Materialising Post-9/11 Security

> [T]here is at all times enough past for all the different futures in sight, and more besides, to find their remains in it, and whichever future comes will slip out of the past as easily as the train slides by the switch.
> William James

> Sometimes we're on a collision course, and we just don't know it.
> Eric Roth

Introduction

In the summer of 2006, a longstanding frontline in the Global War on Terror (GWoT) regained international attention. Far from the battlefields of Afghanistan, Guantánamo detainees were getting fat. Detainees, it was reported, were becoming 'normal to mildly overweight or mildly obese', with an average weight gain of 20 pounds and with one detainee doubling his weight from his arrival in 2002 (Melia, 2006). As Navy Commander Robert Durand explained to journalists: 'detainees are advised that they are offered more food than necessary to provide choice and variety, and that consuming all the food they are offered will result in weight gain' (*ibid*). These announcements from Guantánamo, underscored with the publication of detainee weekly menus, briefings on the number of calories offered ('5,200-5,700' of *Halal* food daily, JTF Guantánamo, 2008), reports of rewards of McDonald's hamburgers or hot-fudge sundaes for good behaviour (Rosenberg, 2006), the suggestion that more money is spent feeding detainees than soldiers (Kamen, 2006) and sample meals offered to touring visitors, fit nicely with the message that Guantánamo really wasn't all that bad and that detainees had all they needed. The evidence of overweight bodies, as well as varied menus, became a sign of Guantánamo's, and by extension the US military's, humane and progressive treatment, while conveniently (re)casting detainees as irrational (after all, rational individuals should be able to cope with the abundance created in a liberal system). And this message had legs. As recently as 2011, prominent US Senator James Inhofe responded to criticism of the site with the following: 'Do you know what the biggest problem in Gitmo is right now? It's obesity' (in Kessler, 2011). At odds with reports of intense hunger strikes (some involving over 200 detainees, some lasting for almost four years) and weight *loss*, this image of Guantánamo as humane and the US military as responsible wardens has been an ongoing feature of the site. Pointing the way to a wider set of issues around the GWoT, such as the rights and responsibilities of those involved in war, the control of bodies and the regulation of objects and spaces of (in)security, its 'spectacle' and therefore the supposed changing character of war and appropriate responses to insecurity, Guantánamo's battle's over food is in part a battle over how to render Guantánamo visible as a particular kind of space, to normalize it while at the same time forming the detainee, and the US military, in a particular image.

In that sense, Guantánamo can therefore be understood as a useful lens for studying many of the different arguments for and against the GWoT and for Bush Administration security policies in the years following the attacks of September 11th, 2001. The transformations of policies, laws and norms that followed the subsequent declaration of a 'war on terror' by President Bush are inescapably connected to the ways in which the GWoT came to be understood. Producing the legitimacy for the GWoT and related security measures required the construction of a form of danger or threat and, by implication, the means by which the threat should be addressed. In other words, the vast amount of political and military activity and investment associated with the GWoT required ongoing justification and public support. A war of this scale 'could not be initiated and sustained without widespread public consent or at least acquiescence … without beliefs and forms of knowledge [in this case] about the nature of terrorism and counter-terrorism' (Jackson, 2005:9).

In particular, Guantánamo remained an ongoing highly and selectively visible spectacle used to generate support for these transformations in policies, laws and norms governing security. Unlike the scandal of detainee abuses by US military personnel at Abu Ghraib, which could be disavowed, and the media coverage of the 'front-lines' in Afghanistan and Iraq, which rarely deviated from conventional war coverage (Griffin, 2004), Guantánamo developed, in a deliberate way, into a key way to project an image of the US to domestic and international publics.[1] Despite continually courting controversy since its (re)introduction as a space of incarceration in January 2002, despite its role as a 'battlelab' in the development and application of controversial interrogation techniques, with nine detainees dead in custody, on-going hunger-striking, waves of protest internationally, constant legal challenges in US Supreme Court, an abysmal rate of success in bringing detainees to trial, an annual running cost of $120 million (30 times the civilian equivalent) and an outlay of upwards of $1.3 billion, and as an issue that continues to affect peace negotiations with the Taliban, by many counts Guantánamo should be closed. Nevertheless, Guantánamo remains open over ten years later, with the approval of as many as 70% of Americans (Rosenthal, 2012). For its supporters, Guantánamo is a national security necessity, a logical response to acts of war, retribution for the terrorist attacks of '9/11', and a legitimate, effective, state-of-the-art, even humane, facility. More than that it enabled a significant transformation in many of the laws and norms governing detention

[1] US Naval Base Guantánamo controversially occupies 45 square miles of Cuba as a result of a lease agreement signed with the Cuban Government in 1903, confirmed by treaty in 1934, and never rescinded. As a result the US exercises 'complete jurisdiction and control' over the territory controlled by USNB Guantánamo, which remains the largest and oldest American base outside of the US (Gregory, 2006). Over the years, the base has served a number of functions, including as a refueling point, but also as a detention space for Cuban and Haitian refugees, most notably in the 1990s when up to 45,000 refugees were held at Guantánamo in similar conditions to those experienced by the first GWoT detainees. During that time, refugees were re-classed as 'migrants', 'criminals' and 'bad guys' by the US government, with HIV-positive refugees held illegally in a special isolation camp, Camp Bulkeley (see Farmer, 2005 and Greenberg, 2009 for an overview of the initial set-up of Guantánamo in 2002.

and interrogation in war, including the militarization of counter-terrorism and the open justification of torture. In this 'new' post-9/11 era, Guantánamo delivers security.



JTF Guantánamo Website

Therefore, to understand Guantánamo's longevity and its role in the GWoT in generating support for an evolution in counterterrorism measures, this work makes an argument for turning to the material and its visual components to understand the making of (in)security. The main contention of this work is that this support required a web of material practices that extended beyond the 'exceptional' US military, into the US carceral system and including practices of projecting the US as a modern state. As rendered partially visible within the complex politics of food and 'fat' bodies at Guantánamo, the site can be understood as the collision of three security narratives: security through punishment, security through exceptional militarisation and security through humane treatment, the rule of law and 'clean war', collided. They collided not only in linguistic terms through the speeches of senior US and Bush administration officials, but also in the practices and objects used at Guantánamo. Through an examination of the *material*, a subset of discursive practices associated with the site that produce non-linguistic, or material, texts (Foucault, 1980b), this book documents the emergence and production of these divergent readings. In particular, it examines how the U.S. state – its central White House and Defense officials, as well as

senior Guantánamo military personnel – used material practices connected with Guantánamo, such as security objects and the control of its visual record, to reinforce or even compel certain readings and to reinforce and try to compel particular political positions or common sense associated with the war, such as the nature of threat, and what constitutes legal and humane treatment. Not only were linguistic practices, such as speeches, used to produce an overarching GWoT discourse and therefore to generate its legitimacy, but a *security assemblage*, the interaction and inter-weaving of linguistic and non-linguistic elements was deployed (Deleuze, 1989; Foucault, 1980b; Anderson and MacFarlane, 2011), that helped to materialize and render commonsensical these approaches. I argue that to understand the production of meaning in the GWoT, its divergent readings, even its competing political 'realities', an examination of the material and visual practices, as opposed to a unique focus on the linguistic practices associated with the site, is needed. Guantánamo materialised post 9/11 (in)security in these collisions, resulting in the changes to norms, laws and policies that endure, along with the site, today.

In particular, to make this case, I turn to the theories of Judith Butler and the concepts of *materialization* and *performativity* (Butler 1993, 2000). Guantánamo and its legacies, the transformations in laws and norms affecting security issues that it facilitated, developed 'with things' (Reckwitz, 2001) in a complex process of materialization and associated visualization that extends far beyond the space and time of Guantánamo. As Judith Butler explains, through the interaction of material and linguistic domains an iterative process occurs whereby matter takes on certain associations over others. Stretching across time and space these meanings materialize and sediment into common sense (Gramscian, 1971:112). In addition, working with the concept of *affordances,* I argue that objects produce certain capacities to enter into and shape specific relationships, to form assemblages with other objects and that they do so in a complex interweaving with past practices and with a visuality that results in the privileging of certain understandings of security. These assemblages materialize, and importantly, shape our understandings of security. The way we understand 'realities' like 'security' or 'terrorism' are produced through these interactions of language and matter and to study these iterations, these materialization processes, offers insight into the operations of power. So, whilst Guantánamo came to mean different things to different people, prompting widespread and international protests for example, to enough of the US population is has meant safety and security that it remains open. This meaning was produced, I would argue, through its materialities and visualities, through touring practices, cells, circulating commodities and signs, photographs and videos which assemble and present Guantanamo as part of a security apparatus essential to the GWoT. Therefore, through a focus on how state officials and those that oppose their policies used these Guantánamo objects to compel meanings, this study

offers insight into the 'power of things'. These object, infrastructures and practices become key battlepoints, not just as points around which arguments are mobilized, but as things we think through. It was *through Guantánamo* and its materialities and visualities that these transformations in practices and policies were enabled, with long-term consequences for security at home and abroad, including today's practices of targeted killing and the US 'kill list'.

Security is often not where it might conventionally be assumed to be. Just as we benefit from looking at the margins, silences and bottom rungs (Enloe, 2004), and at the texts and at the images of war, we might benefit by looking for places where security politics materializes. Do matters and material practices reflect or produce security logics? Do they mobilise or demobilise security publics and if so, How? And to what degree? In studying material as part of discourse, this work argues that the infrastructure and connected practices used by states to mobilize, transform, and demobilize security publics (as well as in resistance) and therefore to produce legitimacy, even realities, also takes place through discourses *that include matter*. Guantánamo was part of the development and deployment of a set of knowledges and associated material and visual practices that drew heavily from the US prison system, from the US military, but even from US human rights discourses to justify and normalise decisions associated with the GWoT. Guantánamo and the GWoT 'had to be made to mean something', to paraphrase Jutta Weldes (1999a: 2), and this meaning-making took place in a central way through the collision of matter at Guantánamo, the matter of everyday US prison practices, the matter of exceptional military ones, and the matter of 'modern' and 'progressive' states. Guantánamo is the materialization of colliding discourses that was a key way for making sense of post-9/11 security.

Materialities, Visualities, Securities

In order to understand how Guantánamo came to mean security and how it contributed to the construction of the 'common sense' of the GWoT, I turn to critical security studies and discursive explanations. However, in a field increasingly filled with discursive accounts of security and war and dominated by constructivist accounts (Fierke, 1996; Campbell, 1998; Weber, 1999; Weldes, 1999a; Fierke and Jørgensen, 2001; Milliken, 2001; Debrix, 2003; Hansen, 2006) – including how discourse relates to the GWoT (Collins and Glover, 2002; Jackson, 2005; Bellamy et al, 2008; Staines, 2007; Hodge and Nilep, 2007; Hodge, 2011; Holland, 2012) – much of this work, whilst acknowledging the role of other forms of communication, nevertheless focus on linguistically produced texts, on the policy documents or the transcribed speeches made by officials. '[T]he theoretical development of security studies includes a discursive turn that, however, is often limited to speech and language and ignores the non-verbal ingredients of discourse and the relationship between verbal and non-verbal

elements' (Möller, 2007: 79). A social constructivist turn in international relations has meant that discourse-based studies in security studies are largely influenced by the 'linguistic turn' to the exclusion of other forms of communication (MacDonald, 2008; Aradau, 2010). In particular, those inspired by linguistic constructivism (Wendt, 1999) and/or securitization theory (Buzan *et al*, 1998) are either principally concerned with the deployment of language and 'speech acts', equate discourse to language (influenced by a more Derridean or Critical Discourse Analysis understanding of discourse (Fairclough, 1992; see also Howarth, 2000)), or focus on linguistically produced texts. In short, as a sub-field, critical security studies too often equates communication with transcribed spoken language.

But discourse, like culture (Tilley et al, 2006), is not and should not be equated with speech or verbal practices alone. Contrary to the assumption that the material is distinct and in opposition to an ideational realm, attributable to the Cartesian mind-body dualism, the material can be understood as part of discourse. Discourse as a set of relations between heterogenous elements (Foucault, 1980b: 194–5) 'includes within itself the linguistic and the non-linguistic' (Laclau and Mouffe, 1987), such as gestures, clothing, and built space.[2] As Foucault demonstrated with his studies of micro-practices (or everyday practices) involving the material – such as the construction of a cell in prison or the use of uniforms in schools – the production of power/knowledge is dependent on discourses that are irreducible to language and to speech alone (Foucault, 1970). In short, as Bruno Latour argued, we do 'politics with things' (2004). These things arrive in every imaginable form and kind to 'constitute the common worlds that we are in and the dense fabric of relations through which we live' (Braun and Whatmore, 2010: ix). While Roland Barthes established the importance of reading artefacts of popular culture as sites of meaning production and therefore worthy of analysis (Barthes, 1977), anthropologists such as Claude Levi-Strauss (1963), Mary Douglas and Baron Isherwood (1979), and Arjun Appadurai (1986) argued for a consideration of 'the social life of things'; that the material have a 'life' of their own entering and shaping social relations, even if we do not always 'see' them (Miller, 1987: 85). The material, including objects, bodies and spaces, and their design, display, use, interpretation, and legacy, suggest that they are more than equipment or receptacles of meaning, but help to produce key subject positions and meanings associated with the international, including those related to understandings of security.

In connection with this (re)turn to the material as part of discourse, an increasing body of work in critical security studies explores how material things take a more active part in the

[2] I use the word 'language' and 'linguistic' with some reticence as shorthand to mean spoken and written languages because of the convention to refer to the 'linguistic turn' and to the distinction made between linguistic and non-linguistic articulations. I would argue that linguistic articulations also entail a material component that is part of meaning making. Language (often associated with the ideational realm) cannot be separated from the material. Things can be words too, and words can be things.

production of security meaning-making, from CS gas to critical infrastructure to bodies.[3] These analyses draw inspiration from a range of materialist theories – ranging from practice theory (Bourdieu, 2011[1977]; Schatzki et al, 2001), material culture studies (Miller, 1987; Buchli, 2002; Tilley et al, 2006), phenomenology, affect and non-representational theory (Merleau-Ponty, 2002[1962]; Thrift, 2008), science and technology studies and actor-network theory (Law and Hassard, 1999; Pickering, 1999; Pels et al, 2002; Barad, 2007; Latour, 2005), feminist theories and embodiment (Butler, 1990, 1993; Harraway, 1991; Hekman, 1998, 2009), network and complexity theory (Castells, 1996; Urry, 2003; DeLanda, 2006), to the more 'speculative' approaches of new materialisms (Coole and Frost, 2010; Bennett, 2010; Kirby, 2011) and object-oriented philosophies (Meillassoux, 2009; Harman, 2009; Bryant, 2009; Bogost, 2011). And, whilst there is significant overlap and differences amongst these approaches - some favour a greater distinction between human and non-human, while some confer more agency to objects than others for example (see Van Veeren, 'Posthuman Security?') – these approaches are unified in their desire to situate matter alongside language, and sometimes inseparable from it, as part of meaning-making.[4]

Briefly, within critical security studies, these theories of matter have been taken up in four ways, sometimes overlapping: first, objects are understood as the point around which human-actors mobilize (Peoples, 2009; Aradau, 2010; Anais, 2011) as metaphor (Saco, 1997; Brown, 2010) or symbol (Coward, 2009) such that the analysis focuses on how actors talk about security things. Second, objects are understood as part of 'vulgar assemblages' or networks bringing together different human and non-human security actors into contact (Bousquet, 2009; Voelkner, 2011; Bourne, 2012), they become markers of identities (Neumann, 2002; Campbell, 2005; Smirl, 2008; Coole, 2006) or the focus on shared patterns of action otherwise understood as practices, such as those that govern diplomacy, nuclear weapons inspections, or protest, (Adler and Pouliot, 2011). Third, matter is discussed as the site into which ideas about security are projected (Weber and Lacy, 2011), or the target of these actions, such as 'urbicide' (Coward, 2009).

Collectively, what this research aims to do is to suggest that matter is part of the architecture

[3] See for example, Bigo, 2002; Walters, 2002; MacDonald, 2008; Neumann, 2002, Pouliot, 2008; Pusca, 2008; Salter, 2008; Smirl, 2008; Lacy, 2008; Bousquet, 2009; Coward, 2009; Aradau, 2010; Adler and Pouliot, 2011; Anais, 2011; Bousquet and Curtis, 2011; Cudworth and Hobden, 2011; Duffield, 2011; Grondin, 2011; Huysmans, 2011; Voelkner, 2011; Weber and Lacy, 2011; Adey and Anderson, 2012; Bourne, 2012; Lacy, forthcoming; Bueger and Bethke, forthcoming,.

[4] For example, contrast the work of Jane Bennett, which has widely been cited in critical security studies of late, with that of Schatzki et al. In *Vibrant Matter*, Bennett offers an account of ways in which objects can be understood to have a form of agency, a 'vibrancy'. (Bennett does not however differentiate between a form of agency (or agency asymmetry) found in a hoard that can produce an affect but that can and often is resisted, and the form of agency founding a power grid that fails which cannot (see Van Veeren, Security Mangles)). Schatzki and the 'practice turn' in International Relations focuses more on how human's deploy matter, and most often their own bodies in the practice of diplomacy for example, and therefore agency continues to reside in human-actors.

of (in)security, even of state-making, a point that has a lineage within poststructural accounts of security (Der Derian 2000, 2009; Walters, 2002; Debrix, 2003; Lisle, 2003; Amoore, 2007, 2009; Wber, 2008; Debrix and Lacy, 2009; Hall and Amoore, 2010) with its willingness to explore matter as a site of meaning-making, as sites that design (in)security for societies (Lacy, 2008). Therefore, in keeping with this line of investigation into materialities and their effects, but extending it by exploring how matter becomes something that can compel certain patterns of action and interpretation, even shifting security concepts, this work therefore draws together three strains of thought, affordance theory, theories of materialization (from material culture theory, but primarily from the work of Judith Butler and Karen Barad), and finally, theories of the visual.

Affordance

In the first case, emerging from 'interactionist accounts' within the psychology of perception, the concept of *affordance* (Gibson, 1954; Greeno, 1994) suggests that different forms of matter possess capacities to enter into certain relations, to assemble, with other forms of matter over others. 'The same material thing may have a great many different possible ways in which it can be used. Each is an affordance' (Harre, 2002: 27). Within this view – a variation of Charles Pierce's framework of categories which suggests that objects have qualities or properties that enable them to interact with the world in given ways – things have a 'language' (Sudjic, 2008) or 'psychology' (Norman, 1988) such that they can be designed to facilitate certain uses or feelings over others: doors tend to open one way, or outdoor spaces can be designed to facilitate or discourage public gatherings (Sorkin, 2008). 'Thus a floor affords walking, dancing, placing furniture; a window affords a view of the lake, an escape from a threat, a view for a peeping tom; a knife affords cutting, threatening, opening a window catch, and lots more' (Harre, 2002: 27). In these cases, an object and its design in one direction or another favours certain actions and discourage others, mediating and shaping relations, and in some cases becoming the foundation for a set of practices even a *habitus* (Bourdieu, 1977)[5] that enable the emergence of new ways of being in and thinking about the world. In Heidegger's thinking, a thing becomes a thing in virtue of its relationships in and through the fields of its action (including its fields of action with and through the human), and the action by which that thing is recognized as possible. For instance, a pen is a pen and not a piece of plastic by virtue of it being used to write with, and writing is part of the conceptual field by which the pen is made possible as a pen' (in Jackson, 2011: 40). A shackle is a shackle rather than a piece of metal by virtue of it being used to restrain, and restraint is part of the conceptual field by which the shackle is made possible as a shackle.

So, in opposition to some readings of affordance (for example, Norman, 1988) these relations

[5] A set of stairs is an example of habitus in action…

are not infinite, but are limited by our perception of their capacities, and can have 'contradictory manifestations or displays' (Harre, 2002: 27). Matter, at least when it comes to security, is 'incomplete unless related to a particular flow of social acts, a particular social world' (Harre 2002 24), or to put it differently, situated within a given assemblage. In other words, the qualities that we perceive or observe in bodies, objects or spaces are actually understood only in relation to something else. As we approach an object we read its capacities but in relation to what we think its capacities are. For example, most of us in this room would see a table as somewhere to eat, write, lie under, sit on. But as Elaine Scarry (1985) suggested, if you were tortured you might perceive the table to be a tool of torture, to be thrown against or to be chained to. The 'no touch' torture policies at Guantánamo (which were exported to Abu Ghraib) of stress and duress techniques involved the ordinary, everyday spaces of walls and chairs, and the ordinary body acts of sitting or lying down were disassembled and reassembled into instruments for torture within these spaces.

> The torture room is not just the setting in which the torture occurs: it is not just the space that happens to house the various instruments used for beating and burning and producing electric shock. It is itself literally converted into another weapon, into an agent of pain. All aspects of the basic structure – walls, ceiling, windows, doors undergo this conversion ... Just as all aspects of the concrete structure are inevitably assimilated into the process of torture, so too the contents of the room, its furnishings, are converted into weapons (Scarry, 1985: 147).

Returning for a moment to the example of bodies at Guantánamo, the same food that has the capacity to provide nourishment and produce 'fat' bodies also becomes a means to exert control, control in the time, amount and kind of food offered, control as a reward for 'good' behaviour in efforts to discipline detainees, even as a means of torture as detainees allege they were painfully force-fed in response to their use of food as a means to resist detention. Detainees repeated engaged in hunger striking, they also threw food (and often its 'by-product', their own waste) at guards as part of 'cocktails'. Detainees were suspicious of food handed to them as they feared they were drugged, and food trays used for distributing meals also became the site of confrontations between detainees and staff. As Valentine and Longstaff argue in their study of prison food and the webs of power that revolved around its production, distribution and consumption, food is a a 'symbol of the complexity of power relations between inmates and staff' because of these encounters (Valentine and Longstaff, 1998: 132). The affordances of food and the relations they enable can become mechanisms for sense-making and control, and most crucially the creation of subjectivities within discourses. Food's role at Guantánamo can therefore also be read as an instance of object agency because of this affordance. The affordances presented by food enabled this battle as much as the constructions of 'us' and 'them' that came to dominate guard and detainee relations. Without ascribing intentionality to the material (as Graham and Thrift (2007) or

Verbeek (2004) do), food is an *actants* (Latour, 2005), that through its being in the world change the behaviour of subjects and make possible certain forms of reason. That guards and detainees can do specific things with food is because of food's properties. These elements/actants 'can *do* things', they have 'sufficient coherence to make a difference, to produce effects, alter the course of events' (Bennett, 2010; viii).

Figure 29 Force-feeding equipment on display (Rosenberg, 2009d].

Materialisation

Secondly, as security develops 'with things' it does so in a complex process of materialization.[6] The affordances of an object provide it with certain capacities to enter into and shape specific relationships, to form assemblages with other objects including with humans and as set within a linguistic context. But it is the repetition of these relations which comes to matter. The interaction of these relations is an iterative process that occurs whereby matter takes on certain associations over others. Through repeated, yet varied *citational* processes, our reality, our 'common sense' is brought into being (Chambers and Carver, 2008). It is 'the notion of matter, not as a site or surface, but as a process of materialization that stabilizes over time to produce the effect of boundary, fixity, and surface' (Butler, 1993:9) that is important. More so, it is also to say that this meaning comes to inflect the object itself. Meaning both crystallizes on the surface of matter and is built into its very design; meaning 'is inscribed *into* materiality' (Chambers and Carver, 2008: 25) for example in the routines that govern a body, in the food that it ingests, in the education it receives, and in the extremis, in its punishment. Whether applied to human subjects in the form of gendered identities (Butler 1990, 1993), to quantum particles (Barad, 2007), to everyday objects (Miller 2005), or to states (Weber, 1998; Campbell, 1998) the principle is the same, the production of common sense,

[6] Material culture's 'objectification' (Miller, 1987) differs from materialization in its commitment to the idea of progressive development …

even 'reality', is an iterative process between matter and its interpretation that sediments over time and space until it becomes almost unseen and unrecognizable as such. For example, political subjects are, for example, often embodied. In this view, subjectivities are the product not of a fixed or pre-discursive interiority, but of practices such as dress, behaviour, gestures, even eating which then can be read into the body as fact (Chambers and Carver, 2008). These signs come to be seen not only as markers but as truth about the body and its identity, altering how subjects live and experience the world. The signs of identities worn on or performed by the body to constitute different subject positions, such as, for example, the American flag worn on military uniforms not only signal 'American soldier' but produce that subject. In other words, certain objects and practices become associated with certain bodies, materializing subject positions. And it is this repeated performance that states are constituted as part of the performance of a national identity that is always in need of securing (Campbell, 1998; Dillon, 1996; Weber, 1998). The way we understand 'realities' like 'security' or 'terrorism' are produced through these interactions of language and matter and to study these interactions, these materialization processes offers insight into the operations of power.

Visualities

Finally, if objects have affordances, and if these affordances allow them to enter into relations that may sediment over time and therefore materialize certain securities over other, the visual offers a different way to understand this process. Just as it is productive to explore the relationship between material and mobilities for understanding security, such as 'following the thing' approaches (Cook and Woodyer, 2012; Bourne, 2012), it is productive to look at the intersection between the visual and material and how these are co-constitutive. In taking on this third component, the visual, this book is therefore also an invitation to move beyond a thin call to bring attention to and consider assemblages to a thicker consideration of *how* these assemblages produce security meanings; a methodological one. In other words, what are the mechanisms by which discourses materialize? Part of the answer to this question is in the way they are materialized. By paying attention to the visual part of this materialization process, following 'the visible thing', the usefulness of assemblage as method (Anderson and MacFarlane, 2011: 125) is evident, for example the appearance and disappearance of an orange prison jumpsuit on a body to attend to the evolution of narratives created across space and time (Van Veeren, 2011).

So, returning to the mundane-seeming subject of food and bodies at Guantánamo and attending to the origins and circulation of this food adds a layer to our understanding of the amount of power invested in the site (in this case in a more traditional materialist manner). Just as many of Guantánamo's guards were part of a revolving door of prison guards who worked in both military

and civilian prison environments, along with them came a host of prison practices, including its food. Prepared by sub-contractor SYSCO in Jacksonville, Florida, a heavy-hitter in the world of catering for prisons (and universities) and delivered by barge by a second sub-contractor (Atlantic Coast Contracting, Inc.), the food served at Guantánamo was divided into those intended for guards, for 'general population detainees', and for high-value detainees. It was 'sanitised' for any dangerous elements, such as plastic packaging or inflammatory symbols, such as American flags on bottled water. The food was reheated and plated by military 'cooks' on the base and served by military police once the paperwork has been checked by Guantánamo's Muslim chaplain to certify it as *halal* (Howard, 2003). This food was then mobilised as part of the spectacle of Guantánamo. Representative Duncan Hunter (R-CA), upon returning to Washington following a visit to Guantánamo in June 2005, notoriously held a press conference at which he distributed copies of daily menus and brandished a chicken to demonstrate the high quality diet that detainees were receiving based on this component of the tour:

> So the point is that the inmates in Guantánamo have never eaten better, they've never been treated better and they've never been more comfortable in their lives… [ignoring the possibility that some detainees come from wealthy families] ...the idea that we are somehow torturing people in Guantanamo is absolutely not true, unless you consider eating chicken three days a week is torture (in Kreisher and Eckert, 2005).

Rep. Ken Calvert, R-Calif., is served a 'typical enemy combatant' meal (Haraz Ghanbari); Hunter: 'It's Humane' .

Though detainees could not be seen eating (and their opinions of the food were not registered as part of these tours), their food could be seen, and a few steps from this component of the tour, visitors could see the force-feeding chair and the liquid food to which hunger striking detainees were subjected (though not as it was administered). How this food circulated, how it was showcased, and how it was controlled with respect to detainee bodies is key to understanding one of the ways in which Guantánamo was constructed and communicated by US officials. The types of subjects constituted through this showcasing and control – a modern US versus an irrational 'other', for

example – were in part constituted through these materialities and visualities of security. `the visualities of Guantánamo's food were carefully controlled.

The chair: 'like a padded cell "on wheels"' (Worthington, 2007) (Photo: Edmund Clarke, 2010).

So, whilst critical international relations has increasingly drawn on insights from visual studies (Williams, 2003; Campbell, 2004a, 2005; Weber, 2006; Campbell and Shapiro, 2007; Möller, 2007; Hansen, 2011; Van Veeren, 2009; Schlag and Heck, 2012) it often does so with reference to the content of images whether presented as photographs, cartoons, or films. But the importance of the visual also lies in its shaping of the material world (see Lisle, 2004, 2011; Amoore, 2009a,b; Van Veeren 2011; Hansen, forthcoming). Part of the affordance of an object is, in part, to co-produce visualities.[7] For example, a window in a classroom or in a prison cell is its naming, but also its shape and design, component parts, building and safety regulations, decorations, and use, including unexpected use and failures, and, bringing it around again, as a reference and a metaphor that shapes our thinking and futures. Our understandings and interactions, our common sense relationship to windows is a product of this materiality and visuality. Similarly, razor wire operates very differently in terms of the visual than concrete blocks do, affecting how what is contained is visualized.[8] Beyond reading the visual grammars of object, matter and its affordances affect how things are viewed and the conditions under which things become visible or are made visible, lessons familiar from the language of design, of architecture, or of art. These visualities and materialities shape relations and encounters and they do so by changing visualities such as practices of occlusion versus foregrounding, inscription, spatial and temporal ordering, articulation and juxtapositioning,

[7] This should also matter because what is observed, or viewed, is inseparable from the viewer (Barad, 2009). That is it impossible to draw a line between that which is observed by human and the means of observing it whether we apply this to atomic particles or detainees in Guantánamo. This observation of the material is a dynamic visual process. The 'visual' and the 'material' should be understood as in continual dialogue.

[8] For an interesting study of the history and politics of razor wire, see Razac, 2002.

and trace (the not-quite-networks of meaning that extend across time as well as space). '[T]he 'visual' and the 'material' should be understood as in continual dialogue and co-constitution' (Rose and Tolia-Kelly, 2012:5) and part of this dialogue is the generation of certain mechanisms for meaning-making which are at the heart of this analysis. So a field of vision or a site of encounter may be shaped by material, such as a razor wire fence or a prison tour.

Finally, fundamental to this process of materialization is its ability to render matter invisible. We stop seeing objects, bodies and spaces the more commonsensical and fixed they seem to be. This is at the heart of the speculative realist account of matter (what many refer to as 'new' materialisms) and its politics that is so controversial. Matter's agency, and therefore its political significance, is at its strongest when we stop paying attention to it, when it is taken for granted whether it is designed into hiding, disappearing into the background of everyday life (Miller, 2005; Weber and Lacy, 2011: 6; Brody, 2008) as a 'taken-for-granted backdrop of cognizance' and 'made explicit only with great difficulty' (Yanow, 2006: 350). Those relations that eventually become common sense (even invisible and enchanting) are the ones that become materialized over time and are performatively constituted through not-quite-networks, the traces, flows and repeated citational processes and performances that shape the political life of matter. This is Heidegger's 'hammer' which only 'reappears' once it is broken, at the heart of speculative realism and object oriented philosophy.[9] And whilst this 'enchanting' and invisible aspect of matter is less the focus of this work, as this book is about how matter is often used deliberately and consciously by human-actors to compel particular security meanings, this enchanting, or 'vibrant' (Bennett, 2010) interpretation of matter cannot be escaped. This includes for example our current associations of cleanliness and sterile surroundings with modern, civilized and 'good', for example (Douglas, 1964; Ashenberg, 2010).

Guantánamo's Colliding Security Narratives

What comes to light when we approach Guantánamo through the lens of affordance, materialization and visualities? Rather than understanding Guantánamo as an 'exceptional' practice, approaching Guantánamo through the lens of its materiality and visuality, as this book contends, enables a different point of access to the three colliding narratives of security (of exceptional militarization, incarceration and humane treatment) that came to shape the site; or as William James might say, Guantánamo 'slips out of the past as easily as the train slides by the switch' (James,

[9] Object oriented philosophy of course goes further in asserting that objects are 'ontologically prior to everything else' (Morton, 2012). Whilst I agree with the assertion that objects 'emit causality' in the aesthetic sense such that meaning is produced co-constitutively, that objects exist prior seems to me to reassert the mind-body, idea-material binary.

1978 [1907]). What follows is therefore an overview of these three security narratives and the ways in which they were essential to redefining key concepts, what it means to be safe, humane, legal and transparent in a 'post-9/11 world' resulting in a set of new policies for counterterrorism, with implications in the US and internationally.

Security through Exceptional Militarisation

First, Guantánamo exists as a result of the mobilization of a discourse of exceptional militarization. This account of Guantánamo is a fairly standard one (see Jackson, 2005; Neal, 2009). This choice to frame the GWoT as a 'war', however, relied on several decades of rehabilitation of the US military (Jeffords, 1989; Witt, 2012) and a general process of militarization of the US more generally (Lutz, 2001, 2002, 2009; Gusterson and Besteman, 2009). This enabled the choice to have the US military lead the response in the GWoT, rather than attributing this to perceived failings of the CIA and FBI to prevent 9/11 or the force of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's personality (Mayer, 2009).

(Re)defining 'the Safe'

Following '9/11', the GWoT rapidly became associated with the emergence of a security paradigm and discourse of new and exceptional threat. As has been discussed extensively elsewhere (Collins and Glover, 2002; Croft, 2006; Dauphinee and Masters, 2007; Jackson, 2005; Hunt and Rygiel, 2006; Staines, 2007), rather than framing '9/11' as a criminal act, the Bush administration sought from the beginning to characterise it as a 'new' and emerging war threat and therefore to characterise the response as a war response.[10] Within the GWoT discourse, terrorism was therefore constructed as new, extraordinary and dangerous, justifying military intervention rather than recourse to criminal justice approaches.

Conversely, terrorists were identified as an exceptional threat, they posed 'a lethal threat to the civilized world' (Rumsfeld in Garamon, 2005). They were irrational, organised, barbaric, inhuman, evil and uncivilised (Collins and Glover, 2002; Jackson, 2005), even 'superempowered' and therefore exceptionally dangerous – an articulation of threat that relied, in particular, on a racial construction of danger (Ahmad, 2009; Puar and Rai, 2002). Guantánamo was therefore used to assist in the (re)definition of what constitutes terrorism and terrorists, and therefore what constitutes the appropriate response to this form of threat, delivering 'the safe' through the exclusion of this 'defiling otherness' (Campbell, 1998: 5). The result was a militarization of counterterrorism and the

[10] In so doing, the U.S. construction was, for example, the opposite of what the British state used in their approach to violence in Northern Ireland, where in order to delegitimise Irish Republicans against whom they were fighting, they actively sought to construct them as criminals (McEvoy, 2001: 5).

requirement that the US military extend its expertise in detention and interrogation in a rapid fashion (Carvin, 2011; Forsythe, 2011).

Based on this construction of terrorists, safety therefore meant detaining superempowered 'terrorists' using exceptional military measures. Everyday criminal detention and treatment, or, detention in 'prisoner of war' (POW) camps was insufficient, even 'unsafe' (Greenberg, 2009: 116). Instead, 'the safe' was constituted as equivalent to indefinite detention in heaviliy fortified facilities off U.S. soil. 'The detention facility at Guantánamo Bay was established for the simple reason that the United States needed a safe and secure location to detain and interrogate enemy combatants. It was the best option available,' explained Rumsfeld (in Garamone, 2005). When it came to discussion of closing Guantánamo, as Congressional Representative Mike Pence (R-In) expressed, 'Let me say emphatically, "Mr. President, public safety comes before public relations." The American people don't want to know how closing Guantanamo Bay will make us more popular, they want to know how closing Guantanamo Bay will make us safer" (Pence, 2009). Americans agreed. By the time President Barack Obama took office, forty percent of Americans, compared to 18%, agreed that Guantánamo made the U.S. safer and strengthened national security (Page, 2009). So, not only did Guantánamo serve to confirm the existence of terrorism and terrorists, and demonstrate the Bush Administration's success at capturing and neutralising this extreme threat, within the GWoT discourse Guantánamo became the ideal place, 'the least worst place' (Greenberg, 2009), to contain them in order to deliver 'the safe'.

Under significant pressure from the White House to obtain 'highly valuable intelligence' (Sands, 2008) the mobilization of an exceptional militarization discourse meant that that not only were US forces expected to hold captives, but to interrogate them. What emerged out of this discourse of exceptional militarization in the GWoT was also an interrogation system cobbled together from borrowed CIA practices (advice derived for example from the School for the America's torture programme (Blakeley, 2006, 2007) and from the CIA's KUBARK manual (1963)) as well as from the Army Field Manual 32-10, Defense Directives from the 1970s, but also largely from the training delivered to U.S. service personnel during Survival, Evade, Resist and Escape (S.E.R.E.) training in preparation for their possible capture and detention by opposition forces who would not abide by the Geneva Conventions (Otterman, 2007: 140). The interpretation and application of these techniques, however, were also inspired by a range of other sources, including the popular television show *24* (Sands, 2008: 73). Combined, these discursive practices of exceptional militarism when applied to counterterrorism meant that in the process of their application, sanctioned techniques 'transmogrified in practice' (Lederman, 2005) so that, for example, 'sleep adjustment'

became 'prolonged sleep deprivation' with stress positions and sensory deprivation, and a culture of 'whetever it takes' to confront an exceptional threat emerged.

(Re)defining 'the Legal'

Closely related to the redefinition of 'the safe', the GWoT redefinitions included the transformation of what constitutes legal treatment. Where detainees were held, the conditions of their detention, their category as (il)legal combatants, and the legal processes to establish their guilt or innocence were reinterpreted. As Gregory argues (2006), to produce Guantánamo the Bush Administration reinterpreted the geographical extent of law to create a space outside both U.S. domestic and international law where detainees could be held indefinitely and without trial, where their identity was defined as outside the law, and a where a new set of processes was developed to replace the law. The redefinition of geographies associated with 'the legal' was therefore also connected to the redefinition of what constitutes a battlefield within the 'new' war. The Bush administration maintained, and guards at Guantánamo believed, the claim that all detainees were caught on the 'battlefields' of Afghanistan, and therefore hardened fighters, though detainees were most often kidnapped and 'bought' across Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bosnia, Gambia, and Zambia.

As with the threat of terrorism and the extreme conditions required to render terrorists 'safe', an exceptionalism discourse was deployed (Aradau, 2007; Gregory, 2006; Johns, 2005; Michaelsen and Shershow, 2004a, 2004b; Neal, 2006). 'The category of the "exceptional" [was] invoked to legitimize and mobilize an array of violent and illiberal practices' (Neal, 2010: 12), especially, as I argue, Guantánamo. While an individual detained within the U.S. has rights and protections under the law, such as the right to file a writ of *habeas corpus* (the right to challenge the legality of their detention) and the right to 'due process', the Bush administration identified Guantánamo – as the Clinton administration did with regards to the detention of Haitian refugees in the 1990s – as a space outside or beyond U.S. domestic laws. Importantly, the Bush administration did not characterise this space as a 'lawless zone' but one redefined as subject to the law through Presidential Military Order 'Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism' (13 November 2001). An order, which asserted that the President had authority to establish Guantánamo, based on the existence of an existential threat to the U.S., as a military concern and out of the jurisdiction of U.S. courts.

Moreover, the Bush administration also sough to generate legitimacy for their actions through a redefinition of U.S. obligations under international law, specifically a reinterpretation of U.S. obligations under the Geneva Conventions and under international conventions governing the use of torture (Lokanetta, 2010). Military and government spokespeople went 'out of their way' to describe the Geneva Conventions as outdated, even 'quaint' (Watson, 2004). This resulted in the redefinition

of those captured as 'enemy combatants' and 'detainees' rather than as POWs (Sands, 2008: 41), therefore denying them 'internationally recognized rights pertaining to the treatment of prisoners of war' (Butler, 2004: 64). Similarly, the Bush administration used the language of exceptionalism to justify the development of new interrogation policies for the sake of increasing the amount of 'valuable intelligence' produced (Blakeley, 2007; Greenberg, 2005; Greenberg *et al,* 2005*;* Hope, 2004; Jackson, 2007; Jaffer and Singh, 2007; Lokanetta, 2010; Macmaster, 2004; Sands, 2008; Welch, 2009a) and to describe these practices as legal. Redefining torture as that which would lead to 'pain equivalent to organ failure' (Bybee, 2002), the U.S. military, under pressure from the White House (Sands, 2008), revised its policies with regard to interrogation techniques and developed new procedures including waterboarding (simulated drowning), extensive use of 'stress positions', and sleep deprivation. These approaches were then put into practice at Guantánamo and at other sites associated with the GWoT, including Abu Ghraib and CIA 'ghost sites'. Though President Bush had indicated publicly that the U.S. did not torture and that detainees under U.S. military detention were to be treated 'humanely' and in the 'spirit of Geneva', the White House, and in particular Vice-President Cheney and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, endorsed the use of 'enhanced interrogations', claiming it was out of necessity (Priest and Wright, 2005).

Detainees were however also identified as '*illegal' or* '*unlawful* enemy combatants'. Identified as members of a*l Qaeda* and the Taliban – regardless of the distinctions between these two groups, the circumstances of their arrest, or evidence to the contrary – the Bush administration argued that they were therefore not signatories to the Geneva Conventions, but were acting outside the law. According to officials, detainees did not satisfy the test for those engaged in the theatre of war under Article 4(2) of the Third Geneva Convention, for example, by identifying themselves with military ranks and insignia. As the Bush administration argued, this meant that detainees did not need to be kept in conditions as outlined in the Conventions, but could be held indefinitely and in accordance with 'the spirit of Geneva' and military necessity.[11] In short, as 'unlawful combatants', detainees were cast 'beyond the legal bounds of warfare' (Johns, 2005: 617) and that any non-U.S. citizen in the world – and for a time any U.S. citizen, until overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court in *Hamdi v. Rumsfeld* – could be detained indefinitely.

Finally, this redefinition from POW to detainee/unlawful enemy combatant also meant the redefinition of acceptable legal processes and standards for establishing guilt. Whereas the initial intention was to hold detainees without trials, under mounting pressure from human rights

[11] This new category of detainee was supported by an extensive set of legal memoranda exchanged within the Bush administration justifying this redefinition, this included President Bush's memorandum of February 7, 2002 in which the Geneva Conventions were deemed inapplicable and the 'Torture Memos' by Jay Bybee and John Yoo (see Sands, 2008: 22).

advocates and lawyers, including impending Supreme Court challenges, the U.S. military established three new 'legal' mechanisms for assessing the guilt of detainees: the Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) (which determined by closed tribunal whether detainees were combatants, and through which 38 of the 779 were deemed 'no longer enemy combatants'); the Annual Review Boards (ARB) in which detainees were assessed annually to determine if they remained a threat; and the Military Commissions tribunals to determine overall guilt and sentencing. However, as critics of Guantánamo have argued, these trials were riddled with procedural and substantive irregularities, earning the reputation as 'show trials' and 'kangaroo courts' (Ahmad, 2009; Denbeaux and Denbeaux, 2008; Margulies, 2006; Olshansky, 2002, 2007; Ratner and Ray, 2004; Stafford Smith, 2007). The forms of these proceedings mattered more than their substantive content. So, to redefine 'the legal', new geographies of law were defined, new terms invented, and new legal processes devised all under the watchful eye of the US military.

Security Through Incarceration

Second, whilst we can make sense of Guantánamo as the manifestation of a discourse of militarized exceptionalism, as an exceptional response to an exceptional threat, and as the product of a policy of creating a space 'outside the law' (Gregory, 2006) where detainees could be denied legal protections and subjected to abuse, even disappearance (whilst safeguarding interrogators from possible prosecution), this characterisation does little to explain this disparate readings of the site, and does not on its own explain how Guantánamo came to fit so comfortably within an understanding of the US as a humane and modern state and continue to generate so much support. Instead, Guantánamo must be read as connected to a set of practices, objects and spaces associated with the wider US 'carceral state' (Beckett and Murakawa, 2012), as part of the infrastructure of state power. Emerging not only out of US military and CIA history, but also out of the US prison and wider carceral system, Guantánamo is also something un-exceptional (Gordon, 2009). As some have argued (Ahmad, 2009; Gregory, 2006; Johns, 2005; Reid-Henry, 2007), Guantánamo is better understood as a set of practices in search of an 'exceptional' justification rather than solely an exceptional militarized one.[12] Just as Abu Ghraib soldiers implicated in the prisoner abuse scandal were constructed as 'bad apples', the exception rather than the rule, Guantánamo's existence and its practices were linguistically constructed as exceptional even if the practices were not. Therefore

[12] Guantánamo has nonetheless been characterised by critics and scholars as a 'a prison outside the law' (Aradau and Van Munster, 2007; Bigo, 2002; Diken and Laustsen, 2005; Hussain, 2007; Kaplan, 2005; Ratner and Ray, 2004; Tagma, 2010); 'a legal black hole' (Annas, 2006; Butler, 2004: 54; Fletcher, 2004: 121; Michaelsen and Shershow, 2004b; Steyn, 2004); a 'legal no man's land' (Newman and Levine, 2007: 83; Paust, 2004: 1346); a place 'beyond the rule of law' (Hope, 2004: 807; Michaelsen and Shershow, 2004a); a 'limbo' (Butler, 2004; 54; Isin and Rygiel, 2007), and a 'rights-free zone' 'based on politics, not legal norms' (Koh, 2003: 341).

understanding Guantánamo as the materialization of an unexceptional security through incarceration discourse can be more productive. While Gregory (2006) and Reid-Henry (2007) respond to this over-determination of Guantánamo as exceptionalism through a discussion of the colonial spatial practices of the U.S., and Johns (2005) and Ahmad (2009) argue that Guantánamo is actually a territory infused with law), what this book seeks to demonstrate is that Guantánamo may have been linguistically constructed as exceptional but that its material practices place it in alignment with current U.S. prison practices. The justifications, extent, and practice of detention in the GWoT is connected to the growing logic of imprisonment as a way to manage threat and risk, rather than as the confirmation of Agambian or Schmittian politics. As Gordon (2009) and Brown (2005) argue, Guantánamo is normal in its apparent exceptional brutality. Moreover, to focus on it as exceptional is also to erase the violence of historical and more everyday sights and spaces (ones often based on race) of incarceration. Historically, Guantanamo also owes much to the earlier exclusion and confinement of Native Americans, the internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II, the detention of refugees (even in the very same spaces), and the continued high levels of incarceration of African-Americans and Latinos within US prisons, which operated based on the same logic of redefinition of the threat based on race. Like the US prison system, Guantánamo is a product of the same tensions and difficult politics that surround US prisons more generally within a cultural and political context that struggles to reconcile a 'culture of punishment' with an image of the US as a modern state.

The road to Guantánamo and its (in)visibilities can therefore also be understood as first connected to these practices operating across the US, which also include the rapid expansion of detention of illegal migrants, the return of debtors' prisons, and the expansion of civil detention for sex offenders and juveniles. They are a product of an American carceral system where incarceration is an expanding and logical response to managing risk and where pain is justifiable according to everyday understandings of detention and its purpose. We cannot consider Guantánamo solely as an exception carved out of the law by the US military when these practices transpire across the US on an everyday basis (Ahmad, 2009; Brown, 2009; Cusac, 2009; Scraton and McCulloch, 2009; Shalev, 2009) and we should therefore also look to what happens inside the US state as an explanation for how Guantánamo came to be a scene of so much (often invisible) violence.

Security Through Humane Treatment

Third, and finally, Guantánamo and the transformation in policies, laws and norms of war of the GWoT is a product of the continued construction of the US as waging a good war not only to bring terrorists to justice and safeguard American citizens, but also to do so humanely with respect

for human rights.[13] Thus, when the US sought to suspend normal judicial processes in connection with the new perceived security threat of terrorism, and committed acts that conflicted with liberal values and its human rights message – including reinterpreting the Geneva Conventions and the United Nations Convention against Torture concerning the treatment of detainees – it had to do so in a way that was consistent with the message of the US as respecting human rights. On the one hand, US officials maintained a construction of the GWoT as a national security crisis, as an exceptional threat requiring exceptional measures. On the other hand, they minimised, concealed, or transformed these departures so as to maintain the construction of the state as a 'humane' actor and that of the GWoT as a 'clean war', one where international laws and norms are respected, where violence is restricted such that the risk to civilian life and to 'friendly-forces' is minimised, and where certain practices such as torture and the use of weapons of mass destruction are prohibited. Guantánamo's emergence and longevity can therefore be understood first and foremost as a 'collision' of the politics of exception as well as of the unexceptional culture of punishment and of the US modern state imaginary which explains the competing readings of the site and by extension the GWoT.

In particular, this narrative paved the way for the redefinition of what constituted 'the humane' in detention. This included the redefinition of torture as the more humane 'enhanced interrogation techniques' and a narrative that emphasised the 'state-of-the-art' physical conditions under which detainees were held, while ignoring the mental torture produced by these techniques, and by indefinite detention and extreme isolation.[14] In particular the discourse of Guantánamo sought to depict the site as humane and compliant with the 'spirit of Geneva' because, particularly as Guantánamo evolved, through its representation as a modern, clean, and state-of-the-art facility

[13] Since World War II, US American wars have involved the constructions of an American identity built around the idea of the US as an advanced Western liberal democracy committed to the rule of law and the freedom of the market against the threat posed by communism. Under President Jimmy Carter, and following the Vietnam War, this construction evolved to include respect for human rights. With the support of Congress, the US was cast as a global beacon of human rights principles and standards with foreign aid and security policies tied, at least in rhetoric, to human rights records. Thus, a national security-human rights nexus was produced that the US has navigated ever since, which has necessitated a defence of its own human rights record at home and abroad. Carter's record at safeguarding human rights is less clear. See Michael Stohl, David Carleton, Steven E. Johnson, 'Human Rights and US Foreign Assistance from Nixon to Carter', Journal of Peace Research, 21:3. (1984), 215-226; David Carleton and Michael Stohl, 'The Foreign Policy of Human Rights: Rhetoric and Reality from Jimmy Carter to Ronald Reagan', *Human Rights Quarterly*, 7:2 (1985), 205-229. On human rights and US foreign policy see also Arthur Schlesinger Jr.,'Human Rights and the American Tradition', *Foreign Affairs*, 57 (1978): 503-526; David P. Forsythe, 'Human Rights in US Foreign Policy: Retrospect and Prospect', *Political Science Quarterly*, 105:3 (1990): 435-454.

[14] 'Humane treatment', acting 'humanely', or being 'humane' is itself a metaphorical construction that not only works to privilege humans as defining the ultimate standard of care, but also, as Hannah Arendt argues, works to suggest that 'humanity' and human dignity exist separate from the laws and institutions of a society. The humane is not 'some ever-present pre-political, pre-legal human attribute meant to regulate and constrain state power' (Owens, 2009: 576). 'Humane treatment' is not abstract, definitive and apolitical, but is implicated in U.S. state constructions.

with health care, and religious freedoms, and yes, the abundant food that rendered detainees fat. This representation of Guantánamo detention therefore – in stark contrast to detainees' claims that they felt dehumanized and degraded, like animals in cages – became the way 'humane' treatment was to be understood. Being treated 'humanely' became equivalent to providing state-of-the-art physically modern and sterile facilities, and a choice of six meal options a day. So, while redefining what constituted U.S. obligations under the Geneva Conventions, under the U.N. Convention Against Torture and with respect to U.S. federal and state laws, or even under the Military Code of Justice concerning care of prisoners, the Bush administration attempted to create legitimacy for its interrogation and detention policies by redefining them as humane.

Finally, this also enabled the Bush administration and the U.S. military to redefine understandings of transparency, a quality 'fundamentally American' (Admiral David M. Thomas Jr., Guantánamo Commander in 2009 in Rosenberg, 2009c). This was accomplished principally through Guantánamo visitor tours and observers of the Military Commissions. Rumsfeld claimed that 'no detention facility in the history of warfare has been more transparent or received more scrutiny than Guantánamo' (Rumsfeld in Haxton, 2005). This use of transparency, articulated as it was to the other main 'missions' of Guantánamo and their redefinitions, was again a move that sought to re-inscribe the 'good' of Guantánamo and the U.S. state. The continued emphasis on transparency, particularly through the everyday tourist practices of Guantánamo, was a double move that not only attempted to 'sell' Guantánamo as transparent, but to redefine what transparency looked like.

Chapter Overview

The following pages therefore present an analysis of these colliding narratives and their result, whilst making a case for the co-constitution of material, visual and linguistic within security discourses. Using the case of Guantánamo, these chapters explore the material and visual practices that brought Guantánamo into being. More specifically, the collision of these competing narratives is evident in the evolving architecture of the site, in the steady bureaucratization of its internal processes, and in the increasingly professionalized VIP and media tours of the facilities.

Chapter 1 is an exploration of the architecture of Guantánamo, both in terms of its outward facing architecture as well as its interior design. As Jewkes and Johnson argue, 'the design of impacts upon the lives of its occupants' but it also stands as a statement of penal philosophy. Built into the fabric of the site are '[p]olitical judgments, policy priorities and public sentiments and as such can be read for an explanation of the security politics of a state (2007:191). More than any other aspect of Guantánamo, the design of its spaces evolved. The architecture of the prison, from Camp X-Ray to the more recent additions of Camps 5 and 6, the 'supermax' camps, worked first as 'architecture of dis-assurance' (Brody, 2008) and then as an 'architecture of reassurance' based on their materialities

and visualities. The maximum exposure provided by the chain-linked cells of X-Ray which emphasising fear and danger from exceptional threat, was replaced by the more traditional prison designs of Camp Delta as a prison narrative was mobilised. This resulted not only in a redistribution of bodies and objects across space at the site as well as a change in the iconography, but a transformation in the scopic regimes and gazes of the site, reshaping what was visible and changing how encounters were mediated. Guantánamo became a space of reassurance to some, materializing and visualizing safety and security as the narrative of exceptional militarization collided with more familiar narratives of prison punishment and humane treatment.

6-Oct-06	140.4	15-May-06	132.5
5-Oct-06	140.4	14-May-06	132.3
3-Oct-06	138.7	12-May-06	131.6
2-Oct-06	137.5	12-May-06	131.7
1-Oct-06	140.2	11-May-06	132.2
30-Sep-06	139.5	10-May-06	132.5
29-Sep-06	139.8	9-May-06	130.5
28-Sep-06	143.5	8-May-06	132.1
27-Sep-06	139.3	7-May-06	131.5
26-Sep-06	140	6-May-06	135.1
26-Sep-06	136.5	5-May-06	131.4
25-Sep-06	139	4-May-06	131.8
24-Sep-06	141.3	3-May-06	133.3
23-Sep-06	139.9	2-May-06	132
22-Sep-06	141.1	1-May-06	130.8
21-Sep-06	140.9	30-Apr-06	130.4
20-Sep-06	140.9	29-Apr-06	132.8
25-Aug-06	139.6	28-Apr-06	132
22-Aug-06	136.5	27-Apr-06	131.9
21-Aug-06	135.5	26-Apr-06	132.1
20-Aug-06	133.5	25-Apr-06	132.3
19-Aug-06	136.5	24-Apr-06	132
18-Aug-06	137.5	23-Apr-06	133.3
17-Aug-06	136	22-Apr-06	131.2
16-Aug-06	136	21-Apr-06	140
15-Aug-06	137.5	21-Apr-06	132.5
14-Aug-06	138.6	20-Apr-06	131.3
13-Aug-06	137.5	19-Apr-06	133.2
12-Aug-06	136.8	18-Apr-06	131.2
11-Aug-06	136.5	17-Apr-06	131.7
10-Aug-06	136	15-Apr-06	132.8
26-Jul-06	138.5	14-Apr-06	130.8
23-Jun-06	129.8	13-Apr-06	133.3
2-Jun-06	135.8	21-Apr-06	133.6
1-Jun-06	134.6	11-Apr-06	131.4
31-May-06	118.3	10-Apr-06	132.1
30-May-06	134.4	9-Apr-06	129.8
29-May-06	134.3	8-Apr-06	130.7
28-May-06	134.2	7-Apr-06	130.2
27-May-06	133.7	6-Apr-06	133.7
26-May-06	133.1	4-Apr-06	131.9
25-May-06	133.1	3-Apr-06	130.8
24-May-06	133	2-Apr-06	130.6
23-May-06	133.4	1-Apr-06	132.6
22-May-06	132.3	31-Mar-06	135.2
21-May-06	135.8	30-Mar-06	136
21-May-06	132.1	29-Mar-06	134.1
20-May-06	130.1	28-Mar-06	134.7
19-May-06	132.1	27-Mar-06	134.8
18-May-06	131.8	26-Mar-06	133.7
17-May-06	132	25-Mar-06	133
16-May-06	131.8	23-Mar-06	135.5

Detainee Weight Record.

Chapter 2 continues this exploration of practices through a discussion of the bureaucractic practices that guided life 'inside the wire'. To see these practices, however, we turn to four sets of documents and read them not only as linguistic texts, but as visual ones: Guantánamo's *Standard Operating Procedures* from 2002, 2003 and 2004, the *Interrogation of Log of Detainee 063*, the height and weight records of detainees, and the 'Letters to Omar', a collection of letters and

postcards set to detainee Omar Deghayes. Through these documents, the unexceptional and dispersed US bureaucratic and carceral practices are more evident as are the exceptional military ones. Through the evidence of control, regularity, pattern and predictability apparent in these documents in the forms of tables, charts, serial numbers, record and timekeeping the legitimacy of the war as a set of routine practices is explored. For example, as artist and photographer Edmund Clark captures in his latest work, any letter sent to a Guantanamo detainee was subject to an extensive bureaucratic processing that transformed the letter from a personal object into a highly processed, sanitised and dehumanized one. Meanwhile, the reintroduction of torture and indefinite detention relied on mundane-seeming practices such as the recording of all encounters with detainees to the maintenance of logs of detainee weights. Disguised as a rational, bureaucratic procedure for the ease of retrieving data and managing risk, the development of layers of bureaucracy in connection with the GWoT – Max Weber's 'iron cage of bureaucracy' – resulted in a surreal bureaucratic landscape which also served to produce the GWoT as 'clean'. This study of the material and visual of bureaucracy offers therefore offers, first, an illustration of how discourse encompasses linguistic and non-linguistic within these collisions in order to produce national security meanings, and two, how these bureaucratic material practices are not 'neutral' but are meaningful and transformative acts with implications for the laws and ethics of war.

Moving 'outside the wire, Chapter 3 is a detailed account of the 'tourist' practices that took place at Guantánamo. In the ten years since Guantánamo opened, thousands of visitors made their way to the detention facilities to inspect the site. Whether journalist, politician, celebrity, or senior military staff, these visitors were invited to view the 'modern' amenities presented as part of the tour. Orange prison jumpsuits, watchtowers, shackles, wire-mesh fences, and later its electronically-monitored cells and 'state-of-the-art' medical facilities took centre stage. Using these tourist practices as illustrative, this chapter sets out an overview of how the materialities and visualities of the tour were used to produce meaning in the contest over Guantanamo. Through these tours the selective organisation and presentation of specific matter within the Guantanamo security assemblage was central to the war's legitimacy and construct Guantánamo as 'safe, humane, legal, transparent', proving a particularly effective way at materializing the colliding narratives of security through punishment, militarization and humane treatment. Aiming to appeal to a divided domestic audience within the US as well as an international one and counter mounting criticism from those opposed to Guantánamo – including those detained inside as well as those protesting outside – who were inevitably involved in counter-constructions concerning the nature of security threats, on the one hand, and what constitutes legal and humane treatment, on the other, tours of Guantánamo were both a means to communicate a message of war-time security and to construct the US as a

progressive state, committed to human rights and the rule of law. But, through this materiality and visuality, Guantanamo was also used to shift the meaning of these very concepts. Through these tours – which can be understood as Butlerian frames – a new reality of what it means to be safe, humane, legal, transparent was created.

Finally, Chapter 4 is an exploration of the materialities and visualities as used by those in opposition to Guantánamo. The mobilization of publics and the creation of security common sense is not the sole domain of the state but can, and is, also used in opposition to it. This chapter is therefore an analysis of the artistic interventions and protest theatre used 'outside the wire' to contest the site. The official representations of Guantánamo, specifically as 'safe, humane, legal, and transparent', were contested by anti-Guantánamo campaigners through the production of an 'icon of outrage' (Permutter, 2003) which (re)articulated key objects from Guantánamo and placed them in new spaces as the main way to transform subjectivities within the discourse, most notably transforming detainees from terrorists to torture victims. Focusing in particular on three works of art that were developed in response to the detention and interrogation facility at Guantanamo: United Holding Company's *This is Camp X-Ray*, Penny Byrne's *Guantánamo Bay Souvenirs*, and Edmund Clark's *Guantanamo: If the Light Goes Out* this chapter explores the collision of narratives encapsulated in this work in order to think through how 'artistic' things, 'art-things', are also part of the production and transformation of security discourses. As carefully constructed assemblages of words, bodies, objects, and spaces, artistic interventions are communicative acts that encourage new ways of looking and therefore new things that we think through. As a result they have the capacity to produce, transform and sometimes constrain meaning.

Given the unseen, 'amorphous and often virtual nature' of the threat of terrorism (Campbell, 2005: 943) and its response, it is my contention that a process of materialization was therefore required, accomplished in part through Guantánamo. As the language of the Bush administration normalized and reified the practice of the GWoT, as Richard Jackson suggests (2005: 2,8), so too did its visual and material practices, helping to make this discourse make sense. Guantánamo was a site of the visual-materialization of the GWoT, where the narratives and justifications of the GWoT came into collision. The colliding narratives of security (security as exceptional militarization, security as incarceration, but also security as humane) were visualized and materialized in a form such that the site 'makes sense' and is proving difficult to close.

Therefore, in trying to understand policies like Guantanamo beyond something exceptional, this book makes a case for looking beyond the narrowly defined linguistic. To understand how Guantánamo and associated post-9/11 security practices and policies came to makes sense to so many people, we need to look and understand the role of matter. Where the power of the site, and

the power in other security discourses, is partially in its matter. The collective suggestion of the material turn that we need to 'attend, quite fundamentally to how collective and individual self-understanding, agency, and, indeed, collective will are enfolded and emergent *from* material bodies, objects and spaces within which they operate (Jackson, 2011: 42). In other words, legitimising discourses involve the non-linguistic and linguistic, the visual and the material. To understand how post 9/11 security makes sense, we need to attend to its matter.