrant groups, particularly on American English. Haugen (1972, p. 76) argues 'America's profusion of tongues has made her a modern Babel, but a Babel in reverse' noting the level of assimilation that immigrants go through when entering the country. This ability is also impressive given the global importance of the US; with many thousands of immigrants arrive each year because of the high standards of living in the country and other reasons. Despite these pressures, ethnic tensions have historically been far lower than for other countries of comparable size, possibly because the idea of life in the US to many immigrants is of a 'new start' rather than bringing exiting prejudices with them from their native countries. This is reflected in language policy by enforcing the 'English Only' policy, which, though not an official policy, gained great support in the US (Tatalovich, 1995). In this way US language policy has been to assimilate immigrants and subjugated populations, however because of the wide range of peoples to assimilate the US government has mostly left language policy up to the states, possibly reasoning that they would understand their own needs best.

'English Only' emphasises the role of American English in promoting ethnic harmony and national unity, as well as remembering the culture and traditions of the Founding Fathers of the nation (Crawford, 2000). However English Only has also been criticised as marginalising immigrants, though proponents of the policy argues that it is not marginalisation, but empowerment to allow the immigrants to be more productive. Immigrants are frequently described by right-wing politicians as living in a 'language ghetto' (Garrett, 2012) which

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prevents them from conversation with the rest of the nation. In this case the needs of US society, from a strategic point of view are to assimilate immigrants to prevent groups from forming inside the US that might be hostile. While this is certainly an intolerant nativist bias, it can be argued that it was necessary to preserve the territorial integrity of the country after large acquisitions of land following the Mexican-American War and the Louisiana Purchase, the treaties acquiring areas of French and Spanish speakers required that they adopt English as their language, and was a condition of their admittance to the Union. There have also been negative policies, such as campaigns against the use of German during the First World War (Martin, 1988). Statesmen and even Presidents have supported the policy, Theodore Roosevelt (1926, p. 554) writing that he did not want America to become a 'polyglot boarding house', in the minds of American politicians before the US became a world power, the integrity of English in schools, law and homes was linked with the integrity of the country itself. Language policy in this way adapted out of a fear of attack, and the need to defend the country against domestic threats as supposedly posed by immigrant communities. While many argued through the 1800s and half way into the 20th century that the policy was beneficial to immigrants, as well as a policy of kindness, the policy is likely one more of fear than anything else. Indeed this can be demonstrated clearly with the policy of 'Benevolent Assimilation' as practiced by the US on the Philippines from 1898-1946 where English was promoted as the only proper language for public use including in courts as well as the 'Tomasites', a group of five hundred teachers shipped from the US to establish a schooling system and teach in English (Karnow, 1990).

The language policies of the United States have been strategic in nature, as such, after 1945 when the US emerged as demonstrably the most powerful state in the world, with the largest military and economy, as well as the only state with nuclear weapons language policy began to become less defensive in nature and more inclusive. Prior to the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 the policy on immigration to the US had been discriminatory to immigrants from places other than northern and western Europe, mainly because people from Germany, Sweden, Britain and the Netherlands were the original colonists of the country and as such were seen as 'safe', however after the Act was passed this changed. The Cold War having settled down somewhat in the 20 years since 1945, as well as the US' secure place in the world meant that lawmakers and politicians were comfortable in allowing more immigration from Southern Europe, Africa and Asia, though there was certainly suspicion to foreigners, many cities became quite cosmopolitan (Lleras-Muney & Shertzer, 2015). This change in global politics mirrored a change in language policy in the US, particularly in educational policy. Where previously official documents were only printed in languages other than English in select places (French in Louisiana for example) 'English Only' became 'English Plus', with more liberal thinkers arguing the strength of the US was its diversity, and that a proficiency in English, as well as a mastery of a second language could only strengthen the US internationally. In this way, while the language policy has evolved, it remains to exploit the 'strengths' of the US, in order to protect the country. Japanese has been promoted following the economic

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recovery of Japan Post-War, as well as Chinese being taught as a second language following the political and economic reforms in China in the 1970s (Welch, 2011). Indeed it is interesting to note the changes to languages of countries at war with the US, whereas German books were removed from libraries in 1917, after the 9/11 attacks US senators hailed Arabic as 'the next strategic language' (UPI, 2005).

Another aspect of the uniqueness of language policy in the US is its ineffectiveness. While during and following the Revolution English was promoted for explicit and popularly understood reasons as a necessity to ensure the survival of the nascent state, the doctrinal clarity of US language policy has waned over time, not helped by the complete lack of language policy at the Federal level, as well as by confusion between education policy, global political strategy and language policy itself. Subtirelu (2013) notes this lack of clarity, drawing attention to such vague statements as 'English is in our blood' as explanations of language policy even in Congressional discourse. Indeed, while there is widespread bi-partisan support for bilingual education, Gallup (2001) notes that even though 50% of Americans think bilingualism is valuable, only 19% of Americans are able to hold a conversation in another language, and of this 19%, many are immigrants who will speak another language anyway. This seeming apathy relating to language policy implies an implicit, rather than explicit understanding of the important of language to a nation. This can be demonstrated with the example of Native American languages and the polices taken toward them, most prominently with the example of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, a department designed to 'manage' the remnants of the First Nations, with J. D. C. Atkins in 1887 demanding that 'Barbarous dialects should be blotted out!' (Crawford, 1992, p. 223). While this is certainly an imperialist and racist policy, it is surprising that in the 300 or so years of US history the country has been unable to integrate the Native American population effectively, like so many other groups have been integrated. In quite an opposite policy, in the present, language policies, though supported fully by most levels of government are unable to prevent the decline of almost all Native American tongues, with language shift, as well as economic and political factors meaning there is little incentive for Native Americans to learn the languages historically used by their people.

In conclusion, language policy in the US has served the strategic interests of the US, at first explicitly in protecting the nation and absorbing other groups, but later in an implicit sense, with many politicians simply arguing for bilingualism without actually understanding why, or indeed having any intention of implementing the policy. The 'English Only' movement served the suspicion and isolationism of the Inter-war Period and the Cold War, while the 'English Plus' policy, as well as the idea of strategic languages, is merely an attempt to build cultural strength in the US to supplement economic and military power. US language policy has been a defensive policy; defending from the 'invading other' whether this is a domestic threat or a foreign one.

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Why Is Turkey Still Not a Member of the EU?

(Written for Political Change: The European Union as a Global Actor [M1541], 3rd Year, Winter 2015)

Aleksandrs Smirnovs

This essay analyses Turkey's accession negotiations to the European Union (EU) and reasons for the reluctance of Turkey to become a full member of the EU. Despite a wide range of political and economic reforms implemented by the Turkish government, the EU policy vis-à-vis Turkey has been based on delaying its membership, thus preserving a more distant type of relationship based on "special partnership" (Chislett, 2015:4). This piece argues that the reluctance of Turkey to become a full member of the EU is best explained by fear of the existing members of the EU that Turkey might constitute a political and financial burden for the European Union (Ugur, 2002:19).

The essay argues that there are two conditions that allow for such relationship to continue. Firstly, the strong EU conditionality and inconsistency of its accession criteria. Secondly, the "Europeanisation" of Turkey's political disputes with Cyprus and Greece, which made the accession process sensitive to political tensions between these countries. By looking at these conditions, the work seeks to demonstrate that the success of the accession process depends on the political readiness of the existing member-states of the EU to accept a new member and belief that the Union can cope with the enlargement (Grabbe, 2002:264).

The argument will proceed in three parts. The first section of the essay will briefly discuss the development of the political criteria as a condition for application for the EU membership. The essay will then try to demonstrate that Turkey's failure to fully implement the criteria for accession cannot provide a sufficient explanation for its reluctance to join the EU, due to the inconsistency and ambiguity of the criteria itself and the effect that EU conditionality had on Turkey's incentive for democratic reforms (Kubicek, 2011; Grabbe, 2002). The next part of the analysis will look at Turkey's accession bid in 1986 and emphasize the importance of Turkey's political disputes with Greece and Cyprus during the accession negotiations. The essay will use the works of Arikan (2006) and Chislett (2015) to demonstrate how political disputes became an important feature of Turkey-EU relations (European Community before 1993). Reluctance of the EU to resolve Turkey-Cyprus disputes eventually stalled further accession negotiations. The final part of the essay will engage with arguments provided by Bogdani (2011) and Gilbert (2005) to demonstrate that cultural factors cannot fully account for the reluctance of Turkey to join the EU. Culture is a salient political issue, which is certainly present in the accession debate; however, the work suggests that it fails to encompass the scope of political opposition towards Turkey's EU membership. The essay will conclude by emphasizing the importance of

political factors in explaining the reluctance of Turkey to become a full member of the European Union.

Copenhagen Criteria 1993 – Political Conditionality for Accession

This section briefly discusses the emergence of the Copenhagen Criteria 1993 as a major shift in the objectives of the European integration to include more responsible political criteria for accession. This work suggests that it is particularly important to analyse whether the implementation of Copenhagen criteria can be viewed as a crucial factor in Turkey's accession negotiations.

The Copenhagen European Council introduced the Copenhagen criteria for membership in 1993 and put democracy and human rights as important factors in EU's enlargement policy (Arikan, 2006:112). The criteria comprises a series of political and economic conditions, as well as the ability to adopt and implement the acquis communautaire – a body of common rights and obligations that is binding on all EU member-states (European Commission, 2012). Dimitrova (2013:17) notes that, while the adoption of the acquis was part of every previous integration, the focus on democracy and human rights was new. Given that many of the Central and Eastern European (CEE) states expressed the desire to join the EU, the Copenhagen criteria gave incentive to implement democratic reforms in the applicant states. Hence, formulating and interpreting the Copenhagen criteria became the basis for the development of EU's conditionality (Dimitrova, 2013:18). However, as argued by Grabbe (2002:249), the EU conditions for applications remain very general and leave ambiguity about when exactly they have been met. Arikan (2006:111) argues that the EU's response to political issues in Turkey has been more rigid and critical than in the case of CEE states. At the same time, it lacked necessary instruments to help the democratisation process and improvement of human rights system in Turkey. The next section will try to demonstrate the inconsistency of the criteria for Turkey's accession, as well as the effects it had on the incentive for continuing democratic reforms in Turkey.

From 'harmonisation' to 'democratization' - Turkey's Constitutional Reforms and the EU Conditionality

This section of the essay will try to demonstrate that Turkey's reluctance to implement the Copenhagen criteria fails to provide a coherent explanation of why it is still not a member of the EU. The difficulty in analysing the process of Turkey's accession in relation to the Copenhagen criteria lies in the ambiguity and inconsistency of the criteria itself (Grabbe, 2002:249). The EU was able to push for democratic reforms in Turkey, whilst keeping the prospect of accession distant and uncertain. This significantly reduced the incentive for further democratic reforms in Turkey after the negotiations for accession began in 2005. This section will therefore argue that the ambiguity behind the EU criteria for accession in relation to

Turkey can be explained by fear of possible economic and political implications caused by Turkey's accession. At the same time, Turkey's reluctance to implement the Copenhagen criteria is used by the EU member-states to legitimise the distinctive approach to Turkey's accession based on delaying its membership (Ugur, 2002).

The EU's 1999 decision to consider the possibility of Turkey's membership generated a great political desire on Turkey's side to "harmonise" its political system with the Copenhagen criteria (Kubicek, 2011:914). In 2001 the Turkish government passed the National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis and managed to implement an ambitious liberalisation programme. In accordance with this strategy, the Turkish state passed 34 constitutional amendments and 6 reform packages in a period of 2001-2004, which included the abolition death penalty, expansion of freedom of expression, curtailment of the power of the military and a series of other reforms (Kubicek, 2011:915). This also encouraged political and financial cooperation by the EU in the form of pre-accession financial assistance (European Council, 2006). The impressive amount of democratic reforms in Turkey reflects the idea that access to negotiations is a powerful conditionality that was used effectively by the EU (Grabbe, 2002:257). However, after the EU opened membership negotiations in 2005, the incentives for further democratic reforms in Turkey have reduced fundamentally (Hale, 2011:323). This essay argues that it happened due to a number of political factors.

Before 2005, the EU approach was based on using the accession negotiations leverage to push for democratic reforms, while keeping the prospect of accession distant and uncertain. The political and economic costs of Turkey's accession to the EU were immediate and high (Font, 2006:202). The admission of Turkey to the EU would make it the most populated state after Germany, and therefore, alter the member state's power shares in the EU institutions and have implications for the qualified majority voting in the Council (Font, 2006:200). The rebalancing of the votes would decrease individual power shares of member-states. At the same time, the economic benefits of Turkey's accession were uncertain, while the costs were expected to be acute, because of Turkey's rising unemployment and decrease in per capita income (Font, 2006:203). In light of these uncertainties, the recognition of Turkey as a candidate for accession in 1999 on an equal footing as other candidate states did not guarantee its membership in the EU. This point is reflected in EU's Negotiating Framework for Turkey 2005, which indicated that the accession could not be guaranteed beforehand and the process had to take into account the absorption capacity of the Union (European Council, 2005). For Turkey, this caused a loss of trust in the EU and its commitments, particularly in the light of the fact that accession was promised to the CEE states upon the implementation of the criteria (Hale, 2011:327). As noted by William Hale (2011:331), there is a direct causal relationship between the prospects of Turkey's accession and the implementation of the democratic reforms. In order for the EU conditionality to work, the benefits of accession have to be greater than the costs of democratisation (Kubicek, 2011:912). However, it can only succeed if the candidate

country is offered full membership, and this offer is sustained, just like in the case with the CEE states (Hale, 2011:325). Hence, before the accession negotiations began, the EU conditionality constituted a powerful tool for the institutional change (Grabbe, 2002:257). However, given that the costs of democratisation are immediate, while the carrot of accession is uncertain (Kubicek, 2011:912), reluctance by the EU to guarantee Turkey's accession reduced the incentive for further democratic reforms. Consequently, Turkey replaced the official rhetoric of "harmonisation" of its political system in line with the Copenhagen criteria with a broader and less specific goal of "democratisation" (Hale, 2011:331).

The uncertainty and open-endedness of the accession criteria is also evident in Kubicek's (2011) argument. He notes that, according to the EU Progress Reports, the EU conditionality remained very uncertain throughout the negotiation process (Kubicek, 2011:922). For example, the language in the 2005 Progress Report had changed to a more critical tone, demanding more "even" implementation of democratic reforms, while the final goal of reforms remained unclear (European Commission, 2005:41). Arikan (2006:132) provides another example, by arguing that while human rights and stability of political institutions remains a stumbling block for Turkey's accession, this wasn't the case for Slovakia. Despite the fact that Slovakia's human rights policies and its approaches to Hungarian minorities were not compatible with the EU norms, it was included in the 2004 EU enlargement. This raises questions about how strong must democracy and the rule of law be, in order to gain the EU membership (Kubicek, 2011:922). Finally, the effect was compounded by the fact that European leaders in France and Germany now publicly voiced opposition to the principle of Turkey's membership (Hale, 2011:323). The election of Chancellor Merkel in Germany in 2005, who argued in favour of a "privileged partnership" between Turkey and the EU, while being opposed to full accession, has turned into a significant opposing force against Turkey's accession (Tocci, 2010:28). At the same time, the election of President Sarkozy in France in 2007 did not change the decision to hold a national referendum in France on Turkey's accession, which was clearly directed against Turkey (Kubicek, 2011:922). The position of the European leaders reflects the public opinion in Europe on further accession in 2005. According to the Eurobarometer 63 (2005:29), only 32% of population of the EU15 countries were in favour of Turkey's accession, with the public in Germany and France being particularly strongly opposed (60%). Hence, these factors emphasise the political and economic uncertainty of the existing member states of the European Union with regards to Turkey's accession.

As this part of the essay demonstrated, the failure of Turkey to implement the Copenhagen criteria for membership of the EU itself offers little explanation of why Turkey is still not a member of the EU. This essay emphasizes the importance of the inconsistency of the criteria, which allows the EU to keep the prospect of Turkey's accession distant and uncertain. It could be asked, however, if the EU did not consider Turkey's membership as an instant possibility, even after implementation of the criteria, what reason lies behind EU's decision to begin

accession negotiations in 2005? Font (2006:197) argues in favour of institutional arrangements that followed the 1999 EU decision to grant Turkey the status of the candidate. It could also be argued that in the period of 2001-2004 there was greater optimism with regards to Turkey's democratic reforms. However, most importantly, the 2004 saw the accession of Cyprus to the EU and consequent "freezing" of Turkey's accession process. The next part of the essay looks at the Greek-Cypriot factor in Turkey's accession process and argues that the politicization of Turkey's tensions with Greece and Cyprus constitutes a major barrier in the accession negotiations.

The Greek-Cypriot Factor in the Negotiations

The process of Turkey's accession negotiations was largely affected by its relationship with Greece and Cyprus. Due to political tensions, the process of accession is currently in limbo, with only 14 out of 33 chapters of the acquis remaining open and just one provisionally closed (Chislett, 2015:2). This section argues that the "Europeanisation" of Turkey's political disputes with Greece and Cyprus made the accession process sensitive to political tensions (Ugur, 2002:21). At the same time, EU's decision to grant Cyprus full membership in 2004 reduced the chances of successfully resolving the issue with the division of Cyprus, hence, allowing the issue to become a barrier to Turkey's accession. This section will therefore argue that the increasing politicisation of disputes, together with the limited efforts by the EU to resolve political tensions between Turkey and Cyprus, reflect the political uncertainty of the existing members of the EU about Turkey's accession. Hence, it demonstrates that Turkey's accession process hinges more upon the political factors, rather than implementation of the criteria for accession.

Since Greece became a full member of the EU in 1981, its political tensions with Turkey became an important feature of Turkey-European Community (EC) relations. Arikan (2006:163) argues that Greece tended to pursue a policy which implied that the improvement of EC-Turkey relations and Turkey's accession must depend on the settlement of disputes between Greece and Turkey. Greece intended to use its membership of the EC to enhance its position in disputes over the invasion of Cyprus by Turkey in 1974, as well as territorial tensions with Turkey over the Aegan Sea. At the same time, Turkey expressed a great political will to join the EC in 1986, partially because of the need to counter-balance the Greek influence, and Turkey's positive response to the critical stance of the EC demonstrated its readiness to undertake a series of necessary policy reforms (Arikan, 2006:135). However, Greece strongly resisted the efforts by Turkey to normalise its relationship with the EC and managed to successfully "Europeanise" its relationship with Turkey. Furthermore, as argued by Arikan (2006:174), it seemed that Turkey's accession would constitute a major political, financial and institutional burden for the EC. This led to the intensification of the political issues in EC-Turkey relations. For example, Arikan (2006:132) notes that shortly after Turkey applied for full membership in 1986, the EC issued a very sensitive resolution, according to

which Turkey had to recognize the Armenian genocide as a part of the framework of EC-Turkey relations. As a result, Turkey's accession process became increasingly difficult and politically sensitive due to its tensions with Greece. At the same time, Greece was able to use its position in the EC effectively to persuade the Community that Turkey's uncompromising position on Cyprus and the Aegan Sea had affected its relationship with the EC.

Despite long-term political tensions with Greece, it was not until late 1990s that Turkey's accession process stalled. As argued by Brewin (2000), 1995 became a turning point for both Cyprus and Turkey's accession, because the European Council dropped the condition that the division of Cyprus must end before accession negotiations could begin. This decision transformed the prospect for Cypriot accession and clearly implied that the EU was ready to let Cyprus join, despite its political tensions with Turkey. Hence, the decision of the 1997 Luxembourg Summit not to include Turkey among the 10 candidate countries, and subsequent accession of Cyprus to the EU in 2004 caused a major rift between Turkey and the EU (Chislett, 2015:3). The accession of Cyprus also reduced the chances of successfully resolving the political tensions between the countries over the division of the island. With Greece and Cyprus both being members of the EU, Turkey was more inclined to take an uncompromising stance on the issue and refuse to implement the 2005 Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement and open its ports and airports to the Greek-Cypriot traffic (Chislett, 2015:7). Consequently, the EU "froze" eight chapters of the acquis in 2006 on the basis of Turkey's non-implementation of the customs union agreement, under the condition that no chapter will be provisionally closed until Turkey had fulfilled its commitment (Tocci, 2010:28). At the same time, Turkey refused to implement the customs agreement until the economic isolation of Turkish-dominated Northern Cyprus ends (*Independent*, 2006). The issue was further complicated by the decision of newly elected French President Sarkozy to block further five chapters in 2007, which reflected France's political opposition to Turkey's accession to the EU.

Turkey's tensions with Greece and Cyprus constituted a major issue in the accession negotiations. Politicisation of disputes with Greece, as well as the accession of Cyprus in 2004 caused deterioration of the EU-Turkey relations, which eventually resulted in the accession process being stalled. The unwillingness of the EU to resolve Turkey's tensions with Cyprus before the 2004 enlargement highlights the political opposition of the existing member-states of the EU to accept Turkey. However, it could be argued that the decision to block Turkey's accession and preserve a more distant type of relationship is based upon the cultural factors and fears of inconsistency of Islam with the liberal values of the EU (Bogdani, 2011). The final part of the essay will engage with the argument that emphasizes culture in the accession negotiations process, and will argue that religious and cultural factors per se do not constitute a primary obstacle to Turkey's accession.

"Culturalising Affairs that are anything but Cultural"

This section examines whether cultural and religious factors can be useful in explaining the EU opposition to Turkish accession. Hurd (2006:402) argues that even if economic and political obstacles to the Turkish accession are lifted, and Turkey will be able to fully implement the Copenhagen criteria for accession, the European opposition to Turkish membership will persist. This is because Turkish accession has become a symbol of domestic European angst about Islamic religion and politics. The essay will examine the validity of this claim by looking at two cultural factors: The assumption that Turkey's Islamic culture is incompatible with the Copenhagen criteria, and fear of the Islamisation of Europe. The work will therefore suggest that although cultural factors are present in the debate about Turkish accession, they do not constitute the main reason for the reluctance of Turkey to join the EU. Cultural factors reflect broader political concerns around Turkey's accession and act as an effective mobilisation tool against Turkey's accession (Gilbert, 2005).

The argument that Turkey's culture is incompatible with Western liberal values and is very resistant to change is rather irrelevant in the light of political will of Turkey to join the EU (Bogdani, 2011:47). Bogdani argues that the reason for Turkey's inability to implement the Copenhagen criteria is because it requires the review of fundamental constitutional tenets, which reflect key Islamic values and social norms and are rooted in the Turkish society. However, after the 1999 Helsinki European Council, the Turkish government passed an impressive amount of constitutional reforms, which addressed issues identified in the EU Progress Reports (Kubicek, 2011:917). The long-term Europeanization agenda demonstrates Turkey's strong desire for the EU membership and readiness to "harmonise" its political system with the EU. Furthermore, as noted by Chislett (2015:4), it was Erdogan's Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP) that initiated a plan to "harmonise" Turkey's constitution with the Copenhagen criteria, began accession negotiations in 2004 and implemented a vast series of constitutional reforms through the period of 2004-2010. From the EU perspective, the AKP, which assumed power in 2002, was initially seen as largely pro-EU and supportive of the impact of the EU reforms on the domestic politics of Turkey (Kubicek, 2011:917). Both Turkey and the EU demonstrated belief in the ability of Turkey to implement the Copenhagen criteria. Given the ability of Turkish AKP to enact a substantial amount of democratic reforms, it is unlikely that the rigidity and conservatism of Turkish Islamic political system can provide a sufficient explanation of why Turkey is still not an EU member.

A stronger argument, however, is based on the perceptions of Turkey in the EU and fear of the Islamisation of Europe. Bogdani (2011:163) emphasizes the increasing opposition to Turkey's accession in the opinion polls and rise of right wing parties in Europe as factors responsible for EU opposition to Turkey's accession. However, despite the fact that these issues are certainly present in the debates over Turkey's accession, they only gained strength after the political will for democratisation in Turkey had reduced and optimism about Turkey's ability to implement

the criteria was replaced with increasing scepticism. Font (2006:200) focuses on the period of considering Turkey's candidacy in the 1999 and argues that the main concerns were based on potential economic and political consequences of Turkey's accession, rather than on cultural or religious factors. When the EU agreed to consider Turkey's application for membership, there was still optimism that Turkey could implement the Copenhagen criteria and Islamophobic sentiments were not strong at that time. Culture-based arguments against Turkey's accession only gained strength later. Given the wide scope of economic and political challenges associated with the process of Turkey's accession, this work suggests that cultural factors alone are unable to explain the reluctance of Turkey to become a full member of the EU. However, with the increasing scepticism and political opposition to Turkey's accession, culture-based arguments gain more strength, reflecting broader political and economic concerns around Turkey's membership and intensifying political opposition to its accession. Gilbert (2005:58) argues that "too big, too poor and too Muslim for Europe" narrative represents an effective mobilisation tool against Turkey's accession, and is widely used by the right-wing parties in the EU member-states to politicise the issue of Turkey's accession. Hence, this essay argues that the logic underpinning the cultural and religious arguments against Turkey's accession reflect Jorgensen's (2007:11) idea of "culturalising affairs that are anything but cultural". This work suggests that an analysis of political and economic challenges associated with Turkey's accession to the EU provides a more comprehensive account of the political opposition to the prospect of Turkey's EU membership.

Conclusion

This essay has demonstrated that the reasons for the reluctance of Turkey to join the EU based on fears among the existing member-states that Turkey's accession might constitute a substantial political and economic burden for the EU. The work analysed a series of factors, which indicate that the EU member-states are unwilling to see Turkey among the members of the Union and are in favour of a more distant "special partnership" with Turkey. This argument is reflected in the unwillingness of the EU to guarantee Turkey's accession, despite the implementation of a wide range of democratic reforms; and unwillingness of the EU to take effective measures to resolve political disputes between Turkey and Cyprus before the 2004 enlargement. All these factors resulted in the subsequent "freezing" of Turkey's accession process.

Hence, the work argues that the success of Turkey's accession was much more dependent upon the political readiness of the existing member-states of the EU to accept a new member, as well as belief that the Union would benefit from the enlargement (Grabbe, 2002:264). Turkey's accession process was largely defined by a great deal of economic and political uncertainty and the lack of political will on the side of the EU. These concerns are based on

fears that Turkey would constitute political and financial burden for the EU, hinder the development of the EU towards a single market, and would severely complicate the decision-making process in the EU institutions (Ugur, 2002:19). This analysis argues that the process of accession is not a question of proving that Turkey's Islamic political system is compatible with the European values and Copenhagen criteria. It is a question of political readiness and willingness of the EU to enlarge.

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How Can We Best Explain the Limitations to the EU's Actorness in Foreign Affairs?

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In the post-cold war era the European Union (EU) has made some serious efforts to further its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The EU's is different from any other player in the international system as it challenges assumptions of the nation states' role in foreign policy, requiring a fresh analytical framework to assess its actorness and its limitations. Bretherton and Vogler define "Actorness" as: institutions displaying an "autonomy from its external environment … and its internal constituents" thereby having the ability to formulate purpose and make decisions.[33] The fundamental factors limiting the EU's actorness are the heterogeneity of its composite states, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)'s presence limiting the scope of the CFSP and the current complexity and multifaceted nature of the EU's security problems. I will demonstrate that viewing the EU as a unitary actor in foreign affairs is simplistic and problematic due to these limitations. Although the EU has made some substantial steps towards achieving its foreign policy goals, ultimately "the EU is better thought of as having powers, than as being a power".[34]

The EU consists of 28 nations, all with different foreign policy concerns and capabilities with "a relatively weak sense of shared history and identity" and therefore political will for the CFSP is lacking.[35] Each nation's individual political system implicitly affects foreign policy; whether the government is plural or majoritarian, presidential or prime-ministerial. From Maastricht (1992) to Lisbon (2007) the EU has developed its foreign policy goals and institutional proficiencies. The treaties provide a set of commonly accepted goals to; 'promote international cooperation … develop democracy, rule of law and respect of human rights'.[36] These principles are unbinding, universal and vague; consequently nation states' international interests compromise them. States will still act against each other – for example, Italy was infuriated by Germany's wish to have a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and "pursued a hostile diplomatic campaign against it".[37]

The CFSP's legitimacy is controversial as there is a "negative relationship between institutional reform and public support".[38] Turnout in the European Parliament (EP) elections has

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[33] Bretherton, C and Vogler, J *The European Union As a Global Actor*, (1999, Routledge, London) p.22-23
[34] Hills, C and Smith, M *International Relations and the EU* (2005, Oxford University Press, Oxford) p.406
[35] Smith, K *European Union Foreign Policy in a changing world* (2008, Polity Press, Cambridge) p.12
[36] Foreign & Security Policy http://europa.eu/pol/cfsp/index_en.htm (11/08/2015)
[37] Hills, C and Smith, M *International Relations and the EU* (2005, Oxford University Press, Oxford) p.8
[38] Bretherton, C and Vogler, J *The European Union As a Global Actor*, (1999, Routledge, London) p225

gradually decreased to 43% in 2014.[39] The EP, despite being the most democratic body in the EU, can only discuss foreign affairs that are far from its jurisdiction with no real power to form policy. Thus limiting the EU's legitimacy as an actor in promoting democracy.

Lastly there is no 'European Army' in the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and the deployment of militaries is strongly intergovernmental. Though the EU has developed the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) and established EU Battlegroups from 2007, these organisations operate only on an ad hoc basis. Holding the right to deploy military force "is not only one of the symbols of sovereignty, it is also a crucial part of its substance".[40] As Smith states "foreign policy is the expression of the identity and interests of a particular community", the absence of a European armed forces under a European flag means the EU does not represent such a community and until such a time, it will "never formulate and implement, legitimate foreign policy".[41]

The United States' (US) dominance in international relations and NATO's role in European defence limits the EU's actorness by highlighting the different foreign policies of its member nations. NATO has a significant history of projecting the Wests' hard power and the Nice Treaty (2000) explicitly states that NATO "remains the basis for (Europe's) collective defence".[42] The Yugoslav Wars from 1991 exemplified NATO's power through its bombardment of Serbia and through America's central role in negotiating a settlement at the Dayton talks (1995). While Germany reasserting its own foreign policy by accepting Croatian and Slovenian independence, was actually pivotal in starting the wars. The Iraq War (2003) demonstrated the foreign policy divisions within the EU. The 'Atlanticist' camp (UK and others) supported the invasion while Germany and France rejected it. France even threatened a veto in the UNSC and President Chirac criticised Central Eastern European Countries (CEEC's) set to join the EU in 2004, for their support of the invasion; stating that they had missed an opportunity to "shut up".[43] US military spending is currently predicted to be around $600bn, making up 45% of the worlds spending on arms, it has unmatched global military dominance.[44] In comparison, the armies of Europe vary in hugely in their ability. US military dominance combined with the divisions NATO creates across European states certainly limits the EU's actorness in foreign affairs.

There are areas where the EU's actorness has surpassed its foreign policy limitations. The EU is a separate political unit from the US, with potential for substantial actorness in the future. The EU contains just 5% of the world's population but makes up a third of its economic output; in fact the US has invested more in Germany than it has in the whole of South

[39] Ondža, D http://www.euspeak.eu/the-2014-european-elections-turnout-achievement-or-failure/ (05/06/2014)
[40] Bale, T *European Politics: a comparative introduction* (2005, Palgrave MacMillan, Hampshire) p.337
[41] Smith, K *European Union Foreign Policy in a changing world* (2008, Polity Press, Cambridge) p.11
[42] Bale, T *European Politics: a comparative introduction* (2005, Palgrave MacMillan, Hampshire) p.352
[43] CNN http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/europe/02/18/sprj.irq.chirac/ (18/02/2003)
[44] Bale, T *European Politics: a comparative introduction* (2005, Palgrave MacMillan, Hampshire) p. 343

America.[45] The EU does stand up to the US and knows how to win, demonstrated by the many trade disputes over anything from bananas, to trading with Cuba or Boeing's aerospace competition.[46] But the US-EU disagreements are compartmentalised to preserve their strategic alliance.[47] The EU also knows that there is little prospect of forming a common army and that it wouldn't be possible or desirable for the CSDP to compete with NATO. But EU nations acknowledge that defence is more interdependent in Europe; in 2014 France was encouraging Germany to spend more on defence, something that would have been unimaginable a century ago.

Enlargement of the EU has made coordinating a uniform foreign policy more complex but it "adds to the EU's global weight and fuels higher expectations" of the EU.[48] Nation states acknowledge that in a multi-polar international climate, unilateral action can be ineffective. By utilising the EU's politics of scale nations can find more effective ways to push their foreign interests. Though the CFSP differs from the incremental institutional development of the EU. Leaving contentious issues to be handled nationally doesn't necessarily diminish the EU's actorness; as states will notice the benefits of the CFSP when it helps all EU nations.
The EU is criticised for being a technocratic and undemocratic organisation. But the High Representative of Foreign Affairs (HR), created following the Lisbon treaty, demonstrates the EU's shrewdness. The HR, previously held by Catherine Ashton, was instrumental to the negotiations over Iran's nuclear programme in 2013, the Iranian foreign minister towards the end of the talks wanted to deal exclusively with Lady Ashton.[49] The HR personifies the EU's quiet conciliatory diplomacy, achieving success in foreign policy behind the limelight. Similar to the EU's contributions to the UN, leading some to argue that "nothing gets accomplished in the UN unless the European's are on board", thus facilitating international cooperation.[50] The EU has demonstrated actorness on the issue of the environment. The EU has a global role committed to a 20% reduction to its CO_2 emissions by 2020. "European unity is due to the seriousness of the situation", hoping to get foreign powers, especially the US and China, to follow suit.[51] In the changing world of international relations the EU's economic clout is arguably more important than its military capability. The limitations to the EU's actorness can be confused with the flexibility in CFSP which the EU is trying to achieve.

Although the EU has demonstrated actorness in foreign affairs the difficulties it faces in the current geopolitical environment explains its limitations. The monumental cost of the Eurozone Crisis has made acquiring CFSP funds more difficult and has undermined the

[45] Ibid p.363
[46] Hills, C and Smith, M *International Relations and the EU* (2005, Oxford University Press, Oxford) p.392
[47] Ibid p.392
[48] Smith, K *European Union Foreign Policy in a changing world* (2008, Polity Press, Cambridge) p.14
[49] Perkins, A http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/nov/25/lady-ashton-eu-secret-diplomatic-weapon (25/11/2013)
[50] Hills, C and Smith, M *International Relations and the EU* (2005, Oxford University Press, Oxford) p.396
[51] Bale, T *European Politics: a comparative introduction* (2005, Palgrave MacMillan, Hampshire) p. 361-2

indispensable liberal economy of the European project. Nations have resorted to more protectionist measures and governments have built "economic barricades in areas far beyond those that caused the crash",[52] while hard-hit CEEC's "lament the lack of solidarity from their EU partners".[53] European austerity measures have exacerbated the impact of the crisis. Greece provides a great example, at the peak of the crisis there was a 200% increase in HIV cases and over 50% youth unemployment.[54] European politicians blamed the 'profligate' Greeks for the crisis.[55] The European Central Bank (ECB) capped Greek bank's liquidity, making the situation more desperate ahead of the Greek referendum in 2015, where over 60% voters rejected the creditor's austerity plans.[56] This highlights the increasingly undemocratic nature of the EU. The crisis has furthered resentment to the union demonstrated by the 2014 EP elections which were a massive win for Eurosceptics across the continent.

This all coincides with Europe's is biggest refugee crisis. At least 350,000 migrants crossed the EU's borders from January to August this year, compared to just 280,000 for the whole of 2014.[57] The EU-wide Dublin III asylum regulation has effectively been dropped while national governments fail to collaborate policy as the public opinion of the refugee crisis is hugely mixed across Europe. Germany has a more compassionate policy but just tinkering with the quota system is inadequate, this crisis requires an exigent revamp of the Union's approach.
The rise of ISIS has also demonstrated the limitations of the EU's actorness. Again member states disagree on the issue; Germany opposes militarily intervention while the UK Parliament's vote rejecting intervention could be ignored by the government this year.[58] * Though European support may be important in the UN it diminishes the EU's actorness if it simply advocates UN resolutions without having clear EU proposals. Another crisis is the unrest in Ukraine, a nation of geostrategic importance as 90% of European gas imports pass across the Ukrainian pipelines.[59] While NATO has deployed forces in Ukraine's neighbouring states, the EU's response to the conflict is relatively futile. As the EU depends on Russia for gas, finance and defence contracts; while large swathes of Ukraine have descended into chaos. Again the EU's timid actorness undermines its CFSP, "history will judge this the ultimate betrayal of Ukraine".[60]

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[52] Youngs, R *The EU's Role in World Politics: a retreat from liberal internationalism* (2010, Routledge, Oxon) p.132
[53] Ibid p.21
[54] Henley, J http://www.theguardian.com/society/2013/may/15/recessions-hurt-but-austerity-kills (15/05/2013)
[55] Lapavistas, C et al *Crisis in the Eurozone* (2012, Verso, London) p.xix
[56] Jones, O http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jul/06/greece-democracy-europe-eu (06/07/2015)
[57] BBC http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-24583286 (21/09/2015)
[58] BBC http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-34706279 (03/11/15)
 * December 2015 second motion for Syria airstrikes authorised with a majority of 174 in HoC - http://www.theguardian.com/politics/blog/live/2015/dec/02/syria-airstrikes-mps-debate-vote-cameron-action-against-isis-live
[59] Hadfield, A *Energy and Foreign Policy: EU – Russia energy dynamics* in Smiths, S et al *Foreign Policy, Theories Actors Cases* (2012, Oxford University Press, Oxford) p.455
[60] Birrell, I http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/may/02/eu-ukraine-betrayal-russia-hostility-lust-european-future (02/05/2014)

The current foreign events affecting the EU are overwhelmingly complex, tragic and show no sign of resolution. A treaty to increase the CFSP's scope and funding is very unlikely and if it were to come about it would be met with surprise and reluctance. This demonstrates that the EU's foreign policy is at a critical stage and we may well see national governments totally bypassing the EU.

The limitations to the EU's actorness in foreign affairs can therefore be best explained by NATO's role in European defence, the lack of political support for the CFSP and the complex security problems the EU faces. Despite these limitation, the EU has developed a more substantial international voice in the past two decades and it has also demonstrated actorness in its role in the UN, on environmental action and developing a flexible institutional arrangement. Nevertheless the EU is lacking in democratic legitimacy and opposition is growing more virulent and widespread. The way the EU has handled the Eurozone crisis, ISIS, Ukraine and the refugee crisis are all exposing the limited capability of the CFSP and the limitations of the EU's actorness.

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