University of Sussex

Event-Driven Finance

Lecture 1: Introduction. The Market (Reality).

Mike Lipkin Columbia University (IEOR)





• What is event-driven finance?

A first, naïve, answer is this: Event-driven finance concerns the pricing of (derivative) securities concomitant to some temporal event.

This first answer is somewhat tautological. And in any case, events happen all the time. So why might we wish to introduce this new category of finance?

To answer this question we need to reexamine our preexisting ideas about derivatives pricing.



- In the course of doing so we shall see that standard approaches to pricing involve assumptions of equilibrium.
- These assumptions include the notion that many events may be averaged over; the events form a heat-bath in whose presence the expected stock behavior may be calculated.
- BUT what if we are not interested in the average behavior of a stock, but only its behavior in the temporal vicinity of ONE event.
- We should expect the pricing of the derivative securities to have a prominent time dependence- and it does.



• So the story is two-fold:

Events are typically discrete changes in some characteristic at a fixed time;

And event-driven finance means that we are interested in the time-dependent price of securities *near* that time.


• Let's look at some pictures:



 The following three plots show the volatility surface for the stock, FDC, at the close of trading, September 15, 2005, (upper surface)


 And below it, the lower surface shows the same stock 1 day later:

FDC impact




FDC impact





FDC impact






- Clearly some *event* had occurred to *lower the implied volatilities* across all expiries.
- This means that theoretical pricing of securities required a discrete change of input parameters.
- We will discuss what happened later, but you may be surprised to note that classical stochastic models do not include a parameter which directly encompasses this change.
- Some more pictures:



Here is a graph of implied volatility for a period of four weeks in April, 2008 in the stock, AAPL


- For three of those weeks the implied volatility was steadily rising; after a crash, the volatility appears to flatten
- After that, a similar *fitted* plot in MSFT

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 Here is the rising portion of a similar graph for MSFT in October 2004



MSFT implied vols around earnings 10-21-04




- For the previous two images, it is clear that while there appears to be an event *date*, the impact of the event is spread out over several *earlier* weeks broadly.
- This is typical of a certain class of events which we shall revisit in Lecture 3; they are clearly *anticipatory* in that we see effects in the volatility surface in advance of the event.



- The following is a graph of implied volatilities for several strikes in the stock, DIGI, for three months in 1998.
- At a certain date (ca. May 14) the volatility surface pleats- the front month at-the-money implied volatility dropping below the volatility of the next higher strike on a relative basis.

DIGI pleat





- In Lecture 4 we will come back to this example and discuss what happens here in more detail. This is a complex event in that it has multiple parts.
- Looking carefully at the long-term volatility, one sees that it drops abruptly in the first week of June.
- This sudden drop in the long-term volatility is, in fact, what most people would identify as the *event*.
- But while the volatility pleating of mid-May is consistent with the June occurrence it is not pre-ordained by it- nor the reverse!




 Here is a plot of stock price for the stock JDEC for a month (February - March) in 2001.

case4

• The Japanese candlesticks indicate a large drop in daily volatility for the stock after Feb 27, and the stock zeroes in on the price of \$10.



JDEC in March 2001





- In case 1, an event on Sept 16 in FDC produced a discrete immediate response in the volatility surface.
- In case 2, an event at a later date caused an anticipatory change in the volatility surface over several weeks.
- In case 3, a complex event stretches over several months and has variable temporal effects on the volatility surface.
- In case 4, -contrast with case 2- the event in JDEC can be associated with the date, Feb 27, but the effect on the volatility surface and stock price stretches forward in time. We will discuss this case in detail next Lecture.
- Let's jump in with a real world problem:

Lecture 1



 Suppose you are working at a desk and running a variant of Black-Scholes, as sophisticated as you care to make it, and a hedge fund shows you 15000 contracts \$0.15 through your theoretical value: "I can sell you 15000 VMW Apr 85 calls for \$7.46."

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	0	0				24.90 0			28.60	29.90	29.90 0 25.20 0	57.05 - 54.57 -		1.20 0		1.20	1.30	1.30 0			
APR60-0 APR65-0	-	0		54.61 0.					24.90	25.20	25.20 0	54.57		1.20 0		1.20	2.05	2.05 0			
APR55-0	0	50		50.31 0.		16.70 0			16.70	17.00	17.00 0	52.11		2.95 0		2.95	3.10	3.10 0			
PR725-0	0	0		49.38 0.		4.90 0			14.90	15.20	15.20 0	49.33		3.60 0		3.60	3.10	3.10 0			
APR75-0		0	49.31	48.69 0.		3.20 0			13.20	13.50	13.50 0	49.33		4.40 0		4,40	4,60	4.60 0			
PR775-0		0	48.40	47.66 0.		1.60 0			11.60	11.80	11.80 0	40.03		5.30 0	5.36		5.40	5.40 0			
APR80-0	0	0	46.64			1.60 0			10.10	10.30	10.30 0	47.76		6.30 0		6.30	6.50	6.50 0			
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APR85-0	0	ő		45.77 0.		7.50 0			7.50	7.70	7.70 0			8.70 0		8.70	9,90	8.90 0			
PR875-0	3	0		45.38 0.		6.40 0			6.40	6.60	6,60 0		_	10.10 0	_	10.10	10,30	10.30 0			
LPR90-0	0	ő		44.74 0.		5.40 0				5.60	5.60 0	44.50		11.60 0		11.60	11.80	11.80 0			
PR924-0	0	ő		44.09 0.		4.50 0			4.50	4.70	4.70 0			13.20 0		13.20	13.40	13.40 0			
APR95-0	-6	0		43.34 0.		3.70 0			3.70	3.90	3,90 0			14.80 0		14.80	15,10	15.10 0			
R974-0	ő	ő		43.26 0.		3.10 0				3.30	3.30 0	43.16 -		16.70 0		16.70	16.90	16.90 0			
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APR145-0	ŏ	ŏ	41.76		0.010					0.15	0.15 0		8 -0.994			1.10 59.			63.50			
ZJUL40-0	0	0		62.97		43.40 0			43,40		45.80 0		6 -0.034			0.57 0.		65	0.65			
JUL424-0	0	0		61.24		41.10 0			41.10	43.10	43.10 0		6 -0.042			0.72 0.		75	0.75			
JUL45-0	0	0	59.11	59.21	0.950	37.60 0		39.85	37.60	40.90	40.90 0	59.	9 -0.050	0.75 0		0.84 0.	75 0.	95	0.95			
JUL475-0	0	0	57.51	57.83	0.940	36.10 0			36.10	38.90	38.90 0	57.	0 -0.060	0.95 0		1.04 0.	95 1.	15	1.15	0		
2JUL50-0	0	0	56.21	56.53	0.927	34.20 0			34.20	36.60	36.60 0	56.	0 -0.073	1.20 0		1.29 1.	20 1.	40	1.40	0		
2JUL55-0	0	0	53.64	54.36	0.896	29.90 0			29.90	31.20	31.20 0	54.	2 -0.104	1.85 0		1.91 1.	85 2.	00	2.00	0		
2JUL60-0	0	0	51.59	51.81	0.858	25.70 0			25.70	27.00	27.00 0	51.	5 -0.142	2.60 0		2.71 2.	60 2.	80	2.80	0		
2JUL65-0	0	0	49.75	50.21	0.811	22.60 0			22.60	23.00	23.00 0	50.	5 -0.189	3.70 0		3.77 <mark>3.</mark>	70 3.	90	3.90	0		
2JUL70-0	0	0	48.29	48.70	0.756	19.00 0			19.00	19.40	19.40 0	48.	2 -0.244	5.10 0		5.17 <mark>5.</mark>	10 5.	30	5.30	0		
JUL724-0	0	0	47.56	47.75	0.726	17.40 0			17.40	17.70	17.70 0	47.	5 -0.274	5.90 0		5.96 <mark>5.</mark>	90 6.	10	6.10	0		
2JUL75-0	0	0	46.77	47.13	0.694	15.80 0			15.80	16.10	16.10 0	46.	7 -0.306	6.80 0		6.86 <mark>6.</mark>	80 7.	00	7.00	0		
JUL77%-0	0	0	46.04	46.40	0.661	14.30 0			14.30	14.60	14.60 0	46.	5 -0.340	7.80 0		7.86 <mark>7.</mark>	80 8.	00	8.00	0		
2JUL80-0	0	0	45.40	45.78	0.626	12.90 0			12.90	13.20	13.20 0	45.	4 -0.374	8.80 0		8.95 <mark>8.</mark>	80 9.	10	9,10	0		
JUL8215-0	0	0	44.88	45.09		11.50 0			11.50	11.80	11.80 0	45.	.0 -0.409	10.00 0		0.12 <mark>10.</mark>			10.30	0		
2JUL85-0	0	0	44.31		0.556	10.40 0			10.40	10.60	10.60 0			11.30 0		1.41 <mark>11.</mark>			11.50		_	
JUL874-0	0	0		44.09		9.20 0			9.20	9.50	9.50 0			12.60 0		2.74 <mark>12.</mark>			12.90			
2JUL90-0	0	0	43.25		0.484	8.20 0			8.20	8.40	8.40 0		55 -0.517			4.20 <mark>14.</mark>			14.30			
JUL924-0	0	0	42.78			7.20 0			7.20	7.40	7.40 0			15.60 0		5.73 <mark>15.</mark>			15.90			
2JUL95-0	0	0	42.24		0.414	6.30 0				6.60	6.60 0		7 -0.588			7.35 17.			17.50			
JUL974-0	0	0	42.06	42.24	0.380	5.50 0			5.50	5.80	5.80 0	42.	8 -0.621	18.90 0	1	9.07 <mark>18.</mark>	90 19.	20	19.20	0		
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EMC to maintain 80% VMware stake

EMC Corp., which specializes in high-end computer storage systems, is based in Hopkinton. (Neal Hamberg/ Bloomberg News/ File 2004)

Bloomberg News / March 3, 2010





- Do you buy them?
 - What considerations do we need make?
 - What if the hedge fund wanted to sell 500 options only?
- Volatility/Vega
- Risk
- The above is an example of a volatility depression (spike). After the trade there will be a new volatility profile.
- What will that profile look like?
- Would it surprise you to know that there is no existing, accepted theory of the *dynamics* of pricing?
 - What we are interested in having at our disposal is not a static (or thermodynamic) model which allows stochastic volatility, but a way of learning about the "response function" of a real market.
- In a sophisticated theory, the following kind of mathematical object would be calculable: $<\Delta\sigma(K_1,t_1)\Delta\sigma(K_2,t_2)>$.



- As you can imagine. If we do decide to buy the Apr 85 calls we will have greatly increased our Vega. From the discussion it is clear that in any case, prices will decline in other strikes and series.
 - By how much?
 - No one knows. There is (almost) a complete absence of theory.
- If the Apr 85 calls decline by 1.5 (implied) vol points,
 - how many points will the Apr 90 calls come in by?
- The market there is \$5.40-\$5.60.
 - Does it make sense to hit the bid? (What does hit mean?)
- The July 85 calls are \$10.40-\$10.60.
 - Should you sell the calls at \$10.40 as a hedge?
 - Is this better than the \$5.40 sale?
 - What if there are earnings between April and July?



- Should you sell EMC volatility instead?!?
- Suppose that the hedge fund "informs" you that the calls will trade.
 - Should you be *leaning* short?
 - What does this say about the assumption that the stock process is independent of option trading?
 - Is there a flaw in the Martingale assumption?
- Later (Lecture 2) we will see that option volume can affect stock prices.
- Here are some Real World examples:



- On September 16, 2005, a BA customer sold 150,000
 FDC Jan 40 calls to market-makers, mostly within a two-hour window.
- The implied volatility of at-the-money options went from 23 to 19 in January and from 28 to 20 in November.

this was case 1 above

 On Tuesday, May 23, 2006, market-makers were told "133,000 RAD Jan '08 2½ calls will trade at 2.35 vs. 4.38 stock. How much would you like to sell?"



	Profile	¢Reload	≋ Positions	🗰 Voly Hist	8Executions	Stocks	- Montage	⊜ Batch	😁Symbol 📀I	nfo
RAD (N)	4.36 (M)	4.37 (T)	(124 x 476)	-0.03	Exchange	•	1	Spread	Size	
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5.000	0.00	0.05	0.05			25 0.3		0.75	0.85	
7.500	0.00	0.05	0.00		*****	05 <u>0.0</u>		0.20	0.30	
10.000	0.00	0.05	0.00		*****	05 0.0				
12.500	0.00	0.05	0.00	0.05	<mark>).00</mark> 0.	05 0.0	0 0.05			
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2.500 5.000	0.00 0.65	0.70	0.65					3.00	3 20	
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RAD = \$4.38 133,300 CONTRACTS TRADE 2.35

DO YOU SELL?

Option	Order	Entry						
						31556@ 2	2.3081144	<mark>4@ 2.35</mark>
_ ₩	VBAZ JA	N 08 2.5	0 Call	Katama N	1Lipkin	-	Limit	-
Qty:	25	KP Pric	e: 2.25	KP	MM	-	ioc	•
DoneAv		ISE	No PIP	0p	J ien	Sweep	None	•
Exch	Size	Bid	Vol	Exch	Size	Ask	Last	SELL
ISE	29	2.25	52	ISE	114	2.35	2.30	
CBOE	40	2.20	0	CBOE	57	2.35	0.00	Snd+Shw
PCX	10	2.20	133300	AMEX	20	2.35	0.00	Show
PHLX	20	2.20	0	PCX	38	2.35	2.35	Show
BOX	30	2.20	0	PHLX	71	2.35	0.00	Spread
AMEX	10	2.15	0	BOX	51	2.35	0.00	
•			•					Close

Lecture 1



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B115-0		0	48.40		0.030	0.03	с. С.	0.06	0.05	0.20	0.20			-0.971	35.30			35.30	37.90		90 0			
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R424-0	-	ō	63.25		0.983	40.50		41.51		41.90	41.90			-0.017	0.10		0.17		0.25		25 0			
PR45-0	-	0	63.14		0.978	37.50		39.07		39.40	39.40			-0.022	0.15		0.22		0.30		30 0			
PR474=0	0	0	60.99	61.45	0.970	35.60	0	36.67		37.10	37.10	0 0	61.42	-0.030	0.28	5 0	0.32		0.40	0.	40 0			
PR50-0	0	0	59.47	60.13	0.960	32.80	0	34.30	32.80	34.60	34.60	0 0	60.10	-0.040	0.40	0 0	0.45	0.40	0.50	0.	50 0			
PR55-0	0	0	56.62	57.08	0.936	28.60	0	29,60	28.60	29.90	29.90	0 0	57.05	-0.064	0.70	0 0	0.75	0.70	0.80	0.	80 0			
PR60-0	0	0	53,83	54.61	0.900	24.90	0	25,10	24.90	25.20	25.20	0 0	54.57	-0.100	1.20	0 0	1,25	1.20	1.30	1.	30 0			
VPR65-0	0	0	51.73	52.15	0.852	20.60	0	20,83	20.60	21.00	21.00	0 0	52.11	-0.148	1.90	0 0	1,97	1.90	2.05	٤.	05 0			
LPR70-0	0	50	50.07	50.31	0.789	16.70	0	16.88	16.70	17.00	17.00	0 0	50.26	-0.211	2.98	5 0	3,02	2.95	3.10	3.	10 0			
2R72H=0	0	0	49.31	49.38	0.752	14.90	0	15.06	14.90	15.20	15.20	0 0	49.33	-0.248	3.60	0 0	3,69	3.60	3.80	З.	80 0			
APR75-0	0	0	48.40	48.69	0.712	13.20	0	13,36	13.20	13.50	13.50	0 0	48.63	-0.288	4.40	0 0	4,49	4.40	4.60	4.	60 0			
027745-0	-	0	47.43		0.670	11.60		11.73		11.80	11.80			-0.331	5.30		5.36		5.40		40 0			
APR80-0	-	0	46.64		0.625	10.10			10.10	10.30	10.30			-0.376	6.30		6.34		6.50		50 0			
PR82 1 -0		0	45.98		0.578	8.80		8,87		9.00	9.00			-0.423	7.40		7,49		7.60		60 0			
PR85-0		0	45.29		0.530	7.50		7.61	7.50	7.70	7.70			-0.470	8.70		8.74	_	8,90		90.0	_		
PR875-0	-	0	44.74		0.482	6.40		6.49		6.60	6.60			-0.519				10.10	10.30		30 0			
LPR90-0		0	44.11		0.435	5.40		5.49		5.60	5.60			-0.566				11.60	11.80		80 0			
R924-0		0	43.76		0.388	4.50		4.59		4.70	4.70			-0.613	13.20			13.20	13.40		40 0			
PR95-0	-	0	43.10	43.34		3.70			3.70	3.90	3.90			-0.657	14.80			14.80	15.10		10 0			
R974-0		0	42.99		0.302	3.10		3,18		3.30	3.30			-0.699	16.70			16.70	16.90		90 0			
R100-0		0	42.21		0.263	2.55		2.61		2.65	2.68			-0.738	18.60			18.60	18.80		80 0			
R105-0		0	41.70		0.193 0.139	1.65		1.71	1.65	1.75	1.78			-0.808 -0.863	22.70			22.70 26.90	22.90 28.20		90 0 20 0			
R115-0		0	41.15			0.65	-		0.65	0.75	0.78			-0.863					28.20		20 0			
PRIIS-0	1	0	40.43	41.10	0.097	0.65	0	0.70	0.65	0.78	0.78	50	41.13	-0.905	31.50		31.83	31.80	32.80	32.	80 0			~

Event-Driven Finance



- Let's take the previous slide of VMW as a template.
- The standard approach to market pricing is calibration. All market models take input data from the actual prices out there. Suppose that the resultant model now "fits" the market, in the sense that no theoretical prices lie outside the bid-offer spreads.
 - Does this mean that the market is correctly priced?
- Suppose that over the next week, buyers show up for all the VMW 87.5 line options (previous slide $S_0=83.77$). As a result,
 - what will happen to the normal skew?
- If the skew "inverts", does this mean that the prices are wrong?
- We will see, (Lecture 4), that under certain circumstances such as take-overs the skew can take a strange but characteristic shape.



- cannot know if our model is now wrong
- or if profitable trading is now possible
- This is because events create a phase change in the system we are studying/trading
- Case 2: earnings dates in AAPL and MSFT
- Case 3: anticipation of, and then take-over of DSC (DIGI) by Alcatel
- Case 4: the *expiration pinning* of JDEC



- Let's try to summarize some of the ideas we have discussed.
- The size of a trade matters. The time scale for the relaxation of the market subsequent to a trade matters. A quant analyzing the thermodynamics of the market will not see many of the time scales needed to understand market dynamics.
- It is important to pay strict attention to time scales.
- Ex.: Optionmetrics IVY database closing prices
- This time scale suffices to look at earnings, drug announcements, take-overs and mini-crashes (Lectures 3 and 4). It does not allow us to look at the response to size trades.
 - What kind of database would you need for that?
 - Would such a database be useful for a trading house?
 - Do you think the *elasticity* of the response is a function of the individual stock? the open interest? the illiquidity of the stock? Anything else?



- Let's conclude this introductory talk by considering a typical problem about which there is a lack of theoretical understanding. The objective will be to abstract the nature of the problem, consider the time scales involved, and finally to propose a database *experiment* to search for market behavior.
- Let's take the VMW, EMC example. These are two related companies. Suppose we run a book with positions in VMW and EMC. When we are offered a large trade in VMW, we would like to know if we need to be hedging in EMC. Notice that this is not asking if stock prices are correlated (although they may be), but rather if volatility surfaces are correlated.
- For example, suppose that we are short 5000 Vega in VMW and long 5000 Vega in EMC. If we buy VMW premium we will become flat, say.
 - Do we need to sell some amount of EMC volatility?
 - If that is true, what would that tell us and how would we quantify it?
 - What time scale would the vol changes occur on?





• To begin with we need to **locate** significant volatility changes in the histories of VMW and EMC. We need these changes to occur over a characteristic time scale, say one or two days, and then we need to see if there is a subsequent change in the volatility of the partner stock. The following quantities may be relevant:

 $<\Delta \sigma_{VMW}(t, K_{\Delta 1}) \Delta \sigma_{EMC}(t + \tau, K_{\Delta 1}) > (1)$

 What is this object? Δσ is the change in vol, τ is the lag time (unknown but possibly very short) between the change in VMW vol and the subsequent change in EMC vol, τ > 0 assumed. K_{Δ1} is the strike corresponding to similar deltas in both products. (Notice how the assumptions are multiplying!!) From the physics of dynamical systems, this quantity is called a response function– for obvious reasons.



- Impact is frustrating (for me) in that it exposes the lack of theory.
- Given some set of parameters involving market cap, supply/demand, initial volatility surface, etc., a complete theory would explicitly yield the *new* volatility surface which results, given a large instantaneous trade of size, Q.
- This is far away, however:
- A "complete" solution exists for stock pinning (Lec. 2)
- "Partial" solutions exists for earnings and take-overs (Lecs. 3 and 4)
- A "complete" (hard) solution exists for hard-to-borrowness (another mini-course)
- The general technical approach is to identify *slow* variables in which reformulated static modeling approximately holds.
- We will see this next time...







University of Sussex

Event-Driven Finance

Lecture 2: Pinning.

Mike Lipkin Columbia University (IEOR)




Bloomberg Businessweek Markets & Finance Global Economics Companies & Industries Politics & Policy Technology Innovation & Design Small Business Business Schools Video & Multimedia China's Autos Need to Emit Less Pollution A Canadian's Requiem for the Penny Photograph by Vincent Oliver/Getty Images Columbia The Internet is abuzz with theories about Apple stock's dramatic closing number Executive MBA Investing An Apple Conspiracy? Theories on That \$500 Close Information Sessions Every Saturday, 10:30 a.m. By Nick Summers on January 22, 2013 | 💟 🛐 in 👧 🧼 26 Comments Shares of Apple (AAPL) closed at 500 on Friday, Jan. 18. Related EXPLORE HIGHER GROUND Not 499.99, not 500.01-five zero zero point zero zero dollars on the nose. There's a long history of market APPLE 4- Columbia Business School Learn watchers having cried conspiracy on Apple stock and for EXECUTIVE MBA More 7 some observers, the impossibly round number was just too much of a coincidence. "I still have that bridge to sell you if you don't think the fix was in on this," wrote John Videos You May Like by Taboola Any Significance to Apple Gruber an Apple über-blogger. Closing at Exactly \$500? Burger Billio A Twitter chorus joined in: Proof of stock market manipulation • If this doesn't merit an SEC investigation then they This Hacking Software Lvnsi Torres' Rise to should just close lionaire Burger Queen Sees Everything You Do VIDEO • Can't imagine all the crazy back-house trading and Apple CEO Cook Feels the Heat manipulation that must have occurred to have \$AAPL on Profits land exactly at \$500.00 • I'm reminded again why amateurs shouldn't get involved in the financial markets Is the BlackBerry 10 Who's Winning the Worth the Wait? Cloud Computing Wars? For some, the neat 500 close seemed all the more fishy for coming so soon after loosely sourced reports of weak **Event-Driven Finance** Mike Lipkin

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
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
• (JDEC pin)

JDEC in March 2001





JDEC 2001 Mar 10 Put & Call Open Interest





- Today we want to look at a static property of the option markets.
- Not all phenomena which appear to violate "standard" option theory are dynamic. As you know, there are many assumptions made in standard classical finance which we know, or suspect, cannot hold in the real markets.
- Suppose you see the following market:

XYZJun 40 C8.50 - 8.80(100 x 450)(Underlying)48.46 - 48.52(650 x 75)Expiration day.

- First of all, what does this mean? What is the fair value of the calls?
- Classical theory says that the Jun 40 calls are overpriced. By how much? Why haven't they traded?



- Costs are an obvious area typically ignored in order to price options.
- A more subtle idea is the assumption of a *stock process*. This is a stochastic process for the stock, *independent* of the presence of options trading.
- Suppose someone bids for 25000 calls all at once. (On Friday, April 28, 2006 this happened in MSFT May 25 (at-the-\$) calls.) Do you suspect that the stock would move in a correlated fashion? Which way? (In MSFT the stock price moved from 24.05 to 24.17 in 15 minutes from the origin of the order.)
- This means that on certain time scales a demand for (supply of) stock moves the stock. Quantifying this effect theoretically means identifying an *Impact Function*.
- What about the very presence of outstanding option open interest? Typically it would seem not, because undoubtedly positions are hedged. And yet, sometimes option positions lead to *changing* deltas.



- Suppose you hold an XYZ Jun 40 C; it is expiration day and the stock is at 40.35 at 10:30. You calculate the delta and find it is 58.
- At 1:30, three hours later, the stock is still at 40.35. What has happened to the delta of the call? When you recalculate the option delta, it is now 66. Why?
- To stay delta-neutral you must sell an additional 8 shares.
- Now couple this to the assumption that supply (demand) of the stock pushes the stock down (up) and the changing deltas of the option lead to long option holders selling the stock.
- An analogous argument applies with the stock below the strike; now buyers push the stock up toward the strike.
- In the Black-Scholes, classical world, there are an equal number of short option holders doing the exact opposite thing. The net effect should be zero.




- But is this an accurate assumption? Market makers are generally active hedgers. When they are long a strike they aggressively hedge, especially close to expiration. But when they are short a strike and since they cannot **continuously** hedge, they avoid hedging as long as possible.
- Consider the region over which the delta is changing most rapidly. This is also the region where $\theta \equiv -(\partial C/\partial t)$ is largest. So there is an incentive for a trader to avoid hedging his short option, as long as the possibility of pinning remains high. On the other hand, the long option holder risks losing all the option value to pinning.
- So unlike the Black-Scholes world, real hedging strategies are asymmetric. Coupled with an additional non-classical assumption of stock price movement to supply/demand, there is the possibility of **pinning** the stock at expiry, that is a non-zero probability of the stock exactly closing at a strike price.



What is stock pinning?

- At the expiration of options, the close of trading on the third Friday of each month, a stock is **pinned** if it closes *exactly* at a strike price.
- For practical reasons, pinning can be considered to have occurred if the closing price is *close* to a strike (±\$0.25, say)
- Mathematically: $P\{|K-S| < \varepsilon\} > 0$ at expiration for all $\varepsilon > 0$.







UI Urbana Study: Optionable vs. Non-Optionable Stocks


At least 80 expiration dates

- = 4,395 optionable stocks on at least one date
- 184,449 optionable stock-expiration pairs
- 12,001 non-optionable stocks on at least one date
- 417,007 non-optionable stock-expiration pairs













Relative Trading Date from Option Expiration Date

(Courtesy: Ni, Pearson & Poteshman)

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- So there is plenty of evidence for pinning, but only in optionable stocks. What models might suffice to explain the effect?
- Krishnan and Nelkin attack the problem of pinning by assuming that there exists an a priori mixture of pinning paths and independent random walks for the stock price. This model can get any desired probability of pinning, but leaves unanswered how actual option data and parameters, and stock price, may affect the probabilities. Also, once the KN mixture is fixed, the price of the straddle cannot be accurate for all eventual stock paths.
- Ni, Poteshman, Pearson originally suspected **collusion** on the part of market participants. (Post our work, somewhat less so.)


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
Which of the following three slides doesn't belong?

(And what are they?!)









Event-Driven Finance

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
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history.

This is on our list of most famous games

See a Mornhy Biography

🥝 Internet







- The answer is: the Eiffel tower. Both the termite mounds and the chess game are constructs of independent agents. In other words, although both those slides show a very specific final ordered result, they are the consequence of two or many agents playing out a game. NO MASTER ARCHITECT exists.
- In the game of options trading, individual market-makers play at HEDGING their positions. They do not collude to maintain unbalanced positions.

- All possible models cannot be known, but one which involves
- ٠ market-makers acting independently to maintain approximately delta-neutral positions satisfies Occam's razor. It requires the fewest assumptions about the outside world. A kind of greatest entropy model.
- It should be noted that there are two distinctions which may be ۲ drawn between market participants. Some, market-makers and desk proprietary traders among them, are active hedgers. Others, investors and positional traders, put on positions (often but not always long delta), and let them play out.
- This asymmetry will be important. ۲









- A number of groups have examined the response of markets to orders entering an order book.
- One group is associated with J D Farmer:

Lillo, Farmer, Montegna: *Nature* **421(**2003) pp 129-130, Daniels, Farmer, Guillemot, Iori, Smith: cond-mat/0112422, a Los Alamos National Lab preprint.

• Another group is associated with JP Bouchaud (CFM).

 These groups all agree on the common sense notion that BUYING stock raises the market price, and SELLING stock

lowers the market price.

- Curiously they all disagree on the functional way in which the changing market varies with S/D. (This will be a subject for discussion later.)
- $\Delta S/S = f(Q) = EQ + E_2 Q^2 + E_3 Q^3 + ... = EQ + g(Q),$

g analytic. This is a simple Taylor's expansion for market price change as a function of the demand for (supply of) stock. For simplicity, we throw out g(Q) and simply assume a linear form.








Estimating the Demand for Deltas using Black-Scholes

$$\Delta \delta = \frac{\partial \delta}{\partial t} dt, \qquad \tau = T - t$$





Taking into account demand for stock: Price-Impact Functions

$$\frac{dS}{S} \propto E \left(\frac{D}{\langle V \rangle}\right)^p$$

$$\frac{D}{<\!V>}>>1$$

- p=0.22 Farmer, Lillo, Mantegna
- p=0.5 X. Gabaix
- p=1 linear model, (A. & Lipkin)
- p=1.5 convex model (Bouchaud, ...)



Dimensionless Model for Power-Law Price-Impact Function (p>0)


Price change= Price impact+ noise

 $\frac{dS}{S} \propto -const. \left| \frac{\partial \delta}{\partial t} \right|^{P} sign\left(\frac{\partial \delta}{\partial t} \right) dt + \sigma dW$



Dynamics for Stock Price

$$\frac{dS}{S} = \frac{E.OI}{\langle |D| \rangle} \frac{\partial \delta}{\partial t} dt + \sigma dW \qquad \qquad y = \ln\left(\frac{S}{K}\right)$$





Dimensionless Variables

$$z = \frac{y}{\sigma\sqrt{T}}, \qquad s = \frac{t}{T}, \qquad z_0 = \frac{y_0}{\sigma\sqrt{T}} = \frac{1}{\sigma\sqrt{T}}\ln\left(\frac{S_0}{K}\right)$$

$$\alpha = \frac{a\sqrt{T}}{\sigma}, \qquad \beta = \frac{E.OI}{\langle |D| \rangle \sqrt{2\pi\sigma^2 T}}$$

$$dz = -\frac{\beta(z - \alpha(1 - s))}{(1 - s)^{3/2}}e^{-\frac{(z + \alpha(1 - s))^2}{2(1 - s)}}ds + d\overline{W}$$



- z represents the dimensionless (logarithmic) distance to the strike; it's presence in the formulation insures that the likelihood of pinning is subject to a feedback of the stock price itself
- β describes the strength of the pinning force. It is proportional to the open interest, OI, and the unknown elasticity constant, E, and inversely proportional to the stock volatility, σ
- β represents the strength of the coupling to the "pinning field"
 - You can think of OI as charge, E as the dimensionful coupling constant, and $\sigma\sqrt{T}$ as a temperature
- α the drift term we will arbitrarily set to 0




Dimensionless Model (alpha=0) for Linear Price-Impact Function

$$dz = -\frac{\beta \cdot z}{(1-s)^{3/2}} e^{-\frac{z^2}{2(1-s)}} ds + d\overline{W}$$

Linear restoring force with increasing coupling with time and compact support.









Solving the linear response model (p=1)


Assume Alpha=0

Forward Fokker-Planck equation:

$$\frac{\partial F}{\partial s} + \frac{1}{2} \frac{\partial^2 F}{\partial z^2} - \frac{\beta z}{\tau^{3/2}} e^{-\frac{z^2}{2\tau}} \frac{\partial F}{\partial z} = 0, \qquad \tau = 1 - s$$

Look for solution of the form:

$$F(z,s) = \exp\left(\frac{1}{\sqrt{\tau}}\phi\left(\frac{z}{\sqrt{\tau}}\right)\right), \quad \phi(\varsigma) \text{ unknown}, \quad \varsigma = \frac{z}{\sqrt{\tau}}$$







A Formula for the Pinning Probability

$$P(z,s) = 1 - \exp\left[-\frac{2\beta}{\sqrt{1-s}}e^{-\frac{z^2}{2(1-s)}}\right]$$

Satisfies :

 $\lim_{s \to 1^+} P(z,s) = 0$ $\lim_{s \to 1^+} P(0,s) = 1$









- From the solution (last slide), we see that to first order, the pinning probability should increase linearly in β- essentially the OI/σ
- However as β increases the pinning probability should saturate
- As z increases the pinning probability should fall off quadratically to lowest order
- The following show unpublished work of my students- actually their PS solutions for the Event-Driven Finance class

PPN graph KO; 1/1/96-1/1/2010; 0.15 pinning criterion




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
All stocks 2002-2003








All stocks 2002-2003 (log distance with 1 week to expiry in 2^d graph)




Cumulative likelihood of pinning with 1 week to go to expiry (T. MacFarland)




Indices do not pin

Count of Close Price within \$0.15 of Strike for 25 AM Settlement Indices






Observations with market-makers <u>net</u> <u>long</u> (~\$0.125)






Market-makers + firm proprietary traders <u>net long</u>










Market-makers + firm proprietary traders <u>net short</u>






Dimensionless Model for Power-Law Price-Impact Function (p>0)

Price change= Price impact+ noise

$$\frac{dS}{S} \propto -const. \left| \frac{\partial \delta}{\partial t} \right|^p sign\left(\frac{\partial \delta}{\partial t} \right) dt + \sigma dW$$

$$dz = -\frac{\beta \cdot |z|^p \operatorname{sign}(z)}{(1-s)^{3p/2}} e^{-\frac{pz^2}{2(1-s)}} ds + d\overline{W}$$

Dimensionless eq. without irrelevant drift terms (alpha=0).





Pinning under non-linear priceimpact models

(i) If $p \le 1/2$, there is <u>no pinning</u>, i.e. P[z(1)=0|z(0)=z]=0, for all z.

(ii) If p>1/2 pinning occurs with finite probability (<1) and

ln P(z(1)=0|z(0)=z)
$$\propto -\frac{C(\beta, z)}{2p-1}$$

$$P_{pin} \propto e^{-\frac{C}{2p-1}}, \qquad p > 1/2$$



- The power, p, in the previous slides is included to suggest the possibility of a spectrum of (non-analytic) impact functions
- Recent work by R. Cont supports the value 1.0 for p
- p may be thought of as a measure of the competition between diffusion and pinning pressure- as p decreases, the impact of hedging becomes less and less
- Viewing this as a physicist would, we should typically expect a phase transition in the p- parameter space from pinning to non-pinning as p declines
- If this is the case (we shall see it is), then the experimental fact of pinning should constrain the possible impact models



- As OI changes with time:
 - Integrate this model
- As other strikes compete:
 - Sum over strikes
- Should work for other instruments that are singly hedged (interest rate, commodity, etc.) but not necessarily indices depending on indirect hedging over multiple instruments



- Complex pricing may result from feedback situations
- Here, independent agents (traders) drive the stock price, which in turn alters their hedging behavior, etc., etc.
- Nevertheless simple models work, as long as they are constrained by appropriate boundary conditions
- Allowing the price impact to be a variable leads to the expected result of a phase transition
- Impact functions weaker than square root are suspectthey cannot explain pinning via our mechanism; if they hold for a class of stocks, those stocks will not pin





• Extra material after here...

feedback



- What we constructed in this fashion was essentially a feedback mechanism of independent agents
- But for the purposes of this approach it is only necessary to imagine
 1 agent hedging the entire outstanding delta position

feedback



- As time advances, the delta of an option (not exactly at the money) moves away from 50 and toward 0 or 100
- Hedging requires a repeated selling or buying of stock which positively impacts the stock price and drives it toward the strike
- We follow the math now...



- The power, p, in the previous slides is included to suggest the possibility of a spectrum of (non-analytic) impact functions
- Recent work by R. Cont supports the value 1.0 for p
- p may be thought of as a measure of the competition between diffusion and pinning pressure- as p decreases, the impact of hedging becomes less and less
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- If this is the case (we shall see it is), then the experimental fact of pinning should constrain the possible impact models

Occam's razor



- You may have noted the use of BS for the calculation of delta in the demand equation
- This returns us to our initial discussion:
 - We look for simple modular approaches to pricing where the hard part has been moved to the boundaries
 - Too often the presence of market events is used to justify a complex stochastic model designed to price an entire state space
 - The crux of the approach I am outlining here is to use the simplest (Occam) sufficient model with the most comprehensive boundary conditions- the boundaries being selected by the events themselves

Real world extensions



- As OI changes with time:
 - Integrate this model
- As other strikes compete:
 - Sum over strikes
- Should work for other instruments that are singly hedged (interest rate, commodity, etc.) but not necessarily indices depending on indirect hedging over multiple instruments

conclusions



- Complex pricing may result from feedback situations
- Here, independent agents (traders) drive the stock price, which in turn alters their hedging behavior, etc., etc.
- Nevertheless simple models work, as long as they are constrained by appropriate boundary conditions
- Allowing the price impact to be a variable leads to the expected result of a phase transition
- Impact functions weaker than square root are suspectthey cannot explain pinning via our mechanism; if they hold for a class of stocks, those stocks will not pin



University of Sussex

Event-Driven Finance

Lecture 3: Dynamics. Earnings. Drug announcements. News

Mike Lipkin Columbia University (IEOR)







- Consider the following scenarios:
 - Stock XYZ; price, S_0 = 50.00; 3 weeks to go to expiration.
- Earnings date: 4 weeks away.
- For concreteness, we take the front month options to be the Junes.
- Which option generally has the *higher* implied vol, the Jun 50 C or Jul 50 C?
- Suppose that XYZ announces a change in the earnings announcement, *moving the date ahead 1 week*. What will happen to the implied vols?
- Suppose XYZ preannounces earnings today;
 - what will happen to the vols?
 - Will it matter whether the announcement is better than expected, or worse?
- Usually, only bad earnings gets preannounced.



- Some basics:
 - How many times a year are earnings announced?
 - What would happen if a stock fails to announce earnings?
- Imagine that earnings are coming out in 2 days (Jun expiry), and XYZ drops \$3 to \$47.00.
 - What will happen to the Jun 50 vol?
- Suppose earnings are announced and XYZ drops \$3 to \$47.00.
 - What will happen to the Jun 50 vol?
- What is the difference between these two scenarios?



- There are two kinds of new information that get disseminated in the marketplace. They are *scheduled* events and *unscheduled* ones.
- It is often pretty easy to distinguish between the two. Let's try some examples:
 - Earnings
 - Drug trial results
 - Upgrades/downgrades by analysts
 - Terrorist bombing in USA or Western Europe
 - Articles in the news media
 - Fed open market meeting/short rate change
 - Mergers/take-overs/acquisitions
 - State/federal actions for improprieties
 - Corporate personnel changes (CEO, CFO, etc.)






- One of the things which we should like to understand is how the volatility surfaces adjust themselves before and after both kinds of events. In a thorough research project, one would examine stocks in different industry groups, of different market caps, etc., and look for regularity.
- Is there an existing theory which addresses these concerns?
- No.
- Note: Theory is different than empirical results. Good (predictive) results will never get published!
 - Why???






- Earnings announcements come (usually) at very specific, well-defined times. What frequency?
- For some stocks, earnings are a small effect;
 - which ones might these be?
- For others, earnings announcements move the stock more than any typical daily move. As a result, the implied volatilities increase strongly heading into earnings. In this way, IVs are anticipative.
- The following is a graph of the IVs for CAT over a six-month interval. (Brown curve; ignore the blue.)
 - Can you identify the earnings dates?
 - About how long before earnings does volatility appear to begin climbing?
- My students at Columbia examine the dynamics of earnings in the database.











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2FEB75-0					1.000 1			14.19		14.30	14.30 0			-0.000					0.05	0.05 0			
FEB774-0					1.000 1					11.80	11.80 0			-0.000					0.05	0.05 0			
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2FEB85-0			159.55		0.933				4.00	4.30	4.30 0				0.05 0			0.05	0.10	0.10 0			
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2FEB30-0		0			1.000 5			59.19		59.90	59.90 0			0.032	5.80 0		0.00	5.80	0.05	0.05 0			
FEB324-0		0			1.000 5			56.69		57.40	57.40 0			0.000			0.00		0.05	0.05 0			
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2FEB60-0	0	0	109.88	109.39	1.000 2	8.90 0		29.19	28.90	29.30	29.30 0	81	. 32 ·	-0.000					0.05	0.05 0			

Day after LNKD earnings





- Drug announcements come in two varieties.
 - There are scheduled dates for stage trial announcements,
 - but also sudden news releases.
- I'm not sure which one applies to the following, but you can see the potential for trading opportunities and blunders!









Monday, Mar 14, 2005

Interim Analysis of Phase III Trial Shows Avastin Plus Chemotherapy Extends Survival of Patients with First-Line Non-Squamous, Non-Small Cell Lung Cancer

-- First Positive Phase III Results with an Anti-Angiogenesis Therapy in Lung Cancer --



- When a corporate event happens suddenly and unexpectedly, a typical response in the market is to have a large size trading day. We have just seen this with DNA. However, size trading can accompany big increases or decreases in volatility and sometimes no change at all.
- The DNA event, a large upward price jump, was accompanied by a big spike in volume. Below are two spikes in volume coinciding with down moves.

- What do you imagine may have happened with the following news event?
- Why?



Dynamics



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





• When a news event is *anticipated*, such as earnings, there is a lag time for dealing with the event. The volatility must go up for earnings, drug announcements, etc.


– Why?

- Can you think of a future, scheduled event which will reduce volatility? (We will discuss such an event in a later week.)
- What would cause the volatility to go up *slowly*? In other words, why wouldn't the vol stay high from earnings to earnings?
- Let's take a look again at a blow up of the CAT preearnings chart:





University of Sussex



• This is why vol doesn't stay high from start to finish. Rising vol just means prices decline at a slower pace.

- It is important to understand the change in volatility heading into earnings announcements. For typical curves of this sort there are two elements of interest:

Dynamics

- The size of the change, and
- The characteristic time scale over which this change occurs.
- Why would it be insufficient to only know one of these properties?
- Characteristic time scales can be eye-balled off the graph, however if the growth curve is exponential, it is conventional to identify the half-life of the curve, the time required to double in value (from a baseline).
- Is there a well-formulated theory of this effect in the literature?
 - The only one I know is:

Johannes, Michael S. and Dubinsky, Andrew L., "EarningsAnnouncements and Option Prices" (June 2005). SSRN: <u>http://ssrn.com/abstract=600593</u>

Dynamics



HPO. +31.26 -2.82 b+31.25 a31.26 33 x 9 h32.92 131.10 o32.79 s34.080o v37916844 13:39 Divs: 03/09/09 0.08 06/09/09 0.08 09/09/09 0.08 12/09/09 0.08 03 Trade Date: 02/19/09 Nodel: Microhedge Type: Equity Exercise: American Interest: 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 Volatility: Using Volatility Skew Net HPO.: 278 I# Delta: 411 Ganma: 900 Theta: -459 Vega: -50 Rho: -547 ThIdg: 182 OpenPos: -1334 DayTrades: -580 Net: -1914 plos YAIVol AIVol Dlt cPos CNBB cThy cBid cilsk cNBO cp¥ol pDlt pThy pBid pAsk pNB0 Series **pNBB** 9FEB25-0 102.15 101.00 0.977 6.10 00WYABPX 5.40 OWYABPX 152.96 -0.023 6.10 6.40 0.05 0.05 OWYABPX -9 0 9FEB274-0 25 94.07 0.964 3.70 OWYABPK 3.70 3.90 3.90 OOWYABPX 95.66 -0.036 0.03 0.05 0.05 OWYABPX 17 131.28 9FEB30-0 0 -3 115.0949.88 0.855 1.30 OQWYABPX 1.35 1.30 1.401.40 OQWYABPX 51.98 -0.145 0.05 OQWYABPX 0.09 0.05 0.100.10 OWYBPX 0.05 OWYABPX 1.25 9FEB324-0 -2 3 109.05 47.31 0.134 0.05 0.100.10 OOWYABPX 45.16 -0.866 1.25 OOWYABFX 1.35 1.35 00WYABPX 3.70 9FEB35-0 65 77 99.97 82.95 0.036 0.05 81.34 -0.964 3.70 OWYABPX 3.80 0.05 OWYABPX 3.76 3.80 OWYBPX 0.05 9FEB374-0 15 97.67 123.37 0.027 0.05 OWYABPX 121.86 -0.973 5.10 OOWYABFX 6.106.30 6.30 OWYABPX -4 6.26 9FEB40-0 -25 89.29 158.89 0.023 0.05 0.05 OQWYABPX 157.48 -0.977 8.60 OWYABPX 8.60 8.90 8.90 COWYABPX 8.76 0.05 9FEB424-0 26 25 115.88 190.68 0.020 0.05 OWYABPX 189.27 -0.981 11.10 OOWYABFX 11.26 11.10 11.4011.40 00WYXBPX 0.05 9FEB45-0 -2 141.40 220.67 0.018 0.05 OWYABPX 219.26 -0.983 13.50 OOWYABFX 13.76 13.60 13.90 13.90 00WYABPX 0 0.02 18.90 9FEB50-0 0 185.62 275.61 0.015 0.05 0.05 OWYABPX 274.26 -0.985 18.50 OQWYABFX 18.76 18.50 18.90 00WYABPX 0.20 9MAR25-0 -5 56.34 0.926 6.30 OOWYABPX 6.42 6.30 0.15 OOWYABPX 0.150.20 OGWYBPX 0 71.00 6.50 6.50 OOWYABPX 56.82 -0.080 0.189MAR274-0 0 -29 51.74 0.821 4.10 OQWYABPK 4.21 4.10 4.304.30 OQWYABPX 52.32 -0.185 0.45 OQWYABPX 0.45 0.50 0.50 COWYABPX 64.92 0.49 9MAR30-0 -50 78 60.95 46.83 0.642 2.25 OOWYABPX 2.34 2.25 2.35 2.35 OWYABPX 47.41 -0.362 1.10 OOWYABFX 1.13 1.101.15 1.15 COWYABPX 9MAR324-0 35 21 44.23 0.407 1.00 00WYABPK 1.06 1.00 1.101.10 OOWYABPX 44.37 -0.595 2.35 2.30 2.4057.01 2.30 OOWYABPX 2.40 00WYABPX 9MAR35-0 26 -50 42.41 0.196 0.35 OQWYABPX 0.36 0.35 0.400.40 OQWYABPX 41.78 -0.806 4.10 OQWYABFX 4.15 4.104.20 4.20 OX 54.B1 43.17 0.082 0.10 00WYABPK 9NAR374-0 69 36 0.12 0.10 0.150.15 OOWYABPX 42.70 -0.919 5.30 OOWYABFX 6.30 6.50 6.50 00WYABPX 50.36 6.41 9MAR40-0 25 46.01 0.037 0.100.10 OQWYABPX 45.61 -0.964 8.80 OWYBPX 8.84 8.80 8.90 8.90 00WYXBPX 48.43 9MAR4244-0 0 46.09 49.49 0.020 0.05 0.05 OOWYABPX 49.12 -0.981 11.20 OOWYABFX 11.32 11.20 11.40 11.40 00WYABPX 16.29 16.20 9MAY15-0 -3 79.44 73.18 0.990 16.20 OWYBPX 16.50 16.50 OWYBPX 73.38 -0.013 0.100.10 OWYABPX 0 0.23 0.20 9MAY20-0 29 68.42 62.09 0.947 11.40 OWABK 11.50 0.20 OWYABFX 0.25 Π. 11.46 11.4011.50 OWYBPX 62.35 -0.054 0.25 OWYABPX 9MAY224-0 57.41 0.903 9.10 00WYABPX 9.17 9.10 9.20 0.40 OOWYABPX 0.400.45 0 48 64.42 9.20 OWYBPX 57.72 -0.098 0.43 0.45 00WYBPX 9MAY25-0 15 53.48 0.835 6.90 OQWYABPX 7.03 6.90 7.10 53.81 -0.165 0.75 OQWYABPX 0.750.80 OP 60.72 7.10 OWYABPX 0.79 0.80 9MAY274-0 82 56.48 50.19 0.740 5.00 OOWYABPK 5.09 5.00 5.105.10 OWYBPX 50.06 -0.260 1.30 OOWYABPX 1.301.401.40 00WYABPX 9MAY30-0 72 3.40 2.20 2.25 2.25 00WYABPX 53.9447.32 0.617 3.40 OOWYABPK 3.50 3.50 OWYABPX 47.36 -0.384 2.20 OQWY 9MAY3242-0 -11 44.69 0.477 2.10 OOWYABPX 2.19 2.10 2.20 2.20 OOWYABPX 44.99 -0.525 3.40 OOWYABFX 3.40 3.50 3.50 OQWYABPX 50.273.44 9MAY35-0 23 42.21 0.334 1.20 00WAPX 42.24 -0.668 48.06 1.20 1.25 1.25 00WYABPX 4.90 OOWYABPX 4.98 4.90 5.10 5.10 COWYABPX 9NAY374-0 0.66 0.60 6.80 7.00 00WYXBPX -2 45.48 40.04 0.215 0.60 OOWYABPK 0.65 0.65 00WYABP> 40.82 -0.789 5.80 OQWYABFX 6.90 7.00 OWAWA 914 1 FO CONVERTY

Event-Driven Finance

Mike Lipkin

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Dynamics



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9MAR274-0		-29	64.92			3.80 OWYABPX		3.80	3.90	3.90 OWYABPX		-0.207				0.60	0.60 OQWYABIX
9MAR30-0		78	60.95			2.00 OWYABPX			_	2.10 OOWYABPX		-0.397	1.25 OGWYABPX		1.25	1.35	1.35 OOWYABPX
9MAR324-0		21	57.01			0.85 OQWYABPX			0.90	0.90 OQWYAX		-0.634	2.55 OQWYABPX		2.55	2.65	2.65 OQWYABPX
9MAR35-0	26	-50	54.81	42.53	0.177	0.25 OQWYABPX	0.32	0.25	0.35	0.35 OQWYABPX	43.41	-0.825	4.40 OQWYABPX	4.52	4.40	4.60	4.60 OWYABIX
9M&R374-0	-69	36	50.36	41.00	0.070	0.05 OQWYABPX	0.10	0.05	0.10	0.10 OWYABPX	43.31	-0.931	6.70 OQWYABPX	6,80	6.70	6.90	6.90 OWYABPX
9MAR40-0	38	25	48.43	48.07	0.037		0.05		0.10	0.10 OQWYABPX	47.92	-0.964	9.10 OQWYABPX	9,25	9,10	9.30	9.30 OWYBPX
9MAR4245-0	3	0	46.09	51.37	0.020		0.02		0.05	0.05 OQWYABPX	51.23	-0.981	11.60 OQWYABPX	11,73	11.60	11.80	11.80 OWYABPX
9MAY15-0	0	-3	79.44				15,88			16.00 OWYBPX	72.17	-0.013		0.05		0.10	0.10 OWYABPX
9NAY20-0		29	68.42			10.90 OWYABPX			_	11.10 OWYBPX		-0.059				0.30	0.30 OWYABJX
9MAY22%-0		48	64.42			B.70 OWYABPX				8.90 OQWYABPX		-0.106				0.50	0.50 OQWYABPX
9NAY25-0		15	60.72			6.50 OQWYABPX			6.70	6.70 OWYABPX		-0.178			0.85	0.90	0.90 OQWYABFX
9MAY274-0		82 72	56.48 53.94			4.70 OQWYABPX 3.10 OQWYABPX			4.80 3.20	4.80 OWYABPX		-0.278 -0.406			1.40 2.35	1.50 2.40	1.50 OQWYABFX
9NAY30-0 9NAY324-0		-11	50.27			1.90 OQWYABPX		1.90	1.95	3.20 OWYABPX 1.95 OWYBPX		-0.405	2.35 0QABX 3.60 0QWYABPX		3.60	3.70	2.40 OQWYABFX 3.70 OQWYABFX
9NAY35-0		23	48.06			1.00 OQWYABPX				1.10 OQWYABPX		-0.692	-		5.20	5.40	5.40 OQWYABIX
9MAY374-0		-1	45.48			0.50 OQWYABPX			0.55	0.55 OWY		-0.810				7.30	7.30 OWYABJX
9MAY42%-0		-25	41.18			D.10 OY	0.12			0.15 OQWYABPX			11.70 OQWYABPX			11.90	11.90 OWYABPX
9AUG274-0		2	53.33			5.80 OWYABPX	5.89	5.80	5.90	5.90 OWYBPX		-0.307	2.55 OWYABPX			2.65	2.65 OWYABPX
9XUG40-0	-4	25	43.28	39.67	0.226	0.90 OWYABPX	0.94	0.90	1.00	1.00 OWYABPX	39.57	-0.778	10.00 OWYABPX	10.08	10.00	10.20	10.20 OWYABPX
9AUG42%-0	4	0	41.47	38.46	0.161	0.55 OWYABPX	0.59	0.55	0.60	0.60 OYBP	38.87	-0.844	12.20 OWYABPX	12,23	12.20	12.40	12.40 OWYABPX
9AUG47%-0	6	0	39.48	36,80	0.069	0.15 OWYABPX	0.20	0.15	0.25	0.25 OWYABPX	36.73	-0.938	16.80 OWYABPX	16,83	16.80	17.00	17.00 OWYABFX

Event-Driven Finance





- Now let's consider the vol surfaces.
- For simplicity let us restrict the discussion to one stock, one series. (For concreteness, we could imagine the XYZ Jun options with May being the front month.)
 - What is the usual shape of the volatility surface for this series?
 - What will happen if the stock experiences a *gradual* price change which shifts the at-the-\$?
 - What will happen if the stock experiences a sudden price change which shifts the at-the-\$?
- Is there a theory which covers this behavior?
- No.





- Let's be blunt about standard option pricing theory!
- It applies when every option is well-priced. ONLY!
- In other words, if conditions materially change, standard option theory will not be able to distinguish between the need to alter the parameters of the model used and the presence of arbitrage!


I am plenty **redundant** about this point!!!!!!!!

- When a stock drops dramatically, the vol often changes. But it can go down and up!
- A theory would be a dynamic theory, but there is no such theory currently.
- An attempt to patch statics to dynamics is sticky strike/sticky delta.
- The following two slides show recent flashcrashes: AAPL; MNKD












- What is sticky strike?
- What is sticky delta?
- Sticky strike postulates that as the stock moves the vol skew stays put. This gibes with our intuition that as the stock moves lower the volatility might go up. But is this true?
- What if XYZ drops suddenly on uncertain news?
- What if XYZ drops suddenly because of definitive news (such as earnings or a drug trial results)?
- Will up moves be different than down moves?





- Sticky delta postulates that as the stock moves the vol skew stays with the corresponding option, delta by delta. This gibes with our intuition that the at-the-\$ options should have a depressed vol.
- Why?
- Should a time scale matter here? In other words, if the stock drifts gently up or down is this different than if the stock shoots quickly to another value?
- How would you define such a time scale?
- The same kinds of spikes can happen in the entire market's volatility. Here is a 3-year graph of the VIX. The data set I used ended with the onset of a vol spike in May 2006.







So, here is a mini-quiz!


The following slide is a picture of a stock I traded for a number of months in 2006.

Can you look at it and deduce what happened to the volatility surface from before to after the event in question?

One thing that did not change much was the realized vol on either side of the event!

Why would the implied volatility not be a reflection of the realized volatility?


The key story is that implied volatilities assimilate the *expected* movement over an extended time horizon. They are a poor man's representation of a jump process.



• Here is a similar stock, in this case prior to an announcement:

<mark>⊠</mark> Options	Profile	Contract	≋ Positions	8Exe	ecutions	Stocks		Montage	⊖ Batch	ee Symbol	💿 Info	喆 Alloca	te	
AGIX (Q)	10.61 (Q)	10.64 (D)	(10 x 10)	+	+ 0.38 Exchange]		Spread		Size		
Strike	Feb 07		Mar 07		A	.pr 07	Г	Jul	07	Jan 08		Jan (19	
2.50	7.90	8.30	7.90	8.30	8.0)0 8.4	10	8.20	8.50	7.70	8.70	7.70	9.20	
5.00	5.40	5.80	5.50	5.90	6.5			6.90	7.40	7.00	7.60	6.80	8.20	
7.50	3.00	3.30	3.50	3.80	5.5	5.6	30	6.20	6.50	6.20	7.00	6.20	8.30	
10.00	0.95	1.00	1.90	2.00	4.5			5.50	5.80	5.60	6.40	5.60	7.90	
12.50	0.25	0.30	1.10	1.30	3.7			5.00	5.20	5.20	5.80	5.00	7.40	
15.00	0.10	0.20	0.75	0.85	3.2			4.40	4.80	4.80	5.20	5.00	6.40	
17.50	0.10	0.15	0.55	0.65	2.7	'5 <mark>2.</mark> 9) <mark>5</mark>	3.90	4.30	4.60	5.00	4.40	6.40	
20.00	0.05	0.15	0.25	0.45	2.5			3.60	3.90	4.00	4.50	4.00	6.40	
22.50	0.00	0.10	0.20	0.45	2.1	0 2.3	30	3.30	3.60					
25.00	0.00	0.10	0.20	0.35	1.8	85 1.9	95	3.00	3.30	3.60	4.00	3.30	4.90	
30.00	0.00	0.10	0.10	0.30	1.5	50 1.6	60	2.40	2.70	2.90	3.30	2.45	4.10	
35.00	0.00	0.10	0.10	0.20	1.1	5 1.2	25	1.90	2.20	2.30	2.65	– Jan 24, 20	2 E A	
40.00	0.00	0.10			0.9	1.0)0	1.35	1.60	1.90	2.20	- 0an 24, 20		
45.00	0.00	0.10			0.7	'0 <mark>0,0.7</mark>	'5	0.95	1.25					
Strike	Febl	07	Mar 07		A	pr 07		Jul	07	Jan	08	Jan (19	
Strike	Febl	07	Mar 07		A	.pr 07		Jul	07	Jan	08	Jan (n 09	
2.50	0.00	0.05	0.00	0.20	0.3	80 0.3	35	0.55	0.75	0.70	0.95	0.75	1.10	
5.00	0.05	0.10	0.35	0.40	1.4	1 <mark>0</mark> 1.4	15	1.90	2.10	2.00	2.30	2.10	2.50	
7.50	0.10	0.25	0.80	0.85	2.8	35 2.9	90	3.50	3.90	4.10	4.40		5.40	
10.00	0.50	0.60	1.65	1.80	4.3	30 4.4	10	5.30	5.70	5.70	6.20	5.50	6.80	
12.50	2.15	2.40	3.20	3.80	6.1	0 6.2	20	7.40	7.80	7.40	8.30	7.40	8.70	
15.00	4.50	4.80	5.30	5.80	8.0	0 8.1	0	9.50	9.70	10.00	10.40	9.40	10.90	
17.50	6.90	7.20	7.50	8.00	10.0			11.30	12.00	<mark>11.40</mark>	12.50		13.00	
20.00	9.40	9.70		0.50	12.1	0 12.7	'0	13.40	14.10	<mark>13.50</mark>	14.60	13.20	15.00	
22.50	11.90	12.20		2.90	14.3		_	15.60	16.10					
25.00	14.30	14.60	14.70	5.30	16.5			17.60	18.20	17.90	18.80	17.20	19.20	
30.00	19.30	19.60		20.20	21.2			22.00	22.70	22.20	23.20	21.00	23.40	
35.00	24 30	24 60	24.50	25 20	25 P	in 26 1	Π	26 40	27 በበ	26 30	27.60	24 90	28 00	













- What do you think happened to the vols after this event?
- Can you tell from the candlesticks what happened to the realized vol?

University of Sussex

Event-Driven Finance

Lecture 4: Take-overs

Mike Lipkin Columbia University (IEOR)







- From time to time stocks are acquired for cash, stock, or some combination of the two.
- There are many scenarios for these deals:
 - Big buyer, small target
 - Equals
 - Take-unders
 - Spin-offs
 - Government intervention
 - Litigation
 - Friendly
 - Hostile
 - Two-tier deal
- SDC Platinum (from Thomson Reuters) for Mergers & Acquisitions.






- The duration for completion of a deal can be brief, i.e. several months, or prolonged, i.e. several years.
- Because there are so many possible scenarios, we will content ourselves with a few choice observations, and also restrict the discussion to cash deals.
- "January's [2006] cash-based takeovers (24 deals with a combined \$15 billion purchase price) tripled 2005's record level, according to Bloomberg." Kenneth L. Fisher, 03.27.06, Forbes.com.
- A typical cash deal involves a tender offer, by the acquirer, for all the stock of the acquiree, at a premium above the last traded price.



• The timeline for undisputed cash deals looks a little bit as follows:







- After a deal is announced the volatility surface of the acquiree becomes severely distorted. Why?
- The price of the target company moves up, but not to the take-over price.
 - Why?
 - What does the price discount represent?
- Let's take a concrete example to examine the problem:
- AZZ acquires XYZ for cash, Jun 2008 (XYZ << AZZ)
 - XYZ pre-takeover price, $S_0 = 32.25$
 - Target price, $S_{++} = 46.30$
 - Post price, $S_{+} = 45.26$
 - Pre-takeover, XYZ has flat vol profiles, σ = 35





- The following might be a typical vol profile after the announcement:
 - $-\sigma(Jun 30) = 8, \sigma(Jun 32.5) = 10, \sigma(Jun 35) = 35, \sigma(Jun 37.5) = 60, \sigma(Jun 40) = 75, \sigma(Jun 45) = 75, \sigma(Jun 50) = 8.$
 - $-\sigma(Jul) = similar to Jun$
 - σ (outer months) << Jul, σ (outer 45's) not large.
- Why? Specifically, why are some vols so low and others very high?
- What would happen if the deal doesn't go through?
- Why might this happen?





- Now let's consider some delicate questions.
- What would be the consequence of insider trading before a takeover?
- What if there were take-over rumors whether they were founded on fact or not?
- Can insider trading be reinforced in the options markets?
- The answer to the last question is YES.





- To get an idea of the consequences of leaked deals and insider trading on the options markets, we need to think about the result of a deal on an option portfolio.
- Consider the following two positions in XYZ:

1. +100 Jun(35) C -100 Nov(35) C

2. - 50 Jun(32.5) C +200 Jun(35) C

- For the parameters we chose, 35 vol, $S_0 = 32.25$, on June 1, the Jun 35's are worth \$0.16, the Nov 35's \$2.25, and the Jun 32.5's \$0.82.
 - So we can put on the Jun-Nov calendar spread, if we are adroit, for a credit of \$2.10.
 - Likewise, the $32/35 4 \times 1$, can be done for a credit of \$0.18.




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Stock: XYZ	•	Price:	32.25		Position:	0 Di	v:	•		
New Strike	Jun	4.563	35.0 +	Nov	4.556	35.0 +	(New	Series)	· ·	
25.000	7.29	0.00	(100)	8.17	0.42	(90)				ſ
27.500	4.81	0.01	(99)	6.22	0.93	(81)]
30.000	2.47	0.17	(86)	4.58	1.74	(70)				
32,500	0.82	1.02	(48)	3.26	2.89	(57)				
25-00	0.16	2.85	(14)	2.25	4.35	(45)				
40.000	0.00	7.75	(0)	0.99	8.14	(24)				
45.000	0.00	12.75	(0)	0.40	12.75	(12)				
50.000	0.00	17.75	(0)	0.15	17.75	(5)				
New Strike	Jul 4	4.563	35.0 🛟	Jan	4.556	35.0 📫	(New	Series)	<u>+</u>	-
25.000	7.43	0.03	(98)	8.58	0.65	(88)				ſ
27.500	5.10	0.19	(91)	6.74	1.25	(79)]
30.000	3.11	0.68	(75)	5.18	2.13	(69)				1
32.500	1.64	1.70	(52)	3.89	3.30	(59)]
35.000	0.75	3.31	(30)	2.87	4.75	(48)				
40.000	0.10	7.75	(6)	1.49	8.39	(30)				
45.000	0.01	12.75	(1)	0.73	12.80	(17)				
50.000	0.00	17.75	(0)	0.35	17.75	(9)				

Event-Driven Finance



- What are the post-takeover values of the spreads?
 - When XYZ goes to \$45+, the calendar falls to parity (from \$2.10).
 - The 4 x 1 loses \$12.76 once and makes \$10.26 four times for a gain of \$28.28. (But this doesn't include the 18 cent credit we put this play on for. Net \$28.46.)
- The temptation for cheating may be very strong!!
- So what will happen if takeover rumors begin and make their way to the trading floor?
 - The Markets will respond by factoring the possibility into the pricing of options.







- The previous slide is a caricature of the way volatilities change as a result of takeover potentiality.
- Problem Set VII delves into both the pre- and post- announcement volatility scenarios.
- Option market makers never get asked by the SEC about takeovers, but they should be, because with zero inside information they can abstract a likelihood that information has been leaked.
- Is this just idle speculation? The following is a screen for EDS after (unfounded?) takeover rumors began:

EDS after takeover rumors began 4 March, 2004

Coption Display 10.11 (c) MMSquared, LLC, 1998-2004, All Rights Reserved											
<mark>⊠</mark> Options	Profile	Reload	I 🛛 🕱 Positio	ons <mark>8</mark> E	xecutions	1 Stocks	III Montage	⊖Basket	🗢 Info	📕 📺 New	z
EDS 2	20.13 (N)	20.14	(8 x 51)	+	0.99	Exchange	-	:	Spread		
17.50	2.75	2.90	2.95	3.10	3.3	0 3.40	3.60	3.80			
20.00	1.00	1.10	1.30	1.40	1.8	0 1.85	2.15	2.25	2.65	2.80	3.6
22.50	0.30	0.35	0.45	0.55	0.7	5 0.85	1.10	1.25	1.65	1.75	
25.00	0.10	0.15	0.15	0.20	0.2	5 0.35	0.55	0.65	0.90	1.05	1.8
27.50	0.00	0.05			0.0	5 0.15	0.25	0.35			
30.00	0.00	0.05			0.0	0 0.10	0.10	0.20	0.30	0.40	0.9
35.00									0.10	0.20	0.4
Strike	Mart)4	Apr 0	4	Jı	un 04	Set	o 04	Jan I	05	Jt
17.50	0.10	0.20	0.30	0.40							
20.00	0.85	0.90	1.15	1.20	1.7				2.70	2.85	3.7
22.50	2.60	2.75	2.70	2.95	3.2	0 3.30	3.60	3.70	4.10	4.30	
25.00	4.90	5.00	4.90	5.10	5.1	0 5.30			5.90	6.10	6.8
27.50	7.30	7.40			7.4	0 7.60	7.60	7.90			
30.00	9.80	9.90			9.8	0 10.00	10.00		10.20	10.40	10.7
35.00									14.90	15.20	15.1
EDS G	ENZ KO	INTU	мот сі	LS K	KD F	DC TLAI	3				

Mar 20 53 vol; Mar 22.5 58 vol; Sep 30 32 vol.

• Here is a screen shot of QLGC from March 2010 after rumors:

😁 MicroHedge [ACTIV] v91.2.0.510 MIKE.31E5 - (QLogic Corp-QLQ QLC VEB YIO) QLGC.31E5																			
File Edit View Format Parameters AutoQuote Recalc! Trade Risk Sheets Tools Help LogOff LIPKIN!																			
០ ធ	à 🖪	ı 🖳	g 1	è 🛍		■ 큪	و ⊛) p	0	\$/? \$% 1	I T :	X.	0 📾 🔥	🤊 ja 🌑 🕺	해 장 교	VA VA	🔽 D 🙇	🕿 🕅	🛆 🖉 🏭 🔜
									-										A EZ SEP INT
QLGC19.	QLGC, -19.24 +0.22 b-19.24 al9.25 4 x 8 h19.34 118.90 ol8.94 s19.020y v1285259 09:55 Divs: None Truck Diturn03/09/10 Model: Microhedge Type: Equity Exercise: American																		
Volatilit					roned	ge Type:				: America 0.4 0.4 (
	-				amma:	851 Thet						lpha: -	-88 WtVega: 9	6 PP: 840 OpenPo	os: 1429 DavT	rades: -3	370 Net: 1059		
Series				AIVol		1	IBB	cThy	cBid	-	CNB	-	cpVol pDlt	-	pThv pBid		pNB0		~
OMAR10-0	0	0	168.97	199.51	0.979	9.00 1	WABPX	9,29	9.00	9.60	9.60 W	ABPX	199.51 -0.023	L	0.05	0.10	0.10 WYABP	х	
OMAR124-0	0	0	115.6e	<mark>,</mark> 137.49	0.970	6.50 1	WABPX	6.79	6.50	7,10	7.10 W	ABPX	137.49 -0.030		0.05	0.10	0.10 WYABP	х	
OMAR15-0	-10	0	70.01		0.955				4.00	4.60	4.60 W	ABPX	86.73 -0.04	5 RUMORQLG	IC TO BE ACQUI	RED BY EMO	, ABb	х	
OMAR174-0		0				1,45 1			1.45	2.00	2.00 ឃី		44.74 -0.110				вр		
OMAR20-0		0		39.29				0.24		0.30	0.30 ឃី		39.29 -0.69		1.00 0.75	1.20	1.20 WYABP		
OMAR224-0		0			-	0.05 1	WYX	0.13	0.05	0.20	0.20 07	YABPX	71.23 -0.87		3.38 2.85	3.70	3.70 WYABP		
OMAR25-0 OMAR30-0		0		85.60 131.50				0.05		$0.10 \\ 0.10$	0.10 W 0.10 W	ZADDV	85.60 -0.948	3 5.50 WABPX 2 10.50 WABPX	5.81 5.50 10.81 10.50	6.10 11.00	6.10 WABPX 11.00 WABPX		
OAPR24-0		0				16.50 1	MARDY		16.50	17.00	17.00 W		312.40 -0.000		0.05	0.10	0.10 WYABP		
OAPR5-0		ŏ				14.00 1			14.00	14.50	14.50 W		206.56 -0.010		0.05	0.10	0.10 WYABP		
OAPR74-0		ŏ				11.50 1			11.50	12.00	12.00 W		147.26 -0.01		0.05	0.10	0.10 WYABP		
OAPR10-0		0	92.59	106.00	0.979	9.00 1	WABPX	9.29	9.00	9.60	9.60 W		106.00 -0.023		0.05	0.10	0.10 WYABP	x	
OAPR1212-0	0	0	63.38	73.06	0.970	6.50 1	WABPX	6.80	6.50	7.10	7.10 07	YABPX	73.06 -0.030	0	0.05	0.10	0.10 WYABP	x	
OAPR15-0	0	-50	43.96	46.11	0.955	4.00 1	WABPX	4.30	4.00	4.50	4.50 W	YABPX	46.11 -0.04	5	0.05	0.10	0.10 WYABP	х	
OAPR174-0		-7	29.90	27.79	0.857	1,70 1	WYABPX	1,87	1.70	2,15	2.15 W	YABPX	27.79 -0.140	3	0.13	0.25	0.25 WPX		
OAPR20-0		0	27.39		0.389				0.50	0.55	0.55 ឃុ	rx	33.03 -0.612	2 1.15 WYABPX	1.28 1.15	1.40	1.40 WYABP	х	
OAPR2214-0		0	31.82			0.10 1	WX	0,12	0.10	0.15	0.15 0		37.77 -0.87		3.38 2.95	3,80	3.80 WYBX		
OAPR25-0		0		45.42				0.05		0.10	0.10 ឃុះ		45.42 -0.949		5.80 5.40	6.10	6.10 WYABP	x	
OAPR30-0		0	63.48		0.038			0.05		0.10	0.10 07			3 10.40 WYBX	10.80 10.40	11.20	11.20 WBX		
0JUL74-0 0JUL10-0		0	71.74			11.10 T 8.80 T			11.10 8.80	12.40 9.80	12.40 WI 9.80 WJ		72.75 -0.009		0.03	0.05 0.10	0.05 WAPX 0.10 WPX		
0JUL124-0		0	44.68			6.201			8.80 6.20	9.80 7.40	9.80 WI 7.40 WI		43.17 -0.020		0.05	0.10	0.10 WPX 0.15 WAPX		
0JUL15-0		-2	36.22			4.10 1			4.10	4.90	4.90 W		33.76 -0.09		0.18	0.15	0.13 WAPA 0.35 WX		
0JUL174-0		2	33.04			2.30 1			2.30	2.70	2.70 07			L 0.60 WYABPX	0.72 0.60	0.85	0.85 WYAPX		
OJUL20-0		0	29.87			1.05 1			1.05	1.30	1.30 0		32.55 -0.534		1.92 1.80	2.05	2.05 WYX		
0JUL224-0	0	0	28.25	31.57	0.240	0.35 1	WYABPX	0.45	0.35	0.55	0.55 0	YAPX	31.57 -0.76	L 3.30 WYABPX	3.68 3.30	3.90	3.90 WYABP	х	
011125 0	IZ MEL	A 46P0	CMNIZ	211 27	0.002 MOT 24	ES (MT	1.00.215		C 31E5	COVE AN		ASPO /		NA.4VSD (TZA.4V		L VIMIN 2			5 (AV9 21E5 /
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QLGC20.	48 +	HO.37)	b-20.47	a20.48	11 x 3	4 h20.51 120.0	l o20.	09 s20.1	110o v.	1154703 14:35 D	ivs: Nor	ne		
Trade Dat	Trade Date: 03/23/10 Model: Microhedge Type: Equity Exercise: American													
Volatility	Volatility: Using Volatility Skew Interest: 0.4 0.4													
Net QLGC.: -119.56 I# Delta: 9554 Gamma: 10145 Theta: -625 Vega: 1030 Rho: 317 ThEdg: 1418 Alpha: 1223 WtVega: 1090 PP: '													: '	
Series	cPos	pPos	YAIVol	AIVol	cDlt	CNBB	cThv	cBid	cAsk	cNB0	cpVol	pDlt	PNBB	p
OAPR15-0	0	-50	56.91	60.96	0.977	5.20 WYBX	5,51	5.20	5.60	5.60 WYBX	60.57	-0.023		
0APR1712-0	117	-7	34.84	38,99	0.942	2.80 WYABPX	3.03	2.80	3.10	3.10 WYABPX	38.53	-0.058		
OAPR20-0	-67	0	28.44	28,66	0.633	0.85 WYAPX	0.90	0.85	0.90	0.90 WYAPX	29.77	-0.368	0.35 WYABPX	
OAPR2212-0	830	0	34.08	32.57	0.159	0.10 WYABPX	0.13	0.10	0.15	0.15 WYABPX	33.16	-0.842	2.05 WYABPX	
OAPR25-0	-1	0	42.47	40.24	0.038		0.03		0.05	0.05 WYPX	40.65	-0.963	4.40 WYABPX	E
OJUL15-0	0	-2	38.35	36.62	0.946	5.40 WYABPX	5.60	5.40	5.70	5.70 WYABPX	36.40	-0.054	0.05 WYABPX	
0JUL1712-0	10	2	33.49	33,53	0.818	3.30 WYABPX	3,42	3.30	3.50	3.50 WYABPX	34.01	-0.182	0.35 WYABPX	
OJUL20-0	10	0	31.15	31.07	0.592	1.60 WYABPX	1,70	1,60	1.70	1.70 WYABPX	31.37	-0.409	1.15 WYABPX	






- We can look at several other examples. First let's summarize what we expect to see:
 - 1) near-term 50 Δ and next-higher-strike vols may flip
 - 2) long term vols, especially higher strikes should tumble
 - Let's look at three stocks: FORE, DIGI and COFD
 - We will follow the at-the-moneys, next higher strike and an upside leap
 - For one of these, only the long terms came in in advance, for one, the near-terms flipped and for one both characteristics were exhibited.






- Here is a chart of FORE in the year 1999: ٠
- There seems to be a price run-up prior to the \$35 announced • deal.
- What were options doing? ٠








The evidence is extraordinary. Even while near-term volatility exploded to over 100, leap volatility dropped by 33%!

Take-Overs











- On June 4, 1998 the French phone giant Alcatel acquired DSC (ticker: DIGI) for stock.
- How can you tell it is for stock from this chart?







• On March 17,1997 COFD was acquired for cash. The following graph shows that both long-terms and near-terms behaved as expected:







- Now let's look at what happens after a stock take-over has been announced.
- We have already seen for FORE that the stock jumps up to a price **below** that of the announced price.
- There are two reasons for this.

• What are they?





- There are many reasons why a deal can fail.
- Can you name some?
- The post-announcement price is an integration by the marketplace of likelihood of success, final price (What are two reasons why this might be different than the announced price?), and time to completion.
- Why is time to completion relevant?
- Additionally, the stock price will fluctuate dramatically if news alters any of the parameters. One of the stocks I traded even traded above the deal price for a time!! Why?





- Just as the stock prices behave in a circumscribed fashion after a deal announcement, so the options after an announcement assume a very characteristic structure.
- Some strikes have vols of near **0**; others have vols much higher than the levels seen prior to announcement.
- Which strikes would you guess are the fat ones, and which the cheap ones?

• Again, it is a simple bimodal cartoon model which can allow us to analyze the problem.





- Let's take a simple case: XYZ acquired for cash.
 - $S_{t}=25.00$
 - $S_{D} = 36.00$
 - S_{t+}=33.00
- Let's make additional simplifying assumptions:
 - Time to completion or breakup, 90 days
 - Interest rate 5.0%
 - Breakdown price 25.00
- Strategy:
 - Calculate the market's estimate of success
 - Calculate the implied volatilities of the 30 day 30 and 35 strike options





- The carry on the stock for 90 days is:
 33 (1/4) 0.05 = \$0.4125
- Let's call the market expectation of success, p;
- p=1-f, the failure probability.
- In this simple picture,
 33=p36+f25-.41
 =25+11p-.41
- p=76%; f=24%



- This same analysis will allow us to find the volatilities of the 90 day 35 and 30 options.
- First ignore carry.
- We will look at two positions:
 - 1) long a 35 call and short N units of stock
 - 2) long a 30 call and short M units of stock
- If both these positions are correctly priced then the returns for both these positions will be equal; from N and M we can determine the deltas.
- Let's look at the initial cash layouts
- T=0;
 1) c[35] 33N
 2) (3+c[30]) -33M
- Here c[X] is the pop of the X-strike call



- r=0
- At t_f , the value for 1 is: (1+(-N)(36))(.76)+(-N)(.24)(25)=-33.36N+.76
- The value for 2 is: (6+(-M)(36))(.76)+(-M)(.24)(25)= -33.36M+4.56
- What are these terms?
- So the payouts are:
 - 1) -33.36N+.76-(c[35]-33N)= -0.36N+.76-c[35]
 - -2) -33.36M+4.56-(3+c[30]-33M)= -0.36M +1.56 c[30]
- For fairly priced options there should be no advantage to owning the options hedged or owning the bond, so the premium on the 35-call is close to .76.
- The premium on the 30-call is close to 1.20. Why?



- The 30-call is \$3 in the money, the \$35 is only \$2 out of the money, yet the premium on the 30-call is ca. 40% higher than on the 35-strike.
- What does this say about the skew?
- In fact, I used an approximation that the 30's were 100 delta and the 35's 0 delta so the skew is even more extreme!
- If the take-over were at \$35, this bimodal assumption would lead to a value of 0 for the 35 call. Why? In fact it would trade at a non-zero bid. What are two reasons for this?
- We can put the pop's into an American pricer and back out volatilities for the 30 and 35 strikes but the point is that the next lowest strike is much fatter than the at-the-money strike.
- The bimodal model also predicts the pop for the 27.5 strike. Is it fatter or cheaper than the 30? Why?




- What would be a good strategy for trading the volatilities of a possible take-over stock if you had an estimate for the likely takeover price?
- For example, suppose XYZ trades at \$35 and the likely t.o. price were \$46. Which lines in the short term would you want to own? Which lines would you not want to own?
- If the rumor gets strong, the stock may run up quickly to \$40 and certain lines will get cheap and others fat. Which ones?
- Suppose you buy the new cheap lines and sell the fat ones. What event are you hoping for?
- Here is a graph of CFC for the first three months of 2007; the stock had been torn between threat of take-over and threat of catastrophic failure in the subprime lender crisis. We know what eventually did happen!!



Countrywide	Financial Corpora	ation (Public, NYSE:CFC) - <u>Add t</u>	o Portfolio - <u>Discuss</u> (<u>CFC</u>	Find more results fo
34.96	Open: 36.38	Mkt Cap: 20.62B	P/E: 8.13		Newer news
0.51 (-1.44%) Mar 16, 4:00 PM ED T Compare Setting	High: 36.50 Low: 34.79 Vol: 13.19M s▼	52Wk High: 45.26 52Wk Low: 32.20 Avg Vol: 10.57M After Hours: 34.80 -0.16 (-0.46%) Ma	F P/E: 8.49 Beta: 0.68 EPS: 4.30 ar 16, 7:53PM EDT	G	<u>CORRECTED - Credit review hits Countrywide higher- issue</u> Reuters - 15 Feb 2007 - <u>Related articles »</u>
Charts can now dis	play extended hours tra	ading - <u>Learn more</u> <u>Settings</u>	X	Η	Countrywide, New Century lead home lenders down Reuters - 12 Feb 2007 - Related articles »
Zoom <u>1d 5d 1m 3m 6</u>	m YTD 1v 5v 10v Max	Jan 10 - Mar 16, 200	7: -7.22 (-17.12%) 46 44 42 40 38 D 38 C B A 34	I	Stocks end day, week down on housing and chip woe MSN Money - 9 Feb 2007 - <u>Related articles »</u> US STOCKS-Stocks end day, week down on housing chip woes Reuters - 9 Feb 2007 - <u>Related articles »</u> <u>UPDATE 1-Bank of America CEO downplays Country talk</u> Reuters - 31 Jan 2007 <u>Bank of America CEO casts doubt on Countrywide de</u> MarketWatch
Jan 2007 Volume (mil / 1d)		Feb 2007	Mar 201 40 - 20 -		US STOCKS-Dow, S&P dip on rate worry, tempered Countrywide Bloomberg - TheStreet.com
2005	2	006	2007		Older news View all news for CFC »


three movies





three movies





three movies



