Stefanie Ortmann

Russia as hyper-Westphalian Great Power

1. Introduction

In an often-cited article, Hannes Adomeit contrasted the "images" and the "reality" of Russian claims to Great Power status shortly after the end of the Soviet Union and proclaimed that "true greatness, whether among men or among nations, does not need advertising. It should be evident." (Adomeit 1995, 35). This argument chimes with an assessment that has been made by many other commentators of Russian affairs over the years: that the incessant references to Russia's Great Power status in public political discourse is an acknowledgement of the loss of precisely this status after the end of the Soviet Union and the expression of a deep insecurity over Russia's identity as a Great Power in the post-Cold War world (Morozov 2002; Neumann 2008). Writing from the perspective of just a few years later, this assessment again seems to fall short of realities: Russia is a rising Great Power, one of the BRICs, and has acquired this status on the basis of hard material facts – its exponential economic growth and the fact that it is an "energy superpower", holder of the world's largest gas reserves (Hedenskog 2005; Kanet 2007).

And yet, this contrast between the real and the imagined, simulated or "virtual" draws a distinction that is problematic to verify for Russia as Great Power in 2009, where the material underpinnings for Great Power status, as in all the BRICs, remain much more ambiguous than appears in the narrative of the "rising Great Powers" . However, apart from the ambiguity of Russia's "real" capabilities as a Great Power, such an argument also neglects the importance of scripts and narratives in the constitution of the state as agent in international relations. Far from being just a veil for decline and separate from the reality of the Russian state, the scripts and narratives that represent Russia as Great Power are constitutive of this reality – they have performative power and engender actions and reactions.

A similar insight underpins constructivist and English School approaches to the rise of the BRICs, which have focussed on the way in which state identities in international society are the product of an intersubjective construction, emerging in the interaction between a state and its "significant Other". For Great Powers, and for the BRICs in particular, recognition of their

status by peers – other Great Powers – is particularly important, precisely because they do not (yet) perform well on various "objective" criteria for Great Power status, especially the traditional requirements for military capabilities and the ability to project their power. Yet, as I will argue in this paper, this focus on external recognition does not capture a central element of the "state effect". This is the way that recognition, as well as the concepts used to describe a state's identity, are continuously translated and interpreted in different contexts. Whether or not recognition "really" occurs matters less than this interpretation, and in this sense, the constitution of the "state effect" blurs the boundaries between the real and the virtual. This matters, because there is a strong assumption in current constructivist conceptions of state identity that interaction with more powerful "significant Others" means socialization into the existing normative order, in particular for new states or newly rising Great Powers.

In this paper, I draw on Baudrillardian conceptions of virtuality and hyper-reality as well as insights from Koselleckian "conceptual history" to show how the identity of the post-Soviet Russian state is constituted by scripts and narratives. These representations are in turn constitutive of the way that Russia now starts to act as a Great Power, and the reactions this engenders from Western "significant Others". Contrary to currently dominant constructivist assumptions, I show how these narratives have evolved in a specific domestic and international context in spite of a lack of recognition as Great Power from Western significant Others, and how they have reinterpreted foundational Westphalian and modern concepts of statehood in different, interlinking narratives. Russia declares itself to be a defender of the "old order", against Western attempts to re-define the normative underpinnings of international order. In certain respects, this self-image is confirmed by the narratives of Russia's "state identity". However, it is once again a *partial* adaptation and reinterptetation that is now so avidly defended. In this sense Russia could be called a "hyper-Westphalian Great Power".

2. NARRATIVES, RECOGNITION AND VIRTUALITY

Why explore the "virtual", or hyper-real, when talking about Russia in world affairs? After all, Baudrillard's conception of the virtual seems to have been developed for the conditions of a post-modern, highly technicized, media-saturated society, and the "virtual", victim-less wars conducted by the West in the 1990s (Baudrillard 1983, 1977). This is a world in which global flows and networks, new wars and new humanitarianisms, challenge the "realities" of modernity, in particular the reality of the sovereign state with its clearly

delineated territoriality (Luke 1993, 1996). It seems fairly removed from a post-Soviet Russia that, according to many Western observers, has developed into a curiously old-fashioned international actor, upholding a starkly Westphalian reading of world politics, playing geopolitical "Great Games" with the US in Central Asia, with a distinct penchant for a "multipolar world order" and an obsession with its status as a Great Power. This Westphalian image of international politics sits uneasily with a Baudrillardian focus on virtuality and indeterminacy and the de-territorialized flows that according to Tim Luke now dominate the international and make "old languages cultivated in past circumstances (...) inadequate for interpreting this new era" (Luke 1996, 5).

In addition, recently there seems to be little need for thinking about Russia as "virtual" Great Power. According to one of the traditional material measures of Great Power status, economic strength, Russia has seen a spectacular recovery in the 2000s, one that has catapulted it into the ranks of the 10 strongest economies world-wide. It is an atomic power, and its military strength is still second only to the US, though by a wide margin. This is a spectacular turn-around from a position of extreme weakness after the end of the Soviet Union. Only a few years ago, Neil MacFarlane claimed that Russia was not an emerging Great Power at all – it was barely reversing the steep decline of its power in the 1990s and "laying the basis for a return to real (as opposed to symbolic) status as a Great Power" (Macfarlane 2006, 56). Just a few years later, Russia's rise as a Great Power, and more precisely "energy superpower" has produced a spate of academic analyses of the challenge it poses to the European order and its energy security (Baev 2008; Heinrich 2008), a "new Great Game" with the US and China for influence in Central Asia (Kleveman 2003; Brzezinski 1997), its "neo-imperialist" re-assertion in the former Soviet space (Orbán 2008; Bugajski 2004), and indeed a "new Cold War" in the making between Russia and the West (Lucas 2008; Korinman and Laughland 2008).

Nevertheless, it makes sense to explore Russia as a virtual, indeed hyper-Westphalian Great Power. In a way, our, the Western observers', reaction to the curiously old-fashioned nature of Russia's gaze on world politics is already a partial answer to this. What we seem to perceive in Russia is a nostalgic, almost idealistic mythologization of a lost world, that of the European concert of Powers. To the extent that Western observers no longer recognize this as the reality of current world politics, we are already judging this account to be virtual, indeed fake. What this highlights is that there are potentially different scripts and narratives about what a Great Power is and does in international politics, that these scripts and narratives may

evolve over time, and that they may not be universally shared among all members of international society.

2.1. Translation and recognition

However, as will be shown in the following sections, framing Russia simply as old-fashioned, Westphalian power in a post-Westphalian world does not capture its post-Soviet identity as a Great Power. The Russian exaltation of core Westphalian values is quite conscious, in the sense that Russia's state elite sees itself as the defender of a pluralist international order under threat from seemingly universal, but in reality deeply Western values; nevertheless, this is as much an exaltation of these values as it is a translation into the Russian context that amounts to a veritable re-interpretation. In this sense, Russia's identity as a hyper-Westphalian Great Power reveals the way that seemingly universal Westphalian concepts are re-interpreted and acquire different meanings in relation to different context – and in this, the cultural contingency of seemingly universal norms of international order. The old order that Russia so vigorously defends is a partial adaptation at best.

In taking this approach, I am emphasising the central importance of interpretation in the constitution of the social world, and the indeterminacy and context-dependence of meaning (Gadamer 1993; Koselleck 1979). This focus is intertwined with a conceptualization of the state as neither subject or object, but the effect of practices, including narrative practices that constitute the identity of a state as a particular kind of actor, both domestically and internationally (Mitchell 1991; Ringmar 1996).

Timothy Mitchell has described the state as "not as an actual structure, but as the powerful, apparently metaphysical effect of practices that make such structures appear to exist (…) what we call the state and think of as an intrinsic object existing apart from society [or the international sphere], is the sum of these structural effects." (Mitchell 1999, 56). This move allows an investigation of the way that the "state effect" is produced through discursive practices, in particular narratives (emplotted storylines) and scripts ("building blocs" and the performative element of narrative, political concepts and slogans) (O Tuathail 2002). In this, we need to pay greater attention to the narratives sustained by those claiming to speak and act in the name of the state and who draw their power from their identification with the state – Russia's state elite or statespeople.[1] There are different narratives of the state and they are

[1] The term is borrowed from (Navaro-Yashin 2002). Russia's "statespeople" are a wider group than what is normally thought of as "state elite", i.e. those associated with formal roles in the presidential apparatus, government and Duma. They include members of influential think tanks such as the SVOP, the most influential

interpreted in different ways, but it is also true that the statespeople claim the authority to act in the name of the state; embodying the state, their narratives and practices do represent the state in a way that external or opposition narratives do not. Thus, the way Russia's Western interlocutors understand the scripts and narratives used by the Kremlin is not necessarily the meaning they have acquired within the discursive context in which they are used in Russia.

This highlights the necessary processes of translation that occur when concepts are used in different contexts, and is arguably something that is both empirically relevant and is still being relatively neglected in empirically-minded "cultural turn" research (Valbjorn 2008). The critique that mainstream constructivism, for example, does not engage language and the contingency and indeterminacy of meaning has been made forcefully by post-structuralists such as Maja Zehfuss (Zehfuss 2001). Nevertheless, and in spite of the extensive deconstruction of the core Westphalian concept of sovereignty, it has been pointed out that the dominant assumption in IR remains that the meaning of Westphalian concepts in international politics is universally shared across different cultural and geographical areas (Callahan 2004; Hobson 2007; Agnew 2006). As the political geographer John Agnew (2006, 3) has rightly pointed out, in IR "there is...a danger of confounding the particular with the universal; with moving rapidly from a specific case or context to making a broad generalization covering all times and places".

This lack of attention to the way that the contingency and context-dependency of meaning plays out when it comes to real, empirical Others, is visible in the assumptions about state identity formation that underlie many constructivist approaches. More recently, they have appeared in the way the rise of the BRICs has been conceptualized within a framework drawing on constructivist and English School insights. These approaches rightly stress that there is more to Great Power status than material and especially military capabilities, the mainstay of Realist analyses (Mearsheimer 2001). Instead, they draw attention to status, and the recognition of status by the established powers (in the current unipolar moment, the US and, for Russia, Western Europe) as a main driving force for the behaviour of the rising powers. As Hedley Bull famously put it, Great Power status could be compared to "a club with a rule of membership" (Bull and Hoffmann 1995, 194). In other words, a state will only be recognized as a fully equal, or "legitimate" Great Power if it upholds the core norms and values that existing members claim allegiance to (Suzuki 2008). Thus recognition as a

---

political PR agencies or people in the "grey zone" between the big energy conglomerates and the state. It is a widening of scope that takes the under-institutionalized context of the Russian state into account. (Kryshtanovskaya and White 1998; Steen 2003; Rivera and Rivera 2006)

legitimate Great Power is not predetermined by material factors, which historically have indeed been a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for Great Power status (Simpson 2004).

In this reading, Great Power status is a social attribute, and the criteria which determine this status are in themselves socially constructed and open to change. It is the "great Power club", or the most powerful states in the system which agree on a normative framework, classically centred around respect for sovereignty, but also special rights granted to the Great Powers to take action to preserve this foundational norm (Bull and Hoffmann 1995). However, it has been argued that after the Cold War, there has been a shift, to some extent even a concerted effort by the now dominant Western powers, to re-define the criteria for membership of this "Great Power club", in line with the new emphasis on democracy and human rights as global norms for the post-Cold War era (Narlikar 2007; Hurrell 2007; Foot, Gaddis, and Hurrell 2003). It could be argued that adherence to norms of democracy and human rights, and a willingness to spread these norms, have begun to be considered essential for full recognition as a legitimate Great Power.

All of this feeds into recent attempts to conceptualize the rise of the BRICs in terms of their desire for recognition of status, or prestige. This emphasises precisely this recognition as equal by the dominant Western powers as a necessary element in Great Power status, and one that is well understood by the "rising Great Powers", who all seek this recognition in various ways (Suzuki 2008; Ringmar 2002). In other words, the social and normative aspect of Great Power status is an empirical phenomenon that influences the behaviour of the rising powers in international politics.

This focus on status points to the intersubjectively constructed nature of a state's identity as a Great Power – recognition is sought from and affirmed by outsiders, external "significant Others" (Neumann 1999). At this point the English School focus on the normative dimension of Great Power status converges with a constructivist emphasis on state identity formation and state socialization in international interaction (Johnston 2008; Alderson 2001). And in fact, underlying this emerging conceptualization of status-seeking are assumptions about state and identity that have informed much of the more mainstream constructivist work – an implicit or explicit reading of states as subjects, with an identity that is constituted though international interaction (Wendt 1999). In this reading, only if an identity is recognized by "significant Others" will it be secured and stabilized. Power differentials matter in this process: it is recognition by the more powerful that is pivotal.

As usual in constructivist discussions of "state identity", an implicit reading of identity as alterity is inherent in this argument. A state's identity as a Great Power, as are identities more widely, is constituted though a process of identification or differentiation, inclusion and exclusion – a process that is reinforced by the way that recognition as a legitimate Great Power now implies identification with the thick norms of democracy and Human Rights. This, as always, is about the production of boundaries – membership of an exclusive Great Power club, and at the same time membership of an imagined "international community" formed by adherence to liberal norms, a "greater West". An aspiring power must have been socialized into this now dominant normative order before it will be recognized as a fully equal Great Power. On this basis, Shogo Suzuki (2008) has argued that the outcome of the "recognition games" (Ringmar 2002) played by the rising Great Powers represent not so much a challenge to the existing international order, but will likely lead to their socialization into the existing normative framework.

This emphasis on recognition has been stressed more specifically for Russia, not only for the post-Soviet period. Erik Ringmar (2002) has claimed that Soviet Russia in the 1920s faced a "struggle for recognition" with the Western powers, and after an initial period in which radically incompatible narratives of self and other were put forward by both Soviet Russia and the Western powers, Soviet Russia finally ceded. As Ringmar pointed out, "they cared too much about how they appeared to others and how they were received. Their primary concern was to be regarded as a 'legitimate state' and to be treated with respect" (Ringmar 2002, 124). Ultimately Soviet Russia, the revolutionary state, was socialized into a dominant Westphalian order in order to gain the recognition of the identity it craved - and identity which was centred around Great Power and later superpower status. Iver Neumann (2008), while starting from a similar assumption about the linkage between socialization and full recognition as equal Great Power, comes to a slightly different conclusion – while Russia was fully socialized into the dominant Westphalian norms of the time and participated in the European concert of Powers in the 18th and 19th century, there was always a lingering doubt over its full recognition as an equal, and this doubt precisely reflected the fact that Russia rejected full socialization, especially with regard to its domestic set-up. In fact, Russia adapted partially to Western European developments of domestic order, but vigorously defended a domestic order – autocracy – that had long been rejected in the West. However, Neumann's analysis raises precisely the question how Russia's identification as a European Great Power has persisted in the absence of full recognition.

It is undoubtedly true that external recognition of Russia's Great Power status matters for the Kremlin and that it is reacting to external frames put before it. This is visible in the way that Russia has reacted to the linkage between democracy and recognition as legitimate Great Power. Under Putin, Russia has not given up its self-identification as a democracy, or even a domestic democratic structure, though the meaning of this identity has been thoroughly reinterpreted (Ortmann 2008). Nevertheless, there is much more to the way recognition is being sought, and indeed to the way that the identity of the Russian state is being constituted than current readings within ES and constructivist frameworks allow for. Russia's state identity as a Great Power has been sustained and even strengthened throughout a long period in the 1990s in which Western recognition was not forthcoming, and in which there were considerable doubts about Russia's Great Power status in its own terms, within the Russian political elite. However, not only did the Kremlin's self-identification as a Great Power strengthen during this period, the very specific narratives and scripts that describe Russia as Great Power could be described as re-interpretations of concepts of modern statehood into a specific post-Soviet Russian context. Russia's identity as a Great Power is therefore not so much Westphalian as hyper-Westphalian, an interpretation that draws its meaning from historical understandings of Russian statehood and the specific context of post-Soviet Russian state-building. While recognition matters in this, what arguably matters more is the interpretation and translation of this recognition by those seeking it. In the case of the new Russian state, the context was set by the way that its Great Power identity was linked in public political discourse to its identification as "Russia" and therefore became a necessary precondition for the legitimacy of Russia's statespeople.

2.2. Russia as virtual Great Power

As I will show in the following section, Russia could be called a hyper-Westphalian Great Power because of the way that the representation of its state identity in scripts and narratives both exalts and re-interprets modern, Westphalian concepts of statehood. At the same time, a focus on translation and interpretation leads back to the question of virtuality and hyper-reality. This highlights the question of audiences – for whom are these identity narratives performed and in which ways do they constitute the Russian state as an international actor? I have claimed that it may not be so much the reality or the intention of the recognition that matters, but the way in which it can be interpreted, and even simulated.

A Baudrillardrian reading of virtuality as hyper-reality points to the way that this simulation transcends a supposed opposition between real and fake and comes to constitute

the reality of the Russian state, by engendering actions and reactions. Even now, attempts to look into the "real" nature of Russia as Great Power in world affairs reveal ambiguities, if not outright contradictions. In spite of gas wars and the August invasion, the record of Russia's ability to project power in its self-declared sphere of influence is sketchy, and its foreign policy still largely reacts to agendas set by others. Nevertheless, it could be argued that scripts and narratives of Russia's state identity, and the practices that are legitimized by these scripts and narratives, have started to bring this hyper-Westphalian Great Power into being. Virtuality, in the Baudrillardrian sense, engenders its own reality, and it is precisely the inability to differentiate between the "real" and the "fake", the essential ambiguity of discursive formations, that is the constitutive element of the simulated or "hyper-real" (Debrix 2009). This inability concerns both producers and consumers of this narrative – outside observers in the West and (in different ways) the statespeople and population of Russia. The point is not that this is a simulation that is necessarily thoroughly believed by those who produce it or those whom it is intended for (Baudrillard 1983, 81). At the same time, neither is the simulation thoroughly *dis*believed by those who put it in practice – even where narratives and scripts delineating the identity of the Russian state (such as the script of "sovereign democracy", discussed below) are indeed purposefully "launched" by Kremlin "political technologists" in state-controlled media. As Debrix (2009, 65) has pointed out, the virtual is more than just a technique, and even where a simulation may have been deployed strategically, it "ends up with the fateful disappearance of the real". The virtual creates its own dynamics of action and reaction, a hyper-real which produces effects beyond the control of any of those who originally intended to manipulate it. In this sense, it is impossible to fix the boundary between the real and the hyper-real because whoever tries to determine this boundary is themselves part of a closed universe of self-referential signs (Baudrillard 1982, 2).

The hyper-reality of the Russian state that emerges through the scripts and narratives maintained by Russia's statespeople establishes a specific kind of state-actor, in which claims to Great Power status underpin claims to strong statehood in a domestic context. As will be seen in the following section, these representations of the Russian state underpin the claims of Russia's "statespeople" to power and legitimacy, even under conditions which put the "reality" of these claims into question. They are also performative, constitutive of a reality of the Russian state in world affairs – they give a specific identity to the Russian state as an international actor. The changing meaning of this identity, established in the scripts and

narratives put forward by Russia's statespeople in reaction to significant events, will be explored in the following section.

3. RUSSIA'S HYPER-WESTPHALIAN GREAT POWER NARRATIVES

In this section, I will trace the way that scripts and narratives of Russia's state identity are hyper-Westphalian, in the sense that they both exaggerate and reinterpret core Westphalian norms. I have stated above that the seemingly universal Westphalian concepts of statehood that constitute states as actors in international politics are translated into different contexts. This importance of context – in a wide sense, both discursive and non-discursive, but acquiring meaning within existing semantic fields – is stressed by the German historian and social theorist Reinhart Koselleck (Koselleck 1985). Following a Koselleckian reading, the foundational political concepts that make up the scripts of Russia's state identity acquire their meaning through the way they are used in association with other concepts, thus constituting semantic fields. They also acquire meaning in relation to the way they are used in interpretation of significant events and processes that "resonate" with these semantic fields. Because meaning is context-dependent, it cannot be fixed; it is inherently contingent and in constant evolution. At the same time, historical or diachronic "layers of meaning" remain present in these concepts; because of these layers of meaning and their context-dependency, foundational political concepts are never fully under the control of the speaker; they cannot be "occupied" and fixed. At the same time, they carry considerable legitimizing power, because they establish the identity of the polity and the right to speak and act in its name.

Both the importance of context and the legitimizing power of these scripts – the foundational political concepts which establish Russia's identity as a Great Power – can be seen in Russia's post-Cold War identity as a "democratic Great Power" that will be explored in this section.[2] First of all, the semantic field constituting the Russian state is intertwined with broader Russian identity discourses, to a larger degree than in the classic Westphalian nation state. Talking about Russia's "state identity" as Great Power refers to more than just the constitution of the Russian state as an international actor – it is a claim that this new post-

[2] The empirical research on which the following section draws involved a close reading of a broad array of publicly available texts (newspapers, broadcasting transcripts, press conferences, the foreign policy and national security concepts etc.) emanating from the Russian political and state elite, starting with central texts and the most visible political figures at the time to identify the core conceptual field and then broadening the scope to include a broader array of "statespeople". (Ortmann 2008)

Soviet state can legitimately claim to be "Russia". At the same time, the question of Russia's identity as a Great Power is linked to the central identity discourse about Russia's belonging to Europe and the West. In both these senses, representations of Russia as a Great Power appear as central markers of Russian collective identity. Secondly, pivotal events, "formative moments", both domestic and international, are interpreted in the light of these scripts and narratives and at the same time provide the context within which these scripts themselves are reassessed and reinterpreted. It is these interpretations of context which are at the basis of the evolution of scripts and narratives of Russia as Great Power. Acts of external recognition, or indeed non-recognition, matter for the interpretation given to them rather than the intention behind them – and they are part of a broader meaningful context in which interpretation takes place.

3.1. Great Power as identity script – Russia's "state identity"

Russian narratives constituting the Russian state as a Great Power – i.e. its identity as an international actor – have always been tied up with the central identity question about Russia's belonging to Europe (if not the imaginary space of the West, which from a Russian perspective may or may not be separate from Europe).[3] It is as a Great Power that Russia has historically been recognized as part of Europe, ever since the victory of Peter I over the Swedes in 1706. In the Concert of Europe of the 18th and 19th centuries, the Tsarist empire was given fully equal treatment and all the formal trappings of European Great Power status – in marked contrast to that other great outsider, the Ottoman empire (Malia 1999). However, at the same time there remained a lingering doubt over Russia's full inclusion in the European civilizational space, a doubt that was mirrored on the Russian side by a persistent Slavophile discourse which declared precisely that Russia was a world unto itself and should not try to emulate Europe (Neumann 2008; Franklin and Widdis 2004). This ambiguity over Russia's belonging to Europe has remained one of the main vectors of Russian identity through the Soviet Union, and has once again turned into a central feature of Russia's post-Soviet identity (Morozov 2004).

[3] These perceptions are not fixed. While there normally exists a differentiation between "Europe" and "the West", since the colour revolutions, Europe and the US have been lumped together in a "West" with negative connotations – the aggressive promoter of seemingly universal norms that only exist to destabilize both international order and the domestic order of states who choose not to follow the command of the West. Cf also (Morozov 2003).

Apart from the well-known debate between Westernizers and Slavophiles, there exists another identity narrative about Russia's relationship with Europe, however. Iver Neumann (1996) has argued that the question of Russia's belonging to Europe was not just about identification with or differentiation from civilizational values defined by Western Europe. There exists a historical identity narrative that stylizes Russia as the defender of "true Europe", of the core of European values which were neglected by a corrupt, weak Western Europe. The narrative of Russia as "true Europe" was a constant theme during Soviet times, where the Soviet Union was presented as the progressive future of Europe (Neumann 1996). This narrative of Russia as "true Europe" of course is a marked reversal of the more enduring "Westernizing" identity narratives which cast Russia in the role of learner, always just short of catching up, but not quite European yet (Billington 1966).

In fact, after an initial turn to the "learner" narrative in the early 1990s (and a strong rejection of Russia's European identity by radical nationalists), a new version of the narrative of "true Europe" has developed, in which Russia is stylized into the defender of what is effectively the old Westphalian order – an international order based on absolute respect for sovereignty as enshrined in classic international law, as well as an endorsement of multipolarity against US hegemony, of which Russia would be a leading pole. This exaltation of classic Westphalian values, including the special status given to the Great Powers in the Westphalian system (and institutionalized in the UNSC), once again finds Russia in the position of defending an old order perceived as outdated in the West. This is one part of what qualifies Russia as a "hyper-Westphalian Great Power", and has led some analysts to call Russia a 19th century Great Power in a 21st century world (Tsygankov 2005).

3.2. Hyper-Westphalian? Russian concepts of statehood and the "democratic Great Power" narrative

The Kremlin may at the moment put forward a self-conscious defence of the old Westphalian order against the Western emphasis on democracy and Human Rights, but this "hyper-Westphalian" identity is tied in with a translation of Westphalian concepts into a specific Russian context. This is visible particulary in the way that sovereignty and territoriality are conceptualized in public political discourse.

Westphalian conceptions of sovereignty centre on territoriality, an absolute, qualitative distinction between domestic and international space (Walker 1992). And indeed, respect for

territorial integrity as a central norm of international law is a central and oft-repeated demand by the Kremlin, as is its opposition against external interference by Western states in the name of universal values. However, while there is a strong resistance to challenges to the unity and autonomy of the Russian state, there appears at the same time a profound ambiguity about territoriality, and with this the distinction between domestic and external space. In Russian discourse, the countries of the CIS are often described as its "Near Abroad", "not quite foreign" (as opposed to the "far abroad", which indicates truly international space, and indeed what could be called an "inner abroad", namely Chechnya – often lumped together with CIS states in a "Caucasus" section of major newspapers). This image of "not-quite-foreign" space resonates with imperial conceptions of "boundless space" and Soviet "layers of sovereignty", in which socialist "brother countries" in the Warsaw pact inhabited a similar ambiguous "in-between" (Jones 1990; Walker 2003; Widdis 2004). However, it also illustrates the contemporary difficulties of imagining "Russia" as bounded, delineated space. This is particularly obvious with reference to the old "little brothers" Ukraine and Belarus. The independence of Ukraine in particular appeared unthinkable to many in 1991 (Solchanyk 1995); however, rather than a choice between independence and reincorporation into Russian territory, what appears in representations of Ukraine and Ukrainian sovereignty in Russian public political discourse is a persistent ambiguity, well illustrated in the following statement of the head of Russia's border guard in 2001, referring to Belarus and Ukraine: "Russia, Ukraine and Belarus are in principle one people.(...) We may as well live in three separate states. By the way, the former Soviet republics were also independent and sovereign states. (...)" (Nikolaev 1997).

This ambiguity is only broken by developments to which the Kremlin is forced to react, such as the Ukrainian "Orange Revolution" in 2005 which was followed by an Ukrainian "turn to the West", culminating in the decision to join NATO in 2008. The persistence of this ambiguous territoriality goes further, though – it is visible in the exceedingly slow and as yet incomplete delineation of borders between Russia and the successor states, and has been an underlying factor in the conflict with Georgia over Abkhazia and South Ossetia (REFS). As Taras Kuzio summed it up, "equating 'Russia' with the Russian Federation may only take place over many decades (...)" (Kuzio 2001).

All of this amounts to a translation of the concept of sovereignty and territoriality into a specific post-Soviet context, one which sits uneasily with its dominant Westphalian definition. And quite apart from the historical layers of meaning that come into play here, this

reinterpretation is at the same time not simply the result of state-building in a post-Westphalian era. In fact, the predominant meaning of sovereignty that emerges in the scripts and narratives of the Russian state is quite different from the general erosion of territorial sovereignty in the context of globalization. While the latter is tellingly conceptualized in terms of the end of the nation-state (in the Westphalian imagination unthinkable without territorial sovereignty), in Russia this ambiguous territoriality goes hand in hand with an exaltation of the state as sovereign subject, both in scripts of Russia as Great Power and indeed of the central Russian state as strong, autonomous, subject (Morozov 2008; Prozorov 2006). Here, sovereignty is not primarily associated with territoriality; instead its core connotation is an image of the Russian state as autonomous, independent actor – as Putin put it, "reaching our priority national goals depends only on us. (...) it is far from everyone in the world that wants to have to deal with an independent, strong and self-reliant Russia" (Putin 26 May 2004).

This exaltation of the power of the state-sovereign could be called hyper-Westphalian, sharply bringing into focus a central, but hidden element of the Westphalian narrative. Intertwined with the boundedness of the modern state emphasised by the Westphalian conception of territorial sovereignty is an image of the state as modern, bounded, self-same subject (Blaney and Inayatullah 2000), an image which has more recently been brought to the fore by constructivist readings of "state identity", most famously Wendt's argument that "states are people, too" (Wendt 2004). In fact, as Bull has pointed out, the classic, Westphalian account of Great Power status stresses sovereign autonomy (Bull 1977, 194). It is precisely this idea of autonomy that has been challenged by the post-Westphalian redefinition of Great Power status outlined above, which posits belonging to a community of values as a central precondition for recognition as an equal. In this sense, the assessment that Russia is defending the Westphalian order, and especially classic Westphalian conceptions of Great Power, against its erosion in the name of universal values seems entirely justified.

Both the emphasis on sovereign subjectivity and the open challenge to a liberal reinterpretation of Great Power status finds its expression in the narrative of Russia as democratic Great Power, first brought into play by then foreign minister Yevgenii Primakov in the late 1990s, but increasingly central under Putin. The main thrust of this narrative is the special place that Russia holds as one of the advocates and future main poles of a pluralist, multipolar international system, structured to prevent the unilateral dominance of the US. In references to a democratic world order in public political discourse, democracy is effectively

interpreted as autonomy, the right of sovereign subjects to control their own way of life (Ortmann 2008). In other words, the identification of Russia as democratic Great Power was precisely not about its identification with a community of values, but about its independence of action and independence from outside interference. In this sense, it is an open contestation of the meaning of Clinton's and Bush's democratic world order, and of course the post-Westphalian re-definition of Great Power status discussed above. As a draft for the 2008 foreign policy doctrine put it, "Russia is an independent player with global interests, [which] leaves no grounds for illusions regarding the possibility of coopting our country into the crumbling Western alliance on conditions imposed on us" (Analytical material from a working group of the scientific council attached to the Russian MFA for the foreign policy review 2007).[4]

This reinterpretation of "democracy" through its connection with the exaltation of sovereign subjectivity that appear in the conceptual field of Russia as Great Power and strong state translate modern, Westphalian concepts of statehood to put forward an alternative vision of the post-Cold War world. In fact, this narrative is closely connected to that of Russia as "true Europe", defending the essence of Westphalia against a Western Europe that has succumbed to the United States and has effectively reneged on its true nature. This was a narrative that came to the fore during the 1999 Kosovo crisis, when there was real disbelief among the Russian political elite that European states would agree to NATO's out-of-area missions. Most notably, it has been reinterpreted again since the colour revolutions, when the narrative of Russia as democratic Great Power was condensed in the slogan of Russia as "sovereign democracy", which fused domestic and external representations of the strong, autonomous state (Averre 2007). In relation to this, the EU, with the US, were cast as hypocrites who would undermine the democratic sovereignty of a state in the name of an abstract, meaningless devotion to universal freedom and democracy, in line with an interpretation of the colour revolutions which put them as western-manipulated and ultimately directed against Russia (Ambrosio 2007). This narrative now rejects not only the legitimacy of Western re-interpretations of the norms associated with Great Power status, but actually suggests that the West is insincere in its own endorsement of these norms.

Yet, the interpretation of sovereignty that once again comes to the fore in the narrative of Russia as democratic Great Power and sovereign democracy, with its emphasis on sovereign autonomy, diverges not only from the Westphalian emphasis on territoriality and boundaries.

[4] The narrative is also well expressed in Putin's infamous "Munich speech" held at the Munich Security conference in 2007, as well as in numerous other documents

It also goes against the modern European dissociation between the territorial state and the ruler, in fact reversing Western European understandings of popular sovereignty. In this sense, the narrative that is being created is a translation and reinterpretation which selectively emphasises certain strands of the Westphalian narrative, but gives them new meaning by putting them into a different context. In some ways, the narrative of Russia as democratic Great Power fuses a projection of the 19th century European balance of power onto the global sphere with elements of Eurasianism, an ideology which was in itself a fusion of classical geopolitical thought with the Russian orthodox tradition, developed by White Russian émigrés in the 1920s (Laruelle 2008). There is a strong element of this in a narrative that declares the historical mission of Russia to act as the vanguard against this unipolar hegemony, both politically and in normative terms – a position for which Russia is claimed to be ideally situated, being the only Great Power participating in three different civilizational spheres (European, Asian and the Muslim world) (Bassin 1991; Smith 1999).

As hinted at above, the narrative of Russia as "sovereign democracy" was a very conscious contestation of Western concepts by Russia's "political technologists". As the political analyst Boris Makarenko tellingly commented: "Sovereign democracy and everything that is associated with it is the discourse of "catching-up" – we argue with the West in its own language, the language of post-communist transition" (Makarenko 15 May 2006). Nevertheless, the underlying dynamics of the development of Russia's state identity into that of a "sovereign democracy" have to be sought not so much in external interaction, but in the specific context of the emergence of the new Russian state after 1991 and the ongoing challenges to its legitimacy that were a result of the way the new Russian state emerged from the Soviet breakdown. The explicit tension between the narrative of state strength and an (interpreted) reality of weakness in the first decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union has been crucial in the production of Russia's state identity, and this will be explored in the following section. The reason for this lays in the way that the new Russian state emerged, which included not only a period of exceptional economic and political weakness, but a fragile legitimacy that put into question the very identification of the Russian state as "Russia".

4. RUSSIA AS VIRTUAL GREAT POWER

As I outlined above, there is a second way of thinking about Russia as hyper-Westphalian, beyond the actual content of the scripts and narratives that constitute its identity as a Great Power – and that is the performative aspect of these narratives, the way they engender actions and reactions and constitute Russia as a virtual or hyper-real state. A Baudrillardian conception of the virtual operates on two levels: the simulation – in tension with the real – and the way that this tension is resolved by blurring the boundaries between the virtual and the real. Russia's virtual statehood covers both grounds and is in the process of transiting from one to the other. Russia's Great Power narrative clearly has become performative now, engendering actions such as the August 2008 invasion of Georgia, re-engagement in the former Soviet space and in particular Central Asia, and increased role on the international stage beyond the CIS, where Russia has been particularly concerned to foster the idea of multipolarity against US hegemony. Russia's Great Power identity also engenders reactions in the West, though again not necessarily those intended by the Kremlin.

This is a very different context to that in which the new Russian state emerged after 1991, when Russia appeared as a virtual, simulated Great Power, understood to be existing in rhetoric rather than fact even by those who claimed this status (Umbach 2000). The liberal reformers around the Yeltsin presidency faced a strong nationalist and communist opposition, which challenged the legitimacy of any Russian state that was not also a Great Power, an empire or indeed the Soviet Union. This the Russian Federation was not – not only had it considerably shrunk in size, but Yeltsin had established the new Russian state in explicit opposition to the Soviet Union and had destroyed it in the process (Breslauer and Dale 1997). In this context, the very identity of the new Russian Federation as a legitimate representation of "Russia" – and by extension the legitimacy of the Yeltsin camp which made this claim – was openly contested in a highly polarized domestic political scene. This comes to the fore in yet another identity narrative, which could be called "Russia in danger", and which complements and sustains that of Russia as strong state and Great Power. This narrative simply suggests that the central Russian state - and therefore Russia – faces a threat to its very existence. In fact, though the transition to the Putin era has meant that this open challenge subsided, an undertone of fragile legitimacy persists even now. The narrative of a threat to the existence of Russia has appeared in different forms in both Russian reactions to the 1999 Kosovo crisis (where a direct parallel was drawn between Kosovo and Chechnya) and in the Kremlin's hysterical reaction to the colour revolutions, which were interpreted as aimed at Russia.

Yeltsin's camp therefore endorsed Russia's identity as a Great Power from the very beginning – as a way to claim legitimacy for the new Russian state and for their own hold on power, to signal to a sceptical opposition and the Russian people that this new state did indeed represent "Russia". However, there remained a significant difference: the Kremlin continued to describe the actual Russian Federation as a Great Power and strong state and thus effectively dissociated Russia's identity as a Great Power from its imperial legacy (REFS Ortmann 2008). Initially, the Kremlin also associated Russia's Great Power identity with its new identity as a liberal democracy, a "normal Great Power" which had finally joined "Western civilization" (Kozyrev 1992). This association, which appears as a textbook illustration of the power of recognition and state socialization, barely lasted a year. When it ended, it was in the context of domestic upheaval (the power struggle between Yeltsin and the conservative opposition in parliament), rather than any specific moves by external significant Others – though the decision to enlarge NATO (strongly opposed in Russia) did not help.

Given the weakness of the state, as well as the precarious legitimacy of the Yeltsin regime itself, the Kremlin might have been expected to be especially dependent on external recognition of its Great Power scripts, a recognition that could have served to confirm their claim to the reality of Russia's status. After all, there was little scope to confirm scripts of Russia as Great Power and strong state in other ways: there was a visible gap between claims to the strength of the state and the presidency and the way that state weakness was openly discussed in the public media and experienced by the Russian public (Lapidus 1999). And in international affairs, there were few markers of Great Power status that the Kremlin could refer to beyond the seat in the UNSC and the nuclear status inherited from the Soviet Union.

However, recognition of Great Power status by Western "significant Others" was very visibly not forthcoming. Both from the perspective of the EU and the US, the Russia of the 1990s was a learner, not all that different from other former Soviet states (Morozov 2004). Russia's claims to Great Power status were acknowledged rhetorically, but not taken seriously. Full membership in the G8 was stalled, various promises to involve Russia in the re-ordering of Europe's new security architecture and in particular in NATO decision making structures revealed themselves as empty – much to the chagrin of the Kremlin. Nevertheless, in this situation of domestic weakness and external lack of recognition as equal, not only did the scripts of Russia as Great Power persist and evolve, but as the 1990s drew to a close and Yeltsin handed over to Putin, recognition was increasingly being demanded on Russia's own terms – as independent actor, equal, but autonomous (Prozorov 2006).

Part of this persistence may be due to the place of the Great Power script in wider Russian identity narratives. Given its centrality for establishing the new state as a continuation of "Russia", keeping the identity script of Russia as Great Power alive was crucial for the self-legitimation of Russia's statespeople. In the absence of external recognition, there were therefore attempts at simulating both Russia's Great Power status and this recognition. Incessant references to Russia's seat in the UNSC and its nuclear status in the official discourse of the Kremlin were supplemented by a simulation of external recognition wherever possible. Thus, Russia's involvement as one of the "troika" in the Ramboillet negotiations during the protracted Kosovo crisis was hailed by the Kremlin as evidence of Russia's status, especially when NATO agreed to delay the use of force in October 1998 in response to Russian pleadings for more negotiation time (Graham 2002; Ortmann 2008).

The bombardment of Serbia, as well as NATO's decision to conduct out-of-area missions announced days previously in April 1999, proved a traumatic event for Russia's political elite, also because it made painfully obvious that Russia was by no means recognized as a Great Power of sufficient influence to prevent any of these developments. At the same time, it exposed the contingency of seemingly institutionalized guarantees of Great Power status such as the UN security council seat, given that NATO had decided to act without UN authorization. The narrative of Russia as democratic Great Power emerged during and after this event and could be interpreted as a way to safeguard the Great Power script by insulating Russia from this blatant absence of outside recognition. The content of this narrative, with its emphasis on independence and the reactivation of the image of Russia as "true Europe" both contributed to this. On the one hand, lack of recognition from a "false", corrupt Europe could be more easily ignored, something that is illustrated both by the Kremlin's reaction to "Operation Allied Force" and more recently by the way that Western criticism of Russia's democratic record is rebuffed with reference to European and American "double standards" (Fawn 2006). On the other hand, the very content of the narrative matters. Independence of action as an expression of Great Power status implies less emphasis on recognition and is easier to simulate than a full inclusion into a European "community of values", even in a media environment that after Putin's advent to power was swiftly brought under the almost exclusive control of the Kremlin. This is particularly true when Russia, through its emphasis on sovereign independence, upholds true European values against a degenerate West.

The tension between the simulated and the "real" persists in the public politics of Putin's Russia, illustrated most infamously by Russia's "virtual democracy", the elaborate system of

fake parties and simulated democratic institutions, where the real politics once again seem to occur behind closed doors between competing networks of elite groups (Fish 2005; Wilson 2005). It also persists in the way that the central Russian state remains "occupied" by elites, in a diffuse relationship with large industrial and energy conglomerates such as Gazprom, which are by no means simply "state-controlled", and it continues to be present in Russian foreign policy. In fact, it would be wrong to assume that the narrative of Russia as a "democratic Great Power" determines a clear line for Russian foreign policy, nor that Russia's foreign policy aims are generally achieved. Russia's declared "sphere of influence" in the CIS looks increasingly fragmented, with Ukraine and Georgia both having made an explicit choice between the West and Russia, which Russia has been unable to prevent. In fact, the intervention on Georgia in August 2008 could partly be read as a rather desperate measure to prevent NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine – a measure that may have been successful in the short run, but has not fundamentally shifted the stakes in either case. In fact, a suggestion for a new European security framework including Russia, launched before the attack and repeated since, is falling on deaf ears. And even in Central Asia, supposedly the new focus of Russian influence in the CIS, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan are openly declaring a "multi-vector" policy that plays out Russia against other states.

At the same time however, this dichotomy coexists with a hyper-reality of Russia's identity as a Great Power and indeed strong state. The narrative that had developed during the 1990s is being increasingly enacted – and has begun to engender reactions, perhaps even recognition, by Western "significant Others. This performance of the strong state occurred both in domestic and international affairs, and was made possible by the astonishing economic recovery of Russia in the 2000s. As oil money flooded into Russia, the state of public finances was transformed in the spate of a few years, so much so that Putin paid back all IMF loans in 2005, years ahead of schedule – a gesture signalling the new-found independence and strength of the Russian state to the West, even though this meant renouncing on much-needed spending on health and pensions.

Russia's increased wealth and its status as "energy superpower" undoubtedly increased its scope for action; and in this, its identity as Great Power and "sovereign democracy" was asserted more forcefully. This can be seen not only in a concerted attempt to regain influence in the CIS, but also a return to engagement further afield, in Latin America and in nuclear cooperation with Iran, and of course the rapprochement with China, symbolized by cooperation in the SCO, which has surprised analysts by leading to regular joint exercised and

other concrete cooperation projects in the region. The latter highlights that the independence stressed in Russia's Great Power narrative is not simply that of a 19th century power, but indicates independence from Western significant Others – the Kremlin is willing to engage in multilateral institutions, if it can be sure to have a position of influence in them (Wilson Rowe and Torjesen 2009). In fact, the Kremlin has put forward not only proposals for a new European security conference, but also vague ideas about a "twenty-first concert of Powers", based on the UN system and other exclusive multilateral institutions, such as the G8, as well as proposals for formalized institutions for regional powers (in all of which Russia would participate, given its geographic location (Averre 2008).

Ultimately, recognition of Russia's identity as a Great Power is now openly demanded and to some degree expected by the Kremlin, and this means treatment as equal, not inclusion into a Western-dominated normative space. In this sense, the Kremlin has successfully re-interpreted what it means to be a Great Power in the post-Cold War world. At the same time, Russia's Great Power status, and some more specific elements of Russia's identity as a Great Power are now increasingly being recognized by Western "significant Others". This change is especially visible for the Russian relationship with the EU and its member states. The Kremlin has long preferred bilateral relationships with individual EU states, a strategy in which it has been successful – different EU member states now have markedly different approaches to Russia (Averre 2007). And the EU, having long sought "normative convergence", i.e. socializing Russia into a common European space, has now abandoned these attempts (Haukkala 2008). The new Eastern partnership does not include Russia (on Russia's expressive wishes), and cooperation (which continues on many levels, if not without problems) is now framed in the language of a "strategic partnership" with what is acknowledged as a powerful country in Europe's immediate neighbourhood. As Chris Browning (2008) has summed it up, "Russia has been successful in its aspiration to conduct relations with the EU in a manner similar to the Concert of Powers" (Browning 2008, 11).

Relations with the US have been more complex in the 2000s, since the Bush administration mixed aggressive democracy promotion (interpreted in the 2005 version of "Russia in danger") and open snubs (for example the 2005 withdrawal from the ABM treaty) with a geopolitical vision that mirrored Russian Great Power narratives and thus provided a degree of recognition from Russia's most powerful "Other". This was visible in the way in which Washington conceptualized a struggle for influence in the FSU and in particular Central Asia as a "new Great Game" between Russia and the US. In some ways, this latter

tendency seems even more pronounced under Obama. His new pragmatic line, which early on led to a halt of the missile defence project (rumoured to be in exchange for Russian influence on Teheran, which would be another acknowledgement of Russia's influence beyond its immediate backyard) is once again one that resonates with the Russian script of a "democratic world order" and therefore gives scope to interpretation as recognition by Russia's "statespeople". Thus, while there remains an ambiguity to Russia's Great Power status, the narratives and scripts that establish the identity of Russia as an international actor are increasingly performed and in this, opportunities for the translation and simulation of recognition arise more frequently. In fact, this recognition, and indeed Russia's status as a Great Power, is now asserted as a matter of fact in public political discourse.

The examples given above, but also prevalent representations of Russia in the public media and in public political discourse in the US and Europe, indicate that this recognition is indeed forthcoming. Yet, this too is not an intersubjective construction, but a translation of the identity narratives put forward by the Kremlin, in the light of evolving identity narratives which are grounded in local contexts. Thus, the normative vision that is inherent in the Kremlin's narrative of Russia as democratic Great Power, or indeed as the preserver of international order, is wholly rejected. Instead, the image of Russia that emerges in many Western narratives, both in Europe and the US, is one of Russia as slightly barbarian and a potential threat to European order – traditionally one of the two dominant identity narratives with which Europeans have made sense of Russia, and certainly the one which has been dominant throughout the 20th century (Malia 1999). This is exemplified by European reactions to the gas wars between Russia and Ukraine: in spite of the fact that this was a complex dispute which involved business as well as political interests, the dominant European reading of the conflict was one of a powerful Russian state using energy as a foreign policy tool, in a manner that was destabilizing and wholly illegitimate. This narrative did recognize Russia as powerful, autonomous actor rather than the passive object of European normative hegemony. However, at the same time Russia is represented as a destabilizing force, certainly far removed from Russian self-images as preserver of European order. Again, this engenders reactions – the central place that "energy security" now occupies on the European agenda and more concretely the Nabucco pipeline project can be directly linked to the gas wars (Barysch 2008).

5. Conclusion

As I have argued in this paper, Russia's hyper-Westphalian Great Power narratives are upheld and evolve not through acts of outside recognition but in a context in which an identity as a Great Power is central to the legitimacy of the new Russian state and by extension those claiming to speak in its name. The hyper-Westphalian nature of the scripts that constitute the Russian state effect reflects the way that these scripts legitimate the claims to power of a "state elite" in a context in which Russia's statehood appeared ambiguous and even fragile. In this, recognition, while being sought, has been interpreted and even simulated in order to sustain the narrative of Russia as democratic Great Power. The way that this Great Power narrative has developed in relation to an existing semantic field of the identity of "Russia", rather than through "real" external recognition is especially interesting because of the centrality of Western "significant Others" for Russia's identity discourses.

While the Russian narrative projects Russia, the defender of the old European order, as part of an imagined European space, Western interpretations of these Great Power narratives, as always, continue to work according to the logic of inclusion/exclusion and at present tend to exclude Russia from this European space. Russia has therefore not gained recognition for its self-image as a defender of European order. Interestingly however, this has nevertheless meant recognition of Russia as a Great Power, even if Russia has not complied with the Western re-definitions of Great Power status discussed above. It is in this sense that the projection of Russia's Great Power narrative has been successful, though like all projections it has in the process been re-interpreted and translated by Russia's Western "Others". But the gap in interpretations between Russia and European countries does not affect Russian self-images as a Great Power, both because inclusion is not the logic according to which Russia seeks recognition as a Great Power in the first place and because there have increasingly been opportunities to interpret and simulate recognition as autonomous, independent actor. As I claimed above, under these conditions, the question whether Russia "really" is a Great Power is ultimately moot. Western "significant Others" react to these identity narratives and this, together with Russian practices (of which the identity narratives are part) constitute the identity of the Russian state as a hyper-Westphalian Great Power.

That said, once again context matters. The success of the Russian challenge to the normative re-definition of Great Power status of the post-Cold War era cannot be separated from an evolving international context in which this challenge does not only come from Russia. Anti-Western sentiments are on the rise in many areas of the non-Western world and this means in particular an attack on the kind of normative agenda that underpinned Western

understandings of legitimate Great Power status in the 1990s. More than anything else, Russia's challenge occurs as part of the rise of the BRICs and in particular China. While it has been argued that China is indeed seeking recognition in the West's own term and does not present an open challenge to the normative framework of the post-Cold War order, its insistence on sovereign autonomy and Western non-interference mirrors and reinforces that of Russia – quite apart from the fact that it is not a liberal democracy. Western narratives about China leave no doubt that this is not only a rising Great Power but a potential contender for hegemony, and this development already presents a challenge to a Western-centric normative order – and is certainly interpreted in Russia as such. While this paper has concentrated on Russia, processes of translation and re-interpretation of core Westphalian norms are unavoidable in international interaction. Russia's hyper-Westphalian narratives highlight that the meaning of central Westphalian concepts evolve not only over time, but that processes of translation and re-interpretation of the narratives projected by international actors are an important feature of international interaction.

Adomeit, Hannes. 1995. Russia as a "Great Power" in World Affairs : Images and Realities *International Affairs* 71 (1):36-68.

Agnew, John. 2006. Open to surprise? *Progress in Human Geography* 30 (1):1-4.

Alderson, Kai. 2001. Making sense of state socialization. *Review of International Studies* 27:415-433.

Ambrosio, Thomas. 2007. Insulating Russia from a colour revolution: how the Kremlin resists regional democratic trends. *Democratization* 14 (2):232-252.

Analytical material from a working group of the scientific council attached to the Russian MFA for the foreign policy review. 2007. *Mezhdunarodnaia Znisn* 1.

Averre, Derek. 2007. 'Sovereign Democracy' and Russia's Relations with the European Union. *Demokratizatsiya* 15 (2):173-190.

Baev, Pavel. 2008. *Russian energy policy and military power : Putin's quest for greatness*. New York, NY: Routledge.

Barysch, Katinka, ed. 2008. *Pipelines, Politics and Power: the Future of EU-Russian energy relations*. London: Centre for European Reform.

Bassin, Mark. 1991. Russia between Europe and Asia: The Ideological Construction of Geographical Space. *Slavic Review* 50 (1):1-17.

Baudrillard, Jean. 1977. *Oublier Foucault*. Paris: Éditions Galilée.

———. 1983. *Simulations*. New York, N.Y.: Semiotext[e].

Billington, James H. 1966. *The Icon and the Axe*. London: Weidenfels and Nicholson.

Blaney, David L., and Naeem Inayatullah. 2000. The Westphalian Deferral. *International Studies Review* 2 (2):26-64.

Breslauer, George, and Catherine Dale. 1997. Boris Yeltsin and the invention of a Russian nation-state. *Post-Soviet Affairs* 13.

Brzezinski, Zbigniew. 1997. *The grand chessboard : American primacy and its geostrategic imperatives*. New York: Basic Books.

Bugajski, Janusz. 2004. *Cold Peace: Russia's new Imperialism*. New York: Praeger.

Bull, Hedley, and Stanley Hoffmann. 1995. *The anarchical society : a study of order in world politics*. 2nd ed. Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Callahan, William A. 2004. Nationalising International Theory: Race, Class and the English School. *Global Society* 18 (4):305-323.

Fawn, Rick. 2006. Battle over the box: international election observation missions, political competition and retrenchment in the post-Soviet space. *International Affairs* 82:1133-1153.

Fish, M. Steven. 2005. *Democracy derailed in Russia: the failure of open politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Foot, Rosemary, John Lewis Gaddis, and Andrew Hurrell. 2003. *Order and justice in international relations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Franklin, Simon, and Emma Widdis. 2004. *National identity in Russian culture: an introduction*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Gadamer, Hans Georg. 1993. *Wahrheit und Methode*. 2nd ed. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr.

Graham, Thomas E., Jr. 2002. Fragmentation of Russia. In *Russia after the Fall*, edited by A. Kuchins. Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Hedenskog, Jakob. 2005. *Russia as a great power: dimensions of security under Putin*. London ; New York: Routledge.

Heinrich, Andreas. 2008. Under the Kremlin's Thumb: Does Increased State Control in the Russian Gas Sector Endanger European Energy Security? *Europe-Asia Studies* 60:1539-1574.

Hobson, John M. 2007. Is critical theory always for the white West and for Western imperialism? Beyond Westphilian towards a post-racist critical IR. *Review of International Studies* 33:91-116.

Hurrell, Andrew. 2007. *On global order : power, values, and the constitution of international society*. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press.

Johnston, Alastair I. 2008. *Social states : China in international institutions, 1980-2000, Princeton studies in international history and politics*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Jones, Robert A. 1990. *The Soviet Concept of Limited Sovereignty from Lenin to Gorbachev*. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Kanet, Roger E. 2007. *Russia : re-emerging great power, Studies in central and eastern Europe*. Basingstoke ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Kleveman, Lutz. 2003. *The new great game : blood and oil in Central Asia*. London: Atlantic.

Korinman, Michel, and John Laughland. 2008. *Russia : a new Cold War?* Edgware: Vallentine Mitchell.

Koselleck, Reinhart. 1979. Begriffsgeschichte und Sozialgeschichte. In *Vergangene Zukunft*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

———. 1985. Begriffsgeschichte and Social History. In *Futures past: On the Semantics of Historical Times*. London; Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Kozyrev, Andrei. 1992. Speech at conference “Transformed Russia in a New World”. *International Affairs (Moscow)* April-May.

Kryshtanovskaya, Olga, and Stephen White. 1998. From Power to Property: The Nomenklatura in Post-Communist Russia. In *Elites and Leadership in Russian Politics*, edited by G. Gill. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Kuzio, Taras. 2006. *Russia continues to hold up border demarcation with Ukraine* [PDF]. RFE/RL 2001 [cited 25/3 2006].
Lapidus, Gail W. 1999. Asymmetrical federalism and state breakdown in Russia. *Post-Soviet Affairs* 15 (1):74-82.
Laruelle, Marlène. 2008. *Russian Eurasianism : an ideology of Empire*. Washington, D.C.
Baltimore: Woodrow Wilson Center Press ;
Johns Hopkins University Press.
Lucas, Edward. 2008. *The New Cold War: The Future of Russia and the Threat to the West*. London: Bloomsbury.
Luke, Tim. 1993. Discourses of Disintegration, Texts of Transformation: Re-Reading Realism in the New World Order. *Alternatives* 18 (229-258).
———. 1996. Nationality and Sovereignty in the New World Order. Paper read at Communications Technologies Seminar Series, at Victoria University of Wellington.
Macfarlane, S. Neil. 2006. The 'R' in BRICs: is Russia an emerging power? *International Affairs* 82 (1):41-57.
Makarenko, Boris. 15 May 2006. Predposlednee poslanie: Staryi Zhanr, novyi diskurs [the penultimate speech: old genre, new discourse]. *Politicheskii Zhurnal* 17 (112).
Malia, Martin E. 1999. *Russia under western eyes: from the Bronze Horseman to the Lenin Mausoleum*. Cambridge, MA: The Belnap Press of Harvard University Press.
Mearsheimer, John J. 2001. *The tragedy of great power politics*. New York, London: W.W. Norton.
Mitchell, Timothy. 1991. The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Critics. *The American Political Science Review* 85 (1):77-96.
———. 1999. Society, Economy and the State Effect. In *State/Culture: State formation after the cultural turn*, edited by G. Steinmetz. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.
Morozov, Viatcheslav. 2002. Resisting Entropy, Discarding Human Rights: Romantic Realism and Securitization of Identity in Russia. *Cooperation and Conflict* 37 (4):409-429.
———. 2003. Auf der Suche nach Europa. *Osteuropa* 53 (9-10):1501-1514.
———. 2004. Inside/Outside: Europe and the Boundaries of Russian Political Community. *PONARS working paper* 23:16.
———. 2008. Sovereignty and democracy in contemporary Russia: a modern subject faces the post-modern world. *Journal of International Relations and Development* 11:152-180.
Narlikar, Amrita. 2007. All that Glitters is not Gold: India's rise to power. *Third World Quarterly* 28 (5):983 - 996.
Navaro-Yashin, Yael. 2002. *Faces of the state: secularism and public life in Turkey*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Neumann, Iver B. 1996. *Russia and the Idea of Europe*. London and New York: Routdedge.
———. 1999. *Uses of the other: "The East" in European identity formation*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
———. 2008. Russia as a great power, 1815–2007. *Journal of International Relations and Development* 11:128-151.
Nikolaev, Andrei. 1997. "Locked" borders and "transparent" borders. *Russian politics and law* 35 (3):18-29.
O Tuathail, Gearoid. 2002. Theorizing practical geopolitical reasoning: the case of the United States' response to the war in Bosnia. *Political Geography* 21:601-628.
Orbán, Anita. 2008. *Power, energy, and the new Russian imperialism*. 1st ed. Westport, Conn.: Praeger Security International.

Ortmann, Stefanie. 2008. Re-Imagining Westphalia: Identity in IR and the discursive construction of the Russian state. unpublished PhD thesis, International Relations, London School of Economics, London.
Prozorov, Sergei. 2006. *Understanding conflict between Russia and the EU: the limits of integration, Rethinking peace and conflict studies*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Putin, Vladimir. 2006. *Annual Address to the Federal Assembly* 26 May 2004 [cited 6 June 2006]. Available from http://www.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2004/05/71501.shtml.
Ringmar, Erik. 1996. On the Ontological Status of the State. *European Journal of International Relations* 2 (4):439-466.
———. 2002. The Recognition Game: Soviet Russia Against the West. *Cooperation and Conflict* 37 (2):115-136.
Rivera, Sharon Werning, and David W. Rivera. 2006. The Russian Elite under Putin: Militocratic or Bourgeois? *Post Soviet Affairs* 22:125-144.
Simpson, Gerry. 2004. *Great Powers and Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal Order*: Cambridge University Press.
Smith, Graham. 1999. The Masks of Proteus: Russia, Geopolitical Shift and the New Eurasianism. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 24 (4):481-494.
Solchanyk, Roman. 1995. Ukraine, The (Former) Center, Russia, and "Russia". *Studies in Comparative Communism* 25 (1):31-45.
Steen, Anton. 2003. *Political elites and the new Russia : the power basis of Yeltsin's and Putin's regimes;* New York: RoutledgeCurzon.
Suzuki, Shogo. 2008. Seeking `Legitimate' Great Power Status in Post-Cold War International Society: China's and Japan's Participation in UNPKO. *International Relations* 22 (1):45-63.
Tsygankov, Andrei P. 2005. Vladimir Putin's Vision of Russia as a Normal Great Power. *Post Soviet Affairs* 21:132-158.
Umbach, Frank. 2000. Russia as a "virtual great power": Implications for its declining role in European and Eurasian security. *European Security* 9 (3):87 - 122.
Valbjorn, Morten. 2008. Before, during and after the cultural turn: a 'Baedeker' to IR's cultural journey. *International Review of Sociology* 18:55-82.
Walker, Edward W. 2003. *Dissolution - Sovereignty and the breakup of the Soviet Union*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
Walker, R. B. J. 1992. *Inside/outside: international relations as political theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wendt, Alexander. 1999. *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge: CUP.
———. 2004. The state as person in international theory *Review of International Studies* 30 (2):289-316.
Widdis, Emma. 2004. Russia as space. In *National Identity in Russian Culture*, edited by S. Franklin and E. Widdis. Cambridge: CUP.
Wilson, Andrew. 2005. *Virtual politics: faking democracy in the post-Soviet world*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
Wilson Rowe, Elana, and Stina Torjesen. 2009. *The multilateral dimension in Russian foreign policy, Routledge contemporary Russia and Eastern Europe series*. London ; New York, NY: Routledge.
Zehfuss, Maja. 2001. Constructivism and Identity: A Dangerous Liaison. *European Journal of International Relations* 7 (3):315-348.