CALL FOR PAPERS (DEADLINE MAY 1, 2005)

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Thanks to Jerome Dokic, Susan Hurley, Chris Peacocke, Sean Kelly, Dominic Lopes, Pete Mandik, Kevin Mulligan, Manuel de Pinedo Garcia, Bernardino Sassoli, Joe Schear, Pepa Toribio, Steve Torrance and Gerald Vision for their additions. Graphic: Fish by Özgür.

Bermudez, J. L. (1995). Ecological perception and the notion of a non-conceptual point of view. In Bermudez, J. L., Marcel, A. and Eilan, N., eds The Body and the Self. MIT Press pp 153-174.

Bermudez, J. L. (1995). Non-conceptual content: From perceptual experience to subpersonal computational states. Mind and Language 10:4, pp 333--369.

Bermudez, J. L. (1994). Peacocke's argument against the autonomy of non-conceptual content. Mind and Language 9, pp 402--418.

*Bermudez, J. L. (1995). Transcedental arguments and psychology. MetaPhilosophy 26:379-401.

Biron, Paul (1991). Non-conceptual descriptions. Unpublished UCSD term paper.

Block, N. (1997?) Is Experiencing Just Representing?. Unpublished?

Butterworth, G. (1996) Infant perception from a non-conceptual point of view. Unpublished paper presented at the Xth Biennial Meeting of the International Conference on infant Studies, Providence, Rhode Island, April 1996.

Carruthers, P. (1998) Natural Theories of Consciousness. The European Journal of Philosophy.

Chrisley, R. (1996) Non-Conceptual Content and Psychological Explanation: Content and Computation. University of Oxford D.Phil thesis.

Chrisley, R. and A. Holland (1995) Connectionist synthetic epistemology: Requirements for the development of objectivity. In Niklasson, L. and Boden, M. (eds.) Current Trends in Connectionism: Proceedings of the 1995 Swedish Conference on Connectionism. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, pp 283-309. Abstract.

Chrisley, R. (1995) Non-conceptual Content and Robotics: Taking Embodiment Seriously. In Ford, K., Glymour, C. and Hayes, P. (eds.) Android Epistemology. Cambridge: AAAI/MIT Press, pp 141-166. [Some reactions to this paper from members of an AI course at Bryn Mawr are on the web. -- RC].

Chrisley, R. and A. Holland (1994) Connectionist synthetic epistemology: Requirements for the development of objectivity, COGS CSRP No. 353. Abstract.

Chrisley, R. (1994) Connectionism, Cognitive Maps, and the Develpoment of Objectivity. In Niklasson, L. and Boden, M., eds., Connectionism in a Broad Perspective. London: Ellis Horwood. pp 25-42.

Chrisley, R. (1993) Connectionism, Cognitive Maps, and the Develpoment of Objectivity. Artificial Intelligence Review 7, pp 329-354.

Chrisley, R. (1992) Taking Embodiment Seriously: Non-conceptual Content and Computation. COGS CSRP No. 246. Abstract.

Chrisley, R. (1992) Non-conceptual Content and Parallel Distributed Processing: A Match Made In Cognitive Science Heaven? In Trappl, R. (ed.) Cybernetics and Systems Research '92, Vol. 2. Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Corporation. pp 1335-1342.

Chrisley, R. (1991) A Hybrid Architecture for Cognitive Map Construction & Use. Artificial Intelligence & the Simulation of Behaviour, special issue on Hybrid Models of Cognition, Autumn/Winter, 1991. pp 31-33.

Chrisley, R. (1991) Opening the Black Box: A Non-conceptual Semantics for PDP. Abstract in The Proceedings of the Second International Colloquium on Cognitive Science. University of San Sebastian.

Chrisley, R. (1990) Cognitive Map Construction and Use: A Parallel Distributed Processing Approach. In Touretzky, D., Elman, J., Hinton, G., and Sejnowski, T. (eds.) Connectionist Models: Proceedings of the 1990 Summer School. San Mateo, CA: Morgan Kaufman. pp 287-302.

Clark, A. (1989). Connectionism, non-conceptual content and representational redescription. COGS CSRP No. 143. Abstract.

Clark, A. (1993). Associative Engines. MIT Press.

Crane, T. (1992). The non-conceptual content of experience. In Crane, T., editor, The Contents of Experience. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Crane, T. (1992). Introduction. In Crane, T., editor, The Contents of Experience. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

*Crane, T. (1988). Concepts in Perception. Analysis 48: 150-153.

*Crane, T. (1988). The Waterfall Illusion. Analysis 48: 142-147.

Cussins, A. (1993?). Nonconceptual content and the elimination of misconceived composites! Mind and Language 8:2.

Cussins, A. (1992). Content, embodiment and objectivity: The theory of cognitive trails. Mind 101, pp 651-688.

Cussins, A. (1992). The limitations of pluralism. In Charles, D. and Lennon, K., editors, Reduction, Explanation and Realism, pages 179--223. Clarendon Press, Oxford.

Cussins, A. (1992). Constructing a world in a painting: Representation for the Post-Wall era. In Cussins, A., B. Latour, A. Lowe & B. Smith Registration Marks: Metaphors for Subobjectivity. Pomeroy Purdy Gallery, London.

Cussins, A. (1990). The connectionist construction of concepts. In Boden, M., editor, The Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence, pages 368--440. Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Cussins, A. (1986). A Representational Theory of Mind. University of Oxford D.Phil thesis.

Davies, M. (1991). Externalism and perceptual content. Proceedings of the Aristotelian society.

Davies, M. (1991). Individualism and perceptual content. Mind 100, pp. 461--484.

DeBellis, M. (1993). Theoretically informed listening. In Krausz, Michael, editor, The Interpretation of Music: Philosophical Essays, pages 272-281. Clarendon Press, Oxford.

DeBellis, M. (1996). Music and conceptualization. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Dokic, J. (forthcoming). La signification des expressions égocentriques. In Proust, J, ed, Le Probleme de Molyneux, PUF, Paris. [Raises the question of whether there is a level of non-conceptual egocentric content in perception, and examines in what sense the perceptual field is oriented. -- JD]

*Dokic, J. (1995). La Structure des Actes Mentaux. University of Geneva PhD thesis. [Detailed discussion of non-conceptual content. -- KM]

Dokic, J. (1992). Le corps en mouvement: Les relations entre l'intention, l'action et le mouvement corporel. Revue de Theologie et de Philosophie, No124, pp. 249-70.[A tentative definition of two levels in the contents of bodily actions: a conceptual level and a non-conceptual one. -- JD]

Dretske, F. (1995). Naturalizing the Mind. MIT Press.

Evans, G. (1984). The Varieties of Reference. Oxford University Press.

Hamlyn, D. W. (1994). Perception, sensation and non-conceptual content. The Philosophical Quarterly, 44(175):139--153.

Honderich, T. (1994) Seeing Things, Synthese, January 1994; Vol. 98, No. 1.

Hurley, S. (1997). Non-conceptual self-consciousness and agency: Perspective and access. Communication & Cognition.

Hutto, J. D. D. (1994)The mindlessness of computationalism: The neglected aspects of cognition. In Pylkkänen, P. and Pylkkö, P. (eds) New directions in cognitive science: Proceedings of the international symposium, Saariselka, 4-9 August 1995, Lapland, Finland. Helsinki: Finnish AI Society, pp 201-211.

Kirsh, D. (1991) Today the earwig, tomorrow man? Artificial Intelligence 47:161-184; also in Kirsh, D., ed, Foundations of Artificial Intelligence. MIT Press; also in Boden, M., ed, The Philosphy of Artificial Life. Oxford Univeristy Press. [Arguing against Brooks' anti-representationalism, on p 242 (in Boden): Brooks' stand on the need for these intermediate representations in a theory of intelligent action is less clear. One difficulty is that he does not explicitly distinguish representations that are non-conceptual declaratives from those that are conceptual declaratives...." -- JS]

*Kelley, D. (1980). The specificity of perception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 40: 401-405.

Kelly, S. (2000). The Non-conceptual Content of Perceptual Experience: Situation Dependence and Fineness of Grain. Forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

Lopes, Dominic (1996). Understanding Pictures. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. [Esp. chs. 7 and 9. -- DL] [Esp. pp 184-187 -- RC]

Määtänen, P. (1995) Content, conceptuality and connectionism. In Haaparanta, L. and S. Heinämaa, eds, Mind and Cognition: Philosophical Perspectives on Cognitive Science and Artificial Intelligence. Acta Philosophica Fennica 58. The Philosophical Society of Finland, Helsinki.

*Martin, M. (1992). Perception, concepts, and memory. Phil Review 101(4): 745-763.

Martin, M. G. F. (1997?) The Transparency of Experience. Unpublished?

McDowell, J. (1994b). Mind and World. Harvard University Press, Cambridge.

McDowell, J. (1994a). The content of perceptual experience. The Philosophical Quarterly, 44(175):190--205. p 205.

*Mellor, D. H. (1988). Crane's waterfall illusion. Analysis 48: 147-150.

*Millar, A. (1991). Concepts, experience and inference. Mind. pp 435-505.

*Mulligan, K. (forthcoming). Perception, particulars and predicates. Proceedings of 1995 Montreal Colloquium "Conscience et Intentionalite". [Argues for the complementarity of three theses: content is non conceptual; basic perceptual reports are extensional; the object of perception are things and individual events and states (tropes). -- KM]

*Mulligan, K. (1997). Percepcion, particulares y predicados. Proceedings of 1995 Valencia Congreso Fundacional de la Sociedad Espanola de Filosofia Analitica . [A shorter version of "Perception, particulars and predicates". -- KM]

*Mulligan, K. (1997). How perception fixes reference. In Hgb. A. Burri, ed, Sprache und Denken.de Gruyter. [About the way non conceptual perceptual content interacts with conceptual content within different types of singular reference. -- KM]

*Mulligan, K. (1996). Konstanz und Kriterien: Brunswiks Beitrag. In Hrsg K. Fischer, F Stadler, eds, Wahrnehmung und Gegenstandswelt: Zum Lebenswerk Von Egon Brunswik, Springer, Veroeffentlichungen des Instituts Wiener Kreis, Bd 4. [On the relation between constancy effects and cues withing the framework of Egon Brunswik's probabilistic functionalism. Brunswik is one of first heroes of NCC within psychology. -- KM]

*Mulligan, K. (1996). Constancy, content and sense. In Rialle, V. & D. Fisette, eds, Pender L Esprit: Des Sciences de la Cognition a une Philosophie Cognitive. Presses Universitaires de Grenoble, 141-150. [On non conceptual content and constancy effects. -- KM]

*Mulligan, K. (1995). Perception. In Smith, B. and D. Smith, eds, Husserl: Cambridge Companions to Philosophy. pp 168-238. [A very detailed account of Husserl on non-conceptual, dynamic perceptual content and its relation to movement, includes comparisons with recent views of Evans, Peacocke etc. -- KM]

*Mulligan, K. (1988). Seeing as and assimilative perception. Brentano Studien I:129-52. [On whether perceptual gestalt switches are intellectual or not in Gestalt psychology and Wittgenstein. -- KM]

*Mulligan, K., & B. Smith (1986). A Husserlian theory of indexicality. Grazer Philosophische Studien (Chisholm FS), 28:133-63.

Peacocke, C. (in press). Nonconceptual content defended. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

Peacocke, C. (1994). Non-conceptual content: Kinds, rationales and relations. Mind and Language 9, pp 419--429.

Peacocke, C. (1993). A Study of Concepts. MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.

Peacocke, C. (1992). Scenarios, contents & perception. In Crane, T., editor, The Contents of Experience. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Peacocke, C. (1990). Perceptual content. In Almog, J., Perry, J., and Wettstein, H., editors, Themes from Kaplan. Oxford University Press, New York.

Peacocke, C. (1989). Transcendental Arguments in the Theory of Content. Clarendon Press, Oxford.

Peacocke, C. (1986). Thoughts: An Essay on Content. Basil Blackwell, Oxford. p 17.

Russell, J. (1996). Agency: Its Role in Mental Development. Erlbaum (UK) Taylor & Francis, Hove. [Esp. ch 2. -- RC]

Sedivy, S. (1996). Must Conceptually Informed Perceptual Experience Involve Non-Conceptual Content?. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26:3, p 413.

Smith, B. C. (1996). On the Origin of Objects. MIT Press. [Esp. chapters 6-8, discussing issues such as object tracking, `reference preservation', `stabilization', ego vs. allocentric registrations....and more related ncc-type stuff. -- JS]

Smith, B. (1992). The owl and the electric encyclopedia. In Kirsh, D., editor, Foundations of Artificial Intelligence. MIT Press, Cambridge. p 271.

Stalnaker, R. (1997) What Might Nonconceptual Content Be?, presented at the SOFIA conference, Barcelona, June 1997.

*Tappolet, C. (1996). Les Valeurs et Leur Epistemologie. University of Geneva PhD thesis. [Detailed account of non conceptual content of emotions. -- KM]

*Toribio, J., "Ruritania and Ecology: Reply to Ned Block", Philosophical Issues, 6, 1995, pp. 188-195.

*Toribio, J., "Externalist Computation". 1995 Annual Meeting of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Stony Brook, New York. June 8-11, 1995.

Toribio, J., "Ecological Content", Pragmatics and Cognition, forthcoming.

Travis, C. (1994). On contraints of generality. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. pp165-188.

*Tye, M. (1995). A representational theory of pains and their phenomenal character. Philosophical Perspectives 9.

Tye, M. (1995). Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind. MIT press. [Esp. Ch 5 -- RC]

Vaden, T. (1995). The Symbolic and Subsymbolic Theories in Cognitive Science. Tampere University Press.

Vaden, T. (1994). Subsymbolic connectionism: Representational vehicles and contents. In Niklasson, L. and Boden, M. (eds.) Connectionism in a Broad Perspective. London: Ellis Horwood. pp 43--48.

*Vision, G. (1996) Problems of Vision. Oxford. [In ch. 9., I discuss the relation of nonconceptual content to my sketchy views on perceptual content, & in ch. 4 (perhaps also chs. 5-6) questions of perceptual content are raised that are perhaps indirectly related to the issue of nonconceptual content. -- GV]

Waugh, R. (1995). Non-conceptual content: Putting meaning before truth. In Pylkkänen, P. and Pylkkö, P. (eds) New directions in cognitive science: Proceedings of the international symposium, Saariselka, 4-9 August 1995, Lapland, Finland. Helsinki: Finnish AI Society, pp 212-221.

This page was created on October 16th, 1996.