The strategy against Proliferation of WMD adopted by the European Council in December 2003 asks the External Relations Council to hold every six months a debate on the implementation of the strategy. The competent Council bodies had over the last months a thorough discussion on the implementation of the strategy and reached unanimous agreement on the attached papers:

- a progress report, setting out results achieved so far (Annex A) and

- a list of priorities for coherent implementation of the WMD strategy, which is of an indicative nature and will serve as practical guideline for future action (Annexe B).

The Permanent Representatives Committee is invited to suggest to the Council to take note of these two documents.
PROGRESS REPORT

on the implementation of Chapter III

of the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

1. Following co-ordination between the Office of the Personal Representative for non-proliferation of WMD and the Commission, the following 6 monthly Progress Report has been established. Initiatives taken or suggested are in bold in the text below, under the headings of the measures contained in chapter III of the European Strategy against the proliferation of WMD adopted on 12 December 2003 by the European Council.

2. On the implementation of chapter III of the Strategy

A) Rendering multilateralism more effective by acting resolutely against proliferators.

1) Working for the universalisation and when necessary strengthening of the main treaties, agreements and verification arrangements on disarmament and non-proliferation.

- Carrying out diplomatic action to promote the universalisation and reinforcement of multilateral agreements, in implementation of Council Common Position 2003/805/CFSP of 17 November 2003:

= On the basis of terms of references agreed by written procedures or by Working Groups, démarches have been carried out in order to promote the early entry into force of the CTBT, as well as the universalisation of the BTWC, the Comprehensive Safeguard Agreement, the Additional Protocol and the HCoC.
The WMD Strategy and its provisions are highlighted in the common statements which are made by the Presidency on behalf of the EU in relevant fora, in particular at the 59th UNGA First Committee in New York, and at meetings of States Parties of relevant treaties. These statements have emphasised the EU’s commitment to the multilateral system, the importance of full compliance with existing treaty obligations and the willingness of the EU to work to strengthen these treaties where necessary.

2) 

- Fostering the role of the UN Security Council, and enhancing expertise in meeting the challenge of proliferation.

- Working inter alia to enable the Security Council to benefit from independent expertise and a pool of readily available competence in order to carry out the verification of proliferating activities that are a potential threat to international peace and security. The EU will consider how the unique verification and inspection experience of UNMOVIC could be retained and utilised, for example by setting up a roster of experts.

On 28 April 2004 the UNSC adopted Resolution 1540. An EU report on the implementation of the UNSC 1540 has been prepared by the Presidency, the Commission Services and the PR. This report was transmitted to the UN General Secretariat before the deadline of 28 October 2004. It presents the areas where the EU has developed a common approach to tackle the issues of the UNSC 1540, in particular those issues related to the areas of European Community competence. National reports by EU Member States refer to the EU report when it comes to the issues of Community competence.

The discussion is still ongoing on the issue of an international inspection and verification capability to be established within the UN.
3) Enhancing political, financial and technical support for verification regimes

- Now that all EU Member States have ratified the IAEA Additional Protocol, the EU will redouble its efforts to promote their conclusions by third States.

  The first declarations in accordance with Article 2 of the Additional Protocol were submitted by Member States and Euratom to the IAEA during the month of October.

  The EU has emphasised the importance of the universalisation of the Additional Protocol in its troika meetings with third countries. Démarches, based on terms of reference prepared by CONOP, have been carried out in a global context. The results of the démarches are being shared with the IAEA Secretariat.

- Fostering measures aimed at ensuring that any possible misuse of civilian programmes for military purposes will be effectively excluded.

  The CONOP Working Group continues to discuss this issue in the light of several proposals which have been made, notably by several Member States and by the US. In addition, experts from several Member States are participating in the advisory group established by the IAEA Director General with the objective of examining multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle.
- Releasing financial resources to support specific projects conducted by multilateral institutions (inter alia. IAEA, CTBTO Preparatory Commission and OPCW) which could assist in fulfilling our objectives.

= Following the adoption in May 2004 by the Council of a Joint Action in support of the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund, a new Joint Action on support for OPCW activities in the framework of the implementation of the EU WMD Strategy was adopted by the GAERC of 22 November 2004. This Joint Action aims at supporting the universalisation of the CWC and, in particular, at promoting the accession to the CWC by States not Party (signatory States as well as non-Signatory States) and at supporting the implementation of the CWC by the States Parties. The EU assistance will in addition be focused on international co-operation in the field of chemical activities. This Joint Action will be implemented in 2005.

= The Personal Representative has suggested in her list of priorities to foresee a renewal of the IAEA Joint Action next year in order to cover countries that it was impossible, for financial reasons, to assist in 2004. In addition, a Joint Action in support of CTBTO could be envisaged.
- Promoting challenge inspections in the framework of the Chemical Weapons Convention and beyond. This issue will be addressed in the CWC competent bodies as well as in the framework of political dialogue with third States.

Austria organised a seminar on challenge inspections on 24-25 June 2004 in Vienna. The meeting was chaired by the Austrian MFA. Thirty-three national delegations (20 EU Member States) and international agencies (in particular OPCW, UNMOVIC, IAEA and CTBTO) participated in the event. Among EU Members, Germany, Finland, France, Italy, Poland and the UK presented non-papers. The Personal Representative made a presentation on the support of the EU to the universalisation of the CWC and to the OPCW and on the problems related to verification and control mechanisms. The seminar led to a better insight and understanding of the principles and procedures required for a successful implementation of challenge inspections. As a follow up, an inspection exercise was held in Switzerland from 14-19 November. Furthermore, Austria presented to the CODUN Working Group a draft Action Plan on Challenge Inspections. At the 38th Executive Council of the OPCW in the Hague (12-15 October), the EU presented its proposals to the OPCW States Parties. The EU proposals were also highlighted at the Conference of State Parties (29 November - 3 December). Open-ended consultations in the context of the OPCW are scheduled to start shortly.

- Reinforcing the BTWC and the CWC and, in this context, continuing the reflection on verification instruments. The BTWC does not contain at present a verification mechanism. The EU must find ways to strengthen compliance. A group of experts to give advice on how this could be done. The EU will take the lead in efforts to strengthen regulations on trade with material that can be used for the production of biological weapons. The EU will also take the lead in supporting national implementation of the BTWC (e.g. in providing technical assistance). The EU will consider giving support to states with administrative or financial difficulties in their national implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the BTWC.
Programmes by Member States, the EU and the Community are ongoing and will continue.

The examination of information provided by Member States on their bilateral assistance programmes lead to the conclusion that there is scope for EU initiatives in the field of biological weapons.

The Personal Representative has put forward, in the context of her list of priorities, suggestions on how to strengthen the BTWC and compliance with it.

Work has already started under the Presidency of the Netherlands to prepare for the 2006 BTWC conference, which will be an important occasion to agree on measures for the strengthening of the BTWC.

4) **Strengthening export control policies and practices in co-ordination with partners of the export control regimes; advocating, where applicable, adherence to effective export control criteria by countries outside the existing regimes and arrangements; strengthening suppliers' regimes and European co-ordination in this area.**

- Making the EU a leading co-operative player in the export control regimes by co-ordinating EU positions within the different regimes, supporting the membership of acceding countries and where appropriate involvement of the Commission, promoting a catch-all clause in the regimes, where it is not already agreed, as well as strengthening information exchange, in particular with respect to sensitive destinations, sensitive end-users and procurement patterns.

EU co-ordination has been systematically organised prior to and, where necessary, during the meetings of the export control regimes, facilitating agreement on EU statements at regime meetings as well as EU proposals on certain issues. Where an EU proposal is agreed it is presented in the regimes by the Presidency.
The Presidency and the Troika have continued their efforts for the inclusion of all new Member States in the export control regimes. Concerning MTCR this issue was raised at the highest political level with relevant third countries prior to the MTCR Plenary Meeting on 4-8 October 2004. The MTCR Plenary did not agree, however, on the admission of the seven remaining new EU Member States. The EU will continue its pro-active policy of support with new démarches to relevant third countries. In this context, the Conclusions by the 14 December 2004 Council on the first phase of the Peer Review Process of export controls should be used as a supporting element. Regarding the Wassenaar Arrangement, the EU Presidency, with the support of the Office of the PR and the European Commission, has made high level démarches to key members of the Arrangement.

At the MTCR Plenary meeting (Seoul, 4-8 October), an EU proposal to strengthen the information exchange within the regime was accepted.

Sweden holds the chairmanship of the NSG for the period May 2004 - June 2005; Spain will assume the chairmanship of the MTCR in fall 2005.

The Office of the PR and Commission Services have regularly attended the relevant export control regime meetings. They are both part of the Presidency delegation in those regimes where the Commission does not have observer or participant status.

- Reinforcing the efficiency of export controls in an enlarged Europe, and successfully conducting a Peer Review to disseminate good practices by taking special account of the challenges of the enlargement.

In line with the Political and Security Committee conclusions of 16 September 2003, a Task Force composed of representatives of Finland, the Office of the PR and the Commission Services was set up to assist with the organisation of the Peer Review and to draw up a report and recommendations.
= Peer review visits, organised in ten clusters composed of three Member States each, commenced on 23 February 2004 and were completed on 8 July 2004.

= The Task Force has prepared an analysis of the functioning of the EU system and recommendations for the follow-up to the Peer Review. The report suggests timely and concrete actions to strengthen and improve the efficiency of the EU export control system, including the improvement of current exchange of denials and sensitive information among Member States. The recommendations issued by the Task Force require follow-up actions by Member States at national level and in some cases could lead to amendment of EC Regulation 1334/2000.

= Recommendations are based on the recognition that there is a need to adopt more pro-active EU and national approaches to the control of exports of dual-use items in order to avoid the risk of possible access to sensitive items by terrorists and other undesirable end-users in third countries. This pro-active approach should take into account the export control measures adopted by other key suppliers of dual-use items, preserve the single market for dual-use items and allow to take into account, at the level of implementation of export controls by Member States, the different situations in terms of volume of dual-use external trade.

- Setting up a programme of assistance to States in need of technical knowledge in the field of export control.

= A TACIS project for Russia to foster the development of effective Dual Use Export Control is under development. The Commission is developing an implementation scheme that will ensure the appropriate involvement of experts from the Member States.
Following preliminary contacts between the Chinese authorities and the Personal Representative, and a subsequent meeting between the Presidency, the PR and Chinese Officials, an ad-hoc meeting on export controls implementation is organised in China soon after the EU-China Summit, with the support of the European Commission and the participation of Member States experts having contributed to the Peer Review process. The objective of the Seminar is to define potential areas for cooperation and compare practices.

- Working to ensure that the Nuclear Suppliers' Group make the export of controlled nuclear and nuclear related items and technology conditional on ratifying and implementing the Additional Protocol.

- Discussions on this issue have continued in the CONOP Working Group. While there is consensus on the concept of making the Additional Protocol a condition of supply, there is as yet no agreement on the scope of those nuclear items, which should be covered in any such proposal within the NSG.

- Promoting in the regimes reinforced export controls with respect to intangible transfers of dual-use technology, as well as effective measures relating to brokering and transhipment issues.

- Work has been carried out in export control regimes on the strengthening of provisions concerning intangible transfers. Germany hosted a seminar on the issue of Intangible Technology Transfer, which will enable the sharing of best practices among export control regimes (14 June 2004 in Berlin). The Task Force on Peer Review has identified the need for further exchanges of practices with the view to adopt guidelines for implementation of the provisions of the Regulation on controls of intangible transfers of technology.
- Enhancing information exchange between Member States. Considering exchange of information between the EU Situation Centre and like-minded countries.

= The Situation Centre is reflecting on appropriate modalities.

5) Enhancing the security of proliferation-sensitive materials, equipment and expertise in the European Union against unauthorised access and risks of diversion.

- Improving the control of high activity radioactive sources. After the adoption of the Council Directive on the control of high activity sealed radioactive sources, Member States should ensure its fast implementation at national level. The EU should promote the adoption of similar provisions by third countries.

= Démarches to third countries have been carried out and the results have been shared with the IAEA.

- Enhancing, where appropriate the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities, including obsolete reactors and their spent fuel.

= Member States have ratified (and are therefore obliged to abide by the provisions of) the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials. Member States are supportive of the initiative to convene a conference for the amendment of the Convention with the objective of widening its scope.

= On a voluntary basis, interested EU Member States could invite the IAEA to conduct International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) and International Nuclear Security Advisory Service (INSServ) and, as a result of such evaluation, to make recommendations as appropriate.

= Improvement of the physical protection of a nuclear facility in the Russian Federation is the objective of the Joint Action which was adopted by the Council on 22 November 2004.
- Strengthening of EC and national legislation and control over pathogenic microorganisms and toxins (both in Member States and in Acceding Countries) where necessary. Co-operation between public health, occupational health and safety and the non-proliferation structures should be reinforced. The creation of an EU Centre for Disease Control and the task that it would perform should be analysed.

The EC Treaty identifies most public health issues as competencies of the Member States. The Health Security Committee and relevant working groups focus to keep a balance between the requirements to ensure “domestic controls” by bio-security measures and the general requirements for public health, such as diagnostic needs, surveillance, epidemiological activities, outbreak controls and response. Bio-safety measures to protect the environment and the working place are regulated by EU legislation. The Council decided the setting up of the EU Centre for Prevention and Control of Diseases to be based in Stockholm on 12 December 2003. Its operational start is anticipated as of 1st May 2005.

- Fostering dialogue with industry to reinforce awareness. An initiative will be taken in order to promote firstly, dialogue with EU industry with a view to raising the level of awareness of problems related to the WMD and secondly, dialogue between EU and US industry, in particular in the biological sector.

The Commission has, with regard to dialogue with the EU Biotech industry, considered that, in line with practice recognised in the context of implementation of Regulation 1334/2000 (in particular under Article 4 regarding the role of the dialogue between governments and exporter), that it would be appropriate to start with an assessment of the modalities and results of the EU Member States national contacts with their industry before carrying out an exercise at EU level. The Commission would like also to draw attention to the importance of raising awareness of the research sector as a matter of priority, given the significant activity in this sector.
The Task Force on Peer Reviews has made detailed proposals to strengthen the interaction between each Member State and national exporters of dual use items (including researchers and academics) as well as between EC and EU federations of exporters. The Commission Services are having contacts with exporters to examine possible means to enhance interaction at EU level and will report to the WP on Dual Use Goods.

6) *Strengthening identification, control and interception of illegal trafficking*¹

- Adoption by Member States of common policies related to criminal sanctions for illegal export, brokering and smuggling of WMD-related material.

= In June 2004, the European Council adopted a text in which it invited the relevant Council bodies, within the framework of Justice and Home Affairs, to review the appropriate political and legal instruments towards the adoption of common policies related to criminal sanctions for illegal export, brokering and smuggling of WMD related material. The CONOP Working Group is having a preliminary discussion on a possible follow-up to the declaration.

- Considering measures aimed at controlling the transit and transhipment of sensitive materials.

¹ Due account to be taken of the fact that nuclear materials are fully covered, at EU level, by the Euratom Treaty).
A draft EC regulation amending the Community Customs Code to ensure enhanced safety and improvement of risk analysis (by means of summary declarations to be delivered by electronic means before goods arrive or depart) is expected to be adopted by the Council early in 2005. In addition, the Commission is collecting Member States national legislation to examine their scope and is considering a possible amendment of Regulation 1334/2000 so as to ensure that a definition of these operations is provided and that all Member States can stop a transit or transhipment of dual-use items on the basis of risk analysis or intelligent information sharing.

- Supporting international initiatives aimed at the identification, control and interception of illegal shipments.

- Several EU Member States hosted exercises in the context of the PSI to which all EU Member States, Commission services and Office of the PR were invited.

- The seventh PSI Operational Experts Working Group Meeting took place in Oslo on 5 and 6 August. It was preceded by a Container Workshop held in Copenhagen on 3-4 August. Representatives from the Office of the PR and the Commission attended the meetings as part of the delegation of the Netherlands.

**B) Promoting a stable international and regional environment**

1) Reinforcing EU co-operative threat reduction programmes with other countries, targeted at support for disarmament, control and security of sensitive materials, facilities and expertise.

- Prolonging the Programme on disarmament and non-proliferation in the Russian Federation beyond June 2004.
A Joint Action for the support of the physical protection of a nuclear site in the Russian Federation was adopted by the Council on 22 November 2004. The objective of this Joint Action is to support a project for the implementation of physical protection measures at the Bochvar Institute in Moscow of the Russian Federal Agency for Atomic Energy. The Joint Action has duration of 3 years and will be implemented by the German Government.

- Increasing EU co-operative threat reduction funding in the light of financial perspectives beyond 2006. The creation of a specific Community budget line for non-proliferation and disarmament of WMD should be envisaged. Member States should be encouraged to contribute also on a national basis. These efforts should include measures aimed at reinforcing the control of the non-proliferation of WMD related expertise, science and technology.

a) On the budget

The 2005 EC budget: The European Parliament, in its 1st reading in October 2004 of the draft 2005 Community budget, did not recommend the creation of a specific Community budget line for non-proliferation and disarmament of WMD. The Parliament did, however, propose to re-introduce an amount of 3 Mio. into budget line 19 0212 for a Pilot Project, the purpose of which is to « investigate measures by which the EC instruments can support and reinforce CFSP actions against the proliferation of WMD and actions to combat the proliferation of light weapons » and illicit arms trafficking » and the « result of the feasibility study would be used into a future legal base ». The Pilot Project under the 2004 EC budget line 19 0212, also with an amount of 3 Mio Euro, is being implemented by the Commission. The CONOP and CODUN Working Parties are and will continue to be informed on the state of play. The competent Council bodies are now examining the Parliament’s proposal for the 2005 budget.
The 2005 CFSP budget: In the context of the 2nd reading of the 2005 budget, the European Parliament and the Council have agreed that the CFSP budget for 2005 should remain at the same level as in 2004, i.e. 62.6 Mio Euro.


b) On the issue of facilitating the conversion of WMD expertise =

- Setting up of a programme of assistance to States in need of technical knowledge in order to ensure the security and control of sensitive material, facilities and expertise.

= The Personal Representative has put forward suggestions in the context of her lists of priorities.

2) Integrate the WMD non-proliferation concerns into the EU’s political, diplomatic and economic activities and programmes, aiming at the greatest effectiveness.

- Mainstreaming non-proliferation policies into the EU’s wider relations with third countries, in accordance to the General Affairs and External Relations Council conclusions of 17 November 2003, inter alia by introducing the non-proliferation clause in agreements with third countries.

= The Personal Representative has continued to participate in several Council geographical working group meetings, in order to promote awareness to the WMD Strategy as well as to the insertion of the non-proliferation clause in agreements with third countries.
The non-proliferation clause has been inserted in the PCA agreement with Tajikistan (signed in Luxembourg on 11 October 2004) and the draft SAA with Albania. Negotiations have been completed with Syria and the text of the Association Agreement, containing a WMD clause closely modelled on the 2003 GAERC conclusions, was initialled in Brussels on 19 October 2004. Discussions are under way in the context of negotiations of an interregional association agreement with Mercosur, a FTA with the GCC countries and the review of the ACP-EU Cotonou agreement. A parallel article 24 and 38 TEU instrument to the community agreement with Pakistan is incorporating a non-proliferation clause. Negotiations have not yet started.

In parallel, the draft Action Plans negotiated with countries of Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean in the context of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) contain WMD chapters the language of which is based on key elements of the WMD clause. Such drafts Action Plans are being negotiated for the moment with Ukraine, Moldova, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia and the Palestinian Authority.

The Personal Representative has also started a number of informal visits in different regions of the world in order to establish contacts, raise awareness about the EU WMD Strategy and convey back in Brussels some preliminary views about possible areas of co-operation. Following a July visit by the PR in the Near-East and the Mediterranean, an initiative was proposed to organise in early 2005, in cooperation with the Presidency and the European Commission, a workshop on non-proliferation in the context of the security volet of the Barcelona Process. The principle of organising such a meeting was endorsed by Euromed Ministers at their meeting in The Hague on November 29th.

Increasing Union efforts to resolve regional conflicts by using all the instruments available to it, notably within the framework of CFSP and ESDP.

Council and Commission to implement this policy on a general level.
C) Co-operating closely with the United States and other key partners

1) Ensuring adequate follow up to the EU-US declaration on non-proliferation issued at the June 2003 Summit.

   = Comparison on EC and US inventories of assistance programmes in the field of border management, border security and export control has been carried out and led to the conclusion that programmes are rather complementary.

   = Co-operation in export control regimes and in the implementation of the G8 Global Partnership will continue.

   = EU-US dialogue meetings as well as contacts between the US authorities and the Commission and/or the HR’s Personal Representative on WMD have assisted in identifying new areas of co-operation.

   = A new Joint Statement was adopted at the EU-US June Summit of 28 June 2004. The Summit provided an action plan for further co-operation in the non-proliferation field.

2) Ensuring co-ordination and, where appropriate, joint initiatives with other key partners.

   = The Presidency and the troika have used all opportunities to advise third countries of the WMD Strategy and its provisions at both working and political level.

   = The Personal Representative's has paid informal visits to Moscow, Tokyo, and Beijing and had informal talks with Canadian authorities.

   = A Joint EU-Japan Declaration on Disarmament and non-proliferation was adopted at the 13th EU-Japan Summit on 22 June 2004, indicating priority areas for specific co-operation.
A Joint Declaration on non-proliferation and Arms control will be agreed at the 8 December 2004 EU-China Summit. As a practical example of EU-China co-operation, an ad hoc meeting of export controls experts is being organised and will take place shortly after the Summit, with the participation of the Peer Review Task Force as well as other EU Member States’ national experts. A cooperation programme could follow this meeting in 2005 (e.g. training).

Ad hoc meetings with Canada as well as an exercise of comparing notes in the field of assistance programmes to third countries have been undertaken.

D) Developing the necessary framework within the Union

1) Organising a six monthly debate on the implementation of the EU Strategy at the External Relations Council.

Presidency is scheduling the debate at the December General Affairs and External Relations Council.

2) Setting up, as agreed in Thessaloniki, a unit which would function as a monitoring centre, entrusted with the monitoring of the consistent implementation of the EU Strategy and the collection of information and intelligence, in liaison with the Situation Centre. This monitoring centre would be set up at the Council Secretariat and fully associate the Commission.

The issue, the scope of mission and possible modalities of a monitoring centre is still to be considered on a basis of a paper established by the Office of the Personal Representative, in contact with the Commission services.

E) Exchange of information and analysis with NATO

Reference to exchange of information and analysis with NATO, within the agreed framework arrangements, is made in the EU’s WMD Strategy in chapter II paragraph 28.
In implementation of paragraph 28 of the EU’s WMD Strategy and following the conclusions of the 10 March 2004 PSC/NAC meeting, staff to staff contacts have continued to take place.
LIST OF PRIORITIES
FOR A COHERENT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EU WMD STRATEGY

OBJECTIVES

By adopting the Strategy against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the European Council has expressed its will that the EU should become a major player in this area on the international scene. The prominence of non-proliferation on the agenda of the G8, and even more the adoption of UNSC Resolution 1540 on 28 April 2004, confirm the importance of this issue. The UNSC Resolution, which was adopted by unanimity, highlights the need for the international community to take action against the proliferation of WMD. By implementing the EU WMD Strategy, we have already anticipated on a number of elements of the UNSCR. But its adoption should also be understood as an encouragement to step up the implementation of our Strategy and in particular to identify priorities for action to be taken, both through diplomatic and other means at the disposal of the EU.

The EU, as any other player, has only limited means and resources. It is therefore of the utmost importance that all resources are allocated in the most effective way and on the basis of agreed priorities. At this stage action is often taken on a case-by-case basis, without an overall approach and using a whole range of different diplomatic and financial resources (Diplomatic action within CFSP, Member States' resources, CFSP budget, FED, Community programmes). A new dimension has been added through the “New Neighbourhood” and the “Strategic Partnership for the Middle East” and related Action Plans. A clearer and more regular identification of priorities within the framework of the EU WMD Strategy and in particular its Chapter III is therefore needed. This could be achieved through the adoption by the Council/PSC of a “list of priorities for a coherent implementation of the WMD Strategy”, for a medium-term period (until 2008), which would be updated every six months.
In line with a request by PSC in January 2004, the Personal Representative of the High Representative, has prepared, in consultation with the Commission services, an outline for such a list of priorities, which could provide a basis for a discussion at political and technical level. It identifies which EU action should be undertaken as a priority in order to implement the EU WMD Strategy. Specific proposals could then be put forward in accordance with relevant procedures, with a view to adoption by the Council.

The priorities, which are based on the measures contained in Chapter III of the Strategy, are listed in the annexes: Annex I contains priorities which do not require specific EU funding, Annex II contains those which require such funding. The purpose is to give a preliminary overview of the resources, which are, or should be, available and of the foreseeable timeframe. This is without prejudice to the competencies, which might be involved (Community competence, action under CFSP, third Pillar, Member States). The European Commission shall obviously play its role as provided for by the relevant Treaty provisions. Once these priorities for the implementation of WMD Strategy have been agreed, the Personal Representative is prepared to present them to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the European Parliament, which is to be involved as appropriate.

Annex II demonstrates the practical difficulties in relation to the implementation of the WMD Strategy, due in particular to the large variety of sources for the financial means and the different procedures to be followed to mobilise them. Since the procedure for the approval of next year's budget and the discussions on the financial perspectives for the next budgetary cycle are currently underway, the financing modalities of the measures contained in Annex II are simply indicative and based on current situation. All this may need to be reviewed in the light of decisions taken on the budgetary questions.

The Personal Representative for WMD non-proliferation could be asked to present, in parallel with the progress report on the implementation of the WMD Strategy, and in consultation with Commission services, an updated draft list of priorities every six months, for discussion in the competent Council bodies. This could also provide the basis for a review of the WMD Strategy after a reasonable period of implementation (for example, end of 2005).
**P.M.** While this list of priorities aims at providing a comprehensive outline of the initiatives needed in the field of non-proliferation of WMD, other actions are carried out by the EU to combat the spread of Small Arms and Light Weapons as well as of landmines. The global picture of actions in the non-proliferation and disarmament field should be kept in mind, when discussing the way ahead in relation to WMD.
1. **Support in favour of multilateralism and universalisation of international treaties and agreements (see also Annex II, point 1)**

The EU will continue to work for the universalisation and, when necessary, strengthening of the main treaties and agreements. Now that UNSC Resolution 1540 has been adopted, the EU should promote compliance with this Resolution by all UN Member States and appropriate implementation within the EU, including through the adoption, where appropriate, of new legal instruments. The EU will also continue to foster the role of the UN Security Council (UNSC).

With a view to the 2005 NPT Review conference, an in-depth discussion should be conducted on how the EU could contribute. The discussion on the issue of compliance will play an important role. The EU should promote action aimed at starting negotiations of an international agreement on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons (Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty) in the CD. The Institute for Security Studies could organise before the end of 2004 a workshop, the results of which could prepare the ground for in-depth work by Council bodies.

**Action:**

a) Political/diplomatic activity in support of UNSC, of compliance with UNSCR 1540 and of universal adherence to NPT (including IAEA safeguards agreement and the Additional Protocol), CWC, BTWC, CTBT, HCOC.

b) Organisation by the ISS of a workshop on NPT before end of 2004.

c) Co-ordination of EU Member States' positions with a view to the NPT 2005 Review Conference; if possible, adoption of a Common Position taking into account the EU/WMD Strategy. Ensuring co-ordination and, where appropriate, implementation of the Common Position throughout the Conference.

Some of these actions would be more effective, if supported by parallel or subsequent initiatives implying deployment of financial means.
2. Implementing effective export controls

- Within the EU

A report by the Task Force further to the completion of the visits in the framework of the Peer Review of national export control systems contains recommendations of a general nature which address potential weaknesses of the EU system. Among the recommendations of a general nature is the urgent need to improve the exchange of information, in particular with regard to denials of export authorisations.

**Action:** The recommendations contained in the report of Task Force should be implemented without delay.

**Resources:** Experts from Member States and EU institutions; costs arising from the recommendations to be determined.

**Duration:** Ongoing: Possible follow-up in terms of adaptation of EU legal instruments for period 2004-2005; if necessary, new verification between 2006-2008.
- **Outside the EU** (see also Annex II, point 2)

The EU will continue to promote strengthening of export control regimes and adherence to their guidelines, as appropriate. Member States could also contribute to this objective by raising awareness on the importance of export controls in third countries, in particular, in the framework of the New Neighbourhood Strategy.

The EU will need concerted and determined action to secure the early membership of its new Members in these regimes.

*Action:* Diplomatic/political.

*Resources:* Diplomatic/political resources of EU institutions and Member States.


3. **Strengthening the control of WMD related equipment and materials in transit and/or in transhipment**

Controlling the transit of WMD-related equipment and materials remains a major challenge for the implementation of an effective non-proliferation policy. Means should be explored in order to strengthen the ability of Member States to inspect and, where appropriate, to intercept cargoes, which are in transit through their territory and which allegedly carry WMD related equipment and materials. Should such an examination confirm the existence of legal loopholes, which do not allow for the appropriate measures to be taken, the advisability of a new legal instrument could be studied at EU level with the objective to empower all Member States to inspect and seize suspicious cargoes.

*Action:* - Examination of options for an efficient and proportionate control of transit and transhipments.

- Identification of possible need for a new EU legal instrument, including with regard to criminal sanctions.
4. **Criminal sanctions for the proliferation of sensitive goods and technologies**

The EU WMD Strategy suggests to adopt common policies related to criminal sanctions for illegal export, brokering and smuggling of WMD-related material. In this context, the European Council, in a declaration on criminal sanctions of 18 June 2004, invited Council bodies to review the appropriate political and legal instruments, including possible actions within the framework of Justice and Home Affairs, that would further the adoption of concrete steps. The Council bodies and the Commission should evaluate the existing sanctions under current Member States' legislation or regulations and, if necessary, make recommendations for their convergence.

Such steps will also contribute to fulfil the requirements of UNSC Resolution 1540. This issue will have to be kept under review.

**Action:**
- Evaluate the existing sanctions under current Member States' legislation or regulations, in particular in light of Member State's national reports to UNSC under UNSC Resolution 1540, and, if necessary, make recommendations for their convergence.
- Review the appropriate political and legal instruments, including possible actions within the framework of Justice and Home Affairs, that would further the adoption of concrete steps.

**Resources:** Member States, in providing information and expertise on their respective rules and regulations. European officials and Council bodies, including Commission representatives, to assess.

**Resources:**
- Work to be carried out by EU officials, together with Member States. Costs to be estimated.
- National resources for implementation

**Duration:** 2004 – 2005.
5. Reinforcing nuclear security

- **Within the EU** (for outside the EU, see Annex II, point 5)

All Member States have ratified the Convention of Physical Protection of nuclear materials and are in favour of strengthening the convention by extending its scope of application to domestic transport, storage and use.

On a voluntary basis, interested EU Member States could invite the IAEA to conduct International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) and International Nuclear Security Advisory Service (INSServ) and, as a result of such evaluation, to make recommendations as appropriate.

**Action:** Voluntary invitation by interested Member States to IAEA.

**Resources:** No EU resources needed; should IPPAS and INSServ lead to recommendations, Member States willing to put them into practice should resort to national resources.

**Duration:** 2004-2005.
6. **Strengthening BTWC**

a) **Expert group on BTWC compliance.**

The EU Strategy is quite ambitious with regard to non-proliferation of biological weapons. It says that the EU must find ways to strengthen compliance with the BTWC and that a group of governmental experts to give advice on how this could be done could be established. Work has already started under NL Presidency to prepare the 2006 BTCW Conference. A group of experts could be convened in early 2005 to further work on this matter in order to develop specific suggestions to strengthen the BTWC, in particular as regards compliance, with a view to the Review Conference. These experts should also draw from the important work already carried out in the UN framework over the last years. In addition, the expert group could also be useful in the context of the development of bio-security and bio-safety standards. Council bodies should therefore agree before the end of the year the composition of such a group, mandate, timeframe, etc.

b) **International verification capability.**

The need for an international verification capability regarding biological weapons has been identified in the WMD strategy as an EU objective. A discussion on ways to strengthen the BTWC and compliance with it could be initiated by the UNSC with the objective to establish a UN roster of experts on which the UNSC and/or the UN Secretary General could draw. EU Member States could contribute to such an initiative by providing experts to be included in such a list. As a prerequisite for such a system, the necessary preparatory work will have to be undertaken (i.e. regular training of experts, availability of equipment, etc.).

**Action:**  

a) Setting up a group of governmental experts on BTWC.  
b) Promoting within the UN framework the drawing-up of a roster of experts for verification of compliance in the biological weapons area.

**Resources:**  
a) Council bodies.  
b) Member States to make available experts to be included in such a roster.
7. Promoting CWC challenge inspections

Following the Vienna seminar in June 2004 on challenge inspections and taking into account the recommendations subsequently developed in CODUN and in the Hague, CODUN should monitor the discussion of the issue in the relevant OPCW bodies and prepare an assessment for the PSC on possible further action by the EU to promote such inspections.

EU Action could also include, in the medium term, initiatives, which would require funding. These could be covered by a new Joint Action in support of OPCW.

**Action:** - Work in OPCW bodies, CODUN and PSC.

**Resources:** - Council bodies.

**Duration:** - Second half of 2004, and 2005.
8. Developing an approach to other regions

a) **India, Pakistan** (see also Annex II, point 8 a).

Under the EU Common Position 2003/805/CFSP, EU policy with regard to India and Pakistan is consistent with UNSC Resolution 1172 of 1998: our final objective is the accession of India and Pakistan to all relevant international instruments, in particular the NPT, the CTBT and HCoC. However, in the meantime, these countries should at least be encouraged to reassure the international community that they do not contribute to proliferation. As an initial step into that direction, the EU should encourage both India and Pakistan to adopt in parallel transparency measures designed to improve their proliferation credentials towards the international community. This could be done by contributing to the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1540, through enhanced dialogue with the export control regimes, and through the adoption of other transparency measures (e.g., in the form of a formal communication to the IAEA on their policies and practices in the area of export controls).

Should these transparency measures develop further into the conclusion of a formal arrangement in the area of safeguards between the two countries and IAEA (IAEA already carries out some safeguards activities in selected nuclear facilities in India and Pakistan), the EU should make clear by all means that this cannot be construed in any way as a de facto recognition of a status of nuclear weapons state.

**Action:** Political/diplomatic means in order to promote the adoption by India and Pakistan of transparency measures.

**Resources:** Diplomatic resources of EU institutions and Member States.

**Duration:** 2004-2008.
b) **ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)** (see also Annex II, point 8 b)

The EU is a "participant" in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) which is a political and security forum in which both ASEAN countries as well as its 14 dialogue partners US, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Russia, Japan and China, Republic of Korea, DPRK, India, Pakistan, Mongolia, Papua New Guinea take part. This forum discusses political and security issues in the framework of seminars and workshops and at an annual ministerial meeting. Exchanges of views on non-proliferation issues constitute a major part of its work.

*Action:* Political/diplomatic initiatives designed to promote non-proliferation in South East and South Asia. Enhanced EU participation in non-proliferation and export controls seminars organised within ARF (notably by Japan and Canada).

*Resources:* Diplomatic means from Member States and EU Institutions.


9. **Mainstreaming the non-proliferation policies into the EU’s wider relations with third countries**

Negotiations with Syria have been completed under the Association Agreement, which has been initialled on October 19, 2004. The text includes a substantive WMD clause with a significant partner in this area.

The WMD clause adopted with Syria provides in article 4 para 2 that "the parties agree to co-operate and to contribute to this end by (...) setting up effective national systems of export, transit and end-use controls (...)". In this context, we could consider to prepare for the implementation of this provision, by reviewing the current Syrian system and, on the basis e.g. of a specific HOM's report, proposing concrete areas of co-operation.
We are also working on:

- the inclusion of the WMD clause in the current negotiations of the Interregional Association Agreement with Mercosur, the Free Trade Agreement with the Gulf Cooperation Council, and the revised Cotonou agreement with the 78 ACP countries;

- the inclusion of the WMD clause in the future individual Framework Agreements on Partnership and Cooperation with countries of South-East Asia, notably Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei.

- the inclusion of the WMD clause in further Stabilisation and Association Agreements in the Balkans, following the precedent of Albania.

- the conclusion of a “parallel” instrument under article 24 TEU with Pakistan containing a WMD clause and the same possibly with China in parallel to a new community cooperation agreement.

- The inclusion of a WMD section covering the same elements as the “model clause” in the Action Plans with all partner countries under the European Neighbourhood Policy (Ukraine and Moldova, Israel, Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, and subsequently all other partner countries covered by ENP)

It would be advisable to proceed to an evaluation of the implementation of the policy approach adopted by the Council in November 2003 after a reasonable period of experience.

**Action:** Evaluation of the implementation of the policy approach by Council bodies.

**Resources:** Council bodies.

**Duration** First half of 2005.
PRIORITY REQUIRING EU FUNDING

(PM: Financial estimates given are indicative and do not prejudice the prerogatives of the Budgetary Authority). ¹

1. Support in favour of universalisation and multilateralism.

In addition to political/diplomatic activity, the EU could and support, where appropriate:

- workshops and conferences organised by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in order to promote accession by States not yet party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), including the conclusion of IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements and the Additional Protocol;

- workshops and conferences organised by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in order to promote accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC);

- workshops to promote accession to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and to the Hague Code of Conduct against the Proliferation of Ballistic Missiles (HCOC);

- as well as workshops and conferences organised by the UN Office or UNIDIR in Geneva, in the context of the CD. The offer of assistance in the drafting of laws for compliance with the Treaties and in the drafting of the required initial and subsequent declarations could also contribute to facilitate the accession of additional states. In this context, the EU could support the establishment of a secure electronic information system for the HCOC.

¹ The Commission notes that the financial estimates given in Annex II can only be indicative and do not prejudice the results of the Commission’s programming of first pillar instruments. The Commission further notes that the estimates cannot prejudice the availability of resources under the CFSP budget.
A draft Joint Action on support to OPCW has already been circulated. Another EU priority could be support to BTWC, namely by assisting countries in the drafting of legislation. This could be achieved through a roster of legal experts similar to the one set up by OPCW for CW. Since there is no international organisation for BW, the EU should ensure that such a roster of legal experts’ is supported by a group of scientific experts to be set up by the EU.

**Action:**
- Participation of EU representatives in seminars and workshops promoting universalisation of NPT, including IAEA safeguards agreements and the Additional Protocol, CWC, BTWC and the HCOC.
- Joint Action in support of OPCW with a view to promoting universalisation of CWC and providing assistance to countries parties or acceding to CWC (to be renewed for 3 or 4 years).
- Renewal of Joint action in support of IAEA (until 2008).
- Joint Action in support of BTWC: assistance in the drafting of legislation.

**Resources:**
- ± 2 million € per annum for the Joint Action in support of OPCW.
- ± 3 million € per annum for the Joint Action in support of IAEA.
- 200,000 € per annum (1,000,000 € over 5 years), Joint Action BTWC, assistance in drafting legislation.
- 50,000 € for setting-up a secure electronic information system for the HCOC.

**Duration:**
2. **Implementing effective export controls.**

- **Assistance to and co-operation with third countries.**

The substantial legislative corpus that the EU has in the area of export controls, and in addition the lessons learned and the best practices identified on the occasion of the Peer Review, allows the EU to be in a very good position to support third countries in the development of good export controls systems.

For that purpose, the EU should provide technical assistance in this field. The team of experts set up for the Peer Review could be moreover targeted to co-ordinate and/or participate in these assistance programmes. Priority areas for the EU could be the Balkans and ENP (European Neighbourhood Policy) partners in Eastern Europe, the Middle East and North Africa. In addition, countries hosting important shipment hubs could also be included. Among the three projects under discussion for the support of the IAEA, one is devoted to enhancing the export controls against trafficking of nuclear materials in the areas of Balkans, Central Asia and Caucasus. This project should be renewed for two-four years in order to cover all the countries of the areas concerned in the order of priority.

Most ENP partner countries are aware of their need to establish or improve export, transit and end-use controls and several have indicated a readiness to co-operate with the EU in this area. Ukraine has already approached a number of Member States in this respect. The EU could develop assistance e.g. trough “administrative twinning” programmes which could be implemented in co-operation with one or two Member States.

Most of these countries also receive assistance from the EU on the basis of community programmes, e.g. on border management. Where possible, these programmes could be expanded in order to include an export control element.

Russia has been identified in the WMD Strategy as a key partner for co-operation. The idea of a programme in the area of export controls had already been envisaged in the framework of the Russia Joint Action. This programme is currently envisaged in the context of the TACIS programme.
China is a country with which the EU should, under the terms of the European Security Strategy, develop a strategic partnership. It has recently issued a Security Concept and a Non-proliferation White Book, which are fully consistent with the European Security Strategy and the WMD Strategy. China has decided to apply the guidelines and the lists of the export control regimes and has just been admitted as member of NSG. In order to ensure that China meets all the requirements to become member of other export control regimes and can become an effective partner of the EU in the fight against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, one or two ad hoc meetings on export controls and exchange of best practices could be organised. The team of the Peer Review, complemented by some national experts from other Member States, could participate in these ad hoc meetings.

As a follow-up to the ad hoc meeting described above, China would be interested in a training course for their export control officials. Such a training programme could be set up by the EU in 2005 and should aim at involving Chinese officials from all provinces.

With regard to the implementation of assistance programmes in the area of export controls, there is not only a need to make the required financial means available but also to ensure the availability of adequate human resources since the relevant expertise is a crucial element for the successful implementation of projects in that field. Since the implementation of export controls is a national responsibility, appropriate experts can only be found in Member States.

**Action:**
- Assistance programmes to third countries, with special emphasis on the ENP partner countries.
- A new Joint Action on a co-operation in the field of non-proliferation and disarmament of WMD with Ukraine.
- Joint Action for a training programme (follow-up to ad hoc meeting) for China.
- Joint Action IAEA (Balkans, Central Asia, Caucasus).
3. **Reinforcing nuclear security**

- **Assistance to third countries.**

The EU needs to support the enhancement of nuclear security in third countries.

Two of the three projects in support of IAEA deal with physical protection of nuclear facilities and protection of highly radioactive sources in countries in the Balkans, Central Asia and Caucasus. A third project is designed to assist countries in combating the illicit trafficking in nuclear and radioactive materials, which will also contribute to improve the overall nuclear security situation. Given the limited budget at our disposal in 2004, the Joint Action should be renewed for a minimum of two years in order to cover all the nuclear facilities and all countries in the regions concerned that are in need of stronger nuclear security measures.

The draft Joint Action approved by the COREPER on 10 November 2004 provides for a project aiming at improving the physical protection of nuclear sites in Russia (see Annex I of document 14324/04).

**Action:**

a) Improving nuclear security in the Balkans, Central Asia and Caucasus through IAEA Joint Action.

b) Improving nuclear security in Russia through the Joint Action for the support of the physical protection of a nuclear site in the Russian Federation.
4. Contributing to disarmament and dismantlement of WMD

The experience gained through the implementation of the Joint Actions for the Russian Federation in the area of disposition of ex-weapons nuclear material, destruction of chemical weapons and dismantlement of facilities suggests that a prolongation of this Joint Action should be sought. At the same time, additional activities could be envisaged in order to cover a wider geographical scope: other states of the Former Soviet Union, but also, according to new developments, states in North Africa, Middle East, etc. In this area, co-operation with IAEA and OPCW is crucial.

One priority could be to support the destruction of chemical weapons in Albania. This priority is based on the geographical proximity as well as on the weakness of state control in Albania. Such a support would be politically significant, since Albania is a neighbouring country.

Action: Supporting dismantling of CW in Albania through a new Joint Action-
Joint Actions supporting disarmament and dismantlement activities in the Russian Federation, in the NIS countries, and in North African and Middle Eastern countries.

Resources: Joint Action Albania, 500.000 € per year, (2,5 million € for 5 years) - To be determined.

5. Facilitating the conversion of WMD expertise.

To fight against illegal trafficking of materials and technology and to dismantle WMD facilities is not enough to prevent the development of new programmes. Following the discovery that covert WMD programmes have been carried out in some states, it is logical to think that there is a need to absorb substantial scientific knowledge and to channel the expertise of scientists formerly directed to WMD programmes, to civilian applications. The EU could, in principle, study and evaluate the setting up of an institute (as is already the case with the ISTC in Moscow and the USTC in Kiev, but aimed at employing scientists from other regions) which would promote the use of critical expertise and skills in peaceful applications. We should start examining and assessing possible needs in Libya, Iran and Iraq.

However, funding for such an institute would require substantial funds for an extended period (8 to 10 years). In the light of the ISTC experience, 150 million € would be required to set up a new institute over a minimum 5-year period. Therefore, subject to a deeper study and evaluation, it seems more appropriate to envisage instead the creation of a mechanism to allocate critical expertise and skills to European public and private industries, possibly through a scheme by which R&D funds from the industrial and private sector could be used to employ former WMD scientists.

**Action:**
- Study and examination of setting up of a scientific institute for conversion of WMD scientists coming from regions other than Former Soviet Union.
- Creating a mechanism to allocate critical expertise and skills to European public and private industries or research centres.

**Resources:**
- The creation of a mechanism to allocate scientists would imply relatively limited resources.

**Duration:**
- For an institute, 5-10 years.
- For a mechanism, 3 years.
6. Developing the security volet of the Barcelona process

The Union has consistently been in favour of a WMD-free-zone as part of a broader effort to promote security and stability in the Middle East and the Mediterranean basin. The Union has promoted the creation of the Barcelona process as a platform for stability, co-operation and dialogue between Euromed partners on both sides of the Mediterranean. However progress on the security volet of this process has been slow and difficult. The recent progress in negotiations with Syria as well as developments in Libya and Iran offer a unique opportunity to launch a new discussion on security issues with partners in the Mediterranean/Middle East, also within the Barcelona process. This could be the starting point for a new process of confidence building, which could be guided, inter alia, by the final objective of a WMD-and their means of delivery systems free zone in the Middle East. More specifically, consideration should be given to the possibility of using the MEDA programme to support the implementation of WMD-related commitments in Association Agreements and ENP Action Plans, in particular the establishment and development of export and end use control systems.

**Action:**
- Organising regular targeted seminars/meetings on non-proliferation (e.g. to promote vision of a WMD-free-zone) as confidence building measures.
- Organising a first workshop/Ad hoc group on non-proliferation and disarmament to start an incremental process among arms control representatives from Barcelona Parties, Early 2005.
- Expanded attention to export controls and border management assistance in the MEDA programme.

**Resources:**
- Some 100.000 € from CFSP budget for seminars/meetings.
- MEDA.

**Duration:**
7. Developing an approach to other regions.

- **Middle East.**

In the context of the EU's Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East, we should be prepared to consider cooperation and assistance programmes tailored to each specific situation as part of possible cooperation projects identified in the course of the present survey conducted on the basis of HOMs' reports requested in countries of the region. In the context of the implementation of the EU Strategy against proliferation of WMD, Iran, Iraq and the GCC States could be of major interest. The Mediterranean countries are already covered by the abovementioned co-operation in the context of the Barcelona process and ENP policy.

- **India**

EU-India relations have recently been upgraded to a strategic partnership. Within this framework, dialogue on non-proliferation should take place. Efforts could be undertaken in order to assist India to develop and introduce a state of the art system for nuclear material accountancy. Such a system would help notably to certify that their nuclear materials have not been diverted to third countries. The EU could, in close consultation with the IAEA, examine the provision of assistance in form of expertise, equipment and training in the area of nuclear material accountancy.

 Assistance in the area of export controls would, in addition to the nuclear field, also have to cover the chemical, biological and missile field (c.f. point 2 above)

**Action:**

- Dialogue on non-proliferation

- Assistance for the improvement of the Indian nuclear material accountancy and export control systems.

**Resources:**

- Up to 5 million € for nuclear material accountancy and export control assistance.
**Duration:** 3 - 5 years.

**Pakistan**

The proposed EU-Pakistan Trade and Co-operation Agreement includes provisions to counter WMD proliferation. Within this framework, dialogue on non-proliferation should take place. Efforts could be undertaken in order to assist Pakistan to develop and introduce a state of the art system for nuclear material accountancy. Such a system would help notably to certify that their nuclear materials have not been diverted to third countries. The EU could, in close consultation with the IAEA, examine the provision of assistance in form of expertise, equipment and training in the area of nuclear material accountancy.

Assistance in the area of export controls would, in addition to the nuclear field, also have to cover the chemical, biological and missile field (c.f. point 2 above)

**Action:**

- Dialogue on non-proliferation

- Assistance for the improvement of Pakistan’s nuclear material accountancy and export control systems.

**Resources:**

- Up to 5 million € for nuclear material accountancy and export control assistance.

**Duration:** 3 - 5 years.