Mr Chairman,

I have the honour to take the floor on behalf of the European Union. The acceding countries Bulgaria and Romania, the candidate countries Croatia and Turkey, the countries of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidates Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro and Albania, align themselves with this statement.

Mr Chairman,

I should like first of all to congratulate you on behalf of the European Union on your unanimous election to the chair of the 2005 NPT Review Conference. Let me tell you how pleased we are to see you presiding this very important Conference. The EU is confident that you will guide this Conference to a successful outcome. You will have the full support, cooperation, confidence and thanks from the European Union for taking on this challenging and eminent task.

Mr Chairman,

The 2000 Review Conference was a success, consensus being reached in spite of the fact that the 1998 Prepcom could not agree on any substantive issue, or the establishment of subsidiary bodies to be recommended to the 2000 Review Conference. The same situation happened at the 2004 Prepcom as regards the absence of substantive recommendations for the 2005 Review Conference.

As was the case at the 2000 Review Conference, the European Union will also make every effort in conjunction with all Partners to reach a successful outcome at the 2005 Review Conference.

Our Conference is coinciding with the sixtieth anniversary of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki nuclear exploitations. The European Union recalls here the preamble to the NPT, which states, and I quote: "Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples, and believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously
enhance the danger of nuclear war. The European Union therefore hopes that this Conference will help strengthen the framework of collective security established by the NPT. It is our utmost responsibility to make our best efforts to work towards this end and to make our world more secure. Let us take up this noble challenge in good faith!

The NPT is an irreplaceable, legally binding instrument for maintaining and reinforcing international peace, security and stability. The EU stresses that the Treaty remains the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament under Article VI, as well as an important element in the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Nothing should be undertaken that could endanger the integrity of the Treaty and undermine the essential equilibrium contained in it, for the sake of our common good: peace, security and stability.

The EU wishes to help build a consensus on the basis of the framework established by the NPT by supporting the Decisions and the Resolution adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the final document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, and bearing in mind the current situation. Furthermore the European Union considers that the recommendations contained in the report of the UN Secretary-General and those contained in the UN High Level Panel Report on Threats, Challenges and Change are useful and should be examined in detail and taken into account by our Conference.

Mr Chairman,

The Heads of State and Government of the European Union adopted in December 2003 an EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. This EU Strategy is in line with the Common Position adopted in November 2003 by the EU Council on the universalisation and reinforcement of multilateral agreements in the field of non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and their means of delivery. Integral to this Strategy is our conviction that a multilateralist approach to international security, including disarmament and non-proliferation, provides the best way to maintain peace and stability.
Multilateralism is based in particular on the principle of shared commitments and obligations contained in legally binding instruments and on the fulfilment of obligations under multilateral agreements. This means that all States Parties to the NPT must comply with their commitments and obligations. The EU attaches utmost importance to a policy of reinforcing compliance with the Treaty. Such a policy requires an effective safeguards system, which ensures the detection of violations of the Treaty and thereby deters the diversion of nuclear materials towards the manufacture of nuclear weapons, and which constitutes a credible instrument concerning the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. In this context the EU calls on all States that have not yet done so to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA without delay, in accordance with their Treaty obligations.

Mr Chairman,

An effective safeguards system has existed since 1997; it involves the combination of a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol thereto. For the EU, these two instruments constitute the verification standard of today.

When the limits of the IAEA's action in a country that only had a comprehensive safeguards agreement were made evident by the discovery of Iraq's clandestine military nuclear programme after the Gulf War in 1991, the international community took the initiative to formulate a new legally binding instrument to strengthen the safeguards system, which resulted in the adoption in 1997 of the Model Additional Protocol.

It is a fact that the implementation of an additional protocol in a given country is essential if the IAEA is to be able to give credible assurances of the absence of undeclared nuclear activities in that country.

At the present time, 106 States Parties have not yet put into force an Additional Protocol. The EU calls on all States Parties that do not yet have an additional protocol to bring one into force without delay, thus greatly increasing confidence in compliance with non-proliferation commitments. The EU calls on all States Parties to ensure that our Conference recognizes the comprehensive safeguards agreements.
Mr Chairman,

The EU is fully committed to the fight against terrorism, the continuing urgency and importance of which has been underlined so tragically by the terrorist attacks of the last years. The EU strongly supports all measures that are aimed at preventing terrorists from acquiring or developing nuclear, biological or chemical weapons and their means of delivery, as well as radiological dispersion devices. We therefore supported and welcomed the inclusion of an anti-terrorist clause in each of the export control regimes. The EU also strongly supports the IAEA’s action to combat this danger. We also welcome efforts in other fora such as the G8 to prevent terrorists or those that harbour them from acquiring or developing weapons of mass destruction, missiles and related equipment and technology. Effective measures must be taken to address the problem of the diversion of and trafficking in materials likely to be used for the purposes of designing, developing, manufacturing or using nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, as well as the problem of the participation of non-state players in the proliferation of WMD. In this context, the EU recalls the important WMD non-proliferation measures to which all UN Member States are bound in conformity with Security Council Resolution 1540. The EU welcomes the unanimous adoption by the UN General Assembly of the Convention for the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism. It hopes the Convention will be signed and ratified as soon as possible by all States.

Mr Chairman,

As regards security, not only has the conflict potential at a regional level increased, but the threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery has become more pronounced. In this context, the EU is deeply concerned that some non-nuclear weapon States Parties to the Treaty do not always comply with their non-proliferation obligations.

The EU deplores the fact that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea announced in January 2003 its intention to withdraw from the NPT. We continue to urge that country to fully comply once again with its international non-proliferation obligations
under the Treaty and its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA. Any clandestine nuclear weapons programme must be completely, verifiably and irreversibly dismantled. The EU restates its firm resolve to contribute to the search for a peaceful solution, through negotiations, to the DPRK nuclear issue; it hopes the dialogue on this matter within the framework of the Six Party Talks will be resumed without delay. The announcement by the DPRK of its intention to withdraw from the Treaty constitutes an unprecedented challenge and led to a debate on the implementation of Article X of the Treaty, which has been echoed by the UN High-Level Group and the IAEA Director-General. The EU considers that our Review Conference should give serious consideration to the question of withdrawal.

The European Union is united in its determination not to allow Iran to obtain military nuclear capabilities, and to see the proliferation implications of its nuclear programme resolved. It fully supports the negotiations currently under way between France, the United Kingdom and Germany, with the full participation of the Secretary-General of the Council, High Representative for the CFSP, and of Iran, on the basis of the Paris agreement of 15 November 2004. The European Union notes that Iran has signed the Additional Protocol and has made a commitment to engage in a relationship of full cooperation and transparency with the IAEA, particularly to resolve outstanding issues. The European Union also welcomes Iran’s commitment to suspend all its activities connected with uranium enrichment and reprocessing, under IAEA supervision. The European Union calls on Iran to comply with all its international commitments fully and in good faith, and to provide the international community with objective guarantees that its nuclear programme is for exclusively peaceful purposes, by ceasing to develop and operate fissile material production capabilities. It is for Iran to re-establish trust. The European Union calls on Iran to strictly respect the provisions of the Paris agreement of 15 November 2004 and the relevant resolutions of the IAEA Board of Governors, in particular with regard to the suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, as foreseen by the Paris agreement.

On 18 December 2003 Libya announced its decision to eliminate all materials, equipment and programmes that lead to the production of Weapons of Mass Destruction and ballistic means of delivery. All States welcome the fact that Libya has brought its nuclear weapons programme to the attention of the IAEA and its cooperation with the Agency and welcome Libya’s ratification of the Comprehensive
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and its signature and decision to implement an Additional Protocol with the IAEA. The dismantling of Libya's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programme is warmly welcomed by the international community as a very positive precedent and an example to others.

We note the conclusion of the Director General of the IAEA that the uranium enrichment programmes of Iran and Libya share common elements and that the basic technology is very similar and was largely obtained from the same foreign sources, namely the A Q. Khan network. This is a matter of serious concern. We therefore fully endorse the Director General's call for full cooperation from all IAEA member States in identifying the supply routes and sources of the related nuclear and non-nuclear technology and equipment.

The illicit trade in highly sensitive nuclear equipment and technology is a matter of serious concern for the European Union and indeed all State Parties to the NPT. The European Union is in favour of strong and effective national and internationally coordinated export controls which we see as a necessary complement to our non-proliferation obligations under the NPT. Recent revelations have demonstrated the need for us to reinforce our efforts to tackle illicit trafficking and procurement networks and to address the issue of involvement of non-state actors in the proliferation of WMD technology. In this context we welcome the efforts made to dismantle these networks in Pakistan, Malaysia, South Africa, the United Arab Emirates and other countries. These efforts must be continued.

In view of the enhanced proliferation threat, the EU considers it necessary for exporting States, as well as for importing States, in conformity with the obligations contained in UNSC Resolution 1540, to assume their responsibilities and take the necessary measures to ensure that exports of sensitive materials, equipment and technologies are subject to appropriate surveillance and control. Export controls must ensure that transfers take place for peaceful purposes as required by the NPT, facilitating also cooperation and the development of nuclear technology. The EU will work towards strengthening the effectiveness of export controls, preventing any uncontrolled dissemination of the most sensitive technologies, in particular to non-state actors, and defining adequate consequences for situations of failure to comply with non-proliferation obligations. We will however pay great attention to the
preservation of the core principles of the Treaty and, in particular, development of and cooperation on peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The EU will act in a way that preserves the vast majority of countries, which respect their commitments, from the consequences of non-compliance by a few. We will avoid creating dividing lines among the international community. Therefore the EU will focus on making export control policies and practices more effective, within the EU and beyond, in concertation with all countries that share this aim.

Article IV of the NPT stipulates in strong terms the inalienable right of all the States Parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, in conformity with Articles I, II and III of the Treaty. They may therefore have recourse to nuclear energy for the production of electricity and to nuclear energy applications in the fields of health, industry, agriculture and research.

The EU underlines the importance of continuing international cooperation in order to strengthen nuclear safety; safe radioactive waste management and radiological protection and calls upon States that have not yet done so to accede to all the relevant conventions as soon as possible and to implement fully the ensuing commitments.

Mr Chairman,

We welcome the accession to the Treaty in 2002 and 2003 respectively of Cuba and East Timor. Cuba’s accession to the NPT and to the抗击疫情 Treaty made the nuclear weapons free zone in Latin America and the Caribbean complete. The EU Member States continue to attach great importance to achieving the universality of, and universal compliance with the NPT. In this connection we regret that there are three countries, India, Israel and Pakistan, remaining outside the Treaty. In accordance with the EU Common Position on the universalization and reinforcement of multilateral agreements in the field of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, adopted in November 2003, we continue to call on them to accede unconditionally to the NPT as non-nuclear weapons States.

The EU continues to monitor the situation in South Asia. We note the declared moratoria by India and Pakistan on nuclear testing and their willingness to participate
in the negotiation of a Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. We call on those States to take and apply all necessary measures towards fulfilling their aforementioned promises. We further note with appreciation the inclusion of nuclear confidence-building measures as part of the announced composite dialogue between India and Pakistan. The EU calls on India and Pakistan to declare moratoria on the production of fissile material of weapons quality and to sign and ratify the CTBT, which would be a vital important confidence-building measure.

The EU remains committed to the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the United Nations Security Council and the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. We call upon all States in the region that have not yet done so, to accede to the biological and chemical weapons convention and to the NPT. The EU calls upon the States of the region to establish an effectively verifiable zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, as mentioned in UN Security Council Resolution 697. In pursuing this objective, and after the recent revelations, it is essential that the States in the region comply fully with the commitments they have made. We believe that the accession of all States in the area to the IAEA’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and the Additional Protocols should be a priority for the international community as a whole and would represent a crucial contribution to an overall improvement for security and confidence in the Middle East.

The EU welcomes the fact that the end of the Cold War put a stop to the arms race between the USSR and the United States. Considerable reductions of arsenals of strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons and their means of delivery have taken place since then and the EU expects further systematic and gradual efforts towards nuclear disarmament.

The EU also welcomes the fact that many facilities for the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons have been shut down and dismantled. 4 of the 5 NWS have moratoria on the production of such fissile material. The EU calls on China to join the other NWS to declare a moratorium on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and to abstain from any increase of its nuclear arsenal.
The EU recognises the importance, from the viewpoint of nuclear disarmament, of programmes for the destruction and elimination of nuclear weapons and fissile materials in excess of defence requirements in the framework of the G8 Global Partnership.

The EU welcomes the Moscow Treaty which entered into force on 1 June 2010. Under this Treaty the United States and the Russian Federation will reduce their strategic nuclear warheads deployed under operational conditions to between 1700 and 2200 by 31 December 2012. This is an important step in the context of international security and a contribution to the efforts of the international community in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. In this context, the principles of irreversibility, transparency and verifiability remain important. The EU expects further reductions in the Russian and US arsenals.

The problem of non-strategic nuclear weapons has been included in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference. Reductions in these weapons are an integral part of the nuclear arms control and disarmament process. We look forward to the fulfilment of the US and Russian 1991-1992 Presidential declarations on unilateral reductions of their holdings of tactical nuclear weapons, as well as of the commitments made by relevant States at the 2000 Review Conference. We encourage all States concerned to start negotiations on an effectively verifiable agreement to best achieve the greatest reductions of these weapons.

Mr Chairman,

We underline the importance of international cooperation for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction. The EU and its Member States fully support and contribute actively to the G8 Global Partnership, which contributes effectively to disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. The comprehensive set of non-proliferation principles set out at the G8 Kanamara Summit in 2002 constitute the criteria to be adopted, pursued and implemented to allow effective international cooperation in the field of the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. The European Union is committed to continuing its cooperation programmes for non-proliferation and
disarmament. We consider that cooperative threat reduction is an effective tool of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. We are currently actively considering expansion of the EU programmes in this area.

Mr Chairman,

The EU regrets the ongoing stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament and is convinced that the new threats to peace and security require that this standstill be overcome as soon as possible. The EU is committed to reaching a consensus on a programme of work in the CD and welcomes the fact that new ideas have been put forward over the last years. We appreciate these efforts aimed at promoting consensus for a programme of work. In the context of the NPT, recommencement of substantive work within the CD is particularly significant in relation to the negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons.

The EU policy is to pursue an international agreement on the prohibition of the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The EU attaches special importance to the negotiation of a non-discriminatory and universal Treaty banning the production of such fissile material without preconditions while bearing in mind the special coordinator’s report and the mandate contained therein, which would strengthen both nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and thus international security.

Some 175 States have now signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, of which 120 have ratified. The EU reiterates that it attaches the utmost importance to the entry into force of the CTBT at the earliest possible date. We call upon all States that have not yet signed and ratified the Treaty to do so without delay and without conditions. We urge in particular those States named in Annex II to the Treaty, whose ratification is required for entry into force, to do so. In this context we welcome the recent ratification by Algeria and the Democratic Republic of the Congo of the CTBT which brings us closer to both universalisation and entry into force.

Pending the entry into force of the CTBT, the EU urges all States to abide by a moratorium and to refrain from any actions which are contrary to the obligations and provisions of the CTBT. The EU is actively involved in promoting universal
adherence to the CTBT and participated actively in the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT held in Vienna on September 2003. We take this opportunity to commend the work of the Provisional Technical Secretariat of the CTBTO (Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation) under the direction of Mr Wolfgang Hoffmann and to welcome the appointment of Mr Tibor Toth to the post of Executive Secretary of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission.

Mr Chairman,

The EU recognizes the continuing high value of the existing legally binding security assurances as provided through the Protocols to the Treaties establishing the nuclear-weapons-free zones and the unilateral declarations made by nuclear-weapons States Parties to the NPT to the non-nuclear-weapons States on the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons noted by UNSC Resolution 984/1995 and reaffirmed at the 2000 Review Conference. The EU Strategy on Weapons of Mass Destruction indicates that positive and negative security assurances can play an important role in the NPT regime. They can serve both as an incentive to forego the acquisition of WMD and as a deterrent. In our WMD Strategy we are committed to promoting further consideration of security assurances.

Mr Chairman,

In order to help build consensus in our Review Conference, the Council of the European Union has adopted a common position on the 2005 NPT Review Conference. The Council of the European Union identified a series of essential issues covering the three pillars of the NPT – non-proliferation, disarmament and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. I shall not list them orally, but they are set out in full at the end of the written version of my speech of which copies are available. I would ask you to consider them:

1. undertaking efforts to preserve the integrity of the NPT and strengthen its implementation;

2. recognising that the NPT is a unique and irreplaceable multilateral instrument for maintaining and reinforcing international peace, security
and stability, in that it establishes a legal framework for preventing increased proliferation of nuclear weapons and for developing further a verification system guaranteeing that non-nuclear-weapons States use nuclear energy safely for peaceful purposes, and that it represents the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament in accordance with Article VI thereof;

3. working towards universal accession to the NPT;

4. stressing the absolute necessity of full compliance with all the provisions of the NPT by all States Parties;

5. calling on all States not party to the NPT to pledge commitments to non-proliferation and disarmament and calling on those States to become States Parties to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States.

6. recognising that serious nuclear proliferation events have occurred since the end of the 2000 Review Conference;

7. stressing the need to strengthen the role of the UN Security Council, as final arbiter, in order that it can take appropriate action in the event of non-compliance with NPT obligations, in keeping with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), including the application of safeguards;

8. drawing attention to the potential implications for international peace and security of withdrawal from the NPT. Urging the adoption of measures to discourage withdrawal from the said Treaty;

9. calling for nuclear cooperation to be suspended where the IAEA is not able to provide adequate assurances that a State's nuclear programme is designed exclusively for peaceful purposes, until such time as the Agency is able to provide such assurances;

10. calling on all States in the region to make the Middle East into an effectively verifiable zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, in keeping with the
Resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference;

11. since security in Europe is linked to security in the Mediterranean, giving top priority to implementation of the nuclear non-proliferation regime in that region;

12. acknowledging the importance of nuclear-weapon-free zones for peace and security, on the basis of arrangements freely entered into between the States of the region concerned;

13. stressing the need to do everything possible to prevent the risk of nuclear terrorism, linked to possible terrorist access to nuclear weapons or materials that could be used in the manufacture of radiological dispersal devices and, in this context, stressing the need for compliance with obligations under Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004). Calling for tighter security for high-activity radioactive sources. Supporting G8 and IAEA action in this regard;

14. recognizing that, in the light of the increased threat of nuclear proliferation and terrorism, the Proliferation Security Initiative, the Global Threat Reduction Initiative and the G-8 Global Partnership Initiative should be approved;

15. calling for universal accession to the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols;

16. recognizing that Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols have a deterrent effect on nuclear proliferation and form today’s verification standard, and continuing to work for increased detectability of any violations of Treaty obligations;

17. working for recognition by the IAEA Board of Governors that the conclusion of a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and an Additional Protocol is today’s verification standard;

18. highlighting the IAEA’s unique role in verifying States’ compliance with
their nuclear non-proliferation commitments and helping them, on request, to tighten up the security of nuclear materials and installations, and calling on States to support the Agency;

19. recognising the importance of appropriate effective export controls, in compliance with Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) and in accordance with Article III.2 of the NPT;

20. implementing, at national level, effective export, transit, transshipment and re-export controls, including appropriate laws and regulations for that purpose;

21. enacting effective criminal sanctions to deter illegal export, transit, brokering, trafficking and related financing, in compliance with UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004);

22. urging the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group to share their experience on export controls, so that all States can draw on the arrangements of the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines;

23. pointing up the need to strengthen the (NSG) Guidelines at an early date, to adapt them to new non-proliferation challenges;

24. calling on the States Parties to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material to work for rapid conclusion of an amended Convention;

25. recognising the right of States Parties to the NPT to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, in accordance with Article IV thereof, with due regard for Articles I, II and III of the Treaty;

26. underlining the importance of continuing international cooperation in order to strengthen nuclear safety, safe waste management and radiological protection and calling upon States that have not yet done so to accede to all the relevant conventions as soon as possible and to implement fully the ensuing commitments;
27. noting that the States Parties to the NPT, may, pursuant to Article IV thereof, have resort to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, inter alia in the area of production of electricity, industry, health and agriculture;

28. urging the formulation of guarantees of access to nuclear fuel services, or to fuel itself, subject to appropriate conditions;

29. noting the report of the IAEA's expert group on multinational approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle and promoting an early start to its scrutiny by the IAEA;

30. stressing, while acknowledging the nuclear arms reductions which have taken place since the end of the cold war, the need for an overall reduction in nuclear arsenals in the pursuit of gradual, systematic nuclear disarmament under Article VI of the NPT and welcoming, in this context, the ratification of the Moscow Treaty by the Russian Federation and the United States of America in 2002, while stressing the need for more progress in reducing their arsenals;

31. stressing the need to implement the declarations made by the Presidents of Russia and America in 1991 and 1992 on unilateral reductions in their stocks of non-strategic nuclear weapons and calling on all States with non-strategic nuclear weapons to include them in their general arms control and disarmament processes, with a view to their reduction and elimination;

32. recognising application of the principle of irreversibility to guide all measures in the field of nuclear disarmament and arms control, as a contribution to the maintenance and reinforcement of international peace, security and stability, taking these conditions into account;

33. recognising the importance, from the point of view of nuclear disarmament, of the programmes for the destruction and elimination of nuclear weapons and the elimination of fissile material as defined under the G-8 World Partnership;
34. Pursuing efforts to secure transparency, as a voluntary Confidence Building Measure to support further progress in disarmament;

35. Since the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) forms an essential part of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime and with a view to its entry into force as soon as possible, without conditions, calling on States, particularly those listed in Annex II, to sign and ratify the said Treaty without delay and without conditions and, pending the entry into force of the said Treaty, calling on all States to abide by a moratorium and to refrain from any action contrary to the obligations and provisions of the said Treaty. Highlighting the importance of the work of the CTBT Organisation Preparatory Commission and actively supporting the work of the Special Representative of the States which have ratified the Treaty charged with promoting universal accession to the Treaty;

36. Appealing again to the Disarmament Conference for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of a non-discriminatory, universally applicable Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, without pre-conditions, and bearing in mind the Special Coordinator's report and the mandate included therein and, pending entry into force of the said Treaty, calling on all States to declare and uphold a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The EU welcomes the action of those of the five nuclear-weapon States which have decreed the relevant moratorium;

37. Calling on all States concerned to take appropriate practical measures in order to reduce the risk of accidental nuclear war;

38. Pursuing consideration of the issue of security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the NPT;

39. Calling on nuclear-weapon States to reaffirm existing security assurances noted by the United Nations Security Council in Resolution 964(1995) and to sign and ratify the relevant protocols on nuclear-weapon-free zones, drawn up following the requisite consultations, recognising that Treaty-
based security assurances are available to such zones;

40. stressing the need for general disarmament;

41. highlighting the importance of universal accession and implementation of the Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention (BTWC), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the conventions, measures and initiatives contributing to conventional arms control;

42. calling for universal accession to and effective implementation of the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation;

43. working for the resolution of the problems of regional instability and insecurity and of the conflict situations which are often at the root of armament programmes.

Mr Chairman,

In conclusion, the EU is convinced that by providing a framework for security and stability for all States, the NPT contributes decisively to the cause of peace. Respect of their Treaty obligations by all the Parties is the essential precondition for the preservation of this collective security framework in the coming decades.

Thank you, Mr President.