This project is about the implications of globalization for the governance of dual-use technologies relevant to chemical and biological warfare (CBW). The project seeks to discover how and why non-state actors become involved in the governance of CBW technologies and what, if any, barriers to entry or structures of co-operation were encountered by them. Recognizing that a state-centric "national security" model does not offer a useful explanatory framework for technology governance policies, our project responds to calls for new analyses of CBW issues in a security environment in which no state, no matter how powerful, can make itself invulnerable to today's threats. Globalization has increased and dispersed worldwide the number of actors involved in governing dual-use CBW technologies and has opened up new governance spaces in which these actors can interact and through which they can influence policy processes.

Our project asks four research questions:

• How has the globalization of CBW technologies and their dual-use nature changed the CBW security problem?
• What effects has the globalization of dual-use CBW technologies had on state action?
• What is the role and interaction of non-state actors in dual-use CBW technology governance?
• What impacts are non-state actors having on the globalization of CBW constraints?