

EU
2004

PERMANENT MISSION OF
THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

235 East 45th Street, 16th floor
New York, NY 10017

tel. (212) 519-9500

fax (212) 370-1954

www.pvnewyork.org

United Nations General Assembly
59th Session
First Committee

Statement by
H.E. Ambassador Chris Sanders, the Netherlands,
on behalf of
the European Union

Cluster: Nuclear Weapons

New York, 18 October 2004

Check against delivery

4. The EU considers a nuclear non-proliferation regime of universal character, supported by a strong system of international safeguards an essential prerequisite for collective security. The IAEA's safeguards constitute the NPT's operational verification instrument. Challenges to the Treaty and to the non-proliferation regime have in recent years emphasised the necessity of full compliance and the need to actively work towards universal adherence. The EU is fully committed to the NPT and the three mutually reinforcing pillars, on which it is based. The EU will continue its efforts to maintain the authority and the integrity of the Treaty.

(IAEA)

Mr Chairman,

5. The EU believes the international safeguards system of the IAEA is the fundamental pillar of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. It is a technical instrument in support of the political goal of sustaining an environment in which there can be peaceful use of nuclear energy without the diversion of nuclear material nor the concealment of nuclear material and nuclear activities directed to nuclear weapons.
6. The EU considers the universal adoption and implementation of comprehensive safeguards agreements, and additional protocols to them, a pre-requisite to an effective and credible safeguards system. Together, the IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements and the Additional Protocol constitute the verification standard. The EU strongly supports the strengthening of the IAEA's safeguards system and considers that additional protocols are an integral part of the IAEA comprehensive safeguards system. We consider adherence to them as an essential means of demonstrating fulfilment of states parties obligations under Article III of the NPT. The EU member states are working towards making the Additional Protocol a condition of supply for nuclear exports.
7. Following the entry into force of the Additional Protocol for the EU on 30 April this year, the Additional Protocol is now in the process of being implemented by all Member States of the enlarged EU. The EU urges all States that have not yet done so, to sign the Additional Protocol at the first possible opportunity. The EU urges all States that have signed but not yet brought into force their respective Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols to do so as soon as possible.

(Illicit networks)

Mr. Chairman,

8. The illicit trade related to WMD, in particular in highly sensitive nuclear equipment and technology is a matter of serious concern. The reality of this illicit trade became clear with the revelation of clandestine networks supplying elements for conversion and centrifuge programmes. We fully endorse the call of the Director General of the IAEA for full co-operation from all IAEA member States in identifying the supply routes, sources of technology and related equipment. We must be united in our common endeavour to strengthen the non-proliferation regimes by closing existing loopholes. The European Union is therefore committed within its Strategy to strong national and internationally co-ordinated export controls which we consider a necessary complement to our non-proliferation obligations under the NPT. In this context the EU strongly supports the UNSC resolution 1540 which calls inter alia upon all states, in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, to take co-operative action to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, their means of delivery and related materials.

In this context, the EU also reiterates its support for the Proliferation Security Initiative, also known as the Krakow Initiative.

(FMCT)

Mr. Chairman,

9. The EU-policy is to pursue an international agreement on the prohibition of the production of nuclear materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The EU attaches special importance to the negotiation of a non-discriminatory and universal Treaty banning the production of such fissile material, which would strengthen both nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and thus international security. The EU and its Member States have actively worked in the Conference on Disarmament in the search for a consensus to launch a negotiation on the basis of the report of the special co-ordinator and the mandate contained therein. Until a cut-off Treaty enters into force, all States are urged to declare a moratorium on the production of fissile material destined for nuclear weapons. The EU welcomes the actions of those of the five nuclear weapon States that have such a moratorium in place.

(CTBT)

Mr. Chairman,

10. The EU believes that the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty is an essential part of the disarmament and non-proliferation regime.
11. This was re-affirmed in the general Joint Ministerial Declaration on September 23d in the Ministerial Week of the UNGA. At this meeting, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, re-expressed their support for the CTBT. They affirmed that the CTBT is to make an important contribution to one of the most important challenges the world is facing today; preventing the proliferation of materials, technologies and knowledge that can be used for nuclear weapons.
12. The EU reiterates that it attaches utmost importance to the entry into force of the CTBT at the earliest possible date. This is why the EU continues to call on those states that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the CTBT, without delay and without conditions. In particular, we call for early ratification by the so-called Annex II countries, States whose ratification is necessary for the Treaty to enter into force. The EU believes that a legally binding prohibition of nuclear weapon test explosions and all other nuclear explosions as well as a credible verification regime, are vital.
13. The EU strongly supports the work of the Special Representative of the ratifying States, Mr. Jaap Ramaker. Mr. Ramaker will visit several of the Annex II countries this autumn to promote universal adherence to CTBT. Progress is being made and at this moment, eleven more ratifications are required to achieve this goal. Mr. Chairman, we hope to move closer to entry into force of the Treaty and work towards universality of the Treaty, because global adherence to the Treaty can contribute to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to the process of nuclear disarmament and therefore to the enhancement of international peace and security. Pending the entry into force of the CTBT, the EU urges all States to abide by a moratorium and to refrain from any actions, which are contrary to the obligations and provisions of the CTBT.

Mr. Chairman,

14. There are concerns about the nuclear programmes of a number of countries. These relate in particular to civilian nuclear programmes, which might be misused for military ends. In this context, the EU notes with interest the ongoing discussion on measures to strengthen control over the most sensitive parts of the fuel cycle.

(Iran)

15. The Iranian nuclear programme continues to be a matter of grave concern for the EU. The EU recalls previous resolutions on this issue and the Declaration of 19 June 2003, and fully supports Resolution GOV/2004/79 adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors and calls on Iran to immediately comply with all requirements in the resolution.

16. The EU welcomes the fact that with regard to the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, the IAEA seems to have an increasingly clear understanding of the nature and extent of Iran's nuclear programme. However, it is a matter of serious concern that a number of issues, after two years, still await clarification. The EU therefore reiterates the call on Iran as stated in the resolution adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors on September 18th, to assist the IAEA to understand the full extent and nature of its enrichment programme and to take all steps within its power to clarify the outstanding issues before the next Board meeting. It also stresses that voluntary suspension of enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, as called for by the Board, would provide the Board with additional confidence in Iran's future activities and considers it necessary, to promote confidence, that Iran immediately suspend all enrichment-related activities.

17. We welcome Iran's submission of the declarations under Articles 2 and 3 of its Additional Protocol and note the co-operation provided to the Agency following detailed discussion in July and August 2004. We urge Iran to continue to enhance this co-operation and urge Iran once again to ratify its Protocol without delay.

(DPRK)

Mr. Chairman,

18. The EU continues to deplore the announcement of the DPRK in January 2003 of its intention to withdraw from the NPT. The EU will not stop to urge the DPRK to completely, verifiably and irreversibly dismantle any clandestine nuclear weapons programme. The EU restates its firm resolve to contribute to the search for a peaceful solution, through negotiations, to the DPRK's nuclear issue and particularly welcomes the dialogue within the framework of the Six Party Talks. The EU looks forward to the fourth round of the Six Party Talks, as the Parties agreed in June 2004. We strongly urge the DPRK to come unconditionally into full compliance with all its relevant international commitments. It should comply in particular with its IAEA Safeguards Agreement under NPT, as a first step, by allowing the re-establishment of the required containment and surveillance measures at its nuclear facilities and the full implementation of all the required safeguards measures at all times, including the return of IAEA inspectors.

(Libya)

Mr. Chairman,

19. The EU has warmly welcomed Libya's decision to eliminate all material, equipment and programmes which lead to the production of Weapons of Mass Destruction. The EU has also welcomed Libya's ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and its signature and decision to implement an Additional Protocol. The EU encourages Libya to continue its good co-operation with the IAEA and the OPCW in implementing its decision. The case of Libya demonstrates that the problems of proliferation can, with good will, be tackled through discussion and engagement, that countries can abandon programmes voluntarily and peacefully and that states have nothing to fear from coming forward and admitting non-compliance.

(Nuclear Weapon Free Zones)

Mr. Chairman,

20. The EU attaches great importance to the development and strengthening wherever possible of internationally recognised Nuclear Weapons-Free Zones, based on arrangements freely arrived at among States of the region. These zones enhance global and regional peace and security, urgently needed as the present political environment indicates and are a means to promote nuclear disarmament and non proliferation, stability and confidence. We therefore welcome and support the signature and ratification by the nuclear weapon States of the relevant protocols of nuclear weapons free zones following the completion of the necessary consultations. The EU also underlines the importance of the concept of zones free of weapons of mass destruction, both nuclear and other, and their means of delivery, envisaged in UNSC Resolution 987 on the Middle East. We call upon all States in the region to establish an effectively verifiable zone free of nuclear weapons, as well as of other weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.
21. The EU believes the Protocol to the Treaty of Bangkok which establishes the South East Asia NWFZ is close to conclusion. The EU welcomes ASEAN's efforts and hopes that issues, which we understand are outstanding since late 2002, can be addressed and resolved quickly.
22. The EU appeals to the remaining States Parties to the Treaty of Pelindaba who have yet to ratify the treaty in order to bring it into force to do so without delay.
23. The EU recognises the continuing high value of the existing legally binding security assurances as provided through the protocols to the Treaties establishing the nuclear weapons free zones and unilateral declarations of nuclear weapons States, noted by UNSC Resolution 984/1995 and reaffirmed at the sixth NPT Review Conference to non-nuclear weapon state parties to the NPT on the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The EU Strategy on Weapons of Mass Destruction indicates that positive and negative security assurances can play an important role in the NPT regime. They can serve both as an incentive to forego the acquisition of WMD and as a deterrent. In our WMD Strategy we are committed to promoting further consideration of security assurances.

Thank you, Mr Chairman.