‘Hooligans’ abroad? Inter-group dynamics, social identity and participation in collective ‘disorder’ at the 1998 World Cup Finals

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During the 1998 Football World Cup Finals in France, English supporters were, once again, involved in major incidents of collective ‘disorder’. Explanations for these incidents concentrated on the conflictual norms held by ‘hooligans’. In contrast, Scottish supporters attending the tournament displayed norms of non-violence, explained by the popular press in terms of the absence of ‘hooligans’. This study challenges this tendency to explain the presence or absence of ‘disorder’ in the context of football solely in terms of the presence or absence of ‘hooligan’ fans. Using data obtained from an ethnographic study of both Scottish and English supporters attending the tournament (N = 121), we examine the processes through which ordinarily ‘peaceful’ supporters would or would not become involved in collective conflict. In line with the Elaborated Social Identity Model (ESIM) of crowd behaviour, the analysis highlights the role of the intergroup context. Where out-group activity was understood as illegitimate in in-group terms, in-group members redefined their identity such that violent action toward out-group members came to be understood as legitimate. By contrast, where there was no out-group hostility, in-group members defined themselves through an explicit contrast with the ‘hooligan’ supporters of rival teams. This analysis represents an advance on previous studies of crowd behaviour by demonstrating how the ESIM can account for not only the presence, but also the absence, of collective ‘disorder’.

During the 1998 Football World Cup Finals in France (France98), major incidents of crowd ‘disorder’ involving English supporters were, once again, witnessed during a major international tournament. By stark contrast, those Scottish supporters attending France98 were commended by both politicians and the press

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for their good behaviour. As has previously been the case, popular explanations for disorder at France98 centred around the presence and absence of ‘hooligans’. However, although the British police did identify a number of hooligans present during the incidents of disorder involving English supporters, they also claimed that the number of fans participating far exceeded the numbers of hooligans known to be present.

These patterns of collective behaviour raise important and difficult questions for those involved in the study of collective behaviour and football hooliganism, questions that echo almost directly those characterizing the initial debates of criminal responsibility surrounding the emergence of crowd psychology (Barrows, 1981; McClelland, 1989; Nye, 1975). It was from these initial debates that the two classical theoretical perspectives on crowd behaviour emerged (see McClelland, 1989; Reicher, 1987).

On the one hand, we have the ‘group mind’ accounts that stress the occlusion of the individual self and the emergence of ‘group mind’ through processes of ‘submergence’ within the crowd (Le Bon, 1895, trans. 1947). The ‘group mind’ is understood to occlude the rational control of an individual’s behaviour and allow casual influence and the dominance of primitive drives. Thus, the ‘riot’ is understood as irrational and normless and a natural consequence of gathering in large groups. This account has subsequently been undermined in crowd theory primarily because of its inability to explain the normative limits found in crowd behaviour (McPhail, 1991; Nye, 1975; Reicher, 1984, 1987), normative limits that are evident in football crowd disorder (Armstrong, 1998; Marsh, Rosser, & Harre, 1978; Stott & Reicher, 1998a).

On the other hand, directly opposed to the ‘group mind’ tradition, we find Floyd Allport’s (1924) ‘individualistic’ account. He argued that crowd behaviour actually entailed the social facilitation of participants’ dominant responses. Thus, according to Allport, collective behaviour is said to arise where there is a coming together of individuals who ‘owing to similarities of constitution, training and common situations, are possessed of a similar character’ (1924, p. 6). A possible reading of this individualistic account is that the commonalities observed among (rioting) crowd participants is owing to the common traits of these participants—in particular their inherently violent, criminal and anti-social personalities.

While no longer a major force in crowd psychology, Allport’s account finds resonance within contemporary theories of football hooliganism. The ‘Leicester school’ (Dunning, 1994; Dunning, Murphy, & Williams, 1988; Dunning, Murphy, & Waddington, 1991), for example, provides an analysis of football crowd violence in terms of the given propensities of certain types of people who attend football matches. They suggest that, given a historical civilizing process (Elias, 1978), values of ‘roughness’, meaning a propensity to physical violence created through particular forms of socialization (Suttles, 1968), have become increasingly marginalized as growing sections of the working class have been incorporated into mainstream society. However, pockets of the ‘rough working class’ still exist and converge in the context of football. It is the disproportionate presence of these individuals among football supporters that is said to lead to violence in football crowds (e.g. Dunning, 1994; cf. Harrington, 1968; Trivizas, 1980).
Thus, while Dunning’s account of football crowd violence explains the origins of ‘violent’ crowd behaviours in terms of class structure and socialization practices, his ‘hooligan’ model shares with Allport’s psychological account the implication that such violence is a result of given dispositions. In both cases, the football crowd is seen essentially as an opportunity for certain types of individuals to converge in order to act out pre-existing dispositions.

Kerr (1994) offers a less class-based and more psychological account of football hooliganism. The crux of his explanation is based upon an application of reversal theory (Apter, 1982), which revolves around individual needs for achieving specific states of arousal. Football hooliganism is assumed to be an activity that is dominated by specific types of meta-motivational states and football hooligans as individuals with abnormal arousal needs arising from deficiencies in their everyday lives. These motivational deficiencies can be satisfied through indulging in hooligan activity. Thus, hooliganism is understood to play a useful role for individuals in their attempt to obtain pleasurable motivational states. Kerr’s arousal model therefore represents a synthesis or restatement of the Leicester school’s hooligan account. In effect, public disorder in the context of football is understood as governed by the convergence of individuals with specific motivational needs or dispositions.

Within crowd research more generally, historical studies provide little evidence to support individualistic accounts of conflict (Davis, 1971; Reddy, 1977; Thompson, 1971; Tilly, Tilly & Tilly, 1975). In particular, they have failed to support any notion that riot participants are more likely to be an uneducated underclass of ‘marginals’ (Caplan, 1970; Marx, 1970; see Reicher, 2001). In addition, there has been little success in finding any individual attributes that reliably predict riot participation (Foster & Long, 1970; McPhail, 1991; Stark, 1973; R. H. Turner & Killian, 1987).

The work of Dunning and Kerr therefore leaves unexplained certain crucial questions about football-related crowd violence. The structural/dispositional accounts may explain particular forms of masculinity, broad variations in the number of incidents of hooliganism from year to year, and why a given number of individuals engage repeatedly in violent behaviour at football matches. The perspective does not, however, address adequately the central concerns facing this study. What remains to be explained are the precise conditions under which collective conflict in the context of football originates, the form that it takes, and how it may generalize during crowd events. Our criticism of the hooligan accounts of both Dunning and Kerr, therefore, is that they fail to explain how and why ‘violence’ in the context of football becomes a crowd behaviour (see also Stott & Reicher, 1998a).

Of course, the Leicester school is not without its critics (Armstrong & Harris, 1991; Giulianotti, 1989; Hobbs & Robbins, 1991; Moorhouse, 1991; Taylor, 1987). Armstrong (1998) argues that football hooligan behaviour should not be understood as a function of macro-structural location so much as participants taking on for themselves various roles and identities, each of which is capable of construction and re-construction, as is the self itself (cf. Goffman, 1975). Similarly, Giulianotti (1991) argues that class and cultural heritage does not determine that certain
football fans become hooligans; rather, fans have available to them different ‘discourses’ and hence forms of action. For example, Giulianotti argues that Scottish football fans in Italy during the 1990 World Cup Finals had available to them two distinct discourses: violent machismo and instrumentally ambassadorial conduct—or ‘hooliganism’ and ‘carnivalesque’. The eventual triumph of the carnivalesque mode among Scottish supporters is explained in terms of impression management and differentiation from their English counterparts.

From a social psychological perspective, these recent ethnographic accounts represent an advance over their structural/dispositional counterparts because they suggest the possibility of variation in collective behaviours through the different identities and discourses available to all football crowd participants. Yet, importantly, Giulianotti and Armstrong do not adequately address the psychological processes through which football fans actually shift from one ‘discourse’ or version of selfhood to another on different occasions (cf. Finn, 1994; Giulianotti & Finn, 1998). In this respect they are unable to explain why, for example, we see football crowd disorder in one context but not another.

The social identity tradition, and Self-categorization Theory (SCT) in particular, grounds self-definition in social context and hence variation in self-definition in terms of variation in social context (J. C. Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987; J. C. Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 1994). The salience of particular self-categories in the psychological system is understood (at least partly) in terms of the extent to which the categorization maximizes intra-category similarity and inter-category difference within a given social context. Moreover, according to the theory, changes in the comparative context entail corresponding changes in the form and content of definitions of self and other (Haslam, Turner, Oakes, McGarty, & Hayes, 1992).

Reicher (1984) applied SCT to crowd behaviour. The basic premise of his Social Identity Model (SIM) is that individuals in crowds shift from behaving in terms of disparate individual identities to behaving in terms of a contextually specified common social identity. Hence, rather than losing control over their behaviours, crowd members judge and act by reference to the understandings that define the relevant social identification. His early research supported the SIM by showing how the collective behaviour of participants in a riot reflected their shared definition of their collective identity and how this in turn determined the normative limits of their collective actions (Reicher, 1984, 1987).

While the SIM was an important development in crowd theory, it was unable to fully articulate the process through which collective conflict actually develops during crowd events. The Elaborated Social Identity Model of Crowd Behaviour (ESIM; Drury & Reicher, 2000; Reicher, 1996a, 1996b; Stott & Drury, 1999; Stott & Drury, 2000; Stott & Reicher, 1998a, 1998b) was developed to overcome this limitation.

The ESIM emphasizes how crowd events are characteristically intergroup encounters. As such, identity processes within a crowd do not simply determine collective action in a one-way process; rather, identity processes involve the dynamics of intergroup relationships. These intergroup dynamics function to change the nature of the social relations facing crowd participants, which in turn
redefines their initial social identity and its associated norms, thus changing the shape of collective action. Therefore, rather than context being seen as something merely external to identity, the context in which any one group acts is formed by the identity-based actions of other groups.

In this way, it has already been argued that the collective character of ‘disorder’ involving English supporters at the football World Cup Finals in Italy in 1990 could not be explained adequately in terms of participants’ prior commitment to conflictual norms. Rather, what was required was a consideration of the dynamics of the intergroup relations between English fans and Italian police. Where police treated all fans as if they were potentially dangerous and all forms of collective self-assertion (singing, chanting, marching, etc.) as actual danger, then many supporters experienced what they perceived as their legitimate rights to be denied (e.g. the right to gather in boisterous support of one’s team) and/or experienced what they perceived as illegitimate forms of external constraint (e.g. being forced to leave particular areas and not to leave others). In either case, resistance to police action was construed by participants as a reassertion of rights rather than commitment to conflictual norms. Where the police were perceived consistently to have treated all fans as dangerous over a period of time, so all police interventions were liable to be seen by these fans as indicating not only violence, but indiscriminate violence. Where this was the case, then resistance to the police, or even attacks upon the police, became construed by participants as self-defence rather than aggression (Stott & Reicher, 1998a).

This is not to say, however, that the model seeks to rule out dispositional considerations entirely; to explain crowd behaviour in terms of intergroup dynamics is not to deny that groups of hooligans exist and actively participate in violence in the context of football (e.g. Allan, 1989; Brimstone & Brimstone, 1996). Yet the ESIM follows SCT in offering an account of situational variability that radically challenges traditional personality and dispositional theories of intergroup behaviour (e.g. J. C. Turner, 1999). The aim is to build a theoretical perspective that has the capacity to articulate issues of prior normative commitment and of intergroup dynamics in a unitary explanation rather than to counterpose them: that is, to examine how norms are both a condition and a consequence of social action (Asch, 1952; Giddens, 1979; J. C. Turner et al., 1987).

While the ESIM already provides a useful heuristic account of the escalation over time of a single incident of collective conflict involving English supporters, it only does so in an exploratory and preliminary manner (Stott & Reicher, 1998a). Because of its case study format, we have yet to examine the model’s ability to account for disorder in other football contexts. Moreover, the role of the original study in developing the ESIM means that, in the context of football, the model is in need of independent confirmatory evidence. Although certain processes taking place in crowd events are amenable to experimentation (e.g. Reicher, Levine, & Gordijn, 1998; Reicher, Spears, & Postmes, 1995; Spears, Lea, & Lee, 1990), the laboratory is not best suited to tracing the dynamics of intergroup conflict and the spiralling possibilities arising from interaction (Stott & Drury, 2000). What is necessary is a methodology that combines some of the principles and advantages of comparison with the flexibility of an ethnographic data-gathering framework. Using such a
methodology, the present study seeks to provide an independent confirmation of the model by exploring its ability to account for the occurrence and non-occurrence of collective ‘disorder’ involving football supporters during France98.

Such a design represents an advance on other field studies of crowd behaviour in two respects. First, previous studies have examined just one collective identity at a time, whereas here, we address two. Secondly, previous studies have focused exclusively upon the development of crowd conflict, while here, we also aim to address its absence (Stott, Hutchison, & Davies, 1999). The current study can also serve to validate the basic principles not only of the ESIM but of SCT itself, which, as has been argued elsewhere, have been tested almost exclusively in laboratory settings (Stott & Drury, 2000). Finally, in exploring the explanatory power of the model, we aim to contribute not only to theoretical debates in social psychology but to those in society at large surrounding incidents of collective disorder involving English fans in general.

**Method**

**Data-gathering strategy**

Between 11 and 25 June 1998, data were gathered during an ethnographic study of football fans during the first round of France98. The tournament involved 32 national football teams divided into eight groups of four. Over the first two weeks, England played in Marseilles, Toulouse and Lens, Scotland in Paris, Bordeaux and St Etienne. Data collection involved three researchers (two Scottish and one English) travelling with, living among, and attending the matches and/or public screenings alongside Scottish and English fans across the six venues, and one researcher collecting contemporaneous media coverage in the UK.

The primary difficulty with research of this kind is access (Armstrong, 1998; Giulianotti, 1995a; Kerr, 1994; Williams, Dunning, & Murphy, 1989). In these days of covert policing and hostile media reporting, researchers can often be mistaken for police officers and/or journalists, and as such, supporters are often reluctant to speak to them or otherwise cooperate with research. Moreover, in a number of circumstances, the researcher’s physical well-being can be, and indeed in this case was, placed in jeopardy. Hence, the collection of systematic longitudinal and quantifiable data, for example using diaries and questionnaires, was considered impossible in the present case.¹

Nevertheless, the ethnographic framework, being supremely flexible and opportunistic (Green, 1993; Whyte, 1984), makes possible the collection of a wide variety of different data sources, which can be considered to compensate for this limitation. The primary data source was field notes, which included observations, informal conversations, unstructured and semi-structured interviews (see Appendix for interview schedule), songs and chants, as well as descriptions of specific events, places and people. These data were drawn from a series of opportunistic conversations and interviews over a two-week period with a total of 121 English and Scottish supporters, both during and after specific events. Supporters were approached when sitting in bars or other public areas and when involved in, or observing, conflictual events. The data were therefore drawn from an opportunity sample in that the researchers approached as many people as was possible and practicable within the given time.

Field notes were recorded directly on to approximately 10 h 30 min of audiotape and later transcribed. Where this was not possible, notes were taken as soon as was convenient afterward. Where conversations and interviews were recorded, informed consent was always obtained, and our identity as researchers was given to the respondents. All participants included in the field notes were male. Video data were collected onto 45 min of videotape during some of the events in question by

¹A large number of survey questionnaires and a small number of diaries were taken to France by the first author. These were quickly abandoned as a viable methodology because the distribution of this material in public situations led to suspicion, negative comment and even abuse from other supporters in the area.
the first author using a hand-held video camera. Seventy-five newspaper articles, approximately 6 h of television and video programmes, 1 h 90 min of radio articles and 192 A4 pages of articles posted on the internet concerning the behaviour of supporters were also collected within the UK both during and after the tournament.

In addition, 223 questionnaires were obtained from the Football Supporters Association (FSA). During the tournament, the FSA organized and staffed a minibus that toured all the venues in which England and Scotland were playing in order to provide information to supporters on such matters as accommodation, tickets, travel and legal issues. While at the venues, the FSA collected the names and addresses of supporters with whom they came into contact. Immediately following the tournament, the FSA distributed questionnaires to these supporters. The questionnaires contained some questions specifically addressed to the incidents of disorder involving English fans and as such provided both qualitative and quantitative data relevant to the current project. The researchers had no input into the design of the questionnaire, and the data were obtained on the understanding that individual respondents would remain anonymous. In total, there were 209 respondents who resided in England. Of those who provided details, 21 (10%) were from the north east, 25 (12%) were from the north west, 54 (26%) were from the Midlands, 86 (41%) were from the south east, and 23 (11%) were from the south west. There were 203 males and six females, and 14 provided no information on their gender. Of these, 90 respondents had been in Marseilles, and their characteristics did not differ from the main sample.

Analytic strategy

Following the strategy adopted in previous studies of the SIM of crowds (e.g. Drury & Reicher, 1999; Reicher, 1996a; Stott & Drury, 2000; Stott & Reicher, 1998a), the analysis comprises of two parts. First of all, we constructed a consensual account of the events in question, of which, in the interests of space, we present only a brief outline below. ‘Consensus’ is operationalized, and a triangulated account constructed (Denzin, 1989), on the basis of agreement between the different parties (e.g. crowd participants on the one hand and police or press on the other hand) or between statements by any one of these parties on the one hand and field notes, photographs, audio recordings or videos on the other hand (cf. Drury & Reicher, 1999, 2000; Stott & Drury, 2000; Stott & Reicher, 1998a). As with any description of an event, such an account is constructed rather than absolute. Yet, to the extent that it is consensual, it represents the reality as understood by the various parties and to which they jointly orientate. The account therefore serves to identify the broad features of the crowd events that are the focus of explanation.

Secondly, the analysis proper is in the tradition of thematic analysis, a qualitative approach that seeks patterns in linguistic data that can be understood in terms of interpretative themes (cf. Hayes, 1996; Kellehear, 1993; Miles & Huberman, 1994). The interest of the present study is in exploring the concerns of those involved in or witnessing incidents of collective disorder and conflict and their constructions of such events. However, we do not approach the data with a theoretical tabula rasa but rather seek to answer particular research questions through it: How did English and Scottish supporters each define themselves prior to participation in any conflict? How did they understand the intergroup context initially confronting them at the tournament? What was the perceived role of police, other supporters and locals? How did supporters define themselves during and after participation in conflict?

In terms of design, the aim was to make comparisons not only across time but between the different groups of supporters: English and Scottish. Hence, the material not only had to be interpreted but also organized to allow such comparisons. The field data were transcribed and then organized into files relating to the particular events being referred to in the text (e.g. for the English supporters, this included incidents in Marseille’s Old Port, on the beach and outside the stadium). The data were then re-read and organized into subfiles according to the various analytic themes that were identified (e.g. legitimacy of in-group action, hostility from out-groups, legitimacy of conflict towards the out-group). The data were then re-read in order to identify the extent to which the themes were shared across the

\[\text{The FSA is an independent organization set up by, and to act in the interests of, football supporters.}\]

\[\text{A full consensual account of the events in Marseilles can be found in Stott (1999).}\]
various events, and an overall pattern was identified, which formed the basis of the analysis. Using two judges and 20% of the data, we achieved an inter-rater reliability figure of 69%.

Since the data were gathered opportunistically rather than systematically, they are not suited to quantitative analysis. Because of the nature of the data, we cannot, nor would it be proper to, make claims about the generality or extent of consensus of particular perceptions. The current analysis recognizes this limitation. It is therefore concerned only with identifying the existence of particular perceptions and examining the extent to which they help to explain underlying psychological and social process. The accounts that we cite in the analysis therefore merely serve to demonstrate the existence of particular perceptions. Nevertheless, the ability of our analysis to explain the broad contours of collective action during the events in question is one criterion for considering these accounts as reflective of processes and shared perceptions operating during those events (cf. Drury & Reicher, 1999, 2000; Reicher, 1987, 1996a; Stott & Drury, 2000; Stott & Reicher, 1998a).

We do, however, indicate in the analysis the broad extent to which those respondents to whom we spoke, and who referred to the specific issue, endorsed a particular account. In addition, the analysis is supplemented by the questionnaire data from the 90 respondents who had been in Marseilles. Since the questionnaires asked the same set of questions to all respondents, the relevant data were coded and quantified. The coding scheme identified whether respondents had experienced hostile out-group action in Marseilles and, if so, from whom; whether respondents had been present at the times and places when incidents of disorder occurred; and who was involved in, and was responsible for, them. Using two judges and 30% of the sample, we achieved a reliability rating of 87%. The analysis reports the percentage of respondents who were coded as endorsing a particular account.

Collective action of English and Scottish supporters at France98
The British police force operates a classification system for football supporters in the UK. A ‘Category C hooligan’ is understood to be any individual prepared to initiate and organize acts of disorder in the context of football, while ‘Category B hooligans’ are understood to join in with violence but are unlikely to initiate it. According to one media report, the British police force had identified prior to the tournament approximately 100 Category C and approximately 1000 Category B hooligans who are active in the domestic context.

Having identified these hooligans, British police officers were sent to France during the tournament to work with the French police. Their role was to act as ‘spotters’, to identify and, if possible, detain any hooligans known to them prior to, or during, incidents of public disorder. Thus, the policing of France98 and the attempt by the authorities to prevent public disorder were organized, at least in part, around notions of public disorder being caused by the activities of these ‘violent’ individuals.

During the period leading up to and including England’s first round game against Tunisia, a series of major incidents of collective conflict involving large numbers of England fans occurred. During each of the incidents, the major focus of collective attacks by English supporters was upon groups of local youths displaying their support for the Tunisian team. On occasion, however, attacks also took place against the police and private property, although it is not clear as to the extent to which the attacks on private property became collective. Prior to and during these incidents, large groups of local youths engaged in collective attacks against English supporters and the police and caused damage to private property.

Sir Bryan Hayes, the English FA’s security advisor, acknowledged during a television news interview that the majority of those English supporters involved in
these incidents of disorder were not known to the British police’s intelligence unit (NCIS) prior to the incidents themselves. How was it, then, that a large number of individuals, not previously known to have engaged in violent acts in the context of football, came to engage in acts of collective violence during their time in Marseilles?

In stark contrast to the English supporters, throughout the Scottish national team’s involvement in the tournament, Scottish fans, on the whole, adhered to norms of ‘carnivalesque’ (Giulianotti, 1991). In other words, the normative contours of their collective action were generally non-violent and involved positive interrelationships with other groups in the proximal social context. There were, however, two relatively minor incidents of collective conflict recorded in our data. Scottish fans’ role in the first incident was minimal; however, in the second incident, a number of Scottish fans were actively involved in violent acts during an incident of collective disorder, while others actively attempted to prevent confrontation.

Why is it, then, that category members of one social group maintained predominately non-violent norms and related positively with other social groups in the proximal context, while another came to be involved in acts of collective conflict against local Marseilles youths? And how was it that category members from a group of supporters who normally reject and avoid violent activity in the context of international football came to be involved in acts of violent confrontation during France98? It is to these questions that the analysis now turns.

**Analysis**

The following analysis is divided into two major sections. Within each section, a specific instance of data is presented that authors felt best represents each of the themes being discussed. Each extract includes a numeric reference to the participant and is appended with a coding scheme to identify the source, date and location from which the extract was obtained.

**English supporters**

*Initial perceptions of the normative dimensions of English football fan identity.* While English supporters we spoke to in and around Marseilles recognized the presence of potentially ‘violent’ English supporters, all but one described their intentions and the normative dimensions of their category in terms of a series of non-violent, boisterous but *legitimate* activities.

5: There may be a small percentage of lads that come out here wanting trouble, but I personally think that most people come out here to have a good time. Like we have been tonight, we might be a bit rowdy [but] we are not doing anything wrong.

[Conversation England supporter, 14 June 1998, Campsite Cassis]

*A ‘hostile’ intergroup context.* All those supporters in our sample who had been in contact with Marseilles youths described a generalized hostility from them toward
English supporters. These youths were understood to be initiating persistent, unprovoked and indiscriminately violent attacks upon category members.

Int: Who do you think was responsible for the trouble in Marseilles?
95: It just seemed to me that it was all Algerians, Moroccans, Tunisians, it was all North African refugees and a few local French that were there, and they purely wanted to have a go with the English fans.
[Interview England supporter, 19 June 1998, Campsite Toulouse]

Accounts of these attacks soon began to form the basis of conversation between other English supporters staying in and around Marseilles.

Int: How did you hear about what went on with the English in Marseilles?
5: Just a few of the lads around here [the campsite]
Int: What did they say to you?
5: They basically said that the Tunisians had started putting bottles or bricks at the English, calling us wankers and stuff like that. I’ve heard loads of stories like that.
[Conversation England supporter, 14 June 1998, Campsite Cassis]

The extent to which this perception of a hostile intergroup context was shared among English supporters is reflected in the questionnaire data. Of the 90 respondents who had been in Marseilles, 60 (67%) reported experiencing some form of hostile out-group action. Of these, 90% reported hostile actions toward themselves and other English supporters by local Marseilles youth.

Within such a perceived context, one could reasonably assume that English supporters would expect a level of police intervention to protect category members from any hostile out-group action. In the questionnaire data, however, 59% of respondents stated that during situations of intergroup conflict with local youths, police inactivity had been an issue for them. Those supporters in our sample who had heard about, witnessed or been involved in conflict understood the police to be avoiding opportunities to prevent hostile action against the English by local youths.

64: This Tunisian just walked up and he’s pulled a blade out and he’s stood there going like that [gestures threateningly] wavin’ it about.
66: There is four police up one side, didn’t come down, didn’t do nothing. And there were three plain clothes ones sat in a car and they didn’t do nothing. They just sat in the car and watched it.
[Conversation England supporters, 19 June 1998, Campsite Toulouse]

Some of these supporters also described situations in which the police did intervene by using coercive force. Such police interventions were seen by all of those who described them as directed indiscriminately against English supporters while ignoring those local youths understood to be not only involved in confrontation but also to be initiating it.

Q6: What was your impression of the policing in Marseilles?
SS179: When the trouble started they then turned on the England fans while the local Arabs were the instigators.
[Questionnaire data]
Of the 90 questionnaire respondents who had been in Marseilles, 22% reported experiencing hostility from the police. Yet, in terms of respondents’ views upon the instigators of the breakdown of order in Marseilles, 66% of the respondents stated that local Marseilles youths had initiated confrontation with the English supporters. This form of police activity led the majority of supporters who we spoke to about the issue to perceive the police as possessing anti-English sentiments.

16: It felt like everybody else was against us. Even the police was against the English. The Tunisians were getting away with murder.
[Conversation England supporters, 15 June 1998, Marseilles]

Of the supporters we spoke to on the streets of Marseilles concerning their fears, all described how the hostile intergroup context combined with a lack of police ‘protection’ made them feel vulnerable to attack from local Marseilles youths.

Int: So how did all this make you feel about your situation?
66: Scared.
64: If we stay around places like that [Vieux Port] we are going to get hurt . . . Because it didn’t look like the police were doing anything.
6: We needed protection as well.
[Conversation England supporters, 19 June 1998, Toulouse campsite]

Variation in the form and content of English supporters’ identity. Subsequently, conflict came to be understood by all those we spoke to who were involved in it as a legitimate and sometimes necessary response to protect category members from hostile out-group action.

Int: That violence in there [Plage du Prado]. What would you call it?
46: Retaliation . . . The thing is any human being is not going to stand there, you have got to charge at them.

Those supporters we spoke to subsequent to conflict all described those conflicts involving English supporters not solely as the activity of a ‘hooligan’ minority but also as defensive activity on the part of ordinary category members.

Int: Yeah but what did you hear about Marseilles?
5: The English charged them to chase them off. ’Cos they were chucking bottles. What are you supposed to do, just sit there and let people chuck bottles at you.
Int: So defending yourself?
5: Yeah, defending yourself.
[Conversation England supporter, 14 June 1998, Campsite Cassis]

One of our sample even saw ‘violent’ others as ‘heroic’ in-group members deserving of credit for their role in protecting other category members from hostile out-group action.
Int: You were saying that you were watching the news.
64: We were watching the news and it was all about English hooligans. And it showed you a group of lads attacking one person. And he was actually English. This other English fan kept running in to try and pull the Tunisians off. The guy was saving his friend. His friend was getting killed. And on the news and in the papers when they showed the pictures of this incident they said English hooligans but they were Tunisians what were battering the English boys.
66: The [English] lad was a hero, there’s not many people what would have done it.

[Conversation England supporters, 19 June 1998, Campsite Toulouse]

‘Englishness’ defined through a continuing history of antagonistic relations to other national groupings. All of the supporters we spoke to about previous international tournaments talked about continuity between events in Marseilles and other contexts in which English supporters had found themselves.

EB: The police steam the English. Seems to be the same way every single time and yet it’s always us held up to be the ones that start it all . . .


It may be that, as a consequence of this history, some supporters have the opportunity to revel in, and consequently seek to maintain, their pariah status. As one Southampton supporter put it while discussing conflict involving English supporters in Marseilles that day:

12: Do you know the beauty of it right?
Int: There isn’t a beauty to it.
12: No there is. There is a beauty.
Int: Go on then what is it?
12: The fact that England are fucking reviled by fucking everybody and this is what gives us that sense of pride.
Int: What, ‘no one likes us and we don’t care’?4
12: It is. Its a simple song with simple lyrics but its fucking spot on.
[Conversation England supporter, 14 June 1998, Campsite Cassis]

Summary. Our analysis suggests that the episodes of collective conflict witnessed in Marseilles were imbedded within a developing intergroup context that had important implications for the normative structure of collective action. As they arrived in Marseilles, increasing numbers of English supporters understood themselves as being confronted by persistent taunts, threats and at times unprovoked violence, from large groups of local youths. They also experienced policing that appeared to go from one extreme to another; from police inactivity during situations of out-group provocation and violence to ‘heavy handed’ indiscriminate intervention against common category members in situations of English

4This is a reference to a well-known crowd chant originally sung by Millwall supporters in the 1980s that reflected their attitude toward their pariah status as renowned hooligans.
retaliation/defence. Moreover, supporters not directly witnessing these events soon came into contact with those who had, and an understanding of illegitimate out-group action became common currency between category members.

This form of intergroup context and intragroup interaction led to variation in the nature of the social identity driving collective action among sections of the English support. Initially, English supporters who had not previously been engaged in conflict came to understand violence as proper social action and to gather together with other category members, particularly those that were prepared to confront, and therefore provide defence from, local youths. The intergroup context was such that it changed hooligans from a violent and confrontational out-group to prototypical category members able and capable of exerting a normative influence among increasingly larger numbers of English supporters. Moreover, it may be that these forms of hostile intergroup relations have a lengthy historical continuity that functions to produce, maintain and intensify a form of antagonistic identity among an increasing number of English supporters when travelling abroad.

Scottish supporters

Perceptions of the normative dimensions of Scottish football fan identity. Like the English supporters, all the Scottish fans in our sample described their social category in terms of a series of boisterous, but ultimately legitimate, actions. Moreover, rather than being antagonistic, such boisterous activities were seen as conducive to creating a positive atmosphere. Consequently, trouble was perceived as outwith the defining dimensions of category membership.

S5: Scots fans don’t want trouble and never get in trouble.
[Interview Scotland supporter, 17 June 1998, La Rochelle]

Those who engage in troublesome or violent behaviour were seen by all of those we spoke to as contradicting the prototypical dimensions of category membership.

S10: I don’t think of them as supporters . . . All they’re doing is tarnishing the reputation of their country and focusing attention upon the bad side of football.
[Interview Scotland supporter, 15 June 1998, Rocheford]

A ‘non-hostile’ intergroup context. By stark contrast to their English counterparts, all of the Scottish supporters in our sample perceived the behaviour of other groups in their proximal intergroup contexts as legitimate.

Int: What do you feel about the way that you have been treated by the local population?
S1: Yeah great, no problem.
S2: The locals have made us particularly welcome here . . . As you can see most of the pubs are flying Scotland flags and France flags. They are a friendly lot the French.
[Interview Scotland supporters, 14 June 1998, La Rochelle]
Like their English counterparts, all our Scottish supporters understood police action as essentially ‘low key’. However, in the absence of hostile out-group action this ‘inaction’ was understood by all supporters in our sample as a legitimate policy designed to allow supporters to engage in their tradition of boisterous activity without unnecessary reprimand.

Int: How have you been treated by the police?
S8: They have just been standing about not doing anything. They haven’t told us not to do anything, they haven’t been bad to us if that’s what you mean.
[Interview Scotland supporter, 11 June 1998, Paris]

Variation in the form and content of Scottish supporters’ identity. All the Scottish fans we spoke to contrasted the prototypical dimensions of their own collective identity with the perceived stereotypical characteristics of English fans in a manner that achieved a positive differentiation from them. In this respect, the norms and values among our entire sample of Scottish football fans were defined in terms of social relations in the distal intergroup context.

Int: What do you feel about trouble at football?
P1: No-one causes trouble at Scottish games anymore ’cause it makes the English look bad. What I am saying is the best way to piss the English off is to behave and have a good laugh with the other fans as well.
[Interview Scotland supporter, 13 June 1998, La Rochelle]

Despite Scottish supporters’ normative adherence to non-violence, violence was seen by those we spoke to about it as appropriate in some social contexts. In contexts where fellow in-group members transgressed what was understood to be appropriate and legitimate action, violence was seen by these supporters as a legitimate response. This is reflected in the following extract taken from an account of an incident where violence involving Scottish fans occurred. From a position where violence was initially denounced, a situation developed where violence came to be understood by those who witnessed it as an acceptable in-group position for the Scottish fans involved.

S21: The guy with the Tunisian top got the ball and . . . the Scottish guy stuck his fuckin’ head on him . . . Next thing there was about twenty, thirty guys with kilts on bootin’ fuck out of the Scottish guy . . . nobody wanted to know him, just thought he was a complete wank.
[Conversation Scotland supporter, 16 June 1998, Bordeaux]

Like the English supporters in Marseilles, violence against out-group members acting illegitimately in in-group terms was also understood as acceptable. For example, all the Scottish fans we spoke to who were present at the event perceived the presence of English fans in St Etienne during the public screening of the England vs. Romania match as intentionally provocative and confrontational:

S7: On the night of an English game surely they should be in the place where the English game is getting played, not the Scottish game. If they are
wanting to just come and mingle and be a part of the Scotland atmosphere, they shouldn’t be wearing the English strips because they know that will wind us up.

[Conversation Scotland supporter, 22 June 1998, St Etienne]

The presence of English fans wearing English national symbols therefore created an intergroup context in which the mere presence of the out-group was understood as illegitimate. As a consequence, violence towards the out-group was perceived by all of the supporters from our sample who were there as a legitimate and indeed a normative response.

S7: I don’t normally fight over football. I don’t normally fight over anything. I’m not that sort of person that fights. But you shouldn’t have to take that, you know. They were there to wind us up . . . I think it was a good thing for them that Romania scored, because I couldn’t imagine seeing four or five hundred Scots with their heads down and them lot [the English] jumping about.

[Conversation Scotland supporter, 22 June 1998, St Etienne]

Once again, perceptions of conflict can be seen to vary dependent upon specific forms of comparative context. Moreover, under such circumstances, ‘violence’ could be understood as not only acceptable but also a normative or prototypical response.

Int: What if anything would make you get involved?
2: That’s the only way it would start if someone actually started on us or other Scottish supporters then everyone would be, everyone would get in.
3: Everyone would get involved, stick together.
[Interview Scotland supporters, 14 June 1998, La Rochelle]

These perceived changes in intergroup relations parallel those experienced by English supporters in Marseilles. Thus, Scottish supporters may themselves have engaged in collective violence toward an out-group if the form of intergroup relations experienced by them reflected those experienced by English supporters in Marseilles.

Int: If you were in a situation like the one we just described about the Tunisians throwing things at you, what would you do?
21: If there was people throwing everything but the kitchen sink at you and the police aren’t doing anything to help you, then there is only one thing that you can do and that is defend yourself.

[Conversation Scotland supporter, 16 June 1998, Bordeaux]

Scottishness defined within a continuing history of positive intergroup relations. All the Scottish supporters in our sample also understood continuity between the predominantly positive intergroup relations at France98 and the behaviour of category members during previous international tournaments.

Int: Do you see yourself as similar or different to those who get involved in trouble?
S8: I see myself as similarly behaved to the Tartan Army who has a reputation for drinking but without getting involved in trouble.
[Interview Scotland supporter, 11 June 1998, Paris]

There is also some evidence that Scottish supporters experienced an improvement in the nature of behaviour toward them by out-group members who had previously understood the Scots to be English. Although only a minority of our sample raised the issue with us there was nothing in our data set that contradicted their claims.

Int: What do you feel about the way that you have been treated by the local population?
S2: Once they realize we are not English they are alright.
[Interview Scotland supporter, 14 June 1998, La Rochelle]

The historical continuity of their category’s relationships with out-groups was therefore understood to serve a purpose in that it functioned to re-generate positive intergroup relations in new social contexts.

S2: I think it will be pretty much the same as anywhere we the Scots go. Just loads of drinking and singing and a laugh, with respect from the locals no matter where we go.
[Interview Scotland supporter, 14 June 1998, La Rochelle]

As such, all the supporters in our sample understood that they would be able to indulge in ‘carnivalesque’-type activity without reprimand, or producing oppressive or reactionary responses, from the local civilian population and police.

S9: The police are only doing their job. They realize that we respect them and their country and so they respect us and leave us alone. We are making their job easy for them when you think about it. They know we can be trusted.
[Interview Scotland supporter, 22 June 1998, La Rochelle]

In addition, all the supporters we spoke to understood a generalized compulsion to conform to these non-violent norms in order to maintain the positive reputation of their category and the subsequent positive intergroup relations and freedoms that it engendered.

S2: The thing is, it’s not like we don’t know how to battle, it’s just that you don’t want to because you don’t want to give Scotland a bad name.
[Interview Scotland supporter, 22 June 1998, La Rochelle]

Moreover, as we have implied in a previous section, all the supporters in the sample understood a pressure to conform in that any transgression of this ‘non-violent’ prototypicality would provoke ‘violent’ retribution by other category members.

S22: Nobody really wants to ruin the Scottish reputation. If somebody ruined the Scottish reputation I think the Scottish guy would have got done in.
[Conversation Scotland supporter, 16 June 1998, Bordeaux]

Thus, given the perception of a context of ‘positive’ intergroup relations, non-violence not only became prototypical, but was understood, at least by those that raised the issue, to be actively self-policed.
S6: They’re self policing the Scots. The Scots make sure no-one ruins it for everyone else. Not a few nutters ruining everything for other people. [Interview Scotland supporter, 23 June 1998, St Etienne]

Summary. The analysis of the accounts of Scottish football fans at France98 suggests that the relative absence of collective conflict and the predominance of non-violent norms reflected the nature of the distal and proximal intergroup context. On the whole, in each of the host towns, Scottish fans perceived a tolerant, permissive and often explicitly friendly response from other fans, locals and the police. This positive intergroup context functioned to legitimize the expression of boisterous or ‘carnivalesque’ behaviour among the Scottish fans.

Scottish fans defined the normative structure of their behaviour as non-conflictual and differentiated themselves from anyone actively seeking out conflict. An important dimension to this self-definition was understood in terms of a comparison and differentiation from English fans; ‘Scottishness’ was defined by distinguishing Scotland supporters from the ‘violence’ of their English counterparts. Moreover, the maintenance of the carnivalesque identity and associated norms was understood to have an important historical dimension, which supporters themselves sought to maintain.

This is not to say that the Scottish fans’ identity was fixed or static, for there is evidence of a degree of variation similar in form to that witnessed among English fans. Certain contexts were identified where violence was understood to be acceptable for Scottish fans—including using violence against fellow in-group members to prevent their illegitimate violence against out-group members, and responding to what was understood by Scottish supporters as illegitimate out-group action (e.g. the mere presence of English fans).

Discussion

In this study, we have argued that the normative dimensions of English supporters’ collective behaviour during the incidents of collective conflict in Marseilles were characterized primarily by attacks against local youths and the French police. The popular press, in line with the structural/dispositional account, have labelled these incidents as a consequence of the presence of ‘hooligans’. According to the British police, however, the disorder involved individuals not previously known to have engaged in violent acts in the context of football. In stark contrast, Scottish supporters displayed strong norms of non-violence explained by the popular press in terms of the absence of hooligans. What we are currently faced with, then, is a tautological account of human action. Whether individuals take part in ‘violent’ acts or not is understood to be a consequence of their predispositions, yet we only know they hold these dispositions to the extent to which they engage in, or abstain from, those very same violent activities.

By way of contrast and in a manner consistent with the ESIM, we have highlighted the role of inter- and intragroup dynamics in drawing both English and Scottish supporters into collective conflict. The nature of the social relations in the intergroup context for both groups was such that it functioned, in part at least, to
shape the normative dimensions of the social category driving collective action. Only in a context where out-group activity came to be understood as illegitimate in in-group terms did in-group members come to redefine their identity in both form and content. The evidence, certainly in the case of English supporters, suggests that the processes underlying the development of this shared understanding of out-group illegitimacy were influenced both by direct experience of the hostile out-groups and by discussions among fellow category members following such contact.

Subsequently, violent action toward out-group members came to be understood as legitimate and sometimes even necessary by those who had previously seen it as inappropriate. Moreover, the norms of the group were now such that certain individuals were empowered and became disproportionately influential in structuring collective action. Violent individuals previously seen as marginal were seen as prototypical and, through processes of induction (Reicher, 1987), were able to provide by their violent action an instantiation consistent with the current collective identity.

In these ways, this study has demonstrated how an ongoing process of inter- and intragroup interaction functioned to generate and then change the nature of supporters’ collective identities. Such a position is entirely consistent with a number of different studies examining the relationship between social context and psychological change (Drury & Reicher, 2000; Haslam et al., 1992), the interdependent consensualization processes demonstrated by Haslam, Turner, Oakes, McGarty, and Reynolds (1998) and indeed with SCT itself (J. C. Turner et al., 1994). It is our contention that the processes we have discussed took place in France and were directly responsible for the scale and intensity of the collective violence involving England fans observed there.

There were, however, a number of interesting developments upon previous work. Previous intergroup studies have focused primarily on relations between the crowd and the police. It has been shown how indiscriminate police intervention can function to change the nature of social identity and thus the normative dimensions of a crowd (Reicher, 1996a; Stott & Drury, 1999, 2000; Stott & Reicher, 1998b). We have focused upon a series of crowd conflicts in Marseilles, however, in which there were three interrelating categories. In such a context, we have demonstrated how a lack of intervention on the part of the police can also set in motion the dynamics necessary for the escalation of conflict. A decision not to intervene at an early stage in the conflicts allowed intergroup contact to take place between the two groups of rival supporters. Moreover, English supporters interpreted the ‘inactivity’ of police as a deliberate decision to allow hostile out-group action to continue. This in turn changed supporters’ views of the legitimacy of the police and allowed conflict against them to take place. In other words, by standing apart from conflict in its early stages, a lack of police intervention functioned to create the dynamics necessary for escalation to take place.

Consistent with previous work, what we see here is a kind of self-fulfilling dimension to the relationship between intergroup dynamics and collective action (Stott & Reicher, 1998a, 1998b). On the one hand, we have a social context in which one social group is expected to be violent and confrontational.
Consequently, intergroup relations within that context are such that they function to produce the conditions under which collective violence both occurs and escalates. On the other hand, we have a social context in which, as a consequence of their recent history (e.g. Giulianotti, 1991, 1995b), another social group is expected to be boisterous but non-confrontational. Consequently, intergroup relationships are such that norms of carnivalesque are enabled and subsequently self-policing.

Thus, developing the work of the previous case study (Stott & Reicher, 1998a), the comparative design has allowed us to demonstrate how intergroup processes were involved in not only the presence but also the absence of collective conflict during France98. Moreover, we have done so in a manner consistent with the ESIM. We have shown that the dimensions of Scottish football fans’ social identity were inherently variable, fluid, and dependent upon different forms of comparative context. Our analysis suggests that the Scottish fans’ strong norms of carnivalesque should not be reduced to any static, rigid or ‘inherent’ feature of the psychological disposition of individual supporters. Rather, the absence, as well as the presence, of collective conflict can be understood in terms of the forms of intergroup relations that constitute the crowd’s proximal social context.

To the extent that both groups of supporters share a common masculine identity (e.g. Dunning, 1994; Dunning & Murphy, 1982; Dunning et al., 1988, 1991), with all its associated norms and values, then they are likely to experience and respond to similar forms of intergroup context in similar ways. However, this is not to suggest that conflict is inherent to the specific nature of these intergroup relations. For example, similar perceptions of out-group illegitimacy were held by environmental protestors during conflicts over the building of a road in London. Yet their adherence to a non-violent ideology meant that they did not respond with violence (Drury & Reicher, 2000). Thus, the current analysis shows how the collective action of football supporters must be understood by reference to a distal, historical and ideological social context (King, 1995; Reicher, 1987; Waddington, 1992).

Reflecting the importance of the historical social context, in the absence of hostile intergroup relations in the proximal context, Scottish supporters differentiated themselves from a social category that was not always physically present. Norms of non-violence and positive intergroup relations became prototypical among Scottish supporters in terms of their ability to achieve maximum positive differentiation from the English. As well as raising questions concerning what actually constitutes ‘context’ (Reicher, 1996b), such a position is consistent with Tajfel’s social identity theory (SIT; Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). However, we would agree with Hopkins (1994) in pointing to the dangers of a focus upon motivational dynamics to explain collective action. As Hopkins argues, while the achievement of positive distinctiveness may well be an important ‘motor’ driving differentiation, it is important to recognize that social, historical and ideological processes are at work.

The analysis also exposes a strategic dimension to differentiation. Normative differentiation was understood by Scottish supporters not only in terms of its ability to reflect negatively upon the English, but also in terms of the subsequent benefits it afforded Scottish supporters. By differentiating themselves, Scottish fans...
understood that they could enable social relations with other groups that would allow them to express identity consonant actions (e.g. the boisterous support of one’s team), which, in other contexts, could invoke reprimand (see Giulianotti, 1991). In other words, within intergroup contexts, groups can make judgments about how to mobilize identity strategically, (cf. Reicher et al., 1998). This provides further support for Giulianotti’s (1991) and Giulianotti and Finn’s (1998) impression management accounts. The current analysis does indeed suggest that particular forms of prototypicality occurred among the Scots in order to maintain particular impressions among relevant out-groups. But what this analysis also highlights is that notions of impression management alone do not provide a comprehensive account of the presence or absence of disorder. In Giulianotti’s terms, what the present study shows is how group level dynamics play an important role in governing the dominance of one ‘discourse’ over another.

Our focus is on the issue of variation in the nature of identity. Our data sample, however, was cross-sectional. It may well be, although unlikely, that there was a systematic bias in our sampling technique toward more ‘violent’ individuals. There is no doubt that a longitudinal within-participants quantitative approach would be desirable, but in this case impossible to achieve. Rather than ignore this important social issue, we have turned instead to the collection and analysis of qualitative data, supplemented where possible with quantitative techniques. With the subsequent reliance on supporters’ accounts, we cannot completely dismiss the argument that they were simply using narratives to justify their activities (Wetherell & Potter, 1989). While it is easy to understand why excuses are made for violent activity, it is less obvious why Scottish supporters would seek to justify non-violent activity. Our position, however, is that these accounts demonstrate that supporters have access to particular ‘world views’. The fact that these world views were present helps to account for the differing patterns of collective action, and as such, we have confidence that they reflect perceptions that were present during the events themselves.5

A further limitation of the research also arises from the difficulties of crowd research in general. In this study, we have examined the activities of two social categories in a naturally occurring context. As such, we have been able to examine, in situ, the role of a broadly similar context (i.e. France98) upon the normative dimensions of collective action within two different social categories. However, at another level, the two groups have experienced widely different social relations within their proximal social contexts. On the one hand, these naturally occurring interrelations are useful in that they help us to understand the unforeseen consequences of intergroup relations and the dynamics of categorization at work in ‘real’ or applied social contexts (Stott & Drury, 2000). On the other hand, the differing histories and proximal contexts of the two social categories mean that it would be virtually impossible to conduct a true ‘comparison’ between them. This

5In researching intergroup conflict, it may be necessary for ethnographers to take sides in order to gather any data at all (Drury & Stott, 2001; Fantasia, 1988; Green, 1993). To the extent that the researcher shares certain values with those being researched, there is the possibility of interview question encouraging desired responses. However, in the present case, the willingness of supporters to provide accounts, often without regard to the particular interview questions, is evidence that ‘interviewer effects’ were minimal (cf. Green, 1993).
particular limitation, we suggest, can only really be overcome by conducting a programme of complimentary laboratory-based studies in order to examine the role intergroup dynamics in a more controlled setting.

Another avenue of research we are currently seeking to pursue is to explore the differences between the collective action of football supporters in the domestic and international contexts. Somewhat paradoxically, public disorder involving Scottish supporters in the domestic context is not unknown, particularly with respect to recent ‘old firm’ clashes (e.g. Allan, 1989; Giulianotti, 1994). However, as we have seen, Scottish supporters are renowned internationally for their non-violent conduct. The processes through which this ‘transformation’ takes place are particularly interesting and pose an exciting opportunity for identity-based research.

During the recent European Football Championships in Belgium and the Netherlands (Euro2000), the world once again witnessed England soccer ‘fans’ engaging in acts of hooliganism. In common with France98, these incidents were rapidly and widely condemned by the authorities and the vast bulk of the mass media in the UK largely in terms of the presence of English hooligans. While we must reiterate that we are in no way seeking to dispute the presence of such ‘fans’, nor of their involvement in some of the incidents that were witnessed, we do, with this current study, seek to develop a fuller and less morally politicized understanding of the phenomenon at hand.

The present analysis suggests it is simply not adequate to see all violence involving English fans purely and exclusively in terms of the presence and predispositions of hooligans. This study has emphasized the role that social relations can have in creating the conditions through which hooligan forms of normative action are realized (see also King, 1995; Stott & Reicher, 1998a). These social relations have a historical dimension that we suggest is functioning to maintain and reinforce an antagonistic form of identity, such that aggression toward others defines for many what it means to be an England fan. Hooligan norms among English fans are therefore facilitated from one context into another. The expression of these norms will confirm among out-groups a stereotype of English fans as dangerous, therefore reinforcing and maintaining hostile out-group relations towards the category in general. Thus, in a truly interactionist sense (Asch, 1952; J. C. Turner & Oakes, 1986), it is our contention that a historical trajectory of intergroup dynamics is in place through which English fans are both produced by, and the producers of, the hostile intergroup relations that surround them. The danger is that by focusing exclusively upon notions of the hooligan, we will ignore these important historical and interactive processes. To move toward a solution for the problems such as those witnessed during France98 and Euro2000, it is essential to recognize the broader social psychological, group and ideological processes surrounding the ‘English disease’.

Moreover, a focus must be placed upon the way in which the constant and exclusive reliance upon notions of the hooligan not only is a partial and inadequate account but, by informing practice, creates social relations that in turn intensify that which it is we actually seek to avoid.

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6English fans are commonly understood to have been the originators of, and primary protagonists in, acts of soccer hooliganism, and as such, hooligan activity is often referred to as the ‘English disease’.
Finally, our account is far from the madding crowd of Le Bon’s irrationalism. But it is also far more complex and properly social psychological—in that we recognize the psychological reality of groups both cognitively and strategically—than the currently dominant dispositional accounts in both psychology and sociology.

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References


Appendix

Semi-structured interview schedule: France98

How did you get out here?
How long have you been out?
Did you use official or unofficial channels to get here?
Why did you choose to come out here in the manner that you did?
What kinds of places have you been staying?

Why did you come out here and not stay at home to watch the football on television?
Did you come out here just for the football?
What else interests you about being here?
What kind of things are you hoping to do?
What do you feel about being here/what does it mean for you to be here?

What do you like about being here?
What do you not like about being here?

What is it like to be with all these other supporters?
Why do you think they have come out?
How does being with these other supporters make you feel in relationship to other groups like the police and locals?

Are you going to travel to all of the venues?
What do you think is going to happen when you arrive?
Do you expect any problems in travelling?

What do you think about the way you have been treated by the local population?
What do you think about the way you have been treated by the police?
What do you feel about F.A. policy toward travelling supporters?
How do you feel the tournament has been organized?
Do you think that the authorities have treated you fairly?
What events have occurred to convince you of your position?
Who has contributed to making the situation that you are experiencing?

What kind of things have you been doing for entertainment?
Have you been to any local clubs/pubs?
What do you think about this place for having a good time?
How have you been having a good time?
What kinds of things do you feel are involved in having a good time?
Have you been threatened by anyone while having a good time?

What do you feel about ‘official’ policy toward unofficial supporters?
Do you see yourself in those terms?
In what ways are you similar/different?
Do you feel all supporters are in the similar situation/facing similar treatment?
What do you feel about those supporters travelling without tickets?
Do you think they should be here?
What do you feel about ‘trouble’?
Do you expect any trouble?
From who?
Why?
What do you feel about those supporters who engage in trouble?
Do you see yourself as different or similar to them?
Do you think those supporters without tickets will be the ones causing problems?
Have you seen any trouble?
Have you heard about any incidents of trouble involving other supporters?
Who was involved?
Who or what started it?
What was it about?
What happened?
How did you feel about this incident?
How do you feel about the involved parties now?
Do you see yourselves as similar or different to those who got involved in the trouble?
Do you think you might get involved in trouble?
How & why?
Who against? Why?

What do you think about ticket allocation for fans?
Have you got tickets?
Do you hope to get tickets?
How—through official or unofficial channels?
Do you think the sale of black-market tickets may be a problem for you or other supporters? Why?

What do you feel about other English supporters here?
Are club rivalries important here?
In what way/why not?
Have you seen or heard of any incidents of inter-club rivalries?