The Discipline of Fear. The Securitisation of International Relations Post-9/11 in Historical Perspective

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This paper argues that International Relations as an academic discipline (IR) since 9/11 has become part of a growing preoccupation with 'security'. This has not always been the case, and still today there are alternative theorisations also within the mainstream of the discipline. The security perspective however was shaped by two particular junctures in which the fear of impending attack on the USA and its allies was articulated at its most dramatic. The first occurred between the original establishment of the discipline in the interwar years and the postwar siege laid on the USSR. Here the role of IR was to define as rational the assumption of a nuclear surprise attack, equating the USSR as a 'totalitarian' state similar to the Axis Powers, one of which did attack Pearl Harbour. The second can be traced back to the 1970s when the threat of Third World revolt under the banner of national liberation was re-baptised 'international terrorism' at the instigation of the Israeli Far Right and militarists in the US, thus creating a continuity between the supposed Soviet threat and post-Soviet instances of anti-Western revolt. From this the paper concludes that IR has functioned to place policy-makers and opinion leaders under a 'discipline of fear' which is insufficiently recognized, let alone challenged by IR scholars.

In the online prospectus of Long Island University's Homeland Security Management Institute[2], it is claimed that 'Homeland Security is among the nation's leading growth sectors, with employment in all areas of the Homeland Security field expected to continue to rapidly expand through the coming decade. Many state and local Law Enforcement agencies also continue to shift their existing personnel and resources toward the collection and analysis of crime and terrorism intelligence, as well as toward the specialized fields of counter-terrorism planning, preparation, and response.'

Along with a range of overt surveillance and security institutions expected to be looking for qualified professionals, 'agencies within the US Intelligence community

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[1] (acknowledgements)

[2] Long Island University, Homeland Security Management Institute, http://www2.southampton.liu.edu/homeland/index.html (accessed 9 November 2010).

need large numbers of analysts and technical specialists as well as operatives.' This demand is not confined to public agencies either.

Indeed, virtually every sector of the American economy has a role to play in ensuring the nation's Homeland Security goals are achieved. Private sector companies, public utilities and critical infrastructure entities—especially in the transportation, health care, education, information technology, and manufacturing fields—are therefore becoming more and more involved in Homeland Security function. Corporate security personnel, and especially corporate security managers with the knowledge and skills to interface effectively with law enforcement, with the intelligence community, and with other corporations and groups involved in Homeland Security and Emergency Management, are in great demand. This demand is especially strong in defence industries, technology companies, and various financial services fields.

The Long Island University prospectus continues by stating that 'the Justice and Homeland Security departments also will be seeking increasing numbers of people, especially those with foreign language expertise, to serve as intelligence officers.' The latter sector, 'ranked as the single largest area of need,' was certainly boosted when 'on November 18, 2004, President Bush issued an executive order calling for the CIA to increase staffing by 50 percent in three key areas: clandestine operators, intelligence analysts and intelligence officers proficient in "mission critical languages".'

There is no doubt that after '9/11', a host of US universities besides Long Island University have taken steps to ensure the increased supply of recruits trained in security matters. Johns Hopkins, Carnegie Mellon, the University of Pennsylvania and Pennsylvania State University, among others, concluded formal agreements with the FBI and under the auspices of the National Security Higher Education Advisory Board, these agreements were intended (in the words of Penn State president Spanier) as a sign of the willingness of 'leaders in higher education… to assist our nation during these challenging times'.[3] The University of Southern

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[3] Cited in Henry A. Giroux, <u>The University in Chains. Confronting the Military-Industrial-Academic Complex</u> . Boulder, Col.: Paradigm, 2007, p. 21.

California actually created the first 'Homeland Security Centre of Excellence' with a grant that allowed it to recruit specialists from other leading universities,[4] and many other examples can be given, Europe not excepted.

In this paper I argue that the brave new world evoked by Long Island University's Homeland Security Management Institute prospectus, and which is affecting student interest and degree development in the United States and elsewhere, is not so new as it seems. The mortgaging of academia to the needs of the national security state in close association with transnational capital, has a longer history, crucially in the evolution of the discipline of International Relations (IR). Of course, as with past episodes of disciplining the universities in the name of political emergencies, such efforts always remain incomplete, not least because students and staff resist them; in doing so, they have preserved a measure of critical scholarship and academic autonomy against the encroachments of the national security state. Inevitably, however, these are marginal to the mainstream.

I will first re-examine the establishment of an IR dedicated to meeting the supposed Soviet threat after 1945, which constitutes the first transition in which fear was instrumentalised to posit a continuity between Axis aggressiveness and the policies of the USSR, whilst rationalising a permanent war economy. Secondly I address the transformation of IR when the imaginary of dictatorship bent on surprise attack and mass annihilation, pinned on the Soviet Union, was projected on the Third World revolt.

International Relations After Hiroshima and Nagasaki

Today's threat of terrorism, especially when associated with the possible use of weapons of mass destruction, has a real basis in the terror evoked by the actual use of atom bombs against Japanese civilian targets at the close of World War II. The atomic attacks elicited a groundswell of fear in the United States as science fiction and fact alike were distributed through all mainstream media. The US general who led the first fact-finding mission to Hiroshima testified before a Senate committee that in a nuclear attack on New York the city's skyscrapers 'would fly apart as

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[4] Ibid., p. 22.

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though they themselves were bombs and someone had lighted their fuse'.[5] John Hersey's book-length report on Hiroshima, first published in the New Yorker a year after the attack and serialised in more than fifty US newspapers, created a sensation among the wider public.

Still in August 1946, the idea to entrust the newly founded United Nations with oversight of all the world's military forces, found an echo among a substantial slice of the American public (ranging in different polls from 36 to 54 percent).[6] In a special postscript to his bestselling global governance proposal, Anatomy of Peace, journalist Emery Reves warned that to avoid 'the apocalypse of an atomic world war', only a world federation modelled on Hamilton's original design would 'prevent the next war and …stop our drifting towards totalitarianism'.[7] This blend of liberal concern over enhanced state power and fear of war also resonated in George Orwell's distopia, Nineteen Eighty-Four, published in 1948. A more extreme version of the same ambivalence was the idea of British philosopher and future peace activist, Bertrand Russell, that world government required a preliminary atomic bombardment of the USSR since 'communism must be wiped out' first.[8]

That the West enjoyed the right of primogeniture, for good or bad, was never in doubt. Boyer records how a draft NBC newscast about the bomb, which spoke of 'the history of man', was changed into the claim that 'Anglo-Saxon science has developed a new explosive 2,000 times as destructive as any known before'—a rather tenuous proposition in light of the role of refugee physicists from Europe, who in fact had hoped that the bomb's 'success' would help quell anti-Semitism in the US.[9] But the imagery of the mushroom cloud, later described by the pilot of the US Air Force B-29 over Hiroshima as 'boiling upward like something terribly alive', and the knowledge that more than 200,000 civilians had been incinerated in what he would depict as a 'turbulent mass of smoke that had the appearance of

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[5] Quoted in Paul Boyer, By the Bomb's Early Light. American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age. New York: Pantheon, 1985, p. 66.

[6] Ibid., p. 37.

[7] Emery Reves, The Anatomy of Peace, 2nd ed. with new postscript. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1947 [1945], p. 249.

[8] Cited in Brian Easlea, Fathering the Unthinkable. Masculinity, Scientists and the Nuclear Arms Race. London: Pluto Press, 1983, p. 121.

[9] Boyer, By the Bomb's Early Light, op. cit., pp. 4-5, emphasis added; cf. p. 223 on anti-Semitism.

bubbling tar',[10] only to be followed by a second bomb on Nagasaki the same week, did not waft over easily. A Dutch psychologist traced the 'vague, ill-defined fear' he had encountered on his US speaking tour in 1946 to 'hidden feelings of guilt' over the atomic bombardment of the Japanese cities.[11]

The Atlantic Synthesis in International Relations

International Relations emerged relatively late as an academic discipline, and only truly came into its own as an Atlantic synthesis between Wilson's original projection of a global governance to 'make the world safe for democracy', and the Nietzsche-Weber-Schmitt legacy of the 'irrational of the real' that German émigré scholars brought with them to the United States in the 1930s. The welding together of these two lineages became the task of the large-scale research infrastructure that had crystallised in the same period in the US, and which itself had a marked Anglo-Atlantic profile.

   Thinking about foreign relations can be traced to the dawn of humanity, but the modern discipline of IR goes back to the Wilson intervention in Europe at the end of the First World War and the brain trust mobilised for it, 'The Inquiry'. Wilson had still entered the war without much concern over its eventual consequences and was known for 'ma[king] up foreign policy out of his hat', but with the large land empires of Europe disintegrating and socialist revolution spreading from Russia, the president 'had grasped the necessity of planning for peace.'[12] The secretary of the Inquiry, Walter Lippmann, on the margins of the Versailles negotiations then worked out a project for an Institute of International Affairs, with Columbia historian James T. Shotwell, J.P. Morgan banker Thomas Lamont, Lionel Curtis, secretary of the Round Table (one of the fronts of the Rhodes-Milner Group, the core fraction of the British ruling class) and Milner Group international affairs

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[10] Paul W.Tibbets, , Jr., <u>Mission: Hiroshima</u> [with C. Stebbins and H. Franken]. New York: Stein & Day 1985 [1978], p. 227.

[11] Cited in Boyer, <u>By the Bomb's Early Light</u>, op. cit., p. 183.

[12] G.J.A. O'Toole, <u>Honorable Treachery. A History of U.S. Intelligence, Espionage, and Covert Action from the American Revolution to the CIA</u>. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1991, p. 310.

specialist Alfred Zimmern.[13] The Institute failed to materialise in its original, transatlantic format when the mood in the United States turned away from Wilson's universalism; a Council on Foreign Relations in the US and in Britain, the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House, under the directorship of Arnold Toynbee) were created separately in the end.[14]

The establishment of these two elite planning councils in the 1920s enlarged the incipient infrastructure for scholarly inquiry into foreign affairs from an Anglo-American viewpoint, the Carnegie network. Using the proceeds from the consolidation of his iron and steel interests into US Steel by J.P. Morgan, the Scottish-born Carnegie, a long-time advocate of an arbitration treaty between Britain and the US (it was eventually concluded in 1911) and of a League of Peace, established the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching of 1905, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace of 1910, and the Carnegie Corporation in 1911. All were dedicated to the propagation and dissemination of knowledge and understanding 'among the peoples of the United States and the British Dominions and colonies'.[15]

Besides the Anglophile philanthropist himself, the driving force in the Carnegie network was Elihu Root, Secretary of War in two Republican administrations and Secretary of State of Theodore Roosevelt from 1905 to '09. Root believed that the United States should mobilise science in large-scale structures to overcome the individualism inherent in Lockean liberalism; only thus would the US be able to match Germany's war-making capacity on the science front.[16] This was exactly what Lippmann thought was necessary for the social sciences. Fearing, like Root,

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[13] On the Rhodes-Milner Group, see Carroll Quigley, The Anglo-American Establishment. From Rhodes to Cliveden. New York: Books in Focus, 1981 [1949].

[14] Laurence H. Shoup and William Minter, Imperial Brain Trust. The Council on Foreign Relations and United States Foreign Policy. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977, p. 16. E.O. Czempiel considers 30 May 1919 (when the original agreement was reached) the birthday of IR, cf. Ekkehart Krippendorff, International Relations as a Social Science. Brighton: Harvester, 1982 [1975], p.23.

[15] Cited in Waldemar A. Nielsen, The Golden Donors. A New Anatomy of the Great Foundations. New York: Dutton, 1985, p. 136. Cf. Ludovic Tournès, 'La Dotation Carnegie pour la Paix Internationale et l'invention de la diplomatie philantropique', in Tournès, ed. L'argent de l'influence. Les fondations américaines et leurs réseaux européens. Paris: Éditions Autrement , 2010, pp. 32-3.

[16] Dominick Jenkins, The Final Frontier. America, Science, and Terror. London: Verso, 2002, p. 15.

that provincialism inherent in liberal, self-regulating society would undermine collective effort, Lippmann in a book of 1922 proposed that universities and research institutes be welded together with the State Department, the War Ministry, and other state institutions, through a 'central agency'.[17] This alone would ensure that the social sciences retain a practical policy orientation.

What is at stake here is the transformation of intellectuals into a functional cadre actively connected to the organisation and reproduction of ruling class hegemony. As 'organic intellectuals', their impact no longer depends on eloquence and the external mobilisation of affects and passions, but on closely studying practical life according to generally accepted methods. Assuming the role of 'permanent persuaders', their socialised intellectual labour thus is made part of the structure of government in every respect.[18] From around the turn of the twentieth century the foundations thus came to operate as relays of the discipline of capital in the sphere of ideas. International topics were funded from the start, not least because the capital groups from which the foundations were spun off as tax-exempt philanthropies, were themselves transnational concerns.

The Rockefeller Foundation, formally established in 1913 to bring order to the philanthropic excursions of the famous oil magnate, dedicated its subsidies first to the study of new managerial techniques, not to international matters.[19] Yet its medical research and the financing of inoculation campaigns, apparently unrelated to US foreign policy, actually followed the flag into areas of foreign involvement fairly directly. With the experience of yellow fever casualties during the war over Cuba in 1898 in mind, the sanitation campaign in Latin America from 1910 and even more so, the anti-TB campaign when Wilson declared war on Germany and began shipping troops to France, are cases in point.[20] Other major philantropies, such as the Guggenheim Foundation spun off from the non-ferrous metals

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[17] Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion. Machine re-edition, n.p.: BNPublishing.com., 2010 [1922], p. 257.

[18] Cf. 'Intellettuali', in Dizionario Gramsciano 1926-1937 [Guido Liguori and Pasquale Voza, eds.]. Roma: Carocci, 2009, p. 427.

[19] Nielsen, Golden Donors…, op. cit., p. 84; Peter Collier and David Horowitz, The Rockefellers. An American Dynasty. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1976, p. 121.

[20] Ludovic Tournès, 'Introduction. Carnegie, Ford, Soros : Généalogie de la toile philantropique,' in Tournès, ed. L'argent de l'influence…, op. cit., pp. 11-2.

operations of the eponymous family, or the Ford Foundation which would tower over all of them after World War II, also were prominent in subsidising social science and IR in particular.

The closest to a 'central agency' mediating between academic research and the various branches of the state apparatus, as intended by Lippmann, was perhaps the Social Science Research Council, SSRC, established in 1923, with key roles played by Beardsley Ruml and political scientist Charles E. Merriam.[21] Ruml was the manager of the Rockefellers' General Education Fund and the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial Fund, founded in 1918 and re-focused on the social sciences in 1922. Merriam had been a US propaganda officer in Italy during World War I. From his experience in dealing with the threat of revolution he drew the conclusion that politics should be approached as a fluid process of opinion formation, which a social science driven by 'method' could realistically hope to 'control'.[22]

In the 1930s, this infrastructure of planning groups like the Council Foreign Relations, the large foundations, the SSRC, and the actual universities, was able to absorb intellectual refugees from Nazi Europe who found a new home in the United States. Table 1 shows to what extent the great names in the Politics and IR disciplines were part of this exodus. It lists thirty prominent IR or otherwise internationally oriented political scientists born in Europe prior to 1918, from the Biographical Dictionary of the American Political Science Association of 1968 with added names from the Who's Who in the same period. From a comparison of the selected names in the APSA directory with the overall number of internationally oriented scholars (174 in all in the APSA list), those selected (20 from the APSA list) were incorporated into the aforementioned networks to a much greater degree than the average. In addition to the links to the major foundations (notably the Guggenheim and Rockefeller foundations) given in the biographical entries, there was a marked (and again greater than proportional) participation in planning activities in the Council on Foreign Relations or the State Department, whilst their roles in the RAND Corporation, the key military-strategic think tank to which I

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[21] Barry D. Karl, Charles E. Merriam and the Study of Politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974, pp. 61, 131-4.

[22] Dorothy Ross, The Origins of American Social Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 396; Charles E. Merriam, Systematic Politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1945, p. v. Merriam after his Italian experience was also active in Chicago city politics for a time.

return below, also stand out (I have added the important link to the Ford Foundation in the case of Bendix, who along with Bert Hoselitz and others, was one of the leading lights of the post-war Ford-funded Labour Problems programme with which I will not be concerned here).[23]

Table 1.1. Politics and IR scholars born in Europe before 1918, members of the American Political Science Association in 1968, or otherwise prominent in US political science, with (semi-)government or foundation affiliations.

Name	Country & Year of Birth	Name	Country & Year of Birth
Hannah Arendt *R, Gug*	Germany 1906	David Mitrany* *FO, C*	Rumania 1888
Reinhard Bendix* *C, F*	Germany 1916	H. J. Morgenthau *SD*	Germany 1904
Karl W. Deutsch *Gug*	Austria-Hungary 1912	S. Neumann* *DD*	Germany 1904
Heinz Eulau *F*	Germany 1915	J. von Neumann* *Rand*	Austria-Hungary 1903
Werner Feld *SD*	Germany 1910	Guy J. Pauker *F, Rand*	Rumania 1917
Carl J. Friedrich *DD*	Germany 1901	Anatol Rapoport*	Russia 1911
John H. Herz *R*	Germany 1908	Joseph A. Schumpeter*	Austria-Hungary 1883
Hajo Holborn* *R, C, SD*	Germany 1902	Pitirim A. Sorokin*	Russia 1889
Bert F. Hoselitz* *F*	Austria-Hungary 1913	Hans Speier* *Rand*	Germany 1905
S.D. Kertesz *R, Gug*	Austria-Hungary 1904	Nicholas J. Spykman*	Netherlands 1893
K.E. Knorr* *SD,DD,Rand*	Germany 1911	R. Strauss-Hupé *DD*	Austria-Hungary 1903
Hans Kohn* *Har, Moore*	Austria-Hungary 1891	I. Szent-Miklosy	Austria-Hungary 1909
George A. Lanyi *R*	Austria-Hungary 1913	Alfred Vagts*	Germany 1892
K. Loewenstein *R,,C,Gugg*	Germany 1891	Karl A. Wittfogel	Germany 1896
Roy C. Macridis *R,, F*	Turkey 1918	Arnold O. Wolfers *SD*	Switzerland 1892

DD: State Department; *DD*: Defense Department; *FO*: Foreign Office (UK). *Rand*: RAND Corp. Foundations: *C*: Carnegie; *F*: Ford, *Gug*: Guggenheim, *Har*: Harris, *R*: Rockefeller

Sources: APSA 1968. Biographical Directory, 5th ed. Washington, D.C.: American Political Science Association; names with * added from Who's Who in America 1964-65. Chicago: Marquis.

Many of those on the list and others during the war also worked as propagandists (Gramsci's 'permanent persuaders') and/or intelligence officers in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the precursor of the post-1947 CIA, to demonstrate their loyalty to the US.[24] As the President of the International Studies Association in

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[23] See Anthony Carew, Labour under the Marshall Plan. The Politics of Productivity and the Marketing of Management Science. Manchester: Manchester University Press,1987, p. 196.

[24] P.Th. Walther, 'Zur Kontinuität politikwissenschaftlicher Fragestellungen: Deutschlandstudien exilierten Dozenten' in G. Göhler and B. Zeuner, eds. Kontinuitäten und Brüche in der deutschen Politikwissenschaft. Baden-Baden: Nomos 1991, pp. 142-3; Alfons Söllner, 'Von Staatsrecht zur "political science"? Die Emigration deutscher Wissenschaftler nach 1933, ihr Einfluß auf die Transformation einer Disziplin', Politische Vierteljahresschrift 31 (4) 1990, p. 645.

1965, John Gange, later remembered, the OSS 'was like a big university faculty in many respects—sometimes, staff meetings were just like faculty meetings'.[25]

The most important research body to emerge as a specifically security-related entity was the RAND Corporation (acronym of Research & Development), established in 1945 by the US aerospace industry and the new Ford Foundation, with active support of the US Air Force. Unlike the situation after World War I, when the fear that German airplanes might cross the Atlantic and attack the United States with poison gas, could not be mobilised by military and industrial interests (which were themselves under attack in the 'Merchants of Death' campaign against US foreign war involvement),[26] this time round military-industrial demobilisation was effectively prevented. The reason was not a matter of military preparedness in the narrow sense, but the awareness, thoroughly studied in various planning groups during the war, that active overseas involvement by the United States was necessary to frame the transnational capital movements on which ruling class interest had come to depend.[27] Military outlays were a critical part of sustaining effective demand from a Keynesian perspective, just as the maintenance of a large defence establishment and overseas military presence in a climate of fear had disciplinary effects on society as a whole, at home and across the US-centred alliance system as it was to take shape after the war.[28]

This suggests that the United States or the West at large, does not 'have' a military-industrial complex, but 'is' one, as E.P. Thompson famously claimed in the 1980s.[29] Certainly the prominence of economists in the evaluation of what nuclear bombs meant for the US world role in 1945-46, would suggest a broader set of interests. The dedicated SSRC committee established right after the bombings was

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[25] Quoted in Marshall Windmiller, 'The New American Mandarins' in Theodore Roszak, ed. The Dissenting Academy. New York: Vintage, 1968, p. 120.

[26] Jenkins, The Final Frontier, op. cit, pp. 13-20.

[27] David W. Eakins, 'Business Planners and America's Postwar Expansion' in D. Horowitz, ed. Corporations and the Cold War. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969.

[28] Fritz Vilmar, Rüstung und Abrüstung im Spätkapitalismus. Eine sozio-ökonomische Analyse des Militarismus, rev. ed.. Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1973 [1965], pp. 59-60; Mike Davis, 'Nuclear Imperialism and Extended Deterrence' in New Left Review eds., Exterminism and Cold War London, Verso, 1982.

[29] E.P. Thompson, 'Notes on Exterminism, the Last Stage of Civilization', in New Left Review, Exterminism and Cold War, op. cit. Thompson also included the USSR as such a 'MIC'.

chaired by Princeton economist W.W. Riefler. With sociologist William Ogburn and Yale University strategist Bernard Brodie among its members, its second report already refocused on civil defence, although only the US had the bomb. Another group, led by Ivy League free trade advocate Jacob Viner (then at the University of California) and the sociologist, Edward Shils, articulated the thesis of nuclear deterrence at a conference in Chicago in 1945. As Kaplan relates, Viner argued that since there was no way an attack could eliminate a state's nuclear arsenal entirely and the remaining retaliatory capability in fact made the atom bomb a weapon of peace.[30] Brodie edited a volume entitled The Absolute Weapon underscoring the deterrence argument, with contributions of Arnold Wolfers, W.T.R. Fox, and other luminaries of Yale's Institute of International Studies. He was one of those denouncing nuclear physicists Leo Szilard, Einstein, and others who called for a world government to deal with the nuclear threat; Viner dismissed them as 'hysterical'.[31] As with the response to '9/11' more recently, the atmosphere of denunciation and suspicion in 1946-47 left little room for nuanced opinion.

The anti-communist witch-hunt associated with the name of its animator, Senator Joe McCarthy, aimed at disciplining the trade union bloc in the New Deal coalition first of all. But the universities, expanding under the G.I. Bill that gave veterans access to higher education on a large scale, also were drawn along in the wave of patriotic fervour. 150 faculty at the University of California alone were fired in 1949 for refusing to sign an oath of loyalty, and given the role of the large foundations and particular funding model of US private universities, 'the greatest direct enemy of the Left in the academy was not the coherent policy of the state, but the opportunism and cowardice of boards of trustees and university administrators'.[32]

Few academics by 1951 would apply for funds citing communist sympathies, yet Guggenheim president Henry A. Moe formally declared party members ineligible for Guggenheim funding.[33] But then, as Lindsley Kimball, vice-president of the

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[30] Fred M. Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984, p. 27.

[31] Boyer, By the Bomb's Early Light, op. cit., pp. 43, 104

[32] R.C. Lewontin in André Schriffrin, ed., The Cold War and the University. Toward an Intellectual History of the Postwar Years. New York: The New Press, 1997, p. 20; Boyer, op. cit., p. 103.

[33] Cited in Schiffrin, The Cold War, op. cit., p. 76.

Rockefeller Foundation, put it also in 1951, the threat was all the more terrifying because it was invisible. Whereas in the past, 'We knew that our enemy was a Spaniard, an Englishman, or a German. We knew where to find him and the beginning and end of his enmity was clearly defined.'

Now our enemy is insidious. He is international. He lives in a twilight zone between war and peace. He invades not only our shores, but our society as well. And he exhibits a protective coloration, and a genius for disguise which make him difficult to combat and leads us to the verge of a national hysteria.[34]

It is hard not to see the similarity between this 'threat assessment' and today's supposed assault by 'terrorism'. A year after Kimball's made his call for enhanced vigilance, Congress actually initiated an investigation into the foundations themselves. The Select Committee chaired by Representative E. E. Cox, whilst finding that some officers had unwittingly supported communism, concluded that on the whole the foundation system was supportive of 'the American system of free enterprise'.[35] The Cox committee also noted that many problems had arisen because many US citizens associated 'social science' with socialism, and 'international' with un-American activities. This as Lipschutz has argued, has deep roots in the fear of strangers dating from early European settlement and in Puritan notions of 'possession' by evil forces, alien or even extra-terrestrial.[36] Clearly to be an IR scholar under these conditions involved almost superhuman responsibilities, but fortunately powerful interests were in place to provide support.

IR as Cold War Discipline

The new IR realism downplays the global governance project originally associated with Wilson without ever giving up the principle of Western supremacy. To suit the needs of a test of wills with the new contender, the USSR,

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[34] Cited in John Krige, <u>American Hegemony and the Postwar Reconstruction of Science in Europe</u>. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2006, p. 142.

[35] Cited in Ibid., pp. 140-1.

[36] Ronnie D. Lipschutz, <u>Cold War Fantasies. Film, Fiction and Foreign Policy</u>. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001, p. 36.

it built on the theoretical legacy that German intellectual exiles had brought with them across the Atlantic. Unlike the Anglo-American tradition which according to Arnold Wolfers derives from the 'relative island security of Britain and the United States' and with its own political institutions in place, encounters a world lacking them, European continental states had always been exposed to 'anarchy' abroad, hence the 'primacy of foreign policy'.[37]

The thinking of Carl Schmitt proved excellently suited for the nuclear age. Schmitt's central tenet, that 'sovereignty resides ultimately in that power that can declare and enforce the state of exception, suspending the constitution in an emergency', becomes acceptable in a climate of terror, as 'the politics of the exception [is] transmuted into the politics of fear as a socially integrative device.'[38] The Schmittian calculus 'effectively became the determining influence for the entire realist ethic, even though the majority of Anglo-American authors appear to have adopted it indirectly and implicitly, notably through the work of Morgenthau.'[39]

Hans Morgenthau was indeed the central figure in imposing Cold War discipline on the field, as transpires in his critique of E.H. Carr in the first issue of the journal World Politics.[40] Here he rejected as 'relativist and instrumentalist' Carr's argument in The Twenty Years' Crisis that the West's global pretensions about peace, law and free trade were as much a projection of power as were the Axis states' claims for revising the Versailles-Washington order. Author of the seminal Politics Among Nations of 1948, and chair in IR at Chicago after Merriam's departure, Morgenthau held that every state, irrespective of time and place, is driven by a Nietzschean will to power. This built on the axiom of the

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[37] Arnold Wolfers, 'Introduction. Political Theory and International Relations', in Wolfers and Lawrence W. Martin, eds., The Anglo-American Tradition in Foreign Affairs. Readings From Thomas More to Woodrow Wilson. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1956, p. xv.

[38] Benno Teschke, 'Decisions and Indecisions. Political and Intellectual Receptions of Carl Schmitt'. New Left Review, Second Series (67) 2011, pp. 72-3.

[39] Klaus-Gerd Giesen, L'éthique des relations internationales. Les théories anglo-américaines contemporaines. Bruxelles: Bruylant, 1992, p. 59.

[40] Cited in Ibid., p. 94.

'irrationality of the real', which as Desai argues runs through the entire Nietzsche-Weber-Schmitt lineage.[41]

This then implies that there can be no reasonable expectation of order outside one's own, secure environment, something which ultimately chimes again with the anarchy theorem of Anglo-American international relations. For if from the continental European perspective, the 'real' is irrational because of the subjective idealism of its philosophical premises, from a Lockean point of view, those without property and by inference, a non-capitalist society, lack rationality because no proper concept of self-interest can be formulated if there is no possession to begin with.[42]

There are other aspects to IR realism at this juncture which compound the designation of the international sphere as irrational. This notably concerned the idea of human sinfulness articulated by Protestant theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, who during the war championed global governance (to which the USSR was expected to submit as well) but after the war swung to the idea of a Soviet design to subjugate the whole of Europe.[43] This earned him an introduction to the Council on Foreign Relations by OSS veteran Allen Dulles and an advisory position with the US State Department. A descendant of German immigrants and wary of Lockean liberalism (as well as rejecting mass consumption), Niebuhr held that people are not fit for self-government because they are sinners. Later in 1946 Niebuhr chaired the founding meeting of Americans for Democratic Action (ADA), an initiative of Roosevelt's widow Eleanor to uncouple the preservation of the New Deal welfare state from Wilsonian universalism.[44]

The repressed fears of atomic death (repressed because it was by then un-American to acknowledge that the United States had actually used the bombs for

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[41] Radhika Desai, 'Fetishizing Phantoms: Carl Schmitt, Chantal Mouffe, and "The Political",' in A. Bakan and E. MacDonald, eds. Critical Political Studies: Debates and Dialogues from the Left. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001, p. 394. Cf. Jan Rehmann, Max Weber: Modernisierung als passive Revolution: Kontextstudien zu Politik, Philosophie und Religion im Übergang zum Fordismus, Berlin: Argument Verlag, 1998, p. 133.

[42] This follows the reading of Locke by C.B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism. Hobbes to Locke. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962.

[43] Richard W. Fox, Reinhold Niebuhr - a Biography. New York: Pantheon, 1985, pp. 211- 217.

[44] Richard H. Pells, The Liberal Mind in a Conservative Age. American Intellectuals in the 1940s and 1950s. New York: Harper & Row, 1985, p. 109; Fox, Reinhold Niebuhr, op. cit., pp. 227-9.

any other purposes than 'to save lives')[45], via this complex of ideas was projected on the USSR and communism. Especially once the Soviet state obtained its own atomic bomb, which in turn intensified the communist witch-hunt, etc., the idea that somewhere out there were irrational monsters intent on destroying the West, gained credence.

The totalitarianism theorem expounded by European exile Hannah Arendt in this climate of fear offered an intellectually sophisticated framework to understand the continuity between Nazism and state socialism as state-led societies.[46] James Burnham's theses on managerialism threatening Lockean possessive individualism, ten years earlier, also highlighted these similarities.[47] But the fear of communism went deeper because it contradicted the foundational liberalism of Anglo-America, whereas there were definite affinities with the anti-communism and to a lesser degree, the anti-Semitism of the Nazis. Niebuhr's conclusion that communism was even more dangerous than Nazism because of its atheism, and Burnham's references to 'Eurasia', a term which according to Pells aroused profound anxiety because the term was little known at the time, added further grounds for making communism far more alien to the US mindset.[48] The head of policy planning at the State Department, George Kennan, in his famous 'X' article in Foreign Affairs in July 1947, likewise stressed the 'Asian' roots of the Russian danger. It fuelled what he called a 'particular brand of fanaticism unmodified by any of the Anglo-Saxon traditions of compromise'.[49] True, Arendt

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[45] Today we are all too familiar with this trope. The debate about whether the bombs were dropped to intimidate rather than shorten the war has subsided, whilst the fact that two bombs were dropped, engineered by two rival consortia, has never truly become subject of deeper investigation. See James S. Allen, Atomic Imperialism. The State, Monopoly, and the Bomb. New York: International Publishers, 1952.

[46] Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 2nd ed. Cleveland, Ohio: World, 1966 [1951].

[47] James Burnham, The Managerial Revolution. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1960 [1941].

[48] He also claimed communism was more dangerous because it was less heinous, Fox, Reinhold Niebuhr, op. cit., p. 229. Pells, The Liberal Mind…, op. cit., p. 79.

[49] George F. Kennan, 'The Sources of Soviet Conduct' [1947, signed 'X'] reprinted in American Diplomacy 1900-1950 New York, Mentor, 1951, p. 105.

may not have been a Cold Warrior, but her conflation of fascism and Stalinism as both capable of 'radical evil', fitted the needs of the period perfectly.[50]

Thus the Lockean West led by the United States, as the epitome of freedom-loving rationality, faces contender states operating from a different, actually irrational, set of premises; through a medium (international relations) that itself too is devoid of reason. This is how the event that had brought the United States into the war, the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbour, could become the paradigm of post-war relations with the nuclear-armed Soviet Union.

Initially the RAND Corporation was concerned with aerospace engineering research, but once the Rockefeller and Carnegie foundations honed in, social science too was made part of its remit. At a conference in New York in 1947, Warren Weaver, then president of the Rockefeller Foundation, inaugurated a RAND social science division under German immigrant Hans Speier and an economics one under Charles J. Hitch.[51] Throughout there were close ties with MIT which likewise mutated from being a science and engineering institution into a comprehensive research university. Philip Morse, the technical director of the weapons systems advisory body to the US armed forces established in 1948, after a brief stay at RAND moved to MIT in 1950. There he would later set up the Institute for Defence Analysis. At RAND, where he remained a board member, Morse directed the war games simulation program.[52]

The role of the intelligence services in foreign policy analysis was secured when President Truman in January 1946 authorized the formation of a Central Intelligence Group to coordinate the work in this domain by the State Department, the War and Navy Departments, and the OSS, officially disbanded in 1945 but sections of which had continued to function in existence.[53] One aspect of the Act was the transfer of the Research and Development Board (which had been working as an intelligence organisation expanding on the work of the Office of Naval Research entrusted with basic science for military purposes) into a new National

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[50] Giles Scott-Smith, The Politics of Apolitical Culture. The Congress for Cultural Freedom, the CIA and post-war American hegemony. London: Routledge, 2002, pp. 43-4.

[51] B.L.R. Smith, The RAND Corporation. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966, p. 63.

[52] Krige, American Hegemony..., op cit., p. 233.

[53] Scott-Smith, The Politics…, op. cit., p. 68.

Military Establishment to be headed by nuclear scientist Vannevar Bush.[54] With the establishment of the Department of Defence and the CIA by the National Security Act of July 1947, the connections with academia were intensified too; after the Korean War, historian William Langer was brought back to the CIA to set up an Office of National Estimates which operated until the 1970s.[55]

Alongside Morgenthau's Chicago, the Yale Institute for International Studies was important as a centre of IR realism, with Wolfers, Brodie, Fox, and Klaus Knorr. It lost ground when Brodie joined RAND in 1951 and Knorr moved to Princeton's Centre for International Studies.[56] There he joined the 'Princeton Consultants', a confidential circle of IR luminaries supplying intelligence to Allen Dulles, then head of the CIA, and including Max Millikan of MIT, scholar-ambassador Robert Bowie of Harvard, Philip E. Mosely (then director of studies of the Council on Foreign Relations), and Hamilton Fish Armstrong (editor of its quarterly journal, Foreign Affairs), along with historians and Soviet specialists.[57]

Soviet studies, 'Russia' institutes that is, were well-funded from the start. The Rockefeller Foundation in 1945 kick-started the Columbia Russia Institute that became the model, a few years later followed by Carnegie's funding of Harvard's Russian Research Centre, of which the director was veteran OSS anthropologist Clyde Kluckhohn. The RAND Corporation too was an important centre in Soviet studies with luminaries such as Nathan Leites, Merle Fainsod, Raymond Garthoff, Herbert Dinerstein, and others.[58]

The nuclear psychosis that was at the root of McCarthyism, forcing IR into its realist straitjacket, proved an enduring feature of US intellectual life. As Shils was to write, what began as an emergency soon 'established itself as a chronic

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[54] Krige, American Hegemony…, op. cit., p. 30.

[55] Arthur S. Hulnick, 'CIA's Relations with Academia: Symbiosis Not Psychosis', International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 1 (4) 1987, p. 42.

[56] W.T.R. Fox, The American Study of International Relations. Columbia, S.C., Institute of International Studies, 1968, p. 54.

[57] John Cavanagh, 'Dulles Papers Reveal CIA Consulting Network. Panel met secretly in Princeton'. Forerunner, April 29 1980, p. 2. www.cia-on-campus.org/princeton.edu/consult.html (accessed 11 February 2010).

[58] Schiffrin, The Cold War, op. cit., p. 112; Immanuel Wallerstein, 'The Unintended Consequences of Cold War Area Studies', in Schiffrin, p. 208.

condition'.[59] The idea of an existential struggle with an evil foe inspired strategic thinkers such as Albert Wohlstetter, who joined the RAND economic division as a mathematician in 1951 and who became the godfather of what we know today as the 'NeoCons'. His wife Roberta wrote the classic study about Pearl Harbour, the metaphor of RAND theorizing from 1945.[60] The notion of unprovoked surprise attack was a rationalisation of an irrational fear because it suspends the need for explaining why an attack would actually be imminent or likely at all.[61]

'Rationality' at RAND thus came to mean the quest for survival in the context of uncertainty created by the capacity for total destruction in the hands of an evil enemy bent on surprise attack. The subject (nation-state, alliance) as defined by IR realism must be driven by a single, axiomatic rationality; any qualification would invite deeper analysis. 'Schmitt's Leviathan is inimical to the mention of purposes, as this would entail a calculus of proportions: no more terror than necessary'.[62] As studies on RAND document extensively, this created a curious mix of elitist self-glorification and fin de siècle decadence. The Wohlstetters especially were cult figures, leading the way in combining apparently emotionless calculations about atomic mega-death and destruction with a lavish wining and dining lifestyle. They saw themselves as wizards, as borne out by Roberta Wohlstetter's dedication of her book on Pearl Harbour to 'my favourite magician'.[63]

Now if social relations as such are devoid of rationality, the only way intersecting interests can be described is by resorting to mathematics, in the matrices of game theory. Based on utility-maximising, self-interested 'rational' behaviour, it divorced

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[59] Cited in Boyer, By the Bomb's Early Light, op. cit., p. 101.

[60] Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor. Warning and Decision. [Foreword Th. C. Schelling]. Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1962. Albert Wohlstetter's classic piece is 'The Delicate Balance of Terror' of 1959, reprinted as 'Choosing Policies for Deterrence', chapter 18 of Ch. J. Hitch and R. N. McKean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age. New York: Atheneum, 1974.

[61] Ronnie D. Lipschutz, 'Terror in the Suites: Narratives Fear and the Global Political Economy of Danger'. Global Society, 13 (4) 1999, p. 429.

[62] G. Weiler cited in Desai, 'Fetishizing Phantoms…', op. cit., p. 397.

[63] Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon, op. cit., pp. 122-3; Easlea, Fathering…, op. cit; Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor…, op. cit., dedication.

strategic decisions from moral considerations.[64] Game theory came to RAND via the mathematician John D. Williams, who brought Hungarian immigrant and mathematician John von Neumann into the organisation as a part-time consultant.[65] Neumann, who pioneered the idea of game theory in a 1928 German journal article and in 1944 published Theory of Games and Economic Behavior with Oskar Morgenstern, introduced his game theory 'as an adjunct to [military operations research], lending mathematical firepower and intellectual clout to the wartime concern over "strategy": it was he who forged the lasting links with the computer as tool and as exemplar for organizational rationalization'.[66] Neumann had worked for the Manhattan Project as a computer analyst and had no qualms about using nuclear weapons. At Los Alamos he was known for his extreme ideas about destroying the Soviet Union as early as possible.[67] Edward Teller in 1953 included Neumann on the so-called 'Teapot Committee' to study the possibility of mounting nuclear warheads on ballistic missiles, a major step in raising the stakes in the arms race from which so far, no way back has been found.[68]

The War on Terror as Global Discipline

Let me now turn to the second transformation in which IR as a discipline of fear ensured a continuity between different, incomparable international challenges to Western supremacy. In the early 1970s, the West was on the defensive against the combined impact of Soviet nuclear parity (the cost of which to the USSR would only become evident much later), a Third World coalition clamouring for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) and using the UN General Assembly to press its cause, and a series of national liberation movements challenging Portuguese

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[64] Anatol Rapoport, 'Systemic and Strategic Conflict. What Happens When People Do Not Think—and When They Do' in R.A. Falk and S.H. Mendlovitz, eds. Toward a Theory of War Prevention. vol. 1 of The Strategy of World Order. New York: World Law Fund, 1966 [1964], pp. 261-4. From the start, this was also extended into other areas of social behaviour: it was RAND economist Kenneth J. Arrow who applied the notion of rational choice in his Social Choice and Individual Values of 1951.

[65] Smith, RAND Corporation, op. cit., p. 283 note.

[66] Krige, American Hegemony…, op. cit., p. 234.

[67] Easlea, Fathering…, op. cit., p. 120.

[68] Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon, op. cit., p. 63-4.

colonialism, Zionism, the white minority regimes of Rhodesia and South Africa, and US-supported dictatorships in Central America. Internally, the states of the Lockean heartland faced the consequences of the student and workers movement which European Social Democracy was containing only with difficulty, by extending class compromise domestically and internationally.

The West in the same period suffered from instability at the government level, highlighted by the Watergate episode that eventually terminated the presidency of Richard Nixon. As a result, the rise of communism in Europe, partly through a mutation to a more Social Democratic posture respectful of both parliamentary democracy and the Yalta East-West division, lacked a comprehensive strategy. In Europe and elsewhere this led to improvised responses to challenges on the part of the 'deep state', the complex of security services and various informal networks such as the NATO stay-behind groups that would become known by their Italian name, Gladio, after the collapse of the USSR. In the Pike Report to the US House of Representatives, established to investigate the role of the CIA in the late 1960s and early 70s, it was concluded afterwards that 'US foreign policy lacked a long-term direction and … the government … often resorted to covert action by the CIA as a short-term solution to problems that really required long-term remedies.'[69]

In Europe, these haphazard responses introduced a new element into domestic politics that had a longer history elsewhere—the use of violence and the manipulation of terror scares to intimidate the Left, especially paralysing the Eurocommunists in Italy, but also Social Democrats judged too far out of step either in domestic or foreign policy, like Willy Brandt in West Germany or Joop den Uyl in the Netherlands. Without going into actual events, which have been subjected to a critical analysis elsewhere,[70] the general structure of the manipulation of fear (which is what terrorism is about), would seem to be the following.

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[69] As summarized by Philip Willan, Puppet Masters. The Political Use of Terrorism in Italy. London: Constable, 1991, p. 114. The Pike Report was actually more critical of the government's use of the CIA than of the organization itself. The House voted not to release it but the text was published in full by The Village Voice, 16 February, 1976.

[70] Kees van der Pijl, Global Rivalries from the Cold War to Iraq. London: Pluto Press, 2006, chapter 5 & passim; Tamir Bar-On and Howard Goldstein, 'Fighting Violence: A Critique of the War On Terrorism'. International Politics, 42 (2) 2005, pp. 225-245.

- There is a, usually marginal, group which is authentic and seeks to make its case by resorting to violence.

- The security services keeping watch over these potentially violent groups resort to infiltration or other forms of gaining a handle on them.

- In a political emergency, the radicalisation of the groups and of (rogue elements in) the security services and those politically responsible for or otherwise wielding influence on them, lead to actual violence; in such situations, the line between authentic perpetrators and (un-) intentional facilitators from the ranks of the security infrastructure and political authority become blurred.

A 'strategy of tension' along these lines was outlined in Supplement B to US Army Field Manual 30-31 dated 18 March 1970 and originally designed for application in Southeast Asia. This Top Secret document, over the signature of General William Westmoreland, US commander in Vietnam and by then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, surfaced in Turkey in 1976. It recommends penetration by US intelligence to propel violent insurgent groups into action in cases where 'Host Governments' and the public are deemed insufficiently alert to the communist threat.[71] At the time of the strategy of tension in their country, Italian analysts already highlighted the Schmittian logic of the state of emergency in a terror scare; a population will rally to its government even when disaffected with it as long as 'terror' is depicted as <u>absolute evil</u>, and not approached realistically and proportionally.[72]

The Terror Threat in International Politics

The idea of mobilising the terror scare in international relations surfaced in a series of conferences in the run-up to the US Presidential election of November 1980. The first, held in Jerusalem in July 1979 under the auspices of the Jonathan Institute, named after Benjamin Netanyahu's brother (killed in the Mogadishu raid on a

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[71] Willan, <u>Puppet Masters…</u>, op. cit., pp. 209-11.

[72] Gianfranco Sanguinetti, <u>Over het terrorisme en de staat</u> [trans. from the French]. Bussum: Wereldvenster, 1982 [1979]), pp. 53-5.

hijacked Israeli passenger jet), discussed the topic of Soviet support for international terrorism. It was attended by US Senator Henry Jackson, George H.W. Bush (Sr., former CIA director and then still a Republican hopeful looking for a cause), and defence intellectuals such as Jonah Alexander of the State University of New York and Ray Cline, an associate of Bush's CIA days and Professor of IR at Georgetown. Identifying 'Moscow' as the hub of 'international terrorism' was made possible by the redefinition of national liberation as terrorism, after the model Israel had developed itself in dealing with the Palestinians, and in which it developed an expertise it was to export to Central America and elsewhere whenever the US Congress hesitated to approve Contra violence.[73]

The conference's key theses were that a 'war on terror' had to be waged through pre-emptive attacks on states supporting terrorism; that an elaborate intelligence infrastructure be established; and that civil liberties should be rolled back for those suspected of terrorism and possibilities for preventive detention without charge and torture be widened. Simultaneously the 'terrorists' should be dehumanized in the eyes of the public.[74] Bush pleaded for 'drastic surgery as the only reasonable course—and by that I mean determined action, firmness under the duress of blackmail, and swift and effective retribution', although he underlined that it would not be easy to convince an open society that these measures were needed—indeed 'the legitimate exercise of state power' might be frustrated by the liberal conscience of 'the open society'.[75]

A follow-up conference in Washington in April 1980 'under expanded auspices' also featured Henry Kissinger, Richard Pipes, and a host of neoconservatives from the US.[76] Bush had to settle for the vice-presidency under Ronald Reagan, who won

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[73] Jan Nederveen Pieterse, 'Israel's Role in the Third World: Exporting West Bank expertise', Race & Class 26 (3) 1985, pp. 9-30.

[74] Diana Ralph, 'Islamophobia and the "War on Terror": The Continuing Pretext for U.S. Imperial Conquest', in Paul. Zarembka, ed. The Hidden History of 9-11, 2nd ed. New York: Seven Stories Press, 2008 [2006], p. 265.

[75] Bush cited in Ibid.

[76] Bob Callahan, 'The 1980 Campaign: Agents for Bush', Covert Action Information Bulletin, 33, 1990, p. 5. Raymond Garthoff, The Great Transition. American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War. (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1994), p. 23, does not mention Bush as a participant in the Jerusalem conference but the others do and his speech is in the conference proceedings, cf. Ralph, 'Islamophobia…', op. cit., p. 285.

the election later that year on a campaign extolling the threats to the US homeland and the promise to bolster the defences against it. In the period leading up to the election, high correlations were established between TV viewing and expressing mistrust for specific groups of the population, leading researchers to conclude that the 'pervasive cultivation of mistrust, apprehension, danger, and exaggerated "mean world" perceptions', conveyed and reinforced by media exposure to them, had created a public 'mainstreamed' by a culture of fear, in the US more than anywhere else.[77] I need not recount here how Reagan's election team under William Casey (later CIA director) secretly arranged with the occupiers of the US embassy in Tehran that they would sustain the occupation until after the election, on the promise of US spare parts for the Islamic Republic's armed forces, an agreement that laid the foundations for the subsequent Iran-Contra scandal.

   Reagan's first Secretary of State, Vietnam veteran and NATO commander Alexander Haig, Jr, put the terrorism issue on the agenda. In a State Department Current Policy document he qualified terrorism as the greatest threat to world peace on account of its reliance on Moscow, the global nerve-centre. Basing himself on the proofs of Claire Sterling's The Terror Network, supposedly exposing a world-wide terror operation managed by the KGB, Haig aimed to deny legitimacy to the notion of national liberation movements, just as he dismissed the concept of a 'Third World'.[78] As we can see today, this apparently semantic shift represents a major ideological transformation which would make the 'war on terror' possible, even if the 'centre' in Moscow was on its last legs. Haig's view was echoed by another Reagan appointee, UN ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, who signalled a confusion that rendered people unable 'to distinguish between force used to liberate and force used to enslave', leaving 'a majority of nations in the UN [to] regard

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[77] George Gerbner, Larry Gross, Michael Morgan, and Nancy Signorelli, 'The "Mainstreaming" of America: Violence Profile No. 11'. Journal of Communication, 30 (3) 1980, pp. 18, 25 & passim

[78] Sterling's analyses were dismissed by the intelligence services as fiction, Jürgen Roth and Bernd Ender, Dunkelmänner der Macht. Politische Geheimzirkel und organisiertes Verbrechen Bornheim-Merten: Lamuv Verlag, 1984, p. 14-15, 37-8; Jürgen Hippler, Krieg im Frieden. Amerikanische Strategien für die Dritte Welt: Counterinsurgency und Low-Intensity Warfare Cologne: Pahl-Rugenstein, 1986, p. 43.

legitimacy as a function of the will and power exercised on behalf of "national liberation movements".'[79]

In 1981 Israel demonstrated how the strategy of 'going after terrorists' would work when it attacked Palestinian targets in Lebanon. It again did so in retaliation for an assassination attempt on the Israeli ambassador in London by the Palestinian Abu Nidal group, a terrorist fraction penetrated by Mossad, the Israeli intelligence service, and which actually had no presence in Lebanon. When PLO forces shelled Israeli West Bank settlements to retaliate for the attack on its nationals in Lebanon, Israel had the pretext to invade Lebanon with regular land forces, initiating an occupation of South Lebanon that would last until 2000.[80]

In June 1984, the second Jonathan Institute conference, also in Washington DC, called for 'a broad-based, vigorous campaign against the terrorists and their sponsors'. Benjamin Netanyahu defined the 'two main antagonists of democracy in the postwar world', communist totalitarianism and Islamic radicalism, as together constituting a 'worldwide network of terror'. What was needed in the West was a 'realignment of attitudes'. Marxism and Islam according to Netanyahu had combined in giving terrorism its impetus, and the United Nations has justified it by calling terrorism a struggle for national liberation.[81]

The papers of the 1984 conference, a year before Gorbachev would take over to preside over the capitulation in the arms race with the West, are almost surrealistic in their glowing depiction of imminent enslavement at the hands of the USSR. Today we may read with amazement Netanyahu Sr.'s assessment that 'there can be no doubt about the Soviets' motive. Terrorism is the first general attack upon a free society which the enemies of freedom plan to take over'; or rightwing columnist George Will's warning against 'denying the undeniable—the fact that we are under assault from the Soviet Union'[82] Yet the statements are relevant because they document extensively how a conscious effort was made by a cross-section of

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[79] Jeane Kirkpatrick in Benjamin Netanyahu, ed. <u>Terrorism. How the West Can Win</u>. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1986, p. 59. These proceedings of the second Jerusalem conference on international terrorism have many short contributions which I have not cited separately in extenso .

[80] Ralph, 'Islamophobia…', op. cit., pp. 265-6.

[81] Netanyahu, ed. <u>Terrorism…</u>, op. cit., pp. 3, xi, 12.

[82] Benzion Netanyahu in Netanyahu, ed. <u>Terrorism…</u>, op. cit., p. 29; George F. Will in Ibid., p. 29.

Western power-holders to carry over the rollback strategy against the USSR to a new age of preventive counterrevolution and global control.

The three main lines of the strategy as formulated at the 1984 conference were, first, the idea of a forward defence against terrorism; secondly, the rejection of investigating any particular motives of terrorists; and finally, the need for a Pearl Harbour-like event to shock people out of their complacency.

As to the first, renegade Labourite Paul Johnson and Neocon stalwart Eugene Rostow both praised the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 as setting an example for terrorists worldwide. It sent a message to 'the master killers of Tehran and Tripoli' (Johnson), and Rostow claimed intervention should be recognised as a right.[83] George Shultz, Haig's successor as US Secretary of State identified a 'League of Terror' composed of Libya, Syria, Iran, and North Korea, recommending that if intelligence warranted it, pre-emptive attack should be an option. For as Republican senator Paul Laxalt put it, 'if we learned that Libya or Iran had obtained … a nuclear weapon, would we really be obliged to wait until that weapon was used?'[84]

As to the second issue, John O'Sullivan, deputy editor of the Times, favourably compared the way the tabloids publicise the horror of an outrage, with the tendency of the quality press to try and explain the causes of terror, which works for the terrorists. TV moderator Ted Koppel however expressed confidence that once a war had been declared (which Johnson had failed to do in Vietnam), 'then all kinds of societal pressures, and indeed legal pressures, [would] come to bear on the media to play a different role from the one they play right now'.[85] Invoking a security emergency indeed reduces the space for democratic deliberation, or even suspends it altogether.[86] So what sort of emergency can achieve this?

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[83] Paul Johnson and Eugene Rostow in Netanyahu, ed. Terrorism…, op. cit., pp. 36-7 and 148, respectively.

[84] George Shultz and Paul Laxalt in Netanyahu, ed. Terrorism…, op. cit., pp. 16 and 187, respectively.

[85] John O'Sullivan and Ted Koppel in Netanyahu, ed. Terrorism…, op. cit., pp. 235 and 239, respectively (in the plenary discussion).

[86] Stefan Elbe, Virus Alert. Security, Governmentality, and the AIDS Pandemic. New York: Columbia University Press, 2009, p. 91.

This was the third theme covered at the 1984 conference, and outlined by Netanyahu himself. Violence, he argued, was already so endemic in the international system that people's sensibilities had been numbed. Yet

Terrorism follows an inexorable, built-in escalation. To be effective, it must continually horrify and stupefy. Yet once we have become accustomed to a particular level of violence, <u>a new outrage is required to shock our sensibilities</u>. It used to be enough for terrorists to hijack a plane to attract international attention; next it became necessary to kill a few hostages; in the future, more violence will be required.[87]

Only if there would be one mighty blow, and then 'a successful war on terrorism… not just erratic responses to individual terrorist acts', the United States, constituting 'an anti-terrorist alliance … with two or three or possibly more countries,' would be in a position to 'credibly threaten the offenders, and [it] alone can impel the neutrals to shed their neutrality'. Then alone, the 'citizens in a democracy', united in fear and seeing themselves as 'soldiers in a common battle', would be 'prepared to endure sacrifice and even… immeasurable pain'.[88]

Paradoxically these prophetic words acquired more practical import only after the Bush Sr. presidency had run its course—paradoxical given Bush's initial role in setting this agenda. In 1995, President Clinton issued a Presidential Directive that gave priority to preventing terrorists from obtaining weapons of mass destruction.[89] The terrorism theme was gaining traction though. In 1998, University of Virginia IR scholar Philip D. Zelikow in an article in <u>Foreign Affairs</u> co-authored with former Assistant Secretary of Defence and Harvard IR Professor Ashton B. Carter, and John Deutch, former director of the CIA and Deputy Secretary of Defence, were arguing as if they had the Netanyahu assessment in front of them.[90]

In the article the authors speculate on the impending 'transforming event' that would, 'like Pearl Harbour, … divide our past and future into a before and after.'

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[87] in Netanyahu, ed. <u>Terrorism…</u>, op. cit., p. 218, emphasis added.

[88] Ibid., pp. 225-6

[89] Lipschutz, 'Terror in the Suites…', op. cit., p. 427.

[90] Ashton B. Carter, John Deutch, and Philip Zelikow 'Catastrophic Terrorism. Tackling the New Danger'. <u>Foreign Affairs</u>, 77 (6) 1998, pp. 80-94.

Deutch, then still CIA director, in 1996 had testified that terrorists would attack US information systems, prompting Senator Sam Nunn to speak of an 'electronic Pearl Harbour'.[91] The 1998 article ('Catastrophic Terrorism') instead refers to the World Trade Centre bombing attempt of 1993. Had that event succeeded, the authors claim,

> The resulting horror and chaos would have exceeded our ability to describe it. Such an act of catastrophic terrorism would be a watershed event in American history. It could involve loss of life and property unprecedented in peacetime and undermine America's fundamental sense of security… The United States might respond with draconian measures, scaling back civil liberties, allowing wider surveillance of citizens, detention of suspects, and use of deadly force.[92]

Earlier in 1998 Richard Betts of Princeton had warned in Foreign Affairs that a 'radical Islamic group' might launch a biological attack, or that otherwise 'enemies' 'might attempt to punish the United States by triggering catastrophes in American cities'.[93] In May 1998 Clinton established the position of 'National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure, and Counter-terrorism' in the NSC. Crucially in 1999, Zelikow produced a paper for the U of Virginia Miller Centre in which he analyses how the thrust of politics is directed by 'public myths', which rest on a 'moulding event' (such as Pearl Harbour). Such events create 'generational public presumptions … that become etched in the minds of those who live through them.' They need not be 'true'. It is a matter of beliefs 'thought to be true (although not necessarily known to be true with certainty)'; they must also be 'shared in common within the relevant political community'.[94]

Carter, Deutch and Zelikow were also participants in the high-level Aspen Strategy Group directed by Robert Zoellick (and which Zelikow took over after Zoellick, currently World Bank president, accepted a government post). Volunteering advice for the incoming president (Bush Junior as it turned out) in

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[91] Cited in Lipschutz, 'Terror in the Suites…', op. cit., p. 420.

[92] Carter, Deutch, and Zelikow, 'Catastrophic Terrorism', op. cit., p. 81

[93] Cited in Lipschutz, 'Terror in the Suites…', op. cit., p. 423.

[94] Cited in Bryan Sacks, 'Making History: The Compromised 9-11 Commission', in Zarembka, ed., The Hidden History of 9-11, op. cit., p. 223.

August 2000 in a series of edited collections, this may be read as crucial information about the direction of policy, never mind the puerile way of addressing an imaginary executive chief. Given that Zelikow would be on the Bush II transition team, the link with actual policy via appointments is meaningful though.

Among the dangers facing the US, Ashton Carter in the Aspen document speaks of 'catastrophic terrorism of unprecedented scope and intensity … on U.S. territory,' in addition to the rise of China and other threats. Future opponents would avoid symmetrical confrontations with the US and rather bring 'destruction to the U.S. homeland through catastrophic terrorism.'[95] A separate memorandum, also included in the Zelikow collection, and prefaced by Deutch, dealt with the 'Revolution in Military Affairs' that would have to replace the deployment of cold-war style military power. Diplomacy would have to be adjusted to this 'RMA' because, as a retired admiral put it 'overseas base access is essential to any significant use of force by the United States' given that 'without ready access to overseas basing', a modernised military force would not be deployable in time in the required locations. Substituting 'force surges for continual forward presence', this would also affect alliance, i.e., NATO strategy, because what had to be ensured was the ability 'to quickly reduce the ambiguity of violent situations, to respond flexibly, and to use force, where necessary, with precision and accuracy'.[96]

It would seem that the Jonathan Institute approach of hot pursuit, with its implication of pre-emptive attack on states harbouring terrorists, is the underlying assumption here. Indeed as a senior RAND official put it in the Aspen papers, unless the US would retreat from its global interests, especially from East and Southwest Asia, it should deny powers in those regions acquiring nuclear arms and other weapons of mass destruction and 'not exclude pre-emptive conventional strikes during crisis'.[97] Clearly everything now depended on the 'new Pearl Harbour' that had been called for ever since the Jonathan Institute conference in Washington and which among others had been repeated as a necessary precondition for a 'New American Century' by the eponymous Project, several members of

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[95] Ashton Carter in Philip D. Zelikow, ed., <u>American Military Strategy. Memos to a President</u>. New York: W.W. Norton, 2001, pp. 37-8, 41.

[96] William Owens in Ibid., p. 137.

[97] David C. Gompert in Ibid., p. 167.

which (notably Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld) joined the Bush Jr. administration in key positions.

9/11 then finally did bring the new Pearl Harbour. As an event it broadly fits the strategy of tension model: authentic perpetrators acting in a context in which the boundary line with the security infrastructure has become blurred, and in this case, with the official explanation unacceptable on straightforward factual grounds. On the other hand everything that followed fits into the projections of what such a disaster would entail by way of response, made from the mid-1980s on. Zelikow became executive director of the official 9/11 Commission that was to study what was certainly a 'moulding event' determining the course of policy for the ensuing decades.

Meanwhile a series of US-led military interventions, beginning with the NATO attacks on Serbia in 1994 and 1999, the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, and air operations in Somalia, Yemen, the NATO war against Libya, and other, more recent operations such as the deployment of US special forces in Uganda, have created what a US newspaper comment has called 'the American era of endless war'.[98] Reporting from the Warrior Transition Battalion complex in Fort Campbell, Kentucky, the writer notes how the idea from the wars against Japan and Nazi Germany, that at some point they would be over, has been abandoned.

In previous decades, the military and the American public viewed war as an aberration and peace as the norm. Today, radical religious ideologies, new technologies and cheap, powerful weapons have catapulted the world into "a period of persistent conflict," according to the Pentagon's last major assessment of global security. "No one should harbour the illusion that the developed world can win this conflict in the near future," this document concludes.

Highlighting how the military as a result of endless war are beginning to lose touch with civilian society, the author notes how 'The endless conflict…has triggered major changes in the way Americans view war and peace.' Among other

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[98] Greg Jaffe, 'A decade after the 9/11 attacks, Americans live in an era of endless war', The Washington Post, 4 September 2011.

things this is evident from a series of video games, 'Call of Duty', which disseminates (to the more than 30 million people a year who play it) an understanding of conflict as a never-ending combat that is particularly grisly, but also all around us. The moral of the tale is that victory is unattainable. 'Peace, of course, is not just absent from video games. It has faded from any debate in Washington surrounding the wars.' 'Peace… has become something of a dirty word in Washington foreign-policy circles.'

This has led, over a period punctured but not started by 9/11, to a renewed mobilisation of the guilt and fear complex that followed the dropping of the atom bombs on Japan. The vast military build-up including the continuing upgrade of the US nuclear arsenal, with Britain's Trident in the pipeline, both in breach of the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty, may be largely invisible to the public. The Anglo-American and NATO interventions however are visible and their high-pitched justifications may not always convince.

One aspect of the new security threat interventions that certainly elicits disquiet is the projection of global justice, the idea that one is already an outlaw by the very appeal to sovereign equality. Not only is the justice meted out through the International Criminal Court, the Yugoslavia Tribunal and other dedicated courts highly skewed to the detriment of those resisting to submit to Western pre-eminence. Those considered dispensable have been dealt with summarily too. From the fall of Afghanistan, when the last secular ruler, Najibullah, and his fellows were hanged from lampposts with their genitals stuffed in their mouths, via Milosevic who was left to die in his cell,[99] to Saddam Hussein who was hanged amidst jeers of his Shiite hangmen, no dignity has been granted to those defeated in the West's wars without end.

Muammar Gaddafi, found hiding from a NATO air attack on his convoy, was lynched in front of cameras. Two weeks earlier Hillary Clinton had paid an unexpected visit to Libya demanding that he be captured or killed. When this

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[99] In January 2006, Rifampicine, a drug used against leprosy and TB was detected in Milosevic's blood, and Dutch newspapers reported on 'errors' in his medicine regime in previous years. Milosevic died a few days after the central plank of the prosecution, that he had led a criminal organisation aiming to create a Greater Serbia, had been dropped whilst evidence compromising the NATO intervention was growing. See N.M.P Steijnen, 'Het tribunaal had een motief voor Milosevic' dood', De anti-fascist, May 2006, 3-5, 20-23.

happened 21 October 2011, she was seen joking to a group of officials in the State Department, 'we came, we saw, he died' (as shown on Russia Today the same day). Yet NATO's actions over Libya, involving some 30,000 sorties destroying the country's infrastructure and public buildings and without which the ragtag army of tribal fighters would have made little headway, were in obvious breach of the mandate of the UN Security Council's resolution 1973 to 'protect civilians', paralysing the Council henceforth. All this has not made the world any safer. To quote the Washington Post again,

> In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, Americans were willing to bear almost any price for their security. One lesson of today's endless war seems to be that Americans will have to learn to live with a certain amount of insecurity and fear.[100]

Among other things this has resulted in a culture of conformity that is reminiscent of the earlier communist witch-hunt, and compared to the McCarthy era, is even more tightly drawn.[101] This takes us to how IR functions in this new environment—which for the discipline, as I have argued so far, is not new at all.

The IR of the War on Terror

The Vietnam war was the high tide of the mobilisation of social scientists for US foreign policy. Noam Chomsky's designation of the likes of Walt Rostow, Ithiel de Sola Pool, and many others as the 'new mandarins', and his reflections on the responsibility of intellectuals remain valid today.[102]

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[100] Jaffe, 'A decade after the 9/11 attacks…'. op. cit.

[101] The percentage of respondents affirming that 'people feel as free to say what they think as they used to' in 2005 was 42.4 per cent, against 55.6 in 1954 (and 52.6 in 1987); the control question inquiring about 'not feeling as free', got 45.7 percent of affirmative answers against 30.7 in 1954 (and 39.4 in 1987). James L.Gibson, 'Intolerance and Political Repression in the United States: A Half Century after McCarthyism'. American Journal of Political Science, 52 (1) 2008, p. 99.

[102] Noam Chomsky, American Power and the New Mandarins. Harmondworth: Penguin, 1969 [1967].

Certainly after the US defeat in Indochina and the Watergate crisis at home, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence chaired by Senator Frank Church appeared to begin to transform the US national security state, and IR (and political science generally) in particular. Church reported in 1976 that academics collaborating with the CIA 'are located in over 100 American colleges, universities and related institutes'.[103] However, when President Carter in 1979 commissioned an outside review of the CIA to set things right, one of the three members of the committee was IR scholar Klaus Knorr, a member of the Princeton Consultants, whilst Carter's CIA Director, Admiral Stansfield Turner, appointed Robert Bowie, another of the Princeton Consultants, to head a Foreign Assessment Centre.[104] Two hundred and fifty universities and colleges had Pentagon contracts in 1980-81, with MIT and Johns Hopkins accounting for half of them. Biological warfare and its implications were studied at University of Maryland, weather modification at Berkeley, and so on.

When Haig redefined national liberation into international terrorism, the IR discipline subscribed to the change in three ways—by taking up the terrorism theme, by intensifying its intelligence role, and by developing the theory of limited sovereignty for states failing to submit to Western-styled global governance.

The first response to the terrorism theme came from the Moon Sect of South Korea (owners of the ultra-conservative Washington Times) which through their front organisation, CAUSA, set up an 'International Security Council'. The ISC in a pamphlet of 1986 proposed among other things 'to insure that terrorist group operations are not financed by dollar and other hard currency accounts held in European banks', and deny passage to known terrorists if need by publicly embarrassing allies, as was done to French President Mitterrand to force him to take action in stopping the Libyan involvement in Chad.[105] Moon also sponsored a Terrorism book series edited by Ray Cline and Yonah Alexander and the journal Political Communication and Persuasion edited by the latter.

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[103] Cited in Konrad Ege, 'Rutgers University: Intelligence Goes to College'. CounterSpy, June – August 1984, 42-44. www.cia-on-campus.org/rutgers.edu/ege.html. (Accessed 1 Feb. 2010, pp. 1-7), p. 4.

[104] Cavanagh, 'Dulles Papers…', op. cit., p. 7

[105] International Security Council, State-Sponsored Terrorism and the Threat to International Security. New York: CAUSA International, 1986, pp. 13-4.

Cline and Alexander also prepared a study for the US Senate Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, State-Sponsored Terrorism, in which they argued that the illegality of international terror somehow slipped through the mazes of international law especially as long as the term 'national liberation' disseminated by Soviet propaganda went unchallenged.[106] Various IR and political science luminaries were recruited on the editorial board of Political Communication and Persuasion, such as Leonard Binder (UCLA), James N. Rosenau (Institute for Transnational Studies in LA), as well as representatives of the Heritage Foundation and RAND. The advisory board included Samuel Huntington, Seymour Martin Lipset, and a number of political figures including Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the Brookings Institution, as well as Lord Chalfont and journalist George Will, the latter two participants in the Washington DC Jonathan Institute conference on terrorism referred to earlier.

Secondly, there was a renewed resort to plain intelligence gathering by IR scholars. The CIA under Casey funded a project at the University of Illinois on developing statistical models of governability on a global basis, whilst other projects aimed at gathering information about liberation movements such as the New People's Army in the Philippines.[107] In November 1984, the New York Times reported that Rutgers University IR scholars Richard Mansbach and Harvey Lee Waterman had been admonished by their school officials for not observing the rule that students' papers should not be fed into a CIA-funded research project without their knowledge. Mansbach and his team at the time worked on the European Non-State Actors Project (ENSAP) and in that capacity also solicited European colleagues to identify finished work or work in progress dealing with forces affecting attitudes towards the Atlantic alliance—this being the period of widespread protest against the 1979 NATO missile decision and the new cold war launched by the Reagan administration.[108]

The idea of pursuing 'terrorists' in countries providing shelter, that is, countries like Nicaragua under the Sandinistas, or Angola and Mozambique freed from Portuguese colonialism with aid from the Soviet Union and Cuba, as well as the

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[106] Ray S. Cline and Yonah Alexander, Terrorism: The Soviet Connection. New York: Crane, Russak & Co, 1986 [1984].

[107] Ege, 'Rutgers University…', op. cit., pp. 3-4; cf. Hulnick, 'CIA's Relations with Academia…', op. cit., p. 44.

[108] Cited in Ege, 'Rutgers University…', op. cit., p. 6, cf. p. 2.

ANC and ZANU-PF fighting the white minority regimes, obviously suffered a blow in this context when the Defence Intelligence Agency in 1981 offered the Africa Studies centres in the US subsidies of hundreds of thousands of dollars, but all twelve of them declined the invitation.[109]

The third role played by IR scholarship in the Reagan counterrevolution (and preparing the current War on Terror perspective) was of an apparently more detached, academic nature. But given the role of organic intellectuals as 'permanent persuaders' educating new generations of cadre and defining disciplinary agendas, this is therefore not less important. Kenneth Waltz's return to a neo-realist IR paradigm[110] shorn of all social references, represents one line of a return to Cold War thinking. More explicitly related to the Reagan counteroffensive was the new 'regime' analysis, of which Stephen Krasner of Stanford is the paramount representative. In Structural Conflict. The Third World against Global Liberalism of 1985, Krasner argues that the NIEO coalition had challenged liberal capitalism not with straightforward socialism, but on the terrain of international politics itself— which it then sought to build on to transform the global political economy in ways incompatible with liberal capitalism. Using the language of David Easton's system theory, Krasner calls capitalism the 'market-oriented' regime, in which 'allocation of resources is determined by the endowments and preferences of individual actors who have the right to alienate their property'[111]; the alternative, a contender model in which a state class mobilises its society from above, is the international regime that he calls, again in Eastonian terms, 'authoritative allocation'.

In this seminal book, Krasner outlines how sovereign equality in the NIEO episode was mobilised against global governance as defined by the West. 'The South has been able to take two legacies of the North—the organization of political units into sovereign states and the structure of existing international organizations— and use them to disrupt, if not replace market-oriented regimes over a wide range of issues'.[112] In the years that followed, Krasner elaborated on the idea that sovereignty in the hands of lesser powers must in one way or another be restricted,

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[109] Ege, 'Rutgers University…', op. cit., p.

[110] Kenneth N.Waltz, Theory of International Politics. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979.

[111] Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Conflict. The Third World Against Global Liberalism. Berkeley, Cal.: University of California Press, 1985, p. 5.

[112] Ibid., p. 124.

challenging the concept itself in <u>Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy</u> of 1999 and <u>Problematic Sovereignty</u> two years later.

In 2005, in the aftermath of the Iraq invasion and the replacement of Colin Powell by Condoleezza Rice, Krasner became Bush's policy planning director at the State Department. In the same year he proposed in a separate article to formalise the class compromise with a client governing class into 'shared sovereignty', a 'voluntary agreement between recognized national political authorities and an external actor such as another state or a regional or international organization', if need be 'limited to specific issue areas like monetary policy or the management of oil revenues'.[113] For post-conflict countries invaded by the West such as Afghanistan and Iraq, shared sovereignty might help in overcoming the limits of governance aid (which the Bush administration in 2004 planned to double in two years). The late Ottoman Empire according to Krasner provides an example of such shared sovereignty in handling debt service, just as West German rearmament in NATO or the prosecution of war crimes in Sierra Leone jointly with the UN are more recent examples.[114]

Building on this Brezhnev Doctrine for imperial global governance, Krasner with former US ambassador to Ukraine Carlos Pascual, holding the new post of Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization at the State Department, actually drew up a list of countries which were liable to collapse in conflict . As Pascual explained in a talk, it was envisaged to write 'pre-completed contracts to rebuild countries that <u>are not yet broken</u>'. His office's mandate, he explained, was 'to create democratic and market-oriented' states, which would not always be a matter of rebuilding states from conflict, but 'tearing apart the old'.[115] Yugoslavia and all subsequent US/NATO intervention targets are testimony to what this means. In an article with Pascual in <u>Foreign Affairs,</u> Krasner explained that to identify candidates for such operations, the CIA and the military, think tanks and universities would

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[113] Stephen D. Krasner, 'The Case for Shared Sovereignty'. <u>Journal of Democracy,</u> 16 (1) 2005, p. 70.

[114] Ibid., p. 77.

[115] Cited in William Easterly, <u>The White Man's Burden. Why the west's efforts to aid the rest have done so much ill and so little good</u>. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 238.

have to provide the information.[116] Basically the authors propose that 'US or other military or peacekeeping operations' fit into a contingency planning in which the causes of internal conflict are well known in advance, so that over the longer term 'the United States will have enabled more people to enjoy the benefits of peace, democracy, and market economies.'[117]

Following the granting of sovereignty to Kosovo by the main NATO states in 2008, South Ossetia's by Russia, and taking a future Palestine as a case in point, Krasner again specified his view of sovereignty, noting that Israel will never allow a sovereign Palestine without some oversight of security, by itself or a third party, what he calls a 'nested security arrangement'. Again he reiterates his point that 'The international environment is too complex for any set of rules, including those regarding sovereignty, to be applied rigidly across all cases.'[118]

Under Obama, the practices accompanying the increasingly violent observance of Western supremacy over 'failed states'—a concept meanwhile current in the discipline—have become perhaps less self-confident, but not fundamentally different. Referring to the 'endless wars' the West and NATO are now engaged in, Krasner's successor as planning director at the State Department, IR scholar Anne-Marie Slaughter, has confirmed that 'In this world we will not "win wars"—we will have an assortment of civilian and military tools to increase our chances of turning looming bad outcomes into good—or at least better—outcomes.'[119]

In the US, the 'moulding event' of 9/11 activated the old hands of the IR discipline, such as Robert Jervis, Joseph Nye, and Bradford Westerfield, all of whom had worked for the CIA previously, to volunteer again.[120] Otherwise all the main changes were already in place. In Europe, however, the response to the terror scare was muted in comparison to the US and the turn from seeing the world in terms of progressive change to a perspective of endless war was hesitant. Robert Cooper, an assistant to Javier Solana, the NATO secretary-general turned EU

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[116] Stephen D. Krasner and Carlos Pascual, 'Addressing State Failure'. Foreign Affairs, 84 (4) . 2005, pp. 156-7.

[117] Ibid., pp. 162-3.

[118] Krasner, Stephen D. 2009. 'Who Gets a State, and Why? The Relative Rules of Sovereignty.' Foreign Affairs Snapshot (http://www.foreignaffairs.com) (Accessed 12 July 2011).

[119] Cited in Jaffe, 'A decade after the 9/11 attacks…'. op. cit.

[120] Giroux, University in Chains, op. cit., p. 64.

security and foreign policy representative, in 2003 still challenged the identification of Third World emancipation with terrorism, noting that 'a century of emancipation, of national liberation movements and self-determination cannot be reversed.' In his view, 'market reform' and 'good governance' can be spread without resorting to violence.[121]

Since then, the securitisation of IR has become more pronounced on this side of the Atlantic too. By way of conclusion let me give a few examples from Britain, which set a fine example of refusing to cooperate with McCarthyism in the 1950s[122] but this time is showing less resilience. In 2003, Bristol University's Politics Department became involved in a Ministry of Defence project on 'Potential Generic Adversaries 2003-2033' amongst a range of defence-related activities.[123] In 2004, the CIA launched a \$4 million pilot project to place trainees in UK anthropology departments under the PRISP programme, funding students on the condition they sign up for intelligence work after their degree and take military intelligence summer courses.[124]

In May 2008, in what began as a overblown surveillance operation, a graduate student and an employee of the University of Nottingham at the instigation of the university management were arrested and held under the Terrorism Act 2000 for six days, in what the Home Office at one point even called 'a major Islamist plot'. The issue was that the two obtained open-source documents available at the university's own library that were deemed security-sensitive. It became a disciplinary issue when Nottingham IR scholar Rod Thornton presented a paper on it at the conference of the British International Studies Association in Manchester, April 2011, only to find himself suspended by his university and made incommunicado by having his e-mail closed down. BISA then also removed Thornton's paper from its website and rather than protesting Nottingham's breach of academic freedom,

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[121] The Guardian, 23 October 2003.

[122] Krige, American Hegemony…, op. cit., passim.

[123] Anna Stavrianakis, 'Call to Arms: The University as a Site of Militarised Capitalism and a Site of Struggle'. Millennium. Journal of International Studies, 35 (1) 2006, p. 143.

[124] Phil Baty, 'CIA outrages UK academics by planting spies in classroom'. Times Higher Education, 3 June 2005, accessed 11 February 2010. Cf. Giroux, University in Chains, op. cit., pp. 69-70.

offered the university its 'good offices' in case it were to undertake a review of the matter.[125]

At the University of Sussex, finally, the appointment of the NATO Planning Director Jamie Shea as a visiting lecturer for three years (his title was later changed to 'visiting practitioner') with several NATO wars in progress leads us back to the Long Island University Homeland Security Management Institute I opened this paper with. Dr Joanne Wright, a security specialist with a background in Northern Ireland, sat on the board member of the Long Island institute (all others minus one more were police and security officials) when she joined the Sussex management in 2006. It was at her insistence that the IR Department at this university made a switch to an enhanced security profile, for which the presence of Shea was judged an asset. As two graduate students wrote concerning this appointment, which the Department failed to reverse after it was made public, 'it is not unreasonable to infer that this focus on the university world is part of a conscious policy designed to give [NATO] a greater academic profile and orientate research to its policy concerns.'[126]

This was underscored when Sussex anthropologists in late 2010 were being approached by NATO to volunteer as 'subject matter expert' to help develop a new 'Capstone Concept for the Military Contribution to Countering Hybrid Threats.' Luckily this was exposed by one of the anthropologists invited, just as there was vociferous protest against the coming of Shea to Sussex, and will continue to be. For what is at issue here is what Jef Huysmans calls 'a political technique of framing policy questions in logics of survival with a capacity to mobilize politics of fear in which social relations are structured on the basis of distrust'.[127] IR scholars and students must reflect on whether this is an approach they subscribe to—or resist it.

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[125] 'Brief Summary of BISA's Responses to the Matter at the University of Nottingham', http://www.bis.ac.uk/index.php?option=com, (accessed 24 October 2011).

[126] Luke Cooper and Maïa Pal, 'Lectures from a Spin Doctor: a Nato strategist's position at a top British university'. Open Democracy 30 June 2011. http://www.opendemocracy.net/author/luke-cooper-and-ma%C3%AF-pal. (accessed 12 September 2011).

[127] Cited in Elbe, Virus Alert..., op. cit., pp. 90-1.