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Statement by
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on behalf of the European Union

Other Weapons of Mass Destruction

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(Check against delivery)
Cluster: Other Weapons of Mass Destruction

I am speaking on behalf of the European Union and the Accession Countries Bulgaria and Romania. The Candidate Countries Turkey and Croatia, the Countries of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidates, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, and the EFTA country Norway, member of the European Economic Area, as well as Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova align themselves with this declaration.

1. As we set out in our General Statement the EU supports and promotes the universal ratification of and adherence to the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. These Treaties have an essential role in countering the threat of chemical and biological weapons, and together with other key multilateral agreements provide a basis for the international community's disarmament and non-proliferation efforts, which contribute to international confidence, stability and peace, including the fight against terrorism. We therefore take this opportunity to urge States who are not parties to them to adhere to these treaties and join the mainstream. The EU will continue to stress the importance of these treaties, and promote universal adherence, in its relations with third countries. And we will continue to urge all those States who are parties to the treaties to take all necessary steps to implement their obligations under both these treaties and UNSCR 1540, including in relation to enacting penal legislation. The EU stands ready to assist when requested to do so.

2. The EU is continuing to pursue its Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, which was adopted in December 2003. Since then we have identified concrete actions in support of promoting and reinforcing the CWC and the BTWC. We will continue to seek practical ways to pursue the implementation of this strategy. We are also committed to implementing the EU's Common Position (2003/805/CFSP) on the universalisation and reinforcement of multilateral agreements in the field of weapons of mass destruction and means of delivery.

3. The EU believes that control of emerging technology will continue to be an issue of considerable concern in the area of CBW. The potential for illicit use of such technologies has been specifically mentioned in scientific literature and highlights the need to monitor technological developments, in respect of emerging processes and related equipment, with potential use in CBW programmes. We intend to be active in this area.
4. The EU underlines the relevance of the G8 Global Partnership initiatives, including the employment of weapons scientists, for the WMD disarmament and non-proliferation process.

5. The EU acknowledges the progress made towards the universalisation of the CWC, a unique disarmament and non-proliferation instrument. We are equally supportive of the organisation that is ensuring the implementation of the CWC and compliance with its demands, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). In November 2004 EU Member States agreed a Joint Action in support of the activities of the OPCW. This is currently being implemented. It is providing financial support to the Organisation in the areas of universality, national implementation and well as international co-operation in the field of chemical activities. We hope to renew this successful Joint Action and provide further financial support for the OPCW's activities in 2006.

6. The EU believes that this instrument must be strictly applied. One of the most important features of the CWC is the obligation for possessors of chemical weapons to destroy their stockpiles by specified deadlines. We continue to urge the possessors to take every possible step to meet these deadlines. In supporting this aim, the EU has provided assistance to Russia.

7. The EU believes that verification and in particular the mechanism of challenge inspections, is an essential means of deterring non-compliance with the convention and increasing transparency, confidence and international security. We are therefore promoting the instrument of Challenge Inspection and, to that end, agreed an EU Plan of Action which was shared with States Parties at the end of 2004. We encourage other States Parties to participate actively in this exercise. Furthermore, in this context we believe that the Technical Secretariat must be well prepared and equipped to conduct a challenge inspection and support the efforts being made by it to maintain readiness.

8. The BTWC is now 30 years old. It remains as relevant as ever today and is the cornerstone of our efforts to prevent biological agents and toxins from being developed as weapons. Since 2002 we have been engaged in a very useful follow-up process. It has led us to address in a successful manner the issues of the adoption of necessary national measures to implement the prohibitions set forth in the Convention, including the enactment of national legislation; national mechanisms to establish and maintain the security and oversight of pathogenic microorganisms and toxins; enhancing international capabilities for responding to, investigating and mitigating the effects of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons or suspicious outbreaks of disease; strengthening and broadening national and institutional efforts and existing mechanisms for the surveillance, detection diagnosis and combating of infectious disease affecting humans, animals and plants as well as, most recently, the content, promulgation and adoption of codes of conduct for scientists. We intend to assess the efficiency of this inter-sessional process with a view to its further employment in the future after 2006. We intend to play an active role in the Review Conference scheduled for 2006. We believe that it is important that States Parties agree a substantive outcome at that Conference so as to strengthen the Convention and build a sound basis for future work. The EU reiterates its commitment to developing measures to verify compliance with the Convention.
9. To implement its Strategy against proliferation of WMD in the field of biological weapons the EU is focusing on practical measures, in particular universality and national implementation, with the aim of agreeing a Joint Action. We also believe that the annual Confidence Building Measures exchange is important and needs to be revitalised. We are working internally to improve our own record in this regard. The EU continues to support the UN Secretary-General’s mechanism to investigate the alleged use of chemical, biological and toxic weapons, endorsed at the 45th session of the UN General Assembly in 1990. EU Member States will consider and volunteer expertise to the Secretary General to help update the lists of experts and laboratories that he may call upon for an investigation. Furthermore, we believe the mechanism, which is now 15 years old, needs to be reviewed and updated so that it can take advantage of the progress of science and investigation in the intervening years and supports efforts to make progress in this regard.

10. In addressing the problem of ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, the EU supports the Hague Code of Conduct (HCOC) which, since its inception in November 2002, has become an important transparency and confidence building instrument and a practical contribution against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In particular, we are deeply convinced that the Hague Code of Conduct constitutes one of the most concrete initiatives in the fight against the proliferation of ballistic missiles. This includes the right of every State to reap the benefits of the peaceful use of space. 121 countries have now subscribed to the Code and more countries are seriously considering taking this step soon. This is an initial but essential step to effectively address the problem of missile proliferation from a multilateral global perspective without precluding other initiatives or, in the longer term, more comprehensive approaches.

*) Croatia continues to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.