

6. Other Arrangements

6. Documents from Other Arrangements

Although the BWC lies at the heart of the international regime governing the prohibition of biological weapons, other arrangements complement and strengthen the norm against the hostile use of disease. These arrangements, which range from informal groupings to more formally-constituted groups of States, tend to entail collective agreement to take or renounce certain actions to prevent BW proliferation. These arrangements are initiated by groups of like-minded States, rather than by widespread international consensus among States, as multilateral treaties are.

Australia Group

The Australia Group, which began work in 1984/85, seeks to harmonize supply-side controls on dual-use technology, including equipment, chemical agents and biological pathogens, applicable to chemical and biological warfare, by promoting common standards for the formation and implementation of national export-control policies.

The Australia Group is one of the earliest plurilateral initiatives on non-proliferation, arising as a direct result of the discovery, confirmed by UN investigators, that the chemical weapons that Iraq used in its war with Iran were not supplied by the Soviet Union, but had been manufactured using 'dual use' commodities and know-how imported from the global marketplace. During the 1980s, a number of countries implemented national export controls on certain chemical precursors, but these suffered from a lack of uniformity. Australia therefore proposed a meeting of countries with relevant export controls and the first meeting of what became the Australia Group took place in Brussels in June 1985. All subsequent plenary meetings until 2003 took place in the Australian Embassy in Paris, but from 2004 onwards meetings have taken place in the Kleber Centre in Paris (except the 20th anniversary meeting in 2005 which took place in Sydney).

Its membership and range of activities have expanded over the years, most notably in the early 1990s, when it expanded its scope to include biological export controls. Regarding BW proliferation, the Group now maintains lists of biological agents, plant pathogens and animal pathogens, in addition to a list of dual-use biological equipment. All four lists are included in this section of the Briefing Book. The Australia Group lists form the basis of the CBW-related sections of the European Union's dual-use goods regime, and they have been adopted as the basis for national export controls by many non-participating countries. The Australia Group now has 39 participating countries, plus the European Commission. All Australia Group participants are States Parties to both the BWC and CWC.

Group of Eight Nations

The Group of Eight Nations (G8) comprises eight major industrialised nations (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the UK and the US) whose leaders meet annual to discuss issues of mutual concern. At their 2003 summit meeting in Evian, France, the G8 leaders adopted a declaration on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, in which they described the threat posed by the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery, together with the spread of international terrorism, as "the pre-eminent threat to international security." At each summit meeting since Evian, the G8 leaders have included reference to the BWC in their summit communiqué:

Summit	Year	BWC reference
Sea Island (USA)	2004	"... we seek concrete realization of our commitments at the fifth Review Conference of the BWC. The BWC is a critical foundation against biological weapons' proliferation, including to terrorists. Its prohibitions should be fully implemented, including enactment of penal legislation. We strongly urge all non-parties to join the BWC promptly."
Gleneagles (UK)	2005	"This year marks the 30th anniversary of the entry into force of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. New biological threats mean that full compliance with the Convention remains as relevant today as it was at its inception. We encourage States Party to take a full part in the ongoing programme of work which this year will discuss the content, promulgation and adoption of codes of conduct for scientists. Further, we look forward to a substantive and forward-looking Review Conference in 2006."
St Petersburg (Russia)	2006	"We look forward to a successful 6th BTWC Review Conference dedicated to the effective review of the operation of the Convention. We will facilitate adoption by the Review Conference of decisions aimed at strengthening and enhancing the implementation of the BTWC. We call upon all States Parties to take necessary measures, including as appropriate the adoption of and implementation of national legislation, including penal legislation, in the framework of the BTWC, in order to prohibit and prevent the proliferation of biological and toxin weapons and to ensure control over pathogenic micro organisms and toxins. We invite the States Parties that have not yet done so to take such measures at the earliest opportunity and stand ready to consider appropriate assistance. In this regard, we welcome initiatives such as the 2006 EU Joint Action in support of the BTWC."

Previously, at its summit meeting in Kananaskis, Canada, in 2002, the G8 launched the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. The Global Partnership served to attract and provide a framework for international financing of the destruction of chemical weapons, the dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines, the disposition of fissile materials and the employment of former weapons scientists, initially in Russia (Ukraine has now also been accepted as a recipient country).

The Global Partnership has since broadened its objectives to include the development of measures for "international non-proliferation, disarmament, counter-terrorism and nuclear safety issues", including biosecurity projects and supportive activities in states beyond Russia that have renounced WMD. At Kananaskis, the G8 leaders committed to raising US\$20 billion to support such activities over the following ten years. By the 2006 summit, held in St Petersburg, Russia, 13 non-G8 countries had joined the Global Partnership as donors (in 2003: Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden, and Switzerland; and in 2004: Australia, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Ireland, New Zealand, and South Korea).


Proliferation Security Initiative

The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) was launched by US President George Bush during a speech in Krakow, Poland in 2003. Like the Australia Group, the PSI is not a formal organization constituted by Member States. Rather, it is a coalition of states that adhere to a statement of principles and that undertake, on the basis of a web of supporting agreements, to cooperate with each other in the interdiction, by armed force if necessary, of international shipments of goods thought destined for WMD programmes considered illegal by PSI participants. According to its website: "The PSI is not a formal institution, nor is it a treaty body. It is a statement of purpose: an activity, not an organisation." The initiative originated in part following an incident in December 2002, when Spain, alerted by a US tip-off, seized a shipment of 15 Scud missiles headed from North Korea to Yemen. The US allowed the ship to continue after determining that it lacked the authority under international law to detain the vessel and after assurances had been given that the missiles would be used for defensive purposes only.

The "Statement of Interdiction Principles" that is included in this section of the Briefing Book sets out the scope and aims of the PSI. The statement was adopted by PSI participants at its third plenary meeting in Paris in September 2003. The "Statement of Interdiction Principles" commits participating states to: "Undertake effective measures, either alone or in concert with other states, for interdicting the transfer or transport of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern." It defines "States or non-state actors of proliferation concern" as "those countries or entities that the PSI participants involved establish should be subject to interdiction activities because they are engaged in proliferation through: (1) efforts to develop or acquire chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems; or (2) transfers (either selling, receiving, or facilitating) of WMD, their delivery systems, or related materials."

To date, PSI participants have convened seven plenary meetings since the first in Madrid, Spain, in June 2003. In addition, there have been over 13 operational experts' meetings in many PSI participant countries. Most significantly, PSI participants have conducted over 20 air, ground and maritime interdiction exercises. Little details have emerged of interdictions conducted under the PSI. However, in May 2005, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said: "In the last nine months alone, the United States and ten of our PSI partners have quietly cooperated on 11 successful efforts."

According to a list maintained by the US Department of State and dated 6 September 2006, 77 countries have expressed support for the PSI. The USA has signed ship-boarding agreements with six countries (Belize, Croatia, Cyprus, Liberia, Marshall Islands and Panama).



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AG Common Control Lists

- Chemical Weapons Precursors
- Dual-use chemical manufacturing facilities and equipment and related technology
- Dual-use biological equipment
- Biological agents
- Plant pathogens
- Animal pathogens

April 2005

CONTROL LIST OF DUAL-USE BIOLOGICAL EQUIPMENT AND RELATED TECHNOLOGY

I. Equipment

1. Complete containment facilities at P3 or P4 containment level

Complete containment facilities that meet the criteria for P3 or P4 (BL3, BL4, L3, L4) containment as specified in the WHO Laboratory Biosafety manual (2 nd edition, Geneva, 1993) should be subject to export control.

2. Fermenters

Fermenters capable of cultivation of pathogenic micro-organisms, viruses or for toxin production, without the propagation of aerosols, having a capacity of 20 litres or greater. Fermenters include bioreactors, chemostats and continuous-flow systems.

3. Centrifugal Separators

Centrifugal separators capable of the continuous separation of pathogenic micro-organisms, without the propagation of aerosols, and having all the following characteristics:

- one or more sealing joints within the steam containment area;
- a flow rate greater than 100 litres per hour;
- components of polished stainless steel or titanium;
- capable of in-situ steam sterilisation in a closed state.

Technical note: Centrifugal separators include decanters.

4. Cross (tangential) Flow Filtration Equipment

Cross (tangential) flow filtration equipment capable of separation of pathogenic micro-organisms, viruses, toxins or cell cultures, without the propagation of aerosols, having all the following characteristics:

- a total filtration area equal to or greater than 1 square metre;
- capable of being sterilized or disinfected in-situ.

(N.B. This control excludes reverse osmosis equipment, as specified by the manufacturer.)

Cross (tangential) flow filtration components (eg modules, elements, cassettes, cartridges, units or plates) with filtration area equal to or greater than 0.2 square metres for each component and designed for use in cross (tangential) flow filtration equipment as specified above.

Technical note: In this control, 'sterilized' denotes the elimination of all viable microbes from the equipment through the use of either physical (eg steam) or chemical agents. 'Disinfected' denotes the destruction of potential microbial infectivity in the equipment through the use of chemical agents with a germicidal effect. 'Disinfection' and 'sterilization' are distinct from 'sanitization', the latter referring to cleaning procedures designed to lower the microbial content of equipment without necessarily achieving elimination of all microbial infectivity or viability.

5. Freeze-drying Equipment

Steam sterilisable freeze-drying equipment with a condenser capacity of 10 kgs of ice or greater in 24 hours and less than 1000 kgs of ice in 24 hours.

6. Protective and containment equipment as follows:

- protective full or half suits, or hoods dependent upon a tethered external air supply and operating under positive pressure;

Technical note: This does not control suits designed to be worn with self-contained breathing apparatus.


- class III biological safety cabinets or isolators with similar performance standards (e.g. flexible isolators, dry boxes, anaerobic chambers, glove boxes, or laminar flow hoods (closed with vertical flow)).

7. Aerosol inhalation chambers

Chambers designed for aerosol challenge testing with micro-organisms, viruses or toxins and having a capacity of 1 cubic metre or greater.

8. Spraying or fogging systems and components therefore, as follows:

- Complete spraying or fogging systems, specially designed or modified for



- fitting to aircraft, lighter than air vehicles or UAVs, capable of delivering, from a liquid suspension, an initial droplet "VMD" of less than 50 microns at a flow rate of greater than two litres per minute.
- b. Spray booms or arrays of aerosol generating units, specially designed or modified for fitting to aircraft, lighter than air vehicles or UAVs, capable of delivering, from a liquid suspension, an initial droplet "VMD" of less than 50 microns at a flow rate of greater than two litres per minute.
 - c. Aerosol generating units specially designed for fitting to systems that fulfil all the criteria specified in paragraphs 8.a and 8.b.

Technical Notes

Aerosol generating units are devices specially designed or modified for fitting to aircraft such as nozzles, rotary drum atomisers and similar devices.

This entry does not control spraying or fogging systems and components as specified in paragraph 8 above that are demonstrated not to be capable of delivering biological agents in the form of infectious aerosols.

Pending definition of international standards, the following guidelines should be followed:

Droplet size for spray equipment or nozzles specially designed for use on aircraft or UAVs should be measured using either of the following methods:

- a. *Doppler laser method*
- b. *Forward laser diffraction method*

Items for inclusion in Awareness Raising Guidelines

Experts propose that the following items be included in awareness raising guidelines to industry:

1. Equipment for the micro-encapsulation of live micro-organisms and toxins in the range of 1-10 um particle size, specifically:
 - a) interfacial polycondensators;
 - b) phase separators.
2. Fermenters of less than 20 litre capacity with special emphasis on aggregate orders or designs for use in combined systems.
3. Conventional or turbulent air-flow clean-air rooms and self-contained fan-HEPA filter units that may be used for P3 or P4 (BL3, BL4, L3, L4)containment facilities.

II. Related Technology

The transfer of 'technology' for 'development' or 'production' of:

AG-controlled biological agents; or

AG-controlled dual-use biological equipment items.

Controls on 'technology' transfer do not apply to information 'in the public domain' or to 'basic scientific research' or the minimum necessary information for patent application.

The approval for export of any AG-controlled item of dual-use equipment also authorises the export to the same end-user of the minimum 'technology' required for the installation, operation, maintenance, or repair of that item.

Definition of Terms

'Basic scientific research'

Experimental or theoretical work undertaken principally to acquire new knowledge of the fundamental principles of phenomena or observable facts, not primarily directed towards a specific practical aim or objective.

'Development'

'Development' is related to all stages before production such as:

design,
 design research,
 design analysis,
 design concepts,
 assembly of prototypes,
 pilot production schemes,
 design data,
 process or transforming design data into a product,
 configuration design,

integration design, and

layouts.

'In the public domain'

'In the public domain', as it applies herein, means technology that has been made available without restrictions upon its further dissemination. (Copyright restrictions do not remove technology from being in the public domain.)

'Lighter than air vehicles'

Balloons and airships that rely on hot air or on lighter-than-air gases such as helium or hydrogen for their lift.

'Production'

Production means all production phases such as:

construction,

production engineering,

manufacture,

integration,

assembly (mounting),

inspection,

testing, and

quality assurance.

'Technical assistance'

May take forms, such as: instruction, skills, training, working knowledge, consulting services. 'Technical assistance' may involve transfer of 'technical data'.

'Technical data'

May take forms such as blueprints, plans, diagrams, models, formulae, tables, engineering designs and specifications, manuals and instructions written or recorded on other media or devices such as disk, tape, read-only memories.

'Technology'

Specific information necessary for the 'development', 'production', or 'use' of a product. The information takes the form of 'technical data' or 'technical assistance'.

'UAVs'

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles.

'Use'

Operation, installation, (including on-site installation), maintenance, (checking), repair, overhaul or refurbishing.

'VMD'

Volume Median Diameter (*note: for water-based systems, VMD equates to MMD – the Mass Median Diameter*).

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- Chemical Weapons Precursors
- Dual-use chemical manufacturing facilities and equipment and related technology
- Dual-use biological equipment
- Biological agents
- Plant pathogens
- Animal pathogens

LIST OF BIOLOGICAL AGENTS FOR EXPORT CONTROL

CORE LIST ¹

July 2006

** New additions to the list are included in italics*

Viruses

- V1. Chikungunya virus
 V2. Congo-Crimean haemorrhagic fever virus
 V3. Dengue fever virus
 V4. Eastern equine encephalitis virus
 V5. Ebola virus
 V6. Hantaan virus
 V7. Junin virus
 V8. Lassa fever virus
 V9. Lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus
 V10. Machupo virus
 V11. Marburg virus
 V12. Monkey pox virus
 V13. Rift Valley fever virus
 V14. Tick-borne encephalitis virus
 (Russian Spring-Summer encephalitis virus)
 V15. Variola virus
 V16. Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus
 V17. Western equine encephalitis virus
 V18. White pox
 V19. Yellow fever virus
 V20. Japanese encephalitis virus
 V21. Kyasanur Forest virus
 V22. Louping ill virus
 V23. Murray Valley encephalitis virus
 V24. Omsk haemorrhagic fever virus
 V25. Oropouche virus
 V26. Powassan virus
 V27. Rocio virus
 V28. St Louis encephalitis virus
 V29. Hendra virus (Equine morbillivirus)
 V30. South American haemorrhagic fever (Sabia, Flexal, Guanarito)
 V31. Pulmonary & renal syndrome-haemorrhagic fever viruses (Seoul, Dobrava, Puumala, Sin Nombre)
 V32. Nipah virus

Rickettsiae

- R1. Coxiella burnetii
 R2. Bartonella quintana (Rochalimea quintana, Rickettsia quintana)
 R3. Rickettsia prowazeki
 R4. Rickettsia rickettsii

Bacteria

- B1. Bacillus anthracis
 B2. Brucella abortus
 B3. Brucella melitensis
 B4. Brucella suis
 B5. Chlamydia psittaci
 B6. Clostridium botulinum
 B7. Francisella tularensis
 B8. Burkholderia mallei (Pseudomonas mallei)
 B9. Burkholderia pseudomallei (Pseudomonas pseudomallei)
 B10. Salmonella typhi
 B11. Shigella dysenteriae
 B12. Vibrio cholerae
 B13. Yersinia pestis
 B14. Clostridium perfringens, epsilon toxin producing types2
 B15. Enterohaemorrhagic Escherichia coli, serotype O157 and other verotoxin producing serotypes

Toxins as follow and subunits thereof:3

- T1. Botulinum toxins4
 T2. Clostridium perfringens toxins
 T3. Conotoxin
 T4. Ricin
 T5. Saxitoxin
 T6. Shiga toxin
 T7. Staphylococcus aureus toxins

T8.	Tetrodotoxin
T9.	Verotoxin and shiga-like ribosome inactivating proteins
T10.	Microcystin (Cyanginosin)
T11.	Aflatoxins
T12.	Abrin
T13.	Cholera toxin
T14.	Diacetoxyscirpenol toxin
T15.	T-2 toxin
T16.	HT-2 toxin
T17.	MODECCIN toxin
T18.	Volkensin toxin
T19.	Viscum Album Lectin 1 (Viscumin)

Fungi

F1.	<i>Coccidioides immitis</i>
F2.	<i>Coccidioides posadasii</i>

1. Biological agents are controlled when they are an isolated live culture of a pathogen agent, or a preparation of a toxin agent which has been isolated or extracted from any source, or material including living material which has been deliberately inoculated or contaminated with the agent. Isolated live cultures of a pathogen agent include live cultures in dormant form or in dried preparations, whether the agent is natural, enhanced or modified.

An agent is covered by this list except when it is in the form of a vaccine. A vaccine is a medicinal product in a pharmaceutical formulation licensed by, or having marketing or clinical trial authorisation from, the regulatory authorities of either the country of manufacture or of use, which is intended to stimulate a protective immunological response in humans or animals in order to prevent disease in those to whom or to which it is administered.

2. It is understood that limiting this control to epsilon toxin-producing strains of *Clostridium perfringens* therefore exempts from control the transfer of other *Clostridium perfringens* strains to be used as positive control cultures for food testing and quality control.

3. Excluding immunotoxins.

4. Excluding botulinum toxins and conotoxins in product form meeting all of the following criteria:

- are pharmaceutical formulations designed for testing and human administration in the treatment of medical conditions;
- are pre-packaged for distribution as clinical or medical products; and
- are authorised by a state authority to be marketed as clinical or medical products.

Genetic Elements and Genetically-modified Organisms:

G1 Genetic elements that contain nucleic acid sequences associated with the pathogenicity of any of the microorganisms in the list.

G2 Genetic elements that contain nucleic acid sequences coding for any of the toxins in the list, or for their sub-units.

G3 Genetically-modified organisms that contain nucleic acid sequences associated with the pathogenicity of any of the microorganisms in the list.

G4 Genetically-modified organisms that contain nucleic acid sequences coding for any of the toxins in the list or for their sub-units.

Technical note:

Genetic elements include inter alia chromosomes, genomes, plasmids, transposons, and vectors whether genetically modified or unmodified.

Nucleic acid sequences associated with the pathogenicity of any of the micro-organisms in the list means any sequence specific to the relevant listed micro-organism:

- that in itself or through its transcribed or translated products represents a significant hazard to human, animal or plant health; or
- that is known to enhance the ability of a listed micro-organism, or any other organism into which it may be inserted or otherwise integrated, to cause serious harm to human, animal or plant health.

These controls do not apply to nucleic acid sequences associated with the pathogenicity of enterohaemorrhagic *Escherichia coli*, serotype O157 and other verotoxin producing strains, other than those coding for the verotoxin, or for its sub-units.

WARNING LIST1**Bacteria**

WB1.	<i>Clostridium tetani</i> *
WB2.	<i>Legionella pneumophila</i>
WB3.	<i>Yersinia pseudotuberculosis</i>

* Australia Group recognises that this organism is ubiquitous, but, as it

has been acquired in the past as part of biological warfare programs, it is worthy of special caution.

1. Biological agents are controlled when they are an isolated live culture of a pathogen agent, or a preparation of a toxin agent which has been isolated or extracted from any source, or material including living material which has been deliberately inoculated or contaminated with the agent. Isolated live cultures of a pathogen agent include live cultures in dormant form or in dried preparations, whether the agent is natural, enhanced or modified.

An agent is covered by this list except when it is in the form of a vaccine. A vaccine is a medicinal product in a pharmaceutical formulation licensed by, or having marketing or clinical trial authorisation from, the regulatory authorities of either the country of manufacture or of use, which is intended to stimulate a protective immunological response in humans or animals in order to prevent disease in those to whom or to which it is administered.

Genetic Elements and Genetically-modified Organisms:

WG1 Genetic elements that contain nucleic acid sequences associated with the pathogenicity of any of the microorganisms in the list.

WG2 Genetic elements that contain nucleic acid sequences coding for any of the toxins in the list, or for their sub-units.

WG3 Genetically-modified organisms that contain nucleic acid sequences associated with the pathogenicity of any of the microorganisms in the list.

WG4 Genetically-modified organisms that contain nucleic acid sequences coding for any of the toxins in the list or for their sub-units.

Technical note:


Genetic elements include inter alia chromosomes, genomes, plasmids, transposons, and vectors whether genetically modified or unmodified.

Nucleic acid sequences associated with the pathogenicity of any of the micro-organisms in the list means any sequence specific to the relevant listed micro-organism:

- that in itself or through its transcribed or translated products represents a significant hazard to human, animal or plant health; or
- that is known to enhance the ability of a listed micro-organism, or any other organism into which it may be inserted or otherwise integrated, to cause serious harm to human, animal or plant health.

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AG Common Control Lists

List of Animal Pathogens for Export Control ¹

- Chemical Weapons Precursors
- Dual-use chemical manufacturing facilities and equipment and related technology
- Dual-use biological equipment
- Biological agents
- Plant pathogens
- Animal pathogens

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Viruses

AV1. African swine fever virus

AV2. Avian influenza virus ²

AV3. Bluetongue virus

AV4. Foot and mouth disease virus

AV5. Goat pox virus

AV6. Herpes virus (Aujeszky's disease)

AV7. Hog cholera virus (synonym: swine fever virus)

AV8. Lyssa virus

AV9. Newcastle disease virus

AV10. Peste des petits ruminants virus

AV11. Porcine enterovirus type 9 (synonym: swine vesicular disease virus)

AV12. Rinderpest virus

AV13. Sheep pox virus

AV14. Teschen disease virus

AV15. Vesicular stomatitis virus

AV16. Lumpy skin disease virus

AV17. African horse sickness virus

1. Except where the agent is in the form of a vaccine.
2. This includes only those Avian influenza viruses of high pathogenicity as defined in EC Directive 92/40/EC:
 - "Type A viruses with an IVPI (intravenous pathogenicity index) in 6 week old chickens of greater than 1.2: or
 - Type A viruses H5 or H7 subtype for which nucleotide sequencing has demonstrated multiple basic amino acids at the cleavage site of haemagglutinin"

Bacteria

AB3. Mycoplasma mycoides

Genetic Elements and Genetically-modified Organisms

AG1 Genetic elements that contain nucleic acid sequences associated with the pathogenicity of any of the microorganisms in the list.

AG2 Genetically-modified organisms that contain nucleic acid sequences associated with the pathogenicity of any of the microorganisms in the list.

Technical note : Genetic elements include inter alia chromosomes, genomes, plasmids, transposons, and vectors whether genetically modified or unmodified.

Nucleic acid sequences associated with the pathogenicity of any of the micro-organisms in the list means any sequence specific to the relevant listed micro-organism:

- that in itself or through its transcribed or translated products represents a significant hazard to human, animal or plant health; or
- that is known to enhance the ability of a listed micro-organism, or any other organism into which it may be inserted or otherwise integrated, to cause serious harm to human, animal or plant health.



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LIST OF PLANT PATHOGENS FOR EXPORT CONTROL

- Chemical Weapons Precursors
- Dual-use chemical manufacturing facilities and equipment and related technology
- Dual-use biological equipment
- Biological agents
- Plant pathogens
- Animal pathogens

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CORE LIST

Bacteria

PB1. *Xanthomonas albilineans*

PB2. *Xanthomonas campestris* pv. *citri*

PB3. *Xanthomonas oryzae* pv. *oryzae* (*Pseudomonas campestris* pv. *oryzae*)

PB4. *Clavibacter michiganensis* subsp. *sepedonicus* (*Corynebacterium michiganensis* subsp. *sepedonicum* or *Corynebacterium sepedonicum*)

PB5. *Ralstonia solanacearum* races 2 and 3 (*Pseudomonas solanacearum* races 2 and 3 or *Burkholderia solanacearum* races 2 and 3)

Fungi

PF1. *Colletotrichum coffeanum* var. *virulans* (*Colletotrichum kahawae*)

PF2. *Cochliobolus miyabeanus* (*Helminthosporium oryzae*)

PF3. *Microcyclus ulei* (syn. *Dothidella ulei*)

PF4. *Puccinia graminis* (syn. *Puccinia graminis* f. sp. *tritici*)

PF5. *Puccinia striiformis* (syn. *Puccinia glumarum*)

PF6. *Pyricularia grisea* / *Pyricularia oryzae*

Viruses

PV1. Potato Andean latent tymovirus

PV2. Potato spindle tuber viroid

Genetic Elements and Genetically-modified Organisms:

PG1 Genetic elements that contain nucleic acid sequences associated with the pathogenicity of any of the microorganisms in the Core List.

PG2 Genetically-modified organisms that contain nucleic acid sequences associated with the pathogenicity of any of the microorganisms in the Core List.

Technical note : Genetic elements include inter alia chromosomes, genomes, plasmids, transposons, and vectors whether genetically modified or unmodified.

Nucleic acid sequences associated with the pathogenicity of any of the micro-organisms in the list means any sequence specific to the relevant listed micro-organism:

- that in itself or through its transcribed or translated products represents a significant hazard to human, animal or plant health; or
- that is known to enhance the ability of a listed micro-organism, or any other organism into which it may be inserted or otherwise integrated, to cause serious harm to human, animal or plant health.

Items for Inclusion in Awareness-raising Guidelines

Bacteria

PWB1. *Xylella fastidiosa*

Fungi

PWF1. *Deuterophoma tracheiphila* (syn. *Phoma tracheiphila*)

PWF2. *Monilia rorei* (syn. *Monilliothpora rorei*)

Viruses

PWV1. Banana bunchy top virus

Genetic Elements and Genetically-modified Organisms:

PWG1 Genetic elements that contain nucleic acid sequences associated with the

pathogenicity of any of the microorganisms in the Awareness-raising Guidelines.

PWG2 Genetically-modified organisms that contain nucleic acid sequences associated with the pathogenicity of any of the microorganisms in the Awareness-raising Guidelines.

Technical note : Genetic elements include inter alia chromosomes, genomes, plasmids, transposons, and vectors whether genetically modified or unmodified.

Nucleic acid sequences associated with the pathogenicity of any of the micro-organisms in the list means any sequence specific to the relevant listed micro-organism:

- that in itself or through its transcribed or translated products represents a significant hazard to human, animal or plant health; or
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Statement by G8 Leaders

The G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction

The attacks of September 11 demonstrated that terrorists are prepared to use any means to cause terror and inflict appalling casualties on innocent people. We commit ourselves to prevent terrorists, or those that harbour them, from acquiring or developing nuclear, chemical, radiological and biological weapons; missiles; and related materials, equipment and technology. We call on all countries to join us in adopting the set of non-proliferation principles we have announced today.

In a major initiative to implement those principles, we have also decided today to launch a new G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. Under this initiative, we will support specific cooperation projects, initially in Russia, to address non-proliferation, disarmament, counter-terrorism and nuclear safety issues. Among our priority concerns are the destruction of chemical weapons, the dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines, the disposition of fissile materials and the employment of former weapons scientists. We will commit to raise up to \$20 billion to support such projects over the next ten years. A range of financing options, including the option of bilateral debt for program exchanges, will be available to countries that contribute to this Global Partnership. We have adopted a set of guidelines that will form the basis for the negotiation of specific agreements for new projects, that will apply with immediate effect, to ensure effective and efficient project development, coordination and implementation. We will review over the next year the applicability of the guidelines to existing projects.

Recognizing that this Global Partnership will enhance international security and safety, we invite other countries that are prepared to adopt its common principles and guidelines to enter into discussions with us on participating in and contributing to this initiative. We will review progress on this Global Partnership at our next Summit in 2003.

The G8 Global Partnership: Principles to prevent terrorists, or those that harbour them, from gaining access to weapons or materials of mass destruction

The G8 calls on all countries to join them in commitment to the following six principles to prevent terrorists or those that harbour them from acquiring or developing nuclear, chemical, radiological and biological weapons; missiles; and related materials, equipment and technology.

1. Promote the adoption, universalization, full implementation and, where necessary, strengthening of multilateral treaties and other international instruments whose aim is to prevent the proliferation or illicit acquisition of such items; strengthen the institutions designed to implement these instruments.
2. Develop and maintain appropriate effective measures to account for and secure such items in production, use, storage and domestic and international transport; provide assistance to states lacking sufficient resources to account for and secure these items.
3. Develop and maintain appropriate effective physical protection measures applied to facilities which house such items, including defence in depth; provide assistance to states lacking sufficient resources to protect their facilities.
4. Develop and maintain effective border controls, law enforcement efforts and international cooperation to detect, deter and interdict in cases of illicit trafficking in such items, for example through installation of detection systems, training of customs and law enforcement personnel and cooperation in tracking these items; provide assistance to states lacking sufficient expertise or resources to strengthen their capacity to detect, deter and interdict in cases of illicit trafficking in these items.
5. Develop, review and maintain effective national export and transshipment controls over items on multilateral export control lists, as well as items that are not identified on such lists but which may nevertheless contribute to the development, production or use of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and missiles, with particular consideration of end-user, catch-all and brokering aspects; provide assistance to states lacking the legal and regulatory infrastructure, implementation experience and/or resources to develop their export and transshipment control systems in this regard.
6. Adopt and strengthen efforts to manage and dispose of stocks of fissile materials designated as no longer required for defence purposes, eliminate all chemical weapons, and minimize holdings of dangerous biological pathogens and toxins, based on the recognition that the threat of terrorist acquisition is reduced as the overall quantity of such items is reduced.

The G8 Global Partnership: Guidelines for New or Expanded Cooperation Projects

The G8 will work in partnership, bilaterally and multilaterally, to develop, coordinate, implement and finance, according to their respective means, new or expanded cooperation projects to address (i) non-proliferation, (ii) disarmament, (iii) counter-terrorism and (iv) nuclear safety (including environmental) issues, with a view to enhancing strategic stability, consonant with our international security objectives and in support of the multilateral non-proliferation regimes. Each country has primary responsibility for implementing its non-proliferation, disarmament, counter-terrorism and nuclear safety obligations and requirements and commits its full cooperation within the Partnership.

Cooperation projects under this initiative will be decided and implemented, taking into account international obligations and domestic laws of participating partners, within appropriate bilateral and multilateral legal frameworks that should, as necessary, include the following elements:

- (i) Mutually agreed effective monitoring, auditing and transparency measures and procedures will be required in order to ensure that cooperative activities meet agreed objectives (including irreversibility as necessary), to confirm work performance, to account for the funds expended and to provide for adequate access for donor representatives to work sites;
- (ii) The projects will be implemented in an environmentally sound manner and will maintain the highest appropriate level of safety;
- (iii) Clearly defined milestones will be developed for each project, including the option of suspending or terminating a project if the milestones are not met;
- (iv) The material, equipment, technology, services and expertise provided will be solely for peaceful purposes and, unless otherwise agreed, will be used only for the purposes of implementing the projects and will not be transferred. Adequate measures of physical protection will also be applied to prevent theft or sabotage;
- (v) All governments will take necessary steps to ensure that the support provided will be considered free technical assistance and will be exempt from taxes, duties, levies and other charges;
- (vi) Procurement of goods and services will be conducted in accordance with open international practices to the extent possible, consistent with national security requirements;

- (vii) All governments will take necessary steps to ensure that adequate liability protections from claims related to the cooperation will be provided for donor countries and their personnel and contractors;
- (viii) Appropriate privileges and immunities will be provided for government donor representatives working on cooperation projects; and
- (ix) Measures will be put in place to ensure effective protection of sensitive information and intellectual property.

Given the breadth and scope of the activities to be undertaken, the G8 will establish an appropriate mechanism for the annual review of progress under this initiative which may include consultations regarding priorities, identification of project gaps and potential overlap, and assessment of consistency of the cooperation projects with international security obligations and objectives. Specific bilateral and multilateral project implementation will be coordinated subject to arrangements appropriate to that project, including existing mechanisms.

For the purposes of these guidelines, the phrase “new or expanded cooperation projects” is defined as cooperation projects that will be initiated or enhanced on the basis of this Global Partnership. All funds disbursed or released after its announcement would be included in the total of committed resources. A range of financing options, including the option of bilateral debt for program exchanges, will be available to countries that contribute to this Global Partnership.

The Global Partnership’s initial geographic focus will be on projects in Russia, which maintains primary responsibility for implementing its obligations and requirements within the Partnership.

In addition, the G8 would be willing to enter into negotiations with any other recipient countries, including those of the Former Soviet Union, prepared to adopt the guidelines, for inclusion in the Partnership.

Recognizing that the Global Partnership is designed to enhance international security and safety, the G8 invites others to contribute to and join in this initiative.

With respect to nuclear safety and security, the partners agreed to establish a new G8 Nuclear Safety and Security Group by the time of our next Summit.



Non Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction – A G8 Declaration

**NON PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION
A G8 DECLARATION**

1. We recognise that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery poses a growing danger to us all. Together with the spread of international terrorism, it is the pre-eminent threat to international security.
2. This global challenge requires a multifaceted solution. We need to tackle it individually and collectively – working together and with other partners, including through relevant international institutions, in particular those of the United Nations system.
3. We have a range of tools available to tackle this threat : international treaty regimes; inspection mechanisms such as those of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons; initiatives to eliminate WMD stocks such as the G8 Global Partnership ; national and internationally-co-ordinated export controls; international co-operation and diplomatic efforts; and if necessary other measures in accordance with international law.
4. While all of these instruments are necessary, none is sufficient by itself. Not all proliferation challenges require the same remedies. We need to deploy the tools which are most effective in each case. We remain committed to work with and strengthen all these instruments and, where appropriate, to pursue the universalisation of relevant treaties and instruments.
5. Last year, at Kananaskis, we endorsed a set of Principles to prevent the spread of WMD and materials of mass destruction to terrorists and those that harbour them. Since then, events in the world have underscored the relevance of those Principles and the urgency of implementing them.
6. We reaffirm our commitment to the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, and we urge all states which have not yet joined them to do so. We consider these three treaties to be essential

instruments to maintain international peace and security and cornerstones of non-proliferation and disarmament. We reaffirm our support for the IAEA, which should be granted the necessary means to implement its monitoring tasks.

7. North Korea's uranium enrichment and plutonium production programs and its failure to comply with its IAEA safeguards agreement undermine the non-proliferation regime and are a clear breach of North Korea's international obligations. We strongly urge North Korea to visibly, verifiably and irreversibly dismantle any nuclear weapons programs, a fundamental step to facilitate a comprehensive and peaceful solution.

8. We will not ignore the proliferation implications of Iran's advanced nuclear program. We stress the importance of Iran's full compliance with its obligation under the NPT. We urge Iran to sign and implement an IAEA Additional Protocol without delay or conditions. We offer our strongest support to comprehensive IAEA examination of this country's nuclear program.

9. We call on all States to establish effective procedures and machinery to control the transfer of materials, technology and expertise which may contribute to the development, production or use of WMD and their means of delivery. We likewise call on all States to establish and implement effective national standards for secure storage and handling of such materials with a view to effectively prevent proliferation and eliminate the risk that terrorists gain access to them. We agree, individually and collectively, to give support to this end where it is most needed.



**Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass
Destruction – A G8 Action Plan**

**GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP AGAINST THE SPREAD OF
WEAPONS AND
MATERIALS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
A G8 ACTION PLAN**

The Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, which we launched last year at the Kananaskis Summit, has made significant progress over the past year toward realising the objective of preventing terrorists, or those who harbour them, from acquiring or developing nuclear, chemical, radiological, and biological weapons; missiles; and related materials, equipment, and technology.

With our determined commitment, significant progress has been made

:

" Substantial sums have already been pledged by Partners towards their Kananaskis commitment to raise up to \$20 billion over ten years

;

" The Russian government has made welcomed decisions to ensure implementation of guidelines, in particular full exemption of assistance from taxation, duties and other charges. Other guidelines have also been intensively addressed ;

" The recent conclusion of the Multilateral Nuclear Environment Programme for the Russian Federation has demonstrated substantial progress in translating the Global Partnership initiative into concrete actions ;

" All Partners have actively engaged in determining co-operation projects to be undertaken, and some significant projects have already been launched or expanded, in accordance with our priorities identified in Kananaskis ;

" Outreach activities have been undertaken to invite and facilitate non-G8 countries to participate and contribute, as a result of which Finland, Norway, Poland, Sweden and Switzerland have indicated their interest in joining the Global Partnership as donors.

We commit ourselves to an active programme to continue the implementation of the initiative and to achieve substantial progress by the next Summit. Our goals are :

" To pursue the universal adoption of the non-proliferation principles

;

" To reach our Kananaskis commitment of raising up to \$20 billion

over ten years through contributions from new donors or additional pledges from Partners ;

" To significantly expand project activities, building upon preparatory work to establish implementing frameworks and to develop plans for project activities, as well as to sustain steady progress in projects already underway. We will continue to review progress in initiation and implementation of projects over the coming year, and to oversee co-ordination of projects, in order to review priorities, avoid gaps and overlaps, and assess consistency of projects with international security objectives, in accordance with our priorities ;

" To resolve all outstanding implementation challenges and to review the implementation of all guidelines in practice, keeping in mind the need for uniform treatment of Partners, reflecting our co-operative approach ;

" To expand participation in the Global Partnership to interested non-G8 donor countries that are willing to adopt the Kananaskis documents. While still focusing on projects in Russia, we mandate the Chair to enter into preliminary discussions with new or current recipient countries including those of the former Soviet Union that are prepared to adopt the Kananaskis documents, as the Ukraine has already done ;

" To inform other organisations, parliamentary representatives, and publics of the importance of the Global Partnership.



THE WHITE HOUSE
PRESIDENT
GEORGE W. BUSH



For Immediate Release
Office of the Press Secretary
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G-8 Action Plan on Nonproliferation

At Evian, we recognized the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, together with international terrorism, as the pre-eminent threat to international peace and security. This challenge requires a long-term strategy and multi-faceted approaches.

Determined to prevent, contain, and roll back proliferation, today, at Sea Island, we announce an action plan to reinforce the global nonproliferation regime. We will work together with other concerned states to realize this plan.

All states must fulfill their arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation commitments, which we reaffirm, and we strongly support universal adherence to and compliance with these commitments under the relevant multilateral treaties. We will help and encourage states in effectively implementing their obligations under the multilateral treaty regimes, in particular implementing domestically their obligations under such treaties, building law enforcement capacity, and establishing effective export controls. We call on all states that have not already done so to subscribe to the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation.

We strongly support UN Security Council Resolution 1540, calling on all states to establish effective national export controls, to adopt and enforce effective laws to criminalize proliferation, to take cooperative action to prevent non-state actors from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, and to end illicit trafficking in such weapons, their means of delivery, and related materials. We call on all states to implement this resolution promptly and fully, and we are prepared to assist them in so doing, thereby helping to fight the nexus between terrorism and proliferation, and black markets in these weapons and related materials.

1. Nuclear Nonproliferation

The trafficking and indiscriminate spread of sensitive nuclear materials, equipment, and technology that may be used for weapons purposes are a threat to us all. Some states seek uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing capabilities for weapons programs contrary to their commitments under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). We reaffirm our commitment to the NPT and to the declarations made at Kananaskis and Evian, and we will work to prevent the illicit diversion of nuclear materials and technology. We announce the following new actions to reduce the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation and the acquisition of nuclear materials and technology by terrorists, while allowing the world to enjoy safely the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology.

- To allow the world to safely enjoy the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy without adding to the danger of weapons proliferation, we have agreed to work to establish new measures so that sensitive nuclear items with proliferation potential will not be exported to states that may seek to use them for weapons purposes, or allow them to fall into terrorist hands. The export of such items should only occur pursuant to criteria consistent with global nonproliferation norms and to states rigorously committed to those norms. We shall work to amend appropriately the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines, and to gain the widest possible support for such measures in the future. We aim to have appropriate measures in place by the next G-8 Summit. In aid of this process, for the intervening year, we agree that it would be prudent not to inaugurate new initiatives involving transfer of enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technologies to additional states. We call on all states to adopt this strategy of prudence. We will also develop new measures to ensure reliable access to nuclear materials, equipment, and technology, including nuclear fuel and related services, at market conditions, for all states, consistent with maintaining nonproliferation commitments and standards.
- We seek universal adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and the Additional Protocol and urge all states to ratify and implement these agreements promptly. We are actively engaged in outreach efforts toward this goal, and ready to offer necessary support.
- The Additional Protocol must become an essential new standard in the field of nuclear supply arrangements. We will work to strengthen NSG guidelines accordingly. We aim to achieve this by the end of 2005.
- We support the suspension of nuclear fuel cycle cooperation with states that violate their nuclear

nonproliferation and safeguards obligations, recognizing that the responsibility and authority for such decisions rests with national governments or the Security Council.

- To enhance the IAEA's integrity and effectiveness, and strengthen its ability to ensure that nations comply with their NPT obligations and safeguards agreements, we will work together to establish a new Special Committee of the IAEA Board of Governors. This committee would be responsible for preparing a comprehensive plan for strengthened safeguards and verification. We believe this committee should be made up of member states in compliance with their NPT and IAEA commitments.
- Likewise, we believe that countries under investigation for non-technical violations of their nuclear nonproliferation and safeguards obligations should elect not to participate in decisions by the IAEA Board of Governors or the Special Committee regarding their own cases.

2. Proliferation Security Initiative

We reiterate our strong commitment to and support for the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the Statement of Interdiction Principles, which is a global response to a global problem. We will continue our efforts to build effective PSI partnerships to interdict trafficking in weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials. We also will prevent those that facilitate proliferation from engaging in such trafficking and work to broaden and strengthen domestic and international laws supporting PSI. We welcome the increasing level of support worldwide for PSI, which now includes all G-8 members. The Krakow meeting commemorating PSI's first anniversary, attended by 62 countries, evidences growing global support.

We will further cooperate to defeat proliferation networks and coordinate, where appropriate, enforcement efforts, including by stopping illicit financial flows and shutting down illicit plants, laboratories, and brokers, in accordance with national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law. Several of us are already developing mechanisms to deny access to our ports and airports for companies and impose visa bans on individuals involved in illicit trade.

We encourage all states to strengthen and expand national and international measures to respond to clandestine procurement activities. Directly, and through the relevant international mechanisms, we will work actively with states requiring assistance in improving their national capabilities to meet international norms.

3. The Global Partnership Against Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction

Since its launch by G-8 Leaders two years ago at Kananaskis, the Global Partnership has become a significant force worldwide to enhance international safety and security. Global Partnership member states, including the six new donors that joined at Evian, have in the past year launched new cooperative projects in Russia and accelerated progress on those already underway. While much has been accomplished, significant challenges remain. We recommit ourselves to our Kananaskis Statement, Principles, and Guidelines as the basis for Global Partnership cooperation.

- We recommit ourselves to raising up to \$20 billion for the Global Partnership through 2012.
- Expanding the Partnership to include additional donor countries is essential to raise the necessary resources and to ensure the effort is truly global. Today we welcome the decisions of Australia, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Ireland, the Republic of Korea, and New Zealand to join.
- We will continue to work with other former Soviet states to discuss their participation in the Partnership. We reaffirm that Partnership states will participate in projects according to their national interests and resources.
- We reaffirm that we will address proliferation challenges worldwide. We will, for example, pursue the retraining of Iraqi and Libyan scientists involved in past WMD programs. We also support projects to eliminate over time the use of highly-enriched uranium fuel in research reactors worldwide, secure and remove fresh and spent HEU fuel, control and secure radiation sources, strengthen export control and border security, and reinforce biosecurity. We will use the Global Partnership to coordinate our efforts in these areas.

4. Nonproliferation Challenges

- The DPRK's announced withdrawal from the NPT, which is unprecedented; its continued pursuit of nuclear weapons, including through both its plutonium reprocessing and its uranium enrichment programs, in violation of its international obligations; and its established history of missile proliferation are serious concerns to us all. We strongly support the Six-Party Process, and strongly urge the DPRK to dismantle all of its nuclear weapons-related programs in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner, a fundamental step to facilitate a comprehensive and peaceful solution.
- We remain united in our determination to see the proliferation implications of Iran's advanced nuclear

program resolved. Iran must be in full compliance with its NPT obligations and safeguards agreement. To this end, we reaffirm our support for the IAEA Board of Governors' three Iran resolutions. We note that since Evian, Iran has signed the Additional Protocol and has committed itself to cooperate with the Agency, and to suspend its enrichment and reprocessing related activities. While we acknowledge the areas of progress reported by the Director General, we are, however, deeply concerned that Iran's suspension of enrichment-related activity is not yet comprehensive. We deplore Iran's delays, deficiencies in cooperation, and inadequate disclosures, as detailed in IAEA Director General reports. We therefore urge Iran promptly and fully to comply with its commitments and all IAEA Board requirements, including ratification and full implementation of the Additional Protocol, leading to resolution of all outstanding issues related to its nuclear program.

- We welcome Libya's strategic decision to rid itself of its weapons of mass destruction and longer-range missiles, to fully comply with the NPT, the Additional Protocol, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and to commit not to possess missiles subject to the Missile Technology Control Regime. We note Libya has cooperated in the removal of nuclear equipment and materials and taken steps to eliminate chemical weapons. We call on Libya to continue to cooperate fully with the IAEA and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

5. Defending Against Bioterrorism

Bioterrorism poses unique, grave threats to the security of all nations, and could endanger public health and disrupt economies. We commit to concrete national and international steps to: expand or, where necessary, initiate new biosurveillance capabilities to detect bioterror attacks against humans, animals, and crops; improve our prevention and response capabilities; increase protection of the global food supply; and respond to, investigate, and mitigate the effects of alleged uses of biological weapons or suspicious outbreaks of disease. In this context, we seek concrete realization of our commitments at the fifth Review Conference of the BWC. The BWC is a critical foundation against biological weapons' proliferation, including to terrorists. Its prohibitions should be fully implemented, including enactment of penal legislation. We strongly urge all non-parties to join the BWC promptly.

6. Chemical Weapons Proliferation

We support full implementation of the CWC, including its nonproliferation aspects. We strongly urge all non-parties to join the CWC promptly, and will work with them to this end. We also urge CWC States Parties to undertake national legislative and administrative measures for its full implementation. We support the use of all fact-finding, verification, and compliance measures, including, if necessary, challenge inspections, as provided in the CWC.

7. Implementation of the Evian Initiative on Radioactive Source Security

At Evian we agreed to improve controls on radioactive sources to prevent their use by terrorists, and we have made substantial progress toward that goal. We are pleased that the IAEA approved a revised Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources in September 2003. We urge all states to implement the Code and recognize it as a global standard.

We have agreed to export and import control guidance for high-risk radioactive sources, which should only be supplied to authorized end-users in states that can control them. States should ensure that no sources are diverted for illicit use. We seek prompt IAEA approval of this guidance to ensure that effective controls are operational by the end of 2005 and applied in a harmonized and consistent manner. We support the IAEA's program for assistance to ensure that all countries can meet the new standards.

8. Nuclear Safety and Security

Since the horrific 1986 accident at Chernobyl, we have worked with Ukraine to improve the safety and security of the site. We have already made a large financial contribution to build a safe confinement over the remnants of the Chernobyl reactor. We are grateful for the participation and contributions made by 21 other states in this effort. Today, we endorse international efforts to raise the remaining funds necessary to complete the project. We urge Ukraine to support and work closely with us to complete the confinement's construction by 2008 in a way that contributes to radiological safety, in particular in Ukraine and neighboring regions.

An effective, efficient nuclear regulatory system is essential for our safety and security. We affirm the importance for national regulators to have sufficient authority, independence, and competence.

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GLENEAGLES STATEMENT ON NON-PROLIFERATION

1. We acknowledge, as we did at Evian and Sea Island, that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery means, together with international terrorism, remain the pre-eminent threats to international peace and security. The threat of the use of WMD by terrorists calls for redoubled efforts.
2. All States have a role to play in meeting the challenge of WMD proliferation by upholding international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation norms. All must meet their obligations in full, and ensure effective implementation. We reaffirm our commitments in this regard. And we emphasise our determination to meet proliferation challenges decisively, through both national efforts and effective multilateralism.
3. At Sea Island, we agreed an Action Plan on Non-Proliferation. During the past year, we have worked intensively with our international partners on all its aspects.

Universalising and reinforcing the non-proliferation regime

4. Multilaterally agreed norms provide an essential basis for our non-proliferation efforts. We strongly support universal adherence to and compliance with these norms. We will work to strengthen them, including through improved verification and enforcement. We call on all States not party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, an IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the Hague Code of Conduct Against the Proliferation of Ballistic Missiles, to accede without delay. We remain ready to assist States to this end.
5. We welcome the agreement by the international community of the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, initiated by the Russian Federation. We look forward to its early entry into force.

United Nations

6. We acknowledge the role of the UN Security Council in addressing the challenges of proliferation. We welcome the fact that the majority of UN members have responded to UNSCR 1540 by submitting reports on their domestic non-proliferation provisions including export controls, and their contribution to international co-operation. We urge those who have not yet done so to submit reports without delay. It is essential that all states meet their obligations in full, by enacting and enforcing national legal and regulatory measures including appropriate criminal and civil penalties for violations, and by committing to international co-

operation on non-proliferation. We stand ready to consider all requests from states seeking to develop their national procedures. We urge the 1540 Committee to work quickly and effectively, drawing on the support of relevant international organisations. We also urge the Security Council to consider how best to ensure that the work of the committee makes an enduring contribution to non-proliferation.

7. We welcome the attention given to non-proliferation by the UN Secretary General in his report "In Larger Freedom". We stand ready to engage actively at the meeting of Heads of State and Government for the High Level Plenary Event of the General Assembly in September. We acknowledge the role of the Conference on Disarmament in advancing our non-proliferation and disarmament objectives and call on it to resume substantive work.
8. We look forward to strengthening the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA) by State Parties at the Diplomatic Conference in October.

Proliferation Security Initiative

9. We reaffirm our commitment to the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and its Statement of Interdiction Principles, which is a global response to a global problem. We welcome the increasing international endorsement for the Initiative. We call on all States to commit themselves to deepen co-operation in order to counter trafficking in WMD, delivery means and related materials.
10. We also call for enhanced efforts to combat proliferation networks and illicit financial flows by developing, on an appropriate legal basis, co-operative procedures to identify, track and freeze relevant financial transactions and assets.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

11. We emphasise that the NPT remains the cornerstone of nuclear non-proliferation. We reaffirm our full commitment to all three pillars of the Treaty. While we note with regret that it was not possible to achieve consensus at the 2005 Review Conference, we welcome the fact that all States Parties reaffirmed the validity of the Treaty. We remain determined that threats and challenges to the nuclear non-proliferation regime be addressed on the basis of the NPT. For our part, we pledge ourselves to redouble our efforts to uphold and strengthen the Treaty.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

12. Safeguards are an essential tool for the effective implementation of the NPT. We reaffirm our full support for the IAEA. We are working for the implementation of a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol to become the

universally accepted norm for verifying compliance with NPT safeguards obligations. The Additional Protocol must become an essential new standard in the field of nuclear supply arrangements. We will continue to work together to strengthen NSG guidelines accordingly. We welcome the establishment of the Committee on Safeguards and Verification, which will review the IAEA's ability to ensure compliance with NPT obligations and safeguards Agreements in the light of recent non-proliferation challenges.

Enrichment and Reprocessing Technology

13. Since Sea Island, we have worked to develop further measures to prevent the export of sensitive nuclear items with proliferation potential to states that may seek to use them for weapons purposes or allow them to fall into terrorist hands, while allowing the world to enjoy safely the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology. We agreed at Sea Island that the export of such items should occur only pursuant to criteria consistent with global non-proliferation norms and to states rigorously committed to these norms. Over the past year, we have made progress in the development of such criteria. We welcome the decision at the recent Plenary Session of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to work actively with a view to reaching consensus on this issue. In aid of this process, we continue to agree, as we did at Sea Island, that it would be prudent in the next year not to inaugurate new initiatives involving transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to additional states. We continue to call on all states to adopt this strategy of prudence. We also welcome the adoption by the NSG of important measures which restrict nuclear transfers to States which have violated their non-proliferation and safeguards obligations.
14. We believe that strengthened conditions on the supply of sensitive technology should be accompanied by new measures to ensure that those states which forgo the nuclear fuel cycle and meet all nuclear non-proliferation obligations enjoy assured access to the market for nuclear fuel and related services. We welcome the efforts of the Expert Group, established by the Director-General of the IAEA, which has recently reported on possible Multinational Approaches to the Fuel Cycle. We will work together with all interested partners for a way forward which provides genuine access while minimising the risks of proliferation.

Proliferation Challenges

15. The example of Libya's important renunciation of weapons of mass destruction demonstrates that the international community responds positively to States which desire to be a part of the global non-proliferation mainstream. In this spirit, we are working with determination to address current proliferation challenges.
16. We express profound concern over the threat posed by DPRK's nuclear weapons programme, particularly following its recent statements that it has manufactured nuclear weapons and in the light of its missile programmes and history of missile proliferation. The DPRK has violated its commitments under the NPT and its

IAEA safeguards agreement. We reiterate the necessity for the DPRK promptly to return to full compliance with the NPT, and dismantle all its nuclear weapons-related programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner. It is also essential that the DPRK not contribute to missile proliferation elsewhere, and maintain indefinitely its moratorium on the launching of missiles. We reaffirm our full support for the Six-Party talks, which represent an important opportunity to achieve a comprehensive solution. It is essential that the DPRK return to the Six Party Talks immediately without preconditions, and participate constructively to this end.

17. We remain united in our determination to see the proliferation implications of Iran's advanced nuclear programme resolved. It is essential that Iran provide the international community with objective guarantees that its nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes in order to build international confidence. We welcome the initiative of France, Germany and the United Kingdom, and the High Representative of the European Union to reach agreement with Iran on long-term arrangements which would provide such objective guarantees as well as political and economic co-operation. We call upon Iran to maintain the suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities while negotiations on the long term arrangements proceed. We reiterate the need for Iran to co-operate fully with IAEA requests for information and access, to comply fully with all IAEA Board requirements, and to resolve all outstanding issues related to its nuclear programme. We also urge Iran to ratify the Additional Protocol without delay and, pending its ratification, to act fully in accordance with its provisions.

Defending against biological threats

18. We reaffirm our strong commitment to strengthening our defences against biological threats. Over the last year, our efforts have focussed on enhancing protection of the food supply. We will continue efforts to address biological threats and support work in other relevant international groups.
19. This year marks the 30th anniversary of the entry into force of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. New biological threats mean that full compliance with the Convention remains as relevant today as it was at its inception. We encourage States Party to take a full part in the ongoing programme of work which this year will discuss the content, promulgation and adoption of codes of conduct for scientists. Further, we look forward to a substantive and forward-looking Review Conference in 2006.
20. 2005 also marks the 80th anniversary of the opening for signature of the 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibiting the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and bacteriological methods of warfare. We emphasise the continuing vital relevance of this multilateral rejection of the use in war of chemical and biological weapons.

Chemical Weapons Convention

21. We continue to support full implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, including its non-proliferation aspects. While acknowledging the obligation to destroy chemical weapons within the time limits provided for by the chemical weapons convention and to destroy or convert chemical weapons production facilities, we recall that States Party agreed in 2003 to an Action Plan which requires all to have national implementing measures in place by the time of the Conference of States Party scheduled for this November. We urge those States Party who have not yet done so to take all necessary steps to ensure the deadline is met. We stand ready to provide appropriate assistance. We support the use of consultations and co-operation, as well as fact-finding, verification, and compliance measures, including, if necessary, challenge inspections, as provided in the CWC.

Global Partnership against Proliferation of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction

22. We reaffirm our commitment to the Global Partnership against the Proliferation of Weapons and materials of Mass Destruction, and to the Kananaskis Statement, Principles, and Guidelines. We will work to build on the considerable progress we have made to implement co-operative projects to which the G8 and thirteen other countries now contribute. We renew our pledge to raise up to \$20 billion over ten years to 2012 for Global Partnership priorities, initially in Russia. In this context, we will embark on new projects according to these priorities. We welcome Ukraine's participation, and continue to discuss with a number of countries of the Former Soviet Union their interest in joining the Partnership. We reaffirm our openness in principle to a further expansion of the Partnership to donor and recipient partners which support the Kananaskis documents.

Nuclear Safety and Security

23. We welcome continued co-operation with the IAEA in the area of nuclear and radiological safety and security, including on strengthening regulatory infrastructures and the interface between safety and security. We support the establishment of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative and welcome the progress which has been made so far. We welcome the results of the IAEA's International Conference on Nuclear Security which was held in London in March. We have all signed the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management and urge others to join us.
24. Since the horrific accident in 1986, we have worked with Ukraine to improve the safety and security of the Chernobyl site. This year, together with the EU and 16 other countries, we have increased pledged funding for the construction of a new safe confinement over the remnants of the reactor to approximately \$1 billion. We welcome Ukraine's political and financial commitment to this project, and urge Ukraine to ensure that the project can be completed safely by 2009.

Radioactive Source Safety and Security

25. At Evian we resolved to improve controls on radioactive sources to prevent their use by terrorists. We welcome the fact that more than 70 countries have committed to implement the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and urge all other states to adopt the Code. We welcome the IAEA endorsement of the international import and export framework for the control of radioactive sources. We will work towards having effective controls applied by the end of 2005, in a harmonised and consistent manner. We commend the results of the IAEA's International Conference on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources which was held in Bordeaux, France in June. We will strengthen our co-operation to improve the security of radioactive sources world wide.



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G8/2006 RUSSIA

Statement on Non-Proliferation

St.Petersburg, July 16, 2006

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery, together with international terrorism remain the pre-eminent threat to international peace and security. The international community must therefore boldly confront this challenge, and act decisively to tackle this threat. We reaffirm our determination and commitment to work together and with other states and institutions in the fight against the proliferation of WMD, including by preventing them from falling into hands of terrorists.

As an essential element of our efforts to confront proliferation, we are determined to fulfil arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation obligations and commitments under relevant international treaties, conventions and multilaterally agreed arrangements to which we are parties or in which we participate. We call on all other states to meet their obligations and commitments in full in this regard. We rededicate ourselves to the re-invigoration of relevant multilateral fora, beginning with the Conference on Disarmament. These efforts will contribute to the further reinforcement of the global non-proliferation regime.

We call on all states not Party to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and the 1925 Geneva Protocol to accede to them without delay and those states that have not yet done so to subscribe to the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation. We urge all states concerned to strictly observe a moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation

NPT

We reaffirm our full commitment to all three pillars of the NPT. We call on all states to comply with their NPT obligations, including IAEA safeguards as well as developing effective measures aimed at preventing trafficking in nuclear equipment, technology and materials.

IAEA Safeguards

We stress the importance of the IAEA safeguards system. We are seeking universal adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements for the effective implementation of Article III of the NPT and to the Additional Protocol. In this context we urge all states that have not yet done so, to sign, ratify and implement these instruments promptly. We are actively engaged in efforts toward this goal, with a view to make comprehensive safeguards agreements together with an Additional Protocol the universally accepted verification standard. We will also work together vigorously to establish the Additional Protocol as an essential new standard in the field of nuclear supply arrangements.

Peaceful use of nuclear energy

We recall that Article IV of the NPT stipulates that nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of the Treaty. We are committed to facilitate the exchange of equipment, materials and information for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Full compliance with NPT non-proliferation obligations, including safeguards agreements, is an essential condition for such exchange.

An expansion of the peaceful use of nuclear energy must be carried forward in a manner consistent with nuclear non-proliferation commitments and standards. In this regard, it is important to develop and implement mechanisms assuring access to nuclear fuel related services to states as an alternative to pursuing enrichment and reprocessing activities. In this respect we appreciate the recent potentially complementary Initiative of the President of the Russian Federation on multinational centres to provide nuclear fuel cycle services and the Initiative of the President of the United States on the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership as well as the recent initiative tabled at the IAEA by France, Germany, the Netherlands, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States regarding a concept for a multilateral mechanism for reliable access to enrichment services for nuclear fuel. We will work to elaborate further these initiatives. To further strengthen this common approach we will:

- continue reviewing multinational approaches to the fuel cycle, including international centres to provide nuclear fuel cycle services, with the IAEA, as well as relevant practical, legal and organizational solutions;
- facilitate developing credible international assurances of access to nuclear fuel related services; while
- those of us who have or are considering plans relating to use and/or development of safe and secure nuclear energy will promote research and development for safer, more efficient, more environmentally friendly and more proliferation resistant nuclear energy systems, including relevant technologies of the nuclear fuel cycle. Until advanced systems are in place, appropriate interim solutions could be pursued to address back-end fuel cycle issues in accordance with national choices and non-proliferation objectives.

FMCT

We support the early commencement of negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty in the Conference on Disarmament.

Enrichment and Reprocessing

In accordance with approaches agreed upon at the G8 summits at Sea Island and in Gleneagles, we support the development of measures to prevent transfers of sensitive nuclear equipment, materials and technologies to states that may seek to use them for weapons purposes, or allow them to fall into terrorists' hands.

We will exercise enhanced vigilance with respect to the transfers of nuclear technology, equipment and material, whether in the trigger list, in the dual-use list, or unlisted, which could contribute to enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, and will be particularly vigilant with respect to attempts to acquire such technology, equipment and material by covert and illicit means.

We agreed at Sea Island that the export of such items should occur only pursuant to criteria consistent with global non-proliferation norms and to those states rigorously committed to these norms. Over the last two years we have made significant progress in the development of such criteria. We welcome the progress noted by the Nuclear Suppliers Group and its commitment to work actively with a view to reaching consensus on this issue by 2007.

In aid of this process we continue to agree, as we did at Sea Island and Gleneagles, that it would be prudent in the next year not to inaugurate new initiatives involving transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to additional states. We call upon all other states to adopt this strategy of prudence.

India

We look forward to reinforcing our partnership with India. We note the commitments India has made, and encourage India to take further steps towards integration into the mainstream of strengthening the non-proliferation regime, so as to facilitate a more forthcoming approach towards nuclear cooperation to address its energy requirements, in a manner that enhances and reinforces the global non-proliferation regime.

BTWC

We look forward to a successful 6th BTWC Review Conference dedicated to the effective review of the operation of the Convention. We will facilitate adoption by the Review Conference of decisions aimed at strengthening and enhancing the implementation of the BTWC.

We call upon all States Parties to take necessary measures, including as appropriate the adoption of and implementation of national legislation, including penal legislation, in the framework of the BTWC, in order to prohibit and prevent the proliferation of biological and toxin weapons and to ensure control over pathogenic micro organisms and toxins. We invite the States Parties that have not yet done so to take such measures at the earliest opportunity and stand ready to consider appropriate assistance. In this regard, we welcome initiatives such as the 2006 EU Joint Action in support of the BTWC.

CWC

We continue to support full implementation of the CWC. We note the ongoing destruction of chemical weapons by the possessor states and are encouraged by the fact that the stockpiles of these deadly weapons are gradually decreasing. We acknowledge their obligations to destroy chemical weapons and to destroy or convert chemical weapons production facilities within the time limits provided for by the Chemical Weapons Convention.

We welcome the increasing number of States Parties to the Convention. We acknowledge the value of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons' Action Plan on national implementation measures and improvement of the situation with adoption of such measures. We urge States Parties to continue and intensify efforts in this direction. We stand ready to provide appropriate assistance.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540

We reaffirm the key role of the UN Security Council in addressing the challenges of proliferation. We urge all states to implement fully UNSC Resolution 1540, including reporting on their implementation of the Resolution.

We welcome the decision of UN Security Council Resolution 1673 to extend the mandate of the 1540 Committee in promoting the full implementation of the resolution. We intend to continue working actively at national and international levels to achieve this important aim, and stand ready to consider all requests for assistance in this regard.

HCOC

We reaffirm our commitment to work toward the, universalisation of the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, and the full implementation of its confidence-building measures.

PSI

We reaffirm our commitment to the Proliferation Security Initiative, which constitutes an important means to counter trafficking in WMD, their delivery means and related materials. We welcome the increasing international endorsement for the Initiative as it was demonstrated at the High Level Political Meeting in Warsaw. We take note of the discussion at that meeting on how PSI states can work cooperatively to prevent and disrupt proliferation finance, in furtherance of the objectives of UNSCR 1540.

Libya

The international community's positive response to Libya's renunciation of weapons of mass destruction demonstrates the benefits that follow a strategic decision to cooperate with the international community and be a part of the global nonproliferation mainstream.

Iran

We remain seriously concerned over the proliferation implications of Iran's advanced nuclear programme and we remain united in our commitment to see those implications resolved.

We stand fully behind the far reaching proposals presented to Iran on June 6, 2006 on behalf of China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States of America with the support of the High Representative of the European Union for a long-term comprehensive agreement with Iran based on cooperation and mutual respect.

We fully support the Statement of the Foreign Ministers of China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States of America issued on July 12, Paris, in which the Ministers and the High Representative of the European Union expressed their profound disappointment over the absence of any indication at all from the Iranians that Iran is ready to engage seriously on the substance of the above-mentioned proposals. Iran has failed to take the steps needed to allow negotiations to begin, specifically the suspension of all enrichment related and reprocessing activities, as required by the IAEA and supported in the United Nations Security Council Presidential Statement. The Ministers therefore decided to return the issue to the United Nations Security Council. We, the Leaders of the G-8, fully support this decision and the clear messages it sends to Iran about the choice it must make. We support the Paris appeal to Iran to respond positively to the substantive proposals made on June 6, 2006.

DPRK

We welcome the unanimously adopted UN Security Council Resolution 1695 which represents the clear and strong will of the international community.

We condemn the launching by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) of multiple ballistic missiles on July 5 local time and express serious concerns as this jeopardizes peace, stability and security in the region and beyond. This action violated the DPRK's pledge to maintain a moratorium on missile launches and is inconsistent with the purposes of the Six-Party Talks Joint Statement of September 19, 2005, in which all parties - including the DPRK - committed to joint efforts to lasting peace and stability in Northeast Asia. We also express our grave concern about the DPRK's indication of possible additional launches. We call on the DPRK to reestablish its preexisting commitments to a moratorium on missile launches and to refrain from contributing to missile proliferation. In accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution 1695 we will exercise vigilance in preventing any external cooperation with the DPRK's missile and WMD programmes.

These missile launches intensify our deep concern over the DPRK's nuclear weapons programmes. We reiterate the necessity for the DPRK promptly to return to full compliance with the NPT. We strongly urge the DPRK to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes. We reaffirm our full support for the September 19, 2005 Joint Statement and the Six-Party talks. We urge the DPRK to expeditiously return to these talks without precondition and to cooperate to settle the outstanding issues of concern on the basis of this Statement, which reaffirms the common objective of Six Parties; all participants should intensify their efforts to achieve the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner and to maintain peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia.

Global Partnership

The Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction has continued its progress in the past year towards achieving the goals set out at Kananaskis. It has become a significant force to enhance international security and safety. Much has been accomplished in all areas but more has to be done to increase the efficiency of our cooperation.

We reaffirm our commitment to the full implementation of all G8 Global Partnership objectives. We also reaffirm our openness to examine the expansion of the Partnership to other recipient countries and donor states which support the Kananaskis documents and to embrace the goals and priorities of all Partnership members. We welcome the progress GP members have made working with Ukraine.

We appreciate the contribution of 13 non-G8 states who joined the Global Partnership.

We remain committed to our pledges in Kananaskis to raise up to \$20 billion through 2012 for the Global Partnership, initially in Russia, to support projects to address priority areas identified in Kananaskis and to continue to turn these pledges into concrete actions.



Fact Sheet

The White House, Office of the Press Secretary
Washington, DC
September 4, 2003

Proliferation Security Initiative: Statement of Interdiction Principles

The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is a response to the growing challenge posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery systems, and related materials worldwide. The PSI builds on efforts by the international community to prevent proliferation of such items, including existing treaties and regimes. It is consistent with and a step in the implementation of the UN Security Council Presidential Statement of January 1992, which states that the proliferation of all WMD constitutes a threat to international peace and security, and underlines the need for member states of the UN to prevent proliferation. The PSI is also consistent with recent statements of the G8 and the European Union, establishing that more coherent and concerted efforts are needed to prevent the proliferation of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials. PSI participants are deeply concerned about this threat and of the danger that these items could fall into the hands of terrorists, and are committed to working together to stop the flow of these items to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern.

The PSI seeks to involve in some capacity all states that have a stake in nonproliferation and the ability and willingness to take steps to stop the flow of such items at sea, in the air, or on land. The PSI also seeks cooperation from any state whose vessels, flags, ports, territorial waters, airspace, or land might be used for proliferation purposes by states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. The increasingly aggressive efforts by proliferators to stand outside or to circumvent existing nonproliferation norms, and to profit from such trade, requires new and stronger actions by the international community. We look forward to working with all concerned states on measures they are able and willing to take in support of the PSI, as outlined in the following set of "Interdiction Principles."

Interdiction Principles for the Proliferation Security Initiative

PSI participants are committed to the following interdiction principles to establish a more coordinated and effective basis through which to impede and stop shipments of WMD, delivery systems, and related materials flowing to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern, consistent with national legal authorities and relevant international law and frameworks, including the UN Security Council. They call on all states concerned with this threat to international peace and security to join in similarly committing to:

1. Undertake effective measures, either alone or in concert with other states, for interdicting the transfer or transport of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. "States or non-state actors of proliferation concern" generally refers to those countries or entities that the PSI participants involved establish should be subject to interdiction activities because they are engaged in proliferation through: (1) efforts to develop or acquire chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems; or (2) transfers (either selling, receiving, or facilitating) of WMD, their delivery systems, or related materials.
2. Adopt streamlined procedures for rapid exchange of relevant information concerning suspected proliferation activity, protecting the confidential character of classified information provided by other states as part of this initiative, dedicate appropriate resources and efforts to interdiction operations and capabilities, and maximize coordination among participants in interdiction efforts.

3. Review and work to strengthen their relevant national legal authorities where necessary to accomplish these objectives, and work to strengthen when necessary relevant international law and frameworks in appropriate ways to support these commitments.
4. Take specific actions in support of interdiction efforts regarding cargoes of WMD, their delivery systems, or related materials, to the extent their national legal authorities permit and consistent with their obligations under international law and frameworks, to include:
 - a. Not to transport or assist in the transport of any such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern, and not to allow any persons subject to their jurisdiction to do so.
 - b. At their own initiative, or at the request and good cause shown by another state, to take action to board and search any vessel flying their flag in their internal waters or territorial seas, or areas beyond the territorial seas of any other state, that is reasonably suspected of transporting such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern, and to seize such cargoes that are identified.
 - c. To seriously consider providing consent under the appropriate circumstances to the boarding and searching of its own flag vessels by other states, and to the seizure of such WMD-related cargoes in such vessels that may be identified by such states.
 - d. To take appropriate actions to (1) stop and/or search in their internal waters, territorial seas, or contiguous zones (when declared) vessels that are reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern and to seize such cargoes that are identified; and (2) to enforce conditions on vessels entering or leaving their ports, internal waters or territorial seas that are reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes, such as requiring that such vessels be subject to boarding, search, and seizure of such cargoes prior to entry.
 - e. At their own initiative or upon the request and good cause shown by another state, to (a) require aircraft that are reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern and that are transiting their airspace to land for inspection and seize any such cargoes that are identified; and/or (b) deny aircraft reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes transit rights through their airspace in advance of such flights.
 - f. If their ports, airfields, or other facilities are used as transshipment points for shipment of such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern, to inspect vessels, aircraft, or other modes of transport reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes, and to seize such cargoes that are identified.

[Also: [Principles for the Proliferation Security Initiative](#) and [Proliferation Security Initiative – Paris Meeting of Core Participants, September 3-4, 2003](#)]

[End]