Social identity as a source of strength in mass emergencies and other crowd events

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Abstract

This paper argues that, through the presence and salience of a shared identity, the crowd may be a source of strength to its participants. A shared identity can explain why a crowd which might otherwise respond to an emergency in terms of individualized panic might instead exhibit mutual co-operation and co-ordination. A review of the literature and anecdotal evidence also finds that experiences in the crowd – including trauma and crowd conflict – can actually be a source of personal development. The paper traces out the possible emergence of feelings of empowerment in crowd participants through an analysis of a protest march which became a riot. The paper goes on to suggest how empowerment might be an enduring outcome of certain kinds of crowd participation. It is argued that such empowerment might have both social consequences and personal health benefits.

Introduction

Can the crowd be a source of psychological strength and even self-development?

Traditional models have emphasized how the crowd undermines both (individual) rationality and hence coordinated responses to coping with disasters. Yet the historical,
journalistic, geographic and other social scientific literature is replete with examples of collective co-ordination amongst crowd members in many kinds of stressful events. Recent psychological research has also begun to point to the way traumatic experiences can be a source of self-development and positive change. Studies of a variety of crowd events suggest how collective processes of support, unity, and collective self-realization can contribute to such positive outcomes.

The paper begins with an outline of the ‘panic’ approach to mass emergencies. Evidence that collective co-ordination and co-operation often occurs amongst crowd participants in response to emergencies points to the role of shared identification in moderating such responses. After describing the Social Identity approach to collective action, the paper focuses on the question of the process underlying positive outcomes. First the question of how enhanced mutual support might arise is examined through studies of a protesting crowd. Second, the issue of empowerment is addressed. It is suggested that empowerment arising from crowd participation not only has social consequences – being a contributory factor in processes of social change – but may be both psychologically and physically beneficial for the individual.

**From individualized ‘panic’ to collective co-operation**

The ‘panic’ model of collective responses to emergencies grew from studies of military evacuations (e.g., Strauss, 1944) and from early crowd theory (e.g., Ross 1908, p. 73; McDougall, 1920, pp. 36-38). It suggested that, in the face of fear and threat, collective
bonds between people dissolve (Brown, 1954; Cantril, 1958). In this account, such public threats and disasters as fires in buildings, earthquakes, capsizing ships and crushes in stadia lead to irrational emotion and selfish behaviour (mutual shoving, trampling) and a general lack of co-ordination (Freud, 1921; Quarantelli, 1954; Smelser, 1962). Thus the collective itself is said to be a source of both irrationality and physical danger, beyond the direct threat posed by the emergency. By contrast, the lone individual is held up as a paragon of rationality.

The ‘panic’ model has informed both fire regulations and the design of public spaces. The ‘mindless’ behaviour of human beings has been equated with the movement of non-thinking objects; and hence solutions to potential safety problems stemming from evacuations have been sought principally in terms of sufficient width of exits, minimizing public availability of information about the nature of the threat, and ease of access to escape routes (Sime, 1983, 1990).

However, reviews of the literature find little support for mass panic as a generic response (Brown, 1965; Johnson, 1988; Sime, 1983). In fact, in many collective emergency situations, interaction between people is characterized by helping behaviour, mutual concern and collective co-ordination.

For example, during the sinking of the Lusitania, passengers’ morale held up and they helped one another (Klapp, 1972, p. 115). Moreover, on closer inspection, even cases where tragedy has struck reveal evidence of collective cohesion rather than interpersonal
selfishness. Thus ‘the Who concert stampede’ is sometimes cited as a textbook example of the disastrous consequences of panic in a crowd (e.g., Forsyth, 1999, pp. 442-443). Yet examination of participant and witness accounts reveals extensive evidence of helping behaviour; far from abandoning social norms of a common humanity, participants only came to disregard others when co-operation was no longer physically possible (Johnson, 1987). A similar pattern was observed in responses to the fire at the Beverly Hills Supper Club in 1977; even when there was competition for the remaining exits, social norms and structural ties continued to determine and constrain behaviour (Johnson, 1988). Similarly, a systematic study of mass evacuation behaviour at the Summerland leisure complex in 1973, based on content analysis of around 500 witness accounts, suggested that behaviour was characteristically ‘affiliative’; participants attempted to escape in groups rather than alone, and such groups (such as families) sought the optimal strategy for collective rather than individual survival (Sime, 1983).

These findings are echoed in recent studies of responses in the days following natural disasters. Thus the victims of Hurricane Andrew, in 1992, displayed a palpable ethos of co-operation and sharing, evidenced in mutual attempts to help each other (Yelvington, 1997, p. 100). In the earthquakes in Armenia (1988), Loma Prieta, California (1989) and in Florida and Mexico, rescue attempts were not left to the professionals; overwhelmingly, friends, neighbours and strangers risked their lives to save each other (Comfort, 1990; Ibanez et al., 2003).
Even some of those employing the concept of panic state that it has been over-used, and that particularly extreme images of panic behaviour have mistakenly been employed to characterize all mass flight situations in disasters (e.g. Quarantelli, 1960). Sime (1990) concludes that the concept of panic is little more than a pseudo-explanation which, in being conflated with flight behaviour per se, serves to obscure understanding of psychological processes in emergency situations.

To the extent, therefore, that there is evidence on occasions of collective co-ordination as well as instances of individualized panic in response to mass emergencies, the question we should be asking is what are the particular conditions determining the occurrence of either outcome. The question is of theoretical interest to psychologists and other social scientists seeking to understand the factors responsible for group (versus interpersonal) behaviours. But it is also a practical question, since the answers may inform the decisions of those involved professionally in responses to mass emergencies, including planners, policy makers, the emergency services, safety advisors and so on.

As Kaniasty & Norris (1997) point out, there are a myriad of variables accounting for the extent to which victims of disasters are helped and themselves offer help, including the (perceived) need of the victim, the relationship between helper and victim, and numerous demographic factors.

Recent work in social psychology suggests that a key determinant of whether our response to others is co-operative, indifferent or conflictual is the content and level of our
social identities at that particular moment. According to the Social Identity approach (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), as well as our personal identities, we each have a number of social identities corresponding to our memberships of different social groups: psychologists, Englishmen, Catholics, Manchester United supporters, and so on. Building on this notion, self-categorization theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987) suggests that the salience of one or another social identity operates as a prism, shaping group processes such as social influence and group cohesion, as well as cognitive processes such as social judgement, self-perception and stereotyping (Ellemers, Spears & Doosje, 1999; Turner, 1991; Turner, Oakes, Haslam & McGarty, 1994; Spears, Oakes, Ellemers & Haslam, 1997). Thus we are more likely to believe, feel attracted to and be influenced by those sharing a social identity with us, than those not, on the relevant issue; but where the relevant issue changes, so might the salient social identity.

The social identity approach has already been applied successfully to explaining a number of general features of crowd behaviour, through both field studies and laboratory analogues. The model has been able to explain the occurrence of co-operation and peaceful behaviour within a crowd, as well as mass violence. In the former case, the relevant social identity defines what counts as legitimate action and who is counted as ‘one of us’ (and thus will be helped); in the latter case, the relevant social identity defines other participants as members of an antagonistic outgroup acting illegitimately against the ingroup. Thus Reicher (1984, 1987) has shown how, far from representing an irrational loss of control, crowd action is limited by the definition of the social identity shared by participants. More recently, the Elaborated Social Identity Model of crowd
behaviour (Drury & Reicher, 1999, 2000; Reicher, 1996a, b, 2001; Stott & Reicher, 1998) has been applied to a variety of crowd events to explain how collective conflict emerges and escalates. In this account, we need to examine not only the perceptions of crowd members themselves but also the perceptions of those with whom they come into contact, such as the police. As we discuss further below, it is within any conflict of stereotypical representations and constructions of legitimate conduct, in conjunction with differential power to implement these views of self-and-other, that the seeds of mass collective conflict germinate.

The social identity approach would therefore point to the role of collective identities in emergency and escape behaviour in a crowd. It would suggest that those situations characterized by ‘panic’ are ones where there is low social identification; behaviour becomes individualized because personal identities are more salient than collective identities. Conversely, the salience of a collective identity in an evacuating crowd would foster co-operative and helping behaviours (including personal risk-taking to help others) since people will experience the threat of danger to others as threat to self.

There are a number of examples and research studies consistent with the suggestion that when identification is high, collective co-ordination, mutual assistance and even personal self-sacrifice is more likely than personally selfish and individualized behaviours.

1 That is, unless the particular collective identity salient is one in which the norm itself is one of individualism; see Jetten, Postmes & McAuliffe (2002).
Thus, in a series of quasi-experiments, Levine, Prosser, Evans & Reicher (in submission) showed that the same participants were more likely to help someone in difficulty when a shared collective identity was made salient (supporters of the same football team) than when an antagonistic collective identity was made salient (supporters of rival teams). Likewise, studies of crowd conflict have found evidence of participants risking their personal safety to rescue others once a sense of shared identity amongst the crowd has emerged in relation to an antagonistic relationship between crowd and police (Drury & Reicher, 1999, 2000; Reicher, 1996b; Stott, Hutchison & Drury, 2001).

From support to empowerment

In his study of those living in tent city following the devastation caused by Hurricane Andrew, Yelvington (1997, p. 100) reports a number of positive outcomes. Participants referred to people becoming more friendly, talking with their neighbours for the first time and different ethnic groups coming together for the first time. Some accounts suggest that this altruistic and co-operative spirit may have been short-lived. But the fact that it occurred at all – and that it was a reaction which extended beyond the immediate hours and days of the disaster itself – is something of both human and theoretical interest.

It is of human interest, of course, since all us would surely see the emergence of intergroup harmony and neighbourliness as a positive development, to be welcomed and encouraged. It of theoretical interest to a number of researchers, including those of us working within the Social Identity approach who have sought to examine not only
psychological dynamics taking place within crowd events, but also the relatively enduring outcomes – identity changes – resulting from such dynamics (Drury, Cocking, Beale, Hanson & Rapley, in submission; Drury & Reicher, 2000). Moreover, such outcomes are also of social and political significance. Participants in mass emergencies and other crowd events who become transformed in various ways – enlightened, enlivened, empowered, politicized, radicalized, imbued with a spirit of philanthropy etc. – may bring this to future events and/or to other areas of their lives. They may become more committed and courageous social actors, and may therefore contribute to wider processes of social change (Andrews, 1991).

There are numerous journalistic and anecdotal examples where, far from disempowering and enfeebling, the experience of mass disaster has seemed to inspire people to effective collective organization and action. In Kobe, Japan, following the earthquake, the trade unions and chamber of commerce joined to lobby a resistant Diet to provide financial assistance to employers who would rebuild in Kobe and provide employment to those made unemployed as the result of the quake. Similar forms of mutual aid occurred after the Athens earthquake. Likewise, the attacks on New York on September 11th 2001 had unexpected positive outcomes in that a number of support and campaign groups were formed, the experience of which was compared by some of them to being like that of a family.

There is also evidence that trauma can provide the impetus for personal transformation (Tedeschi et al., 1988). Linley & Joseph (2003) found that 43% of survivors of the
sinking of the Herald of Free Enterprise said their lives had changed for the better, saying things like ‘I don’t take life for granted any more’ and ‘I live every day to the full now’. Likewise, Peterson & Seligman (2003) found evidence of character strength increases (e.g., hope, love, teamwork) among some participants following the traumatic events of September 11<sup>th</sup> 2001.

Some of these kinds of examples suggest the role of collective support in mediating any positive outcomes that may result from the experience of disaster. At the very least, social support may moderate the damaging effects of PTSD and self-reported psychological distress (Eustace et al., 1999). Of course this is not to deny that other factors may be involved in participants’ resilience to and ability to grow through the experience of disasters and other stressful crowd events; nor is it to deny that social support itself may be mediated through such factors (e.g., Murphy, 1988). Thus a study by Dougall et al. (2001) shows how optimism is associated with greater use of social support following survival of plane crash; Tyler & Hoyt (2000) indicate that social support moderates depression in flood victims, but less so for older age group; and the study by Benight et al. (1999) of victims of Hurricane Opal, Florida, found that coping self-efficacy mediated trauma related distress and effects of social support. While not denying the role of other factors, the present paper seeks to examine how social support might lead to certain psychologically positive outcomes, a process which recent work on crowd participation has shed light on.
This recent work focused on the issue of empowerment. It began with the question of how a passive crowd might become confident and conflictual. In particular, it was concerned with how people might transcend a victim status or identity.

The dynamics of the ‘poll tax riot’, which took place in and around Trafalgar Square, London, in March 1990, provide an initial illustration. (For further details, see Stott, 1996; Stott & Drury, 1999, 2000; Stott & Reicher, 1998). A march and rally against a new form of local taxation in the UK, the poll tax, was far larger than both organizers and police had expected. Some estimates put the numbers at around 250,000. Police became concerned at the potential influence (and perceived representativeness) of a small number in the crowd displaying obvious hostility to them and to other authority figures. To counter any possible threat posed by this small group, they diverted part of the march and then attempted to move those participants gathered outside Downing Street (the Prime Minister’s residence). However, there was a bottleneck in the crowd, and the attempt to move people here and elsewhere – initially through walking mounted officers against them, and later through baton charges – led to crushes. For those caught in the crushes, there was a real danger of serious injury if not death. Only the year before, a crowd crush at the Hillsborough football stadium in Sheffield had led to nearly 100 deaths. A chant went up in the crowd of poll tax protesters: ‘Hillsborough, Hillsborough!’.

However, the threat posed by the police action was also accompanied by a greater psychological coming together amongst crowd members. Until that point, the only thing that had united people had been the somewhat abstract poll tax itself. There was a clear
split in the crowd between the majority, who endorsed peaceful protest, and that hostile minority, previously identified by the police, who did not. Whereas at the beginning of the march the ‘violent minority’ were seen as ‘other’ and were actively avoided by the majority, with the police action, which was experienced as both illegitimate and indiscriminate by a crowd which largely saw itself as having done nothing to warrant such behaviour, all were ‘in the same boat’. In these circumstances, hostility and aggression towards the police was transformed from illegitimate ‘violence’ to legitimate ‘self-defence’; and the ‘violent minority’ became protectors of the interests of the crowd as a whole.

With ‘violence’ towards the police now becoming normative, participants expected (and received) support from others in the crowd when they attacked the police. Put differently, the enhanced unity within the crowd empowered participants to act in ways which they wouldn’t have done otherwise, thereby transforming the crowd situation itself to a mass riot.

Theoretically, the Elaborated Social Identity Model (ESIM) of crowd behaviour suggests we can understand what happened as follows. In the first place, there was an asymmetry of categorical representations between crowd participants and the outgroup of police. Most crowd members saw themselves as ‘legitimate protesters’ who were expressing their democratic right to assemble and express their voice. They felt no antagonism to the police, and they understood their own actions as non-threatening. By contrast, the police saw the crowd as a whole as ‘oppositional’ and perceived their actions as either actually
or potentially illegitimate and threatening. Acts of confrontation by the minority which the crowd majority saw as atypical were therefore seen by the police as representative and as signs of (incipient) generalized conflict.

Second, there was an (initial) asymmetry of power-relations such that the outgroup had the power to impose its perspective upon the crowd so that this came to constitute the context within which crowd participants (re-)defined themselves. That is, the police did not only see all crowd members as oppositional and dangerous, they treated the whole crowd as such – through setting up cordons to prevent crowd members going where they wished, using horses to force them in particular directions, or else attempting to disperse them through a baton charge. The important point is that such power meant that the outgroup did not just perceive the social position of crowd members differently to the way crowd members perceived it themselves, but that the outgroup was able to re-position crowd members in practice. Since social identity is conceptualized as an understanding of one’s social position, such outgroup action therefore impacted on the self-definition and subsequent action of crowd members themselves.

Generally, where there is an asymmetry of categorization and power between groups in a crowd event, two further consequences follow. The first is that the outgroup perception may become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Groups that are perceived by the police as oppositional and treated as oppositional then come to perceive themselves and act in oppositional ways. In particular, where police actions such as containment or dispersal
are seen as illegitimate, then active opposition to the police becomes legitimimized. This is precisely what happened in the case of the poll tax riot.

The second consequence is that social relationships within the crowd, as well as between crowd and police outgroup, will be transformed. Notably, where the police treat all crowd members as oppositional, then those within the crowd who advocate confrontation will no longer be seen as ‘other’ and prior divisions will be superseded by a single and more inclusive categorization.

The ESIM suggests that the formation of a single large self-category underpins the emerging sense of collective empowerment in crowd events, and that it does so because common categorization leads to expectations of mutual goals and hence mutual support in reaching those goals. (See also Andrews, 1991, and Fox-Cardamone, Hinkle & Hogue, 2000, for the role of mutual support in movement participation.)

A study of one of the town hall anti-poll tax protests taking place in the same month as the London riot identified a similar process of collective empowerment (Drury & Reicher, 1999). Indiscriminately denied access to their councillors, ‘troublemakers’ and ‘legitimate protesters’ united to attempt to force their way into the building.

In addition, however, this study also identified evidence of the endurance of such feelings of empowerment. Participants spoke of being ‘on a high’ afterwards, and of feeling more encouraged about the possibilities of the anti-poll tax movement. One interviewee
described how through the protest she then felt confident enough to risk prosecution by refusing to pay the hated tax.

This question of the endurance of empowerment was directly addressed in a comparative study of anti-roads environmental protest (Drury & Reicher, in submission). Two collective action events featured the same conditions specified in the ESIM (above) yet differed in terms of their experiential outcomes. Systematic comparison suggested that what determined these different outcomes was the extent to which participants successfully acted upon the world to bring it into line with their conceptions of proper practice, conceptions which reflected their social identity as campaign participants. While the two events – a land occupation and then an eviction of participants by police from the same land – were both characterized by reports of unity and support, only the first was followed by expressions of empowerment, joy and increased confidence in the campaign. In the case of the occupation, just as the (‘illegitimate’) construction work of the road represented the negation of what participants saw as ‘common land’, so the crowd negated this work of negation and thus ‘reclaimed the land’, actualizing their collective identity. By contrast, the eviction of the participants from the ‘common land’ served to re-impose the illegitimate power of the road contractors and negate the ‘free-space’ the participants had created, and thus their collective identity. The result in this case was despair and anger, and, subsequently, an increased sense of self-legitimacy which provided a motivation for future involvement distinct to that of empowerment.
The explanation offered, therefore, is that while unity and support may be necessary for empowerment, they may not be sufficient given the power of the outgroup.

Empowerment as an outcome of action would appear to require the ingroup to realize its identity in the social world, a process termed collective self-objectification.\(^2\) An empowered self is a function of participation in social relations defined in terms of power-transformation - from the outgroup to the ingroup. Put differently, if one acts upon the world to reflect one’s identity – one’s definition of proper practice – the result of such action is perhaps the best evidence that one (or at least the relevant social identity) is indeed an active and powerful subject. Changing the world in line with one’s identity demonstrates the power of that identity.

The notion of collective self-objectification builds upon and is consistent with the ESIM and the Social Identity approach more broadly. In the first place, the very reason why an inclusive ingroup self-categorization and the expectations of ingroup support that it engenders are empowering is because such resources are precisely what is necessary in order to instantiate ingroup-normative practice (Reicher & Haslam, in submission). That is, the wider group is the means through which collective self-actualization can occur: the greater the numbers acting in unity in the ingroup (relative to the power of outgroup

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\(^2\) Miner-Rubino, Twenge & Fredrickson (2002) use the term ‘self-objectification’ to refer to women’s experience of being an object for another. But the present usage is based on a much earlier one, that by Marx (1975/1844, pp. 326-7) in his theory of labour. In this latter account, self-objectification refers to a process of translating one’s subjectivity into a material reality through self-activity (labour) – a process which is one of alienation when the purposes of one’s activity are capitalist and hence antagonistic to one’s own. See Arthur (1986).
forces), the greater the potential for collective self-objectification and hence social change (Drury, Reicher & Stott, 2003).

A follow-up study examined how far experiences that we as analysts understand in terms of collective self-objectification feature in the subjective accounts – the phenomenology – of participants in a wide variety of types of empowering collective actions (Drury et al., in submission). Among the various explanations offered by participants for their feelings of empowerment, those coded as collective self-objectification were most prominent, followed by such factors as unity and support, as specified by the Elaborated Social Identity Model. By the same token, failure of collective self-objectification (or outgroup self-objectification), disunity and lack of support were predictive of disempowerment.

While the types of crowd examined in these studies were protest crowds, the application to the evidence of social support and collective empowerment in response to disasters is clear. For any kind of coordinated response or campaign of post-disaster reparation, particularly in the face of opposition (whether natural or social), mutual support will be necessary. Mutual support feels good in itself, and serves to endorse or validate a particular self or identity, which might then feel confident to act upon the world in other areas. Wives of miners involved in the UK strike of 1984-5 described how, through the experience of mutual aid in the strike (which took place in the face of concerted opposition from the authorities, and which ended in defeat), many of them developed and grew as people. They developed new interests, ambitions and confidence in themselves (Evans, Hudson & Smith, 1985; Salt & Layzell, 1985).
The Drury et al. (in submission) study of the phenomenology of empowerment also found that collective self-objectification was predictive of reports of positive emotion during and after collective action. What is interesting about this is the fact that participants weren’t actually asked about what they felt during the actions, and so all such references made during the interviews were spontaneous, perhaps reflecting the salience of emotion in their experience at the time. Terms used to describe how they felt during the collective action included ‘exhilaration’, ‘feeling good’, ‘joy’, ‘feeling great’, ‘buzz’ and ‘positive feeling’. Indeed, emotion was to the fore in the research process: for interviewees, simply relating their empowering experiences brought back and communicated some of the joy of the experiences themselves.

Studies of the link between emotion and health indicate the importance of such experiences for psychological and even physical well-being. Work in psychoneuroimmunology began by showing the deleterious effects of negative emotions (for example arising from the experience of a relationship break-up) on susceptibility to colds and other illnesses (Sarafino, 1990; Taylor, 1999). More recently, research by Fredrickson (2000) has suggested that positive emotions (e.g., joy, interest, contentment) serve to build an individual’s survival functions; such experiences can therefore undo the damaging physiological effects of negative emotion through building up the individual’s thought-action repertoires.
The findings of Drury et al. (in submission) overlap somewhat with research on the concept of locus of control, which has shown how perceived controllability can predict health indices and even mortality rates (Marshall, 1991; Rodin & Langer, 1977). In each case, it might be argued, the sense that the self is a subject, rather than a mere object in relation to external forces, seems to be crucial. One moves from victimhood to personal growth through experiences of agency. However, the Drury et al. study also suggested that we need to go beyond the somewhat individualized approach to the study of the relation between empowerment, emotional experiences and well-being. Empowerment and its emotional and possible health-related outcomes can be understood not just as a personal matter but also in terms of social contexts of collective resistance to domination and inequality (cf. Stein, 1997). Collective action may be politically necessary for positive social change for those who are dominated; and action which has an impact as part of the attempt to bring about such change may even be proportionately better for well-being than personal action, in that the collective can actualize on a greater scale and with greater social and historical consequences than can the individual.

The literature on collective action contains many examples of defeats and ‘burn-out’ as well as success and empowerment. Positive outcomes are not an automatic consequence of collective action. When collective action is empowering it is because it is unusual or against the odds. As a conceptualization of empowerment, collective self-objectification refers to power-transformation or power-reversal; as such, it suggests that mundane (as well as ritualized) ‘self-impositions’ are not expected to be experienced as empowering (Drury & Reicher, in submission; Drury et al., in submission).
One can see a link here to those stories of personal growth coming out of experiences of trauma (Linley & Joseph, 2003; Tedeschi et al., 1998). We value what we have done, and what we can do, precisely because there is an element of uncertainty in such achievements. In each case, there may be the experience of self-development – of becoming more than we were previously, both in terms of our capabilities and in terms of our appreciation of life. Moreover, the consequences may not only be psychological but also physical, improving our resilience to illness.

**Conclusion**

This review of recent research suggests that, while those in authority have traditionally treated the collective as a source of danger, from the point of view of those involved in collective action, the collective may be a source of strength, support and even self-development, even in the face of a mass disaster. Of course, while there may be positive social, psychological and even physical health consequences of collective action for crowd participants themselves, the authorities may still have reasons for opposing collective action. Crowd protests, social movements and campaigns arise because some people but not others seek to change aspects of society, or even change society as a whole. Whether one regards collective action as positive and beneficial or as negative and destructive cannot be determined simply from a psychological analysis but will depend upon where one situates oneself in relation to the issue around which people are taking collective action.
Collective action as a source of strength is mediated by a shared social identity, which provides perceptions of unity and expectations of support. It is the relative strength or weakness of shared identification in a crowd – whether for example we see ourselves as part of a shared humanity or merely as atomized and independent individuals – that determines whether we ‘panic’ or co-ordinate in the face of a mass emergency. The development of a shared identity transforms a fragmented crowd into a collective subject capable of acting against those it sees as attacking its members or denying them their rights. Such empowered action may serve to actualize the collective sense of proper practice, which then provides subjective evidence of the power of that identity, and, in engendering positive emotions, may actually be good for one’s health and well-being.

References


Additional refs